POLITICS and GOVERNMENT Understanding Ukrainian Politics

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POLITICS and GOVERNMENT Understanding Ukrainian Politics Understanding Ukrainian Politics Understanding Ukrainian Politics Power, Politics, and Institutional Design Paul D’Anieri M.E.Sharpe Armonk, New York London, England 2 UNDERSTANDING UKRAINIAN POLITICS Copyright © 2007 by M.E. Sharpe, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form without written permission from the publisher, M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 80 Business Park Drive, Armonk, New York 10504. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data D’Anieri, Paul J., 1965– Understanding Ukrainian politics : power, politics, and institutional design / by Paul D’Anieri. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN-13: 978-0-7656-1811-5 (cloth: alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-7656-1811-7 (cloth: alk. paper) 1. Ukraine—Politics and government—1991– 2. Power (Social sciences)—Ukraine. I. Title. JN6635.D365 2006 320.9477—dc22 2006016004 Printed in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z 39.48-1984. ~ BM (c)10987654321 ———— Contents ———— List of Tables, Figure, Appendices, and Maps vii Acknowledgments ix 1. Introduction 3 2. Institutions and Democracy: Questioning the Connections 23 3. Power and Institutions: Overview of the Argument 48 4. The Evolution of Ukrainian Politics, 1989–2006 74 5. Societal Divisions and the Challenge of Liberal Democracy in Ukraine 103 6. The Constitution and Executive-Legislative Relations 125 7. The Electoral Law: Cause or Effect of Weak Parties? 148 8. Parliamentary Rules and Party Development 174 9. How Power Politics Trumps Institutional Design 192 10. Ukraine in Comparative Perspective: Electoral Authoritarianism in the Former Soviet Union and Beyond 215 11. Beyond the Orange Revolution: An Agenda for Further Reform 241 Notes 259 Index 287 About the Author 299 v vi UNDERSTANDING UKRAINIAN POLITICS Ukraine: Borders and Administrative Divisions Borders and Administrative Ukraine: List of Tables, Figure, Appendices, and Maps Tables 5.1 Regional Distribution of Parties’ Support, 2002 Parliamentary Elections 108 5.2 Regional Breakdown of Vote, 1999 Presidential Election, Second Round 109 5.3 Party Support Across Regions: Single-Member Districts, 1998 Parliamentary Election 110 5.4 Support Across Regions (Selected Parties): 1998 Proportional Representation Voting 111 5.5 Frequency with Which Ukrainian Political Parties Vote Together, Sixty-eight Roll-Call Votes, March–May 2000 112 5.6 Left–Right Orientations of Factions in Ukrainian Parliament, 2000 114 5.7 Orientations of Ukrainian Political Parties, 2003–2004 116 5.8 Shifting Alliances in Ukrainian Politics, 2000–2006 118 7.1 Results of the 1994 Parliamentary Elections 155 7.2 Results of the 1998 Parliamentary Elections 161 7.3 Results of the 2002 Parliamentary Elections 162 7.4 Results of the 2006 Parliamentary Elections 164 8.1 Variation in Membership, Factions in Ukrainian Parliament, 1998–2002 178 8.2 Shifting Results of the 2002 Parliamentary Election 185 9.1 Number of People Subject to Direct Voting Pressure from the State 203 10.1 Freedom House 2004 New Democracy Score and Presidential Powers 217 vii viii LIST OF TABLES, FIGURE, APPENDICES, AND MAPS Figure 3.1 Outline of the Argument: Causes of Electoral Authoritarianism in Ukraine 49 Appendices 4.1 Key Figures in Ukrainian Politics, 1991–2005 101 4.2 Political Leaders of Ukraine, 1991–2006 102 Maps Ukraine: Borders and Administrative Divisions vi 5.1 2004 Presidential Election, Vote by Regions, Second Round Runoff 104 ———— Acknowledgments ———— A great number of friends and colleagues in several countries provided use- ful commentary on various parts of the manuscript, in their earlier incarna- tions as conference papers. Taras Kuzio, who knows more about day-to-day goings on in Ukraine than anyone, has provided feedback on most of the arguments in this book. Our good-natured disagreements about Ukrainian politics have sharpened my thinking considerably. Sarah Whitmore’s exper- tise on the Ukrainian parliament was especially helpful in developing Chap- ters 7 and 8. Conversations with Lucan Way have helped me refine my theoretical arguments significantly. Orest Subtelny invited me to participate in a series of workshops in Toronto and in Kyiv, which provided extensive opportunities to develop my ideas in conversations with Ukrainian officials and scholars. I owe a special debt to my host on several trips to Kyiv, Georgiy Khomenko of the Diplomatic Acad- emy of Ukraine, and to Bohdan Myndiuk, who helped organize the trips. A great number of colleagues in Kyiv have shared their time generously, to help me gather data and to help me interpret it. Hrihoriy Perepelytsya has been especially helpful. I have also benefited immensely from my long col- laboration with colleagues at Lviv National University, including Anatoliy Romaniuk and Yuriy Shweda. Ivan Vakarchuk, rector of Lviv National Uni- versity, along with Volodymyr Kyrylych, vice-rector for International Rela- tions, and Viktor Krevs have steadfastly supported wide-ranging cooperation between their institution and the University of Kansas. The ideas in this book have also benefited from presentations at the Harvard University Ukrainian Research Institute; the University of Toronto Munk Centre for International Studies; the George Washington University Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies; and the chair of Ukrainian Stud- ies at the University of Ottawa. At the University of Kansas, I have benefited from the support of the Center for Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies, and from its past and current directors, Maria Carlson and Erik Herron. The university and its administrators have provided considerable support to Ukrainian studies over ix x ACKNOWLEDGMENTS the past fifteen years, making it a very supportive place to carry on my re- search. I received very helpful research assistance from Kara Smith, Sabra Wormington, and Ken Zucher. This book is dedicated to my wife, Laura. She has patiently supported my research, and has indeed made it possible by bravely parenting our five chil- dren whenever I was away working on this project. She did not flinch when I left on a research trip when our daughter was two weeks old, or when a pair of my Ukrainian houseguests split a bottle of Jack Daniel’s over dinner and then moved on to champagne. She has taken my research seriously, but has helped me to avoid taking it too seriously. For this and much more, I am grateful to her. I, of course, am responsible for any inconsistencies, factual errors, or ques- tionable interpretations that remain in the book. Understanding Ukrainian Politics ———— 1 ———— Introduction In November 2004 the eyes of the world focused on Ukraine, as the brightly colored banners of the Orange Revolution were unfurled in snowy Kyiv. The sight of hundreds of thousands of young Ukrainians braving freezing weather to overturn the results of a rigged election was inspiring. Equally inspiring was the courage of opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko, who survived a poisoning attempt that ravaged his skin, and continued on to lead the demo- cratic reform movement. The Orange Revolution promised a fundamentally new era of democracy in a country that had never really experienced it. It was seen as finally bringing Ukraine into Europe after centuries of externally enforced separation. Yet, within a few short months after the Orange Revolution, disillusion- ment set in, as many of the expected reforms failed to materialize. Corrup- tion prosecutions against the previous leaders were delayed. The review of illegally privatized companies bogged down. Trade legislation needed for Ukraine to join the World Trade Organization was defeated. Several of Yushchenko’s cabinet ministers did not give up their seats in parliament, as required by law. Yushchenko’s own twenty-year-old son was seen driving about Kyiv in a BMW worth over $100,000. And Yushchenko split bitterly with his partner in revolution, the charismatic Yulia Tymoshenko. A sense that little had changed, or that not enough had changed, quickly emerged. In March 2006, Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions, apparently doomed af- ter its effort to steal the 2004 election, won a large plurality in a free and fair parliamentary election. Finally, in August 2006, Viktor Yushchenko agreed to nominate Viktor Yanukovych for prime minister. In the eyes of many ob- servers, the Orange Revolution was undone.1 How did the Orange Revolution run into difficulties so quickly? Has the pace of reform merely been slowed, or is there a more fundamental prob- lem? What factors in Ukrainian politics continue to hamper the construction of liberal democracy? The optimism of 2004 appears to have been unwar- ranted, but it is not clear that the despair of 2006 is based on firmer analytical ground. 3 4 UNDERSTANDING UKRAINIAN POLITICS This book seeks to answer these questions through a careful analysis of Ukraine’s political system. By examining Ukrainian politics prior to the Or- ange Revolution, we can see the extent of the obstacles to reform. The mis- judgment made by many within and outside Ukraine was that Leonid Kuchma, Ukraine’s president since 1994, was the heart of the problem, and that re- placing him would be a large part of the solution. This book shows that re- form in Ukraine is hindered by deep problems in both its political institutions and in the concentration of political power. Kuchma certainly took advan- tage of these characteristics, but he did not, by himself, create them, and they endure after him. There are no insurmountable barriers to Ukraine becoming a vibrant de- mocracy, integrated with Europe, and thriving economically. However, for its political problems to be solved, they must be clearly understood. The Puzzle: Authoritarianism in Ukraine The faltering of the Orange Revolution surprised most observers, but it is not the first time that Ukraine surged toward consolidated democracy, only to get bogged down. By the end of 1994, Ukraine had established itself as among the most democratic of the post-Soviet countries.
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