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Conflict Mediation with Chinese Characteristics

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Conflict Mediation with Chinese Characteristics Conflict Mediation with Chinese Characteristics: How China Justifies Its Non-Interference Policy as an Arbitrator Conflict Mediation with Chinese Characteristics How China Justifies Its Non-Interference Policy as an Arbitrator Jason Li IN 1955, CHINESE PREMIER ZHOU ENLAI advocated R2P-enabled “regime change” in Libya and Syria, for and supported the adoption of a ten-point “dec- Beijing aims to build a defense against R2P being laration on promotion of world peace and cooper- applied to China. ation” at the Afro-Asian Conference in Bandung, As China’s global presence expands, however, Indonesia. One principle from the final communi- retaining such a lofty position and defense of non- qué, the “abstention from intervention or interfer- interference has become increasingly difficult. In ence in the internal affairs of another country,” has recent years, major overseas investments such as since been enshrined as one of China’s cornerstone those under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have foreign policy principles. This “policy of non-inter- created exceptional difficulties for Chinese policy- ference” denies China the ability to meddle in the in- makers to maintain this policy. According to the ternal affairs of other states under a tacit assumption Mercator Institute for China Studies, China was en- of reciprocity. In its public statements and strategic gaged in nine mediation projects in 2018, up from messaging, Beijing has since clung tightly to this three in 2012, the year before Xi Jinping launched the tenet of Chinese policy, even as its newfound global BRI. China’s current mediation projects span Asia economic presence motivates it to play an increas- and Africa, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh and ingly active role mediating internal conflicts in other Myanmar, Iran, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, all countries where China has expanding interests. of which are sometimes termed as BRI countries. At the foundation of China’s non-interference China has recently been compelled to involve policy is a self-interest in promoting norms of itself in conflict areas outside its borders in ways non-interference within global governance systems. that some—even some Chinese—see as counter It is in China’s best interest to universalize its norma- to its policy of non-interference. While the tive understanding of the infallibility of sovereignty motivation to interfere in conflict-ridden areas to and territorial integrity and the non-interference secure economic and national security interests in internal affairs. The policy has been particularly is not unique to China, China’s particular welcomed by authoritarian governments with colo- dilemma stems from its dual commitment to nial pasts, like many of those who attended the 1955 these interests and its non-interference policy and Bandung Conference. With growing international from its emerging and dominant role in concerns about its treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang development and infrastructure finance regimes. and the developments in Hong Kong, China has a The question, therefore, becomes: how does China strong motivation to promote policy alternatives to claim to maintain its non-interference policy while the “responsibility to protect” (R2P), which, in its it increasingly mediates conflicts abroad? calculation, may be used as justification to infringe China squares this circle—achieving the im- on China’s sovereignty or promote regime change. possible of maintaining a non-interference policy Able to cite its condemnations of what it views as while securing its important interests in unstable countries—by framing its engagement in a way that PAGE 1 | SEPTEMBER 2019 | STIMSON.ORG Conflict Mediation with Chinese Characteristics: How China Justifies Its Non-Interference Policy as an Arbitrator softens the perceived breadth and depth of its in- the fabric of the conflict’s origins. In Afghanistan, for terference. This softened approach manifests itself example, China’s goals have revolved around culti- with two tactics: host-government consultation and vating political agreement for fighting to cease, and limited means and goals across its mediation. therefore the depth of its involvement has been lim- China has justified its interference via conflict ited. This limited role has often taken a form closer mediation by conditioning its mediatory role on to “good offices,” whereby China mostly provides the host-government consultation, which some Chinese space for discussion between combatants, rather than scholars have branded as “consultative intervention” the sometimes interchangeable “mediation.” In 2015, 协商介入 ( xieshang jieru). Because the spirit of the Beijing convened meetings between representatives of non-interference policy largely rests on the impor- the Taliban and the Afghan government in Urumqi tance of state sovereignty and territorial integrity, but stopped short of pressuring further negotiations China can claim to still adhere to non-interference or offering solutions; in its opinion, China is simply by gaining the consent of or consulting with the rightful sovereign body whose internal affairs it is the provider of the venue in which the two sides can interfering in. In the cases where China is mediating talk. In its mediation between the ethnic armed orga- internal conflicts, such as Myanmar, Afghanistan, nizations and Myanmar since 2013, China also played and Bangladesh, Beijing first begins its intervention a “quiet and behind-the-scenes role” of coordinating through bilateral consultation with the sovereign under the guidelines of “persuading for peace and governments, then gradually expands the dialogue promoting dialogue” (劝和促谈 quanhe cu tan). to include the opposition groups or the opposition China’s preferred mediation tools also illustrate parties. The logic is that if the host government is this narrow scope: it deploys special envoys and tar- receptive and welcoming of a Chinese role in the me- gets the top levels of parties involved for high-pro- diation, it no longer constitutes interference, which file negotiations. In the case of mediating between by default is an unwanted unilateral imposition. Afghanistan and Pakistan, in 2017 China initiated a Paired with its host-government consent and crisis prevention and management mechanism be- consultation, Chinese mediators and the Foreign tween the two countries’ central leadership, as well as Ministry also often reiterate a country’s sovereignty the China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers and territorial integrity when engaging in any me- diation roles. During debates about the Syrian civil Dialogue, to increase discussion and consultation at war, for example, China’s Special Envoy to Syria and the top levels of decision-making. its representation at the UN Security Council have re- Thus far in its conflict mediation abroad, Beijing peatedly referenced Syrian “sovereign independence” has relied on normative distinctions of host-govern- (主权独立 zhuquan duli) and “territorial integrity” ment consultation and limited means and goals in its (领土完整 lingtu wanzheng) to promote restraint be- mediation to differentiate its involvement from R2P fore interfering or to veto resolutions seen as overly intervention. Nevertheless, as its engagement across interfering in Syrian internal affairs. While these jus- the globe continues to evolve, so might its corner- tifications also align conveniently with China’s gener- stone policy of non-interference. A major conflict al support for the Assad regime, China can point to that threatens China’s economic or security inter- its concern for the host government’s rights to these ests too severely for it to mediate in its traditional principles as evidence of its continued adherence to way could emerge. How—or if—China tries to up- non-interference. hold its non-interference policy in such an event will The second way by which China claims non-inter- be interesting to observe as a bellwether of China’s ference while mediating is by limiting the scope of its self-perceived norm-making role on the world stage. mediation means and goals. In an effort to be mini- mally invasive, Beijing often prefers conflict manage- Jason Li is a Research Assistant with the East Asia ment (making peace) to conflict resolution (making program at the Stimson Center. His research focuses peace and dismantling the risk factors for future on U.S.-China relations, cross-Strait relations, and conflict), since the former requires less alteration of grand strategy in Asia-Pacific. PAGE 2 | SEPTEMBER 2019 | STIMSON.ORG.
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