The image of Russia in Central & Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans
Russia: mighty Slavic brother or hungry bear next-door?
www.globsec.org Author
Daniel Milo Senior Adviser
Democracy & Resilience Center
Methodology
The outcomes and findings of this report are based on public opinion poll surveys carried out in September and October 2020 on a representative sample of the population in nine countries: Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia. The surveys were conducted on a sample Table of of 1000 respondents using stratified multistage random sampling in the contents form of computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI) due to COVID-19 04 Introduction pandemic restrictions. In all countries, 06 Executive summary the profiles of the respondents were 08 No appetite for turning to representative of the country according the East in CEE and the Western to gender, age, education, place of Balkans residence and size of settlement. 10 Russia – a resurgent strategic For the purposes of graphical data partner or a shadow of the visualisation, the results were rounded past era? to full numbers. To improve the 14 Fear of the Russian Bear readers’ experience, the responses 16 Russia - the victim of NATO in closed questions with a scale were and Western machinations generalised. For example, a question 20 Russian virtual military muscle with options definitely agree/ rather 22 Legacy of Slavic brotherhood agree/ rather disagree /definitely and anti-fascist struggle as disagree was merged to agree / door-opener disagree. 24 Country summaries ? Countries surveyed
Poland
Czechia
Slovakia
Hungary Romania
Serbia
Bulgaria
Montenegro
North Macedonia Introduction
Central and Vladimir Putin himself. The manner in which the Kremlin is nurturing and Eastern Europe exploiting these attitudes for its political (CEE) and the purposes, however, is a paramount Western Balkans problem. have been, due to Russia’s turn to a more confrontational their geographic foreign policy approach has seen the country use various methods, including position and active measures, disinformation and history, contested information operations, to increase territories that have its leverage in an attempt to roll back the pro-Western transition of the seen global and region. The end goal of this long- regional powers term influence operation is not the compete for control renewal of the Warsaw pact2 - the communist alternative to NATO - or and influence. the Soviet Union dominated Council Following the fall of of Mutual Economic Assistance3. By cultivating and amplifying pro-Russian communism in 1989 attitudes and narratives, the Kremlin and the successful rather is seeking to weaken both the integration of CEE EU and NATO from within, slowing and/or paralysing their decision- into the EU and making processes and shaping their NATO, it seemed policies. EU unity is indeed crucial almost inevitable if the sanctions regime and overall approach of the EU towards Russia that the allure is to be sustained. The planting and of Russia would cultivation of geo-political, cultural and historic narratives concerning Russia diminish as would can critically influence how people in its footprint. the two regions perceive Russia and the EU, NATO and the US. The recent example of the Russian-produced Yet 40 years of communist rule that Sputnik V vaccine bypassing the witnessed countries come under official registration procedures of the Soviet domination, combined with the European Medicines Agency, with memory of the Red Army liberating the Moscow instead turning to negotiating two regions from fascism and a web of deliveries with individual EU members, economic, cultural and religious ties, is yet another example of the country continue to draw certain segments of exploiting every opportunity to the population to Russia. The mere influence its image and gain political fact that a significant subset of Central leverage. European and Balkan society feel nostalgia for “the good old days” of the communist past1, one where Russia played a more predominant role in world affairs, is not necessarily a cause for concern. Nor the fact that some feel an affinity towards Russian culture,
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Moscow’s geopolitical stances or even
4 To counter these influence strategies, This report, it is necessary to first comprehensively understand how Russia is seeking therefore, aims to to depict itself in CEE and the provide answers Western Balkans and how successful its attempts have been. Equally to the following important is the need to take note of questions: both commonalities and differences across the region and within different segments of societies.
What narratives concerning Russia and its policies are most ? prevalent? How are they exploited to drive pro-Russian sentiment?
Which countries and population sub-groups are seemingly ? most vulnerable to pro-Russian narratives and why?
Is there a single disposition that fits all pro-Russian sympathizers ? across the two regions or are there multiple distinct groups drawn to the country?
What is the interplay between different pro-Kremlin narratives ? and how do they reinforce one another? The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
5 Key Findings
1 4 There is no single image of Russia is seen as a strategic Russia in the region. partner by 30% of people across Narratives that emphasize a common the region. heritage and victimhood, however, resonate Given that all surveyed countries, apart from most strongly, overall, among populaces. Serbia, are NATO members, this substantial figure is quite surprising and a testament to the still-significant Russian footprint present. 2 Societies in some countries are 5 more inclined to accept pro- Russian narratives, which, in The narrative asserting that turn, further reinforce these NATO is deliberately provoking predispositions. Russia by encircling it with The concept of Slavic unity underpins military bases is shared by 45% the victimhood narrative that sees Russia of the region’s population. recognized, by some, as a mere victim of The opposing view stating that Russia is the West. Those identifying with this notion responsible for provoking NATO by initiating are also more likely to believe that Russia is conflicts in Eastern Europe, meanwhile, is a superior military power. affirmed by 40% of people.
3 The majority of people living in the region (56%) do not feel threatened by Russia. Most respondents think that their country is too small to pose a threat to Russia or that Slavic links and heritage will discourage Moscow from engaging in hostile acts. The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
6 6 8 Even in countries that are Pro-Russian narratives serve notably reserved towards as an important tool in shaping Russia, Moscow’s projection of public opinion its military superiority appears across the region and they are widely to be resonating. accepted as discussed in this report. On average, 50% believe that Russia has the most powerful military in the world, whereas only 47% think the same of the US military. 9 Russia is still not seen as a real alternative to the West but 7 rather as a victim of Western machinations. Favourable attitudes towards Post-communist nostalgia, Slavic Russia and high levels of brotherhood and/or dissatisfaction with the acceptance of pro-Russian state of society underline the rejection of narratives that blame the West the Western liberal democratic order and and/or NATO do not translate the preponderance of pro-Russian attitudes. into geopolitical support for Moscow. Rather than falling into the Russian bear’s embrace, even the most ardent supporters of pan-Slavic unity and admirers of Russian 10 weaponry rather choose the West or a middle ground position. Russian influence There is no universal profile of operations, as of yet, only rarely result a pro-Kremlin backer across the in tangible changes in public support for region. the EU and NATO - two primary Western Different groups in different countries geopolitical and cultural anchors important indicate varying level of acceptance of pro- to the region. Russian narratives. The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
7 Countries of this region can be categorized into three groups according to their
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western views on Russia
8 Bear Bear Bear huggers feeders sceptics
Serbia Hungary Romania
Bulgaria Czechia Poland
Slovakia North Macedonia
Montenegro
Undergirded by complex This group of countries These two countries, historical, cultural and is home to attitudes on separated by geography, ethnic ties, these countries Russia that are marked share scepticism of Russia. express favourable views by pragmatism and some This sentiment is based, and share a high level of sympathetic ears. Unlike in to a certain extent, on affinity towards Russia. The the previous group, Russia historic experiences and victimhood narrative that is not seen as a brother/ the national narratives places the blame squarely sister and religious, cultural interpreting them (e.g. on the shoulders of West and/or historical links play a the Molotov-Ribbentrop and NATO, moreover, considerably less prominent Pact or the occupation of receives a sympathetic role. Several Russian Bessarabia and Northern audience and buy-in in narratives, nevertheless, Bukovina). Neither these countries. The notion are accepted in significant perceives Russia as an that they share a common numbers. The reasons important strategic partner Slavic heritage with behind these attitudes differ and the prevailing view Russia is also pervasive in each country and so in each sees Moscow and popular among an too does the openness of labelled as a threat. Some overwhelming majority of societies to any particular pro-Russian narratives people, reinforcing other narrative. including, for example, narratives. Despite this the claim that NATO and sentiment, when asked, West are aggressive and even the bear hugger unfair, however, are shared group declines to select by sizeable proportion of Russia, as opposed to the the populations of the two West, as their preferred countries. While people choice for the geopolitical in both countries firmly and cultural orientation of believe that the US has the their countries. upper hand when it comes to the military, a sizeable minority subscribe to the belief that Russian military superiority is unsurpassed. The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
9 1 1 No appetite for turning to the East in CEE and the Western Balkans
Most countries of CEE are positioned at the eastern edge of the EU and NATO. Cultural and social feelings of belonging to the West or East, therefore, can play a crucial role in framing the place of this region and its affinity to the two opposing geopolitical poles. As underlined in GLOBSEC Trends 20204, instead of choosing one or the other, most Central Europeans choose the in-between position. On average, 49% would prefer to join neither the West nor East, not surprising considering the region’s history, geography and self- identification.
Following the fall of communism, the Unlike the western lure of a better life narratives, the desire to choose West came to embody the promise of and economic opportunities, those the East (Russia) over the West better living standards, security, stability electing for a pro-Eastern leaning (represented by the EU and NATO) and economic opportunity, these ideals are influenced by a broader range is rather small. This might, at first, be serving as a magnet for EU and NATO of factors. Bulgaria and Slovakia seen as a problem for Russia but it integration. The West, consequently, is exhibit the greatest propensity for actually is congruent with Moscow’s the region’s second highest preference this viewpoint, 9% and 11% in Central overall strategy. Rather than attempting for its geopolitical orientation, selected Europe, respectively. In these two to present itself as a viable alternative by one third of respondents (33%). countries, this stance is driven by to the EU or NATO, as elaborated on positive attitudes towards Russia in this report, Russia is seeking to including their cultural and/or religious smear and damage the image of these East means Russia proximity and even common Slavic organizations6. heritage. In other countries, like According to our research findings, in Czechia and Hungary, this affinity is CEE, the East is largely associated with rather buttressed by negative attitudes Russia5. And when given a clear-cut towards the West and its perceived ills. choice, only 9%, on average, choose Whatever the reasons, Russia is to express an explicit preference for a not seen as a real alternative to the pro-Eastern cultural and geopolitical West. Even in countries where large orientation (which often translates into segments of the population are
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western pro-Russian). sympathetic to some pro-Russian
10 ? 1 East vs. West* West East
Montenegro
35% 25%
Slovakia
29% 11%
Serbia
21% 10%
Bulgaria
25% 9%
North Macedonia
46% 7%
Romania
37% 6%
Czechia
29% 5%
Hungary
37% 3%
Poland
42% 2% The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
* There has recently been much discussion in our society about the geopolitical and civilisational positioning of your country. Would you like your country to be a part of the West. a part of the East. or somewhere in between? 11 2 2 Russia – a resurgent strategic partner or a shadow of the past era?
The political and economic transition of the post-communist bloc and its accession to the EU and NATO was hailed by many as a shining example of successful societal transformation leading to greater prosperity and stability. While a large majority of the region’s population supports the political and economic changes that have been introduced since the fall of communism, the perception of these changes on a personal level is much more mixed. As evidenced in the 2018 GLOBSEC Trends report or in a 2019 Pew Research report7, sizeable shares of people express dissatisfaction with the effects of post-1989 developments on their own lives. One quarter (28%) of the populations of the Visegrad Four countries (CZ, HU, PL, SK), for example, believe that their lives were better before the fall of communism, with Slovakia and Hungary particularly driving these figures.
The post-communist transformation countries and age groups within each of communism, are more prone to indeed has not proceeded without country. In Bulgaria, Czechia and falling victim to contemporary anti- setbacks and there have been winners Slovakia, identification of Russia as a Western and pro-Russian narratives and losers in the process. The effects strategic partner increases with age. than their parents or grandparents. of post-communist nostalgia and/or That said, the youngest generation disillusionment with the current state in other countries, including Serbia, of affairs is discernible in perceptions, Hungary, North Macedonia and held by some, that Russia is a strategic Montenegro, is, surprisingly, more partner. inclined to see Russia as an ally. An explanation might lie in the possibility There are, however, significant that young Serbs, Hungarians and
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western differences both between different Montenegrins, born long after the end
12 ? 2 Russia is the most important strategic partner* Agree
59%
42% 41%
38%
33%
30% Regional average
23% 21%
6% 6%
North Serbia Slovakia Bulgaria Montenegro Hungary Macedonia Czechia Poland Romania Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
* Which of the following countries or groups of countries are the most important strategic partners of [your country] today? 5 countries to choose from, maximum two picks: The US, China, Russia, France, Germany and the EU (for non EU member states) 13 ? 2 Russia is our most important strategic partner - age groups
Slovakia
47% 43% 44% 41% 39% 29%
18 - 24 y.o. 25 - 34 y.o. 35 - 44 y.o. 45 - 54 y.o. 55 - 64 y.o. 65+ y.o.
Bulgaria
53%
41% 40% 38% 35% 29%
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western 18 - 24 y.o. 25 - 34 y.o. 35 - 44 y.o. 45 - 54 y.o. 55 - 64 y.o. 65+ y.o.
14 2
Serbia
76%
58% 60% 58% 59% 52%
18 - 24 y.o. 25 - 34 y.o. 35 - 44 y.o. 45 - 54 y.o. 55 - 64 y.o. 65+ y.o.
Hungary
44% 39% 41% 34% 31% 21%
18 - 24 y.o. 25 - 34 y.o. 35 - 44 y.o. 45 - 54 y.o. 55 - 64 y.o. 65+ y.o. Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
15 3 3 Fear of the Russian Bear
Media coverage of Russia’s actions and policies, especially in the Western press, is mostly critical8. The direct Russian military involvement in combat in eastern Ukraine, the illegal annexation of Crimea, Russian airstrikes in support of the brutal Assad regime in Syria, aggressive hacking campaigns carried out by the military intelligence GRU units and the targeted assassination of the Kremlin’s defectors and detractors have indeed made headlines across the world in recent years. Yet how do these stories influence perceptions of Russia as a threat in Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans?
With few exceptions, the majority of threaten them. In Hungary, meanwhile, people living in this region (56%) do respondents judged the fair mutual not feel threatened by Russia. This relations between Budapest and might come as a surprise in light of Moscow to be the most important the geographic proximity of several factor. countries in the region to Russia and their complicated histories that have The wide variety of motivations, included past military occupation and Twice as many including emotional and cultural bonds conflict. Americans and pragmatic appeals, point to the perceive Russia success of the information operations According to a Pew Research survey, conducted by or on behalf of Russia twice as many Americans (50%) as a threat than and their reliance on customised feel threatened by Russia than people living country-specific narratives that reflect countries situated in its vicinity (25%). different local contexts. In many of While differences in Russian threat in CEE and these countries, Russia is described perceptions are vast across the region, the Western in official intelligence or security the three-group classification laid out reports as a challenge and its actions earlier is not necessarily applicable Balkans. as threatening to their stability and on this question. Czechia (57%) and security . These official security Bulgaria (55%), the former a bear assessments, nonetheless, do not feeder and the latter a bear hugger, are Serbia, Slovakia, Montenegro), a seem to have much bearing on societal similarly inclined, for example, to reject perceived brotherly/sisterly Slavic perceptions of Russia. the notion that Russia poses a threat. family link, shared with Russia, plays an important role. In other countries The reasons why such a small share (Czechia, Poland, North Macedonia, of populaces feels threatened by Romania), respondents cite the fact Russia vary in each country. In the that their country poses no threat to
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western more Russophilic countries (Bulgaria, Russia, giving Moscow no reason to
16 ? 3 Do you think that Russia presents a danger to your country? Yes No
68%
43%
30% 25% Regional average Yes 25% 22% 20%
10% 7% 3% Serbia Poland Czechia Bulgaria Slovakia Hungary Romania Montenegro North Macedonia 21% 24%
56% Regional average No
55% 57% 61% 65% 65% 66%
91% Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
17 4 4 Russia - the victim of NATO and Western machinations
The accession of Central European, Eastern European and some Balkan countries into NATO extended the security guarantees enshrined in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to this region, shielding it from direct military threats and anchoring it to the West. The Russian Federation, for its part, has been concerned with this NATO expansion into an area it considered to be its backyard and has perceived these developments as posing a threat to its security and national interests11.
Since 2014, NATO has become one of the most prominent targets of Russian disinformation campaigns12. The Russian government and aligned outlets have sought to consistently disseminate anti-NATO narratives. The claim that NATO is The converse narrative purporting that Russia is provoking NATO by initiating deliberately provoking Russia by conflicts in Eastern Europe, meanwhile, encircling it with military bases is is believed to be true by only 40% of respondents. The detrimental impact particularly prevalent and gains of Kremlin rhetoric is further visible in acceptance by 45% of people in the gradual decrease of support for NATO in Bulgaria, which has declined surveyed countries. by 9% since 2019 and currently stands at 47%.13 is a relevant factor influencing public Russia. Bulgaria, where people with The categorization of countries into opinion on the matter within countries. university education are more likely three main groups is pertinent, with the Those having secondary education to affirm this narrative, represents an exception of Romania, in understanding without school-leaving certificate are interesting exception. attitudes towards the “Russia vs. most prone, in the majority of countries,
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western NATO” pairing. Education, meanwhile, to believe that NATO is provoking
18 ? 4 Russia vs. NATO NATO deliberately provokes Russia by encircling it with military bases. Russia deliberately provokes NATO by initiating conflicts in Eastern Europe.
Serbia
71%
31%
Montenegro
60%
44% 40% Regional average Russia provokes NATO Slovakia
56%
41%
Bulgaria
46%
22%
Romania
38%
37%
Czechia
38%
42%
North Macedonia
37% 45% Regional average 32% NATO provokes Russia
Hungary
33%
42%
Poland
23%
67% The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
19 ? 4 Russia as a victim vs. Russia as an agressor Western countries often unjustly accuse Russia of unlawful or fraudulent behaviour. Those who also agree that Russia is our Slavic brother or relations with Russia should be nurtured. Russia is behaving aggressively against its neighbours and tries to weaken the EU and NATO.
74% 75%
71% 58% 59% 56% 60% 48% 44% 42% 50% 49% 41% 43% 43% 37% 35% 34% Serbia Montenegro Slovakia Bulgaria Czechia Hungary Romania North Macedonia Poland
23% 27%
37% 39% 40%
49% 48% 53%
More than half of respondents in the region view relations with Russia 84% positively. 55% consider Russia to be our Slavic brother or believe that relations with the country should be nurtured. 47% believe that Russia is subjected to unfounded criticism by the West. The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
20 Russia a victim of the West or the 4 aggressor?
Similar to narratives that portray NATO as the real aggressor, this same victimhood storyline is The concept elevated through assertions that Russia has been unjustly accused of all wrongdoings by the West. The of Slavic unity comparison, therefore, of two opposing narratives – one blaming Russia and the other the West – can provide interesting insight into the relative underpins the success of Russian image projection endeavours. victimhood The survey data, in fact, indicates that a majority across the region fault the West for unfounded criticism rather than Russia’s actions. This perspective narrative is more likely to be held in five of nine surveyed countries. The “West is to blame” view garners, overall, 2% more that portrays buy-in than the “Russia is a regional aggressor” narrative.
The “Russia as a victim of the West” Russia as a and “Slavic brotherhood/special relations with Russia” narratives, meanwhile, correspond closely in the mere victim of eyes of respondents. Indeed, when it comes to victimhood, those who subscribe to the Slavic brotherhood/ special relations storyline are more the West. inclined to see Russia as a victim, with each reinforcing one another. The positioning of Russia as a brotherly/ sisterly nation in Slavic countries of CEE and the Western Balkans and the perceived need for a special relationship in non-Slavic countries, as elaborated further below, plays an important role. The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
21 5 5 Russian virtual military muscle
Russian global image projection is underpinned by its show of force including the dramatic use of military equipment, military drills and accompanying rhetoric for psychological effect. Russia, in this regard, has mastered psychological tactics and information operations, making them integral components in its military affairs since World War II. Russia, notably, has employed these capacities extensively in the presentation of new equipment and military operations in Ukraine and, most recently, Syria.
This emphasis has included, for According to responses to the two example, the development and opposing narratives – one asserting presentation of new military equipment that Russia has the strongest military (e.g. tanks, fighter jets, cruise missiles, in the world and the other that the US ATBMs and submarines). A standard military is more powerful than Russia’s feature encompasses slick video - the majority in six of nine countries footage of new equipment, sometimes are inclined to accept Russia’s line. comprising its combat use in action Nevertheless, overall perceptions, it (e.g. test sites in Syria), that enables should be noted, are nearly equal. The majority Moscow to boast its abilities. These images have been disseminated There is, significantly, no single age in six of nine through the sprawling network of profile that characterizes people countries are pro-Russian information sources in who subscribe to the Russian military inclined to the region, instilling an image of vast superiority framing. In some countries, military power14. it is youth - the supposed digital natives accept Russia’s – that are enormously influenced by line on military The aim of projecting conceptions of the Kremlin narrative (Serbia, Hungary, Russia as a military superpower on par Czechia, Romania and Poland). In superiority. with the US, achieved by parading its Bulgaria and Montenegro, conversely, new equipment and proving its combat the oldest generation proves most readiness, is two-fold. Firstly, Moscow susceptible to the claim. Slovakia and is seeking to foster admiration and Romania, meanwhile, present the support from those sympathetic to case where both the younger and the Russia and spark apprehension among oldest generations were found to be those wary of the country. Moscow, prone to perceiving Russia as a military secondly, is attempting to camouflage superpower. North Macedonia is also the fact it is lagging on other issue a distinct case, with the middle-aged areas, among others, economic demographic most likely to believe development, quality of life and the that Russia holds a military might 15
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western state of medical facilities. advantage.
22 ? 5 Military superiority: Russia vs. the US Russia’s military power is far greater than that of any other country in the world. The US military is more powerful and technologically advanced then Russian.
Serbia
62% 30%
North Macedonia
58% 41%
Romania
57% 68%
Montenegro
56% 50%
Bulgaria
53%
25%
Slovakia
52% 47%
Czechia
47% 45%
Hungary
35% 52%
Poland
30% 68% The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
23 6 6 Legacy of Slavic brotherhood and anti-fascist struggle as a door-opener
In addition to contemporary issues, perceptions of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans are influenced by historical and cultural narratives. In Slavic countries, which represent all surveyed countries apart from Those who agree that Hungary and Romania, the notion of joint historical, Russia is our Slavic cultural and even “spiritual” bonds is often exploited to brother elevate Russia’s image in the region. 67% Average
Serbia 89%
Notwithstanding the many historical other attribute concerning Russia and and even current conflicts between adopt more anti-Western attitudes. Bulgaria 84% Slavic nations that have witnessed a Russian role (e.g. the breakup of That said, no universal characteristics Slovakia 78% Poland, the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, are discernible among people the Russian invasion of Ukraine and professing a special bond between annexation of Crimea), this communal their country and Russia, ethnic (Slavic Montenegro 72% sentiment garners a tremendous countries) or otherwise (Hungary and following throughout the region, Romania). The segmentation by age, North Macedonia 65% creating further openings for additional similarly, points to no distinct pattern. pro-Russian narratives to seep in. Though Slavic unity holds greater Czechia 47% sway among older people in Slovakia, In our research, people who subscribe Bulgaria, Czechia and Montenegro, to the Slavic brotherhood/sisterhood youth are more drawn to the possibility Poland 30% concept are both more inclined to take of special relations with Russia in
The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western a positive view towards nearly every Hungary, Romania and Poland.
24 ? 6 Russia as the main actor responsible for the defeat of Fascism in WWII. continues to play the leading role in fight against fascism today Agree Disagree
70%
60% 58% 51% 48% 41% 39% 37%
25% Serbia Montenegro Bulgaria Slovakia North Macedonia Czechia Romania Hungary Poland
17% 17%
30%
39% 38% 40% 40% 46%
60%
The (ab)use of fascism as a central element of its Against this backdrop, the “Russia as anti-fascist legacy raison d’être. leader against fascism” storyline was found to be prevalent in five of nine by Russia While the remembrance of fallen countries surveyed. In another two soldiers and victims is, undoubtedly, countries, equal shares embraced and Memories of the region’s anti-fascist laudable, its contemporary exploitation rejected the narrative, whereas it was struggle and the toll absorbed by the for nefarious political motivations is not. vehemently spurned in only one. Most Soviet Red Army in its campaign to This flagrant abuse was exemplified, people in the region, furthermore, are liberate Europe during the Second for example, in Russia’s preposterous inclined to believe that Russia is playing World War remain intact throughout situating of the Ukrainian conflict as a leading role in combating fascism the region. The remembrance of Red a contest between “fascist” forces on today. The fact that Russia, in fact, has Army soldiers who sacrificed their the Ukrainian side and brave anti- been cultivating (complex) ties with lives during this struggle indeed were fascist volunteers on the other17. This many far-right political groups20 and an integral component of communist attempt to frame the conflict in Ukraine parties throughout Europe appears lost ideology, contributing to the formation through the prism of the anti-fascist on these segments of society. of close bonds between the liberators struggle was further emboldened by and the liberated. The communist era the activities of groups like the Night that ensued (and claimed many lives16) Wolves18 operating also in CEE and 19 put an emphasis on the victory over Western Balkan countries. Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
25 Country summaries
Bear huggers
Serbia Bulgaria
Most pro-Russian country in Russia perceived as an the survey important strategic partner by four in ten Bulgarians Russia seen as a strategic partner by more than 50% of Explicit pro-Eastern geopolitical Majority of respondents orientation not present Slovaks (50%)
Majority of population believes Russian victimhood narrative are inclined to in all surveyed pro-Russian prevalent, accepted by nearly see Russia as narratives half the population a victim of the
Slavic brotherhood narrative Oldest and university West. Among nearly universally accepted in educated most sympathetic those who the country to pro-Russian narratives subscribe to the concept of Slavic brotherhood, Montenegro Slovakia this figure Most pro-Russian country Considerable presence of increases to among NATO members pro-Russian attitudes - among 58%. surveyed most ardent of NATO and EU members Russian narratives targeting NATO have proven effective Russia seen as a strategic and are widely accepted partner, NATO as an aggressor
Most inclined to believe Majority believes in Russian Russian victimhood narrative victimhood narrative among Slavic brotherhood adherents Slavic brotherhood plays a predominant role Middle-aged people most reserved in their attitudes Young and educated more towards Russia resilient to pro-Russian narratives The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
26 Bear feeders Bear sceptics
Czechia 74% of Romania Hungarians Population wary of Russia, agree that More people see Russia as a evidenced by second highest threat than not threat perception of Russia in Hungary should the region nurture its Russia and NATO are equally relations with blamed for provocations One in five respondents view Russia as a strategic partner Russia. Slightly more people believe that Russia is acting More people believe Russia aggressively towards its is responsible for provoking neighbours than the “West is NATO and acting in a hostile North Macedonia unjustly making accusations manner than the reverse about Russia” narrative Population holds low threat More people identify the perception of Russia While more people recognize Russian military, rather than the the US military as superior, six US, as superior. People express second in ten Romanians believe that highest belief, following only Russia has the most advanced Slavic brotherhood affinity Serbia, in the idea that Russia military second lowest in the region has the military upper hand Majority of Romanians believe Slavic brotherhood in nurturing their relationship attachments to Russia are with Russia Hungary shared by two-thirds of the population
Russia perceived as a strategic One-third are inclined partner and a victim of NATO Poland to believe that NATO is provocations by one-third of responsible for provoking the population Russia is seen as a threat by Russia seven in ten Poles Three-fourths of people agree More people conclude that that the country should further Strategic partnership with the West is unjustly accusing develop its relationship with Russia and any pro-eastern Russia of wrongdoing than the Russia orientation sentiments are other way around. negligible Russian victimhood narrative is accepted by four in ten, rising Two-thirds consider Russia’s to five in ten among those who actions as provocations support closer ties with Russia against NATO and eight in ten think Russia generally treats Explicit support for Eastern its neighbours aggressively – orientation is negligible the highest percentage in the region Younger generation holds more favourable disposition 66% of Poles One-third of Poles believe towards Russia and oldest consider Russia has the strongest generation most distant Russia’s actions army and identify with Slavic as provocations brotherhood links with Russia against NATO. Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western
27 4 Globsec Trends 2020, GLOBSEC, available at: 13 GLOBSEC Trends 2020 Credits https://www.globsec.org/publications/globsec- trends-2020/ 14 See for example coverage on a Slovak pro-Russian web Armadny Magazin (Military Collection of opinion polls in each 5 GLOBSEC Trends 2019, GLOBSEC, available News) affiliated to a flagship of pro-Russian country was coordinated by FOCUS, at: https://www.globsec.org/publications/ sources in Slovakia Hlavné Správy https:// s.r.o. globsec-trends-2019/ www.armadnymagazin.sk/2019/05/30/analyza- nasadenia-ruskych-zbrani-v-syrii-nabada- 6 See for example NATO’s approach to rusov-k-optimizmu/ or the notorious Czech countering disinformation. NATO, July 17, 2020 disinformation outlet Aeronet.cz https://aeronet. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/177273.htm cz/news/rusko-odpalilo-z-kaspickeho-more- Terminology or A Russian Federation Information Warfare 26-strel-s-plochou-drahou-letu-v-syrii-zasahly- Primer, University of Washington, November cile-islamskeho-statu-usa-chteji-assada-i- used to identify 12, 2020, https://jsis.washington.edu/news/a- putina-zalovat-pred-mezinarodnim-tribunalem- russian-federation-information-warfare-primer/ brzezinsky-navrhuje-odzbrojit-r/
regions in the 7 European Public Opinion Three Decades 15 See for example the UN Human After the Fall of Communism, Pew Research, Development Index, where Russian Federation report: October 15, 2019, https://www.pewresearch. is at position no. 52 http://hdr.undp.org/en/ org/global/2019/10/15/european-public-opinion- content/latest-human-development-index- three-decades-after-the-fall-of-communism/ ranking • CEE / Central and Eastern Europe – Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Poland, 8 See for example: International media image 16 Valentino, Benjamin A. (2005), Final Solutions: Romania, Slovakia of Russia: trends and patterns of perception, Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Ekaterina A. Repina et al, DOI: 10.18355/ Century, Cornell University Press, XL.2018.11.02.45, • Western Balkans – North Macedonia, 17 Russian Disinformation Distorted Reality in 9 Montenegro, Serbia Share of Americans who say that Russia and Ukraine. Americans Should Take Note, Foreign its power pose a threat to the well-being of Policy, August 2019, https://foreignpolicy. the United States. Climate Change and Russia com/2019/08/02/russian-disinformation- Are Partisan Flashpoints in Public’s Views distorted-reality-in-ukraine-americans-should- of Global Threats, Pew Research center, 30 take-note-putin-mueller-elections-antisemitism/ July, 20219, https://www.pewresearch.org/ politics/2019/07/30/climate-change-and-russia- 18 The Night Wolves: Russian Motorcycle References are-partisan-flashpoints-in-publics-views-of- Club or Kremlin Militia?, Military.com, global-threats/ September 2018, https://www.military.com/ 1 GLOBSEC Trends 2018, GLOBSEC, available daily-news/2018/09/04/night-wolves-russian- at: https://www.globsec.org/wp-content/ 10 See for example: Annual report of Czech motorcycle-club-or-kremlin-militia.html uploads/2018/05/GLOBSEC-Trends-2018.pdf Intelligence Service, available at https:// www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/ 19 Russia’s influence in Slovakia. The Night 2 The Warsaw Pact was a collective defense vyrocni-zpravy/2019-vz-cz.pdf or Annual Wolves, Putin’s biker gang, The Economist, treaty similar to NATO, uniting the Soviet Union report of Slovak Intelligence Service https:// August 28, 2018, https://www.economist.com/ and seven other Eastern Bloc socialist republics www.sis.gov.sk/pre-vas/sprava-o-cinnosti. europe/2018/08/23/the-night-wolves-putins- of Central and Eastern Europe. Signed in May html#bezpecnostna-oblast biker-gang 1955 in Warsaw, it was established as a military counterweight to NATO. 11 NATO expansion a ‘direct threat to Russia’ 20 These many links include financial, media – Putin, RT, 4 April 2008, https://www.rt.com/ and political support, cooperation agreements 3 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance news/nato-expansion-a-direct-threat-to-russia- signed between Our Russia Party and a host was a socialist economic organization set up by putin/ of Western European far-right parties, illicit the Soviet Union in 1949 following the rejection financing etc... See Anton Shekhovtsovs` Tango of the Marshall economic plan by socialist bloc 12 EEAS East Stratcom team has documented Noir, https://www.tango-noir.com/ countries. Led by the Soviet Union, its original 1087 cases of NATO related disinformation members included Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, in its online database: https://euvsdisinfo.eu/ East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania; disinformation-cases/?text=NATO&date=&per_ Cuba, Mongolia and Vietnam joined later. page=&orderby=date& offset=1080&order=ASC
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