The Battle of Al-Khafji
Total Page：16
File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection 2002-06 The battle of al-Khafji Williams, Scott. Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5686 NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL Monterey, California THESIS THE BATTLE OF AL-KHAFJI by Scott Williams June 2002 Thesis Advisor: Glenn E. Robinson Second Reader: Harold D. Blanton Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED June 2002 Master’s Thesis 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: The Battle of Al-Khafji 5. FUNDING NUMBERS 6. AUTHOR(S) Scott Williams 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING Naval Postgraduate School ORGANIZATION REPORT Monterey, CA 93943-5000 NUMBER 9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING N/A AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) The battle for the Saudi coastal town of al-Khafji, was the first major ground battle of Desert Storm. Despite the fact that Iraqi forces were being systematically destroyed by the allied air campaign, the Iraqis were nonetheless able to mount a rather sophisticated ground attack and seize the Saudi town with relative ease. The Iraqi attack came as an absolute surprise despite the coalition’s technological advantages in reconnaissance equipment and the impressive array of coalition forces defending the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Saddam Hussein attempted to use the surprise attack into Saudi Arabia as a method to advance several strategic-level political and military objectives. First, he was able to use the attack as a propaganda mechanism to rally domestic and Arab nationalistic support. Next, he endeavored to destabilize or destroy the coalition arrayed against him. Lastly, he sought to dampen American enthusiasm for the war by generating American casualties, thus demonstrating to the American public the unappealing potential for, and disastrous results of a protracted ground conflict. Ultimately, the Iraqi incursion was a failure in that it neglected to achieve Saddam’s strategic objectives of disrupting the coalition forces arrayed against him. 14. SUBJECT TERMS al-Khafji, Khafji, Saddam Hussein, Desert Storm 15. NUMBER OF PAGES 79 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF OF ABSTRACT REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UL NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89) Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239-18 i THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK ii Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited THE BATTLE OF AL-KHAFJI Scott Williams Major, United States Marine Corps B.S., Michigan State University, 1986 Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS from the NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL June 2002 Author: Scott Williams Approved by: Glenn E. Robinson Thesis Advisor Harold D. Blanton Second Reader James Wirtz Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs iii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK iv ABSTRACT The battle for the Saudi coastal town of al-Khafji, was the first major ground battle of Desert Storm. Despite the fact that Iraqi forces were being systematically destroyed by the allied air campaign, the Iraqis were nonetheless able to mount a rather sophisticated ground attack and seize the Saudi town with relative ease. The Iraqi attack came as an absolute surprise despite the coalition’s technological advantages in reconnaissance equipment and the impressive array of coalition forces defending the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Saddam Hussein attempted to use the surprise attack into Saudi Arabia as a method to advance several strategic-level political and military objectives. First, he was able to use the attack as a propaganda mechanism to rally domestic and Arab nationalistic support. Next, he endeavored to destabilize or destroy the coalition arrayed against him. Lastly, he sought to dampen American enthusiasm for the war by generating American casualties, thus demonstrating to the American public the unappealing potential for, and disastrous results of a protracted ground conflict. Ultimately, the Iraqi incursion was a failure in that it neglected to achieve Saddam’s strategic objectives of disrupting the coalition forces arrayed against him. v THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK vi TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................1 A. OVERVIEW.....................................................................................................2 B. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................3 II. MOTIVATIONS FOR THE IRAQI ATTACK ........................................................5 A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................5 B. THE IRAQI POLITICAL/MILITARY MOTIVATIONS ..........................7 C. A GRAND INVASION SCHEME................................................................12 D. THE IRAQI PROPAGANDA INITIATIVE...............................................17 II. A CHRONOLOGICAL ACCOUNT OF THE BATTLE ......................................23 A. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................23 B. THE SKIRMISH AT UMM HUJUL ...........................................................24 1. Delta Company, 3rd Light Armored Infantry Battalion.................27 2. The Battle at Umm Hujul..................................................................29 C. THE SKIRMISH AT OP-1 AND OP-2........................................................38 D. ARAB ACTIONS TO RETAKE THE CITY..............................................39 1. U.S. Reconnaissance Marines are Stranded....................................41 2. Planning the Attack ...........................................................................43 3. The Action to Retake al-Khafji.........................................................45 IV. CONCLUSION: OVERVIEW AND IMPLICATIONS.........................................51 A. CONCLUSION ..............................................................................................51 B. THE AFTERMATH ......................................................................................51 C. ALLIED FAILURES.....................................................................................53 1. Did Saddam Achieve his Goals?.......................................................56 2. Lessons Learned.................................................................................57 BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................63 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST .........................................................................................67 vii THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I would like to extend my sincerest appreciation to all of those people who helped bring this project to a successful conclusion. Special thanks are extended to Professor Glenn Robinson for his expertise and for his persistence with this work. His efforts in imparting his comprehensive knowledge of the Middle East to his military student officers has undoubtedly made an impact within the entire Department of Defense. Professor Harold Blanton deserves special thanks for his significant intellectual contributions and his service above and beyond the call of duty. My greatest thanks goes to my family for their love, understanding and perseverance, particularly to my daughter, Alexandra, and my son, MacLaren. Without them I will have been nothing. ix THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK x I. INTRODUCTION In every conflict there is a moment when the tide is seen to turn. In the Gulf War, the Battle of al-Khafji was such a moment.1 General Khaled Bin Sultan Desert Storm was the first war broadcast live, as it transpired, on national television. America was riveted to their television sets as the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) staff, led by its Commander General Norman H. Schwarzkopf, provided daily updates on the conduct of the allied aerial campaign. Using this forum to bolster American sentiment for the conflict, the generals boasted of coalition successes and heralded the overwhelming Iraqi losses. To substantiate