Image of Russia in Central & Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
The image of Russia in Central & Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans Russia: mighty Slavic brother or hungry bear next-door? www.globsec.org ? Countries surveyed Author Daniel Milo Senior Adviser Poland Democracy & Resilience Center Methodology The outcomes and findings of this report are based on public opinion poll surveys carried out in September Czechia and October 2020 on a representative sample of the population in nine Slovakia countries: Bulgaria, Czechia, Hungary, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Serbia and Slovakia. The surveys were conducted on a sample Table of of 1000 respondents using stratified multistage random sampling in the contents Hungary form of computer-assisted telephone Romania interviewing (CATI) due to COVID-19 04 Introduction pandemic restrictions. In all countries, 06 Executive summary the profiles of the respondents were 08 No appetite for turning to representative of the country according the East in CEE and the Western to gender, age, education, place of Balkans residence and size of settlement. 10 Russia – a resurgent strategic For the purposes of graphical data partner or a shadow of the Serbia visualisation, the results were rounded past era? to full numbers. To improve the 14 Fear of the Russian Bear readers’ experience, the responses 16 Russia - the victim of NATO Bulgaria in closed questions with a scale were and Western machinations generalised. For example, a question 20 Russian virtual military muscle with options definitely agree/ rather 22 Legacy of Slavic brotherhood Montenegro agree/ rather disagree /definitely and anti-fascist struggle as disagree was merged to agree / door-opener disagree. 24 Country summaries North Macedonia To counter these influence strategies, This report, it is necessary to first comprehensively understand how Russia is seeking therefore, aims to Introduction to depict itself in CEE and the provide answers Western Balkans and how successful its attempts have been. Equally to the following important is the need to take note of questions: Central and Vladimir Putin himself. The manner both commonalities and differences in which the Kremlin is nurturing and across the region and within different Eastern Europe exploiting these attitudes for its political segments of societies. (CEE) and the purposes, however, is a paramount Western Balkans problem. have been, due to Russia’s turn to a more confrontational their geographic foreign policy approach has seen the country use various methods, including What narratives concerning position and active measures, disinformation and history, contested information operations, to increase Russia and its policies are most territories that have its leverage in an attempt to roll back ? prevalent? How are they exploited the pro-Western transition of the seen global and region. The end goal of this long- to drive pro-Russian sentiment? regional powers term influence operation is not the compete for control renewal of the Warsaw pact2 - the communist alternative to NATO - or and influence. the Soviet Union dominated Council Following the fall of of Mutual Economic Assistance3. By cultivating and amplifying pro-Russian Which countries and population communism in 1989 attitudes and narratives, the Kremlin and the successful rather is seeking to weaken both the sub-groups are seemingly integration of CEE EU and NATO from within, slowing ? most vulnerable to pro-Russian and/or paralysing their decision- into the EU and making processes and shaping their narratives and why? NATO, it seemed policies. EU unity is indeed crucial almost inevitable if the sanctions regime and overall approach of the EU towards Russia that the allure is to be sustained. The planting and of Russia would cultivation of geo-political, cultural and historic narratives concerning Russia Is there a single disposition that diminish as would can critically influence how people in its footprint. the two regions perceive Russia and fits all pro-Russian sympathizers the EU, NATO and the US. The recent ? across the two regions or are example of the Russian-produced Yet 40 years of communist rule that Sputnik V vaccine bypassing the there multiple distinct groups witnessed countries come under official registration procedures of the drawn to the country? Soviet domination, combined with the European Medicines Agency, with memory of the Red Army liberating the Moscow instead turning to negotiating two regions from fascism and a web of deliveries with individual EU members, economic, cultural and religious ties, is yet another example of the country continue to draw certain segments of exploiting every opportunity to the population to Russia. The mere influence its image and gain political fact that a significant subset of Central leverage. What is the interplay between European and Balkan society feel different pro-Kremlin narratives nostalgia for “the good old days” of the communist past1, one where Russia ? and how do they reinforce one played a more predominant role in another? world affairs, is not necessarily a cause for concern. Nor the fact that some feel an affinity towards Russian culture, The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Moscow’s geopolitical stances or even Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western 4 5 Key Findings 1 4 6 8 There is no single image of Russia is seen as a strategic Even in countries that are Pro-Russian narratives serve Russia in the region. partner by 30% of people across notably reserved towards as an important tool in shaping Narratives that emphasize a common the region. Russia, Moscow’s projection of public opinion heritage and victimhood, however, resonate Given that all surveyed countries, apart from its military superiority appears across the region and they are widely most strongly, overall, among populaces. Serbia, are NATO members, this substantial to be resonating. accepted as discussed in this report. figure is quite surprising and a testament to On average, 50% believe that Russia has the still-significant Russian footprint present. the most powerful military in the world, whereas only 47% think the same of the US 2 military. 9 Societies in some countries are 5 Russia is still not seen as a real more inclined to accept pro- alternative to the West but Russian narratives, which, in The narrative asserting that 7 rather as a victim of Western turn, further reinforce these NATO is deliberately provoking machinations. predispositions. Russia by encircling it with Favourable attitudes towards Post-communist nostalgia, Slavic The concept of Slavic unity underpins military bases is shared by 45% Russia and high levels of brotherhood and/or dissatisfaction with the the victimhood narrative that sees Russia of the region’s population. acceptance of pro-Russian state of society underline the rejection of recognized, by some, as a mere victim of The opposing view stating that Russia is narratives that blame the West the Western liberal democratic order and the West. Those identifying with this notion responsible for provoking NATO by initiating and/or NATO do not translate the preponderance of pro-Russian attitudes. are also more likely to believe that Russia is conflicts in Eastern Europe, meanwhile, is into geopolitical support for a superior military power. affirmed by 40% of people. Moscow. Rather than falling into the Russian bear’s embrace, even the most ardent supporters of pan-Slavic unity and admirers of Russian 10 weaponry rather choose the West or a 3 middle ground position. Russian influence There is no universal profile of operations, as of yet, only rarely result a pro-Kremlin backer across the The majority of people living in the region (56%) do not feel threatened in tangible changes in public support for region. by Russia. the EU and NATO - two primary Western Different groups in different countries Most respondents think that their country is too small to pose a threat to Russia or that Slavic links geopolitical and cultural anchors important indicate varying level of acceptance of pro- and heritage will discourage Moscow from engaging in hostile acts. to the region. Russian narratives. The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western Balkans The image of Russia in CEE and the Western 6 7 Bear Bear Bear huggers feeders sceptics Serbia Hungary Romania Bulgaria Czechia Poland Slovakia North Macedonia Montenegro Undergirded by complex This group of countries These two countries, historical, cultural and is home to attitudes on separated by geography, ethnic ties, these countries Russia that are marked share scepticism of Russia. express favourable views by pragmatism and some This sentiment is based, and share a high level of sympathetic ears. Unlike in to a certain extent, on affinity towards Russia. The the previous group, Russia historic experiences and victimhood narrative that is not seen as a brother/ the national narratives places the blame squarely sister and religious, cultural interpreting them (e.g. on the shoulders of West and/or historical links play a the Molotov-Ribbentrop and NATO, moreover, considerably less prominent Pact or the occupation of receives a sympathetic role. Several Russian Bessarabia and Northern audience and buy-in in narratives, nevertheless, Bukovina). Neither these countries. The notion are accepted in significant perceives Russia as an that they share a common numbers. The reasons important strategic partner Slavic heritage with behind these attitudes differ and the prevailing view Countries Russia is also pervasive in each country and so in each sees Moscow and popular among an too does the openness of labelled as a threat. Some overwhelming majority of societies to any particular pro-Russian narratives of this region people, reinforcing other narrative. including, for example, narratives. Despite this the claim that NATO and sentiment, when asked, West are aggressive and even the bear hugger unfair, however, are shared can be categorized group declines to select by sizeable proportion of Russia, as opposed to the the populations of the two West, as their preferred countries.