70-23,27-S

BOWLING, John William, 1920- A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY. i The American University, Ph.D., 1970 Political Science, international law and | relations i j • University Microfilms. A XEROX Company. Ann Arbor. Michigan

© Copyright by John William Bowling 1970 A CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT THEORY

by

John William Bowling

Submitted to the

Faculty of the School of International Service

of The American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy

in

International Studies

Signatures of <

Chairman: ^

Deapi of the School

Date: 1970 THE A M E p p tfljpsiTY The American University Washington, D. C.

H U 3 The gentle journey jars to stop;

The dreadful dream is done;

The long-gone goblins, up ahead

Stand waiting, every one.

Walt Kelly TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Introduction ...... 1

Analytical Propositions...... 1

Introductory No t e ...... 8

Chapter I Parallels in World History...... 21

Chapter II The Coming of the Western Culture: The Birthplace and the Borderlands...... 38

Chapter HI The Coming of Western Culture: Spain...... 53

Chapter IV The Coming of Western Culture: Eastern Europe...... 64

Chapter V The Coming of Western Culture: Russia and J a p a n ...... 91

Chapter VI Ideologies: "Democracy, " " C o m m u n i s m , " and "Fascism" . . 123

Chapter VII The Theme and the Actors: Nationalism and the Elites .... 148

Chapter VIH The Record in Afro-Asia and Latin Am e r i c a ...... 189

Chapter IX Casting the R u n e s ...... 226

Selected Bibliography...... 245

Primary Sources ...... 245

Secondary So u rces ...... 250 INTRODUC TION

Analytical Propositions

Contemporary theories of political development are based, in whole or in part, explicitly or implicitly, on five assumptions.

The central assumption is that the process called "modernization" is unique typologically and specifically, is without historical parallels, and partakes of inevitability.

It is further assumed that the foci of decision-making in non-Western polities of Africa, Asia, and Latin America have made, are making, or will make deliberate choices to reject their "traditional" ways of life and to embrace "modernity. " It is assumed that the two prime and consciously sought results of this choice, and the two hallmarks of modernity, are "economic development" and "political participation. "

The phenomenon usually described as "national integration" is assumed in almost all contemporary development theory to be an instrumental value/process essential to the attainment of

"modernization" as marked primarily by "economic development" and "political participation. " Furthermore, "national integration" is usually assumed to be limited by and dependent upon shared 2. aspirations toward "modernization" rather than shared linguistic, ethnic, and cultural factors.

A survey of world history indicates that a succession of great human cultures, most of them developing over a period of centuries, have come and gone in the past. Each of these great cultures has been based on its own unique pattern of values and techniques. There are no transcultural standards by which these cultures m a y be ranked in terms of their inherent value in guiding and ordering the lives of men.

What contemporary theorists call "modern" values and techniques represent the totality of another one in this set of world cultures, one which seems to have originated about 300 years ago in northwestern Europe. "Modernization" is a culture- centric description of the process by which that particular culture has developed in northwestern Europe and the process by which it has, like other cultures before it, penetrated and influenced areas outside its native environment.

The ma n y historical examples of inter-cultural penetration and interaction prior to the coming of our own great culture -- that of northwestern Europe -- yield certain co m m o n and recurrent features. The most important of these is the emergence of third, hybrid, cultures out of a situation of massive interaction. Another is the extreme differentiation between masses and elites, between the cities and the countryside. The relative capacity of each culture in military and police terms has been the salient element in determining which will be the "male, " dominant, and active culture of any two in a state of interaction, arid which will be the passive, influenced one. Elements have been borrowed from one culture and adapted to another primarily by elites struggling to attain or retain privilege and status in competition with other elite groups. In areas of heavy penetration from an outside culture, existing customs, laws, and constitutions are weakened while new ones are not strong enough to mitigate and channel inter-elite struggles for status and privilege. Elite security disappears and unrestrained struggle between competing elites becomes a salient feature of social life at such times. Finally, cultural borrowing tends to be not from the birthplace of a culture but from a pre­ viously heavily influenced hybrid culture.

Our own Western culture has been penetrating strongly into areas outside its native soil for about two centuries, and the record of that interaction to date shows that the general characteristics listed above for the general category also hold good for this specific instance. It appears that the initial exposure of non-Western masses to Western values and techniques in the absence of a local elite mo r e willing and capable than the masses of comprehending and grasping such alien elements re­ sults in a political-social syndrome characterized by the cargo cult. When such local elite elements do exist, however, and serve as a filtration and translation mechanism for such borrow­ ings, the basic and uniquely Western value of the ethnic- linguistic-cultural unit as a basic group identity, along with the techniques used to translate this identity into military, police, and persuasive power tools, has been of primary interest to such elites. They have tended to adapt and utilize this value and these techniques as a uniquely effective weapon in their bitter and con­ stant struggle for privilege and status with competing elites.

Both dominant and challenging elites in these circumstances have been motivated by the desire to get and keep status and privilege for themselves and their offspring. They have utilized certain apparently efficacious elements of the alien culture as instruments. They have tried to justify themselves through the modification or destruction of existing political myths and the substitution therefor of new myths or new mythic elements.

They have tried to indoctrinate politically conscious elements of their populations with these myths and have convinced themselves of the independent reality of the myths. They have without hesitation destroyed existing laws, customs, and constitutions in the course of establishing such myths, even at the cost of greatly sharpening elite struggles and weakening elite security.

Any elite which has not utilized the Western culture in this fashion to the best of its ability has been hopelessly disadvantaged vis-a-vis any elite which has done so.

Central to the penetration of Western values and techniques into alien cultures has been ethnic-linguistic nationalism as born in northwestern Europe and modified in central Europe. It has proved itself superior to all competitors as a basic group identity foundation for the mounting of military, police, and propaganda efforts. It has accordingly been siezed by both dominant and challenging elites in non-Western areas as the central thread of their new political myths. The formation and consolidation of such myths has required the existence or fabrication of three elements: a national experience, a national destiny, and an adversary just powerful and malevolent enough to threaten attainment of the national destiny but not so powerful as to be irresistible.

These nationalist political myths, operating in societies where pre-existing elite truces based on custom, law or consti­ tutions have been destroyed, have resulted in two prototypical regime forms based on hypernationalist sentiment. One is radical revolutionary totalitarianism of which the paradigms are Jacobinism, European fascism, and Stalinism. The other is consolidating authoritarian dictatorship, exemplified in history by Bonapartism and the nationalist dictatorships of

Iberia and Eastern Europe.

Nationalism has prevented the formation of solid multi­ ethnic and multi-lingual polities in the sense of a real sharing of power, and has stimulated fissiparous tendencies in such polities. It has rendered those myths based on it highly suscep­ tible to militarization and irredentism. It has provided a neces­ sary, but far from sufficient, framework for the adoption of

Western techniques of production, war, police controls, and propaganda. Such techniques can improve the chances for

"economic development" and "political participation" but need not necessarily do so.

The five assumptions of contemporary development theory listed above are incorrect when measured against the present

scene in Latin America, Asia and Africa. "Modernization" is neither without parallel nor inevitable. Neither elites nor masses have made deliberate choices in favor of one culture and against another in order to gain "economic development" and/or 7.

"political participation. " Nationalism is not an instrumental value subordinate to the two former objectives.

Rather, the dominant political and social dynamics in the non-Western world are the development of national myths, the destruction of barriers between the individual and the national state and/or single party, and the consequent reinforcement of the privilege and status of the ruling elite(s). Economic develop­ ment and political participation, along with all other phenomena of the West, are incidental to, limited by, and supportive of these dominant political dynamics.

Religious, racial, economic class, and geographic bases for political mythology are not competitive with ethnic-linguistic - cultural unity, and policies based on such myths are likely to break up or exist only under extraordinary continuing strains, which will be marked by an increasing incidence of civil wars and military/subversive irrendentist conflicts, along with extreme xenophobia, usually in die form of virulent hatred of the West, nurtured by elites.

Political regimes can be expected to range on a spectrum between the "fascist" and "authoritarian" prototypes of nationalism listed above, probably oscillating between the two. Economic development will be spotty, autarkic, geared to military needs, 8. statist, and marked by great inequalities of living standards.

The final shape of the hybrid cultural patterns which will even­ tually emerge and be politically fixed by elite truces solidified in customs, laws, and constitutions is so far in the future and dependent on so many now unperceived variables as to be quite unpredictable.

Introductory Note

This study began with a project for comparing a model of between-wars European fascism with selected existing regimes in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, in order to check on at least a partially empirical scale Seton-Watson's provocative hint*' that regimes of the Third World might better be understood in terms of European fascism than mo r e conventional classifica­ tions. While the concept remains a key element of the study, its scope widened almost against my will as I plunged into the vast literature of the past decade on the general subject of compara­ tive politics and its special field of development or modernization theory -- reading which had been undertaken only for auxiliary background purposes in terms of the study as originally conceived.

To put it bluntly, I was amazed, in going into this literature for the first time, to discover that the greater part of it seemed to refer to a world bearing only coincidental resemblances to the real Afro-Asian world in which I had spent more than twenty- years professionally dealing with regimes and attempting to predict their political and economic reactions to changes in their external and internal environments. I attempted to utilize some of the mo r e prestigious theoretical formulations which I found in the literature to predict general and specific trends in the non-Western world in contemporary cases, and found that the predictive value was low. For example, as a general propo­ sition, non-Western regimes should, according to the vast preponderance of the theoretical literature, accord priority in the allocation of resources to butter, factories, and guns, in that order. In the real world, as a general rule, the priority is precisely reversed.

The recent attempts at development theory contain brilliant flashes of insight and are often internally consistent as systems to a remarkable degree, but the lack of correspondence with the real world is too striking to be passed over lightly. In attempting to find out what was wrong I constantly ran into unspecified assumptions as to the nature of political culture and of man. Although it appeared that one failing lay fairly close to the surface --a tendency to assume that the stated, overt objectives of non-Western intellectual and pseudo-intellectual elites represent their real objectives — 10. this by itself would not account for the discrepancies between theory and practice. The surface fault itself probably was rooted in some of the basic and usually unspecified assumptions on which the theories were built.

I was therefore forced to go back to the very beginnings and attempt to trace in the broadest possible outlines the basic historical trend lines in the non-Western world of the recent past, the present, and the near future. Existing theory, while it ma y be inadequate for predictive purposes, has been essential for this task. I have not been forced to grope in the dark; rather,

I have moved from lamp to lamp of firmly grounded bits and pieces of contemporary theory and have had to utilize m y own small powers for the relatively simple tasks of choosing an initial direction, and then of trying to ma p out the areas of darkness b e ­ tween the lamps.

Working in such an immensely broad field, I have necessarily used secondary sources for most of my research, and those secondary sources have been as contemporary as possible.

Theory is undergoing a constant process of modification, and the modification seems to be in the direction of greater correspondence with reality and less concern with system-building. Furthermore, the presentation of an alternative to the present body of theory 11. requires the best -- which means the latest -- existing theories be used as aids and backdrops.

It is only right to explicate at the beginning a few of the basepoints of the analytical tactics to be used in this study --at bottom, they, too, amount to assumptions. To the extent that they can be justified at all, they can be justified only to the degree that the totality of the approach described herein can explain the present and the recent past and predict the near future.

To begin with, I am a cultural relativist -- that is, I feel that it is only from within the assumptions of a given culture that judgements can be ma d e as to the nature and destiny of ma n and hence as to the relative normative worth of one or another human culture. Standing outside all cultures, in other words, it is impossible to make judgements of "better" or "worse" between human cultures, or to imply therefrom that any particular political culture, say that of a Leningrad engineer, is closer or further away than any other, say that of an Australian aborigine, in permitting or stimulating the fulfillment of ultimate human values.

The foregoing is not intended to foreclose value judgements; it is intended solely to affix a warning sign on such judgements:

"Notice: This judgement is predicated on the acceptance of the 12. arbitrary standards of value found in sector x of political culture y. " I acknowledge here m y debt to the hundreds of "full-blood",

"Ross Party" Cherokee Indians among wh o m I spent my childhood and early youth. Unlike mixed-bloods and a constant boiling-off of individual full-bloods assimilating to the dominant American culture pattern, a core of these "Ross Party" Indians retained a set of values as alien to the standard American culture as are the values of Bushmen. American academics tend to react to this situation by assuming that because the Ross Party full-blood's living standard is "low" by comparison with those about him, he is being exploited by others. This judgement forewarned me against similar judgements in the field of development theory.

I also assume that within the framework of values provided by any specific culture, man's behavior, insofar as it is not con­ strained by cultural norms, resembles the behavior of me n in other cultures. I am thereby permitted to follow the lead of Gaetano

Mosca when he remarks that "Dipping into the documents that tell us how people of other ages thought, felt, and lived, we always come to the same conclusion: that they were so very mu c h like

Furthermore, I assume that the most accurate method of measuring various political cultures and sub-cultures is not likely 13. to be through a haze of contemporary hopes and fears but rather through comparisons across time, comparisons between systems of values which no longer offer actual or potential threats to one another's integrity. Again with Mosca, "If political science is to be grounded upon the observation and interpretation of the facts of political life, it is to the old historical method that we must 5 return."

M y choice as to an angle of attack on any problem of large- scale analysis is also inspired by Mosca: I assume that elites usually control societies, that they struggle among themselves for dominance expressed in status and privilege, that "they tend to become hereditary in fact if not in law", ^ that they justify their 7 dominant roles through myths, or "political formulations", and that limitations on their power are usually rooted in custom or law ("juridical defense") which in turn springs from the necessity for competing elites sometimes to compromise as the only alter­ native to struggle for absolute dominance.

I go beyond Mosca and Machiavelli in only one respect, and this point is implicit in the writings of these masters. Dominant and challenging elites alike tend to believe their own "political formulations" or myths justifying a dominant role in society.

This assumption is vital to my analytical method, and proof of it 14. across time is simply not available, although it accords with the personal experience of most contemporary dispassionate observers.

Acceptance of this point means that one m a y expect to find in contemporary elites a mixture of the "conscious" and '.'sub- conscious" in all external evidence of their objectives, ethics, and value standards. The political myth of a particular elite will tend to distort and modify political action to some extent, while the pragmatic interests of any elite in a changing environ­ ment will produce some degree of tension with, and eventually distortion and modification of, its "political formulation. "

Each level of thought and expression is capable of modifying the other, although it can be expected that, within the outer parameters of any political culture, cognition of the ultimate interests of a dominant or challenging elite will prove more resistant to distor­ tion than will that elite's political formulation. The point is that we should expect to find the two elements inextricably inter­ mingled at any given time and place. The greatest single fault of modern theorists of the non-Western world seems to be a tendency to accept the "political formulation" as an accurate measure of elite objectives. It is noteworthy that ma n y of these same scholars refuse to ascribe any real role whatever 15. to the covering myths of dominant elites in their own Western

societies.

There is in this study no thought of building a consistent theory of political processes in the non-Western world. It constitutes an attempt to construct logically and to make explicit trends of history in the non-West by utilizing pieces of contem­ porary theory but by striking out from re-examined and reformu­ lated basic assumptions. M y objective is a particil theory which will help to explain recent and current trends and which will offer some general predictions as to future developments in the non-West.

I have noticed that few theorists are willing to draw out of their theoretical structures general predictions which can be checked for accuracy within one or two decades. As I have m e n ­ tioned above, attempts to draw out of theories like those of O Rostow a set of general predictions have produced zero or negative correlations with general trends of history over the past decade. I intend to conclude m y study with general predictions which should be empirically verifiable within a decade and which simultaneously provide a theoretical explanation of some developments of the past two decades.

While it is oriented toward prediction of trends in the 16. international environment of great interest to policy-makers,

I shall refrain from policy and normative judgements, and will stand outside m y own culture insofar as I can.

As Ronald Cohen has pointed out, regimes in the non-

Western world are "heavily dependent on forms of socio-political structures that are still strongly influenced by their traditional 9 cultures" and since their traditional cultures are regionally and often individually unique, all predictions based on a general theory involving co m m o n factors in these countries can have only a statistical validity, the validity one finds in a successful effort to predict the behavior of a gas, even though there can be no meaningful accuracy in terms of a single molecule.

I shall begin by examining the problem of the non-West in the broadest historical terms, identifying the core of current processes as a far from unique case of massive acculturation, with historic parallels in other historic epochs. I shall then examine the historical record of the process of the expansion and transformation of Western culture, placing the current travail of the non-West within a broader historic design and identifying

such key concepts as nationalism. I shall then examine the assumptions behind most recent theoretical efforts to explain developments in the non-West and will identify certain conceptual 17. and methodological failings in those efforts, such as an apparent reversal of the actual relationship in terms of the goal-instrument dichotomy between the concept of ''modernization" or "development" and the concept of "national integration. "

I shall proceed to describe current processes as I see them in terms of a continuum with the past patterns already discussed,

and will conclude by projecting these processes and patterns into the future by means of a set of interlocking predictions capable of empirical verification a decade hence.

In addition to ma n y friends and enemies, official and non­ official, in Asia and Africa who have provided a constant stimulus over the years, I owe especial thanks for the intellectual examples of Oswald Spengler and Hugh Seton-Watson, in the general and particular aspects, respectively, of history, of Gaetano Mosca and Niccolo Machiavelli in political philosophy, and to A. James

Gregor, Eric Hoffer, and A. A. Said for their incisive and icono­ clastic observations of the contemporary non-West.

Like John Henry Newman, "I am proposing no measures, but exposing a fallacy and resisting a pretence. Perhaps I can be more specific by identifying the fallacy and the pretense as that

"the problems (of the non-West) today are primarily those of economic development and social evolution of an '‘underdeveloped" As is evident in the following pages, this effort is inter­

disciplinary in the fullest sense of the word. The author is a professional diplomat who has explored the meadows of political

science, history, philosophy, sociology, psychology and even linguistics. It ma y be that the interdisciplinary and radical nature of this enquiry, aiming as it does at an examination of prime assumptions, will appear in some respects simplistic, particularly in comparison with the convoluted and heavily qualified nature of mu c h contemporary theory. I can only ask readers so impressed to consider a famous historian's plea:

There is another type who will deny me any semblance of 'objectivity*. This is the ma n who considers the truth to lie halfway between any pair of extremes. O n no account must any 'objective' person agree on any point with any 'extremist' . . . Any political idea which can be grasped at once by the ordinary citizen must be unsound, for it does less than due honor to intellectuals created to deal with subtleties. 12 19.

"Revolutionary nationalist regimes, applying techniques of mass mobilization, injecting into their quasi-socialist ideologies strong doses of racialism and of historical mythology, and moving from simple dictatorship ever closer towards totalitarianism, m a y end up nearer to the Third Reich than to the Soviet or Chinese model. " Hugh Seton-Watson, "Fascism, Right and Left, " in the Journal of Contemporary History, I (January, 1966), 194.

"A ma n feels, believes, loves, and hates according to the environment in which he lives. " Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: M c G r a w Hill Co., 1939), p. 17. A. L. Kroeber, The Nature of Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952) p. 8, describes the essence of culture as "that way of acting, feeling, and thinking channelled by a society out. of an infinite number and variety of potential ways of thinking. "

Albert Wahrhaftig, "Renaissance and Repression: The Oklahoma Cherokee, " Trans -Action, VI, No. 4 (February, 1969),

4 Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 39.

^Ibid., p. 41.

^Ibid., p. 61.

*7 "Ruling classes do not justify their power exclusively by their de facto possession of it, but try to find a moral and legal basis for it, representing it as the logical and necessary conse­ quence of doctrines and beliefs that are generally recognized and accepted." Ibid., p. 17. O W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, I960).

^Ronald Cohen, "Anthropology and Political Science, " American Behavioral Scientist, XI, No. 2 (1967), 5.

^Quoted in George E. Kirk, Contemporary Arab Politics (New York: Praeger Press, 1961), p. 140. 20.

n Kirk, op. cit., p. 173.

■^Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars (3rd ed.; Hamden, Connecticut: Anchor Books, 1962), p. X. C H A P T E R I

Parallels in World History

The phenomenon under study involves the interaction of cultures which had previously developed in comparative isolation

-- that of the West and those of the non-West. Almost all current theory of this interaction appears to presuppose that the interaction process on such a vast scale is quantitatively and qualitatively unique. Therefore, historical parallels are sought in (a) the process by which what we now call Western culture arose out of a medieval background in the West, and (b) cultural interaction between the West and non-West in such areas of early contact as Turkey and Japan. The focus, in other words, is on interaction between key elements of Western culture and other cultures; it is assumed that there is something about Western culture so special that reference to historical examples of inter­ action between non-Western culture x and non-Western culture(s) y are not relevant.

Later in this study the argument regarding the alleged non­ comparability of Western culture with non-Western cultures in history will be taken up again. For the present, it would seem 22. only fair to assume tentatively that Western culture is not so peculiar as to render other examples of culture contact irrelevant to the understanding of the current process. Therefore, the enquiry should begin with an analysis of some historical examples of cultural contact which (a) occurred over long periods of time

-- several centuries, (b) occurred over large areas and popula­ tions in terms of the techniques of communication and transpor­ tation of the time, and (c)weremarked not by roughly equivalent cultural interaction but by one-sided flow from a dominant to a receptive culture which in its early stages involved physical domination by the political institutions of the former over the latter.

These three characteristics are descriptive of the princi­ pal historic dimensions of the process which appears to be underway in the non-West today, provided one assumes that the West is one historical culture among many and does not possess such super- cultural traits as to remove it from the scale of historical comparison.

Many examples of the interactions above come to mind with a survey of world history. A few are so audacious in the sweep of vision of most observers (like Spengler's vision of a great

Near Eastern culture distorted and isolated in the mighty shadow 23.

of the Classical Culture) that they are not given due weight by

scholars. There are ma n y others, however, which apparently qualify; for example, we can point to the Sinicization of Southeast

Asia, the spread of Byzantine Christian culture into old Russia, and the Hispanization of the non-Western cultures of Latin

A m e rica.

While one can note the c o m m o n characteristics of these and other comparable historical processes, one should avoid

selecting c o m m o n relationships and behavior patterns until a

couple of examples are studied more closely.

One of these, a classic of its kind, is the spread of

Hellenic culture into the Persian, Syrian, and Egyptian East, first by the armies and later by the governors, artisans, and artists of Alexander the Great. It is noteworthy that the term

’’Hellenistic" rather than "Hellenic" is used to describe the

culture resulting from this interaction in the non-Hellenic East.

Parenthetically, it might be noted that Greece itself was apparently affected by the reverse flow, but in subtle ways not

clearly evident at the time to Hellenes and Macedonians; probably

something of the sort is true in the great contemporary interaction.

The interaction began by the receiving culture's (or cultures') initial contact with Hellenic culture on an equal basis, later 24. changing to a general acknowledgement of the functional superi­ ority of the Hellenic military, * the technological superiority of

Greek artisanship, and the intellectual attractiveness of Greek thought and abstract culture (no Achaemaenian padeshah or

Nilotic Pharaoh worthy of his salt would be caught without a couple of alleged Greek philosophers at his court, like parakeets in cages). This phase was followed rapidly by military conquest and by formal rule by Greeks through transplanted Greek political structures as filtered through the Macedonian kingdom. Within a little while, on the scale of history, direct Greek-Macedonian controls slackened, but political institutions and the upper levels of society were dominated by expatriate Greeks, local Hellenized elites, and their offspring, effectively combining the two cultures into a new synthesis which was in effect a new culture -- the

Hellenistic Age.

In the words of a standard scholarly history:

In this Hellenistic Age ma n thought of himself more and mo r e as a me m b e r of a world society, a society in which there might be, and were, striking differences, but in which a c o m m o n culture acted as a natural bond. . . . The non-Greek considered it essential to have some Greek culture, and for business reasons, if no other, a co m m o n Greek dialect was adopted. . .

Cultural diffusion was centered in the burgeoning urban areas, and stimulated their growth; acculturation was weaker 25. and slower in the countryside, although even in the country there was a slow boil-off into the new culture through recruitment to minor government posts.

In the urban centers Hellenism was strongest. In the villages and countryside of the East this Hellenistic veneer was thin, and after the first great creative push, the oriental bakcground came once mo r e to the surface ... A cosmopolitan population gathered iin (the great cities), intent briefly on money-making and pleasure, and inevitably the ideas and customs of diverse peoples reacted on one another and tended to me r g e d . . . The native peasants formed the mass of the population in the new Hellenistic kingdoms. They lived in villages, without much self-government, though interference with their ancestral ways was rare. . .Hellenism touched them little, but the ambitious native would learn Greek and Greek ways and try for a minor post in the bureaucracy .. .To understand the features of the Hellenistic Age, we must realize the importance of cities. N e w ones were founded ineessantly. They exerted a powerful attraction, and the extraordinary development of some was a veri­ table revolution. ..non-Greeks were Hellenized and acquired the rights of the city. ^

Pierre Jougouet describes the Hellenistic rulers, "half­ submerged under non-Hellenic traditions, attitudes, and habits" trying desperately to Hellenize by artificially stimulating urbani - zation, concentrating life and power there, and encouraging

Greeklike intellectual and artistic activity. But he also tells how

"the peasant, the mass of the population, fell backward", and how the city dweller "remained only lightly attached to Greek culture and was rendered restless."^ 26.

Mosca, writing of mankind in general, noted that "Ancient formulas, complexes of beliefs and sentiments, are dominant in lower strata of society, while often rapid flows of ideas agitate the higher classes, which are generally located in large cities, and the lower classes or outlying districts are left

n behind. " This side-product of "marginal men" is delineated more clearly in the following text.

The ordinary citizen, cut off from the life that had absorbed his every energy in the past, was thrown on his own insufficient resources and felt lost in a changing world. It is hardly strange, then, that in his effort to understand life and to enjoy it he should have turned to new philosophic systems, to foreign religions, to social cliques, and to business partner­ ships . Viewed in the large and compared with previous periods, the Hellenistic Age, materially at least, repre­ sented a great improvement for the c o m m o n man. Now, a citizen of the world, he might travel anywhere; the products of the world came to his door; but high standards of taste, freedom, responsibility, and the intensity of Periclean life were definitely things of the past. ®

Emile Durkheim's historic description of "anomie" is perhaps apposite in trying to understand what goes on in the soul of a m a n caught between two world cultures:

A thirst arises for novelties, unfamiliar pleasures, nameless sensations, all of which lose their savor once known. Henceforth one has no strength to endure the least reverse. The whole fever subsides and the sterility of all the tumult is apparent, and it is seen that all these new sensations in their infinite quantity cannot form a solid foundation of happiness to support one during days of trial. The wise man, knowing how to enjoy achieved results without having to replace them with others, finds 27

in them an attachment to life in the hour of difficulty. But the ma n who has always pinned all his hopes on the future and lived with his eyes fixed upon it has nothing in the past as a comfort against the afflictions of the pre­ sent, but the past is nothing to him but a series of hastily experienced stages. What blinded him to himself was his expectation to find further on the happiness he has so far missed. N o w he is stopped in his tracks: nothing remains behind or ahead of him for him to fix his gaze on. ^

It is significant that of all the advanced arts and crafts of

the Hellenes, it was the superior Greek technique in war which was

apparently the most attractive to the Hellenistic states and which most completely displaced its non-Hellenic equivalent.

"Warfare was well-nigh continuous in the Hellenistic era,

and multitudes of people were killed. ..Greek mercenaries were in

constant demand to fight and to train and co m m a n d non-Greeks^®

. . .Greeks were spread everywhere as soldiers.

Trade, industry, learning, and the general economy made

spectacular advances, but at the cost of severe concealed dislo­

cations of the social order:

The new capitals were busy centers of trade and industry. . .The scientific spirit and a keen desire to understand the universe blossomed wonderfully. . .but superstition and ignorance remained, and the literature and art, while often interesting and sometimes pleasing, frequently strove for mere effect. Side by side with luxury and sophistication existed poverty and slavery. Mass production and far-flung trade routes meant wealth, a widening horizon, and social revolution... ^ There was a remarkable economic development to 28.

which the Greeks contributed technical knowledge and certain Asiatics habits of industry.. . In the midst of all the festivals and luxury the condition of the peasant and laboring ma n was very low. .. this led, of course, to social unrest and the familiar cry for the cancellation of debts and the redistribution of property was heard. . . . ^ It is clear that the upper and middle classes were well off and that their wealth stimulated trade. But wealth was unevenly distributed and the lot of the worker was bad. The free craftsman generally followed in his father's steps and became the victim of extreme specialization (stonemasons no longer sharpened their own tools). There was a slow development of trade unions, but strikes were relatively rare. Some people advocated communism, particularly of the Stoic variety. ^

It might be noted, as an interesting side fact, that the Hel­ lenistic East, like the non-West of our day, paid a price for its relatively "modern" economy in terms of population increase.

After a period of thrashing about, the problem was met head-on and solved by a widespread and socially honored custom of infanticide. ^

The aspect of acculturation most pertinent to this enquiry is that of politics and administration. And here a peculiar phenome­ non leaps to the eye. The model toward which political Hellenization aspired was never the Hellene polis, the free city, but was rather the Macedonian monarchy, which itself was the result of Hellene influence penetrating and finding political influence in a non-

Hellene borderland. The political model was itself an adaptation 29. to a non-Hellene environment of Hellene political patterns; it was certainly an easier model to imitate, and it was the model from which sprang the military machine that smashed the existing political structures of the East. It was the overwhelmingly real model, but the imitative effort produced something as different from the Macedonian kingdom as the Macedonian kingdom was from Athens. Botsford and Claude describe the inevitable swal­ lowing of free cities by the militarily and economically more efficient large monarchies. 17 Further, the histories tell us:

The most striking difference between the Hellenistic Age and preceding centuries was the size of the political unit. . . . At the top of the system stood the Hellenistic king, now far removed from his subjects and considered officially as a god - his deification was a sort of symbol of his right to rule and ma d e it easier for him to unite under him various races. He was surrounded by a vast bureaucracy, for the task of governing was now complex and required specialists. .. The successors took as their model the old Macedonian monarchy, with a certain simplicity to court life, but actually they were autocrats, who made the laws and appointed the officials and upon their deaths were deified, if this had not already been done during their lifetimes. Deification was unknown in Macedonia, where life was more democratic... ^ The combination of Egyptian tradition and Greek efficiency made possible a vast experiment in nationalization. To fish in the Nile, one had to buy a license and take along an official in one's boat to see that a quarter of the catch went to the government. ... The people, which had been everything in the old Greek commonwealth^ was no longer anything in the Hellenistic kingdoms.

And how did it all come out in the end ? The course of world 30. history shifted perceptibly, of course, but Henri Biere has per­ haps best described the result as it affected the me n and wo m e n who experienced that particular Great Awakening:

Alexander's hope of fusion was a chimera, though something did survive in the economic and political sphere. The East became not Hellenic but Hellenistic, and Hellas was, in the end, "barbarized". ^2

Without attempting to draw conclusions from this case, one might examine more sketchily another example of massive cultural interaction, that of the spread of the R o m a n cultural complex among the Celtic and Germanic lands and peoples of Western Europe.

There will be no attempt here to describe or evaluate the culture of Ro m e -- to be envisioned as a complex of technical skills, a set of political institutions, an attitude toward the environment, or through some other prism. A prominent scholar has recently described the core of that culture as "the belief that moral health and political power and stability were indissolubly joined, and that personal pre-emine.nce exists only in the service of the state.

Even the Late Empire, now laced with external cultural borrowings and under tremendous political and military pressures, is described by a historian as "a ferocious despotism propped up by harshly repressive law" but still trying desperately to justify itself and rebuild itself in terms of the dying tradition. 24 31.

The Celtic lands long conquered and administered by Ro m e were not Roman; they were perhaps as R o m a n as Philip's Macedon was Hellenic. The real "other culture" was the Germanic one.

Politically, it has been described as based on (a) kinship groupings, with a built-in blood feud, (b) assemblies of freemen to declare customs applicable to disputes (c) the idea of lordship: great me n 25 and their followers, and (d) low status for any kind of honest work.

This culture found itself face to face with the Late Empire, "that latter world of rabbit-warren towns and monster autocracies, to despair born of chaos. " ? A°

The complex of relationships and values which we call feudalism developed only partly from tribal Ge rman sources. It

"proceeded on parallel lines from its R o m a n and Germanic origins. Its R o m a n origin was found in the Celtic "Macedon" of the Empire in certain relationships between landowners. 28

H o w does the historian describe the process of political confluence of the two cultures ?

F r o m kinglets they (the barbarian rulers) had become autocratic rulers of powerful states, restricted only by custom, by the counsel of their landed nobles, and by the chances of murder and revolt. They soon appear as administrators, taxers, and legislators in­ stead of as me r e chiefs of tribal armies. They thereby stepped into a Ro m a n heritage. , The inheritance b e ­ queathed by the Imperial civilization, however depleted and maimed, was of the first importance. In various, 32.

more simplified degrees, the Ro m a n civil adminis­ tration outlasted the conquest. So did the Ro m a n L a w for Romans: simplified, broken versions of it for daily life were current and sanctioned by kings. It strongly influenced the evolution of barbaric codes and the far-away development of local custom in later centuries. ^

O n a larger, non-political scale, the moving interface between the two cultures is again reminiscent of the Hellenistic one:

To these men, the modern world appeared vastly inferior to the ancient. Its aesthetic achievements, its political organization, its mastery of the political environment all fell short of the levels Greece and Ro m e has previously attained. The study of the classical heritage became the focus of progress, the principal instrument of the effort the modern world was making to recapture the glories of the past by learning all that the past'had to teach. The emphasis was on imitation."^®

Bolgar's study of the interaction process between these two cultures leads him to emphasize how all borrowings from the

R o m a n culture quickly resulted in completely new formulations in a different environment.

Anything taken from Ro m e was soon altered out of all recognition by the mere process of development in an alien setting, as the opinions of Ro m a n jurists acquired feudal interpretations, and the Virgilian hexameter ended as the frame for an elaborate rhyme pattern. 3 1

Finally Bolgar notes that neither lords nor peasants were consciously interested in imitating Ro m a n ways, but that the conduits, in the later periods of interaction, were the rising

elements in the large cities. ^2

T w o examples of massive interaction between two cultures have been examined, one of them mo r e carefully than the other.

It would be interesting to examine these and other examples in more detail, using the comparative method. Other examples abound, but general rules can be drawn from these two. The

similarities one ma y tentatively extract from these examples check out positively with other historical examples drawn at ran dom, including those mentioned on page

It seems evident that a phenomenon called massive cul­ tural interaction over time and space has occurred repeatedly in hu m a n history. What are some of the general characteristics

Of such interaction ?

(A) The impingement of a dominant culture A upon a passive culture B results in the creation of a third culture C which is more than and different from a simple su m of cultural

33 characteristics previously identifiable in A and B. It further

results in modifications ol both culture A and B, with the greate modification/attenuation occurring in culture B as the more passive.

(B) The primary determination of the relative status of 34. two interacting cultures is their relative capacity to make war effectively -- to extend themselves or defend themselves in the political-military arena -- their survival quotient. The trigger for the process is usually an act of physical conquest.

(C) Urban elites tend to pick up the more dominant culture m u c h more rapidly than do rural-based elements of the population.

Therefore a prime result of cultural absorption is a bifurcation of society and a "falling backward" of the non-affected segments, which in both group and individual terms tend to lose their creative and adaptable elements to the new synthesis. A loss of identity and a sense of "anomie" is probable among the quickly adapting groups.

(D) As a great culture expands, whether or not a form of physical conquest is involved, the synthesis in areas first affected, even though the local culture appears to have been greatly weakened, is marked by special adapted political forms not at all typical of the political forms developed by the great culture in its nursery. It is these secondary political forms, rather than the primary political forms of the culture, which tend to supplant alien political forms in areas physically or spiritually more distant from the homeland.

(E) Cultural absorption goes against the built-in centripetal tendencies which hold cultural patterns together. 35.

People adapt to new cultures because the personal alternative to absorbing the new is intolerable -- humiliation or insignifi­ cance. Old customs die before new customs can develop.

Other generalities ma y come to mind -- for example, the spread of a universal language or dialect among elites absorbing another culture -- but the ones listed above seem sufficiently grounded in a number of historical cases that one can approach the interactive processes in which Western culture has been and now is engaged with a fairly firm conviction that massive cultural interaction is a well established historical phenomenon and that one might expect most of certain historically indicated character­ istics to ma r k such interactions. In other words, one has a very generalized and limited power of prediction. 36.

See Xenophon's Anabasis

George W. Botsford and Charles A. Robinson, Jr., Hellehic History (4th ed.; N e w York: The MacMillan Co., 1956), p. 368.

^Ibid., pp. 368-369.

^Ibid., p. 398. 5 Henry Biere, "Foreword to Pierre Jougouet, " Macedonian Imperialism and the Hellenization of the East (New York: Knopf, 1932), p. xvi.

^Pierre Jougouet, Macedonian Imperialism and the Hellenization of the East, pp. 322-392. 7 Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: M c G r a w Hill, 1939), p. 49. O Botsford and Robinson, Hellenic History, p. 370.

^Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study in Sociology (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1955), pp. 63-64.

^Botsford and Robinson, Hellenic History, p. 369.

U Ibid., p. 400.

^ Ibid., p. 368.

13Biere, Macedonian Imperialism, p. xvi.

^Botsford and Robinson, Hellenic History, p. 399.

^Ibid., p. 404.

l6Ibid., p. 401.

17Ibid., p. 397. 37.

18Ibid., p. 369.

19Ibid., p. 398.

20Ibid. , p. 404. 21 Biere, Macedonian Imperialism, p. xvi. 22 Ibid., p. xix. 23 Donald Earl, The Moral and Political Tradition of Ro m e (Ithaca, N e w York: The Cornell University Press, 1967), p. 131.

24Ibid., p. 132. 25 C. W . Previtte-Orton, The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. I (Cambridge: The University Press, 1952) pp. 128-131.

26R. R. Bolgar, The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries (Cambridge: The University Press, 1963), p. 26.

27Previtte -Orton, The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History, p. 428.

28Ibid., pp. 21-29.

29Ibid., p. 130.

30 Bolgar, The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries, p. 31.

31Ibid., p. 4.

32Ibid., p. 137.

33 See Bronislav Malinowski, The Dynamics of Culture Change (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945). C H A P T E R H

The Coming of the Western Culture: The Birthplace and the Borderlands

It can be agreed that the non-Western countries of Asia,

Africa, and Latin America are in the throes of a relatively rapid process of change, and that while each example of the process shows individual variations, there are certain broad general trends which appear to be valid over time and space.

Most contemporary theorists assert that these general trends can be covered under a rubric of "modernization." This term will later be examined more closely and shown to be of little value as a concept in comparison with an older term used to describe the same process-'-"Westernization. " The critical point is whether or not the elements which appear in one form or another to be heavily influencing non-Western societies represent one particular cluster of variables and techniques among ma n y such clusters scattered through history, or whether this cluster represents a kind of Hegelian culmination, or "highest form" of human history. The argument will be taken up in more detail later, and the reader is at this point asked to assume that this 39.

examination of the cluster from the adjectival viewpoint of

"Western" rather than "modern" is of at least heuristic value.

Whether the cluster is called by one term or the other, its

birthdate is not a subject of scholarly consensus. In one well

regarded recent collection of essays, * for example, one

eminent expert dates the value and technique cluster from the

Fifteenth Century, 2 and another from the early Nineteenth Century. 3

A third and equally eminent scholar, writing at the same time, 4 dates it from the early Twentieth Century. Other examples

could easily be produced.

But almost all agree that no mattervhat the assigned birth­

date or no matter what name is applied, something of immense

importance came onto the world scene in Western Europe some

time between the years 1400 and 1910. Whether the descriptive

word is "modern, " "developed, " or "Western, " and no matter

which if any of the values and techniques are emphasized as of

particular significance, there is general agreement among modern

scholars that the core concept has a political dimension characterized

by "nationalism" and "liberalism, " a technological dimension

characterized by the tapping of mechanical sources of power, a

social dimension characterized by extreme "role differentiation"

and the prominence of the mobile nuclear family as the prime 40.

sub-national social unit, an economic dimension characterized

by "free enterprise" or "capitalism, " a psychological dimension

characterized by "the Protestant ethic" and a scientific-philosophic

dimension characterized by logical empiricism.

The process of the birth of this value-technique cluster has been the subject of endless speculation and putative description, usually keyed to the coming together of the Renaissance, the

Reformation, and the Industrial Revolution within the environment

of late feudal institutions. There will be no attempt here to attempt yet another description. It seems fairly obvious that one of the great historical cultures was born at that time, just as the

great medieval culture had been born out of the confluence of the late Imperial culture and the value-techniques cluster of the

Germanic tribes, and like the Hellenistic culture was born out of the confluence of Hellenic culture and the culture of the non-

Hellenic East.

For the moment, discussion will be postponed as to whether or not this particular culture has to be regarded as a culmination of hu m a n history or as another great culture, of no greater historical destiny and of no greater essential dimensions than the value-technique clusters represented by the Classical or

Chinese cultures. 41.

Whatever one wants to call the new synthesis, it appears to have first appeared, indigenously, in a small corner of north­ western Europe, including England, the L o w Countries, and most of Scandinavia. When it spread to France, it was still largely rooted in local, native developments, but now had a detectable "alien importation" smell to it -- it was to a slight extent tainted as an "English idea. " These relatively cohesive values and techniques were transplanted bodily into certain over­ seas areas as northwestern Europeans physically moved themselves to places like North America, but the next great crystallization occurred in Italy and Germany, where the element of alien impor­ tation. became quite marked, and where there was considerable synthesis with indigenous cultural elements, and a corresponding appearance of certain tensions c o m m o n to other historical examples of massive cultural interaction.

The areas destined to play the Macedon to northwestern

Europe’s Hellas, however, were areas which by virtue of their cultural backgrounds could never have developed anything like the great Western culture on their own, and where Western culture was largely established by means of cultural interaction rather than by indigenous synthesis or the imitation of ideal or dead models, as was the case in northwestern Europe. These 42. areas were Eastern Europe and the Iberian peninsula.

There is a set of historical phenomena extending past the birth of the modern West which appears to represent two or three concentric rings into -which Western culture penetrated, with the greater penetration marked by nearness in time and space to the original birth of the West. These phenomena will now be examined in the large to discover general trend lines in the process, and one might naturally look ftr.st for processes resembling those manifested in other historical examples of massive interaction between two or more cultures.

It is necessary to attempt to separate first the key element(s) of the dynamic culture on the expansion of which we are going to focus. There seems little doubt that its key political expression was the concept, institution, or secular religion of the nation-state, as the key political expression of expanding Hellenism was the polis grafted onto the Macedonian model of monarchy, while the key political expression of Ro m e was universal Ro m a n law and imperial administration. "Nationalism is not universal -- it is a product of European thought of the last few hundred years.

O n the other hand, Hellenism was cosmopolitan and anti­ peculiar, as was the Ro m a n Empire based on it: "From the be­ ginning of the R o m a n Empire to the end of the Middle Ages, m e n 43. had commonly stressed the general and the universal, and seen imperial unity as the desirable goal. Contrast this norm with that of a genuine nationalist thinker: "Not in universal harmony, or in fond dreams of unbroken peace, rest now the best hopes of the world. .. rather they rest in the competition of national interests, in the reviving sense of nationality, in the jealous determination of each people to provide for its own. "

But this study is concerned with realities, nor with norms, conflicting or otherwise. And there is little doubt that when modern nationalism did burst onto the world, it burst like a thunderbolt. Contrast the basic assumptions of modern nationalism with the testament of Saint Stephen, the first King of Hungary, in the eleventh century: "A country unified in language and customs is fragile and weak. Induce many foreigners speaking different tongues to settle in Hungary and contribute to its strength and welfare."®

Questions immediately arise as to the central significance of nationalism and its parameters and essence. These natters will be developed mo r e fully later. There are occasional scholars who still argue that nationalism is not the key political concept of

Western culture, that centralized absolute governments came first and that popular sentiments of nationalism came later to justify 44. the new dispensation. ^ In the criticism just described, the spread of Western culture, with its concomitant spread of popular nationalism into increasingly alien concentric rings, has been confused with the synthesis between the nationalism born in England and the L o w Countries and the only somewhat related political cultures of France, central and eastern Europe, and

Iberia.

The peculiar and indigenous nature of the original nationalist political culture of northwestern Europe is probably best explained by Seton-Watson's m o d e l ^ of feudalism as a balance between the

R o m a n heritage and Germanic tribal customs, between trading cities and landowners. He notes the significance of the fact that a combination of elites ended by over-shadowing the rulers in northwestern Europe, while in France and Russia, the monarchs ended by overshadowing the several elites. ^ Therefore the latter political institutions did not need, did not require for survival, were not forced to generate, national sentiment as a prime cement of society. They waited, and hence when they received it, it came to some extent as a foreign import, an

"English idea" or later a "French idea" which had been in turn fertilized in its early stages by an "English idea. " 45.

Thus Hans Kohn tells us that:

Nationalism was predominantly a political movement to limit governmental power and secure individual rights and to create a liberal and rational human society. But in central and eastern Europe, in Spain and in Ireland, it came to lands which were in political ideas and social structure less advanced than the modern West. There was only a weak middle class: the nation was split between a feudal aristocracy and a rural proletariat. Thus nationalism became at first a cultural movement, the dream and hope of scholars and poets. This rising nationalism, as the whole modern social and intellectual development outside northwestern Europe, was influenced by the West. Yet this very dependence hurt the pride of the native educated class, as soon as it began to develop its own nationalism, and led it to oppose the "alien" example, with its liberal and rational outlook. Thus the new nationalisms looked for their justification and differentiation from the West in the heritage of their pasts. ^

Nationalist sentiment was the necessary political frame­ work for parliamentary democracy, for liberal capitalism, and for

economic differentiation. There is little evidence that any other

element of the Western value-technique cluster had the central

position of nationalism in the outward movement of Western culture.

The other elements of the new cluster required nationalism as a

supporting framework and a necessary, although not a sufficient,

environment.

In every case of outward penetration of nationalism from

northwestern Europe, there was a general military superiority on 46.

the side of the more Westernized culture. Examples are legion:

Gustavus Adolphus in Germany, the battle of Valmy, the defeat

of the Armada, the Anglo-French wars of the 18th century,

Solferino, and ma n y others. This military superiority was not

based on technical factors -- it was based on the immense military

advantage enjoyed by a nationalist army or navy over a feudal,

imperial, or mercenary force. 13 A ma n will fight madly for his own life, and will usually sacrifice himself for his family --

neither of these units can be used as a nucleus for large military

forces:

The nation affords a provisional solution of the ambiguity of finite sacrifice, and only if this is the case does the nation or any other political entity become the subject or political agency capable of legitimating finite sacrifice. ^

Religion, class, and race are the only concepts around which

rival military potentials might coalesce, and all three have for

the contemporary era shown themselves inferior to nationalism

in providing the mutual confidence and self-sacrifice essential for

military efficiency.

A second and third phenomenon also seem clear: the

political culture established outside the narrow northwestern area

differed from the original culture in important respects, and

the vehicle for the spread of the new culture (paced by the sentiment 47.

of nationalism) was a restive secondary elite seeking power and

status and affected to some extent by the anomie described

earlier. Compare for example the assured, natural, unself­

conscious national sentiment of that typical British nationalist,

David Hume, or Edmund Burke in the next generation, with the

strain, suffering, and extremist views of the father of modern

French nationalism, Rousseau:

It is the task of education to give to each hu m a n being a national form, and so direct his opinions and tastes that he should be a patriot by inclination, by passion, by necessity. O n first opening his eyes, a child must see his country, and until he dies must see nothing else. ^

The Abbe Sieyes, another early French nationalist, also

expresses himself in a way which would be difficult to attribute

to an Englishman or a Dutchman:

The nation is prior to everything. It is the source of everything. Its will is always legal; indeed, it is the law itself. Prior to and above the nation, there is only natural law. Every attribute of the nation springs from the simple fact that it exists. ^

Carleton Hayes describes the Jacobin nationalism of the

French Revolution as (a) intolerant of internal dissent, (b) violent

and militaristic, (c) fanatical in a religious sense, and (d) marked by missionary zeal. 17

As nationalism, spearheaded by the military prowess of 48. the new French state, began to gain mo m e n t u m in Germany and Italy, the distortion of the sentiment and the key role of intellectuals as against the role of me n of action became even more striking. Boyd Shafer describes the process in central

Europe in the early 19th century:

Hope, fear, and hate in a time of insecurity and disintegrating values: these were fundamental in the growing nationalism. The nation became an answer to men's anxieties, a solution for their frustrations, and a refuge in time of trouble. For m a n y it became the hopeful road to a heavenly city of the future upon earth.

Shafer describes the genesis of Ge rman nationalism as rooted in fear, hatred, and a lust for revenge growing out of

French military superiority.

In Italy even Mazzini argued openly the all-too-common but irrational doctrine that national self-government, no matter how bad by any external standard, is preferable to the best possible government on any other basis. 197 The Garibaldian army sang:

W e are spurned and scorned by the centuries because we are not a real people, but divided. Let us form a c o m m o n bond, a co m m o n hope.

Boyd Shafer describes in detail how these rabid religio- national expressions were fueled on one side by the new technology, which eased the growth of nationalism (while nationalism pro­ 49. vided the arena for the new technology) by permitting and later requiring economic classes to cooperate for their c o m m o n good, and on the other side by the destruction of traditional authority and consequent widespread anxiety and frustration.

The traits of German romantic nationalism are too well known to require recapitulation here. It began with Hegel's

"all the worth the human being possesses, he possesses through 21 the State. " It goes on to the wilder passions of Trietschke.

These "doctrines of national pride and power" which burgeoned with nationalism in central and southern Europe, have been summarized as follows:

The nation is a real being to which persons must be sacrificed. It is a final unit in the world's order. Its interests are particular: they are not reconcilable with those of other nations save through temporary expedience and force or the fear of force. Its policies must be based on considerations of gain or loss of power, on calculations of available power, and of the consequence of various choices in its use. Power itself is m e n and resources, propaganda and morale, as these can actually be applied to generate, and, if need be, to use, force. In their totality these ideas have generally been associated with strong or autocratic regimes. 7 1u7 50.

Myron Weiner, ed., Modernization (New York: Basic Books, 1966). 2 Joseph La Palombara, "Distribution and Development, " in Weiner, Ibid., p. 218.

3 J. J. Spengler, "Modernization of the Economy, " in Weiner, Ibid., p. 323. 4 Marion J. Levy, Jr., Modernization and the Structure of Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 85.

5 E. H. Carr, Nationalism and After (London: Oxford Press, 1945), p. 74.

^Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (rev. ed.; Princeton, N e w Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, 1965), p. 15. 7 •Alfred T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1909), p. 29.

Along the same line is the following from Ernst Renan, Discours et Conferences (Paris: Colman-Levy, 1887), p. 310: "Nations are nothing eternal. They will have an end. The European Confederation will probably replace them. But this is not the law of our age. At present, the existence of nations is good and even necessary. Their exis­ tence is a guarantee of liberty which would be lost if the world had only one law and one master. "

^Quoted in Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Hapsburg Monarchy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 39. Q Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D. C.i1 The Brookings Institute, 1967), p. 29.

^ H u g h Seton-Watson, Neither War Nor Peace (2nd ed.;; N e w York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 218-220. 51.

^ R a y m o n d Aron underlines further the importance of the near-unique multiple elite structure in the cradle of the Western culture. In "Social Structure and the Ruling Class, " in Comparative Politics, ed. by Roy C. Macrides and Bernard C. Brown (3rd edi, Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), pp. 44-55, he describes the elites of early West as distinct from one another, while in ma n y later-Westernizing societies, the elites are relatively unified. "A unified elite means the end of freedom. When elite groups are not only distinct but a disunity, it means the end of the state."

l^Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, pp. 29-30. 1 ^ "Political Nationalism has become for the European of our age the most important thing in the world, more important than civilization, humanity, decency, kindness, piety; more important than life itself. " N o r m a n Angell, quoted in Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality (New York: Harcourt, Bruce, and World, Inc., 1955), p. vii.

■^Paul Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (New York: Charles Scribner's & Sons, 1968), p. 15.

15C . E. Vaughn, ed., Political Writings of J. J. Rousseau, Vol II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1915), p. 437.

^Abbe-Sieyes, What is the Third Estate ? ed. by S. E. Finer (London: Pall Mall, 1963), p. 126.

17Carleton Hayes, The Historical Evolution of Modern Nationalism (New York: Russell and Russell, 1968), p. 53.

*®Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality, p. 136.

^Quoted in Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (rev, ed.; N e w York: Praeger, 1962), p. 109.

^Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality, p. 176.

Quoted in Louis L. Snyder, The N e w Nationalism (Ithaca, N e w York: The Cornell University Press, 1968), p. 31. 52.

^Thomas c. Cook and Malcolm Moss, Power Through Purpose (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1954), p. 115. C H A P T E R HI

The Coming of Western Culture? Spain

Beyond France in the first instance and Germany-Italy in the second, there remains yet another area of historical explora­ tion in the search for characteristics of the effect of massive cultural interaction between the Western culture and non-Western ones. And these later examples, while still not leading us into the Afro-Asian-Latin American phenomenon, appear to lie half­ way between the French, German, and Italian examples on the one hand and the wholly non-Western areas on the other hand in terms of their cultural difference from the indigenous West and therefore in terms of the relative degree to which cultural change took the form of the importation of alien values and techniques.

The results of an examination of this area -- Spain and Eastern

Europe -- are critical to this study.

Massive cultural interactions in history have been shown to display certain characteristics, most of which are c o m m o n to most examples. The earliest phases of the spread of Western culture, into its own "back yard, " give no reason to believe that massive cultural interaction involving the West is qualitatively distinct from the great bulk of historical examples of such 54.

interchange, and within the larger pattern of traits c o m m o n to

most cultural interactions, traits have been discerned which may, on further examination, turn out to be c o m m o n to most

instances of massive cultural interaction involving the West. If

Spain and Eastern Europe show logical extensions of the same

tendencies, one ma y be well on the way to assuming that the

spread of Western culture represents a long-extant and not sur­ prising type of historical process, which should be expected to

conform generally to the laws of such processes, and one will have in hand some promising assumptions as to phenomena accompanying interactions involving this particular cluster of values and techniques -- the Western culture.

Spain will be considered first, and separately from Eastern

Europe. It seems that an examination of Portugal would show

strong parallels with Spain, but no attempt is made here to study

Portuguese contact with the West, in order to keep the mass of the study at a workable minimum. Spain's, and, to a lesser extent, Portugal's experience will be of particular value later in

examining Latin America's travails of "development."

The brilliant economist, Martinez de la Mata, described

Spain's problem succinctly in the mid-Eighteenth Century, when the Western culture was burgeoning in the Northwest and beginning 55.

to affect France:

The most obvious defect which one finds in the body of this republic is that there does not exist in any one of its parts any love or regard for the conservation of the whole; for every ma n thinks solely of present utility and not at all of the future.

Raymond Carr, generally accepted as one of the most

eminent of Western students of Spanish history, puts the difficulty

in mu c h the same way:

All interpreters of Spain have insisted upon the primacy of local ties and the rule of inverse proportion -- the greater the area to which patriot­ ism is applied the less intense it becomes. The imperfect sense of national unity is thus explained in terms of those mores and customs that gave Spain unity at a lower level. National unity came late and could not conquer the sense of belonging to pre- national societies. . .a Spaniard's natural emotional loyalty is to his puebla, to his province; he identifies himself progressively against those of another village or province, against other Spaniards, and only finally against all foreigners. ^

The overtly Westernizing Radicals of the period 1790-1808,

critical of all traditional values, were intellectuals and officials who identified themselves with a Spanish version of the new

French nationalism. ^ But an old scene was re-enacted when

the attraction of French military superiority, supported by

French integral nationalism, turned to the negative element in the

central myth of Spanish nationalism -- the war against the

Napoleonic invaders. While a national myth of enormous potency 56.

was created, it wasn't enough to overcome localism, particu­

larly since all subsequent "mythical" struggles turned out badly.

Actually, the Spanish military effort in 1810-1814 was ineffectual,

and was subsidiary to the military efforts of the English. ^ The

Cortes of Cadiz in 1810, which ought to have been the catalyst

of Western-style national unity in Spain, tried to abolish the historic provinces and raise up a middle-class elite to co-exist,

in British fashion, with other and better-established elites.

Liberalism failed miserably after 182® in its effort to

"apply, by means of military sedition, the politics of interest

and the machinery of parliamentary government to an under­

developed society. The extreme radicals dominated the press

and drew on discontented younger office seekers as a primary

source of recruits.

By the 1830's, Carlism appeared on the scene as a

peas ant-oriented, provincialist, anti-national crusade, and it

remained on the scene, a counterweight to radical Western-type

nationalism, for a hundred years. The countryside was usually

Carlist, the towns radical. By 1840 the core of the radical

party, the "Westernizing" opponent of Carlism, was the under­

employed educated middle class looking to government jobs.

"To be an aspirant for a government post was almost an honored, 57. and certainly a recognized, profession.. .. Without enough pasture for the beasts to feed on, those left outside, w h e n patronage was divided up among the claimants, went into oppo­ sition. . .this inevitable and necessary pruning of the world of self-appointed functionaries was regarded as a betrayal of the g masses by the leaders."

Spanish liberalism, the vanguard of Westernization, lost out to the radicals even while it was defeating Carlism. It was the latter, not the former, which wa s a true mo v e m e n t of the dispossessed. 9 While there was economic progress, it was marked by an extreme of protectionism during the 19th

Century. ^ By 1866 the A r m y was no longer absorbed in defend­ ing the realm; it no w be c a m e loyal to "opinion" -- viz. , it inter­ preted the national will. ^ In the latter third of the century,

Spanish intellectual and political history was dominated by the strange student doctrine of Krausism, a mystical belief in natural harmony, "a blend of subjectivism and vague modernism, " which "converted Spanish intellectuals into philosophic radicals, with Moral Purpose rather than Utility as the standard by which existing institutions should be judged.

B y the end of the 19th Century, Spanish experiments in parliamentary democracy had foundered because people voted 58. on national issues for local reasons, and because Spanish military prestige had hit rock bottom. The navy once had a hundred admirals and no ships ! There were twice as many officers in the Spanish as in the French armies! 13

At the beginning of the Twentieth Century Spanish intel­ lectuals were divided into starkly contrasting groups -- Ortega y Gassett and others who believed Spain must truly Westernize itself, and on the other hand U n a m u n o and his friends, w h o believed that national salvation mu s t imply Spanish values.

Neither group was now liberal -- both despised contemporary society and urged "difficult, total solutions." Both feared popu­ lar democracy. The connection between ethics and politics exemplified in the Krausist movement meant that romantic revolutionarism, Utopianism, and various separatist nationalisms were rampant.

The Rivera dictatorship was not fascist. It supported the

Nation, the Church, and the King, in that order. It considered as its en e m y anyone w h o threatened national unity. De Rivera's son founded the only Spanish fascist movement, which represented a desperate effort to build a genuine and fervent national unity.

Franco regarded the Civil Wa r as anti-secessionist. His primary beliefs s e e m to have been in the unity of the state, in order, and 59. in heinarchy, along with his intense Catholicism and some social radicalism. 15

Gerald Brennan's description of the Carlist mo v e m e n t brings out again the underlying problem of national unity as the sine qua non key to Westernization:

A longing for the past because the past gave unity. . .a return to that regional and personal inde­ pendence and weak central government that Spaniards love.

Portugal broke away successfully from the rest of Spain, and Catalonia almost did so several times. A Reuters dispatch from Madrid of April 12, 1968, describes a recent series of gun fights and b o m b blasts marking the activities of a Basque nationalist organization, the E T A .

Brennan also locates impediments to Westernization in pride, a belief in miracles, contempt for work, impatience, and destructiveness:

Work had become a degrading thing. To avoid it one should live by one's wits or be c o m e a govern­ ment clerk. Spaniards had become accustomed to living for great, spectacular ends, and could not adjust 17 to the ideals of wo r k perseverance, and duty.

Brennan is here saying, of course, that Spain did not become.

Western in economic and political terms because it remained psychologically non-Western. But the "ideals of work, perse- 60.

verance, and duty" could hardly have flowered without a frame­ w o r k of national identity to give them cohesion.

The story of the interaction of "Western" culture with that

of Spain ma y still be an unfinished story. But the basic trend

lines observed earlier seem to be reinforced by the Spanish case.

Spain did not, and doubtless will not, bec o m e Western -- the

cultural interaction is producing a n e w synthesis. Spain took as a model of Westernization the secondary "Macedon" of France, not the original models in northwestern Europe. Western influ­

ence first struck the cities, while the countryside remained untouched, and the society was split as a result.

The political aspect of Westernization, and perhaps its central aspect, was perceived as national unity -- the establish­ m e n t of a national sentiment and a national state as against the earlier countervailing localisms. Westernization became strong when France proved its military superiority based on French nationalism. The great Spanish national myth was born out of a

romanticized resistance to that military capacity. Westernizing

elites thenceforward in Spain looked to France for inspiration while using France as an enemy, linking the Wes t in general with Carlist plots and the allegedly anti-national and cosmopolitan

Jewish minority. Spain badly needed a good myth of military 61. valor and success, but the only thing it had after 1814 was the mini-imperialist venture culminating in the capture of

Tetuan in I860.

What was the nature of the elite minority that spearheaded

Western influence in Spain? It was marked by the possession of formal education, by an aversion to work other than in government offices, and by a romantic, "ethical, " view of politics. It wa s cut off from its ow n society and split between elements who prescribed wholesale adoption of Western ways and those who favored a vaguely defined mixing of the best in

Western values and techniques with the best in local values and techniques. Th e various elites affected by Westernization suffered in varying degrees, but clearly did suffer, from Durkheim's

"anomie. " None of them seem to have emphasized economics per se, although mo s t of them desired a degree of industriali­ zation for purposes of defense and prestige.

As for Spain's present posture, it is probably best s u m m e d up by James H. Meisel, who writes:

Spain sports a feeble fascist ideology, but is not a fascist system. The regime remains authori­ tarian, but, true to its origins, its structure rests on the tetrarchy of Army, Church, Business, and Falange, in that order of importance. ... Through Franco, Spain became at last a contemporary state .. .and has been opened up for the industrial revolution. Quoted in Gerald Brennan, The Spanish Labyrinth (Cambridge:; The University Press, 1864), p. 13.

^Raymond Carr, Spain: 1808-1939 (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 58. 3. Ibid. p. 75.

Ibid. p. 105.

5Ibid. p. 95.

6Ibid. p. 130.

7Ibid. p. 165.

8Ibid. p. 167. In one recorded instance in the 1840*s, there were , 636 formal applicants for 40 jobs in the post office 9 Ibid. p. 168.

10Ibid. pp. 278-279.

U Ibid. p. 283.

12Tbid. p. 297.

13Ibid. p. 530.

14.Ibid. p. 566.

15Ibid. p. 674.

16,Brennan, The Spanish Labyrinth, p. 205. Also note the conclusions of Harold Livermore, A History of Spain (New York Minerva Press, 1968), p. 452, where a continuum of basic North-South and East-West disunity is mentioned.

17Ibid., p. 11. lftLivermore, A History of Spain, p. 452: "Spanish politicians vainly but indefatiguably sought absolutes. " 19 James H. Meisel, Counter -Revolution (New York: The Atherton Press, 1966), p. 186. C H A P T E R IV

The Coming of Western Culture: Eastern Europe

In order to further check the existence, within the history of cultural interaction involving the West, of trend lines c o m m o n to other cases of massive cultural interaction, and in order to arrive at general rules applying to interactions involving the

West, the recent history of Eastern Europe must be examined along with that of the Iberian peninsula. If c o m m o n factors are discovered in the Eastern European and Spanish examples one can assume that these factors, or s o m e trace of them, will be visible in still other cases. Russia will be considered along with Japan in the next chapter as special cases -- the term

Eastern Europe excludes for our purposes Russia, and includes the area c o m m o n l y known as the Balkans. This area, like Spain, first encountered the modern West while possessing some elements of the "indigenous" Northwestern cultural pattern, but effective

Westernization would require a massive cultural interaction.

The area concerned has for the past several centuries been largely under the control of the Russian, Austrian and

Ottoman empires. In the interests of brevity, this study will concentrate on the mo s t significant of these multi-national 65.

structures -- the Austrian Empire of the Habsburgs.

As Spain represents Westernization in an independent

country, the Empire represents Westernization within a pro­ foundly non-Western institutional structure. It was not the

"imperialism" of popular myth; although the rulers spoke

German, they hated Ge r m a n national sentiment just as m u c h as they hated any other national sentiment. The imperial rulers tried desperately to create and nurture a multi -national political

system based on good administration (the imperial civil service was more efficient than anything the people had known before or were to know afterwards^1) and economic advantage (the Empire's per capita G N P grew at a fantastic rate between 1900 and 1914, for example). If Westernization meant economic advantage,

good administration, and role differentiation -- the Habsburgs had all these in their baggage.

Until well into the Nineteenth Century, Habsburg rule

rested firmly on the dynasty itself, to which were attached the

great ma s s e s of the population, the A r m y , "which was insulated from particularism and stood in principle and practice for

equality, " the "Sixty Families" of the multi-national nobility, the Catholic Church, the civil service, and m o d e m trade and 66. industry, particularly that part directed by the Jews, wh o were clearly a supra-national "European" and cosmopolitan 2 potential target.

The supra-national element in the A r m y was surpris­ ingly strong; even its marching songs wer e carefully no n ­ national, and to the very end in 1918 the young Em p e r o r was calling on the dying and defeated A r m y to save the State.

W h y didn't the E m p i r e become a national state ? C e r ­ tainly countries like G e r m a n y and Italy wer e far from ho m o ­ genous. Oscar Jaszi ma k e s a good case to the effect that good government and economic advance -- even the power of Marxist socialism (which was throughout an anti-peculiarist ally of the

Habsburgs ) and the long-held sympathy between the oppressed 4 classes of the national minorities, could not succeed in creating a nationalism where the lingo-ethnographic elements were so mixed and diverse that a kind of "critical ma s s " was reached.

The dissolution of the Habsburg mo n a r c h y and the establishment of ne w national states on its ruins was essentially the s a m e process which in ma n y other states of Europe led to the State integration of those peoples having the s a m e language and culture. The s a m e causes working for unity in the nationally homogenous states of Europe worked toward dissolu­ tion in the ethnographic mosaic of the Empire. .. The E m p i r e collapsed because the historic tradition of each nation stood in a hostile wa y against the histori­ cal experience of the other nations.^ 67.

Nationalism came like a contagious disease into the

Imperial structure. First it wa s only the Hungarians -- then, in rapid succession, Poles, Germans, Italians, and Bohemians awakened to national consciousness. Each felt that the awakening of national consciousness among the minorities they oppressed would be practically impossible. But soon Slovaks, Rumanians,

Ukrainians, and Croats had also caught the fever. In a way, the political and military strength of the "ancient nation" of Hungary tended to knock over a row of dominoes.

Concessions in the way of greater self-government made the problem worse: "The problem was intensified to the extent that the absolute state b e c a m e democratic. A n d free trade, a c o m m o n market, and industrialization on balance exacerbated national conflicts and were dominant factors in rousing a sense of national identity because mo s t capitalists and technicians were

Germans and Jews; economic advance therefore equalled exploi­ tation. Furthermore, industries were concentrated in economically advantageous areas, which me a n t that in the absence of a national sentiment, the eastern regions of the Empire chalked up still another example of "exploitation. "

It would be wrong to neglect the ever-present military power factor. If the Empire had emerged gloriously victorious 68. over its enemies in 1918, it might still be alive fifty years later. But it was fighting national states, and its resulting military disadvantage was such that it could not win a tough war, despite heroics and professional skill on the part of the non-national professional soldiers.

The E m p i r e represented a dozen national traditions struggling to be born. Spain represented only one --if the

Catalons and Basques are arbitrarily called Spaniards. But the elite role in the nationalist (or Westernizing) m o v e m e n t is much the same. Metternich spotted it as "Professorial theory

— a.swindle by the universities. ..an enlightened demagogy, originating with the educated urban middle class and gradually g envenoming the great ma s s of the population. "

Jaszi identifies the two social classes w h o pushed the nationalist faith as the intelligentsia and the lower middle class, in that order of importance. For the intelligentsia,

it meant a growing participation in the administra­ tive positions and in the economic advantages depen­ dent on state power. The struggle for national myths was in their eyes identical with the claim that not strangers but the national intelligentsia should occupy all administrative positions, both large and small. '

In Eastern Europe, poets, writers, and artists played the role that kings and ministers had played in Western Europe. 69.

M a x Nom a d has described eloquently the primary aspect

of Balkan revolutionary movements in general as a struggle for

government jobs by intellectuals.

The lower middle class, according to Jaszi, felt the

national awakening within a multi-national state as "a struggle

for the customer of their small shops, inns, and artisan estab­

lishments. But the peasantry, except where landlords were

of another nationality, were m o v e d only by religious aspects of

the movements, and were drawn in only slowly, while urban

workers were unimpressed unless their bosses were foreigners

or until they c a m e under the influence of intellectuals.

What could the Habsburgs have done to save themselves ?

Should they have appeased the nationalities with political, economic,

and educational advantages? A. J. P. Taylor doesn't believe that

any amount of prescience of good will could have helped, and he

points to the problem the Czechs had with the Sudeten Ge r m a n s

and the Slovaks after 1919. 1 ^ Jaszi opines that "Each nation

had a marshals baton in its knapsack -- the idea of perfect

national independence." He points out that the problem by its

nature could not be solved by reforms, and that actually it in­

creased as the nations grew in economic, cultural, and political rights. "The m o r e that former claims we r e satisfied, the m o r e 70.

the nations felt themselves oppressed... The m o r e the former

ruling nations were put on the defensive, the m o r e the Czechs and

the other former servant-nations began to feel that their situ­

ation was shameful and the m o r e their orators hurled phillipics

against foreign oppression and exploitation. 11 ^

The n e w national sentiments involved partook of the nature

of a mass psychosis, carried on for slogans and symbols.

They contained "Something religious, something mysterious. .. , an im m e n s e creative force.. .an irrational character, deeply sen- 15 timental and traditional." Further, Jaszi notes:

(The submerged nationalities) were devoid of any rational pr o g r a m in the m o d e m sense. O n the con­ trary, their national efforts were full of age-old emotional elements partly social and partly mystical in origin. Every mass movement had a tendency toward extremism. There was a credulous mysticism in the great ma s s e s of the population; legend originated easily, and had wide repercussions. With the masses on such a low level of critical power, it was scarcely possible to carry out a rational policy in the Western sense of the word.

The importance of language as a determinant of national sentiment is written largely in the decay of the Empire. Even

Czech intellectuals manufactured and forged an immense mass of epic poetry which they then presented to themselves and their followers to prove that Bohemians were cultured while Germans were still barbarians. In each of the nations such exalted poets 71. and visionaries held forth, often trying to create a unified national literary language and then endowing it with antiquity for use as a political tool. 17 "Everywhere there was a curious searching for real or imagined historical ancestors, a lost, glorious Past, like a lost Paradise. "18

Before leaving the record of the Empire, we might quote

Jaszi once m o r e to describe the reactions of an eyewitness to the free advice of well-meaning Westerners:

I repeatedly (beofre 1914) heard opinions of distinguished visitors from Western Europe or America according to which the struggling national minorities were prisoners of an anachronistic sentimentalism be­ cause instead of promoting their mo r e important social and economic interests, they were always shouting their national grievances and their linguistic and historical aspirations.. .Our visitors forgot that an oppressed nationality which fights continuously for its languages, schools, and administration cannot have an adequate interest in the so-called higher problems of civilization.

So m u c h for the era of "the struggle for independence. "

There is m o r e to the story. W hat happened wh e n political inde­ pendence was obtained? In what ways did the Western culture continue to interact with non-Western indigenous influences ?

In the 1919 settlement, it was not possible to d r a w lines on the ground which coincided with divisions between peoples of ne w national sentiments. The territory given to Italy was 72. less than half Italian, in population. F e w e r than two-thirds of the people of new Poland were Polish, and the same proportion was true for Rumania. Yugoslavia contained nine nationalities, 20 and Czechoslovakia seven. It wa s confidently expected in the

W est and in Am e r i c a that with the coming of national independence and the transfer of power (except for Czechoslovakia and Hungary) to the ma s s nationalist agrarian parties headed by intellectuals, the areas concerned would be blessed by economic advance, political democracy, and individual liberty -- the constellation of classical liberalism.

A m o n g the.various things which really did happen, there can be no doubt that the prime phenomenon was the frantic effort to obliterate national minorities, again with the partial exception of urbanized Czechoslovakia and aristocratic Hungary. Hungary had since 1870 been forcing the Magyar language on non-Magyar children. This policy was far less inhuman than that devised in ma n y of the successor states after 1918. Socialists with pretensions to internationalism turned as a m a n to exclusive romantic nationalism. The following excerpt from Hugh Seton-

Watson's standard wo r k shows w h y the elaborate international agreements to safeguard minorities were useless, and charac­ terizes the nationalist essence of the successor states: 73.

The identification of nationality or language with the State apparatus m a k e s permanent friend­ ship between the majority and minority nations within a state impossible. A s long as these things are identified, the minorities, however well treated, will desire incorporation in another state, where their kinsmen are a majority, or the creation of a new state in which they can form the majority, while the majority nation will regard the minorities, however well behaved, as a potential danger to the State. Mutual confidence and friendship are in such cases impossible... .It is often said that the Eastern European peasant is the bearer of the national idea. This catch­ word is repeated on every conceivable occasion by the intellectual chauvinists of Eastern Europe. It is true that during centuries of foreign rule the national languages and customs were preserved by the peasantry, which had little contact with the alien ruling class. H e clings stubbornly to his language and customs. But the peasant is not the bearer of the national ideology of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. That idea is essentially intellectual, and was introduced into Eastern Europe by m e n who had studied it in the class - rooms of Paris or had heard the version proclaimed by the G e r m a n romantic distorters of the principles of 1789. It is quite probable that the principle of cultural autonomy within State unity would be acceptable to the peasant. It is doubtful, however, whether the nationalist intellectual class and its pupils in the army, bureaucracy, and co m m e r c e -- the ruling class in between wars in Eastern Europe -- could ever accept this principle. These people could not be satisfied with cultural autonomy. They require nothing less than a National State, in which the whole bureaucratic, military, and commercial apparatus of state sovereignty is utilized by them as rulers of the majority nation within the State. They require this partly because it affords them oppor­ tunities of personal enrichment and power which would be denied them under any other system, and partly be­ cause their ideological leaders have for fifty years or more been convinced that no nation can escape physical annihilation that does not possess a sovereign state of its own, equipped with all the tools of “integral nation­ alism". This d o g m a is shrieked forth with fanatical 74.

and wearisome frenzy by the representatives of the educated classes of the [Eastern European nations. The fact that this is historically untrue and practically meaningless in no way diminishes its importance. It is believed by the educated classes of oppressed minorities and oppressing majorities alike. The tearful bleatings of the former and the confident brayings of the latter blend mo s t unharmoniously in a deafening chorus. If political power and the control of education remain in the hands of the ruling intellec­ tuals, there is no prospect that a ne w system other than sovereign states could succeed. Minorities prob­ lems will continue to give trouble.

The application of this exclusiveness to the Jews (except in aristocratic Hungary) is of particular importance, since their

education, traditions, Westernized values, and their innocence

of any "threat" of a dangerous counter-nationalism should have m a d e them the natural allies of ne w elites ostensibly dedicated to liberal Western values and economic development. Instead, in

Seton-Watson's words:

The native intellectual of Eastern Europe resents the greater mental agility of the Jew. The romantic nationalists at once recognized the prag­ matic cosmopolitan Jew as an enemy. .. the spread of education brought forth an increasing crop of "intellectuals." Graduates expected by right a place in either the civil service of the free profes­ sions. Despite great distention, the bureaucracy could not provide places for all, and the professions were one-quarter to two-thirds Jewish. Therefore the intellectuals d e m a n d e d their exclusion from the professions, and even from commerce. 22

Another example is thus provided of the absolute priority given to "national integration" and less formally to the interests of 75.

dominant elites, as against the Western ideals of liberty, d e m o ­

cracy, and economic efficiency.

Seton-Watson's position is summarized in his remark that

"the fundamental conflict in Eastern Europe is between the ruling

bureaucratic-commercial class and the peasantry." He says it

is true but unimportant that most of the ruling classes are t h e m ­

selves the sons of peasants. The son of the peasant no longer belongs in the village; still less do his children. H e is almost

always the son of a big peasant, a schoolteacher, or a priest. By

1944 the chances that a son of the ruling proletariat could rise

to a high place was no greater than it was in 1918.^3 jt appears

that his chances are no better in 1969, although adequate and

accurate statistics are not available.

The ruling elites, unwilling to confront the problem of

rural overpopulation, tried to sweep the peasant under the rug by physically preventing migration to the city. Skilled workers

in the towns got along very well, maintained at relatively high

wages in autarchic and inefficient industries at the expense of

peasants and unskilled workers. 24

Most scholars believe that per capita income in Eastern

Europe as a whole actually declined between the collapse of

the Em p i r e and the outbreak of World Wa r II. Certainly, as 76.

Seton-Watson asserts, "Oppression, robbery, discontent, and disunity were greater throughout Eastern Europe in 1939 than 25 they had been in 1918. " Overt political preachments were democratic, but the ruling elites used police terror against the peasants to keep th e m in their place. 26

While administration was better in areas like Bohemia and Moravia where Habsburg traditions were strong, and worst in former parts of the Turkish and Russian empires, in general it was "essentially arbitrary and dictorial, with its severity always mitigated by inefficiency and corruption. " Seton-Watson goes on to give as an eyewitness description of the administration of the "emerging nations" between the wars:

The Balkan official regards himself as immeasur­ ably superior to the peasants among w h o m he lives and from wh o m he has sprung. T o be an official is the fondest dream of every young son of a peasant. The Balkao official does not like to work. H e considers himself so fine a fellow that the State and the public should not ask hi m to m a k e efforts that will tax his intellect or character. A visitor to a Balkan ministry or police headquarters in the middle of the morning will find the rooms filled with good-natured fellows comfor­ tably enjoying a cup of coffee and a chat with their friends. Papers lie on their desks. Outside stand, sit, and squat patient queues of peasants awiting their various permits and receipts. Foreigners and citizens with pull obtain swift and polite attention, but the people can afford to wait. Balkan bureaucracy involves obscure and compli­ cated formalities and documents. .. .Everything which can be is centralized in the capital. The local official dreads above all responsibility. Everything mu s t be 77.

referred to a higher quarter., .administration is characterized by pompous laziness, love of formality, and fear of responsibility. Petty corruption is wide­ spread. .. .In Eastern Europe the great fortunes are m a d e not in industry or banking but in politics.^

Special mention must be given to educational "advances"

Tinder the new national dispensations. Huge numbers of schools w ere established, and literacy increased sharply There was a vast appetite for schooling. But teachers were scarce, and no one wanted a teacher of another national group.

Teachers continued to pay lip service to the ideals of the French Revolution, but in practice they fell back on the safe and easily intelligible doctrine of romantic nationalism. Each schoolchild looks back to a brief historical period wh e n his country dominated its neighbors. The youth of each nation was taught to regard itself as superior to all others in culture, moral values, and courage. In mos t schools the students got no mo r e than a grounding in the three R's, and a conviction that chauvinism is the highest civic virtue.^®

University education was an even sadder mockery of the culture of northwestern Europe which allegedly inspired the new dispensation.

The great majority of the students were the sons and daughters of poor families;, enabled by the State to continue their studies. They should constitute a national elite, but only a small proportion were inspired by a love of learning or a desire to train their intellects for the service of their countries. Their idea of such service was rather that they had an automatic right to a place in the State administration after spending a given nu m b e r of years in the university. A university diploma wa s con­ sidered a claim on the State for life. A great part of the 78,

students' time was spent in political activity... When the professors were rash enough to remind the students that they had c ome to work, the students "went on strike" and refused to take the examinations. Many of the professors encouraged them. This system of false education at best encouraged chauvinism and at most helped destroy all conception of morality. U n ­ healthy romanticism, national arrogance, and intel­ lectual and moral dishonesty were not confined to the schools and universities, but extended to the press, all sorts of publications, the theatre, and all propaganda in the widest sense. A ruling class formed in this atmosphere had no sense of responsibility toward other classes, no understanding of the principle of individual liberty, no knowledge of the fundamental problems of the country, and still less of neighboring countries. .. the grave problem of "intellectual underemployment" which became acute in Eastern Europe.. .provided a generous supply of "Fuhrers" for the local fascist movements .9

Wha t political forms did the "liberation" of the peoples of

Eastern Europe take? As has been pointed out, all of the new states were exclusively nationalist. E v e n in overtly multi­ national Yugoslavia the Serbs maintained a belligerent superiority over the other eight national groups, and even in overtly liberal

Czechoslovakia Sudetens, Hungarians, and Slovaks believed themselves oppressed by a kindly but alien Czech government.

A n elite marked primarily by the possession of formal education and me m b e r s h i p in the locally dominant linguistic group dominated each country.

The era began with formally democratic parliamentary forms of government, which Seton-Watson calls "pseudo- 79. parliamentarianism. " The dominant elites rigged the elections, and soon everyone kn e w the results beforehand. Parties used the mo s t extravagant slogans and promises: Freedom, Justice, and Prosperity would be established eternally by each party.

Every year the number of credulous voters decreased, as party after party showed that it wa s dishonest, seeking mainly to exploit the peasantry. Extremist mo v e m e n t s c a m e up, and as the pseudo-democracies replied with repressive laws, the pseudo-democratic regime was transformed into what Seton-

Watson calls a police dictatorship30 but is better described as a consolidating nationalist authoritarianism.

These regimes were threatened by radical reform mo v e ­ ments on the Right, backed by challenging younger elite groups, which best fit under the rubric of "fascism" (see Chapter VII ).

Governments in Eastern Europe, once they fell into the consoli­ dating dictatorship-fascist continuum, did not slide backwards into pseudo-democracy or into liberal democracy of the north­ western European variety. They dwelt either on the Horthy-

Pilsudski-Antonescu end of the spectrum or on the Codreanu-

Tiso-Szalasi end of it, or, less likely, somewhere in between.

Spain provides a similar pattern, although as one peculiar nation, the general pattern is not so clear. Th e elder de Rivera 80. and Franco provide the Horthy-Pilsudski paradigm of con­ solidating nationalist authoritarianism, while the Falange represents the other end. The Republic and the pre-de Rivera m o n archy take the shape of the pseudo-democracy of Eastern

Europe.

Of the consolidating national dictatorships, Poland and

Hungary are good examples. Pilsudski was a Marxist socialist whose socialism, like that of Mussolini, fell victim to his nationalism. The ideology of Pilsudski1 s dictatorship was murky,

7 1 irrational, mystic, and hyper-nationalist. 1 Poland needed a strong charismatic leader:

All Poles we r e united in their determination to guard Polish independence and to m a k e life intolerable for those of their citizens whose loyalties were outside the Polish State. O n everything else they were divided.

Like other consolidating nationalist authoritarian regimes, that of Pilsudski talked a lot of National Unity, Moral Regeneration,

Non-Party Objectivity, and Strong Hands. It specifically was not "reactionary." It was essentially defensive, protecting elites newly in power by the power of the State and the emotional fervor of newly found nationalism. It was closely associated with the A r m y and Police but was not Praetorian. Power was more and mo r e centralized in the "Colonel's Gang" as well as in 81.

Pilsudski himself. In the na m e of patriotism the regime bal­

anced against each other the radical fascist reformers of the 33 N A R A party and the pseudo-Liberals.

In Hungary Admiral Horthy played the same role, con­

solidating the interests of the different elites w h o profited most

from Hungarian independence. Because in Hungary alone of the

Eastern European nations the aristocracy was a respectable

component of the ruling elite structure, the regime was somewhat

more human and less anti-Semitic than its contemporaries.

Horthy balanced Bethlen's aristocrats, Jews, intellectuals who

had "made it, " peasants, and social democrats, against the

radical right, led by unemployed intellectuals, of Ga m b o s and

Szalasi, of Scythe Cross and Ar r o w Cross, the refuge of the

poor, the unskilled, and the disinherited. ^

Like the regimes of Horthy and Pilsudski, King Boris'

dictatorship in Bulgaria was a reaction to the failure of pseudo-

democracy and the rising threat from the radical right -- in

this case the fascist I. M . R . O . Unlike the fascists, but like the

other consolidating regimes, it tried to soften external quarrels while talking tough. "The division between ruler and ruled in

Bulgaria was m o r e political than social or economic. The

rixling class of civil servants, a r m y officers, and intellectuals 82.

jealously maintained by force their supremacy over the people

against all competitors.

Seton-Watson, as an eyewitness, is perhaps a trifle bitter

over the typical consolidating national dictatorships:

They devote themselves partly to enriching themselves and their friends and partly to playing clever little games in international diplomacy. While by their magnificent foreign policy they seek to carve themselves a niche in the Temple of History, the voice of the people goes -unheard. E v e n if they were inclined to listen to it, they couldn't, for it has no other me a n s of expression than the moving demonstrations of devoted enthu­ siasm staged by the flunkeys w h o m they pay to flatter t h e m . ^ ^

Twenty years later, having seen the results of Fascist,

Nazi, and communist totalitarian regimes, Seton-Watson is not so harsh in his judgment on the Pilsudskis of this world; as he compared the dictatorships with their fascist and communist competitors:

The power of the dictatorships was classi­ cally negative. They forbid their subjects to do and say certain things. Totalitarian regimes exer­ cise positive as well as negative power. They, too, forbid certain things, but they also unceasingly tell their subjects what they must do and say and think. They keep them permanently mobilized. They recog­ nize no distinction between public and private life... everything is political. Dictatorships will net tolerate institutions or associations whose aims co n ­ flict with their policies. Totalitarian regimes will not permit any institutions or associations not directly controlled by them — society must be atomized... 83.

.. .Dictatorships confine themselves to matters of political power, which m a y be widely interpreted. They will not hesitate to act counter to current standards of morality if the defense of their power requires it. But they do not claim themselves to be the source of morality. ^

The swamping of Bastern Europe in a new Russian Empire and the contemporary struggles of the Eastern European nations to escape the clutches of that Em p i r e are a straight-line continu­ ation of the story up to 1945. U p like a flock of Phoenixes from the supposed "ashes of bourgeouis society" have risen familiar figures of exclusive nationalism. F r o m Yugoslavia to Poland the continuing struggle against Russian control has been in nationalist, not in Leninist or anti-Leninist terms. Barbara

Jancar writes in 1968:'

(In both Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia) at the present time antagonisms between nationalities are in the ascendant, a threat to the fragile exis­ tence of the two states..... In both cases, support for a nationality opposition within the party awakes a positive response fro m corresponding articulate nationality groups within the population at large .. .The increasing self-assertiveness of ethnic groups threatens the very existence of Yugoslavia. ^

A glance at the daily press shows first Czech nationalists using Slovak separatism against the Russian imperial power, and then the Russians, in true Hapsburg style, themselves snuggling up to the Slovaks. Or one sees the Bulgarians openly threatening

Yugoslavia over Macedonia, and Yugoslavia forcibly repressing 84.

expressions of Macedonian nationalism. A communist Gomulka

in Poland has to fight for his life not against liberal or classical

conservative opposition, but against a hyper-nationalist anti-

Semitic M o c z a r who looks m o r e like the radical right of Polish

fascism than he looks like Pilsudski. Le d by Rumania, each

country clings tightly to economic autarchy against regional

economic rationalization. Once m o r e the intellectuals are

calling for national expression against imperialism. Eastern

Europe, even with its vast Ge r m a n and Jewish minorities forcibly

destroyed, still looks and sounds like wildcats in a gunny sack.

The repression of minorities will begin whe n the Russian grip is

relaxed.^®

Although public opinion surveys in Hungary have shown a

great increase in achievement orientation as against ascription, plus other signs of a gradual approach toward northwestern

European value judgments, the validity of such studies in a

communist society is still open to question, and both Ru m a n i a

and Czechoslovakia obviously fear Magyar irredentism. One

can even see traces of the Horthy-Pilsudski regime type in

Ceausescu's government in Rumania, of the fascist extreme in

Moczar, and of Czech civility in Smrkovsky.

But the resurgence of nationalism of the familiar style as 85. the prime motive force of change remains the same:

These expressions of romantic nationalism were truly unheard of and unimaginable as long as Stalinism held forth. These multiple patterns have only recently c o m e into their o w n again — with the relative, but relentless, weakening of an alien- inspired ideological system. In effect, to the de­ light of the Western social scientist, there seems to be a direct correlation between the deterioration of a central controlling authority and the slow re- emergence of native political forces and endemic socio­ economic drives.^

The Spanish example showed the results of Western cultural interaction in a semi-Western environment where there was no long period of imperial control -- where nationalism had no real foil, and had only itself to struggle with. In Eastern Europe

Westernization came against a background of supra-national, imperial organization. There is an obvious parallel with the two principal types of Afro-Asian countries.

But the similarities of the two historical experiences are far m o r e striking than the differences, despite the great difference in environment between the two cases. In both one sees that the confluence of the Western culture with a non-Western culture does not lead to a slowed or diluted variety of the Western exper­ ience. It is a vector of its own, in accordance with other lessons from history. In both examples one sees the severe psychic effect, the divorce from reality, which affected the urban elite, 86. and its use of its n e w values and techniques to gain and keep power for itself.

Both Iberia and Eastern Europe demonstrate the importance of military potential, and ho w nationalism and national integration are necessary if the polity hopes to defend itself against states with a developed national identity. In both one sees the externally aggressive and internally intolerant 42 aspects of nationalism as absorbed indirectly from the West through the Macedons of France,

Germany, and Italy. In both one sees the relative lack of interest on the part of elites in the value-cluster called liberalism and democracy -- its failure, and the rise of consolidating national dictatorships or radical fascist nationalism. One sees an increasing gap between city and countryside. One sees the notable lack of priority accorded to economic development and living standards.

The economic advances of the past twenty-five years, shaky as they are and limited as they are in terms of sector and geogra­ phical area (viz., Czechoslovakia’s declining per capita GN P ) have occurred largely as a result of imperial fiat, not as a historically determined trend.

A fairly elaborate, if somewhat unappetizing, historical model is n o w available which superimposes on the pattern of massive cultured interaction per se the particular patterns exhibited by the reactions between the Western culture and other cultures of a progressively alien nature. The essentials neces­ sary to construct predictions as to the probable results of

Western interaction with cultures even m o r e alien than the Spanish and the Eastern European are n o w in hand, but it will first be necessary to deal with two special cases, Russia and Japan, to discuss in the light of this approach the principal ideologies of the modern world, and to review examples of elite domination of changing societies. !

88.

^Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy (Chicago: University Press, 1929), p. 169. 2 Sigmund Neumann, Permanent Revolution (New York: Praeger and Company, 1965), p. 299. 3 Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, p. 184.

4lbid., p. 51. 5 Ibid., p. 7 and p. 130.

6lbid., p. 217.

7Ibid., p. 172.

g Quoted in Ibid., p. 76.

9Ibid., p. 285.

^9Karl Deutsch, Political C o m m u n i t y and the North Atlantic Area {Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 63.

^ M a x Nomad, Aspects of Revolt (New York: The Noonday Press, 1959), p. 161 and pp. 172-178.

^Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, p. 286.

l^A. j. p. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy-{London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948), p. 291.

*4Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg M o n a r c h y , p. 287.

1%bid., p. 215.

16Ibid,, p. 218.

*7Ibid., pp. 260-261. 89.

18Ibid., p. 257.

^■^Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy, p. 251.

29Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, p. 272.

21Hugh Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars (3rd ed.; Hamden, Connecticut: Anchor Books, 1962), pp. 273-275.

22Ibid., pp. 144-145.

23Ibid., p. 133.

2 4 Ibtia:, p. 135.

25lbid. , p. 154.

26 Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy, p. 272. 27 Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars, pp. 147-148.

28Ibid., p. 141.

29Ibid. , pp. 142-145.

30Ibid., p. 156.

2 ^See Joseph Rothschild, Pilsudski*s Coup d-etat (Ne w York: Columbia University Press, 1966), and Nomad, op. cit., p. 196: " A combination of socialist and nationalist elements, with the neo- fascist comppnent eventually taking the upper hand, has been particu- large conspicuous a m o n g the terrorists of the small nationalities of Eastern Europe, and can be identified among Pilsudski's associates. 11

22Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the Wars, p. 161.

32IbMvy p. 164!. Also see Janusz Tazhir and others, History of Poland (Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers, 1968), p. 638 and 678.

24Istvan Deak, "Hungary, " in The European Right, ed. by Hans Rogger and Eugene Weber (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1965), pp. 374-385. 90.

oc Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe Between the W a r s , p. 254.

36Ibid., p. 265.

37 Hugh Seton-Watson, Neither War nor Peace (2nd ed.; New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 216-217. See also Eugene Weber, "The Right, " in The European Right (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1965), p. 14: "The policies of Antonescu, Franco, Petain, Horthy, Dollfuss were not policies of mo v ement at all, but rather holding operations organized as a rule in alliance with or without the approval of moderate conserva­ tives. "

^Barbara Jancar, "A Loyal Opposition Under Communism, " Orbis, XII, No. 2 (Summer, 1968), p. 422.

3^Ibid., p. 432. Also see Iliya Jukic, "Tito’s Last Battle, " East Europe (April, 1967), pp. 2-11, for an account of rivalries between Serbs and Croats, and Paul Shoup, C o m munism and the Yugoslav National Question (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), for a broader study.

^®See G. C. Paikert, The Danube Swabians (The Hague: M . Nijhoff, 1967) for a view that Eastern Europe is hopelessly mired in "chauvinisms within chauvinisms. "

Andrew Gyorgy, "Soviet-East European Relations: Theoretical Perceptions and Political Realities, " The Central European Federalist, XVI, No. 1 (June, 1968), p. 9. Also see the description of reborn nationalism in Paul Lendvai, Eagles in Cobwebs (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1969).

42M y r o n Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development, " in Political Modernization, ed. by Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Company, 1967), p. 155. Weiner mentions as mere samples of the post World War II integration atrocities of Eastern Europe the killing of two and one-half million Jews, and the killing or exiling of nine million Germans in Poland alone, as well as the 250,000 Turks expelled from Bulgaria in 1950, and the three million Ge r m a n s and 250, 000 Hungarians expelled from Czechoslovakia. C H A P T E R V

The Coming of Western Culture: Russia and Japan

Outside the mass of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, and subject to massive Western value-technique impingement for about two centuries, are two countries which are of key importance to any analysis of basic historical trends in the non-Western world.

They are regarded by many scholars as examples of successful

"Westernization, " "Modernization, " or "Development. " Although they lay at a greater physical and cultural distance from the indigenous West of two centuries ago than did Spain or Eastern

Europe, their record in s o m e ways is m o r e like that of Central

Europe than of the two former areas: they have industrialized with considerable success measured in economic terms; they have had more success than have Eastern Europe and Spain in establish­ ing a militarily powerful, stable, political system allegedly based on the Western concept of the national state; and the social mo r e s and customs of their peoples are apparently Western in ma n y ways.

Students of "development" and comparative politics in

general tend to take these two countries, rather than Spain and

Eastern Europe, as heuristic models of the historical trend-lines 92. in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. W e shall in this study examine in broad outline the effects of the interaction of Western values and techniques first with Russia and second with Japan, and determine the extent to which this record reinforces or invalidates our tentative conclusions.

F r o m Peter the Great until 1917, one overwhelming fact dominates Russian history: a traditional autocracy perceived that it could not compete with the Wes t (vide C harles XII of

Sweden) unless it deliberately cultivated those elements of Western culture which it perceived as vital to the defense of its power against outside predators. U p until 1917, this autocracy did a remarkably successful job of it, and while building an impressive external military capacity, it also maintained the autocratic elite in places of power and status against rising sub-elites, permitting them smaller shares as tactically necessary. After

1917 the original autocratic elite group was destroyed and super­ seded by a competing elite which carried on mu c h as the original autocrats had done, seeking to build a militarily po w e r ­ ful nation and to defend its dominant position within Russia.

Like Spaniards and Eastern Europeans, the autocratic elite of Russia saw that it would be absolutely necessary to establish the wonderworking political concept of the national 93. * state in Russia. The wild and often cruel fervor of newly- awakened nationalism in Eastern Europe was deliberately fanned in Russia. But the average Russian accepted and enjoyed the romantic, aggressive, and cruel national passions which marked the notorious pogroms of Czarist times. No Spanish, Hungarian, or Polish nationalist could raise nationalism to the status of a religion mo r e passionately than did Dostoevsky with his concept of a Russian national mission to save the world from itself.

The Russian autocracy, by the vagaries of history and military fortune, dominated certain non-Russian areas at the beginning of the Petrine era, and Russians have been adding more such people to their imperial domains ever since The

Russian autocracies, pre- or post-1917, have been Russian. In times of crisis they have always appealed to Russian nationalism, to Russian history. Then what are they doing with all those non-

Russian subjects ? Answer: They were able to dominate them, not as the non-national Habsburgs dominated their Empire, but as the Magyarizing Hungarians dominated their private preserve.

Writing of the smaller Eastern European national groups,

Jaszi wrote:

W e find everywhere the s a m e spectacle: the political morality of an oppressed nation changes completely wh e n it attains a ruling position. The 94.

former claim for national equality drops into a claim for national supremacy. At the beginning of the struggle we ordinarily hear the vindication of national autonomy. Later w h e n they b e c o m e a majority they assert the political unity of the country against the former rulers, n o w in a minority. W h e n they acquire still mo r e power, they begin to lay plans for the reconquest of territories for which they have a so-called claim but from which they were ousted. F r o m here it is only a step to naked imperialism w h e n a victorious nation announces as its- cultural and historical mission the occupation of parts of weaker foreign nations. *

The foregoing was written to describe Poles, Hungarians, and

Rumanians, but it is a thumbnail sketch of the aspirations of the great Russian nation over the past three centuries.

There was an occasional counter-current. Non-Russian nationalities were encouraged and used by the rebels in the 1905 uprising against the autocracy, but were promptly repressed again in 1907. ,The plight of the non-Russians in the E m p i r e in 1914 was fairly depressing -- the first Ukrainian nationalists were clapped into Russian jails in 1847, and it is noteworthy that by this time the so-called "Westernizers " am o n g the challenging elites in Russia were less tolerant of non-Russian minorities than were the so-called "Slavophiles. "3

The great reformer Struve dreamed of a Russian nationalism which could be multi-ethnic but still politically and militarily 95. cohesive, emerging into a kind of supra-national unity. ^ Like a similar dream on the part of Lenin, it appeared to have been no mor e than an eddy in the current of nationalism, which has flowed in the direction outlined above by Jaszi. Russification was like Magyarization, not like Habsburg, Ottoman, or British imperial rule. ® The contempt of Russian colonizers toward their Turki subject peoples was notorious, and was marked by the events running from the great revolt of 1916 right through the Basmachi rebellions of the twenties. T o a me m b e r of a subject nationality, the switch in elite composition in 1917 meant that the alien rulers conceded little things like language teaching in school but be c a m e mo r e efficient in repressing any political expression of nationalism.^

It was all quite logical -- the basic doctrines of nationalism required that only Russians could be loyal citizens of the Russian national state. Therefore others m u s t be transformed into-

Russians, remain second-clas-s citizens, or be killed or exiled.

There is no reason for even the mo s t naive Western observer to believe that the situation is greatly changed in principle under the

Bolsheviks. Russia is a closed society, and of all its secret places the problem of the non-Russians, from cosmopolitan

Jews to Kirghiz bound to their ancestral soil, is the most closely 96.

guarded and sensitive. Neither Lenin's nor Struve's dream

has c o m e true for Kalmucks, Ukrainians, 'Czechs, or Jews.

In Ma r c h of 1966, for example, both the Latvian and Georgian

Party Congresses warned against local nationalism as the prime

Q political danger. An eminent foreign correspondent like

Anatol Shub mentions in passing that most educated Russians

believe that half the people in prison in the U S S R in 1969 are

accused of "bourgeouis nationalism.! "9

"Russification" campaigns are being carried on today with

zeal equal to and cleverness superior to their Nineteenth Century

equivalents in places like the Ukraine. M o s c a warned that

often the appearance of political unity ma s k s the fact that the

"political formulation" of the ruling elite has not penetrated

important segments of the population, or that "there is considerable

difference between the customs, culture, and habits of the ruling

class and those of the governed classes. Robert Conquest, in the latest and mo s t exhaustive survey of the nationality problem

in the USSR, writes:

The problem has proved intractable. Real solutions have not been found. E very advanced country in the post-war world has faced as one of its most consistent problems the demand for indepen­ dence by a people previously ruled from the metro­ politan centers. The USSR has succeeded in delaying 97.

this confrontation, but almost wholly by sheer a d ­ ministrative power. It has yet truly to face it or to resolve it on the political plane. 1^

Those acquainted with the masterpieces of Russian litera­ ture are already aware of the vast dichotomy between the urban and rural Russian, between the educated and the uneducated, which developed from the impact of Western culture on the existing non-Western patterning of society. And, just as in all other examples of massive cultural interactions, the peasantry has been in Russia an inert mass, the spoil of one or another of the contending elites above it.

Seton-Watson notes that only during the immediate post­ wa r period, with the power of the autocracy broken and the power of the Bolsheviks still not consolidated, did grass-roots peasant movements (viz., Makhno's government) control political institutions. But they were drowned in blood by the urban

Bolshevik elite and its urban-based military forces. 13 xhe immense rural-urban gap has been exemplified by one scholar in the apt statement that while Voltaire and a contemporary

French peasant were at opposite poles of French culture, the

19th century Russian Socialist Chernyshevski and a contemporary

Russian peasant belonged to two different cultures. 14

Some Western scholars believe that the Bolshevik 98. revolution changed the rural-urban dichotomy, "reaching into the lives of and stirring that body of the peasantry that constitutes the insuperable problem elsewhere, " as part of a "war against backwardness,"^ The stubborn resistance of the Russian peasant to mass terror can rather be read in the regime's own published concerns over the backwardness of agriculture, the quality of rural education, the disproportionate share of agri­ cultural produce coming from private plots, and so on ad infinitum.

The dead giveaway for the Russian as well as for m a n y other historical and contemporary regimes is the structure of criminal law permitting residence in an urban area as a special privilege.

What of the nature of the ruling Russian elites ? T w o mu s t be considered -- one the autocracy before 1917 and its auxiliaries, and the other the post-1917 elite. Traditional Russian culture, like other h u m a n cultures, was a unique configuration of values and techniques. The Russian background was not like that of northwestern Europe in that there was not the background of privileged elites bargaining among each other for balancing privileges. Rather, the monarchical power w o n out over other- elites in Russia, and a thoroughly Russian sentiment became visible which refused to recognize the moral validity of benefits gained by elite bargaining. Benefits are deserved, but should 99. rightly be conferred by the ruler, w h o has the basic duty to be moral and combat evil. ^

The autocracy tried, with perfect rationality and consi­ derable foresight, to restrict education to its ow n ranks. The result was that while m a n y of those so educated (for which read

"partially Westernized") had excellent minds and good educations, the defenders of the regime among them tended to be devoid of general ideas, and devoted themselves to the service of the auto- cratic elite and to that elite's conception of the social good. 17

Except insofar as they be c a m e bored, they did not suffer from the "anomie" we have noted in other elites. But they were essen­ tially hollow, uncreative men. Even while the shell of autocratic political institutions remained, the energetic, active elements of the political elite had begun to show the characteristics w e have noted in earlier elites in cultural battlefields.

Those of the educated minority wh o were not invited to share power with the autocracy became the prototypical "intel­ ligentsia, " educated but forced to earn a poor living as teachers or writers, so well described in 19th Century literature, hostile to and envious of the rulers but isolated fro m the masses despite their pretensions: 100.

The gap is exceptionally painful at a time when a society is embarking on a new process of transformation, whose origin lies not in its o w n history but in external forces, a process into which it has not grown, as in Western Europe since the 16th century, but has been impelled by the will of rulers resolved to acquire for their country the advantages and power of the modern world.

Gradually the autocracy's roots dried up as an increasing proportion of the well-educated became "intelligentsia" rather than loyal technicians and functionaries. Seton-Watson has noted that in addition to the nobility and a few rich merchants, the sons of priests tended to dominate higher education, with a resulting preoccupation with moral issues, contempt for worldly goods and satisfactions, and the politicization of ideas of absolute right and wrong. Some even became fervent and passionate atheists.

Seton-Watson has tried to correct what he considers an overemphasis on the roles of "westernizers" and "Slavophils" in the Russian intelligentsia. The Westernizers in Russia, he points out, were highly nationalistic, and the Slavophils tried to adapt Western institutions. The Westernizers were interested in Europe primarily to find there ideas and tools with which to struggle with the system in Russia. The Slavophils emphasized peculiar Russian virtues, but probably understood Europe better than the Westernizers did.^® 101.

The autocratic regime of 1914 can be compared, with admitted discontinuities, to the "consolidating nationalist dic­ tatorships" which have been exemplified by the elder de Rivera and by Horthy, Pilsudski, Antonescu, and others. It is easier to compare the successful revolutionaries with the passionate nationalist challenging elites w h o have been identified as "fascist" in terms of the Iron Guard, A r r o w Cross, and the Falange.

The Bolshevik elite was not proletarian, nor was the Nazi elite composed of sturdy G e r m a n peasants. These regimes represented no "revolt of the masses. " They were, rather, operated by and for frustrated segments of the middle classes who had been denied access to what they (considered their proper place and wh o organized violent action to gain what they had been denied.

C o m m u n i s m , following Lenin's substitution of his party for Marx's proletariat, developed a party- composed of an elite of intellectuals representing no given social class but seeking ab a s e for the realization of its ambitions from any class from which it can draw support. 77u

Russia's economic imitation of the West deserves special mention. Russia is one of the two non-Western regions which have with considerable success (and failures, too, as witness the current stir over agricultural backwardness and industrial stagnation) imitated Western productive skills and techniques, building an infrastructure and accumulating capital. The first 102. conclusion one must reach on examining all the available sta­ tistics and comparing them with those of other countries at other times is that the key part of the transformation was accomplished prior to 1917. Furthermore, there is every reason to believe that the n e w Bolshevik elite, like its counter­ parts in other parts of the word, would not have been able to get the process going by itself. It imported Western skills and capital goods in unprecedented quantities.

The Bolsheviks inherited a vast internal market, a government-built transportation and power infrastructure, highly skilled engineers, technicians, and workers, a me c h a n i s m for the governmental control and quasi-planning of industry, and a proportionately small but, for its day, super-modern industrial plant. They inherited a backward agriculture, and never succeeded in doing mu c h better than the Czars did in that sector. T o talk of "capitalism" or "socialism" as determinant issues is to beg the real issues. SetonrWatson covers them well in this quotation:

The (Czarist) government wanted big mo d e r n industries in order to m a k e Russia a great political and military force in the world, the equal or superior of any of the other great powers. The Russian bureau­ crats did not kn o w ho w to create industry. T h e people wh o kn e w ho w to do that were capitalists, w h o might be Russians or Jews or foreigners. The basic policy was similar to that of contemporary Japan. Capitalists m a d e profits, but the state be c a m e m o r e and mo r e 103.

powerful. Government gained more than business did, and kept control of the state power. The industries which were developed were those which provided a backbone for that state power. ^

S. Y. Witte, the greatest of Russian "economic developers" is described as follows by Seton-Watson:

The motive of his policy was not economic. His a i m was the greatness of the Russian state, and he could best serve this ai m by industrialization.^^

"Modernizers" like Witte detested both the. nobility and the intel­ ligentsia. They advocated extreme protectionist tariffs, and aimed, of course, at autarchy. Their bureaucratic controls over industry resembled those of the Italian corporate state later.

Business itself had relatively little reverse influence on the

Czarist autocracy.

O n e last but important aspect of the Russian case has yet to be mentioned: what was the final result? A n imitation of the

West, or a synthesis between two cultures which represented something new, quite different, and henceforth not to be judged by Western standards ? The answer is not in yet, but it would

9 appear that despite technological similarities and the childish doctrine of "convergence, " it is likely to be a n e w synthesis within the Malinowskian scheme which will pop up at the end, rather than an essentially Western Russia. 104.

Looking back at this analysis, there is no reason to throw

aside the initial hypotheses. The result of this interaction appears

to be a ne w synthesis between the impinging and receiving culture.

It v/as sparked by military factors, a desire to preserve the re­

ceiving state by adopting superior military and quasi-military

aspects of the alien culture. The alien culture was absorbed by

urban elites, w h o be c a m e alienated from the exploited ma s s of the

rural population. The n e w technology was only partially absorbed.

N e w elites were psychologically disoriented. Population increased,

and was controlled by peculiar counter-factors.

In co m m o n with other examples of Westernization, nationalism was the key concept of change -- nationalism directed toward state

security and the protection of an elite fro m external and internal

enemies. Industrialization wa s m u c h mo r e spectacular than in

other examples, but was throughout subordinate to national-state

security ends. Politics b e c a m e to a large extent ethical rather

them interest-oriented, and the actors continued to be dominant

and challenging elites who were marked by having absorbed

Western values and techniques and regarded the ma s s e s as objects

of exploitation.

The Russian case gives rise to only two serious problems.

First is the relative success of Westernization in economic terms.

Another is the identification of the two contending elites with our 105. previous ends of the political spectrum in Spain and Eastern

Europe. The challenging elite, represented by the Bolsheviks, can mo r e easily be identified with the unemployed intellectual

Fuhrers of central and eastern European fascism, and with Jose

Antonio, than the Czarist autocracy can be identified with Franco of Pilsudski. Perhaps both problems can be explained by one theoretical elaboration. The "consolidating" (as opposed to the

"radical change") side of the nationalist political spectrum m a y be represented by either of two sub-types -- an indigenous sanc­ tioned ruling elite which picks and chooses consciously from the

Western display counter, or the "ins" a m o n g the n e w elites who have replaced an earlier non-adapting order. The former m a y be more capable, because more secure and less passionate, of absorbing technology and economic methods.

A n analysis of .the Westernization of Japan is essential for the purposes of this study. The island was quite isolated from

Western cultural influence for a full century after the Petrine

Czars began to-borrow from the West for the benefit of the R o m a n o v autocracy. A n d yet, despite this relative isolation, Japan be c a m e by 1940 a militarily powerful national state, and by 1969 has the third or fourth largest national industrial base in the world.

It is vital to decide, before any attempt to predict trends in 106.

Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the extent to which Japan is to be looked on as the first item off an assembly line — a model for the future of other non-Western countries. It should be useful to compare the Japanese phenomenon with developments in Russia, since the parallel aspects of environment, problem, and response are striking even on the surface.

One peculiarity of Japan mu s t be mentioned immediately.

Except for post-1920 Turkey and for Somalia, it seems to be the only state in Africa, Asia, and Latin Am e r i c a which constitutes an ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and geographical unity resembling the ideal of European nationalism 2 5 and the reality of England,

Holland, or Sweden. Thus Japan could step forth like Venus from the foa m as a nation-state, freed of the tormenting violence of irredentas and the shaping of a national ideal and national identity. Japan was like a customer wh o goes into the shop of

Western values and techniques and finds he can wear a suit

(nationalism) right off the rack, without altering the suit or trying himself to gain or lose weight.

The existing indi genous culture of Japan was, a m o n g the m a n y cultural systems in the world, uniquely though perhaps fortui­ tously fitted for the easy adaptation of the Western political-social value cluster of nationalism, where it could develop with as m u c h

9 L support from as conflict with the native cultural pattern. The 107. indigenous basic elements of mythical history, a doctrine of national organic harmony, the supreme value of loyalty, and the vital leadership role all dovetailed uniquely and fortuitously into the Western value cluster known as nationalism.^7

In following this line of analysis, one is led immediately to the critical problem of the significance of the Meiji Restoration.

There is a widely accepted view in which Japanese history is divided into two utterly different periods, before and after the

Restoration, which itself represented a national decision to repudiate a meaningless past and embrace the future with all 28 the ardor of a "Westernizer" of 19th Century Russia. C o n t e m ­ porary scholarship is, on balance, turning against this view and toward a minimizing of the significance of the Restoration.

John Bennett, for example, believes that the adoption of Western values and techniques is firmly rooted in the Tokugawa tradition and the Tokugawa era. He believes that Japan's life as a

Westernizing country is roughly equivalent to that of the U.S. -

Japanese travellers in Europe in 1820 were not plagued with sentiments of social or technical backwardness. This scholar has described the Japanese habit of unashamed borrowing and adaptation from abroad not as forced on an unwilling people, but rather as a part of the existing indigenous tradition. J30 108.

In a similar vein, W a r d points out the deep Western borrowings in pre-Restoration Japan, where mass education was equal to that of Europe by 1850, and was stimulating "the contingency of social institutions on hu m a n will, training in abstract analysis, the evaluation of policy, respect for merit over status, personal ambition, and a collectivist ideology."

W a r d also proves the existence of a trained, structured bureaucracy and an increasing urban value orientation well before the Restoration. 31

After 1868 there was certainly an increased rural-urban dichotomy in Japan, but the fission was less m a r k e d than in any of the other historical examples noted in this study. This was apparently due at least partly to the vigorous efforts of the

Japanese elites to "educate" the ma s s e s (quite the opposite of

Czarist educational policy). As the Japanese Minister of

Education put it in the late 19th Century:

P r i m a r y education, being based on the doc­ trines of Japanese nationalism and militarism, will teach the people to be loyal to the state while they are still in their formative years. ^

Once Japan has become, for practical purposes, a

European-type national state and the vehicle of an authentic nationalism, the dominant elites, the "Establishment, " which 109.

had embarked in Tokugawa times on a less blatent pr o g r a m of

selective borrowing and transformation of elements of Western

culture, 33 went after strength and security quite openly with the

Restoration. Th e following quotation is a good s u m m a r y of what

happened:

The most urgent needs we r e for national unity and for the creation of a r m e d strength sufficient to guarantee the national security against both real and fancied dangers of foreign imperialist aggression and economic exploitation. Instrumental thereto, of course, was the creation of a strong and stable government to lead the nation along suitable paths. Fortunately for Japan, her leaders were wise enough to define these goals in wise and constructive terms. Military strength meant to them far more than a large army and navy well equipped with Western armaments; it also meant the industrial plant to sustain and expand such a mili­ tary establishment and appropriate training for the m e n who m u s t staff it. National wealth ca m e to m e a n a radical diversification of the predominantly agrarian economy, urbanization, systematic mass and higher education, planned industrialization, n e w commerical and financial institutions, and a variety of other c o m m i t ­ ments which were perceived as essential to survival in a Western-dominated world. Not all these commitments were either generally perceived or welcomed at the outset by the leading elites, but in their search for national unity, strength, and security they found themselves embarked upon a kind of "modernization spiral" similar in so m e respects to the inflationary spiral of the economists.

The n e w educational techniques and the force of tradition were combined to hold the standards and character of rural life

steady while the farms were milked of every drop of surplus production in order to capitalize the defense establishment and 110. o c the supporting industrial plants of the n e w cities.

There was throughout the Meiji era the Japanese equiva­ lent of a "Slavophile-Westernizer" dichotomy in terms of the objectives of change in Japanese society.^6 The dominant out- look(s) throughout was conservative --to accept from the West selectively and to transform what was accepted. The recessive outlook was one of indiscriminant adoption of things Western, such as parliamentary democracy, without regard for possible effects on traditional institutions. "But all parties were agreed on one 37 basic goal: to ma k e Japan strong and important. "

Japan is and always has been under elite domination. What was this elite during the period of Westernization?

The old Tokugawa feudal elite shifted in 1868 into the c o m ­ bination of feudal, administrative, military, and commercial oligarchs still known as "The Meiji Leaders. " Something of the sort started to happen in late 19th Century Russia, but the problem of nationalism and the comparative stupidity of the Russian nobility probably would have prevented it. But for operational purposes, the dominating elite in Japan prior to 1868 was deter­ mined to maintain Japanese values, except where necessary to maintain the unity and security of the state.

The Meiji leaders can be classified, then, as a consolidating in. nationalist dictatorship on the order of Franco, Pilsudski, and company: an Establishment. It contained a minority wing of ostensible Westernizers and radical reformers, who can be compared to Seton-Watson’s "pseudo-democrats" of Eastern

Europe: those wh o provide the prelude for dictatorship but differ from the Francos, Horthys, and Brezhnevs only as con­ cerns tactics.

Japan did not escape the effects of the other end of the spectrum -- the challenging sub-elites under the banner of re ­ forming radical hyper-nationalism. As in the other cases we have studied, these mo v e m e n t s were led by jobless intellectuals and they sought to displace the elites in power by using against them a politics of ethics and morality rather than the politics of elite bargaining and compromise which was the hallmark of the older business-bureaucratic-aristocratic elite of the Meiji leaders. The old elite spoke loudly but carried a small stick

-- their three major wars were probably beneficial to Japan on a simple cost-benefit ratio. The new challenging elite was openly imperialist, and probably deserves the description

"fascist."

The clash was described as "a split that ran right through the nationalist movement. O n one side were those who preached 112.

a fundamentally conservative mystique (Japanism). On the

other were the radical nationalists, the advocates of revolu­

tionary reconstruction and national socialism. In 1924

Kita Ikki, the founder of Japanese Fascism, "called Japan a

proletarian nation and declared, inter alia, that in the n a m e of

rational social democracy Japan mu s t possess Australia and

Eastern Siberia. Kita Ikki, incidentally, is a fascinating

and hitherto ignored leader. The parallels between his ideologi­

cal pilgrimage and those of his contemporaries Mussolini and

Lenin are striking, as is his debt to Tokugawa political thought

for the ideology he used against the multi -headed Meiji dominant

elites. Storry describes the challenging militarism thus:

A complex amalgam of militarism, agrarianism, fascism, and ultranationalism, the movement owed its unity partly to a c o m m o n animosity toward big business and the existing political parties.

B y the late thirties, the Meiji nationalist consolidators

were for all practical purposes superseded by the military

fascists. 43 Imperialist wars based on doctrines of national mission were launched. Big businessmen admitted the right of

the military to provide "overall leadership and supervision"

for enterprise. 44 It was too dangerous to resist. Already the hypernationalists were tending to interpret internal issues in 113. external, national-security terms. ^

Spokesmen for the prewar Japanese business elite accepted without apparent reservation the view that individual interests and private gain should be subordinated to the preservation of harmony within an organic society.

The aspect of position-seeking by status-hungry graduates is also clearly visible in the hypernationalist fascist movement of the Thirties. M a x No m a d quotes a Japanese newspaper of 1938:

The conquest of China is a heaven-sent oppor­ tunity for the graduates of middle schools wh o for more than a decade have had to seek employment as bus drivers and policemen. ^

In a sense, the story of Japan ends, for our purposes, in

1940, in the flames of a mounting and limitless imperialism, terror in the streets, the militarization of society, and totalitarianism.

Pre-war Japan was transformed by the swift and effective embrace of mo d e r n technology into an instrument of power, and by the use of old myths and n e w drives into a system for the mobilization of the minds and energies of the people.^7®

This is where the internal dynamics of the Japanese scene ended. A n d it shows that the task of drawing historical analogies is not easy. If the British had succeeded at Gallipoli in World

W a r I, and in terms of physical factors they should have, Czarist

Russia would probably have developed something like a Meiji elite 114. and Meiji outlook by 1930, and might well be further ahead today in economic development than it is under the Soviets. If the

Japanese had succeeded at Midway, and in terms of physical factors they should have, an ultranationalist totalitarianism in

Tokyo could be cracking the whip over an enormous "Co-prosperity

Sphere."

In 1945, even mo r e than in 1917* the d r a m a can only be explained in terms of deux ex machina. The minority liberal

"Westernizing" wing of the nearly-destroyed Meiji elite coalition was put in power by the occupying forces. The United States, in effect, restored the Establishment after the wild and angry young m e n had thrown it in the ashcan. Since 1950 it appears that, even with this boost up, the Westernizers are not succeeding, and traditional social forms have revived while the '‘individual culture"

mo in economic terms, had waxed. ^ For example, the Nehko system of wages, promotion, and employment continues as the traditional, non-Western basis for employment in all except the largest

Japanese industries. In certain respects, it can be defined as pay based on need. There is now a tendency to move toward pay based on ability, but no one is interested in pay based on production.

One might predict that the present slow mo v e m e n t of the pendulum away from the "Westernizers" and pseudo-democrats®^ 115. will continue and perhaps accelerate, particularly when Japan's present unique position of being protected by the world's strongest power has ended, and the country feels again the cold wind of the realities of power politics in an anarchic world.

A s a footnote, and in light of the c o m m o n idea that Japan represents a "typical" case of "modernization," it should be added that students and intellectuals in Japan today find no inspira­ tion in their own history over the past two centuries. They find it boring, and prefer to contemplate Chinese c o m m unism or the welfare statism of Sweden. And very few leaders of African,

Asian, or Latin American countries show any current interest in

Japan as a possible modelfor their ow n political, social, or economic development. It ma y be a success story, but it does not inspire other elites.

Slimming up the Japanese example in the light of the larger objectives of this study, one can without ma n y qualms (one might not have been so sure.in 1949) assert that the result of massive cultural interaction has again been something different and unique, not just a combination of traits. On e can assert that the hypo­ thesis as to the military impetus toward interaction has been confirmed; 52 and that the use of elements of the impinging culture by an urban elite to maintain itself against internal and 116. and external enemies is again clearly visible. The growth of challenging elites m a d e up of the educated and status-hungry and their confrontation with the entrenched elites on a program of hyper nationalism and radical reform is also confirmed. Though we know little about the psychological make-up of the Tokugawa lords or the Meiji oligarchs, they do not s e e m to suffer from

Durkheim*s anomie to any great extent, and hence are possible exceptions to a general rule. The militarist challenges of the

Thirties, however, are a classical example of psychological dislocation due to unresolved dual cultural demands on a newly- urbanized minority.

As in the other cases examined, the concept of nationalism, the organic nation-state, and a Rousseauvian National Will and

National Destiny apparently are an indispensible primary element in the process of cultural interaction, with other aspects trailing and dependent on this central value. In the particular and probably unique case of Japan, the existing Tokugawan culture was remarkably well fitted to this Western concept, and Japan itself was a ready-maden,integral nation" by virtue of geography and demography.

In su*n> the Russian and Japanese cases reinforce the observations ma d e earlier, but require modification to the earlier hypotheses to account for the activity of pre-contact elites w ho seek conscious and selective acculturation. 118.

*Oscar Jaszi, The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy {Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 293. 2 Hugh Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967), p. 664.

^Ibid., p. 271.

4lbid., p. 677.

5Ibid., p. 737.

^Lenin himself, in Works, Vol. V (4th ed.; Moscow: Marx-Engels Institute), p. 270, and in Vol. XXVI, p. 408, showed the priority of Russian state (i.e., socialist) goals * over national ones.

^Ibid., p. 268.

^N e w Yo r k Ti m e s , M a r c h 28, 1966.

^Washington Post, February 11, 1969.

^Vyacheslav Chornovil, ed., The Chornovil Papers (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1969)

^Gaetano Mosca, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw- Hill, 1939), p. 49.

Irving Horowitz, in Three Worlds of Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 10, argues that both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. "have adopted a cultural pluralism which enables them to absorb rather than crush separatist claims. " Any Russian or American would do well to pray that Horowitz' statement is correct, but not to count on it.

^ R o b e r t Conquest, Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice (New York: Praeger, 1967),

^ H u g h Seton-*Watson, Neither W a r Nor Peace (2nd ed.; N e w York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 128-130. 119.

14Ibid., p. 168.

^Robert L. Heilbroner, Rhetoric and Reality in the Revolution of Rising Expectations in a pamphlet distributed by the U. S. League of W o m e n Voters in 1966, p. 2.

^Seton-Watson, Neither War Nor Peace, pp. 220-221. 17 Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p. 539.

18Ibid., p. 226.

^ Ibid., p. 362.

20Ibid., pp. 259-264. 2 1 Daniel Lerner, "The Coercive Ideologist in Perspective, " in World Revolutionary Elites, ed. by Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T, Press, 1966), p. 463.

on ‘■John H. Kautsky, C o m m u n i s m and the Politics of Development (Ne w York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), p. 53. I ^Seton-Watson, The Russian Empire, p. 524.

24Ibid., p. 519.

2^Seton-Watson, Neither War Nor Peace, p. 262, and Robert E. Ward, "Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan, " in Political Modernization, ed. by Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Company, 1967), p. 95.

2^David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (with 1967 Preface, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 332.

2^See Robert K. Hall (ed.), Cardinal Principles of The National Entity of Japan (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1949).

Ruth Benedict, The Chrysanthemum and the Sword (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1946). 120.

28See Lawrence Olson, "The Elite, Industrialism, and Nationalism in Japan, " in Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development, ed. by K. H. Silvert (New York: Vintage Books, 1963), pp. 401-403.

297John’ W. Bennett, "Tradition, Modernity, and Communalism in Japan's Modernization, " Journal of Social Issues, X X I V {No. 4, October, 1968), p. 26.

30Ibid., p. 31.

31Ward, Political Modernization, p. 91. 32 Quoted by Se y m o u r M . Lipset, "University Students and Politics in the Underdeveloped Countries, " Minerva, III (No. 1, Autumn, 1964), p. 29.

33Bennett, Journal of Social Issues, p. 33.

34Robert E. Ward, "Modernization and Democracy in Japan, " World Politics (July, 1963), p. 591.

35 Robert E. Ward, "Political Modernization and Political Culture in Japan, " in Political Modernization, ed. by Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Company, 1967), p. 93.

38J. W. Bennett and R. K. McKnight, "Approaches of the Japanese Innovator to Cultural and Technical Change, " Annals of the Am e rican Ac a d e m y of Political and Social Science, fcTo. 305, 1956), pp. 101-103.

3^Bennett, Journal of Social Issues, p. 29. 38 Martin Bronfenbrenner, "The Japanese Howdonit, " Transaction (January, 1969), p. 35.

39Richard Storry, The Double Patriots - - A Study of Japanese Nationalism (London: Chatto and Windus, 1957), p. 33. Storry also describes the movement of large numbers of Marxists into the c a m p of militarist nationalism. 121.

40Ibid., p. 38.

41 George M. Wilson, Radical Nationalist in Japan: Kita Ikki, 1883-1937 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969).

42 Storry, The Double Patriots, p. 104.

43 F or an opposite, but out-dated view, see J a m e s B. Crowley, Japan*s Quest for Autonomy and Security, 1930-38 (Princeton, N e w Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966)

44Byron K. Marshall, Capitalism and Nationalism in Pre- W a r Japan (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1967) p. 110.

45 Storry, The Double Patriots, p. 300.

^Marshall, Capitalism and Nationalism in Pre-War Japan, p. 114. Also see G. O. Latten, III, The Social Democratic M o v e ­ ment in Pre-War Japan (Ne w Haven: Yale University Press, 1966) where it is explained that socialists looked on the a r m y as an anti-capitalist popular force.

^ M a x Nomad, Aspects of Revolt (New York: The Noonday Press, 1959)» p. 183.

48 Harold R. Issacs, "Group Identity and Political Change, " Survey, No. 69 (October, 1968), p. 91.

4^Bennett, Journal of Social Issues, p. 36.

^®S. Sidney Ulmer, "Local Autonomy in Japan Since the Occupation, " Journal of Politics, X I X (No. 1, February, 1957) p. 65. Trends in Japanese local government since the Occupation are discovered to be centralist and anti-democratic, and "assuredly toward the pre-surrender position with the likelihood that the m o v e m e n t will stop somewhat short of that point. "

^ " T h e Soka Gakkai owes part of its success to its ability to satisfy the natural feelings of national superiority of the Japanese." James Allen Dator, Soka Gakkai, Builders of the Third Civilization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969)> p. 137. 122.

^Denkwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D . C . : The Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 240. "The threat of Western power provided the catalyst for reform. " C H A P T E R VI

Ideologies: "Democracy, 11 "Communism, 11 and "Fascism"

A prominent student of the non-Western countries recently asked himself a question in public: T o w a r d what objective is

Western economic and technical assistance provided to "develop­ ing" {read non-Western) countries The question immediately led to a search for a non-evilture-bound and universal definition of the good. The scholar solved the problem to his o w n satisfaction by defining the good as "humanistic" and that which advanced the capacity of a society toward fulfillment of specifically "human" potentialities. This formula does not fit the world, of course, b e ­ cause it is precisely on a definition of what is "human" that the great philosophies, to say nothing of ideologies, diverge. It is currently fashionable to assume that "pragmatic, " universal, non-culture-bound factors which can be measured objectively render obsolescent the "political formulations" or ideologies which c o m ­ prise a code for the translation of basic assumptions as to the nature of ma n and his environment into a set of general guidelines for political action. Actually,

All modernizing movements in underdeveloped countries, led as they almost universally are by 124.

Western-educated or Western-influenced intellec­ tuals, take their inspiration from som e m o r e or less well-formulated Western ideology. . .All of them, if they are to serve the needs of practical politicians, m ust be adapted to the realities of the under-developed environments to which they are being transferred... In this process of adaptation, however, the old Western words of the ideology are not given up; they remain as treasured symbols that stand for political myths. ^

Even an attempt to cross temporal and geographical scales to find universal hu m a n traits c o m e s up, paradoxically, with such conclusions as:

H u m a n beings all seek some value or system of beliefs to which they can c o m m i t themselves. In the midst of the probabilities and uncertainties that sur­ round them, people want some anchoring points, some certainties, s o m e faith that will serve either as a beacon light to guide the m or a ba l m to assuage them during the inevitable frustrations and anxieties living engenders. ^

If one is to study the impact of Western culture on other cultures, and if one is to emphasize the political, it is necessary to place in focus the political generalizations which have been extracted from the Western value constellation. There is little reason, in a survey like this one, to attempt an analysis of political programs produced by Western political entities, but the ideologies from which such programs spring and which owe their own.-origins to Western values and the Western environment, are an essential factor in the process being examined. 125.

.. .1 study a state of mind, a wa y of feeling, a disposition, a pattern of mental, emotional, and beha­ vioristic elements, best co m p a r e d to the set of attitudes induced by a religion.. .all-embracing attitudes of this kind, once crystallized, are the substance of history. ®

And:

Any ideology is important only as a vehicle for establishing solidarity and identity, by reducing anxiety, increasing self-confidence, displacing fear to an outside group. .. The powerful ideologies are those which at crucial moments during the cycle of perception give individuals a sense of identity and solidarity with their o w n kind. Nationalism, socialism, and national socialism are more satisfac­ tory for these purposes than is the ideology of science.

Mosca, as usual, has the last word:

This need, so universally felt, of governing and feeling that one is governed not on the basis of me r e intellectual or material force, but on the basis of moral principle, has beyond any doubt a practical and real importance.^

A m o n g the m a n y definitions of ideology available in the litera­ ture, the following can be used easily and still represents each of the valid aspects referred to above: "a pattern of ideas which provides for self-definition, for a description of the situation, and a set of general imperatives deduced from the two other factors."®

The general analysis of Western ideology which is most c o m m o n in scholarly literature can be pictured by the following diagram: 126.

"Left" "Right" Social Communism Democracy Capitalism------Fascism

The eminent student of ideology, George Lichtheim, for example, has noted three basic differences between Stalinism and fascism: (a) not even the Stalinists believed that "inferior races should be exterminated and the workers held in permanent sub­ jection;" (b) C o m m u n i s m holds to "universalist liberal-democratic values, " fascism does not; and (c) M a r x and Lenin were great thinkers, while Sorel and Mussolini were hopeless and even Mo s c a and Pareto were no more than "second-raters. An eminent historian has shown ho w a great deal of this conception of radical ideologies is rooted in the Soviet analysis of European fascism be ­ fore World Wa r 11, when only the soon-to-be-purged Radek per­ ceived fascism as an anti-capitalist revolutionary movement.

Other Soviet observers, realizing that such an evaluation would be wholly inconsistent with the "political formulation" of the

Bolshevik elite, insisted that fascism had to be a late and particu­ larly depraved stage of capitalism in the Marxist sense, and, as such, could and should be dealt with by the U S S R as any other capitalist manifestation should be. The internal alliance with the G e r m a n Nazis against the Social Democrats has still 127.

not been officially repented, nor has the 1939 alliance with Hitler.

For the purposes of this study, a completely different con­

ception of the essential characteristics of Western ideologies will

be utilized. It cannot, by virtue of space limitations, be defended

in detail, but its essential elements are present in the works of

J. F. Talmon and Eric Hoffer. It has been refined by A. James

Gregor, to w h o m the author is greatly indebted, and the ne w

scholarship on European fascism, which is cited later in this

study. This conception is reflected in the following diagram:

'I" Axis Social D e m o c r a c yLiberalism

P" Axis Radical Anarchism Collectivism

The "I" Axis, or continuum, represents the area in which the indigenous Western ideology developed. The peculiar c o m ­ bination of environmental and cultural influences which brought forth the Western value-technique complex three hundred years ago in England, Holland, and Scandinavia produced a political ideology as well. Everything on this axis has been defined as "a matter of trial and error, " and "pragmatic contrivances of hu m a n 128.

ingenuity and spontaneity.

Another good definition of the indigenous Western ideologi­

cal continuum is, interestingly, contained in David Apter's

description of "The Consociational System, " which he terms one

of three "transitional systems" utilized in the process of "political

modernization. It is characterized by:

(a) dispersed pyramidal authority;

(b) tolerance of multifold loyalties;

(c) a necessity for constant compromise;

(d) pluralism, with diverse, competing political subgroups;

(e) diffuse ideology.

Still another typical definition is Kautsky1 s: "All or the m ost significant interests have access to effective representation

in the process of making governmental decisions.

The designation "I" for the continuum symbolizes the primary characteristic of the continuum, the acceptance of

Imperfection as inevitable in any desirable political system. This

acceptance springs from the basic philosophical approach of David

H u m e ^ and from the concept of original sin, as well as from the bargaining, rule -of-law, multi-elite political reality of the indigenous West. It implies the irreconcilability of the requirements

of the individual and the requirements of other individuals as 129. represented by society, and the consequent necessity of adjust­ ment in the political system to incomplete fulfillment of the demands of individuals and the demands of society. In a hyper­ simplified way, Thomas Hobbes can be seen on one side of the spectrum, where the primary emphasis is on the limitation of the damage individuals can inflict on others. John Locke repre­ sents another end of the axis, in which the emphasis is on the limitation of the da m a g e society can do to the individual.

The patterns of political ideas described above are con­ sidered by some scholars as non-ideological, apparently because they are implicit rather than explicit and because they do not involve passion. Thus, the disappearance of "ideology" in con­ temporary Western society is "ending democratic politics for those intellectuals w h o mu s t have ideologies or Utopias to motivate 1 5 them to political action. " For the purposes of this study, this argument must be considered as semantic; it is assumed here that an ideology as described earlier is essential to any political system, and that a pattern of ideas which freezes passion out of politics is as valid an ideology as any other.

Marx and Marxism do not represent a live ideology now operating in the real world. Marx's goal appears to be the anarchist goal; his transition stage to that goal lies on the 130. continuum of Imperfection, and he utilizes a concept of the proletarian class as a dominant social grouping which is on the

"pu (Perfectionist) continuum as a non-national aspect of radical collectivism. Despite its contributions to both axes of the diagram, classical M a r x i s m is a dead ideology, no matter h o w often anarchists, social democrats, or radical collectivists m a y mouth Marxist texts. M a r x did contribute, along with the romantic nationalists, a technique, of vast importance;

B y reducing property relations to the old re ­ lationship which violence, rather than necessity, establishes between men, Marx summoned up a spirit of rebelliousness that can spring only from being violated, not from being under the sway of necessity. ^

The anarchist end of the perfectionist continuum will be disregarded here, since, with very few exceptions, it does not s e e m to manifest itself in societies which have not been largely

Westernized, in that nationalism has not been fairly well estab­ lished, defined, and sanctified. It is sufficient to note that the

N e w Left, despite a love affair with external radical collectivities, seems to be a linear extension of the anarchist movement which was eclipsed in 1917.

It is the radical collectivist end of the Perfectionist con­ tinuum which is of primary interest here. The philosophical mainspring of this ideological family is found not in Ma r x but in 131.

Rousseau and his doctrine of the General Will, wherein the true interests of every individual as an individual and the true interests of an organic society were united in one immanent set of rela­ tionships and policies which could be discerned by a sensitive and qualified leader or elite. A mystic, eternal, organic Nation was postulated as this prime focus of hu m a n existence. For the purposes of this study, the background, or photo-negative element in Rousseau should be especially noted:

Rousseau presupposed the existence of and relied upon the unifying power of a c o m m o n en e m y . . .National unity can exert itself only in foreign affairs and under circumstances of at least potential hostility. .. He went one step further. H e wishes to discover a unifying principle within the nation that would be valid for d o m e s ­ tic politics as well. Thus his problem was where to detect a c o m m o n enemy outside the range of foreign affairs, and his solution wa s that such an en e m y exists in the breast of every citizen, namely in his particular will and interest. . .the c o m m o n en e m y within the nation is the s u m total of the particular interests of all citizens.. . 17 ‘

W e slide easily from Rousseau into Talmon's description of:

Totalitarian democracy, based on the assumption of a sole and exclusive truth in politics. It postulates a perfect, pre-ordained, and harmonious state of things, to which m a n can and will arrive. It recognizes only one sphere of existence -- the political. Purpose is i m ­ manent in man's reason and will, the fullest satisfaction of his true interest, the guarantor of his freedom. M e n can be coerced, ignored, or intimidated into conforming, without any real violation of the democratic principle, since m a n is thought of in terms of what he is meant to be, not in terms of what he is. 132.

While Lipset's taxonomy of radical collectivisms is i m ­ pressive, it seems to be so intermingled with and dependent upon outdated neo-Marxist class concepts that it must be set to one side as against the m u c h m o r e powerful classification set forth by T a l m o n and mo r e specifically by A. J a m e s Gregor. H e describes convincingly the convergence of romantic nationalism and socialism in the person of Mussolini, and the parallel slow abandonment of internationalism in the socialism of the Bolsheviks, while by the early Twenties Lenin and Mussolini had both aban­ doned the straight Ma r x i s m of their youth to build elitist infallible conspiratorial parties with a Rousseauvian ethos, to militarize, centralize, and bureaucratize the state, identify the dicta of the party with the true interest of the collectivity and the individual, and accordingly destroy the judicial rights of the individual and of competing elites.

The principal ideological differences were the formal c o m ­ mitment of the Bolsheviks to (a) international class as the basic social group, (b) determinism and egalitarianism, and (c) govern­ ment ownership as well as control of productive plant and tools toward a productionist ethic. With Stalin even these differences largely disappeared, leaving the Bolsheviks pursuing Mussolini's national socialism with the following unimportant exceptions: 133. the Bolsheviks formally took over private property and operated it under state planning goals, while the fascists in prog r a m and in practice were anti-capitalist, but permitted owners to continue to manage their own property under state planning goals and close bureaucratic control. Both movements focussed on external ene­ mies and their alleged internal allies, and expounded this doctrine within the doctrine of the proletarian state, exploited and violated by capitalist states. This doctrine, set forth first by Lenin in

Imperialism, The Last Stage of Capitalism, was picked up by both Mussolini and by Kita Ikki (see Chapter V) and became an inevitable element in the fascist ideologies of central and eastern

Europe.

In the Thirties both the Soviets and the Nazis benefitted fr o m the erosion of the despised d e m o ­ cratic middle ground, gaining adherents not at the expense of each other but through the disintegration of the traditional non-ideological body politic of Europe.

The sociological aspect (of this revolution of the declasse intellectuals) was national in scope and aimed at reversing the roles of the "haves" and "have-not" nations. . .examples of the latter aspect are the USSR's "world revolution, " Hitler's "United Europe, " and Mussolini's "Italian L a k e .

Hug h Seton-Watson, in a tragic passage, describes young, idealistic Serbian and Roumanian college students w h o m he knew personally in the Late Thirties. Both groups were populists in 134.

that they believed, or pretended to believe, they had a duty

to look toward and help the c o m m o n people. Both groups also wanted power, prestige, and careers for themselves and for the

educated as a class. "The heroic intellectuals who are giving their lives in the nation’s service naturally deserve a reward

from the grateful masses. The author then describes the fate of the Serbians, Tito's triumphant cadres, the rulers of an admired country; and the fate of the Roumanians, dead in streets and prison camps, despised as Iron Guard thugs. Any yet they were really the s a m e people.

The U S S R offers a shining example of the heights of power and influence to which intellectuals can attain. Fascism exercised the same double appeal. Its spokes­ m e n claimed it liberated its people from oppressive rulers and under it great careers stood open for nationally-minded young men. ^

There is an excellent literature on fascism which has sprung up largely in the last ten years, and apparently is not well known 25 a m o n g students of comparative politics and political development.

Following are a series of quotes emphasizing those aspects of

European fascism which are particularly significant for this study.

Fascism wa s revolutionary in bringing the insti­ tution of private property into subservience to the state as well as in its abolition of individual liberties and its subordination of all its citizens to the one-party state. ^ 135.

Fascism can best be understood as a form of imperialism, with other factors subordinate to this. ^

B y seeing in fascism a reflection of the fear of left-wing revolution and placing it on the extreme right of the political spectrum, w e miss m u c h of the complexity that m a d e it appeal to a large body of European public opinion. I a m speaking here of the socialist and syndicalist components. . .Clearly, Mussolini's program of 1919 was based on the Revolu­ tionary Soviet Republic of Munich.

Fasc i s m is a necessary stage in the destruction of capitalism. . .1 see in the reformism of Italian fascism, of Hitlerism, and of Stalinism a line of conduct which seems quite acceptable to me . ^

Those spirits capable of becoming fascists -- the young radicals, the socialists, the communists -- there dwells the Jacobin tradition, the Caesarian outlook, the syndicalist or socialist tendency which are at the base of all fascism. Fascism is always a party of the Left.

The fascist utopia is like the futurist anticipation of an industrial society where the abstract order of the State rules - - a society which fascism intends to bring about by revolutionary means. But this revolution, this acceleration to be inflicted on the course of history, is regarded by fascists in regressive terms, as a return to original purity, to a primordial race and a solar cult.

National Socialism was neither a version of the class struggle nor a G e r m a n national phenomenon, rather it was a social revolution that carried its own contradiction: ideologically it implied wa r against big business and industrial society, but practically its dynamics and international aggressiveness m a d e it de ­ pendent on the very things it wanted to fight. There wa s conflict between its ideal of equality and its ideal of elitism. Eventually German national power and aggres - siveness triumphed over the original social ideology. ^ / 136.

The nation becomes, to the Right, a single class, a proletarian class, in struggle against others... nowhere does the Radical Right divest itself fully of traditionalist trappings and appeals. . . ^

The anti-hour geouis anti-capital! st£ militant who leaves C o m m u n i s t for fascist ranks, or vice versa, is a familiar figure.^

Radical Rightist students of the Thirties were nationalistic, anti-authoritarian, and concerned with the seeming inferiority of their nations within the world community. The subtleties of ideology were not meaningful to them. There was often a mixture of rightist and Marxist rhetoric, which combined notions of racialism with ideas of the "proletarian” and exploited nations. ^ ^

It is difficult to cast aside the outdated intellectual cate­

gories of the "universalistic, humanitarian, socialist" Radical

Left, and the "violent, reactionary, capitalist" Radical Right and

to consider the so-called "totalitarian" regimes and mo v e m e n t s of

Europe as two sides of the sa m e coin, the coin of Radical Collec­

tivism. Two scholars, Tucker and Kautsky, have tried to illum­

inate Bolshevism in this light, as W e b e r and Gregor have to

illuminate fascism. Tucker points out that communist revolutions

have actually occurred in "underdeveloped" countries, with a

radical intelligentsia ready to furnish the leadership of a ma s s -

based revolutionary movement to overthrow the old order in the

name of national renovation and development. Kautsky has

even mo r e specifically identified the relationship of so-called 137.

C o m m u n i s m to other forms of radical collectivism, though he continues to insist that the objective of communist elites is

"modernization. "

All modernizing movements in underdeveloped countries (Note: Kautsky considers the Russia of 1917 to be in this category.) led as they almost in­ variably are by Western-educated or influenced intellectuals, take their inspiration from s o m e m o r e or less well-formulated Western ideology. M a r x i s m is but one of these Western ideologies. All of them, if they are to serve the needs of practical politicians, m u s t be adapted to the realities of the underdeveloped (Note: read "non-Western1) environments to which they are being transferred. Leninism was such an adaptation of Western Marxism, and Maoism and Castroism are further adaptations. In this process of adaptation, however, the old Western words of the ideology are not given up; they remain as treasured symbols that stand for political my t h s . ^

It seems hardly necessary here to point out the anti-Marxist and fascist nature of such epiphenomena as "Cuban Communism" or "Maoism.

A recent study of Cuban "revolutionism" points out that the revolutionaries have had to abandon one of the three basic Lenin­ ist assumptions -- that a proletarian revolution inlhe West would be forthcoming. They are therefore left with only two Leninist postulates: (a) the capitalist world econ o m y of exploiting and exploited countries, and (b) the revolutionary elite as the agent of revolution. ^ 138.

The best single taxonomy of fascist mo v e m e n t s in Europe is Seton-Watson's. H e explains h o w consolidating nationalist dictatorships (viz., Hungary under Gomb o s , Yugoslavia under

Stojadinovic, R u m a n i a under King Carol) tried to ape fascist policies and institutions. "The true fascists were not deceived.

Arrow Cross, Ustashi, and the Iron Guard bided their time, and when it came, they showed, in orgies of butchery, that they were m e n of a different stamp. "^9

Nazi G e r m a n y has to be classed as fascist, but it showed strange elements not quite paralleled in other European fascist movements. Hitler appears to have been a racist rather than a hyper-nationalist, ^ and this essentially non-national view of fascist ideology sets hi m aside from the fascist standard.

That set of political values and techniques (ideology?) which are generally accepted as liberal, social democratic, or a combination thereof, have been identified as having been born, uniquely, within the peoples of northwest Europe several hundred years ago, and existing in other times and places as a result of cultural interaction.^ In general, the stability characteristic over a period of time of this type of polity varies inversely with its spatial and temporal distance from the birth time and place of Western culture and with the degree of 139. difference between non-Western indigenous environments and the environment prevailing in northwestern Europe at the time of the appearance of Western values and techniques.

Of the hybrid polities vAiich have sprung up in Europe other them northwest Europe as a result of interaction with the

West, a very few (Switzerland, France, Belgium, Germany) have m a n y of the characteristics of the northwestern political system described above, but with variations in the direction of radical collectivism. The historically accidental Bolshevik regime carried tatters of ideology which were neither northwestern nor radical collective, but it soon developed typically radical collec­ tive characteristics, as have its imitators. The impact of the

West on Japan resulted in a typical radical collectivism -- the present Japanese polity results from military defeat and external intervention and protection.

The collectivity on which radical collectivist ideology is based is the putative nation-state, overtly in so m e cases and covertly in others (vide the CPR). The ethos of radical collec­ tivism is distinct in its elemental nature from that of the nation- based northwestern European political culture in that it is based on a conviction that a perfect, harmonious reconciliation of individual and social requirements is imminent in the concept 140. of an organic nation, embodied in a state, whose will, destiny, and interest can be discerned and interpreted by an organized ruling elite through essentially supernatural processes.

It is anti-capitalist, militaristic, and would like to be totalitarian. It controls economic production. It seeks to eliminate self-seeking and educate the population in the virtues of the ruling ideology. It fears and/or hates other political forces as potential enemies, and applies absolute moral standards both to other collectivities and to groups within the collectivity. It identifies the welfare of a priestly elite with the welfare of the collectivity as a whole and the welfare of its m e m b e r s . It attempts to destroy social and legal barriers standing between tiie individual and the will of the elite.

The general rule has been for radical collectivism to show itself in two forms: consolidating nationalist authoritarian dictatorships, and fascist revolutionary regimes. An y radical collectivist regime m a y mo v e toward one or the other of these poles. It may, and usually does, contain elements of both types, as Mussolini's Italy began with the latter form, shifted toward the former, and after 1943 shifted far to the revolutionary pole again. A.prime determinant of any regime's location on the continuum is the length of time it has been in power. It is a r m e d with a my t h as its political formulation, a m yth which has only a coincidental relation to reality as pe r ­

ceived by a ruling elite and the self-interest of such an elite.

In order to focus attention on the mythological ultimate good

of the collectivity, it is inevitable that the political universe

outside the collectivity be perceived as at best flawed, and, to

s ome extent, as evil. Particularly on the revolutionary side of the continuum, real or imagined external and internal enemies of the collectivity mu s t be regarded as satanic, and the source of all misfortunes, all frustrations.

F r o m all the foregoing, one can with reasonable confidence predict the political pattern very likely to emerge from further

contact between the West and cultures even mo r e alien to the northwestern original than were central and eastern Europe,

Russia, and Japan. It would be radical collectivism ranging between the Horthy model of authoritarian consolidating dictator­

ship to revolutionary fascism on the Iron Guard model.

The consolidating dictatorship pole of the continuum can be expected to f orm coalitions with established elites, but to lose the apocalyptic and fanatic outlook of the m e n of the

"fascist" pole. Fanatic revolutionary elites, once in power, will tend to lose their vision and begin to consolidate. The 142. consolidating pole of the radical collective continuum will usually in any polity represent an older generation than will the "fascist" pole. The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution and the last manifestations of the Italian fascist regime represent attempts to reverse this dynamic.

In succeeding chapters of this study, w e shall examine the national basis of radical collectivism, and the characteristics of the ruling elites associated with it.

/ 143.

^Denis A. Goulet, "Development for What?" Comparative Political Studies, I (July, 1968)

"Ifleology does not of itself mobilize elites; it is produced by mo r e immediate and less abstract pressures. M y t h exists before mas s mobilization because the elite is mobilized before the masses." Margaret Mead, Cultural Patterns and Technical Change (New York: New American Library, 1955), p. 28. 3 John H. Kautsky, C o m m u n i s m and the Politics of Development (Ne w York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), p. 4.

^Hadley Cantril, The Pattern of Huma n Concerns (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965), p. 320. 5 J. F. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (New York: Praeger, I960), p. 11.

^David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 328. 7 Gaetano M o sea, The Ruling Class (New York: McGraw Hill, 1939), p. 18. g M a r y Matossian, "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization, " in Political Modernization, ed. by Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont, California: The Wadsworth Company, 1967), p. 323.

^George Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology (New York: Vintage Books, 1937), p. 237.

^Walter Z. Laqueur, Russia and Germany (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965), pp. 196-251.

Hj. L. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian De m o c r a c y (New York: Praeger, I960), p. 1.

l^David E. Apter, The Political Kingdom in Uganda (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 44.

13John H. Kautsky, ed., Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 10. 144.

14 David Kettler, "Political Science and Political Rationality, " in Political Theory and Social Ch a n g e , ed. by David Spitz (New York: The Atherton Press, 1967), p. 74. Hume's rationality is described as "the process which generates custom,"

^Seymour M. Lip set, Political Man (New York: Anchor Books, 1963)

^Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 57.

17Ibid., pp. 72-73. 18 J. F. Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, p. 2.

19Lipset, Political M a n

20 A.James Gregor, Contemporary Radical Ideologies (New York: R a n d o m House, 1968)

21Vladimir Petrov, " A Missing Page in Soviet Historiography," Orbis, XI (Winter, 1968), 1116.

22i)avid Lerner, "The Coercive Ideologists in Perspective, " in World Revolutionary Elites, ed. by Harold D. Lasswell and David Lerner (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1966), p. 464. 23 Hugh Seton-Watson, Neither W a r Nor Peace (2nd ed. ; N e w York: Praeger, 1962), p. 184.

24Ibid., p. 183.

2^There are three key studies which, while not identical in their analyses, will serve to provide an excellent cross-section and bibliographic references. They are:

Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. I, No. 1, 1966, entitled "International Fascism, 1920- 1945.

Eugen Weber, Varieties of Fascism, Princeton, N. J.: D. V a n Nostrand Co. , 1964. 145.

Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (eds.), The European Right, Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1965.

The three references above are the standard co n t e m ­ porary collections, but for a slightly aberrant but i m m ensely useful insight one should read at least the first and last twenty pages of Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1965, and the whole of a remarkable French paperback which is a brilliant study of the roots of fascism, J. Plumyene and R. Lasierra, Les Fascisms Francais, Paris: Editions duSeuil, 1963.

2^H. S. Rauscenbush, The March of Fascism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), p. 314.

27jacob Rasner, Per Faschismus (Wien: self-published by the author, 1966), p. 114.

2®M. A. Ledeen, "The Complexity of European Fascism, " Transaction, VI (No. 1, 1968), 60.

2^Drieu de L a Rochelle in L a Grande Re v u e , March, 1934.

30Drieu de L a Rochelle in L a Lutte, 3 March, 1934.

*2 1 J. Plumyene and R. Lasierra, Les Fascisms Francais (Paris: Editions. duSeuil, 1963), p. 10.

^ D a v i d Schoenbrun, Hitler's Social Revolution (Garden City: Doubleday, 1966), p. 209.

•^Hans Rogger, "Afterthoughts," in The European Right, ed. by Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 576.

^4Eugen W e b e r , "Introduction,"in The European Right, ed. by Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965), p. 5. 146.

Q C S. M . Lipset, "Students and Politics in Comparative Perspective, " Daedalus, (Winter, 1968), p. 8. The degree to which this description can be applied to Afro-Asian and Latin American student movements today has doubtless not escaped the reader.

36 Robert C. Tucker, Paths of Communist Revolution, Research Monograph No. 29, Princeton, N.J., 1968 (Princeton, N. J.: Center for International Studies, 1968), p. 6.

37John H. Kautsky, C o m m u n i s m and the Politics of Development (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), p. 4. Kautsky's intellectual insights are invaluable to the present study, although he goes wrong in attributing altruistic motives to communist elites. Kautsky can observe that Nasser "manipu­ lated Fascist symbols just as Lenin manipulated Marxist symbols and earned the enmity of the W est thereby. " (Ibid. , p. 132). Kautsky also seems to indicate that a thing he calls a "modernizing elite" is a special category of phenomena, separate from any variety of European radical collectivism, and apparently does not see the possibility that Lenin, Mussolini, Nkrumah, and Per on m a y all be classifiable as radical collectivists for purposes of political analysis.

3®Irving L. Horowitz, "Cuban Communism, " Transaction (October, 1967), p. 12.

39 Peter Worsley, "Revolutionary Theory: Guevara and Debray, " in Regis Debray and the Latin American Revolution, ed by Leo Huberman and Paul M. Sweezy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1968)

^ H u g h Seton-Watson, "Fascism, Right and Left, " Journal of Contemporary History, I (No. 1, 1966), 191-195.

^Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (rev, ed.; N e w York: Praeger, 1962), p. 88, quotes General Bec k as saying of Hitler: "This fellow has no fatherland at all!".

^ ^ A m o n g numerous definitions, one stands out, which uses the adjectives "homogenous" and "secular. " The first adjective is then described as implying "multi-valued, rational -calculating- bargaining, and experimental. " The second is described as i m ­ 147. plying that the ultimate goals of the polity are "some combination of the values of freedom, mass welfare, and security. " Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems, " The Journal of Politics, XVIII (No. 3, 1956), 398. C H A P T E R VII

The T h e m e and the Actors: Nationalism and the Elites

The political lynch-pin of the northwestern European value - technique cluster was the concept of the nation as a form of collec­ tive identity superseding even the nuclear family in terms of loyalty, sacrifice, and survival. Definitions of nationalism, some of them very involved, can be found on any scholarly streetcorner

-- perhaps the best statement has been made by Rupert Emerson:

The simplest statement that can be made about a nation is that it is a body of people who feel that they are a nation; and it ma y be that when all the fine - spun analyses are concluded, this will be the ultimate statement as well. ^

Before further consideration of the significance of nationalism to this study, it will be necessary for a mo ment to put it into per­ spective by describing basic group identity as the class of which nationalism is a member:

A man's basic group identity is the set of iden­ tifications which every individual shares with others from the mo m e n t of his birth: his ethnic being, his family and group name, his physical characteristics, the history and origins of the group into which he is born, its whole culture-past, providing him, among other things, his language, religion, arts, modes, and styles of life, and inherited value systems. It lays upon him his nationality or whatever other 149.

condition of national self-awareness which is signal in his group. He is endowed finally, with the total structure of his family's culture, with all its intersecting, concentric, and multiple enlargements, the socio­ economic threshold of the family through which he enters upon life; the geography and economics of the country of his birth, and all the impinging circumstances of his time. The primary function of this basic group identity is to provide a person with some measure of supporting self-acceptance and self-esteem. Like money or health, group identity presents no problem when it is assured, when the self-acceptance it gener­ ates is an unquestioned promise of life. It is only when it fails to supply a ma n with a basis for some prideful association of himself with others, or, worse, forces him into a pattern of self-rejection, that it becomes a problem, and, sooner, or later, a matter of crisis. H o w dominant or how dominated is the group to which the individual belongs, and how, therefore, is he able to bear himself in relation to others ? This is the cardinal question, and it is essentially a question of politics or power.

Even in the indigenous West a built-in political trap has long been recognized: the danger that the limitless nature of the indivi­ dual's identity with the nation will lead ma n to seek universal harmony and the salvation of his soul in the nation, and that, failing to find it there, he will seek it in a larger or smaller group identity, thus moving his politics onto the radical continuum somewhere be­ tween anarchism and radical collectivism.

Thus, nations as close to the Western heartland as France and Germany have gone through repeated convulsions of either worship or rejection of the nation-state, and even in those nations 150. born within the wo m b of Western culture we find today such phenomena as a widespread and positive attempt to find salvation for the individual soul in the rejection of the imperfect conception of the utilitarian nation-state in favor of identification with man- O kind in general or in favor of a sub-national and inherently seces­

sionist concept. The United States has its "black nationalists, "

Canada has its French linguistic separatism, Britain its Irish and Welsh nationalist movements, France its Breton problems, and

Belgium the Flemish-Walloon split. Even Switzerland has a lively movement on the part of certain French-speaking areas for

greater autonomy. A.’

The state, in Western culture, exists as a vehicle for the nation. The nation exists without the state but expresses itself through the state. Thus the Habsburg Empire could not by defini­ tion be a nation-state --a state manifesting a nation. ^ The

struggle to form a state allegedly manifesting this pre-existing unit of basic group identification and to preserve it is a back­

ground note to the political process in the indigenous culture-

area of the West. In those areas where the West has interacted massively with other cultures, it becomes the essence of the process, and the mo r e alien to the West the host culture, the more central the place of the struggle and the more likely the 151. struggle is to become passionate, ethical, and millenial in nature.

The key ingredient for the formation of nation-states appears to be language. While customs, shared experiences, religion, and even previous political unity ma y be important, the commonalty of language seems to be the central concept. ^

This m a y not be a wholly mysterious and arbitrary standard.

The possession of a co m m o n language is an indicator of a capa­ city, and probably a habit, of information interchange (thus

n fulfilling most of the criteria enumerated by Karl Deutsch ); g the insights of Benjamin Lee Whorf, as welleB the less scientific earlier musings of Hegel, lead us to suspect that language ma y in itself define basic value-clusters which affect perception.

The rare multi-lingual but flourishing state like Switzerland proves nothing about nationalism that Helen Keller does not prove about blindness, deafness, and loss of speech. For every

Switzerland, there are two or more Belgiums or Canadas, raising the grave suspicion, nay, conviction, that a multi-lingual and viable nation-state is a freak.

The passage quoted below explains why nationalism has been so productive of conflict. 152.

Nationalism is a political movement which seeks to attain and defend an objective we ma y call national integrity. It seeks "freedom, " but freedom means many things. The demand carries with it the suggestion that nationalists feel themselves oppres­ sed. Out of ideas we ma y extract a general definition of nationalism: it is a political movement depending on a collective feeling of grievance against foreigners. The grievance must be collective and the collectivity must be the nation. .. Nationalism teaches that foreign rule itself is an affront to hu m a n dignity. Faced with any block to their desires, people with nationalist ideas feel that they under stand why they are unhappy. In internal struggles, one faction must be identified with foreigners. The stages of national integration, cultiiinating in the sovereign nation-state, m a y be summarized as legend-making, struggle (where an enemy does not exist, one must be created), and con­ solidation. .. Struggle is to a nationalist what thrift is to a puritan, something which purports to be done for a reason, but which in fact sums up a complete understanding of life. 9

Nationalism, at least outside its northwestern home, i m ­ plies by its nature a concept of oppression and of struggle against oppressors outside the nation in order to build, and to a lesser extent maintain, the nation-state. This fact is often forgotten by scholars who give the impression that nation-states blossom like roses in the desert, affecting their environment only by their freely dispensed fragrance. It is essential to this study to under stand that nationalism has meaning only when projected against a hostile environment outside the nation. This is only partly true of nationalism in its British, Dutch, and 153.

Scandinavian birthplaces; but it is without doubt more true,

on the record, the greater the alien admixture in any area of

ac cultur ati on.

It is useless to try to analyze the causes of the advent

of nationalism in northwestern Europe. Since Marx, it has

become fashionable to seek for reasons behind massive cultural

concepts in terms usually of economics or sometimes of psychology.

To do this in the case of a key concept like nationalism is to

analyze the cause of a baby's feet or liver and carries within

itself a culture-based prejudice which implies that square feet

of living space, deference accorded by others in ritual practice,

or any other alleged causal factor is a stopping place, an ulti­ mate criterion. Here, the place of nationalism as the key,

binding element in Western political culture will be assumed.

Once one gets outside the wo m b area of Northwestern

Europe, however, it will be possible to analyze why and how

nationalism displaced alien concepts and institutions. The most

c o m m o n explanation has been in terms of economic utility --

for example, that the unification of Germany under Bismarck

came about because Germans wanted to enjoy the economic ad­ vantages of large-scale markets. Far more realistic than this

as an explanation for the key trigger of nationalism is the simple 154. fact, testified a hundred times in history, that a group of people with an immensely strong large-scale focus of group identity, be this religion, race, dynasty, or "nation, " has an over­ whelming survival advantage over smaller groups with an equi­ valent "sacrifice-quotient" in terms of group identity, or large groups with a more diffuse and weaker group identity. In order to survive as basic group identities, diffuse concepts like Spain,

Italy, Germany, or Rumania had to be developed toward a level of intensity approximating the nationalism expressed in political- military equivalents of the most cohesive units impinging on them in their external environment. Two factors were among several which produced the necessity for nationalism in areas outside the wo m b of the West -- the degree of intensity of nationalism in co-actors, and the salience of those co-actors in the external environment. Thus, French nationalism was more a cause of German national integration than was Hungarian nationalism.

It is often said in the West (though no longer in the Leninist world) that nationalism is .outdated and a negative factor in politics, due to die quietly under the influence of a thing called

"interdependence. " If this analysis of the basic nature of nationalism as a lynch-pin of Western culture, and this analysis 155. of the external threat as the specific prod toward national in­ tegration are correct, "interdependence, " by providing for an easier flow of Western cultural concepts, and by increasing the salience of the always threatening external environment, m a y tend to increase, rather than decrease, the intensity of the phenomenon, unless some new element like a universal religion enters the stage.

At this point, some thought should be given to the spear­ head of nationalism in terms of its effect on other groups through the process outlined in the preceding paragraph. The core of the perceived threat is of course a combination of military capacity in terms of perceived threats and of political capacity in terms of internal subversion of the relatively diffuse group identity. The latter threat is in the linguistically-oriented world of nations an irredentist threat which in turn hinges on the straight military threat as perceived. The military threat itself has never primarily been one reflecting technological and industrial strength but rather morale -- the mutual confidence and willingness to sacrifice self for the c o m m o n good which was so evident at Plassey, at Khartoum, in the Sinai peninsula, and which accounts for the ease with which a hundred Europeans today can handle a thousand well-armed Africans in the field. 156.

It is also evident in the capacity of the North Vietnamese, for example, to fight the infinitely "stronger, " but relatively weak-willed, Americans to a standstill. It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that weapons and production technology and the general strength of the economy became anywhere near as important as the political-cultural aspects of nationalism in producing usable military strength.

It might be argued here that the super-powers, America and Russia, are diffuse, untypical hybrids between nation-state and empire; both are to a large extent multi-national, and yet their size and technological capacity make them super-powers, out of the league of ordinary nation-states. This argument fails to recognize that both contain a dominant national group identity

(Great Russian in the USSR, W A S P in the USA) to which sub­ nationalities are expected to adapt in essential respects and to operate as partial, satellite basic group identifies. Both countries, although their problems differ enormously, have to count between half to a quarter of their populations as sub- nationalities.

The rebuttal to this criticism is to question the assumed degree of military strength and political unity in the two quasi­ nations. If Hitler had not been a racist, rather than a Germ a n 157. nationalist, the mu c h smaller but compact national Ge r m a n state would have taken the USSR apart and destroyed it at will in World Wa r II, using the two advantages of battlefield morale and subversive capacity. The U.S. has not experienced a major military or political test since 1865, when the essence of the old W A S P political culture was actually defeated by Ge rman and Irish immigrants and Negro ex-slaves. But it would take an unusually confident American to believe that today a mass cross-sectional American military force would fight with the reckless spirit of sacrifice shown at Gettysburg, or that an invader would not be able to subvert certain very substantial

"minority communities" with more success than Hitler subverted the Ukrainians. Specifically, a Martian observer might well conclude that each of the two super-powers, regardless of its massive industrial economy and its sophisticated weaponry, is not equipped to survive for long against external and centrifugal forces unless it succeeds in overcoming what appear to be bur­

geoning separatisms among its minority "nationalities,"

While racialism, universal religions, and some hitherto invisible forms of empire or supra-nationalism remain in the wings as theoretical alternatives to linguistically-based nationalism, the latter remains as the political theme of the Western culture, 158. at least as important in this context as the central concept of imperial law and administration was to the expanding and massively interacting Ro m a n culture in a parallel world-historical situation.

The most pressing spur to the penetration of the concept of nationalism into areas outside its birthplace is the threat to which non-national groups are subjected by the high capacity for military efficiency and political subversion of a nationally in­ tegrated group as against a group with a non-national basic group identity or no basic group identity. ^

The ideologies mentioned in the preceding chapter are shaped around the raw material of nationalism. 12 Radical collectivism, including its paradigmatic forms of European fascism and consolidating nationalist aqthoritarianism, is the shifting of nationalism from the assured form of northwestern

Europe into the hothouse artificial form of passionate, ethical fanaticism which it has assumed in alien environments. 1 ^ One now can distinguish a fairly hard, definite political trend line in terms of the ideological forms taken by a mixture of Western and more or less non-Western cultures. Next is the question of elite identity, motivation, and performance, which should provide perspective on the human dimension of this trend line.

The "what" of the major political institutions and ideologies which have marked theorise of Western culture and its synthe­

sis with non-Western elements in areas increasingly distant, in cultural terms, from the birthplace of the Western value- technique cluster has now been examined. Before one can hope to locate the historical trend-line well enough to project it

into the present and future, however, it will be necessary to

examine the elements in cultural synthesis which have an extra-

Western origin or foundation. One set of those elements can be sub-divided into those non-Western cultures which ma y by virtue of co m m o n historical roots share some features of the indigenous Western cultures of the northwest (viz., Spain,

Poland, or even Germany), and into the wholly non-Western

cultures where features in co m m o n with the indigenous West are probably the result of chance (viz., the Tokugawa political

culture, the Chinese attitude toward work and individual destiny).

In order to project historical trend-lines into Africa, Asia, and Latin America, the second class of non-Western cultures will be considered.

The other element of non-Western origin is people -- the people of the area of interaction who actually absorb parts of the penetrating culture, synthesize it, and nurture the hybrid values and techniques in their own culture-areas. First to the cultural aspects. It will not be possible,

by definition of the assumptions underlying this study, to

analyze any elements of any non-Western culture as we have

analyzed certain key elements of Western culture. The reason

is that while there is only one Western culture, as there was

only one R o m a n or Hellenic culture at any given time, there

are ma n y more or less non-Western cultures with which the

Western has interacted, is interacting, or will interact; just

as there were dozens or hundreds of more or less non-Roman

or non-Hellenic cultures with which those dominant cultures interacted in their time. This study is an attempt at a thermo­ dynamic type of prediction - -a statistical prediction which will probably not be absolutely true at any given time for a

single one of the national "molecules" of the non-Western

states. It might be possible, using the basic parameters of this study, to take up in detail a wholly non-Western single

culture and attempt to sharpen predictions from the general- probable-statistical level to the specific national-unit level.

No such effort is projected as part of this inquiry, and there­ fore no non-Western culture will be studied in detail. Some

general remarks are in order about non-Western cultures as a class, however. 161.

By definition, the scales and values for any specific cross-cultural comparison must spring from assumed values, habits, and techniques of a given culture. ^ Therefore, Culture

A, if compared by Culture A ‘s standards to Culture B, C, and

D, will tend to be more different from each of them than they will be from each other. Culture A's standards might result in Culture B and C being almost identical in important charac­ teristics. But Culture D ‘s standards might result in B and C being comparatively far apart, as compared to average intercultural differences. The problem is even more complicated by the well- known difference between formal and informal elements of any given culture, and the tendency of classes and individuals within cultures to link their own cultures to their sub-cultural values and techniques.

The foregoing explains why, at least in terms of the assump­ tions behind this study, almost all the references in the contem­ porary literature to "modern" and '"traditional" cultures are worthless. The "modern" .(fe^d "northwest European") ma n who emerges from the works of scholars like C. E. Black, Denkwart

Rustow, and most of their colleagues is a remarkable silhouette indeed. He is a rational bargainer in politics, always watching out primarily for number one in economic terms. He is devoted 162. to his nuclear family, and "patriotic" rather than "nationalistic. "

He cynically questions every social norm. He believes nothing until it can be empirically proved. He has a deep empathy for his fellow-man, but wants privilege and status to follow achieve­ ment, not ascribed status. Those commentators are not des­ cribing Western ma n as we see him every day. They are not describing Western culture. They are describing a formal, idealized version of a scholar in the social sciences at a leading

American universityJ 15

The "traditional" culture described in most of the contem­ porary literature on political development seems unreal. A p ­ parently this "traditional" culture is constructed as follows:

Take each "modern" characteristic and assume that its lack is an attribute of "traditional" culture ! The only trouble is that the traditional culture has the same reality as the R o m a n or

Hellenic "barbarism" had. It was possible for a Ro m a n senator to fit a Parthian grandee and a Celtic chieftain into the same mold, but only as the Parthian could have fit the Ro m a n and

Celt, or the Celt the Ro m a n and the Parthian together. Some scholars think of a single "traditional" set of cultures, and do not realize that they are saying "non-Western" from a Western viewpoint. The use of the word "modern" to describe the north- western European value-technique cluster 17 and some of the earlier syntheses arising from interactions with that culture is also indicative of a culture-bound approach, as is the even more outlandish term of "modernization" to describe massive cultural interaction with the West. It implies first that non-

"modern" cultures dissolve under the influence of the "modern" and become Western, presumably as Western as Holland, and that this process is as inevitable as the self-realization of

Hegel's Weltgeist. All available historical evidence points to the contrary -- that massive cultural interaction results in a synthesis and what is in effect a new culture.

It also assumes that the values and techniques originating in Europe about three hundred years ago are uniquely superior, in absolute and supra-cultured terms, to all other sets of tech­ niques and values, and that it is the destiny of the bearers of this set of values and techniques to "civilize" the rest of ma n ­ kind. It is just possible that this is "true" or "real" by some unimagined supracultural scale. But what a strange coinci­ dence that the dozens of recorded cultures which were so demonstrably superior (to their own bearers) and most of which embodied (to their bearers) the highest hopes of mankind, have 164. passed away, that Westerners alone were right in this old, old assumption, and that History, with its long record of relative values and shifting techniques is at last drawing itself into hard, straight lines !

No reference is necessary to the fact that this particular ultimate culture is working on irreplaceable capital in terms of natural resources, that its immense economic strength goes in large part for war materials and "toy" and "status" consumption, that artistic creativity per capita is almost certainly declining, that the generational conflict is increasingly savage, that the individual seems relatively lost and unhappy, that pollution of the atmosphere and of water sources is increasing at a geometric ratio, that biological selective mechanisms have been halted or reversed, that old age has become a time of terror, etc. This culture, inevitable as it ma y seem to us, is certainly not trium­ phant. To speak of it or some variant of it as a unique and absolute model to which all other cultures must adjust is on its face arrant nonsense if such a judgment is based on normative terms of what is "good" and "just, " even from within the Western culture itself.

As regards the general characteristics of "traditional" cultures, only one guide appears among contemporary social 165. scientists who has a lively sense of culture as other than a rigid shell -- and even he still uses words like "modern" and

"modernization, " Donald R. Levine, in a recent study, hypothesizes that: (a) the contents of "pre-modern" cultures are not uniformly shared throughout any population; specialization, individuality, competition, and differential enculturation produce diversity in any culture, (b) The contents of "pre-modern" culture do not persist unchanged; the innovative power of traditional authorities, impulses toward rationalization, diffusion, and the shifting relative state of cultural complexes are con­ stitutive of ma n y kinds of change, (c) The contents of "pre­ modern" cultures do not form a tightly consistent whole; culture lag and functional differentiation account for basic inconsistencies in all cultures. 18

Despite the use of the solipsistic term "pre-modern" to describe people who don't share ones' own "whys " and "hows, "

Levine's comments, emphasizing the lively and particularistic nature of non-Western cultures in general, are a fitting note of caution on which to leave the discussion of cultures and turn to a discussion of the people through whom, cultural interaction occurs.

It is easier to ma k e useful generalizations as to the 166.

human material on which the Western culture works in non-

Western environments than it is to make such generalizations

about non-Westem cultures themselves. This is because the

cultures have in co m m o n only the fact that they are, to varying

degrees, non-Western. The people who play key roles in the

acculturation process are (a) a special class of people, those

with dual operating cultural backgrounds, who have been seen

before throughout history, and (b) already deeply affected by

Western culture. Therefore they can be described in

general terms.

First of all, it must be emphasized that the "masses" of

no culture at any time in history have voluntarily abandoned their

ancestral patterns of values and techniques in favor of some

alien culture unless they have been forced or enticed to do so

by their rulers or would-be rulers. When they are directly

affected, it usually means that there is not an effective elite

in the affected culture through which elements of the West can

be filtered. Thus we can expect reactions from the masses, without elite guidance, to be qualitatively different from the

standard. The deviant form, without filtration, exhibits a set

of symptoms which can be called the "Cargo Cult Syndrome"

For example, Iraqi villagers are known to dream actively of 167.

"progress, " even though they are completely non-Western.

They would have their own land to cultivate with tractors; the backbreaking labor of digging ditches and building dams would be done by the government, they would have medical facilities in the village, etc. . .this is the dream of progress .. .they know it will be fulfilled some day, in the natural course of events. They have no doubt of this; the only question is when. *9

In the same study it is noted that the villager defines as

progress that which he profits from, in his own terms. Thus

he se.es the ultimate end of progress as the present dispensation

plus a capacity on his part to sit in the village tea house,

gossiping and enjoying the radio all day long while a machine

or somebody else does all the work. This is the life he sees his own village elite live, and to him it represents the essence

of happiness on this earth. To the extent that the West were

to affect this villager even if his dreams should come true, he

would not have given up his non-Western culture, and accultura­

tion would not have occurred. What would have happened

would have been the fulfillment of a "cargo" dream. 20

The "cargo" dyndrome has shown itself in the South Seas,

in Africa, and in North America. In it the contrast between

Western power and productive capacity and that of the affected

non-Western society leads to cults which allege that Western

power and production are rightfully within the provenance, as 168.

"things, " of the indigenous culture, and that the Western monopoly on them is due not to the totality of Western cultural factors, but to the malicious cleverness of the exploiting

Westerners. Some combination of an imitation of Western externals, violence against Westerners, and a mystic return to the essence of indigenous rituals are prescribed as means toward the obtaining of the "cargo" of the Western culture without painfully disturbing the indigenous culture.

There is an admixture of "cargo" in most past and current examples of massive cultural interaction with the West, and it should never be overlooked in any specific case; it is characteristic of the acculturation of the masses. Even accul- turated elites tend to present programs of partial Westernization to the masses in "cargo" terms, as witness the huge popular expectations of "uhuru" or some variant thereof.

But "cargo" has over time never been a dominant element in the acculturation process. The dominant factor is one already identified from historical examples mentioned in Chapter I -- the dominant or challenging elite group which utilizes elements of the external culture in order to seize privilege and status and/or to maintain itself in status and privilege against its actual and potential enemies. These elites have manipulated 169. and utilized the vague sense of relative deprivation^ * of the masses toward this end, but they have been neither the cast-up and inevitable instruments of the masses nor a type of Moses who has out of a sense of duty to the masses decided to lead them to a better world despite personal hardship and incon­ venience. Elites don't operate for such reasons -- they never have and never will. The search for status and privilege almost always, and their maintenance usually, are veiled within the mind and emotions by culturally acceptable cover motivations. The drive ma y or ma y not be overt. It ma y or ma y not be "rational" in terms of any culture or mixture of cultures.

Status and privilege themselves are relative terms --a holy m a n living in a mountain cave can possess both status and privilege in certain frames of reference.

Absolute cultural relativism requires the reader to concede that "privilege" and "status" are indissolubly linked to the Western concept of social and political "power, " but that manifestations of privilege and status can be infinitely varied across cultures. In the children's tale Tik-Tok of Oz L. Frank

B a u m more than a half-century ago described the privilege and status enjoyed by the greatest sorcerer in the world, Tititihoochoo, in the Land of the Fairies. The other fairies were all Kings 170.

and Queens, wearing crowns and living in palaces. The

jealously guarded privilege and status of the great sorcerer

lay in the fact that he alone bore the proud title of "Private

Citizen" and had for his abode a humble cottage.

But the cases under consideration here are not infinitely

varied; they share a c o m m o n trait --in all of them there is

some admixture of the northwestern European culture, even

though it ma y have been picked up at second or third hand.

Therefore, while the milieu of inter-elite struggle, the nature

of the privilege and status which are the bones of contention,

and the very tactics of the struggle ma y and usually will vary

widely in different parts of the non-West, there will be a cer­

tain number of co m m o n Western-derived features, such as

semi-Western educational institutions as elite spawning grounds,

semi-Western police and military tools in the political struggle,

and semi-Western concepts of the nation-state as the key

elements in elite political formulations.

There is enough experience drawn from 1945 and earlier to make a few easy predictions: acculturation in Africa, Asia,

and Latin America will be filtered through elites to the masses.

These elites will be of two types and along the continuum be­

tween these types: elites already holding power and sub-elites 171.

owing their special status to the changes induced by cultural

interaction, who are striving to sieze and consolidate power

and status for themselves and their children. The second type

shifts toward the first after it has been able to consolidate its

own status and privilege. The first becomes increasingly

vulnerable to the ambitions of the second.

In a time of rapid and massive cultural interaction, new

and usually unexpected elements are constantly intruding into

the political and social stage. Therefore, elites in or near

power in these societies find it mu c h more difficult than those

in more stable societies in history to stay on top; greater

vigilance and vigor is required of any elite, and a rapid rotation

of elites is more likely. At the same time, stable elite coalitions

based on custom or on Mosca's "judicial defense" are less likely

to occur. This is true even though the Franco-type cons olida ting-

authoritarian regime might, if not challenged, become the first

tentative vessel of a constitutional partial truce between elites --

a pattern which might eventually develop into solid custom,

relative elite security, and "judicial defense." Sadly, it will be

challenged, continuously, by fascist-type radical reformers, at least for several decades in the future.

The elites filtering the dominant culture will almost cer­ 172.

tainly be urban. 23 They will very probably be quite alienated from the rural masses in their own society, despite any formal expressions of concern and empathy for such masses and an

emotional need to have the peasantry dependent upon them. ^

They will be "marginal men, " unsure of themselves, since they must utilize elements of two usually conflicting value-technique

7 c clusters in making personal decisions. Since elites of the

first sub-group mentioned above are in a position to have their

egos massaged by political rituals and their minds focussed by decision-making requirements, they will tend to be overtly more secure and "rational" by Western standards than the

challenging elites will be.

F r o m what has been noted of France, central and eastern

Europe, Spain, Russia, and Japan, one can expect that the

origins of these elites will be either Western-oriented educational

institutions, the political and social institutions of a ruling elite

or coalition of elites, or some combination of the two*

Earlier in this chapter, in discussing non-Western cultures,

it has been argued that an all-too-common assumption of the

literature on "development" is incorrect and indefensible:

namely, the unilinear doctrine that there are vast historical

forces pushing the world inevitably toward accepting one or 173. another definition of the "modern" (for which read some variety of Western) culture.

F r o m the foregoing analysis of catalytic elites, another even more c o m m o n assumption of the contemporary scholarly literature comes into serious question: namely, that either the elites or the general masses of non-Western countries or both are consciously determined to adopt an alien culture for the benefit of their fellow me n and/or their own descendants.

Everything seen in other historical examples of massive cul­ tural interchange shows that the rural masses simply do not, except for "cargo" syndromes, consciously rise up and demand general or specific massive cultural changes. Catalytic elites do not act out of .self-abnegating love for others -- they have time and energy to work for such goals if and when they and their have accumulated a modicum of privilege, status and deference, or if custom or constitutional defenses given them a modicum of security. The chances of this happening in a non-Western society open to direct or indirect contact with Western culture are, on the record, very small, since cultural stability is by definition constantly endangered, thereby subjecting ruling elites to constant challenges.

Therefore, the c o m m o n conception of non-Western peoples 174. as striving cooperatively to shake loose their ancient ways and to become "modern" as a result of a rational choice and a 26 burning desire to imitate superior "modern" ways of doing things would appear, without even investigating the contemporary scene in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, to be very unlikely. The objective above might to some small extent overlap either (a) the "cargo" syndrome or (b) elite drives toward siezing, con­ solidating, and maintaining elite status and privilege.

Perhaps the best elaboration of elite characteristics can be evoked from the following series of quotations from a great mass of excellent scholarly analyses -- but even many of these quotations indicate an assumption of altruistic elite motives.

To the new rulers, the gesture is of greater significance than the result. .. The native thinker's intellect is subservient to his pride. ^7

Even within the literate elites in the changing societies, who ma y be quite skilled and ma y talk the language of modernization with fluency and ap­ parent conviction, there is often latent conflict between the modes of action and the values that modernization requires and the ingrained habits and attachments of traditional society. ^8

The high degree of political involvement of the intellectual in underdeveloped countries is a complex phenomenon. It has a three fold root; The primary source is a deep pre-occupation with authority. Even though he seeks and seems actually to break away from the authority of the powerful traditions in which he was brought up, the intellectual 175.

intellectual of the underdeveloped countries, even more than his confrere in more advanced countries, retains the need for incorporation into some self-transcending authoritative entity. Indeed, the greater his struggle for emancipation from the traditional collectivity, the greater his need for incorporation into a new, alternative collectivity. Intense politicization meets this need. The second source of political involvement is the absence of an even temporary sense of vocational achievement; there have been few counter-attractions to the appeal of charismatic politics. Finally, there has been a deficient tradition of civility in the underdeveloped countries which affects the intellectuals as m u c h as it does the non-intellectuals.^

Were not these me n (the nationalist elites of central and eastern Europe), liberals and fascists alike, motivated solely by self-interest? The ans­ wer might be "yes, " but their personal ambitions were subsumed in the national, and at the same time they made the national ends their own. . . the ends of self-interest and national interest, of individual career and national welfare became for them the same. 30

The appearance of a Westernized elite is essential, .‘.it translates to the local scene the nationa­ list experience and ideology of the West, and serves as the crystallizing center for the inchoate disaffections of the mass. ^^

The fact that the dominant elites of the non- European countries have been the formulators and • heroes of the national movements will not save them from replacement as new generations rise. . .The seeds sown with literacy are likely to sprout up in such a fashion as to overshadow those who now have their heads in the sun. ^

M a x No m a d has elaborated on Mo sea by showing how un­ organized revolts from below must fail because they are 176. unorganized, while organized revolts breed a new elite which acts for its own interests, even if subconsciously. Even if income and education were artificially equalized there would still be an elite of the better endowed:

Theoretically such a system would result in a continuous change in the personnel of that elite of merit and in the establishment of a rule of the wise. But human nature being what it is and refusing to change, one ma y safely and melancho- lically assume that the me m b e r s of that "natural" elite will try and succeed in securing undeserving positions of power and prestige for their children even though these ma y boast of no other merit than to have gone to the trouble of being born in an elite family. This, in turn, would give rise to pe r m a ­ nent struggles for power and prestige between ambitious and better-endowed "outs" stemming from the c o m m o n herd of the non-elite, and the less-endowed "ins" who are merely the beneficiaries of the time-honored principle of inheritance. Pareto's "circulation of the elites" would thus re- main valid -- even in Utopia. 33 177.

^Rupert Emerson, F r o m Empire to Nation (Boston: The Beacon Press, I960), p. 108.

Also note Hans Kohn, Nationalism, Its Meaning and History (Ithaca, N. Y. : The Cornell University Press, 1965), p. 9, "nationalism is a state of mind in which the supreme loyalty of the individual is felt to be owed to the nation-state. "

^Harold R. Isaacs, "Group Identity and Political Change, " Survey, No. 69 (October, 1968), 78.

As a typical example of the universalist trend, note Barbara Ward, Nationalism and Ideology (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1966), p. 12: "Nationalism, which we thought was no longer the strongest force inftie world, is showing signs of a serious comeback, " and "nationalism fails to provide kinship, cohesion, and economic function. "

"But is it not obvious that the nation-state is obsolescent? Here the wish is father to the thought, and historical distortion comes to be produced as much by internationalist aspiration as by nationalist bias. " K. R. Minogue, Nationalism (New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. 21.

^Recent articles in the international press have described the "spectacular" by -election gains of the Plaid Cy m r u (Welsh) and the Scottish National parties. In 1966 and 1967 both elected deputies to Parliament from seats long considered safe for the traditional parties.

According to The Ne w York Times of January 28, 1969, the provincial government of Quebec recently exchanged formal "letters of intent" with the French government regarding projects of cooperation in education, investment, and science.

^K. R. Minogue, Nationalism, pp. 10-11, makes an ex­ cellent distinction between the relative position of the state and the nation.

Louis L. Snyder, The N e w Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968), argues that the indigenous Western culture-area held that a nation could develop from within the framework of a state, while the adaptors of Western culture 178.

usually held, with more passion, that the state could only develop within the "chrysalis11 of the nation.

^Paul Kecskmeti, "Static and Dynamic Society, " in Political Theory and Social Change, ed. by David Spitz (New York: Atherton Press, 1967), p. 42, notes that the " m o d e m " world tends to traditionalize politics, and that the central traditional element is language, "a decentralized undirected spontaneous encoding process producing a behavior pattern uniform through-out the group and fixed from one generation to another. "

Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (rev. ed.; N e w York: Praeger, 1962), p. 70, argues that language is the primary determinant of states and nation-states, thereby rendering very difficult any supra-national society.

Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Dr a m a (New York: Pantheon, 1968), pp. 82-87, explains the key role of language in nation-buidling, and the dilemma whereby education in local languages stimulates sub-national political consciousness. 7 See Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Co m m u n i ­ cation (rev, ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966).

8"The forms of a person‘s thoughts are controlled by inexorable laws of pattern of which he is unconscious. These patterns are the unperceived intricate systematizations of his own language, " Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: Technology Press of MIT, 1956), p. 252. o Minogue, Nationalism, pp. 25-29.

^®For excellent discussions of nationalism seen as a religion, a concept fully compatible with this study, see:

David E. Apter, "Political Religion in the N e w Nations, " in Old Societies and Ne w States, ed. by Clifford Geertz (New York: 1963), pp. 193-232; 179.

pp. 193-232 of Apter*s So m e Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968), and

Carleton Hayes, Nationalism: A Religion (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), parti­ cularly pp. 164-170. (For example, "a nationalistic theology of intellectuals becomes a nationalist mythology of the masses. . .there is a constant fear lest the masses lose their nationalist faith. " )

"The nation is a deity composed of all the ele­ ments of creation" -- the leader of the Federated Black Militants of Newark, on a P B L broadcast, Channel 26, Washington, December 15, 1968, referring to the building of a black nation inside the United States.

^Minogue, Nationalism, pp. 65-66 notes that all modern nationalists regard foreigners as both cunning and malicious, and that nationalists fear above all ridicule and seek to inspire above all fear. He notes that Fichte and other hyper-nationalists of central and eastern Europe denigrated foreigners passionately but at the same tijne were inexplicably sensitive to the opinions of the same people they denigrated. "Nationalists present their political struggle as carried out by a homogenous society against external aggressors. They have to admit these outside oppressors have internal allies -- stooges and traitors -- all that resists the national leadership. " Ibid., p. 154.

"The idea that wars have such a unifying force suggests the dangerous idea that in order to remain truly united, a nation ought to fight a war every now and then. Fortunately, this is not necessary, for old wars will serve as well as new ones, perhaps better, for they are all glory and no sacrifice." A. K. F. Organski, World Politics (2nd ed. ; Ne w York: Knopf, 1968), p. 31.

"The nation becomes, to the fascist, a single class, a proletarian class, in struggle against others." Hans Rogger, 180.

The European Right (Stanford, Calif. : Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 584.

"The price of nationality is war; and yet what is bought at that price is of great value. The brotherhood of ma n finds m u c h of its working expression within the nation. " Rupert Emerson, F r o m Empire to Nation (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1960), p. 384.

"Independence, the first condition of liberty, can be secured in the last analysis only by the armed strength of the citizenry itself, never by mercenaries; consequently, arms are the first foundations of liberty in anything but one’s own strength. Internally, also, liberty rests on force, on the . public force of the State, however, not on force exercised by private individuals or groups, which is a direct threat to liberty. " Machiavelli, as quoted in James Burnham, The Machiavellians - Defenders of Freedom (New York: John Day Company, 1943), p. 69.

"Struggle sharpens and deepens national consciousness. It does not explain why it begins, what causes the c o m m o n re­ sentment, what gives the c o m m o n feeling that there is a co m m o n enemy. " Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1955), p. 47.

12Since fascist movements were by definition nationalistic, there could be no such thing as a ’fascist international. '" Stanley G. Payne, Falange, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 78.

Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962), pp. 179-184, argues that in both China and Yugoslavia co m m u n i s m and nationalism were "fused, " and that co m m u n i s m provides a convenient ideological base for nationalist movements.

"As the nations of the world become mo r e nationalist, they become more collectivist; as they become mo r e collectivist, they become more nationalist. " Louis L. Snyder, The Ne w Nationalism, p. 367. 181.

"The co m m o n cause which produces a revolutionary alliance or parallelism is usually nationalism and the catalyst is usually a foreign enemy. " Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies {New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 304.

13 "Fascism is a universal attitude of return to one’s own national essence. Every nation has its own national style of political expression. " Jose Antonio de Rivera, leader of the Spanish Falange, quoted in Stanley G. Payne, Falange, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1961), p. 78.

"However variant in motivation or conduct, the dictator­ ships of the Thirties in Germany, Italy, Russia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Austria, Portugal, Spain, Yugoslavia, and China were emphatically nationalist. .. the national state became omniscient, infallible, and omnipotent. " Carleton Hayes, Nationalism, A Religion, p. 142.

"Fascists saw the Nation as a reality very similar to the God of the Old Testament: not a philosophical notion, an abstract concept; but a real, terrible power which manifests itself most obviously in its anger, in violent catastrophic acts .. .and before the mystery of the nation, as before God, m a n is nothing but a creature of the superior entity in function of which he exists. The Nation is the depository of the fundamen­ tal force from which its me m b e r s draw their life. This force must be invoked for society's sake; it must be conjured up from the depths, where, forgotten, it has been lying dormant while society, cut off from its roots, from its source of life energy, weakens and decays. " Eugen Weber, "The Right, " in The European Right, ed. by Hans Rogger and Eugen Weber (Stanford, Calif. : The Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 24.

"Fascism was from the beginning an inflammation of nationalism: " Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (rev, ed.; Princeton, N. J.: Van Nostrand, 1965), p. 79.

"Fascism is a parasite that thrives on frustrated Nationalism. " W. W. Kulski, International Politics in a Revolutionary Age (2nd rev, ed.; N e w York: J. B. Lippincott, 1968), p. 138. 182.

"Who today .wants to be known as a fascist? There are at least a dozen regimes among the newly independent states which could lay claim to the title, but their leaders would sooner be called communists. " George Lichtheim, The Concept of Ideology (New York: Vintage Books, 1967), p. 226.

^ " N o m a n ever looks at the world with pristine eyes. He sees it edited by a definite set of customs and institutions and ways of thinking. " Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (New York: Penguin Books, 1934), p. 2.

"It is the general belief that there must be a way out of poverty and the psychic constructions of the traditionals that links the author of this volume with, his own national traditions. But this very American belief that there is a way is a dream. " David Reisman, in the Introduction to Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958), p. 10.

^ O u t of dozens of available examples, one based on an allegedly "empirical survey" is as good as any for a de m o n ­ stration. Alex Inkeles, "The Modernization of Man, " in Modernization, ed. by Myron Weiner (New York: Basic Books, 1966), pp. 138-152, concludes on the basis of empirical, scientific evidence, that "modern men" share the following principal characteristics:

1. A disposition to accept new ideas and try new methods.

2. A readiness to express opinions.

3. A time sense emphasizing the future over the past.

4. A sense of punctuality.

5. A concern for planning, organization, and efficiency.

6. A tendency to see the world as calculable.

7. A faith in science and technology. 183.

8. A belief in distributive justice -- (this last term is a solipsism implying a uni­ versal standard of justice -- but that, too, must be explicitly or implicitly culture-bound!)

The reader is asked to look at the above listand ask whether mo r e than half the items are actually descriptive of the reader himself today. Then the reader should ask himself if he would like to possess all or nearly all of these characteristics !

Also note John C. Resenbrink in a book review, The Review of Politics, X X V H I (No. 3, July, 1966), 395. "The 'emerging world culture1 looks*-suspiciously like gentle, middle class Western professionals and intellectuals projected into a context in which they are in a decisive political sense irrelevant. "

*^Inkeles, in his description of "modern ma n " quoted above, uses psycho-social indices because he sees culture primarily from that viewpoint. Another scholar, Marian J. Levy, Jr., in Modernization and the Structure of Societies (Princeton, N. J. : Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 85, also lists the charac­ teristics of "modern" and "non-modern" societies, but he uses strictly material and economic standards. ("We interpret our dependence, in our civilization, on economic competition, as proof that this is the prime motivation that human nature can rely upon. " Benedict, Patterns of Culture, p. 6.) Thus Levy comes up with the following definition of the essential elements of all "non-modern" cultures:

1. Dependence on animate power sources;

2. Any inanimate sources are fixed or nearly so;

3. Tools have only a small multiplication effect;

4. Tools are of a sedentary nature.

Levy's "modern ma n " is as unrecognizable as those of other scholars; he emphasizes "rationality, " and "emotional neutrality. " 184.

17Even mo r e dangerous is a tendency among younger scholars, particularly economists and physical scientists, to narrow down further the idea of "modern" to the technological and scientific developments of the last few decades. Thus the warning:1

That all peoples can participate in, and con­ tribute to, scientific-technological development and thus insure its global enhancement is now an article of faith. It is precisely that and no more. Perhaps the future will show that science and tech­ nology have devised their own perpetuum mobile of pro­ ductivity. It is just as possible that the curve which now is steep will flatten out. It is just as possible that a period of stagnation and then a period of decline will follow upon a period of great creativeness and great expectations. .. the dominant society and culture are credited with a power of self-abnegation which has been a stranger to all dominant cultures of history. This hypothesis falls under the rubric: the end of the political. . . it seems an implausible hypothesis. . .The one and only political innovation of the last fifty years -- the age of the scientific-techno­ logical revolution -- has been totalitarianism. " Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Social Values and Politics, 11 The Review of Politics, XXX, No. 1 (January, 1968) 66-71.

*®Donald N. Levine, "The Flexibility of Traditional Cul­ ture, " The Journal of Social Issues, XXIV, No. 4 (October, 1968) 140.

^ M a l c o l m Quint, "The Idea of Progress in an Iraqi Village, " in Political Modernization, ed. by Claude E. Welch, Jr. (Belmont, Calif. : Wadsworth Company, 1967), p. 52.

^®See P. Lawrence, Road Belong Cargo (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964)

P. M. Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1957) 185.

W. H. Friedland, "Traditionalism and Modernization, " The Journal of Social Issues, XXIV, No. 4 (October, 1968)

Lucy Mair, N e w Nations (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), points out in a brilliant passage, from the view­ point of a social anthropologist, that millenary movements "are all concerned with the relationship of dominance hnd subjection. " (p. 173) She describes the typical cargo cult as promising free­ d o m through a vast supply of material goods. Some of the c o m m o n symptoms of cult behavior are the destruction of treasured religious objects, the repudiation of money, refraining from all work, killing livestock, imitating Western external be­ havior, and consulting secret texts. She describes pure cargo cults in tropical Africa and notes that independence-minded local elites usually communicate with their followers by the same emotive slogans. "The process of rational conviction is extremely slow -- the short cut is to endow the desired reforms with magical efficacy." (pp. 176-181)

Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millenium (Ne w York: Oxford University Press, 1958) shows that millenary cults in medieval Europe, focused on the removal of all problems through removal of the Enemy, "arose among peoples who were cut off from social ties with any one group and hence found them­ selves insecure."

21 W. C. ~Runciman, in his very scholarly Relative Depri­ vation and Social Justice, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), proves that a sense of status deprivation is more of a stimulus to political action and is more keenly felt than material deprivation. Furthermore, this sense of status depri­ vation is the more keenly felt the closer actual equality of status comes to being achieved.

22 "There is always a certain amount of elitism mixed with the populism of the nationalist leaders. . .after independence, a massive political education program must be carried on to assure that the popular will actually corresponds to the conception of it in the theory of the elites. " Paxil E. Sigmund, ed. , The Ideologies of the Developing Nations (rev, ed., N e w York: Praeger, 1967), p. 5.

Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Develop­ ments, " in Political Modernization, ed. by Claude E. Welch, Jr. 186.

(Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Company, 1967), pp. 161-162 characterizes the nationalist leader out of power as "a populist and champion of the masses, " but the same ma n in power looks on the masses as an impediment. Weiner calls attention to the key role of elite attitudes as against mass attitudes and against structural elements.

^ S e e Carl Leider and Karl M. Schmitt, eds., The Politics of Violence (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 78-89, which contains a conclusive s u m m a r y of the urban, privileged, and middle-class origins of challenging elites.

24iiThe illiterate masses who have had little or no relation to national politics are educated to read the party literature and to become aware of national and international problems from the party point of view. " Sigmund, The Ideologies of the Developing Nations, p. 9.

"The popular will from vhich a ruling party must derive its legitimacy seems to consist as much in what the people should desire as in what they do desire. " Ibid., p. 24.

"The intellectuals compensate for their alienation from the masses by romanticizing them." Myrdal, Asian Drama, p. 62.

2 5M a x F. Millikan and Donald F. Blackmer, in The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1961), p. 14, point out that of new elites "many attained the badge of university edu­ cation without achieving great professional skill in any field, " while others had become bitter and frustrated long before they were educated, and most tend in any case to remain suspicious and defensive.

Lucien W. Pye, in Politics, Personality, and Nation- Building (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1963), pp. 52-53 explains why political elites in developing countries are most disturbed over questions of personal identity: their access to power leaves them sensitive to advantage-disadvantage, superior- inferior, honored-shamed, and effective-ineffective comparisons. 187.

"They ma y have experienced moments of insight into the real meaning of being a modern ma n in a modern country, and for­ ever after been left distuvbed by the knowledge that in matters that really count they have been rationalizing rather than des - cribing the reality of their society.. .their ambivalences have undermined their sense of judgment and taste, their self- confidence has been sapped to the point where they are consciously anxious about their own worth, and unsure of their own identities, " Pye adds that "The need for reassurance of individual worth produces the need for a politics of status. "

Also, see a novel, Fereidun Esfandiary, The Day of Sacrifice (New York: Obolensky and Sons, 1958), for a detailed account of the psychological anxieties of a "marginal man" in an Afro-Asian country.

"They wanted some cultural roots to cling to, something that would give them assurance of their own worth, something that would reduce the sense of frustration and humiliation that foreign conquest and rule had produced. In every country with a growing nationalism, there is this search apart from religion, this tendency to go back in the past," Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (London: Meridien Books, 1947), p. 54.

"Throughout non-Western world, there is a passionate effort on the part of peoples to attain knowledge of Western values and to realize them." Testimony of Louis Hartz, U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Nature of Revolution, 90th Cong., Special Session, , p. 130.

"The object (of modernizing elites) is to increase the social product with fair shares for all. Successful models now include Japan and the Soviet Union. " David E, Apter, The Politics of Modernization (with 1967 Preface) ( Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965) p. vii.

R. C. Macridis and B. E. Brown, "Introduction to Part Five, " in Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings, ed. by Macridis and Brown (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey, 1964), p. 501, allege that political elites in the non-Western world are "attempting to popularize new values and norms and create new attitudes in order to achieve industrialization, prosperity, and equality. " "The predominant policy of the Third World arises from a legitimately obsessive concern with victory over poverty, illiteracy, and disease. This threefold goal dominates their actions and policies at home and abroad. " Thomas P. Melady, Western Policy and the Third World (Ne w York: Hawthorn Books, 1967), p. 19.

"The; passionate concern of the nationalist leaders is to eliminate inequality and to develop economically. " Sigmund, The Ideologies of the Developing Nations, p. 17.

27A. A. Said, The African Phenomenon (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), p. 65.

28 Millikan and Blackmer, The Emerging Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy, p. 26.

^ E d w a r d Shils, "The Intellectuals in Political Development, in Political Change in the Underdeveloped Areas, ed. by John H. Kautsky (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962), p. 205.

OA Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality (Ne w York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1955), p. 179.

31Rupert Emerson, F r o m Empire to Nation (Boston: The Beacon Press, I960), p. 44.

32Ibid., p. 147.

33M a x Nomad, Aspects of Revolt (New York: The Noonday Press, 1959), p. 46. C H A P T E R VIII

The Record in Afro-Asia and Latin America

As the Western culture complex began to interact strongly with wholly alien cultures all over the world, no basic develop­ ments occurred which could not have been easily foreseen by virtue of the lessons of ancient and.modern history. There have been no carbon copies, or even reasonable facsimiles, of the original northwestern European culture complex, though new syntheses have occurred in several areas. *

Specifically, there has been no reproduction of Western economic performance and no reproduction of Western political institutions other than pro-forma. The most striking impact of the Western culture has been in the adaptation of Western nationa­ lism as a political-military technique to alien cultures. The rural masses have been little affected by massive cultural inter­ action except for a vague unease and weakening of confidence which is exemplified in "cargo" politics --a vulnerability to promises of magical and symbolic access to Western techniques without cost in terms of cultural change.

The prime political effect of Western values and techniques has been on elites, not on masses except insofar as elites have utilized "cargo" politics on those relatively rare occasions when mass support has been of any importance to them.

Elites have been those predating significant interaction with the West, and those owing their elite status to Western influ­ ence. The former have been classifiable as (a) unchanged, or pristine non-Western elites, and (b) those who have shared power by co-opting other elites. The latter have been classi­ fiable as (c) radical revolutionary elites, either challenging the ruling elites or having recently taken power, and (d) consolidating authoritarian elites, which have evolved from onfe of the other three types. Elite rotation has been rapid, as the capacities and parameters of political systems have been subject to rapid change due to massive cultural inter­ action. Therefore, the number of ruling elites of types (a) and

(b) above, being ipso facto non-expansible in total numbers, has been declining, and, assuming no miraculous political freeze, must continue to decline. Except for a few type (a) elites, vast gaps of life style and understanding have opened between elites and masses.

The prime point of cultured impact has been, as might have been expected, from earlier examples, the concept of nationalism, which has pulverized alien concepts of basic 191. group identity in terms of efficacy as a political-military catalyst for the maintenance of any elite against foreign and domestic enemies. But since ethnic-linguistic solidarity is conspicuous by its absence in the areas under study, nationalism of one or another order of magnitude is also the focus of effort of challenging elites, who try to use it to mobilize against ruling elites. 3

It is also possible to consider a fifth category of elites: caretakers, who are in power temporarily because there is no one else. This type (e) ma y of course be transformed into types (c) and (d). The two latter are clearly the keys to under­ standing elite behavior in the contemporary non-Western world.

The radical revolutionary elite member, and very often the consolidating authoritarian who preceeds and succeeds him, is marked by formal education, which means partial ac­ culturation, along Western lines. This means that, typically, he is a "marginal man, " afflicted by the anomie of all such un­ fortunate victims of culture clash and synthesis.^ The afflic­ tion if greater among a type (c) elite than among type (d), since i the self-esteem of the second has been reinforced by the rituals of power, status, and privilege, particularly when these can be associated with the concept of absolute national sovereignty. 192.

Aside from the outwardly special case of Latin America, which will be discussed below, the non-Western world, outside the "Macedons" discussed in earlier chapters, was struck by the West in one of two ways: with or without a period of formal European political control. In those areas where poli­ tical control was formally in Western hands, the possibility of survival of an indigenous ruling elite, whether pristine or of the catalytic, amalgamating type, is obviated.

The all-too -c o m m o n habit of attributing various allegedly evil or undesirable effects of cultural interaction to the prac­ tice of official Western political control of non-Western areas

-- "imperialisrri1-- has little or no utility for the purposes of this study. It seems obvious that the alternative to such

control would have been the survival of "a" and "b" type elites, a slowing of the rate of cultural change in the form of

education, linguae francae, etc., and the substitution of private for public institutions of alieh control. The alternative to the

British Empire in India was never a "free India" in the Nine­ teenth Century. It was John Company, or Jean Compagnie,

or Johann A. G. The attribution of economic maladjustments in these areas to "imperialism" seems no mo r e valid than the attribution of political problems to the same phenomenon. 3 193.

The aspect which, in the light of our earlier analysis, needs particularly to be watched is the key political concept of the Western culture -- nationalism as the basic group identity. And against this factor, the differences between areas under Western l,imperialism,, and other areas become insigni­ ficant. Almost all "free" geographically-based political entities in the non-Western world (excepting a very few freakish units such as Japan) were not national -- they were either tribal like the Congo or imperial like India or Mexico. They possessed neither linguistic nor cultural unity. There was no greater basis for nationalism in the colonial political units --in ma n y cases the latter cut across linguistic and cultural lines.

The first impulse toward deliberate borrowing from the

Western culture should be expected to come from relatively

sharp local ruling elites disturbed by evidence of Western military superiority -- this reaction has been clearly exempli­ fied in Russia and Japan, as well as in innumerable other his­ torical examples. It is necessary for any flexible ruling elite to adapt successful techniques from abroad, or even, if abso­ lutely necessary, a dash of alien values. The first adaptations in "free" non-Western political entities were the imitation of demonstratedly successful Western military equipment and 194.

techniques, such as artillery and its use. This was followed by efforts to imitate Western military discipline and to build industries capable of supporting essential weaponry. The former embodied the use of foreigh military technicians, the latter the use of industrial technicians. But it soon became evident that military drill was only the external symbol of

Western morale, which really lay underneath in other factors, an important and visible one of which was nationalism. And it also became evident, particularly after about I860, that a war industry could not exist apart from a wholesale importation of Western economic and technical elements, which were, in turn, dependent on nationalism and other northwestern European cultural elements. ^

None of these non-Western ruling elites who experimented with Western techniques were at all concerned with the adoption of'Western culture as a good per se. They were interested in the enhancement of their capacity to resist their external and internal enemies by increasing the efficiency of the appli­ cation of police and military power against those enemies.

There was no thought or pretense of raising living standards of the masses, or of the establishment of parliamentary institutions, or of world peace, or of human dignity. There 195. was only their own survival as ruling elites.

W h e n they found that the introduction of Western mili­ tary techniques was a matter of the camel's nose in the tent, they were faced with a slow choice between evils. Either they could try to block off Westernization, despite the resulting decline in their own power, or they could ma k e the best bargain they could by giving up some of their own status and privilege through broadening the elite base in order to achieve Western strength -- to become, in other words, a type "b" elite. Both

Hie Russian and Japanese elites did so, but were eventually overwhelmed by radical revolutionaries, though the Japanese elite was later restored from off stage.

In the early stages of the process under study the "imi­ tation of Macedon" syndrome becomes apparent. One example of several stands out. Economic, industrial, and technological capacity was from the first measured against the cost of such capacity to a ruling elite. The cost to a ruling elite of the creation of facilities for some kind of laissez-faire capitalism would have been immense and probably intolerable, since this northwestern European elite model was wholly incompatible with the conditions under which those alien elites could main­ tain power for themselves and their children. What was more 196. natural than that they should turn to one or another of the

"Macedons" and find a set of guidelines which would permit enough economic and technological adaptation greatly to en­ hance military and police capabilities but would not at the same time, by correllating prestige and privilege with indi­ vidual economic achievement, destroy the ruling elite ? The answer, hopefully, lay in something between the Russian

(Czarist or Bolshevik) and the post-1930 and pre-1945

Japanese "Macedons. " Thereby economic and technological strength, though perhaps limited, would be more or less wedded to the state governing machine, thus allowing the ruling elite an important voice in allocating power and status through formal or informal state control over the economy

n as well as the polity.

Similar problems were faced in other sectors --a completely professional military or police force was obviously optimal in terms of efficiency, but by their nature, professional standards would work against elite interests. Here again, ruling elites tried to compromise, as witness the somewhat professional Bolshevik or Czarist armies, with high military rank allocated, respectively, by the Party and by the nobility.

The compromising was not between elite interests on the 197. one hand and larger interests on the other which could be sub­ sumed under such rubrics as "development, " "Modernization, " or "democracy. " It was between immediate elite interest on the one side and on the other longer-range elite self-interest, in the form of capacity to defend against or deter threats by internal or external challengers for elite privilege and status.

There is no essential difference between the dynamics of elite behavior in an area which did know formal Western political control, like India, Mexico, or Ghana, and in an area which did not, such as Russia, Spain, Ethiopia, China, or Iran.

In all the former cases the earlier ruling elites were destroyed, debilitated by lack of responsibility, or were forced to trans­ form themselves in order to survive. The core of the elite which challenged the alien rulers was always the creation of the alien rulers -- the assistants of the alien administrators and soldiers, and those partially Westernized through the new educational system, courts, or other such Western importations.

They did not represent the return of something old -- they represented the institutions and techniques, and to some extent the values, of the West. But did the Romanovs and Meijis.

The dynamics of elite struggle and survival were essentially identical, and the dilemmas described above were valid for all. 198.

In both types of polity an interesting tension and historical

blind alley can be seen -- the phenomenon of the true "Westernizer"

as against the equivalent of the "Slavophile. " Tendencies can

be found, such as in the early Indian National Congress, the

Japan of the Nineties, and among the "economist" Marxists of

Czarist Russia, toward a wholesale Westernization, including

the conscious rejection of non-Western values and institutions.

This was Mahan's dream of a "Christianized" East, the dim

end of Kipling's vision, and the heart of Marx's view of the non-West's destiny.®

In every case, however, individuals and elites attempting a genuine Westernization of society either changed their own objectives or went down before challenging elites which formally espoused something between an outright rejection of the West (as in Ghandi's India and Mao's China) and a synthesis of cultures (as in Lenin's Russia and Nehru's India). Apparently the old historical rule has continued to hold: cultures do not move intact out of their birthplaces into areas where other

cultures are dominant.

Whether these elites are psychologically secure or insecure, new or old, fanatic or pragmatic, they are still elites. While they ma y well utilize their political activities to 199. provide cushions for their psyches or to weave elaborate ethical justifications for their actions, perhaps in multi-cultural terms, they are unlikely to destroy their own elite positions by a consistent pattern of action. Every ruling elite has one or more internal or external challenging elites on its heels.

Ruling elites in Afro-Asia and Latin America are sur­ rounded by other elites which threaten their security. The well-known mechanics of power politics come into play, and each ruling group must do its best to protect itself against the outside. The external threat can be classified into two dis­ tinct categories -- that from other Afro-Asian states on the one hand, and that from the West and from comparatively

Westernized "Macedons" on the other. The first threat is po­ tentially important, but is mitigated by the fact that nationalism as a basic group identity is still so weak, limited, or non­ existent in most of the states concerned that an attempt to wage external war would be suicidal for their ruling elites, since a precarious internal balance would of necessity become even more precarious. Should State "A" be able to coordinate external attack with an internal rising of an irredentist minority within State "B", the prospects for success might be worth the risk for State "A's" elite, but otherwise the average elite can 2 00, be expected to talk up bogus threats as part of its particular

"political formulation, " but not to act except in desperation as the only alternative to near-certain overthrow. The require­ ment to prepare for this type of warfare, however, acts as a constant spur to a ruling elite to promote nationalism, to obtain a limited, basic conventional military capacity and infra­ structure which can operate against neighbors without the per­ mission and control of great powers, and to obviate, in one way or another, the threat of irredentist ethno-cultural- linguistic minorities which'could operate in conjunction with an aggressive neighbor.

The external threat from Western, or "Macedonian" external forces, is a different matter -- the Afro-Asian-Latin

American elite has no force which it can interpose in the tradition of sovereign power politics against a determined effort by such a power to conquer and exploit the non-Western state. The

Westernized state's physical power is due to its mastery of

Western techniques and its basic group identity of nationalism with its concomitant solution of "the problem of finite sacri­ fice. N o matter how mu c h an Afro-Asian elite m a y delude itself into thinking that it struggled successfully with a metropole for its freedom, the facts of the cases and the constant examples of feeble Portugal and its colonies impress on the local rulers 201. the inescapable fact that they owe the sovereignty of their countries and their own elite positions to a reluctance on the part of Western and Westernized countries to use force against them. And in neither military-linked industrial capacity and infrastructure, in professional military skill, nor in the in­ tensity of national identity is there any hope that the non-

Westernized country can catch up or even appreciably narrow the gap in the foreseeable future.

An Afro-Asian-Latin American elite can therefore take only the following actions to protect itself against what it per­ ceives as an intolerable overhanging threat of physical force applied by a Western or relatively Westernized power against it:

(a) Build up an international ethic to the effect

that the use or threat of force by Westernized

against non-Westernized countries is deeply

immoral -- the ultimate evil of "colonialism, "

and utilize international organizations and

friendly sub-elites in the more powerful states

to institutionalize this ethical innovation;

(b) Seek by various means to deter the Westernized

or Western state by the possibility that other powerful states will mo v e to prevent such an application of force; this without putting the weak state into a position of subordination to

the other powerful states -- the basic tactic

of "neutralism;

Develop a capacity for defensive guerrilla wa r ­ fare which would largely negate the conventional military superiority of the mo r e Westernized

state -- this requires, however, (1) a powerful national basic group identity, (2) popular iden­ tification of likely powerful foes as satanic,

(3) the elimiiation or neutralization of ethno­ cultural-linguistic minorities, (4) the down­

grading of conventional military capacity in favor of militia-type popular forces and the consequent weakening of other elite power capabilities, and (5) the voluntary restriction by the more Westernized state of its own military tactics within the bounds of the Christian

European justification for war; guerrilla wa r ­ fare, no matter if all other conditions above were wholly met, would simply not work other 203.

than as an element in a coalition if it were

applied against a Ghengiz Khan, a Ho Chi

Minh, or even a Nkrumah. 12

A ruling elite's defense of its status and privileges, and a challenging elite's attempt to sieze that status and those privileges, has also a domestic dimension. As mentioned above, top political elites in the countries swept by cultural interaction are insecure -- personally and in terms of elite status. Elites rise and fall rapidly; voracious sub-elites are eagerly awaiting a slip which changes the domestic power balance and are con­ stantly estimating the various possibilities for coalitions, m e r ­ gers, and fissions. Whether the ruling elite coalition is radical-revolutionary or consolidating, whether its accession was recent or ancient, it has to work in the same environment with the same threats and the same possibilities. Challenging elites and those recently ensconsced in power m a y tend to be more "sincere, " more "intolerant, " more "altruistic, " more

"ethical, " and more "fanatic, " than those accustomed to power, but these are matters of degree, not of quality. Also a matter of degree is the extent of lip service paid to one or another of the latter-day distortions of Marxism as an official ideological framework, or the degree of resemblance in practice to 204.

European fascism. Similarly, the fact that an elite or an elite coalition represents two, five or even seven per cent of a given population is not a qualitative difference -- there are no mass-origin, mass-controlled, and mass-oriented elites in the non-Western world. The existence of genuine personal sympathy for the masses, an esoteric sense of brotherhood, the possible partial coincidence of mass interests and elite interests, and the use of "cargo" symbols to lull or gull the masses are not central to the issue.

The prime task of a ruling elite is to organize and util­ ize power -- from raw military and police power through party organization and economic power to the passive and diffuse power called "legitimacy," Therefore, there is and has been in these countries a constant competition between elites and elite coalitions for the control of short-range police and military power, for the somewhat more indirect control of production, and for the general acquiescence of the masses.

W e have seen the significance of basic group identity in the creation, maintenance, and implementation of the instru­ ments mentioned above. The necessary key for any elite is the creation of some degree of large-scale basic group identity and the elite's elevating itself into a symbol of that identity.. ^ The nationalism ma y be limited to only a small portion of the physical population, but must affect a significant proportion of the politically conscious population -- that is, the portion which even contemplates having an impact itself on the structure of power. Whether the elite is challenging or consolidating, the creation and/or utilization of national sentiment is the raw material from which it can build its challenge or its defense.

It is this, not democracy, not individualism, not science, not industry, not technology, which is the central element of Western culture in the context of a penetrated alien culture. These con­ flicting and mutually antagonistic nationalisms m a y be based on the same human raw material but on different elite formulations of the national myth --as see the Republican and Justice Party elites in Turkey, or North and South Vietnamese elites. O r the human raw material itself ma y be different --as see Ukrainian nationalism in the USSR versus Soviet or Great Russian supra- nationalism, Biafran nationalism versus Nigerian federal

^'nationalism, " Naga nationalism versus Indian federal "nationa­ lism, " and so forth.

Any ruling elite in an Afro-Asian or Latin American country must be constantly ready to counter either kind of rival political formulation. It is, therefore, unlikely: to permit 206. organized political activity or processes which it cannot control or contain. It is highly unlikely to allow the military, police, and courts to perform their functions other than in defense of the ruling group. It is unlikely to permit concen­ trations of power to develop in the economy which are not under its direct control.

It must at the same time keep a ma x i m u m of psychic pressure behind its own formulation of national myth,, utilizing the public media and educational institutions to impress a m a x i m u m number of people who matter or might matter of the promise of this formulation, its vitality, and its pantheon of devils and heroes. It must present this formulation as an ultimate solution to the problems of the people to w h o m the appeal is directed, far beyond the possibilities of alternative basic group identities, and far beyond the easy-going and assured nationalism of elite bhlance, interest politics, and judicial defense characterizing the pristine culture of north­ western Europe.

Two aspects of this requirement for nationalism are particularly worthy of note. One is that all evidence to date, including the experience of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., indicates that the building of a sturdy multi-ethnic, multi-cultural, and 207.

most especially multi-linguistic national sentiment is ex­

tremely difficult and can be expected in most cases to lose

out to concepts of basic group identity based on a co m m o n

language and at least one of the other two prime cementing

factors. The other is that any nationalism requires the per­

sonification of an external danger which requires heroic

struggle on the part of the people of the national unit concerned.

The difficulty in selecting the national unit, the competition

between different formulations, the basic insecurity and'

aggressiveness of elite elements, and the ignorance of the masses all have resulted in formulations of nationalism

which rival and surpass European early romantic nationalism

and fascism in the primeval focussing of hatred against al­

legedly malevolent outsiders. It is amusing and pitiful

to observe elites in countries like Iran and Afghanistan, which

have never been under European colonial rule, inventing a

symbolic colonial past and a mythical but heroic freedom

struggle against the foreign oppressor, or elites in African

countries like Guinea pretending that somehow they wrested

political sovereignty from the metropole rather than having it handed to them on a silver platter.

A particular creation of a typical myth-maker from an 208. underdeveloped country, Lenin, contained in his Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism and his Draft Theses on the

Colonial Areas, has had a vast though probably not permanent effect on today's non-Western elites. Almost by chance, and for limited tactical objectives, he came forth with an idea so attractive that even today, despite its total incongruity with empirical data, it focuses the fear and hatred of non-Western elites on the U.S. and Western Europe and away from governments professing Marxism-Leninism as an ideology, arid at the same time provides these different elites with a real, though slight, sense of a c o m m o n destiny arid c o m m o n interests vis-a-vis the West. The effect of even this gigantic and global political formulation, however, has probably been no more than marginal, and will in the future be slowly washed out by changing circumstances.

It is noteworthy that the requirement to forestall serious challenges to the national myth and the requirements mentioned above for defense against potential subversion from outside and for an effective guerrilla defensive posture all require the neutralization of ethnic-cultural-linguistic minorities.

There is no remotely equivalent pressure on the leaders or would-be leaders of Afro-Asian or Latin American countries 209. to industrialize, to raise standards of living (other than for themselves and their children), to educate, to organize poli­

tically, to democratize, or to carry out "social reforms."

One special, and usually transitory, elite form is that of the "caretaker" elite -- type (e) above. An utter failure on the part of a ruling elite without a corresponding rise on the part of a challenging elite cluster can result in a period in which elements of the military, police, or civil administration will begin to control basic decisions simply because there is no one else and because the existing political structure cannot otherwise survive. H u m a n nature being what it is, such

"caretaker" elites drift imperceptibly into larger ambitions and become for practical purposes ruling elites.

Latin America’s political, cultural, and social environ­ ment is different from that of non-Western Afro-Asia, and the rilling and challenging elites of Latin America are not quite the same. The Latin American countries were colonies of the partially Westernized countries of Iberia, studied in an earlier chapter. The rulers who succeeded the imperial

governors were creoles who shared the outlook and political culture of their counterparts in Iberia. One would therefore, other things being equal, have expected the historical trend 210. in Latin America to run parallel with what we have observed in Spain and Portugal, with never-quite-successful attempts at national integration and a stately minuet of elites within an elite pattern ending in a shabby imitation of Western techniques and the installation of a pragmatic substitute for Western nationalism in the form of a single-party consolidating dicta­ torship.

But other things are not equal; namely, the problems of instilling a genuine sense of nationalism are mu c h more diffi­ cult than in Iberia. In Chile, Argentina, ^ and Uruguay alone is the problem roughly equivalent to that of Spain and

Portugal, but even in those fortunate three countries at least half the cementing ties of tradition which Franco and Salazar can use are weak or missing altogether. In the other Latin

American states, there is a linguistic, ethnic, and cultural diversity as formidable as that of India, along with burgeoning regional nationalisms. There has not been even a beginning in the problem represented by American Indian elements in the population, at its most intractable in places like Guatemala and Bolivia. The ethnic clash is no more solved in Guyana or

Brazil than it is in Angola. Regional sub-nationalisms like that in Yucatan can be found in many Latin American countries. 211.

At present, national sentiment is confined to small segments of the population, even in the Southern region.

Elites physically descended from the Creoles who won inde­ pendence from Spain and the mestizos who joined them later are threatened by their own generational sub-elites (students, professionals and white-collars), by utterly alien ethnic- linguistic lower classes, and by radical nationalists of the Peron and Castro type, seeking new political formulations. Thus, the prime political actors remain elites which bear a close resemblance to either the Nehru-type Congress, the Biafran elite, the Iron Guard, or the Pilsudski-Franco-Horthy type.

The dynamics of the Afro-Asian situation also appear to be the decisive forces in Latin America.

The more formalized aspects of the various nationalist political formulations put forward by elite groups in Africa,

Asia, and Latin America are not identical --if they were, they could hardly be uniquely national. But, like the fascisms of

Eastern Europe in the Thirties and the pseudo-Marxist elites of today, the mainstream ideologies of the non-Western world constitute a class, with distinguishable co m m o n features.

These include a view of the nation as holy -- an ethical- religious radical collectivism which assumes the existence of an Ultimate Good identical for the nation and for the individual.

This ultimate good is revealed to an elect priesthood, which has a duty to educate and if necessary to compel the less dis­ cerning, the inveterately selfish, the non-believers, and the allies of The E n e m y to do their duty happily, or die. Power must of course be centralized in the elite priesthood and in its church, which is often a political party. All other forms of basic group identity.must by any means be reduced to subordination to the nation and the ruling elite. The ultimate political activity is the merging of nation and state and the consolidation and maintenance of that incarnate and unique vessel of virtue. This achievement and its consolidation takes priority over all other social objectives, and requires constant struggle against The En e m y and his allies. The

E n e m y is usually the West, and more particularly the United

States. The Enemy's allies are uncooperative and hostile elements within the population, and nearby external ruling elites which have incompatible national objectives. The char­ acteristics of the holy nation are a combination of the obser­ vable characteristics of the "Macedons" of Europe, plus a unique and often manufactured melange of local non-Western values and techniques. 213.

This archetypical ideology, put forward in various guises and with varying degrees of fervor by ruiing and challenging elites, is of course the ideology of fascism. In its application, it ma y be as pro forma as the rule of the

King of Afghanistan or Houphuet-Boigny, or as perfervid a the rule of Castro or Ataturk. But the political formulation, regardless of the amount of particularist, neo-Marxist, or liberal Western verbiage that ma y be thrown about, is identifiable as that of fascism.

Only because so mu c h space in the current literature of "modernization" and "development" is devoted to the alleged economic constraints operating on Afro-Asian-Latin

American politics and the alleged efforts of "emerging peoples" to escape those constraints, a word is in order which ma y summarize the economic processes now visible, which bear an. uncanny resemblance to the historical analogues of those processes.

Science, technology, production, and consumption are not being Westernized to any marked extent in these countries.

F r o m time to time great thrashings about occur, as in c o m m u ­

nist China, South Korea, Ayub's Pakistan, Castro's Cuba, or

Nasser's Egypt a few years ago, but when the dust settles, 214. no Meiji Japan emerges -- rather it is the same old subsis­ tence economy with a few uneconomic factories, a burgeoning bureaucracy, more schools, more people, a bigger army or militia with fancier equipment, and the usual exploited peasantry underneath. The world has now witnessed twenty- five, thirty, or more years of this imminent "take-off."

There are perfectly simple techniques by which the spread of Western economic techniques and values to non-

Western countries can be maximized. The simplest, most effective, and most impossible is to follow Marx's advice and accept Western colonial control happily.

Failing that, a sensible technique would be to copy northwestern Europe's example -- reduce the mission of government to a mi n i m u m of enforcing contracts, permitting the freest of trade, defending against external force, and keeping the peace, opening the country wide to the movement of persons, goods, and capital and letting nature take its course. 20

Any ruling elite which acted in this way would be over­ thrown almost immediately by external or internal challenging elites with a political formulation and following policies con­ sonant with the "fascist" ideology described above. The key element in Westernization in terms of the non-Western environment is not economic production but nationalism.

Until nationalism can be firmly synthesized, economic pro­ duction can be only instrumental --it cannot be an objective in itself. 216.

"The nationalist movement in those underdeveloped countries which have older traditions must willy-nilly make a new synthesis. The real problem of these societies is that of finding the terms on which they can co-exist honorably with the West. There is no question of rejecting the latter -- at the same time it is not possible for these societies to accept the West completely -- to reject their own pasts. " D. R. Gadgil, Economic Policy and Development (Poona, India: Sangam Presp, 1955), p. 150.

"New forms of legitimacy must represent a powerful affirmation capable of breaking up deeply ingrained habits and replacing earlier loyalties. There must be elements of the older culture, elements of the new and transitional or resultant political phenomena of one type or another. " Gabriel Almond, "Comparative Political Systems, " in Comparative Politics, ed. by R. C. Macridis and B. E. Brown (Homewood, 111.: Dorsey, 1964), p. 62. In the same passage Almond, describing "mixed political cultures and systems, " calls "the charismatic nationalism which occurs so often in these areas" a "manifestation of the conflict of political cultures. "

"Countries ma y never succeed in becoming modern, but they can never return to their traditional polity. " Edward Shils, "The Military in Political Development in the N e w States, " in The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries, ed. by J. J. Johnson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 61.

^William J. Foltz, "Building the Newest Nations, " in Nation-Building, ed. by Karl W. Deutsch and William J. Faltz (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), pp. 118-119, points out the universal significance of this gap, and the fact that "it has given the elite the great flexibility of maneuver that is necessary to sieze and consolidate the power of the state."

‘To make boundaries of language coincide with those of states has been a gradual and difficult achievement in Europe. It promises to be more protracted and mu c h more difficult in Asia and Africa.1 India, for example, is thus not a national state but an empire or a federation of national states. It has 217. been one thing for India, in the pursuit of nationalism, to cast off British imperial rule -- it is quite another to prevent, in the long run, India's disintegration into a congeries of rival and quarrelsome linguistic nationalities and national states." Carleton Hayes, Nationalism - - A Religion (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966), pp. 158-159.

Following Karl Deutsch and others, scholars like Denkwart Rustow (as exemplified in his article on "Nation" in The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New York: MacMillan Company and The Free Press, 1968) argue that a country like India ia a nation by virtue of its U. N. m e m b e r ­ ship. These scholars, like Deutsch with his social co m m u n i ­ cations -- socialization-social mobilization triad, argue against determinants in geography, language, or history,, and prefer to identify nationalism with "modernization, " Rustow, in the article referred to, goes so far as to state that "nationa­ lism and the drive for modernity are two facets of the same social, cultural, and political revolution. " The Deutsch- Rustow view does not appear to be reflective of the real world, although it is ethically and morally attractive.

^"Emotionally as in political discourse most Latin American students are sincere democrats, but in political practice they sometimes support authoritarian movements whose ideology suggests a willingness to override the par­ ticularistic demands of established interests in favor of a more general welfare. " (sic) Robert E. Scott, "Student Activities in Latin America, " Daedalus (Winter, 1968) 78.

B. V. Shah, in his remarkable and unique Social Change and College Students of Gujrat (Baroda, India: Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, 1964), pp. 169-178, shows that Indian students talk achievement rather than ascription as the basis of status, but don't practice it. Like student moralizers everywhere, they "demand equalitarian relations with their superiors but treat those with less status than they unequally. "

^See Gaston G. Leduc, "The Economic Balance Sheet of Colonialism" and P. T. Bauer, "The Economics of Resent­ ment: Colonialism and Underdevelopment, " The Journal 218. of Contemporary History, Vol. 4, No. 1 (January, 1969). O n page 60, the latter states: "The suggestion that colonial status has retarded.material progress in Africa and Asia is almost certainly invalid," Further on page 70, Bauer adds: "The insistence on external responsibility for the material backwardness of underdeveloped countries has often promoted policies adverse to their material progress. It has served as spurious justification for the imposition of extensive state con­ trols over economic activity, especially over external eco­ nomic relations. The belief in external economic responsibility for material backwardness has also encouraged the imposition of restrictions on the activities of foreign and of ethnic and linguistic minorities, and often also the confiscation of their assets and the expulsion of people. These policies have seriously damaged the development prospects of poor countries, because of the importance of the external contacts and of the activities of minority groups as agents of material progress. "

And on page 71, Bauer sums up with: "'Whatever material progress has been achieved in the underdeveloped world was largely initiated and promoted by the West, which supplied the human and financial resources absent locally, and induced the necessary changes in attitudes, beliefs, motivation, and insti­ tutions . "

^The best study of this usually overlooked aspect of Westernization i£ J. C. Hurewitz, "The Beginnings of Military Modernization in the Middle East: A Comparative Analysis, " The Middle East Journal, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Spring, 1968) 144- 158.

n Robert Heilbroner (see his "The Revolution of Rising Expectations, " in Struggle Agadnst History, ed. by N. D. Houghton (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968) ) and others are in sharp disagreement with this argument, as is Gunnar Myrdal (Asian Dr a m a ^(New York: Pantheon, 1968) ). They feel that centralized, comprehensive, bureaucratic planning is a necessary and nearly a sufficient condition for the raising of living standards and for economic Westernization. Harry G. Johnson’s concluding chapter in Harry G. Johnson (ed.), 219.

Economic Nationalism in Old and Ne w States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967) demonstrates that this kind of economic nationalism does sacrifice efficiency to autarky, bring production facilities under bureaucratic con­ trol, prefer industry to agriculture, and warp industry to defense requirements, but is still necessary for "political integration. "

Of the several strong counter-arguments recently set forth, the best, because the most empirical, is Robert T. Holt and John E. Turner’s trail-blazing The Political Basis of Economic Development (Princeton, N e w Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company, 1966). The findings of Holt and Turner cannot be reconciled with the theories of Myrdal and Heilbroner. The theories must give way.

Willard J. Barber in "The Colonial Hangover and Ec o ­ nomic Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries, " Yale Review, (December, 1968) pp. 182-193 points out persuasively that all theories implying a "grand design" behind European colonial policies ma s k the fact that at least the economic poli­ cies of the colonial powers "were molded by administrative imperatives of specific circumstances."

8See Shlomo Avinieri, "Marx and Modernization, " Review of Politics, Vol. 31, No. 2 (April, 1969). It is strange that, in terms of the model set forth in this study, M a r x is the most prescient and insightful of all general theorists of the non-Western world, while his disciple Lenin, particularly in his Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, is the most unrealistic and useless in terms of prediction.

For a depth study of the original documents, see Avinieri (ed.), Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization (New York: Doubleday, 1968).

^"The people of 'emerging countries* remain political only in their tribes which precisely solved for them the ambiguity of finite sacrifice,, and indeed of finite individuality. At least the tribe did so until a short time ago. These people are pre- political within the sometimes non-viable framework of the states they have inherited.. .a harshly expressed test of this 220.

is that they cannot fight a good war, i.e., a war in which force begins and ends in subordination to a national purpose and policy, even the purpose of a civil war to determine what the national purpose shall be. " Paul Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), p. 15.

^ E v e n though Franco Noguiera, as a Foreign Minister of Portugal, can hardly be expected to take a detached scho­ larly attitude, his book The Third World, (London: Johnson Publications, Ltd., 1967), is a useful corrective to the reams of worshipful nonsense about Afro-Asian "principles" of inter­ national behavior. Noguiera points out, inter alia, that these principles (such as democracy, one man-one vote, peace, individual liberty, and non-interference) make up a set of obligations from which they only are exempt. They proclaim the "just rights" of governments and the "legitimate aspirations" of peoples, but reserve to themselves the sole right to identify and measure these variable s. They allege that the traditional international order has lapsed, and claim the right, by virtue of moral superiority, of redefining that order.

^Some new elites are so weak that they have, as the only possible way to remain in power, allied themselves with a secondary Great Power, France, which guarantees them against internal revolt mu c h as the British guaranteed a ruler in the Himalayas or in Northern Nigeria. It is notable that this practice is not denounced as neo-colonialism. Perhaps the key to the anomaly lies in the fact that if France should ever try to re-establish political control, the local elites could count on both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to interpose themselves on the side of the local elite. In this sense, France is being used. In any case, the practice would appear to be out of tune with the times, and to offer too good an issue for challenging elites.

12Good, broad, and calm discussions of guerrilla warfare which are not swamped by self-serving quotations from Castro and Mao-Tse-Tung are few and far between. One such is in pages 432-481 of Paul Ramsey, The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1960). 2 21.

Of ma n y specific and general references on this point, one of the finest is on pages 186-190 of Gaetano Mosca's The Ruling Class (New York: M e G r a w Hill Company, 1939). Mosca tells in a classic passage how new elites are first grouped by c o m m o n bonds of ideals and enthusiasms, but this soon gives way to a focus on interests. Once a ruling nucleus is organized, writes Mosca, it uses persuasion, education, and force, often at one end and the same time, to train the masses to implicit obedience.

"All ruling classes tend to become hereditary, in fact if not in law. " The Ruling Class, p. 61.

"The status de jure of any ruling class was pre­ ceded by a status_de_facto," The Ruling Class, p. 61.

14"The strength of the West was something to be studied and copied, and a major component of that strength was the existence of integrated nations. " Rupert Emerson, F r o m Empire to Nation (Boston: The Beacon Press, I960), p. 133.

"They wanted some cultural roots to cling to, something that would given them assurance of their own worth, something that would reduce the sense of frustration and humiliation that foreign conquest had produced. In every country with a growing nationalism there is this search apart from religion, this ten­ dency to go back into the past. " Jawaharlal Nehru, The Discovery of India (London: Meridien Books, 1947), p. 51.

David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), p. 294, and in later works is mo r e and more interested in the concept of "political religion11: *It seeks to establish faith through c o m m o n interest in a wider polity through which identity, sentiments, and beliefs can be enlarged and strengthened rather than minimized and destroyed. Political religion seeks to do these things and to render massive change heroic and joyful, infectious and liberating. " O n page 297 Apter writes that political religion must develop interest in the semi-mythical past and constantly attack an Enemy, usually neo-colonialism. Apter has described Eastern European fascism and hyper -nationalism. O n page 329, Apter says that 222.

in the nationalism of the underdeveloped world "the concept of society is one of a natural, organic body, all parts of which have appointed functions. "

^"Nationalism has been the first love of millions of me n emerging into active political life for the first time; they have been loath to be unfaithful. " K. R. Minogue, Nationalism (New York: Basic Books, 1967), p. 152.

"The general will is used by Congress-type political parties to endow themselves with sovereignty against the metropole. Its dominant concept is ‘popular sovereignty1 and its spiritual ancestor is Rousseau." T. Hodgkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London: Cambridge Press, 1956), p. 144.

^While it is still fashionable in Western academic circles to indulge non-Western colleagues by readily agreeing to the attri­ bution of political problems to "colonialism,11 there is a growing tendency to avoid emotional stereotypes and look at the record of European colonialism coldly and against a historical, not an ethical, background, as Rupert Emerson does in his "Colonialism, " ap­ pearing in The Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 4, No. 1 (January, 1969).

For many reasons, scholars, politicians, and publics of Western and Westernized countries do not realize, and are resis­ tant to the realization of, the depth and importance of this primeval mass hatred. Lucian Pye, in his more recent writings, has measured its depth in China. Jose Antonio Torres ("The Political Ideology of Guided Democracy, " Review of Politics, XXV, No. 1 (January, 1963), 35) has devised a five-point analysis of the general doctrine, demonstrating that "concensus" can only be found in unanimous opposition to "reaction, " "neo-colonialism, " etc.

A. A. Said, in The African Phenomenon (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), p. 26, points out the overriding tendency on the part of African leaders of all persuasions to preserve them­ selves from what is perceived as an all-pervasive danger of foreign encroachment.

Karl Deutsch (Introduction to Deutsch and Foltz, eds.) Nation - Building (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 10 states "The choice of national alignment and national identity is related 223.

the decision to choose a co m m o n enemy. " Objections could nevertheless be raised to the concept of "choice" in this context. It is the environment, not conscious choice, which determines national identity, and the necessary co m m o n enemy is also al­ most always unique and not subject to effective choice by elites.

^Argetina is of special interest in view of its economic advantages, its climate, and its relative linguistic, ethnic, and cultural unity. One would normally expect to find Argentina far ahead of its less fortunate neighbors in the creation of a workable Westernizing process . And yet, H. A. Murena can write in "The Nature of the Argentine Crisis" in Wh y Per on Ca m e to Power, ed. by Joseph R. -Barrager (New York: Knopf, 1968), p. 247:

"Argentina is not an organism of which all feel themselves a part. Each organ believes itself the whole. . . "

George Pendle, in "The Past Behind the Present, " in Barrager, Ibid. , writes on p. 229 of die Argentine immigrants:

"They broke away from community and became un­ attached individuals. The nation continues to be a conglomeration rather than a community. "

K. H. Silvert, in "The Costs of Anti-Nationalism: Argentina" in Expectant Peoples, ed. by K. H. Silvert (New York: Rand o m House, 1963), p. 352, notes that "The narrowness of loyalty horizons and the failure to accept the state as the ultimate arbiter of secular dispute weaken social institutions and invite autocratic personalism. " Summing up on p. 353 the reasons for Argentine failings and paradox, he centers on the fact that "economic devel­ opment and occupational mobilization have taken place in a context of insufficient acceptance of the values of the nation-state. "

18More than half the population of Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia are Indians of Indian culture speaking Indian languages, far mo r e alien to the dominant culture than is the most deprived negro ghetto dweller or sharecropper in America, and at least as alien as the Ukrainian peasant or Kazakh herder in the U. S.S.R.

In The Ruling Class, Mosca writes (p. 118) "cosmopolitan fraternizing is mu c h more characteristic of the wealthy and 224. liesured than of the poor. "

"Are not the external threats of invasion and the memories of imperialism the strongest catalysts in encouraging disparate interests to cooperate and integrate within the political process once the political and cultural minima required for internal unity are achieved? It is the lack of this incentive, if nothing else, which sets Latin America apart from the rest of the world. " Robert E. Scott, "Nation-Building in Latin America, " Nation Building, ed. by Deutsch and Foltz (New York: Atherton Press, 1963), p. 83.

Claudio Veliz in the Introduction to Claudio Veliz (ed. ) The Politics of Conformity in Latin America (London: Cassell, 1967), states that groups which talk of "bringing about profound changes in the institutional structures of Latin American society" are actually seeking to improve and protect their own elite positions. As examples Veliz mentions university students, military juntas, and "technocrats" who are actually trying to suppress competition from foreigners.

19The most consistent broad picture of Latin American elite dynamics is contained in Claudio Veliz‘s "Centralism and Nationalism in Latin America, " Foreign Affairs, Vol. 47, No. 1 (October, 1968). He sees the future in terms of a con­ tinuation of the trends foreshadowed by Villareal, Ibanez, Vargas, Peron, and Arias (p. 76); he notes that "neither the landless peasant nor the exploited worker" epitomize the politically significant Latin American: it is rather the under­ paid bank clerk with social aspirations (p. 74). "The central government is itself the most powerful pressure group. " (p. 76) Veliz believes that Latin America is falling back on nationalism as a framework for political action, though such reliance leads to international friction, the magnification of external as against internal factors in politics, and even heavy armament, (p. 78) Veliz has uncannily forecast current developments in Peru as he notes that the military in Latin America, a pillar of the State, is beginning to focus on the U.S. "as a threat to national sovereignty and integrity. " U.S. influence will be ended in Latin America not by the Left, "but by the State itself, supported by m u c h of the urban population. " (p. 79) Veliz is describing something on the Iron Guard- Antonescu continuum, but it is symbolic of the scholarly blank spot regarding fascist ideology that in his brilliant essay, Veliz mentions fascism only once: he notes that Vargas and Peron "did not represent a Nazi plot -- they were "essentially domestic;" they were "alternatives to established programs of the Right and Left;" they "provided the basis for Latin American populism, the most revealing portent of the political future of the region" (p. 77).

20 There is very little scholarly literature expounding this point of view as against the Myrdal-Heilbroner assumption that the absorption of Western productive techniques and values can only be effected via state planning and controls over non- state economic activity. But (a) contemporary comparative evidence between such pairs as B u r m a and Thailand, Formosa and the mainland, Malaysia and Indonesia, Iraq and Lebanon, Ghana and the Ivory Coast, etc. , (b) the still-fragmentary work of P. T. Bauer (a full-scale exposition of his views will probably be published in 1970), and (c) the opinions, commonly unsought, of the vast majority of Western technicians, bus­ inessmen, and missionaries with long practical experience in the non-Western world, all combine into a formidable weight on the other side of the question, one which more than balances the Heilbroner-Mao-Myrdal hypothesis. However, advocates on both sides often miss the point by not realizing the secon­ dary importance to penetrated societies of the whole complex of things covered under the term "economic development. " C H A P T E R IX

Casting The Runes

A n attempt to trace any social phenomenon in the time dimen­ sion cannot be ended abruptly in the present. The mind cannot escape the human urge to project trends into the future. Far

( better for the investigator to include such a projection in the picture he draws of past and present than to influence the reader implicitly. And an explicit projection into the future serves other ends: it may, by presenting the hypothesis in still another t e m ­ poral setting, allow the author better to convey its nature and significance; and it provides a partial check on the validity of a hypothesis at some future date -- at least to the extent of indi­ cating whether or not, at that date, the hypothesis if worth further research along the same lines.

The previous chapters are based on three principal hypotheses, and the key conclusions flow from -these hypotheses:

I. Contemporary "modernization" is not new; it is another of ma n y historical examples of massive cultural penetration.

H. Massive cultural penetration generally and acculturation of other cultures to the Western one specifically has been going on for centuries and provides the researcher with a good historical 227. record of the process as it has affected host cultures progressively more alien to the core West.

III. The key and central concept of acculturation to the West is the concept of nationalism as a primary basic group identity and the foundation of social order.

There are two inherent difficulties in "casting the runes" for a look into the future based on these hypotheses as detailed in previous chapters. One is the necessity to trace phenomena against a background of other factors. This in turn requires that variables not directly related to the hypothesis be held as steady as possible. Therefore, the world into which the projec­ tion will be made is one of straight-line extrapolation of environ­ mental factors not related to the hypothesis. For example, a thermonuclear exchange, a visit from intelligent extra-terrestrial beings, a practical method of ensuring individual immortality, and ma n y other mo r e likely possibilities will be ruled out of the future environment.

The second difficulty is that the host cultures now being penetrated by Western culture are of an enormous variety. This would perhaps not be of importance to a Ma r x of a Myrdal, but the hypothesis here presented must predict the eventual hybridi­ zation of host cultures and the emergence, as a result of the 228. interaction, of cultures so changed as to be new for most practi­ cal purposes. For purposes of prediction, therefore, it will be necessary to the mi n i m u m and unavoidable extent to assume a kind of dead average non-Western culture -- something like the smug portrayals of "traditional" cultures which have been ex­ posed in previous chapters. This requirement, along with the opaque nature of the future in terms of small groups and individuals, means that it will derive meaning and validity not as a picture of any specific society at a point in time, but as a picture of the average. If a verifiable theory is involved, it partakes of the statistical probability of thermodynamics on the one hand to the theory of evolution on the other.

The time frame to be examined will be the next fifteen to twenty years. Anything greater would strain the capacity of the hypothesis; anything less could be regarded as too likely to repre­ sent an historical sub-trend or the writing of next weeks' newspapers.

It is highly unlikely that within the next two decades some genuine substitute or some Russian or American-style quasi- substitute for linguistic-cultural-ethnic prepolitical unity as the essential foundation of-a national state can be discovered and applied by non-Western elites. There is nothing in the historical record to indicate that religion, race, or economic class could rival linguistic' unity as the key element in the long term in building a nationalist basic group identity. Efforts by ruling and challenging elites to stimulate a basic group identity based on language supported by some cultural and ethnic elements can be expected to continue and to increase in intensity as the alternate bases mentioned above are shown mo r e clearly to be inadequate as a unity factor. Within two decades, most linguis­ tic unities large enough and well enough endowed to provide themselves with the essentials of formal defense (man and ma i n ­ tain a foreign-supplied regimental combat team and a squadron of four jet trainer aircraft, plus a squadron of MTB ' s if they have access to the sea) will either be politically independent, will have been destroyed, or will be reasonably united in a struggle, armed or unarmed, for national sovereignty, with victory not mo r e than two decades away. The total in this category should be at least two hundred and forty units. Existing sovereign states such as India, Congo (Kinshasa), and Peru will have either disappeared or be embroiled in internal struggles serious enough to paralyze them as international actors. The struggle of Biafra and the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq will be multiplied manifold by the year 1990 all over the non-Western world. These elite shifts powered by nascent nationalisms should

overshadow elite shifts primarily dependent on economic and/or

social class drives. Revolutions, successful, unsuccessful, and indecisive, will be largely revolutions of nationalism.

If the next two decades do not see the establishment of many linguistic nation-states, it is not likely that the non-Western world will have found an alternative mechanism for the generation of,a militarily and politically effective basic group identity -- race, religion, social class or something unimagined. Rather, the non-Western states will have remained in a condition of extreme political instability with two alternatives looming closer: the renaissance of pre-Western patterns or the creation of a successful formula of linguistically based nationalism.

The contemporary variance between ethnic-linguistic boundaries and formal state boundaries presages a large number of irredenta. These irredenta should provide holy causes not only for nascent nationalisms but for newly established states.

As such, the irredenta will, along with goals of "self-determii nation, " become the triggers for small wars, which could easily be fierce struggles between nascent nationalisms. It is out of

such wars that the threat of Great Power involvement and conflict m a y emerge -- but Great Power involvement will require a far- 231. from-inevitable willingness on the part of at least one of the superpowers to become involved.

Granted a dominant ethnic-linguistic group in a sovereign state, the dominant elite thrown up by that group will see linguistic-ethnic-cultural minorities, in the light of the dynamics mentioned above, as standing threats to the security of the state in the dual context of external and internal politics. Therefore, it is probable that such minorities will be subject to pressures ranging from parallels to "Magyarization" -- the forcible sub­ stitution of languages and cultures, plus legal disabilities --to parallels to what the Young Turks did to their Armenian minority in 1914. Exchanges of population and refugee movements will probably increase through two decades with attendant hardship and suffering of the innocent.

The net effect of the non-Western states on the prospects for a supranational order, in the form of political, economic, or legal institutions, will be negative. The non-Western states will continue to depend on formal international organizations as a natural arena for the amplification of their power through one state-one vote, for the stimulation of economic assistance on their own terms, and for the reinforcement of norms of conduct inhibiting the use or threat of force by a Western or Westernized state against a non-Western state. But, wedded as they will be to norms of absolute national sovereignty, they cannot do other than block the fulfillment of various schemes and hopes for a supra-national order.

There appears to be little chance that in many instances over the next two decades any elite will dominate a state, for other than a very short time, which does not have in relative terms a capacity to handle Western techniques of persuasion, organization, and compulsion. This has beencharacteristic of all historic examples, and it can be expected to ma r k the next two decades as well. Since the prime vehicle of the Western culture has been Western-oriented education, we can expect the me m b e r s of both ruling and challenging elites to be marked by Western educational backgrounds of sufficient depth (ten years to more) or dislodge them from their moorings in the pre-

W e s t e m culture. Judging from the historical experience to date it can be predicted with slightly less certainty that me m b e r s of dominant or challenging elites will also spring from social elements whose concept of personal fulfillment, status, honor, and privilege is tied to state office as an anodyne to the doubts, fears, and sense of personal inadequacy to which "marginal ma n is prone. It is this element of society which will constitute the 233. dominant and challenging elites who can be expected to pass across the ma n y stages of non-Western societies. In the grand sweep of history, the identification of an elite with civilian or military office, or its identification with a multi -nations], dual ­ national, or classic unitary political formulation to build power on a combination of indigenous loyalties and a new basic group identity appeal is relatively unimportant. The important thing is that the political interest groups which the Westerner tends to see as the sources of history can be expected to play a passive role in the near future, to be manipulated by the key elites.

Thus, discussions as to the possible "rule" of "peasants" or

"workers" or "entrepreneurs" or "soldiers" or "landlords" or

"priests" are essentially meaningless.

Those who think of the process of massive cultural inter­ action involving the West as the more or less perfect transfor­ mation of the non-West into the West as these observers conceive the West to be are probably due for a severe disappointment.

Depending on the personal predilections and the academic back­ ground of the Western or Westernized observer, the end result is envisaged as some combination of participation by a large proportion of the population in political decision-making, and the utilization of Western technology and techniques of production 234. and distribution. In less accurate language -- democracy and economic development, usually hand in hand.

As we have shown in earlier chapters, this analysis leads to a situation comparable to the witnessing of an automobile race by spectators who have decided that each contestant is intent on producing the ma x i m u m amount of noise and/or smoke; the spec­ tators aren*t aware of the significance of speed, laps, and the checkered flag. If, as we postulate, political participation and economic development are possible side effects of some kinds of elite political formulations aimed at cargo politics in the short run and a basic group identity on the Western national model in the long run, it is not likely that the next twenty years will see either massive strides toward greater political partici­ pation on the part of the masses or greater economic development.

Much more likely to increase, though still only problematically, is the military capacity of the non-Western states as they become more mono-lingual, mono-ethnic, and mono-cultural, and hence more capable of carrying a nationalist basic group identity, with the relative combat efficiency implied by such an identity in either conventional or guerilla modes of warfare.

There is no reason to expect military elites to play dominant roles per se. The possession of a uniform will not in itself 235. identify the wearer in the drama of the next few decades. There will be military officers in dominant and in challenging elites, though the mo r e senior the officer, the more likely he will be to hold a secure place in the dominant elite. 'Military officers and institutions ma y be statistically more prominent on the con­ solidating-authoritarian end of the pendulum path, but young officers and an ideal of paramilitary violence will be found on the fas cist-radical end.

Imperial elites will be more likely to promote professionalism in conventional military forces, as they will have no alternative means of providing for the concentration of power for internal and external protection. But even these elites will allow the armed forces to become professional only to a certain point -- thereafter, such a military force will become mo r e to be feared than the other enemies of the dominant elite, and the rulers must sacrifice efficiency to reliability.

Mono-lingual elites, on the other hand, will tend to rely more on party militias, with the military and non-military elites merged into one, and will therefore place greater reliance on guerilla warfare, at least for defense. Both imperial and mo n o ­ lingual elites will give both types of armed force a high or even absolute priority in the allocation of economic resources, Conventional military forces will still be relatively inefficient, however, and will tend to give way to guerrilla levies in the states with lively and widespread national myths. The "Third

World" will not conceivably be a military threat to North

America and Europe, although most states will manage to pro­ gress towards a skeleton of industrial infrastructure supporting the military forces: typical will be ammunition factories and simple ordnance works. Outside arms, as necessary, will be supplied from varied sources if the receiving state finds this politically possible. Western or Westernized states not restrained by Christian traditions of morality should experience no serious difficulties in handling overwhelming numbers of Afro-Asian or Latin American guerrillas or conventional forces, as Portugal,

Rhodesia, and South Africa have done and as France could have done in Algeria.

The form of government appearing in most of the states of

Africa, Asia, and Latin America will be, as explained above, a pattern for the dominance of relatively narrow elites, totalling ten percent of the population or less. The origin and general characteristics of these elites have been described above. The political patterns to be utilized by these elites are relatively simple and have been amply foreshadowed in the history of 237.

Westernization. The dominant pattern will lie between the radical collectivist type exemplified by the Iron Guard and the

Falange, and the authoritarian consolidating collectivism e x e m ­ plified by regimes of Antonescu and France. The center of gravity will tend to oscillate between the two types, moving slowly from the first to the second and rapidly back from the second to the first. There is no need to describe the charac­ teristics of either type. Political formulations at one end of the indicated spectrum will be m o r e "idealistic, " mo r e "honest, " mor e "passionate, " and bloodier than formulations, usually aging ones, at the other end. Neither will be ma r k e d by any increase in political participation, the rule of law, or democracy as understood in the West.

T w o sub-types of the principal political pattern should be mentioned. One is a set which does not really deserve a separate designation: the types shifting across the above-described spectrum which m a y go through ritual obsequies to Marxism,

"scientific socialism, " "dictatorship of the proletariat, " and so forth. For all practical purposes, such dominant and challen­ ging elites, which are also c o m posed largely of job-seeking intellectuals, are one with their rivals w h o rely mo r e openly and honestly on national mythology as a political formulation. 238.

Another sub-type is the sequence of elites identified with a multi-national polity without clearly dominant linguistic elements. This type, almost certainly destined for extinction, is imperial, not national, and until it is succeeded by nationalist challengers wiLl, like the rulers of India, be compelled by the logic of its political environment to avoid the truly radical collectivism which can be built cna.powerful basic group identity.

Subversion by nominally communist-oriented elites will normally be followed by such elites falling into the m a i n .track of the nationalist spectrum described above, and will therefore represent no lasting increment to the political or military weight of a Mo s c o w or Peking unless the foreign power follows through by the ousting of the local communists and their replacement by expatriate rulers in the classic colonial pattern.

Those who expect economic development in the non-Western world will be as disappointed as those who expect democratic participation and individual liberty. Elites along the political spectrum described above would be happy to see "economic development," but its presence or absence is not strongly corre­ lated with the degree of success attained by that elite in promoting national sentiment am o n g the politically sentient and identifying itself with that sentiment. The maintenance of a strong focus of 239. fear and resentment against a national enemy, for example, is m u c h mo r e strongly correleted with the gut issue than is economic development, however defined.

Political realities will require state control of the econ o m y insofar as the economy is sufficiently Westernized to contain differentiated key sectors with a capacity to affect the whole society. The realities, again, will require that very serious handicaps be put in the wa y of the free transfer of capital and skills within the country and to and from other countries -- autarky, not development, will be a conscious goal. The linguistic-cultural minorities (viz., overseas Chinese or

American corporation executives) wh o are the productive catalysts of many Afro-Asian-Latin American populations will be oppressed or exiled as part of the nationalist political formulation. The

"international corporation, " so often hailed as the inevitable economic inheritor of the world, is actually a blindfolded sacri­ ficial lamb in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. While large- scale foreign enterprise m a y hang on in "imperial" states, it is just too tempting a target to typical nationalist regimes on either end of the ma i n spectrum.

Non-national, imperially-based elites such as those in

India and Pakistan are m o r e likely to concentrate on genuine economic development to the extent that their hope for building the elusive national identity with themselves as heroes dwindles.

But the basic analysis of this study indicates that any such elite will be replaced by one or m o r e elites who do carry the nationa­ list banner. Therefore, we might predict that in general elites genuinely concentrating their efforts on economic development in the Western sense of the wor d will probably be in their political twilights; the s a m e could be said of elites attempting to operate on non-national formulas of group identity.

Not only is the nationalist prerequisite incompatible with efficient economic development; most formulations of national identity, conceived as dynamic political vehicles, will not accommodate deeply and at length massive social programs aimed at population control. The association of pro-natalist policies with burgeoning nationalisms is a matter of record; it is equally a matter of record that people with a vision of a holy national destiny before their eyes are not hospitable to foreign-promoted programs aimed at reducing the numbers of the chosen people.

All in all, the prospect for the rest of the Twentieth Century is one of declining living standards for mo s t of mankind.

It has been demonstrated in the preceding chapters that elites, dominant or challenging, m ust build their particular 241. national myths on a foundation of fear, hatred, and resentment of an Enemy. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America the Enemy has been and usually is, the West, and in particular the United

States, which is a special target for all intellectuals by virtue of its tradition of ma s s culture and its contempt or, worse, a m u s e d tolerance toward its o w n intellectuals.

The environment and the forces which have required nationa­ list elites to build into their national myths a gigantic and irra­ tional hatred of the W e s t and of the United States will not be

greatly modified in the near future, and anti-Westernism will

continue regardless of what the W e s t or the United States actually do or try to do. However, the probable increase in the number of actual or aspiring single-language, single-culture,

elites and polities and the reduction in the nu m b e r of "imperial"

elites will me a n a probable slight reduction in the average level

of anti-Westernism throughout the world. Nationalist elites on the Spanish or Eastern European classic model use neighbors

and/or cultural minorities as an important component in the

threatening pattern of outside forces which provides the backdrop

and ultimate rationale for a passionate nationalism. As witness

Eastern European anti-semitism and anti-Germanism, the m o r e diffuse and global scapegoats are still used, but the neighbor 242. of another language and another set of customs will draw some of the ill will earlier reserved almost totally for the global scapegoat --in this case the West and the United States.

Imperial elites, on the other hand, cannot afford the stimulation of linguistic nationalism inherent in such a projection, and therefore must concentrate emnity on the West and the United

States.

Many other predictions can be drawn from the analyses and assumptions set forth in this paper, but the mo s t important ones have been covered. It is possible, for example, to predict that as a general trend primary education will be given a high priority by dominant elites in resource allocation, but that higher education will be expanded only reluctantly. Every pe r ­ son who can be given a Rousseauvian indoctrination while learning ho w to listen to the elite is a potential recruit for conversion to the nationalist myth currently being purveyed.

Every graduate of a higher educational institution is a potential threat wh o will d e m a n d admission to the dominant elite or will adhere to a challenging elite formulation.

Historical examples and current evidence indicate that the gap between the rural and urban sectors, the m a s s and the elite, the semi-Westernized and the indigenous classes, will increase 1

243. in mo s t non-Western societies for several decades before a levelling synthesis reverses the trend.

Nowhere in this study has there been any consideration of

"policy implications, " whether for the United States, the West in general, or any particular non-Western elite. Any discussion on such lines mu s t await initial verification of the theory. The delay won't influence events, since the one fairly easy conclu­ sion with policy implications is the following: Nothing the United

States or any other Great Po w e r can do other than to apply physical coercion to Africa, Asia, and Latin America will make any real difference in the larger contexts, and will not affect the validity of the above predictions. W hat real influence, for example, would doubled or halved quantities of U.S. technical or financial "aid" show on the level of economic development in the non-Western world if the key factors are those provided in the analysis contained in this study? The possibility of setting forth policy implications is therefore not of critical importance if the theory is correct, since, should the theory be correct, m ost conceivable policy alternatives on the part of the Western and already Westernized states would not greatly influence the course of events.

T o the critic w h o finds the analysis and conclusions of this 244. paper fantastic and utterly out of line with the general run of theories which outline the triumph of "Modern" man, the in­ evitability of economic development, political participation under the rubric of democracy or socialism or both, and the dawn of a new world moral order while nationalism threshes in its death agonies in the wings, the author can only offer these quotations from James Burnham's The Machiavellians -- Defenders of

Freedom (pages 30 and 82):

Political goals themselves are not evidence. .. goals express our wishes, hopes, or fears. They therefore prove nothing about the facts of the world. N o matter ho w mu c h we m a y wish to cure a patient, the wish has nothing to do with the objective analysis of his symptoms, or a correct prediction of the pro­ bable course of the disease. . .If our aim is peace, this does not entitle us to falsify hu m a n nature and the facts of social life in order to pretend to prove that "all m e n naturally desire peace, " which, history so clearly tells us, plainly they do not. If we are in­ terested in a "totalitarian democracy, " this cannot be a scientific excuse for neglecting the uninterrupted record of social inequality and oppression. ..

The revolutionary crisis m a k e s men, or at least a small number of men, discontent with what in nor­ m a l times passes for political thought and science -- namely disguised apologies for the status quo or utopian dreams of the future; and compels them to face m o r e frankly the real issues of power. SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary Sources

A. Books

Aidit, D. N. The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party. Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1964.

Arevalo, Juan Jose. The Shark and the Sardines. Trans­ lated by June Cobb and Raul Osegueda. N e w York: Lyle Stuart, 1961.

Arfa, Hass an. Under Five Shahs. New York: William M o r r o w , 1965.

Awolowo, Obafemi. Awo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I960.

Azikwe, Nnamdi. Selections From Speeches. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961.

Batista, Fulgencio. The Growth and Decline of the Cuban Republic. New York: Devin-Adair, 1964.

Brown, D. MacKenzie, ed. Indian Political Thought F rom Ranade to Bhave. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961.

Bourguiba, Habib. La Tunisie et La France. Paris: Juillard, 1954.

Castro, Fidel. History Will Absolve M e . N e w York: Lyle Stewart, 1961.

Chaudhuri, Nirad C. Autobiography of an Unknown Indian. N e w York: MacMillan, 1951.

Chornovil, Vyacheslav, ed. The Chornovil Papers. New York: ' McGraw-Hill, 1969. 246.

Das, M. N. The Political Philosophy of Nehru. N e w York: John Day, 1961.

Debray, Regis. Revolution in the Revolution? N e w York: Grove Press, 1967.

Dedijer, Vladimir. The Beloved Land. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1961.

Dia, Mamadou. The African Nations and World Solidarity. New York: Praeger, 1961.

Fairbank, John K. , ed. China's Response to the West: A Documentary Survey, 1839-1923. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954.

Ghandi, Mohandas. Autobiography. Boston: Benson Press, 1957.

Guevara, Che. The Complete Bolivian Dairies. N e w York: Stein and Day, 1966.

Homer, Jack A., ed. The Ghandi Reader. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1956.

Jagan, Cheddi. The We s t on Trial. N e w York: International Publishers, 1966.

Kai-Shek, Chiang. China's Destiny. Ne w York: MacMillan, 1947.

Kaunda, Kenneth. Zambia, Independence and Beyond: The Speeches of Kenneth Kaunda. Edited by Colin Legum. London: Nelson, 1966.

Kenyatta, Jomo. Harambee ! The Prime Minister's Speeches. Nairobi: The Oxford University Press, 1964.

Khan, Mohamad Ayub. Friends Not Masters. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Lenin, V. I. Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism. N e w York: International Publishers, 1939.

Lumumba, Patrice. Congo, M y Country. New York: Praeger, 1962. 247.

Marx, Karl. Karl Marx on Colonialism and Modernization. Edited with an Introduction by Shlomo Avineri. N e w York: Doubleday, 1968.

Maudoodi, S. A. Nationalism and India. Pathankot, Punjab: J a m a ‘at-e-Islam Books, 1947.

Narayan, Jayaprakash. Socialism, Sarvodaya, and Democracy. Edited by Bimla Prasad. N e w York: Asia Publishing House, 1964.

Nasser, Gamal Abdel. The Philosophy of the Revolution. Cairo: Department of Information, 1954.

Nehru, Jawaharlal. The Discovery of India. London: Meridien Books, 1947.

Nehru, Jawaharlal. Toward Freedom. New York: John Day, 1941.

Nkrumah, K w a m e . Africa Must Unite. N e w York: Praeger, 1963.

Nkrumah, Kwame. Conciencism. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964.

Nkrumah, Kwame. Ghana: The Autobiography of Kwame Nkrumah. N e w York: T h o m a s Nelson Sons, 1957.

Noon, Firoz Khan. From Memory. Lahore, Pakistan: Ferozsons, Limited, 1966.

Okello, John. Revolution in Zanzibar. Nairobi: East African Publishing House, 1967.

Pahlavi, Mohamad Reza. Mission for My Country. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961.

Sigmund, Paul, ed. T h e Ideologies of the Developing Nations. New York: Praeger, 1967.

Senghor, Leopold. On African Socialism. N e w York: Praeger, 1964.

Toure, Sekou. La Lutte du Parti Democratique de Guinee pour 1‘Emancipation Africaine. Conakry: Imprimerie Nationale, 1959. 248.

Tung, Mao-Tse. The Political Thought of Mao-Tse Tung. Edited by Stuart Schram. New York: Praeger, 1963.

Tung, Mao-Tse. On Revolution and Wa r . Edited with an Intro­ duction and notes by M. Rejai. Garden City, N e w York: Doubleday, 1969.

Vasconceles, Jose. A Mexican Ulysses: The Autobiography of Jose Vasconceles. Translated by W. Rex Crawford. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1963.

Yoshida, Shigeru. The Yoshida Memoirs. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1963.

Yukichi, Fukuzawa. Autobiography. Translated by Eiichi Kiyooka. Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, I960.

B. Government Publications

Bourguiba, Habib. Bourguibism. Tunis: State Secretarist of Information, 1961.

Kassem, Abdul Karim. The Principles of the July 14th Revolution. Baghdad: Government Printer, 1959.

Lantini, Feruccio. General Lines of Italian Corporatism. Rome: Government Printer, 1939.

Mboya, Tom. African Socialism and Its Application to Kenya. Nairobi: Kenya Government, 1965.

Nasser, Gamal Abdel. Remarks on the Draft Charter: Arab Socialism. Cairo: Department of Information, 1962.

Nkrumah, Kwame. Peace and Progress. Accra: Government Printer, 1964.

Nu, U. T o w a r d a Socialist State. Rangoon: Government Printer, 1958.

Sukarno. Lecture to the Students of Hasanuddin University. Djarkata: Ministry of Information, 1959. 249.

C . Periodicals and Excerpts from Collections

Cardenas, Lazaro. "Economic Emancipation. " Readings in La.tin Am e r i c a n Civilization. Edited by Benjamin Keen. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1955.

Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. "Decision on the Absorption of Intellectual Elements, D e c e m b e r 1, 1939. " A Documentary History of Chinese C o m m u n i s m . Edited by Conrad Brandt, Benjamin Schwartz, and John K. Fairbank. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959-

Chih-Liung, Chang. "Exhortations to Learn." Sources in Modern East Asian History and Politics. Edited by Theodore McNelly. N e w York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967.

"Constitution of the Arab Resurrection Socialist Party, " Text in Middle East Journal, XIII (March, 1959).

Ikki, Kita. "Plan for the Reorganization of Japan. " Sources of the Japanese Tradition. Edited by Ryusaki Tsunoda. N e w York: Columbia University Press, 1958.

Keita, Madeira. "Le Parti Unique en Afrique." Presence Africaine, 30 (March, I960).

Minh, Ho Chi. "Some Considerations of the Colonial Question." Ho Chi Minh on Revolution. Edited by Bernard Fall. N e w York: Praeger, 1967.

Mussolini, Benito. "The Political and Social Doctrines of Fascism." International Conciliation, 306 (January, 1935).

National Committee of the Arab Baath Socialist Party. " R e s o ­ lution of the Sixth National Congress: Damascus. " Arab Political Documents: 1963. Beirut: The A m e rican University, 1964.

Nyrere, Julius. "Nationalism and Pan-Africanism. " World Assembly of Youth Forum, 40 (September, 1961). 250.

Palmeiri, Mario. "The Philosophy of Fascism.11 Communism, Fascism, and Democracy. Edited by Carl Cohen. New York: Random House, 1962.

Vargas, Getulio. "Philosophy and Objectives of the Estada Novo. " A Documentary History of Brazil. Edited by E. B. Burns. N e w York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966.

Vargas, Getulio. "Suicide Note. " History of Latin Am e rican Civilization, Vol. II. Edited by Lewis Hanke. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1967.

Yat-sen, Sian. "Fundamentals of National Reconstruction. " Sources in Modern East Asian History and Politics. Edited by Theodore McNelly. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967.

II. Secondary Sources

A. Books

Ake, Claude. A Theory of Political Integration. H o m e w o o d , Illinois: The Dorsey Pr e s s , 1967.

Alexander, Robert J. The Per on Era. New York: Columbia University Press, 1963.

Anderson, Charles W . , et. al. Issues of Political Development. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967.

Apter, David E. The Political Kingdom in Uganda. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Apter, David E. The Politics of Modernization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.

Apter, David E. Some Conceptual Approaches to the Study of Modernization. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1968.

Arendt, Hannah. On Revolution. New York: Macmillan, 1963.

Aron, Raymond. The O p i u m of the Intellectuals. N e w York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1962.

Atkinson, W. C. A History of Spain and Portugal. London: Penguin Books, I960. 251.

Badian, Seydou. Les Dirigeants Africains Face a Leur People. Paris: F. Maspero, 1965.

Baldwin, Robert E. Economic Development and Growth. New York: John Wiley, 1966.

Barager, Joseph R., ed. Why Peron Came to Power. New York: Knopf, 1968.

Bauer, P. T., and Yamey, B. S. The Economics of Under­ developed Countries. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957.

Batsford, George W. and Robinson, Jr., Charles A. Hellenic History. 4th ed. Ne w York: MacMillan, 1956.

Bayne, Edward A. , et. al. Expectant Peoples: Nationalism and Development. New York: Random House, 1963.

Bayley, David H. Public Liberties in the N e w States. Chicago: R an d McNally, 1964.

Bendix, Reinhard. Nation-Building and Citizenship. N e w York: John Wiley, 1964.

Benedict, Ruth. The Chrysanthemum and the Sword. Boston: Houghton -Mifflin, 1946.

Benson, Oliver, ed. The Emergent Nations -- Problem for the Sixties. Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1963.

Bhagwati, Jagdish. The Economics of Underdeveloped Countries. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.

Binder, Leonard. The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East. N e w York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964.

Black, Cyril E. The Dynamics of Modernization. N e w York: Harper and Row, 1966.

Blanksten, George I. Peron*s Argentina. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. 252.

Bolgar, R. R. The Classical Heritage and Its Beneficiaries. Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard University Press, 1963.

Bouscaren, A. T. Diem of Vietnam. Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1965.

Brecher, Michael. Nehru: A Political Biography. London: Oxford University Press, 1959.

Brepan, Gerald. The Spanish Labyrinth. Cambridge, Mass.: The Harvard University Press, 1964.

Brockway, Fenner. African Socialism. London: Bodley Head, 1963.

Broomfield, E. H. Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: Twentieth Century Bengal. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.

Burnham, James. The Machiavellians -- Defenders of Freedom. New York: John Day Company, 1943.

Butz, Otto. Of Ma n and Politics. N e w York: Holt, Winston, and Rinehart, 1963.

Carr, E. H. Nationalism and After. London: Oxford University Press, 1945.

Carr, Raymond. Spain 1808-1939. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1966.

Charques, R. D. Short History of Russia. New York: Dutton, 1956.

Cohn, Norman. The Pursuit of the Millenium. Fairlawn, N. J.: Essential Books, Inc., 1957.

Coleman, James S. Politics of the Developing Areas. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1960.

Conquest, Robert. Soviet Nationalities Policy in Practice. N e w York: Praeger, 1967.

Crozier, - Brian. The Rebels. London: Chatto and Windus, I960. 253.

Dator, James Allen. Soka Gokkai: Builders of the Third Civilization. Seattle: The University of Washington Press, 1969.

David, Harold E. Latin American Social Thought Since Inde­ pendence. Washington, D. C . : University Press, 1961.

DeUtsch, K a r l W . , and Foltz, William J., eds. Nation -Building. N ew York: Atherton Press, 1963.

Deutsch, Karl W. Nationalism and Social Communication, rev. ed. Cambridge, Mass. : The Harvard University Press, 1966.

Deutsch, Karl W. Political C o m m u n i t y and the North Atlantic Area. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957.

Draper, Theodore. Castroism in Theory and Practice. New York: Praeger, 1965.

Durkheim, Emile. Suicide: A Study in Sociology. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1951.

Earl, Donald. The Moral and Political Tradition of Rome. Ithaca, N e w York: Cornell University Press, 1967.

Emerson, Rupert. From Empire to Nation. Boston, Mass.:' Beacon Press, I960.

E m m e r s o n , Donald K. Students and Politics in Developing Nations. New York: Praeger, 1968.

Esfandiary, Feriedun. The D a y of Sacrifice. N e w York: McDowell, Obolensky, 1958.

Etzioni, Amitai. Political Unification. N e w York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965.

Fairbank, John K. , et. al. The Modern Transformation, Vol. II: A History of East Asian Civilization. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965.

Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth. N e w York; Grove Press, 1963.

Friedrich, CarlJ., ed. Revolution. N e w York: Atherton Press, 1966. 254.

Gadgil, D. R. Economic Policy and Development. Poona, India: S a n g r a m Press, 1955.

Gaucher, Francois. Le Fascisme: Est-il Actuel? Paris: Documents et Temoignages, 1961.

Geertz, Clifford, ed. Old Societies and N e w States. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1963.

Georgy, Andrew, and Blackwood, G. D. Ideologies in World Affairs. Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell, 1967.

Gerschenkron, A. Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1962.

Gopal, Ram. Lokamanya Tilak: A Biography. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1965.

Gregor, A. James. Contemporary Radical Ideologies. N e w York: Random House, 1968.

Gruchy, Allen G. Comparative Economic Systems. New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966.

Hayes, Carleton. Nationalism: A Religion. New York: MacMillan, 1966.

Hodgkin, T. Nationalism in Colonial Africa. London: Cambridge Press, 1956.

Hoffer, Eric. The Ordeal of Change. N e w York: Harper and Row, 1965.

Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer. New York: New American Library, 1958.

Holt, Robert T. and Turner, John E. The Political Basis of Economic Development. Princeton, N. J.: D. V a n No strand, 1966.

Horowitz, I. L . , de Castro, Josue, and Geras si, John, eds. Latin American Radicalism. New York: Random House, 1969. 25S.

Horowitz, Irving L. Three Worlds of Development. N e w York: Oxford University Press, 1966.

Houghton. N. D . , ed. Struggle Against History. N e w York: Simon and Schuster, 1968.

Huberman, Leo, and Sweezy, Paul M . , eds. Regis Debray and the Latin American Revolution. N ew York: Monthly Review Press, 1968.

Huntington, Samuel P. Political Order in Changing Societies. N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Jazsi, Oscar. The Dissolution of the Habsburg Monarchy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1929.

Johnson, Chalmers. Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962.

Johnson, Harry G. Economic Nationalism in New and Old States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.

Johnson, John J. The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1962.

Jouquet, Pierre. Macedonian Imperialism and the Hellenization of the East. N e w York: Knopf, 1932.

Kautsky, John H. C o m m u n i s m and the Politics of Development. N e w York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968.

Kautsky, JohnH., ed. Political Change in Underdeveloped Areas. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1962.

Kebschull, Harvey G . , ed. Politics in Transitional Societies. N e w York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968.

Kedourie, Elie. Nationalism, rev. ed. N e w York: Praeger, 1962.

Kerr, Clark. Industrialism and Industrial Man. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, I960.

Kirk, George E. Contemporary Arab Politics. New York: Praeger, 1961. 256.

Kohn, Hans. Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, rev. ed. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1965.

Kohn, Hans. Nationalism and Realism: 1852-1879. Princeton, N. J.: D. Va n Nostrand, 1968.

Klausner, Samuel Z., ed. The Study of Total Societies. N e w York: Praeger, 1967.

Kulski, W . W . International Politics in a Revolutionary A g e . N ew York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1968.

Lantier, Jacques. L tAfrique Dechiree. Paris: Planete, 1965.

Laqueur, Walter Z. Russia and Germany. London: Wiedenfeld and Nicholson, 1965.

Las swell, Harold D. Psychopathology and Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930.

Lasswell, Harold D. and Lemer, Daniel. World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements. Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1965.

Lawrence, P. Road Belong Cargo. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1964.

Lefranc, George. Histoire Des Doctrines Sociales Dans L^urope Contemporaine. Paris: Aubier, I960.

Leiden, Carl, and Schmitt, Karl M. , eds. The Politics of Violence. Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1968.

Legum, Colin. Pan -Africanism, rev. ed. New York: Praeger, 1965.

Lendvai, Paul. Eagles in Cobwebs. Garden City, N. Y.: Doubleday, 1969.

Lerner, Daniel. The Passing of Traditional Society. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958. 257.

Levy, Jr., Marion J. Modernization and the Structure of Societies. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Lichtheim, George. The Concept of Ideology. N e w York: Vintage Books, 1967.

Lipset, S e y m o u r M. Political Man. N e w York: Anchor Books, 1963.

Lloyd, P. C. , ed. The N e w Elites of Tropical Africa. London: Oxford University Press, 1966.

McCord, William. The Springtime of Freedom. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

McNeill, William H. The Rise of the West. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.

Maclver, Robert M. The Web of Government. New York: MacMillan, 1947.

Macridis, RoyC. and Brown, Bernard C., eds. Comparative Politics. 3rd ed. Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968.

Mahan, A. T. The Problem of Asia. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1900.

Maine, Henry S. Ancient L a w . Boston: Beacon Press, 1963.

Mair, Lucy. N e w Nations. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.

Mair, Lucy. Primitive Government. London: Penguin Books, 1962.

Marshall, Byron K. Capitalism and Nationalism in Pre-War Japan. Stanford, California: The Stanford University Press, 1967.

Mead, Margaret. Cultured Patterns and Technical Change. N e w York: New American Library, 1955.

Melady, Thomas P. Western Policy and the Third World. New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967. 258.

Meisel, James H. Counter -Revolution. New York: Atherton Press, 1966.

Michels, Roberto. Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1958.

Miller, J. D. B. Politics of the Third World. N e w York: Oxford University Press, 1967.

Millikan, M a x F. and Blackmer, Donald F . , eds. The Emerg i n g Nations: Their Growth and United States Policy. Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1961.

Minogue, K. R. Nationalism. N e w York: Basic Books, 1967.

Moore, Barrington. Political Power and Social Theory. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1 9 5 8.

Moore, Barrington. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.

Mosca, Gaetano. The Ruling Class. New York: McGraw-Hill Company, 1939.

Myint, H. The Economics of Developing Countries. N e w York: Praeger, 1965.

Myrdal, Gunnar. Asian Drama, 2 Vols. New York: Pantheon, 1968.

Nettl, J. P., and Robertson, Roland. International Systems and the Modernization of Societies. N e w York: Basic Books, 1968.

Noguiera, Franco. The Third World. London: Johnson Publications, Ltd., 1967.

Nolte, Ernst. Three Faces of Fascism. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965.

Nomad, Max. Aspects of Revolt. New York: The Noonday Press, 1959.

Organski, A. F. K. The Stages of Political Development. New York: Knopf, 1965. 259.

Paikert, G. C. The Danube Swabians. The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1967.

Pares, Bernard. History of Russia. New York: Knopf, 1953.

Payne, Stanley G. Falange. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1961.

Pennock, J. R . , ed. Self-Government in Modernizing Nations. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966.

Phillips, Herbert P. Thai Peasant Personality. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1965.

Pinson, K. S. Nationalism in the Western World. Washington, D. C. : Institute of Ethnic Studies, Georgetown University, 1959.

Plumyene, J., and Lasierra, R. Les Fascismes Francais. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1963.

Power, Paul, ed. Neutralism and Disengagement. New York: Charles ScribnerIs, 1964.

Previte-Orton, C. W. The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History, Vol. I. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1952.

Pye, Lucien W. Politics, Personality, and Nation-Building. N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1962.

Pye, Lucien W. The Spirit of Chinese Politics. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Presp, 1968.

Rakowska-Harmstone, Theresa. Russia and Nationalism in Central Asia. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1969-

Ramsey, Paul. The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility. N e w York: Charles Scribners5 Sons, 1968.

Raushenbuch, H. S. The March of Fascism. New Haven: Yale University Press,- 1939.

Rogger, Hans, and Weber, Eugen, eds. The European Right. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1966. 260.

Rosner, Jacob. Per Faschismus. Wien: By the Author, 1966.

Rossi, Mario. The Third World. Ne w York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1963.

Rostow, W. W. The Stages of Economic Growth. New York: Cambridge University Press, I960.

Rothschild, Joseph. Pjlsudskits Coup d*Etat. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

Rudenko, Georgi. Imperialism and Colonialism, Past and Present. Moscow: Novosti Publishing House, 1968.

Runciman, W . G. Relative Deprivation and Social Justice. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.

Rustow, Dankwart A. A World of Nations. Washington, D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967.

Said, A. A. The African Phenomenon. Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968.

Schoenbaum, David. Hitler*s Social Revolution. Garden City, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1966.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. Eastern Europe Bsfcween the Wars, 3rd ed. Hamden, Conn. : Archon Books, 1962.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. Neither War Nor Peace, 2nd ed. New York: Praeger, 1962.

Seton-Wats on, Hugh. The Russian Empire -- 1801-1917. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1967.

Shafer, B oyd C. Nationalism: M yth and Reality. N e w York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1955.

Shah, B. V. Social Change and College Students of Gujarat. Baroda, India: Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda, 1964.

Shils, Edward. Political Development in the N e w States. N e w York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1965. 261.

Shoup, Paul. C o m mu ni sm and the Yugoslav National Question. New York: Columbia University Press, 1966.

Sinai, I. R. The Challenge of Modernization. N e w York: The W. W. Norton Company, 1964.

Singer, Marshall R. The Emerging Elite. Cambridge, Mass. : The M.I.T. Press, 1964.

Smith, Thomas C. The Agrarian Origins of Modern Japan. Stanford: The Stanford University Press, 1959.

Smith, Wilfred Cantwell. Islam in Modern History. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1957.

Snyder, Louis L. The N e w Nationalism. Ithaca, N. Y.: The Cornell University Press, 1965.

Spengler, Oswald. The Decline of the West. London: Allen and Unwin, 1926, 1928.

Spitz, David, ed. Political Theory and Social Change. N e w York: Atherton Press, 1967.

Storry, Richard. The Double Patriots: A Study of Japanese Nationalism. London: Chatto and Windus, 1957.

Talmon, J. L. The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy. New York: Praeger, I960.

Taylor, A. J. P. The Habsburg Monarchy. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1948.

Tazbir, Janus. History of Poland. Warsaw: Polish Scientific Publishers, 1968.

Thornton, Thomas P., ed. The Third World in Soviet Perspec­ tive. Princeton, N. J. : The Princeton University Press, 1964.

Totten, George O. The Social Democratic Movement in Pre-War Japan. N e w Haven: Yale University Press, 1966. 262.

Townsend, James R. Political Participation in Communist China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.

Wang, Y. C. Chinese Intellectuals and the West. Chapel Hill: North Carolina Press, 1965.

Ward, Barbara. Nationalism and Ideology. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1966.

Weiner, Myron, ed. Modernization. New York: Basic Books, 1966.

Welch, Jr., Claude E., ed. Political Modernization. Belmont, Calif. : Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1967.

Woolf, S. J., ed. European Fascism. London: Weidenfield and Nicolson,. 1968.

Worsley, P. M. The Trumpet Shall Sound. London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1957.

Yost, Charles. The Insecurity of Nations. Ne w York: Praeger, 1968.

B. Articles, Reports, Periodicals, and Contributions

Abu-Labon, Baha. "The National Character of the Egyptian Revolution. " Journal of the Developing Areas, I (January, 1967).

Almond, Gabriel. "Political Systems and Political Change. " World Politics, XVII (January, 1965).

Avineri, Shlomo. "Afro-Asia and the Western Political Tradition. " Parliamentary Affairs, X V (Winter, 1961-62).

Bauer, P. T. "The Economics of Resentment: Colonialism and Underdevelopment." Journal of Contemporary History, IV (No. 1, 1969).

Bennett, John W. "Approaches of the Japanese Innovator to Cultural and Technical Change. " Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, No. 305 (May, 1956). 263.

Bennett, John W. "Tradition, Modernity, and Co m m u n a l i s m in Japan's Modernization. " Journal of Social Issues, XXIV (October, 1968).

Bienen, Henry. "An Ideology for Africa. " Foreign Affairs, X L VII.

Bronfenbrenner, Martin. "The Japanese rHowdunitt." Trans- Action, VI, No. 3 (January, 1969).

Chaudhuri, NiradC. "Nationalism in India. " Survey, No. 67 (April, 1968).

Cohen, Ronald. "Anthropology and Political Science. " American Behavioral Scientist, XI (No. 2, 1967).

Conner, Walker F. "Ethnology and the Peace of South Asia. " World Politics, XXII (October, 1969).

Conner, Walker F. "Myths of Hemispheric, Continental, Regional, and State Unity. " Political Science Quarterly, L X X X I V (December, 1969).

Curton, Philip,D. "Nationalism in Africa. " Review of Politics, XXVIII (April, 1966).

Deutsch, Karl W. "The Growth of Nations: Some Recurrent Patterns of Political and Cultural Integration." World Politics, VI, No. 4 (April, 1953).

Feuer, Lewis. "Patterns of Irrationality." Survey, No. 69 (October, 1968).

Finlay, D. J. "Students and Politics in Ghana." Daedalus, 97, No. 12 (Winter, 1968).

Fitzgibbon, Constantine. "The Joys of Industrialization. " National Review, XXI, No. 17 (May 6, 1969).

Frey, Frederick W. "Socialization to National Identification A m o n g Turkish Peasants. " Journal of Politics, XXX, No. 4 (November, 1968). 264.

Friedland, W. H. "Traditionalism and Modernization: Move­ ments and Ideologies." Journal of Social Issues, X XIV (No. 4, 1968).

Goulet, Denis A. "Development For What?" Comparative Political Studies, I, No. 2 (July, 1968).

Greenstein, Fred I. "Personality and Politics. " American Behavioral Scientist, XI, No. 2 (November-December, 1967).

Gyorgy, Andrew. "Soviet-East European Relations: Theoretical Perceptions and Political Realities. " The Central European Federalist, XVI, No. 1 (June, 1968).

Heilbroner, Robert L. Rhetoric and Reality in the Revolution of Rising Expectations, pamphlet. Washington, D. C.: League of W o m e n Voters, 1967.

Horowitz, Donald L. "Multi-Racial Policies in the N e w States: T o w a r d a Theory of Conflict. " Paper presented at the American Political Science Association meetings in Ne w York City , September, 1969.

Horowitz, Irving L. "Cuban Communism. " Trans - Action, HI, No.12 (October, 1967) .

Horowitz, Irving L. "Political Legitimacy and the Institution­ alization of Crisis in Latin America. " Comparative Political Studies, I, No. 1 (March, 1968).

Huntington, S. P. "Political Development and Political Decay. " World Politics, X V H (April, 1965) .

Hurewitz, J. C. "The Beginnings of Military Modernization in the Middle East. " Middle East Journal, XXII, No. 2 (Spring, 1968) .

Isaacs, Harold R. "Group Identity and Political Change* " Survey, No. 69 (October, 1968) .

Jukic, Ilija. "Tito's Last Battle. " East Europe, X V I (April, 1967) 265.

Karsh, Bernard, and Cole, Robert E. "Industrialization and the Convergence Hypothesis: Aspects of Contemporary Japan, " Journal of Social Issues, XXIV, No. 4 (October, 1968).

Kedourie, Elie. "Revolutionary Nationalism in Asia and Africa. " Government and Opposition, HI, No. 4 (Autumn, 1969).

Kohl, Joseph A. "The Moral Economy of a Revolutionary Society. " Trans -Action, VI, No. 6 (April, 1969).

Koplin, Robert E. "A Model of Student Participation in the Developing Nations. " Comparative Political Studies, I, No. 3 (October, 1968).

Levine, Donald N. "The Flexibility of Traditional Cultures, " Journal of Social Issues, XXIV, No. 4 (October, 1968).

Lipset, S. M . "Students and Politics in Comparative Perspective. " Daedalus, 97, No. 1 (Winter, 1968).

Maidenburg, H. J. "Latins Calling the Tune on Investments. " The New York Times, January 19, 1969.

Mazrui, Ali A. " F r o m Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization. " World Politics, XXI, No. 1 (October, 1968).

Mazrui, Ali A . , and Engholm, G. F. "Rousseau and Intellectual Populism in Africa. " The Review of Politics, X X X , No. 1 (January, 1968).

Melson, Robert, and Wolpe, Howard. "Modernization and the Poli­ tics of Co m m u n a l i s m . " Paper presented at the American Political Science Association meetings in Ne w York City, September, 1969.

Michael, Franz. "The Fall of China. " World Politics, VIII, No. 3 (March, 1956).

Mosse, George L . , et. al. "International Fascism 1920-1945." Journal of Contemporary History, I, No. 1 ( 1966).

Needier, Martin C. "Political Development and Socio-Economic Development -- The Case of Latin America. " The American Political Science Review, LXII, No. 3 (September, 1968). 266.

Parsons, Talcott. "Evolutionary Universals in Society. " American Sociological Review, XXIX (June, 1964).

Pennock, J. R. "Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Go o d s . " World Politics, XVIH, No. 3 (April, 1966)

Petrov, Vladimir. "A Missing Page in Soviet Historiography. " Orbis, XI, No. 4 (Winter, 1968).

Pfeffer, Richard. "The Pursuit of Purity. " Problems of C o m m u n i s m , XVIII, No. 6 (November-December, 1969).

Pipes, Richard. "The Forces of Nationalism. " Problems of Communism, XIII (January-February, 1964).

Roth, Guenther. "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Em p i r e Building in the N e w States. " World Politics, XX, No. 2 (January, 1968).

Rustow, Dankwart A. "Nation. " The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences. New York: The MacMillan Company and the Free Press, 1968.

Schwartz, Benjamin. "The Reign of Virtue. " The China Quarterly, No. 35 (July-September, 1968).

Scott, Robert E. "Student Activism in Latin America. " Daedalus, 97, No. 1 (Winter, 1968).

Shils, Edward. "The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the N e w States. " World Politics, XII, No. 3 (April, I960).

Smith, Peter H. "Social Mobilization, Political Participation, and the Rise of Juan Peron. " Political Science Quarterly, LXXIV, No. 1 (Spring, 1969).

Strausz-Hupe,Robert. "Social Values and Politics. " The Review of Politics, XXX, No. 1 (January, 1968).

Symmons-Symonolewicz, Konstantin. "Nationalist Movements: An Attempt at a Comparative Typology." Comparative Studies in Society and History, VII (January, 1965).

Tanner, Henry. "Breton Separatism. " New York Times. February 1, 1969. 267.

Torres, Jose Antonio. "The Political Ideology of Guided Democracy." The Review of Politics, XXV, No. 1 (January, 1963).

Tourutani, Taketsugu. "Machiavelli and the Problem of Political Development. " The Review of Politics, X X X , No. 3 (July, 1968).

Tucker, Robert C. Paths of Communist Revolution, Research Monograph No. 29. Princeton, N. J. : Center for Interna­ tional Studies, Princeton University, 1968.

Van den Berghe, Pierre L. "Africa's Language Problems. " Trans -Action, VI, No. 1 (November, 1968).

Veliz, Claudio. "Centralism and Nationalism in Latin America." Foreign Affairs, XLVII, No. 1 (October, 1968).

Ward, Robert E. "Modernization and Democracy in Japan. " World Politics, XV, No. 4 (July, 1963).

Weatherbee, D. E. Ideology in Indonesia, Monograph Series No. 8. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, Department of Southeast Asian Studies, 1966.

Zonis, Marvin. "Political Elites and Political Cynicism in Iran. " Comparative Political Studies, I, No. 3 (October, 1968).