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The External Dimension of the Eu's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in Relation to Russia

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The External Dimension of the Eu's Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in Relation to Russia EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BRIEFING Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union PAPER Policy Department External Policies THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE EU'S AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN RELATION TO RUSSIA External Policies OCTOBER 2006 JANUARY 2004 EN DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION DIRECTORATE B - POLICY DEPARTMENT - BRIEFING PAPER The External Dimension of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in Relation to Russia Any opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament. EP-ExPol-B-2006-22 10 October 2006 PE 348.594 EN This briefing paper was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs This paper is published in the following languages: English [translations] Author: Marek Menkiszak (team leader) Marta Jaroszewicz Maciej Falkowski Centre for Eastern Studies Warsaw, Poland Responsible Official: Dag Sourander Directorate-General External Policies Policy Department Manuscript completed in October 2006. Copies can be obtained through: E-mail: [email protected] Brussels, European Parliament, 10 October 2006. II The External Dimension of the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in Relation to Russia Study September 2006 III This study was commissioned by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs This study was carried out by the team of experts of the Centre for Eastern Studies Warsaw, Poland Marek Menkiszak (team leader) Marta Jaroszewicz Maciej Falkowski Disclaimer: The opinion expressed in this document represent authors’ points of view which are not necessarily shared by the government of the Republic of Poland IV The Centre for Eastern Studies (CES) based in Warsaw, Poland was established in 1990. CES is financed from the state budget. Its task is to monitor and analyse the political, economic and social situation in the Central and Eastern European countries, in the Balkans, in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. CES analysts use publicly available sources of information, of which the most important ones are the Internet, press and television. CES subscribes over 100 foreign titles. Another important source of information are the experts’ study trips to the respective countries of their interests, where they meet local analysts and representatives of the media and administration, and where they explore the situation. The information collected is stored in databases that form one of Central Europe’s largest collections of information on political events taking place in the CES’ area of interests. In Poland, the Centre has the largest collection of periodicals from the countries of the region and the library of publications concerning the objects of its analyses. Marek Menkiszak, the team leader, is Head of the CES Russian Department. He is specialised particularly in Russia’s foreign and security policy, including Russian-EU relations. Mr Menkiszak was responsible for coordination of the work on this study as well as for preparation of those parts of the study that concern political and institutional issues. Marta Jaroszewicz is an expert of the CES Department of Security and Defence. She is specialised particularly in the issues of migration, border security and security cooperation in the CIS area. Ms Jaroszewicz was responsible for preparation of the parts of the study that concern soft security issues. Maciej Falkowski is an expert of CES Russian Department. He is specialised in Northern Caucasus as well as in Russia’s policy towards countries of Southern Caucasus. Mr Falkowski was responsible for preparation of the parts of the study that concern the issues of terrorism as well as human rights and rule of law in Chechnya and other parts of Northern Caucasus. V Executive Summary According to the authors of this study, the most important challenges to the EU originating from the Russian Federation (see pp. 1-8) include: - insufficient rule of law in Russia, especially failures in judicial independence; excessive authority of the law enforcement agencies; selective application of law etc. (see pp.1-2), - human rights violations e.g. limitations to the freedom of the speech, political activity, development of the civil society as well as the abuse of basic human rights in the Northern Caucasus (see pp. 2-5), - institutional weakness, (see p.5) - terrorism (see pp. 5-6) as well as - organised crime (see p. 6), - migration challenges (see pp. 6-7), - border demarcation and management (see pp. 7-8). The challenges and EU priorities in the area of JLS were most accurately identified in the Communication from the European Commission of 12 October 2005 (A Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice), and in many other documents adopted by the EU as well as in the EU-Russia joint declarations and agreements. The EU responses to the aforementioned challenges (see pp. 8-12) include unilateral activities (e.g. concerning terrorist threats), and measures taken in cooperation with Russia (e.g. problems of migration and organised crime fighting). The most important instruments used currently by the EU in its policy towards Russia in the area of FJS include special programmes, such as TACIS and EDIHR, which focus on supporting the process of transformation in Russia. However, a number of important factors hinder the realisation of EU’s policy towards Russia (see pp.12-13): - One of the essential factors is the fact that the direction of Russia’s political and economic development considerably differs from the EU course. - This factor is very closely linked to another obstacle in the EU-Russia cooperation, i.e. the lack of commonly shared core values which could serve as a basis for bilateral relations. - Differences between the Russian and (Western) European mentality and bureaucratic practice are also very important. - Another factor that hinders mutual cooperation is the lack of confidence between the partners. - One of the problems that seriously impede the realisation of the EU’s policy is Russia’s rejection of the “top-down” model, i.e. the transfer of the EU’s standards to Russia. - A serious problem impeding the realization of the EU policy towards Russia is also the fact that European institutions and member states are not unanimous in their judgments and insufficiently coordinate their activities towards Russia. - Another serious shortcoming of the EU policy towards Russia is that it is too focused on the formal criteria of the cooperation assessment (e.g. declarations or adopted documents) and not on the implementation thereof. As far as the sphere of FJS is concerned, the co-operation between UE and Russia can be divided into two parts, each of them governed by a separate set of rules: - The issues of rule of law and human rights are perceived very differently by the two partners and the development of co-operation in these areas encounters serious resistance. - Co-operation in fields of crime fighting, migration issues as well as other, less politically charged areas, are much easier to implement as both sides have similar views and immediate common interests. As to the EU policy towards Russia (see pp. 13-18), taking into consideration that EU’s leverage on Russia is obviously limited, the European Union should focus on such issues as: fighting organised crime, counteracting illegal migration, challenges in the Northern Caucasus as well as border demarcation and management. However, in its relations with the Russian Federation, the EU should concentrate not only on technical issues, but also on human rights and the rule of law, as the European Parliament stated. Any EU’s attempts to ‘trade’ the issues of human rights and rule of law for the Russian Federation’s concessions on some issues important to the EU (as the energy issues) seem rather fruitless. VI should be constructed and implemented with the recognition that positive changes in Russia will only occur as a result of grassroots initiatives, not top-down processes. The present authorities do not want Russia to follow the path of democracy, nor do they encourage the development of the civil society, guarantee the observance of human rights or the rule of law. This may only be achieved by means of an evolutionary process supported by the society as opposed to the authorities. The EU should support the processes, communities and organizations (especially NGOs) which may lead Russia in the desirable direction. Cooperation with the authorities is important and should be continued, it should not, however, overshadow other activities. The proposals put forward by the EU Presidency on 30 November 2005 in the FJS strategy concerning the EU policy seem to be correct, as well as the decision to leave the cross-pillar coordination within the competence of Coreper. It would also be advisable to increase the participation of the European Parliament, where possible. The criteria of the cooperation assessment should be changed (including individual projects), and the stress should be put on the effectiveness and implementation of the projects. Broader NGO’s participation in the EU projects implementation and assessment seems necessary. VII Contents Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………….1 I. Main challenges to the EU…………………………………………………………………………1 1. Rule of law……………………………………………………………………………………….1 1.1. Failures in judicial independence and impartiality………………………………………1 1.2. Excessive authority of the prosecutor’s office, security services and other law enforcement agencies…………………………………………………………………………………...2 1.3. Selective application of law……………………………………………………………...2 1.4. Violation of standards applied to detained people……………………………………….2 2. Human rights……………………………………………………………………………………2 2.1. Limitations to the freedom of the speech and independent media………………………3 2.2. Limitations to the freedom of political activity and political pluralism…………………3 2.3 Limitations to the development of civil society and NGO activity……………………...3 2.4. Xenophobia, intolerance, racially and ethnically – based violence……………………...4 2.5. Specific human rights violations in the Northern Caucasus…………………………….4 3.
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