EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT BRIEFING Directorate-General for External Policies of the Union PAPER

Policy Department External Policies

THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF THE EU'S AREA OF FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE IN RELATION TO

External Policies

OCTOBER 2006 JANUARY 2004 EN

DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION DIRECTORATE B - POLICY DEPARTMENT -

BRIEFING PAPER

The External Dimension of the EU’s Area of

Freedom, Security and Justice

in Relation to Russia

Any opinions expressed in this document are the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position of the European Parliament.

EP-ExPol-B-2006-22 10 October 2006 PE 348.594 EN This briefing paper was requested by the European Parliament's Committee on Foreign Affairs

This paper is published in the following languages: English [translations]

Author: Marek Menkiszak (team leader) Marta Jaroszewicz Maciej Falkowski Centre for Eastern Studies Warsaw, Poland

Responsible Official: Dag Sourander Directorate-General External Policies Policy Department

Manuscript completed in October 2006.

Copies can be obtained through: E-mail: [email protected]

Brussels, European Parliament, 10 October 2006.

II

The External Dimension of the EU’s Area of

Freedom, Security and Justice

in Relation to Russia

Study

September 2006

III

This study was commissioned by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs

This study was carried out by the team of experts of the Centre for Eastern Studies Warsaw, Poland

Marek Menkiszak (team leader) Marta Jaroszewicz Maciej Falkowski

Disclaimer: The opinion expressed in this document represent authors’ points of view which are not necessarily shared by the government of the Republic of Poland

IV

The Centre for Eastern Studies (CES) based in Warsaw, Poland was established in 1990. CES is financed from the state budget. Its task is to monitor and analyse the political, economic and social situation in the Central and Eastern European countries, in the Balkans, in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. CES analysts use publicly available sources of information, of which the most important ones are the Internet, press and television. CES subscribes over 100 foreign titles. Another important source of information are the experts’ study trips to the respective countries of their interests, where they meet local analysts and representatives of the media and administration, and where they explore the situation. The information collected is stored in databases that form one of Central Europe’s largest collections of information on political events taking place in the CES’ area of interests. In Poland, the Centre has the largest collection of periodicals from the countries of the region and the library of publications concerning the objects of its analyses.

Marek Menkiszak, the team leader, is Head of the CES Russian Department. He is specialised particularly in Russia’s foreign and security policy, including Russian-EU relations. Mr Menkiszak was responsible for coordination of the work on this study as well as for preparation of those parts of the study that concern political and institutional issues.

Marta Jaroszewicz is an expert of the CES Department of Security and Defence. She is specialised particularly in the issues of migration, border security and security cooperation in the CIS area. Ms Jaroszewicz was responsible for preparation of the parts of the study that concern soft security issues.

Maciej Falkowski is an expert of CES Russian Department. He is specialised in Northern Caucasus as well as in Russia’s policy towards countries of Southern Caucasus. Mr Falkowski was responsible for preparation of the parts of the study that concern the issues of terrorism as well as human rights and rule of law in Chechnya and other parts of Northern Caucasus.

V Executive Summary

According to the authors of this study, the most important challenges to the EU originating from the Russian Federation (see pp. 1-8) include: - insufficient rule of law in Russia, especially failures in judicial independence; excessive authority of the law enforcement agencies; selective application of law etc. (see pp.1-2), - human rights violations e.g. limitations to the freedom of the speech, political activity, development of the civil society as well as the abuse of basic human rights in the Northern Caucasus (see pp. 2-5), - institutional weakness, (see p.5) - terrorism (see pp. 5-6) as well as - organised crime (see p. 6), - migration challenges (see pp. 6-7), - border demarcation and management (see pp. 7-8). The challenges and EU priorities in the area of JLS were most accurately identified in the Communication from the European Commission of 12 October 2005 (A Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice), and in many other documents adopted by the EU as well as in the EU-Russia joint declarations and agreements.

The EU responses to the aforementioned challenges (see pp. 8-12) include unilateral activities (e.g. concerning terrorist threats), and measures taken in cooperation with Russia (e.g. problems of migration and organised crime fighting). The most important instruments used currently by the EU in its policy towards Russia in the area of FJS include special programmes, such as TACIS and EDIHR, which focus on supporting the process of transformation in Russia.

However, a number of important factors hinder the realisation of EU’s policy towards Russia (see pp.12-13): - One of the essential factors is the fact that the direction of Russia’s political and economic development considerably differs from the EU course. - This factor is very closely linked to another obstacle in the EU-Russia cooperation, i.e. the lack of commonly shared core values which could serve as a basis for bilateral relations. - Differences between the Russian and (Western) European mentality and bureaucratic practice are also very important. - Another factor that hinders mutual cooperation is the lack of confidence between the partners. - One of the problems that seriously impede the realisation of the EU’s policy is Russia’s rejection of the “top-down” model, i.e. the transfer of the EU’s standards to Russia. - A serious problem impeding the realization of the EU policy towards Russia is also the fact that European institutions and member states are not unanimous in their judgments and insufficiently coordinate their activities towards Russia. - Another serious shortcoming of the EU policy towards Russia is that it is too focused on the formal criteria of the cooperation assessment (e.g. declarations or adopted documents) and not on the implementation thereof.

As far as the sphere of FJS is concerned, the co-operation between UE and Russia can be divided into two parts, each of them governed by a separate set of rules: - The issues of rule of law and human rights are perceived very differently by the two partners and the development of co-operation in these areas encounters serious resistance. - Co-operation in fields of crime fighting, migration issues as well as other, less politically charged areas, are much easier to implement as both sides have similar views and immediate common interests.

As to the EU policy towards Russia (see pp. 13-18), taking into consideration that EU’s leverage on Russia is obviously limited, the European Union should focus on such issues as: fighting organised crime, counteracting illegal migration, challenges in the Northern Caucasus as well as border demarcation and management. However, in its relations with the Russian Federation, the EU should concentrate not only on technical issues, but also on human rights and the rule of law, as the European Parliament stated. Any EU’s attempts to ‘trade’ the issues of human rights and rule of law for the Russian Federation’s concessions on some issues important to the EU (as the energy issues) seem rather fruitless.

VI should be constructed and implemented with the recognition that positive changes in Russia will only occur as a result of grassroots initiatives, not top-down processes. The present authorities do not want Russia to follow the path of democracy, nor do they encourage the development of the civil society, guarantee the observance of human rights or the rule of law. This may only be achieved by means of an evolutionary process supported by the society as opposed to the authorities. The EU should support the processes, communities and organizations (especially NGOs) which may lead Russia in the desirable direction. Cooperation with the authorities is important and should be continued, it should not, however, overshadow other activities.

The proposals put forward by the EU Presidency on 30 November 2005 in the FJS strategy concerning the EU policy seem to be correct, as well as the decision to leave the cross-pillar coordination within the competence of Coreper. It would also be advisable to increase the participation of the European Parliament, where possible.

The criteria of the cooperation assessment should be changed (including individual projects), and the stress should be put on the effectiveness and implementation of the projects. Broader NGO’s participation in the EU projects implementation and assessment seems necessary.

VII Contents

Introduction ………………………………………………………………………………………….1

I. Main challenges to the EU…………………………………………………………………………1

1. Rule of law……………………………………………………………………………………….1 1.1. Failures in judicial independence and impartiality………………………………………1 1.2. Excessive authority of the prosecutor’s office, security services and other law enforcement agencies…………………………………………………………………………………...2 1.3. Selective application of law……………………………………………………………...2 1.4. Violation of standards applied to detained people……………………………………….2

2. Human rights……………………………………………………………………………………2 2.1. Limitations to the freedom of the speech and independent media………………………3 2.2. Limitations to the freedom of political activity and political pluralism…………………3 2.3 Limitations to the development of civil society and NGO activity……………………...3 2.4. Xenophobia, intolerance, racially and ethnically – based violence……………………...4 2.5. Specific human rights violations in the Northern Caucasus…………………………….4

3. Institutional weakness …………………………………………………………………………..5 3.1. Corruption………………………………………………………………………………..5 3.2. Ineffective bureaucracy…………………………………………………………………..5

4. Terrorism ………………………………………………………………………………………..5

5. Organised crime ………………………………………………………………………………...6 5.1. Money laundering………………………………………………………………………..6 5.2. Cross-border trafficking and smuggling…………………………………………………6

6. Migration ………………………………………………………………………………………..6 6.1. Inflow of asylum seekers………………………………………………………………...7 6.2. Illegal migration and trafficking of human beings…………………………………...….7 6.3. Labour immigration…………………………………………………………………...…7

7. Border demarcation and management ………………………………………………………..7

II. The EU response and cooperation with Russia………………………………………………....8

1. The rule of law………………………………………………………..…………………...8 2. Human rights……………………………………………………………………..………..8 3. Institutional weakness………………………………………………………………....…..9 4. Terrorism …………………………………………………………………………...……..9 5. Organised crime…………………………………………………………………………...10 6. Migration management…………………………………………………………………….11 7. Border demarcation and management …………………………………………………….12

III.EU – Russia cooperation in FJS: assessment and proposals...... ……………………………...12

1. Fundamental problems in the EU-Russia cooperation……………………………………….12 2. General conclusions and recommendations……………………………………………….…..13 3. Issue-specific conclusions and recommendations ……………………………………...……..15 3.1. The rule of law ……………………………………………………………………...…...15 3.2. Human rights…………………………………………………………………...... …...….15 3.3. Institutional weakness ……………………………………………………………………16 3.4. Terrorism ………………………………………………………………………………...16 3.5. Organised crime ………………………………………………………………………16

VIII 3.6. Migration………………………………………………………………………………17 3.7. Border demarcation and management ………………………………………………...17

Short bibliography………………………………………………………………………………….18

Appendices …………………………………………………………………………………….……21

Appendix no. 1: Breaches of the judges’ independence: Moscow City Court case…………………23

Appendix no. 2: “Military” people (siloviki) in Russian political elite: Olga Kryshtanovskaya findings ………………………………………………………………………………………………23

Appendix no. 3: Examples of selective application of law or other breaches of the rule of law, made by federal law enforcement structures or courts…………………………………………………………………23

Appendix no. 4: Increase of state control over the main national TV channels……………………..24

Appendix no. 5: Biased news coverage in the state-controlled TV channels……………………….24

Appendix no. 6: Selected major legal changes in Russia as of 2000, and their adverse consequences for democratic standards, the rule of law and human rights …………………………………………….24

Appendix no. 7: The law on NGOs: the most important new provisions……………………………27

Appendix no. 8: Racially and ethnically based violence and xenophobia in Russia………………...27

Appendix no. 9: Number of kidnappings in Chechnya in 2002-2005………………………………27

Appendix no. 10: Examples of kidnappings………………………………………………………..27

Appendix no. 11: Hostage taking…………………………………………………………………..28

Appendix no. 12: Mopping up operation in the Borozdinovskaya village…………………………28

Appendix no. 13: Cases of extra-judicial executions……………………………………………….28

Appendix no. 14: The law enforcement agencies’ activity in Kabardino-Balkaria………………..29

Appendix no. 15: Elmurzaev’s case………………………………………………………………..29

Appendix no. 16: Osman Boliev’s case……………………………………………………………29

Appendix no. 17: Corruption dynamics in Russia: INDEM findings……………………………..29

Appendix no. 18: State administration reform under Putin: a brief account………………………30

Appendix no. 19: Main factors of instability in the Northern Caucasus…………………………..30

Appendix no. 20: Possible evolution of terrorist threats originating in the Northern Caucasus…..31

Appendix no. 21: Russia’s system for fighting organised crime………………………………….31

Appendix no. 22: Migration balance of the Russian Federation in 1992-2005 (in thousands of persons)………………………………………………………………………….32

Appendix no. 23: The problem of irregular transit migration within the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) area…………………………………..……………………………………32

Appendix no. 24: Key provisions of the Russia-EU Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice…………………………………………………………………..32

IX

Appendix no. 25: The issue of the rule of law in EU/Russia documents………………………..33

Appendix no. 26: The EU’s and EU member states’ projects on the promotion of the rule of law and legal reform……………………………………………………………………..33

Appendix no. 27: The issue of human rights in EU/Russia documents…………………………33

Appendix no. 28: The EU’s and EU member states’ projects on human rights…………………33

Appendix no. 29: Documents raising the issue of human rights violation in the Northern Caucasus, adopted by the European Parliament between 1999 and 2006………………………34

Appendix no. 30: Activity of EIDHR in the Northern Caucasus……………………………….35

Appendix no. 31: Activity of ECHO in the Northern Caucasus………………………………..35

Appendix no. 32: The EU’s and EU member states’ projects on strengthening the institutions..36

Appendix no. 33: Main EU counter-terrorism measures adopted in the recent years…………...36

Appendix no. 34: Key provisions of Russia-EU documents on combating terrorism…………..37

Appendix no. 35: Conventions against terrorism adopted by Russia……………………………37

Appendix no. 36: Reasons for the weakness of the EU-Russia cooperation in fighting terrorism………………………………………………………………………………..37

Appendix no. 37: The specific nature of Russia’s battle against terrorism……………………..38

Appendix no. 38: German-Russian cooperation in fighting organised crime…….…...... 38

X Introduction

Framework and structure of the study The main goal of the study is to put forward a concise analysis of the main challenges coming from Russia, that the EU faces in the sphere of freedom, security and justice (FJS). The authors also aim at giving a brief overview of the EU responses to those challenges, evaluating the adequacy of those responses and putting forward proposals for its improvement. The structure of the study reflects these fundamental goals. The text consists of three parts: Part I gives a brief description of the main challenges to the EU in a sphere of FJS. The list of challenges is based on the authors’ own assessment (they take into consideration the documents by the EU and other European institutions). The scope of the analysis is the issue of FJS, as defined in the aforementioned documents. Part II gives a brief overview of the activity of the EU institutions towards Russia, including major documents, projects, and other actions - unilateral, bilateral (with Russia) or joint (with other European institutions) in the sphere of FJS. It also includes selected activities by the European institutions outside the EU and individual EU member states’ actions, whenever they are relevant to the subject discussed. Part III presents the authors’ conclusions concerning general EU policy priorities, principles and instruments as well as specific activities towards Russia in the sphere of FJS. Whenever possible, the authors have tried to give their own suggestions or recommendations, in order to improve the efficiency and productivity of the EU policies in a given sphere.

Study limitations This study is based solely on the open sources from Russia, the EU, its member states or elsewhere. However, the information that provided the basis for the analysis cannot be treated as exhaustive, given the sensitivity of the subject concerning important national security issues, among other things, as well as serious limitations to the openness of the official sources (especially the Russian ones). The authors, however, did their best to provide extensive and objective information and analysis based on their best knowledge. The limit to the study length, as defined by the European Parliament, is a serious limitation, given the complexity and extent of the issues discussed. Therefore, both the description of the challenges and the EU responses, as well as the authors’ conclusions and proposals are rather general. Some more detailed information and analysis, which was used as a basis for the theses or conclusions presented in main body of the text, has been presented in the appendices.

Part I: Main challenges to the EU

1. Rule of law

1.1. Failures in judicial independence / impartiality The judiciary in contemporary Russia have always faced serious problems, including corruption or pressure from the state administration. However, under ’s presidency, especially in the last few years, the problem of the influence the executive powers have on the judiciary, and doubts concerning judicial independence and impartiality, have grown considerably, partly due to certain legal changes introduced (especially in 2001-02). Those changes have led to the partial formalisation of the presidential office’s strong influence on the judiciary (which had largely been informal until that point). In fact, a kind of vertical system has been created in which the presidential office influences the courts’ administration, which in turn pressures the judges(1). Therefore, besides the informal influence/pressure from the federal and local state administrations and the prosecutor’s office (prokuratura) upon judges (the so-called ‘telephone justice’), we are witnessing the strengthening of the formal competences of the presidential office in relation to judges, which undermines all legal guarantees of judicial independence and impartiality, as well as the separation of power. The pressure on judges and on courts’ rulings has been especially apparent in cases with a political or (important) economic aspect, or those involving the security services as source of charges (i.e. concerning alleged espionage). Examples of such pressure have been publicly confirmed by some judges (see app. no 1). In addition, certain

1 The President not only nominates the candidates for the Supreme Court head (who is then formally confirmed by the Federation Council), and nominates judges to federal courts, but also appoints the federal courts’ chairmen, and has a decisive influence on the Supreme Qualification Board (the main organ overseeing the courts). These and other mechanisms were described among others by the former judge of Constitutional Court Tamara Morshchakova; cf. T. Morshchakova, Printsip nezavisimosti i mekhanizm zavisimosti, www.gazeta.ru 31.03.2005.

- 1 - courts or court officials have been widely perceived as merely executing the Prokuratura’s or the presidential administration’s ‘orders’ (2).

1.2. Excessive power of the prosecutor’s office, security services and other law enforcement agencies The rule of law in Russia is also being violated as a result of an increase of the influence of the prosecutor’s office (Prokuratura). Despite certain limitations to the competence of the prosecutor’s office in criminal cases, which have been introduced by the new Criminal Procedure Code (3), its informal influence on courts, especially in political or more important economic cases, has grown. The problem is deepened by the fact that in the Russian legal system, the prosecutor’s office enjoys no effective independence from the presidential office(4). This in fact allows the presidential administration to use the prokuratura as a political and administrative tool. (See other parts of the study).

Over the last 6 years, the security services (especially the , FSB) have considerably increased both their informal and formal influence in Russia. The main source of their informal influence is the fact that people who used to work in the Russian security services(5) now compose the main bulk of the current ruling elite in Russia (including President Putin himself and his closest collaborators); these people are widely represented, and in growing numbers, in virtually all state executive structures (both federal and regional), as well as in legislative bodies (see app. no. 2). Their influence has been reinforced by legal changes introduced mainly in 2002 and since 2004, formally as anti-terrorist measures. The introduction of new security or law enforcement structures, sometimes with wide and not clearly defined competences (such as the National Anti- Terrorist Committee in February 2006), has also added to that process.

1.3. Selective application of law One of the major problems in contemporary Russia is the selective application of the law, i.e. the different approaches of the state administration and various law enforcement structures to particular social or political organisations, business structures or individual citizens, depending on their relations with or attitude towards the major state administration structures (especially the presidential office). Some economic practices by business structures defined by the authorities as unlawful, or small irregularities committed by political groups or NGOs, sometimes lead to serious legal consequences and sometimes not. Russian law, which as set down is often complicated or vague, is used by the state organs as a tool to punish or combat political opposition, ‘unfriendly’ businesses or certain NGOs. The prosecutor’s office, the police, the security services, other executive state structures (such as those responsible for tax collection, customs or sanitary standards) or some courts are widely perceived as executing the presidential administration’s ‘orders’ in political or important economic cases (see app. no. 3) .

1.4. Violation of standards concerning detained people According to official statistics, there were more than 760,000 people detained in various forms in Russia at the beginning of 2005. The major problems concerning this group of people are as follows: bad conditions of imprisonment (including overcrowding, poor sanitary conditions and insufficient medical care(6)) and bad treatment (including violence and sexual harassment among inmates). Over recent years there has been progress in reducing overcrowding in Russian detention facilities, as reported by the authorities and the Council of Europe(7). However, other problems are still a source of concern, as they violate European standards.

2. Human rights

2 The local Basmanny rayon court in Moscow is ‘famous’ for such rulings, as demanded by the Prokuratura, in important political or economic cases. Its controversial activity has led to such failures of judicial independence/impartiality in Russia being widely and ironically known as ‘Basmanny justice’ (basmannaya spravedlivost’). 3 The CPC came into force (in stages) between 1 July 2002 and 1 January 2004. Its major limitation was shifting the decision-making process concerning the arrest of suspects, as well as decisions concerning searches, from the prokuratura to local courts. 4 The Prosecutor-General is independent of the Ministry of Justice, but is in fact fully dependent on the presidential office, as the office is nominated by the Federation Council upon the President’s proposal, and can be dismissed by the President at will. 5 This concerns both Soviet-era security structures (such as the KGB [civilian intelligence and counter-intelligence] or the still existent GRU [military intelligence]), as well as post-Soviet structures (such as the FSB [civilian counter-intelligence], SWR [civilian intelligence], the Security Service of the President, and other services). 6 According to sources in the Russian Ministry of Justice (November 2004), around 78% of inmates were ill. According to other official sources in mid-2003, around 10% of inmates were tuberculosis-infected and around 5% had HIV. Based on data given in Doc. 10568. Honoring obligations and commitments by the Russian Federation. Report by David Atkinson and Rudolf Bindig, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 3 June 2005. 7 Cf. Doc. 10568. Honoring obligations…, op. cit.

- 2 - Human rights record in Russia is relatively poor with general tendency towards increase of violations. It must be stressed, however, that the situation in that respect varies depending on the region and period. Situation in the Northern Caucasus, despite minor improvements, is still the worst, as the human rights violations there concern fundamental rights. For this reason the situation in Northern Caucasus, including republic of Chechnya, is treated separately in this paper. Among the numerous spheres of human rights abuse in Russia, the four following groups of problems seem to be currently the most alarming:

2.1. Limitations to the freedom of speech / independent media Limitations to the freedom of speech and media freedom have become one of the most significant problems in Russia, especially since President Putin assumed his office in 2000. Already in spring 2000 crackdown of the state structures on Vladimir Gusinsky’s media holding (Media-MOST), including NTV national TV channel, heralded the beginning of the ‘new order’ in Russian media. Above all, the authorities have focused on assuming full political (and often also financial) control over the main national TV channels which have the strongest influence on public opinion (see app. no.4) The culmination of this process took place in 2001 and has been followed with minor acquisitions or liquidations thereafter. The result was the national TV channels’ biased news coverage for the benefit of the ruling elite. Independent analysis shows that the opposition is neglected on TV or portrayed extremely negatively while the “party of power” Yedinaya Rossiya receives active media support (especially in pre-election period). (see app. no. 5)(8). The main TV channels are used for transmitting state propaganda to the people. Informal censorship and self-censorship are a common practice. The process of assuming indirect state control over the media has been continued, as many popular radio stations and dailies have been purchased by the companies closely connected to the presidential office (especially Gazprom). In 2005, the first examples of limiting foreign-based media appeared in Russia(9). Abuse of the freedom of the speech and media freedom in Russia has been widely noted in various European institutions’ reports(10).

2.2. Limitations to the freedom of political activity / political pluralism One of the most striking phenomena of the president Putin’s office is the process of gradual limitation of the political pluralism in Russia. Russian authorities have used various instruments to this end. Firstly, legal changes were introduced (see app. no. 6) which made registration of political parties and their participation in parliamentary elections much more complicated; a highly complex and ‘unfriendly’ electoral law has brought more possibilities for the authorities to limit the opposition’s activity; various legal pretexts are used to deny the opposition’s right to carry out political campaigning over the country. Secondly, the main TV channels clearly favor the ‘party of power’, while ‘black PR’ is often used against opposition and their leaders. Thirdly, there are reasons to believe that the secret services actively interfere with the opposition activity, provoking conflicts and splits. Finally, the presidential office has in fact initiated and indirectly sponsored ‘fake’ opposition parties (like populist-nationalist ‘Fatherland’ (‘Rodina’) or the new leftist party being created at the moment from the aforementioned Fatherland and two other small groups) in order to ‘steal the votes’ from the ‘real’ opposition. These actions have far reaching consequences. After the last parliamentary elections (December 2003) the ‘party of power’ (‘United Russia’ – ‘Yedinaya Rossiya’) assumed qualified majority (around 70 % of seats) in the (lower house of parliament) making it fully controlled by the presidential office. Other parties are weakened (like the communists and nationalists) or marginalised (like the democrats). The real political competition ceased to exist. Some political processes (debates etc.) have moved inside the ruling party, which has no real alternative in the country.

2.3. Limitations to the development of the civil society / NGO activity Despite the declarations coming from the Russian top political elite, the authorities not only offer no effective support to the development of the civil society in Russia, but to the contrary, they actively suppress it. The atmosphere for the NGO development and various citizens’ initiatives has never been very friendly in Russia, especially since President Putin took his office. Over the last year, however, we have witnessed real deterioration of the situation in that sphere. One of the main goals of Russian authorities has become the weakening of politically active NGOs and reducing their substantial support from abroad. It resulted in adoption of the law (December 2005) which limits the NGO activity and tightens the state control over this sphere (see app. no. 7).

8 Cf. the report prepared by the Centre for Extreme Journalism http://www.memo98.cjes.ru/?p=3&sm2=on&reports=200604; Cf. the Transparency International Russia report Ot mifov k faktam: ispolzovaniye administrativnogo resursa w izbiratelnoy kampanyi v cifrah, www.transparency.ru. 9 Since 2005 several influential Russian dailies (such as Izviestyia, Nezavisimaya Gazeta and Kommersant) have been taken over by the business groups associated with the Kremlin. The broadcast of the Russian-language services of Radio Liberty and Voice of America has been limited in Russia, formally due to legal and technical reasons, as reported by the Washington Post 7 July 2006. 10 CF. for example: Doc. 10568. Honoring obligations…, op. cit.; Report on EU-Russia relations, 4.05.2005, A6-0135/2005 (final).

- 3 - Hence the state propaganda campaign against some NGOs who allegedly cooperated with foreign intelligence, as well as crackdown on some of the politically active NGOs, by using legal pretexts (mainly tax evasion charges). These actions resulted in serious problems both for the NGO activity in Russia and external support for thereof. On the other hand, Russian authorities have created some institutions (like the Social Chamber in early 2006), which serve as a formal appearance of state support for the civil society development but in fact have no real influence.

2.4. Xenophobia, intolerance, racially and ethnically-based violence Over the recent years xenophobia, intolerance as well as racially end ethnically-based violence is on the rise in Russia. Growing numbers of racially and ethnically based violence reported by Russian NGOs in the recent years seem particularly alarming (see app. no 8). In August and September 2006 Russia has witnessed spectacular incidents of this kind: a bomb explosion on Cherkizovsky bazaar in Moscow (an act of racial hatred committed by juvenile Russian extremists, which left 10 people dead and 50 wounded) and ethnic clashes between local Russians and migrants from the Caucasus in Kondopoga, Karelia (4 people dead). The other source of concern are the instances of religious intolerance towards members of non-Orthodox (or non- ’Traditional’) religious communities. A growing role of the Orthodox church vis–a-vis Russian state and the ‘state ideology’ as well as other similar actions may suggest that we are witnessing the instances of certain religious-based discrimination in Russia(11). It seems that those problems are the result of mutually reinforcing phenomena. On the one hand, we are witnessing gradual changes in the social frame of mind and the people’s viewpoints in Russia. On the other hand, the authorities’ approach has fueled the problem (the new ‘state ideology’ propaganda based on the slogans of Russia’s ‘greatness’ reinforcing nationalist moods; striking indulgence of the law enforcement structures towards extreme nationalists and acts of violence against ‘aliens’).

2.5. Specific human rights violations in the Northern Caucasus Most severe human rights violations in Russia occur in the Northern Caucasus, especially in the Chechen Republic. Nevertheless, the security condition in the republic has relatively improved as compared to the past several years, people’s material situation has also slightly improved. This is reflected by the increasing number of refugees voluntarily returning to Chechnya.

However, human rights are still being violated throughout the region. As compared to the situation of 1999- 2002/2003, the extent and nature of human rights abuses has changed significantly. Previously, they mainly took place in Chechnya, now they occur also in other Caucasian republics, especially in Ingushetia and (12). In the past, human rights were mainly violated by federal law enforcement agencies, whereas now they are also carried out by Chechen pro-Russian armed groups (not only in Chechnya) and republican law enforcement agencies. Kidnappings or enforced disappearances carried out for ransom or in revenge (see: app. no. 9 and 10)(13) are the most widespread form of human rights violations. Hostage-taking and other repressions against militants’ relatives carried out by pro-Russian Chechen armed formations (the so-called “”) are also common, especially in Chechnya (see: app. no. 11)

Tortures, arbitrary detention, preventing the accused from contacting an attorney, fabrication of accusations by the prosecution, planting arms or drugs by the police, and inhuman treatment of the detainees is a common practice in all Caucasian republic(14). The zachistkas or mopping up operations in search for militants (see: app. no. 12) are still carried out and civilians are being killed (see: app. no. 13), but unlike in the past years, these occurrences are no longer massive. Particularly young religious Muslims (especially in Kabardino-Balkaria, Dagestan, Karachay-Cherkessia and Northern Ossetia; see: app. no. 14) and Chechen refugees living in Ingushetia are at risk of harassment. European Court of Human Rights applicants and their family members (see: app. no. 15) as well as human rights activists (see: app. no. 16) are frequently subject to persecution. The

11 Among the phenomena that are rising concerns we can name: a special legal status of “traditional religions” (Orthodox Christianity, Islam, Judaism and Buddhism); the state-controlled business’ support for the Orthodox Church; instances of harassment of Jehova Witnesses, Krishnaites or other minority groups; difficulties with building Catholic churches; introduction of obligatory classes of “basics of Orthodox culture” in elementary schools in 9 regions as of 1 September 2006, etc. 12 For details see: Conflict Spill-Over Outside the Chechen Republic in 2004-2005 (Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria), Memorial, Moscow, February 2006. 13 The problem of kidnappings in the Northern Caucasus is described in detail in: Worse than a war, Human Rights Watch, March 2005, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/chechnya0305/. 14 The problem of tortures in the Northern Caucasus is raised e.g. by the authors of one of the Memorial report: V atmosfere strakha. Politicheskiy process i parlementskie vibory v Chechenskoy Respublike, Memorial, Moscow, December 2005 r., http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/index.htm.

- 4 - situation is worsened by the fact that the majority of human rights abusers remain unpunished; the Russian government does not take any measures to change this situation.

3. Institutional weakness One of the most important problems hindering the practical EU-Russia cooperation is institutional weakness in Russia. In fact we are facing a whole set of problems here, with corruption, ineffectiveness and problems in interaction at the top of it.

3.1. Corruption Corruption has traditionally been one of the most serious problems of the Russian state. It is difficult to reckon. However, according to the reports prepared by an esteemed Transparency International agency, Russia currently occupies the 126th rank in the 2005 Transparency International Corruption Perception Index(15). Formally, Russia’s authorities place the fight with corruption at the top of their agenda. In practical terms, however, one cannot spot any measurable effect of the anti-corruption campaign in Russia. On the contrary, the research conducted by the Russian INDEM foundation suggests that the so-called ‘social corruption’ has slightly risen in absolute numbers during president Putin’s term, and totalled US$3 billion per year in 2005. However, this figure seems not impressive when compared to a huge value of ‘commercial corruption’ totalling US$316 billion per year in 2005 (16). It is especially worth noting that the military authorities’ corruption has grown significantly; the growth has also been noted - to a lesser extent – in other law enforcement agencies. In the case of the courts, the corruption has relatively decreased (see app. no. 17).

3.2. Ineffective bureaucracy The problem of the bureaucracy ineffectiveness in Russia is related to several mutually reinforcing phenomena. Firstly, to the problem of poor implementation of the decisions made and the law passed. Secondly, to the barriers created by a specific bureaucratic culture in Russia (which is tightly connected to the problem of a specific approach to law that is not the main regulator of social order and to paternalistic model of relations between the authorities and citizens). The problems mentioned, as well as the Kremlin’s attempts to introduce the administrative reform have sharpened the problem of the poor interaction of state institutions (or even certain administrative chaos) that seriously reduces the effectiveness of the state apparatus. The fact that the administrative reform in Russia has so far failed to be introduced and the Russian authorities lack a clear strategy and consequence in that process (see app. no 18), is major challenge to the EU – Russian cooperation (in the area of FSJ in particular).

4.Terrorism Beset by conflicts and chaos, organised crime and Islamic fundamentalism, the Northern Caucasus is the most unstable region of the Russian Federation (see: app. no. 19). The mere fact that it lies so close to EU borders is a serious threat to its security and stability.

The permanent instability in the Northern Caucasus is the source of massive influx of refugees from the region to the EU, which entails the danger of Europe being penetrated by members of North Caucasian organised criminal groups and Islamic fundamentalists. Most refugees arriving in Europe do not constitute a threat to its security, as they are typical political or economic immigrants. Among them, however, there are probably also members of armed groups, some of which use terror in their struggle They may contact and enter into cooperation with Islamic terrorist networks that already operate in Europe. Unlikely as it seems, they might also attempt to organise terrorist attacks on the EU territory aimed at e.g. Russian diplomatic missions or Russian tourists.

At present, the EU does not face a serious threat of terrorism originating in the Northern Caucasus. However, this situation could change in case the instability in the Northern Caucasus deepened along with further deterioration of socioeconomic conditions in the region (for details see: app. no. 20).

A serious threat to the EU is its possible penetration by international terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists coming through the territory of Russia mostly from or via Central Asia and, to a lesser extent, also the Southern Caucasus. The territory of the Russian Federation may also be used for operational purposes, e.g. to plan and prepare terrorist attacks on the EU territory. Terrorists may also seek safe haven (especially in the Northern Caucasus) and attempt to get hold of materials that could be used for the production of biological, chemical or nuclear weapons The threat to nuclear safety in the context of terrorist activity is rather low but it cannot be ruled

15 Along with Albania, Niger and Sierra Leone. www.transparency.org. 16 Cf. Vo skol’ko raz uvelichylas’ koruptsya za 4 goda, www.indem.ru. By the term ‘social corruption’ (bytovaya koruptsya), the authors of the research mean corruption in relations between the citizens and the state (or public institutions).

- 5 - out. Terrorists may attempt to steal or purchase weapon-usable nuclear materials from Russian facilities housing such materials (especially various research centres and fuel cycle facilities). They may also target those facilities (including nuclear power plants). However, it is worth noting that in the recent years Russia has improved security measures at nuclear-related facilities, especially in civilian institutions and the Navy. (17). The factors that enable terrorist networks to spread to Russia and operate on its territory include: porousness of Russian Federation’s southern borders (especially with Kazakhstan), enormous corruption of state officials (police, border guards, etc.), weakness of state institutions, very high number of legal and illegal immigrants from the Caucasus, Central Asia, Afghanistan and other Asian countries.

5. Organised crime The chronic inefficiency of Russian law enforcement officials (see app. no. 21) and the long tradition of organised crime in Russia are factors which create an environment of strong criminal activities in Russia. This is exacerbated by the existence of criminal organisations whose membership recruits from among the former security and law enforcement employees, as well as the presence of ethnic (non-Russian) criminal groups. Geographical proximity, invariably poses the threat that the activities of Russian organised crime will spread onto the EU’s territory. The likelihood of that scenario, which was most likely to come to pass directly after the collapse of the USSR, has nevertheless since diminished. However, Russian criminals have engaged in various kind of activities within the EU. Nowadays, those groups are more likely to take part in financial or trafficking actions, and usually do not participate in ‘street-level’ activities. Moreover, they often invest in legal business (18). Russian groups are also known for their abilities to invade cyberspace, and for the production of child pornography. The EU’s most recent enlargement has caused some Russian or Russian-speaking criminal groups from the CIS to relocate to the new member states, and has at the same time increased the risk of cross-border crimes, mainly smuggling. Although the most popular trafficking and illegal migration routes lead from or via Russia to Ukraine or Belarus and then onto EU territory (19), other borders which are just as susceptible to illegal activities are those which Russia shares with Finland and the Baltic states.

5.1. Money laundering The underdevelopment of Russia’s banking system, as well as the enormous scope of the ‘shadow economy’, provides opportunities for both Russian criminal network’s incomes as well as the revenues of different European criminal groups to launder their money. An important part of money-laundering crimes relates to financial transactions performed in offshore zones. Fiedieralnya sluzba po finansowomu monitoringu (Federal Service for Financial Monitoring, FSFM) estimates that in 2005 Russian citizens laundered approximately US$ 7 billion (20). Although Russia’s progress in the fight against money-laundering is commonly acknowledged to be substantial, the country can nevertheless still be regarded as a shelter for illegal financial transactions. Particularly disturbing is the participation of high-ranking state officials in such activities; recently, the Russian press has carried reports of several such scandals.

5.2. Cross-border trafficking and smuggling Due to its geographical position and porous borders, Russia is the origin, transit point as well as the destination for drug and human trafficking and arms smuggling. It is also one of the biggest European markets for stolen vehicles (21). The commodities most frequently smuggled from Russia are tobacco and cigarettes, and to a lesser degree precious metals, alcohol and caviar. The vast majority of opiates trafficked from Afghanistan (via the so- called ‘Northern Route’) remain in Russia and does not enter the EU (22); this poses a threat to the stability of a country already plagued by a high level of substance abuse. Besides being a destination state for synthetic drugs produced in the EU, Russia is a new producer of amphetamine and traditional precursors for synthetic narcotics(23). Publicly available information on arms smuggling from Russia to European Union is rare, but usually concerns more specialised armaments or parts thereof, rather than small arms and light weaponry.

6. Migration

17 See: Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces, National Intelligence Council, Washington, February 2002; Annual Report of Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces, National Intelligence Council, Washington, December 2004. 18 Excluding the new member states; see Galeotti, M., M., ‘Russian mafia…”, op. cit., pp. 24-25; idem, ‘Russian mafia become…”, op. cit, pp. 22-23; Europol, 2005 EU Organised Crime Report, 5, pp. 5, 30. 19 Europol, 2003 European Union Organised Crime Report, pp. 10. 20 2006 US Department of State International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. 21 Europol, An overview of motor vehicle crime from a European point of view, , pp. 2. 22 To some extent to northern European states. 23 Europol, 2005 EU Organised Crime…, op. cit.; UNODC, 2006 World Drug Report, pp. 131, 135.

- 6 - Russia is characterised by extensive, usually irregular external migration flows. The most dynamic and disruptive migration movements were observed following the collapse of the (see app. no. 22). That wave had a predominantly ethnic character. Currently migration exhibits a tendency to diminish, and labour migration now represents the predominant trend. The majority of migration flows takes place within the area of the former Soviet Union, where Russia has for some time held the position of the main labour market for foreign workers. Between 1989-2002, Russia received around 11 million legal immigrants, mainly from post-Soviet states(24). The number of illegal migrants is difficult to estimate; Russian experts estimate that number at between 3 to 5 million illegal migrant workers. Emigration, much smaller then immigration (since 1989 more than 5 million people(25) left Russia) prevails in migration exchange with Western countries. The internal security of the European Union is directly influenced by three kinds of migration processes which occur on Russian territory:

6.1. Inflow of asylum seekers The outbreak of the second Chechen war was marked by a growing wave of asylum seekers from the Northern Caucasus. The peak of this process was observed in 2003 and 2004 (26). In 2005 the number of refugee applications from Chechens decreased. Most likely, this situation is owed to two factors: a relative improvement of the security situation in Chechnya and the EU’s toughening asylum policy. The Chechen emigration involves the risks posed by a closed, insular nature of that group, cultural and religious differences, and by the existence of organised crime entities within its fold. (For more on the terrorism threat, see section 4.1.).

6.2. Illegal migration and trafficking in human beings Russia is a key transit and source country on the Central and Eastern European people-smuggling routes to the EU. Although the scope of illegal migration coming through this channel is much less numerous than the traffic coming via the North African route, its increasingly organised character makes it a disquieting phenomenon. This route is commonly used by illegal transit migrants from South-East Asia, the Middle East, and by citizens of CIS countries (see app. no. 23). Channels used for smuggling migrants are also used for illegal trafficking of people, mainly women and children for sexual exploitation. Russia, alongside other eastern European countries, remains the main point of origin for women working in the sex services and entertainment sectors of the EU’s economy. Russia has also became an ‘exporter’ of children for adoption, which is often conducted illegally.

6.3. Labour immigration Russian nationals travel abroad in search of employment much less frequently than citizens of other CIS countries. Estimates concerning the number of Russian citizens temporarily working abroad vary substantially, from several hundred thousands to between 1-1.5 million. Some of them are employed legally (as contract specialists, inter alia in fishery, navigations, the technical sphere, arts and culture). Others work at low-skilled professions under the cover of tourist visas. The main destination countries for Russian labour migrants in the EU are Great Britain, Germany, Greece, Malta and Cyprus.

7. Border demarcation and management Border problems should be acknowledged as one of the major roots of cross-border crimes and illegal migration in Russia. This phenomenon is connected to several main factors: delays in building a border protection system, lack of legal regulations concerning border status, technical problems with securing some 60,000 km of borders (which in many places abut unstable countries or regions). For the first few years of its independence, the Russian authorities supported the concept of guarding the external borders of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), instead of national borders. The growth of cross-border threats, however, along with a failure to create a free movement area within the CIS, have caused Russia to decide to secure its entire border. This process started at the beginning of this decade. The Russian authorities adopted a direct program entitled ‘The National Frontier of the Russian Federation (2003-2010)’, and have undertaken the reform of the border guard services. The problem of border control is affected by the lack of delimitation and demarcation agreements with Russia’s neighbours. This issue is particularly visible in Russia’s relations with the post-Soviet states. None of those borders, except for the Russian-Lithuanian one, have been demarcated; many of them are still not delineated. The border with Belarus is of an administrative nature as both countries are in a common, co-federal state.

24 Results of Russian national census. 25 Ibidem. 26 In 2004 Russian citizens have claimed asylum in the EU (including the new members) more than 28,000 times. In 2005 there were substantially fewer claims, 19,500. Source: European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE).

- 7 - Russia and Ukraine, although they have delimited their land border, have not yet started demarcation. The border treaty with Kazakhstan was signed as recently as January 2005. The border treaties with Estonia and Latvia are yet to be concluded, solely due to political reasons. The Russian border management system requires modernisation, chiefly the construction of a new border infrastructure and outfitting the border service with modern equipment. Although Russia’s border service, which is part of the Federal’naya Sluzhba Bezopastnosti (Federal Security Service, FSB), is undergoing a process of reform, it has not yet been transformed into a police-style security force. Singular attention should be paid to Russia’s southern border with Kazakhstan, where the main drug trafficking and migrant smuggling routes cross into Russia. The inadequate level of protection of Russia’s border with Eastern European states allows smugglers and illegal migrants to move without any major hindrance.

Part II: EU responses and cooperation with Russia

Provisions concerning EU-Russia cooperation in Justice and Home Affairs were included in the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation agreement (PCA), as well as the 1999 Common Strategy on Russia. In addition, the fight against organised crime has been regulated in a separate document, as has the issue of Russian citizens’ transit from Kaliningrad to mainland Russia through Lithuanian territory. The EU-Russia Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice (27) establishes the comprehensive principles and objectives of cooperation in this sphere, as it is presently understood within EU, after the Tampere and Hague Programmes (see app. no. 24). As can be inferred from the claims of both sides, the current Road Map-based provisions of FSJ will be covered by the new EU-Russia Agreement. In May 2006, both sides signed visa facilitation and readmission agreements.

The institutional mechanisms for cooperation are as follows: the FSJ ‘Troika’ ministerial meetings with Russia, the Permanent Partnership Council in the FSJ Format, informal dialogues between the Commission Member in charge of the FSJ and the Russian coordinator on justice and home affairs, meetings of liaison officers and representatives of law enforcement agencies, as well as meetings of experts. FSJ issues are also discussed at the EU-Russia summits. FSJ constitutes a sphere of the EU technical assistance programme TACIS. By 2006, the EU has spent more then €110 million on justice and home affairs projects for Russia, mainly on support for judicial cooperation, legal protection of individual rights, and border management (28).

1. Rule of law Strengthening of the rule of law in Russia remains one of the major goals in the EU policy towards this country (see app. no. 25) The basic form of the EU policy aimed at strengthening the rule of law in Russia is its support for the judicial reform in the country. It was reflected inter alia in: the EU-Russia Road Map, as well as in the Russian Federation National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2004-2006 under the TACIS (29). This first document listed the main instruments to this end: the exchange of experience, organisation of professional training for judges, prosecutors and law enforcement officials, workshops and other cooperation projects. The main financial instruments (see app. no. 26) used to date by the EU in that sphere have been some sub-areas of Institutional, Legal and Administrative Reform (ILAR) area under TACIS (especially concerning judiciary reform and partly JHA). Another instrument currently in use is the campaign for promoting justice and the rule of law under European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in 2004-2006.

2. Human rights in general The advancing observance of the human rights lies at heart of the EU’s policy towards Russia. (see app. no. 27). However, we can witness a clear tendency in the EU’s policy to treat human rights agenda less as a goal of cooperation and more as a principle thereof. This is clearly the result of a more ‘partner-like’ cooperation, considering the Russians’ refusal to be ‘accountable’ to the EU in the sphere of human rights observance. Necessity of human rights observance in Russia and critique caused by human rights violations in Russia is stressed in numerous European Parliament’s resolutions(30). Apart from the resolutions (including recommendations for Russia and for the EU policy), the EU has various concrete instruments at its disposal. The basic financial instrument is the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR). Currently

27Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice, May 2005. 28 Source: European Commission fact sheet; (http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/externa/russia/fsj_external_russia_en.htm). 29 TACIS Russia NIP 2004-2006, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/csp/04-06_en.pdf. It declares progress towards a well-functioning, impartial, accountable, accessible, competent and effective judiciary in Russia among the EU’s main objectives. 30 Especially in those adopted on: 18.11.1999 /17.02.2000 (UNCHR), 18.01.2001/18.01.2001 (UNCHR), 7.02.2002 / 7.02.2002 (UNCHR), 4.07.2002 / 30.01.2003 (UNCHR), 10.02.2004 (UNCHR), 24.02.2005 (UNCHR), 26.05.2005, 15.12.2005 (besides those numerous resolutions related to the situation in Chechnya); PE 368.090v02-00

- 8 - (2005-2006), 4 thematic campaigns are being executed, including the campaign for fostering human rights culture, promoting the democratic process and advancing equality, tolerance and peace. Apart from that, some part of TACIS are being implemented (see app. no. 28): certain sub-areas of ILAR (notably CSO – advancing civil society), as well as a part of Small Projects Programmes (SPP) have direct reference to human rights promotion in Russia. As to the latter, the aforementioned Institution Building Partnership Programme (IBPP) under SPP is focused on support to civil society and local initiatives (with allocations totalling € 21 million in 2000-2003 Action Plans). Also, projects of Bistro Programme under SPP aimed at promotion of democratic values have been executed (with allocations totalling € 9 million in 2000-2003 APs).

2.1. Human rights violations in the Northern Caucasus Activities of the European Union aimed at the improvement of human rights observance in the Northern Caucasus are focused on criticizing Russian Federation authorities for human rights violations occurring in the region, non-compliance with the ratified conventions and international agreements, disproportionate use of force, refusing to cooperate with the international organisations and the fact that people responsible for human rights abuse remain unpunished. The EU has also called on Russia for peaceful resolution of the Chechen conflict and stressed that the necessity to fight against terrorism may not justify human rights violations(31). The critical attitude towards the Russian policy in the Caucasus, which was very explicit in the beginning of the present conflict (1999-2001) was tempered with the passage of time. Only a few years ago, the issue of Russia’s human rights violations in Chechnya was raised at every Russia-EU meeting (e.g. during EU-Russia summits), now it is usually a subject of unofficial talks. Apart from the criticism, the EU has adopted few actual measures towards the improvement of the situation in the region. In the beginning of the second Chechen war, the EU did, indeed, introduce symbolic sanctions against Russia (on 24 January 2000 the TACIS program was suspended), however they were lifted 6 months later (on 10 June 2000). One of the few activities the EU took was the submission of resolution drafts on Chechnya criticizing Russia at the sessions of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in Geneva (recently – in April 2004) (see app. no. 29). However, under the pressure of Russia, the EU withdrew from the submission of this draft resolution in 2005.

For another EU activity aimed in the improvement of the condition of human rights in the Northern Caucasus see: app. no. 30 and 31.

3. Institutional weakness The EU policy aimed at addressing institutional weakness in Russia is one of the most practical aspects of the EU-Russia relations. Common Strategy referred to the aim of consolidating public institutions in Russia(32). The Common Strategy referred particularly to the aim of fighting corruption (it suggested signing, ratifying and implementing proper UN and Council of Europe conventions, participation in GRECO, cooperation with civil society and exchange of experience)(33). The main focus has been made on support for administrative reform in Russia. Basic financial instrument in use (see app. no. 32.) was ILAR under TACIS with its sub-areas including institutional development (IDE) and Public Administration Management (PAM). Also projects under Small Projects Programs (SPP) (including PAP, IBPP and Bistro) were partially addressing that issue.

4. Terrorism The European Union has not taken any action aimed at diminishing terrorist threat resulting from its vicinity to Russia. Its only activities concerned the fight against terrorism in general (see: app. no. 33).

Russia is one of the EU’s partners in its fight against terrorism, however the EU-Russia cooperation is predominantly of a declaratory nature. Its key element was the adoption of several documents in which both parties committed themselves to cooperation in the combat of terrorism. Two of them: Joint Statement on International Terrorism adopted on the EU-Russia Summit in Brussels on 3 October 2001 and Joint Statement on the Fight Against Terrorism adopted on the EU-Russia Summit in Brussels on 11 November 2002 were devoted exclusively to the fight against terrorism(34). Two of four Russia-EU Road Maps (Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice(35) and Road Map for the Common Space of External

31 See e.g.: statement by the then President of the European Commission Romano Prodi of 23 April 2004 made during his Moscow visit; SPEECH/04/198. 32 CS, 1999/414/CFSP. 33 Ibidem. 34 http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/images/pText_pict/238/sum41.doc, http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/images/pText_pict/235/sum62.doc. 35 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_05_05/finalroadmaps.pdf#fsj.

- 9 - Security(36) adopted on the Moscow Summit on 10 May 2005 also contained declarations on cooperation in combating terrorism (see the app. no. 34 for the most important of the above documents ).

An important factor of the EU-Russia counter-terrorism cooperation was the adoption of the European Union Action Plan on Common Action for the Russian Federation on Combating Organized Crime (April 2000)(37) and ratification of the Agreement on Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Police Office (Europol)(38). The EU countries and Russia are parties to most international conventions on the fight against terrorism (see: app. no. 35) (39). Russia also cooperates in this area with NATO and the U.S.(40).

Various documents signed by the EU and Russia do not transform into actual counter-terrorism cooperation, such as: information exchange on terrorist organisations and their activity, sharing of experience in the fight against terrorism or joint counter-terrorism military exercises. Although some EU programs implemented in Russia (e.g. the MOLI-RU(41) program) include expert sessions during which the above issues are raised, it does not have a greater impact on the overall counter-terrorism cooperation (for details see: app. no. 36). It is worth noting that Russia’s approach to the fight of terrorism differs from those of the EU’s or US’s (see app. no. 37).

Important EU activities related to terrorist threat concern nuclear safety. The main instrument of the EU activity in this context is the EU Joint Action on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in Russia established in 1999.42 Projects executed include those concerning support for destruction of plutonium weapons, nuclear material accounting and control as well as reconversion of Russian weapon experts. Even before EUJA has started, in 1991 – 1998, the EU pledged to issue €310 million for all actions concerning nuclear safety in Russia. In total, between 1992 and 2002 the EU pledged to pay (under TACIS, EUJA and The G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction) almost €617 million (of that some €205 million targeted terrorist-related threats). Other important initiatives concerning nuclear safety in Russia included the G- 8 Global Partnership (mentioned above) and the US Cooperative Threat Reduction programme.43

5. Combating organised crime Combating organised crime is a crucial (and politically well-developed) element of the EU-Russian agreement on the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice. As the EU-Russia Road Map states, this area of cooperation includes data security, money laundering, drug matters, trafficking in human beings, corruption, trafficking in stolen vehicles and items of cultural and historical value(44). Similar priorities, together with internet child pornography, are presented in the EC’s Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (45).

The main document in this area, the EU Action Plan for the Russian Federation on combating organised crime, was devised in 2000(46). In order to enhance the fight against organised crime, this plan anticipates legislative framework improvements (including ratifications of certain international treaties) and creating new forms of cooperation between judicial and law enforcement agencies. It also foresees the development of cooperation between police liaison officers, as well as closer collaboration between the Russian authorities and the European Police Office (Europol). The last provision was implemented by signing an agreement on cooperation in 2003,

36 http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/summit_05_05/finalroadmaps.pdf#es. 37 OJ, 2000/C/106/02. 38http://www.europol.eu.int/legal/agreements/Agreements/16191.pdf#search=%22Agreement%20on%20Cooperation%20bet ween%20the%20Russian%20Federation%20and%20the%20European%20Police%20Office%20(Europol)%22. 39 NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism was adopted on 9 December 2004, for details see: http://www.unodc.org/unodc/terrorism_conventions.html; full list of parties of these conventions see: http://www.state.gov/s/ct/c8895.htm. 40 NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism was adopted on 9 December 2004, see: http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b041209a-e.htm. 41 For details about the MOLI-RU program (i.e. Project against Money Laundering in the Russian Federation) see: http://jp.coe.int/CEAD/JP/Default.asp?ProgrammeID=35&SA=1, http://jp.coe.int/CEAD/JP/Default.asp?ProgrammeID=35&SA=1. 42 Council Joint Action on 17 December 1999; 1999/878/CFSP 43 Figures from the European Commission website, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/russia/. The Global Partnership was established during the G-8 Summit in Kannanaskis in 2002, where G-8 members promised US$20 billion for the initiative (only part of that commitment was actually distributed). Under the Cooperative Threat Reduction started in 1991 more than US$5 billion has been committed to mid 2005 for post-Soviet states including Russia. 44 Road Map, op. cit. 45 COM(2005)491 Final. Other documents (especially the EU Action Plan for the Russian Federation on combating organised crime) also mention financial crime, arms trafficking, hi-tech crime and illegal migration 46 OJ, 2000/C, 13.4.2000.

- 10 - which envisions the exchange of various kind of information, apart from personal data, cooperation in training, and holding working meetings and consultations(47). The EU-Russia road map for the common space of FSJ proposes a Europol-Russia operational agreement, and calls for the development of cooperation between Eurojust and Russia’s General Prosecution Office.

The EU’s assistance to Russia encompasses combating money laundering by supporting the appropriate legislative and institutional development (the MOLI-RU project), upgrading facilities and training programmes for law enforcement agencies, and training judges and court personnel. The EU also supports the idea of linking Russia to the global Interpol communication network known as Interpol 24/7(48). The budget for EC assistance in the TACIS projects forecasts an allocation of €20 million(49). On the other hand, Russian commitment to cooperate on implementing EU assistance projects in JHA has not been deemed sincere, as indicated by the document evaluating TACIS 1999/2000(50).

The dual, intergovernmental and communitarian nature of police and judicial cooperation inside the EU, as well as slow progress in increasing the EU’s own internal coherence on this issue, makes any rapid development of co-operation with Russia on these issues unlikely. Such cooperation is more likely to develop within the framework of bilateral relations between Russia and the EU’s member states (especially those states which border Russia or endure the presence of Russian criminal groups; see also app. no. 38) or within multilateral subsets such as the Task Force on Organised Crime in the Baltic Region, Interpol and FATF (Financial Action Task Force).

6. Migration management The Hague Programme calls for further integration of migration in the EU’s relations with third countries, and assistance to them in their efforts to improve their capacity for migration management and refugee protection (51). These general priorities have served as a basis for creating a Commission strategy on the external dimension of FSJ (52), as has the Council (JHA) strategy in this regard(53). However, most likely due to the particularities of EU-Russian cooperation, as well as member states’ tendency to regard a common migration and asylum policy as exclusively a security issue (‘Fortress Europe’), the EU’s FSJ policy on Russia is focused on readmission issues. The same conclusions can be drawn from the European Parliament’s resolution on EU-Russia relations (2004/2170(INI))(54).

The EU-Russia Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice sets the following priorities: facilitation of the movement of persons and readmission, supporting an efficient migration policy, and the development of cooperation in the field of asylum policy (55). In May 2006, the EU and Russia signed two long- awaited agreements: on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to citizens of the Russian Federation and the European Union(56), and on readmission(57).

The first accord eases the procedures for issuing short-stay visas by shortening the maximum allowable time for issuance of visa, as well as by reducing the number of documents required for some categories of persons(58). It also establishes simplified criteria for issuing multiple-entry visas for certain categories of travellers, as well as fixing visa fees at €35 for all categories of person. The readmission agreement sets the obligation for the governments of Russia and individual EU member states to admit each other’s citizens illegally resident on the other side’s territory, as well as those third-country nationals or stateless persons who have directly and illegally entered the other party’s territory. Both sides will start admitting other categories of third-country nationals and stateless persons after a transition period of 3 years. Both agreements foresee the creation of Joint Committees charged with monitoring compliance with the agreed obligations; both agreements are yet to be ratified.

47 Agreement on cooperation between the Russian Federation and the European Police Office, November 2003. 48 EU & Russia Update, March 2006. 49 Russia: National Indicative Programme 2004-2006, pp. 17. 50 DRN-ADE-ECO-NCG, Vol. 3, January 2006, pp. 101. 51 OJ, 2005/C/ 53, 3.3.2005, pp. 5. 52 COM(2005)491 Final, op. cit. 53 A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA : Global Freedom, Security and Justice, doc 15446/05. 54 P6_TA(2005)0207. 55 Road Map…, op. cit. 56 The text of the agreement is available on the EC delegation to Russia website. 57 Ibidem. 58 Including official delegations, business people, drivers transporting international cargo and passenger transportation services, students, journalists, participants in scientific, cultural and artistic activities.

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Migration issues are included in the current TACIS National Indicative Programme for Russia, with an indicated annual budget of €20 million(59). This plan prioritises the issues of improving the asylum system in Russia and creating conditions for implementing the EU-Russia readmission treaty. The main project realised within the TACIS framework concerns combating human trafficking. In 2004 the EU established ‘Aeneas’, a new programme that provides financial and technical assistance in the area of migration and asylum to third countries. In implementing its projects, the EU has been working closely with other international organisations and institutions, including the International Migration Organisation and UNHCR. It also supports activities for an international dialogue on migration, for example the Söderköping process(60) and the Budapest process(61).

7. Border demarcation and management Cooperation on operational border management and control between EU member states and third countries lies within the competencies of the national authorities of the European Union’s member states. The EU’s integrated border management is limited to coordination, exchange of information, establishing common rules and procedures. Likewise, the newly created European Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders (FRONTEX), has primarily coordinative, training and research functions. Those arrangements naturally limit the areas of co-operation between EU and Russia.

The EU-Russia road map calls for an intensification of discussion on border management, supporting an improvement of border crossing points (notably on their common borders) and the enhancement of cooperation between border units. Two other provisions have major importance for the EU. The first concerns the demarcation of borders between EU member states and Russia, which are not at present demarcated (borders with Latvia and Estonia); the second proposes discussing the issue of strengthening Russia’s southern border. Contacts stipulating the development of operational cooperation have recently been established between FRONTEX and the Russian FSB border service.

The European Union provides technical and financial assistance to Russia mainly via the Cross-Border Cooperation (CBC) programme. Projects implemented under this umbrella include the development of border crossings and the training of custom and border control officers. The CBC Indicative Programme 2004-2006 considers the development of border crossing infrastructure at the border between Kaliningrad and EU member states as its main priority(62). Russia is also a recipient of the TACIS programme of biometric travel documents.

Part III. EU – Russia cooperation in FJS: Conclusions and recommendations

1.Fundamental problems in the EU-Russia cooperation

The direction of Russia’s political and economic development, which considerably differs from the EU course, is one of the essential factors. In the 1990s, Russia seemed to be undergoing a gradual transformation into a democratic country with European standards and an emerging civil society, etc. However, the situation has changed dramatically since then, as over the last years the Russian authorities has transformed Russia into an authoritarian state with the power concentrated in the hands of the few (primarily the law enforcement agencies) undermining the development of the institutions of civil society.

This factor is very closely linked to another obstacle in the EU-Russia cooperation, i.e. the lack of commonly shared core values which could serve as a basis for bilateral relations. Russia declares its acceptance of European values, but at the same time it increasingly emphasises its own principles, concepts of human rights etc., stressing the unique character of the Russian (orthodox) culture and civilisation(63). It is noteworthy that the

59 Russia: National Indicative…, op. cit., pp. 15. 60 See: http://soderkoping.org.ua. 61 See: www.icmpd.org. 62 TACIS Cross-Border Cooperation: Strategy and Indicative Programme 2004-2006. 63 Several examples of such ideas are: „Russian unique values”, the idea presented by Vladimir Putin (Prime Minister of Russia at the time) at the congress of the „Unity” („Yedinstvo”) party in December 1999; „sovereign democracy” concept by Vladislav Surkov, Presidential Administration deputy chief and the Kremlin’s unofficial „ideologist” (it has been promoted since summer 2006), see: Masha Lipman, “Putin’s “sovereign democracy”, Washington Post, 15 July 2006; and „orthodox human rights”, the idea adopted on the Tenth World Council of Russian People in Moscow on 6 April 2006 (the Russian Orthodox Church representatives dominated in the Council and coined this term), see: Valentinas Mite, “Russia: Orthodox Church Discusses Morality and Human Rights”, http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2006/04/51756546-a805-4991-8aaa- 739220fa4ba8.html.

- 12 - Russian government treats these concepts as a political instrument and uses them to turn down Western countries’ criticism concerning democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

Differences between the Russian and (Western) European bureaucratic culture are also very important. What is notable is the attitude towards the law in Russia (informal interpersonal relations tend to be much more important than legal regulations) and quite a common acceptance for the government’s paternalistic attitude towards people (the government sets out the rules of the socio-political system and redistributes goods in exchange for obedience and loyalty of people accepting the restrictions imposed on their freedom).

The EU policy towards Russia in the area of FSJ should be constructed with the increased awareness of the contradictory interests existing between the EU and Russia, which very explicitly manifest themselves in the visa issues: the EU wants a stricter control of borders with its Eastern neighbours (not only with Russia), while Moscow seeks the abolition of the visa regime, opening of the EU borders and the EU’s financial support for its activities focused on the strengthening of the Russian border, including its non-European section.

Another factor that hinders mutual cooperation is the lack of confidence between the partners visible e.g. in the lack of actual cooperation in the fight against terrorism which requires mutual exchange of confidential information, and in the fact that Russian authorities treat EU’s criticism of their internal policy as an instrument in the political game.

One of the problems that seriously impede the realisation of the EU’s policy towards Russia is the latter’s rejection of the “top-down” model, i.e. the transfer of the EU standards to Russia. Moscow perceives it as the EU’s attempt to impose its conditions on Russia, which is seen as undermining mutual partnership. This position is further strengthened by Russia’s growing world power aspirations and the increased assertiveness of its foreign policy resulting from the country’s strong position in the production and export of energy resources.

An important practical impediment to the EU-Russia cooperation is the formal attitude of the Russian authorities towards the changes proposed by the EU; the creation of subsequent documents, strategies and structures, etc. is not followed by the practical implementation of concrete solutions.

2. General conclusions and recommendations Basically, the EU’s priorities in the area of FJS listed in the Communication from the European Commission of 12 October 2005 (A Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice) have been identified correctly.

As far as the sphere of FJS is concerned, the co-operation between UE and Russia can be divided into two parts, each of them governed by a separate set of rules. The issues of rule of law and human rights are perceived by the two sides very differently and the development of co-operation in these areas encounters serious resistance. Co-operation in the fields of crime fighting, migration issues as well as other, less politically charged areas, are much easier to implement as both sides have similar views and immediate common interests. However, in its relations with the Russian Federation, the EU should concentrate not only on technical issues, but also on human rights and the rule of law, as the European Parliament stated. Any EU’s attempts to ‘trade’ the issues of human rights and rule of law for the Russian Federation’s concessions on some issues important to the EU (as the energy issues) seem rather fruitless, simply because Russia is reluctant to get involved in such trade-offs. Russia feels too self-confident for that; such attempts by the EU would only undermine European credibility.

At the same time, the EU policy towards Russia should be constructed and implemented with the recognition that positive changes in Russia as regards democracy, human rights and the rule of law will only occur as a result of grassroots initiatives, not top-down processes. The present authorities do not want Russia to follow the path of democracy, nor do they encourage the development of the civil society, guarantee the observance of human rights or the rule of law. This may only be achieved by means of an evolutionary process supported by the society as opposed to the authorities. The EU should support the processes, communities and organisations (especially NGOs) which may lead Russia in the desirable direction. Cooperation with the authorities is important and should be continued, it should not, however, overshadow other activities.

- 13 - Consequently, the EU should address its projects, e.g. various training programs, primarily to young people (students, clerks, lawyers, etc.) for whom Europe may become a role model. The EU should also seek to attract as many Russians as possible to visit the EU countries, develop student exchange and increase cooperation with NGOs, especially in border regions (e.g. Kaliningrad), where the changes are most likely to begin.

The Russian minority in the Baltic states, notably in Latvia and Estonia (as well as in other EU member states) could play a significant role here. If Russians living in these countries become integrated with the local societies, they could spread EU values among the Russian society by means of personal contacts. The EU should, therefore, support existing and possible new projects aimed at the integration of Russians living in the Baltic States and other EU countries with the local societies. They should also have the possibility to maintain contacts with their compatriots in Russia.

A serious problem hindering the realisation of the EU policy towards Russia is the fact that European institutions and member states are not unanimous in their judgments and insufficiently coordinate their activities towards Russia (e.g. the issue of human rights abuse in the Caucasus). The proposals put forward by the EU Presidency on 30 November 2005 in the FJS strategy seem to be correct, as well as the decision to leave the cross-pillar coordination within the competence of Coreper. It would also be advisable to increase the participation of the European Parliament where possible.

Another serious shortcoming of the EU policy towards Russia is that it is too focused on the formal criteria of the cooperation assessment (e.g. declarations or adopted documents) and not on the implementation thereof. In this situation, the criteria of the cooperation assessment should be changed (including individual projects), and the stress should be put on the effectiveness and implementation of the projects. NGO’s participation in the EU projects implementation and assessment seems necessary.

Insufficient instruments’ flexibility as well as bureaucratic inertia are further serious problems impeding the realisation of the EU policy towards Russia. More informal meetings with the Russian side could be one of the ways to improve this situation. They could be even more effective if they involved the representatives of the Presidential Administration or key law enforcement agencies (e.g. National Antiterrorist Committee), i.e. the most influential institutions in a decision-making process in Russia.

Although the ‘ownership principle’ applied in the EU-Russia partnership is correct, EU should not give up its own principles and values (an example of such resignation was EU’s withdrawal from the submission of the draft resolution on Chechnya at the session of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights in 2005).

Tightening the cooperation with international organisations, primarily the UNHCR and ICMPD is another matter of crucial significance (especially in human rights and migration issues). It is also extremely important to coordinate the EU’s cooperation and activities relating to Russia with NATO (which comprises most EU countries) and the Council of Europe who have common interests on the post-Soviet area.

Insufficient coordination between EU member states as well as overlapping activities towards Russia are also significant shortcomings of the EU policy in the area of FSJ. This could be solved by intensified information exchange between the member states and the EU institutions (e.g. in the form of regular reports), and introduction of regular clearing house mechanisms.

Moscow’s reluctance to meet some of the EU postulates and its persistence in putting forwards its own agenda create further problems. The EU should present some encouragement to Russia that would depend on the progress in Russia’s implementation of the EU recommendations (positive conditionality). Limited sanctions against Russia should also be considered in case of serious human rights abuse, violations of the rule of law or Russia’s breaching of the cooperation conditions with the EU (negative conditionality). According to the European Commission communiqué on relations with Russia (64), the EU should condition the implementation of selected Moscow’s claims by the realisation of the selected elements of the EU’s agenda by Russia (linkage) whenever possible and desirable. The EU should also firmly enforce its agenda in its relations with Russia.

Taking into consideration that EU’s leverage on Russia is obviously limited, the European Union in its policy towards Russian Federation should focus on such issues as: fighting organised crime,

64 COM (2005) 491 final.

- 14 - counteracting illegal migration, challenges in the Northern Caucasus as well as border demarcation and management.

3. Issue-specific conclusions and recommendations

3.1 The rule of law Major EU support should be offered to extensive projects on Russian attorney training (including those specialised in tax law, law on military service, law on the secret services etc.), as well as to support free legal advice centres in order to help local NGOs and individual citizens defend their rights vis-a-vis state administration and law enforcement agencies. The EU and EU member states (also with participation of European NGOs) may also consider support for the creation of mechanisms of direct legal advice for the Russian NGOs and citizens in need.

The EU should keep persuading the Russian authorities to refrain from planned legal changes that would undermine judicial independence and impartiality, as well as those aimed at increasing the competences of the law enforcement structures.

The legal aspect of the human rights observance during anti-terrorist activity carried out by the state administration and law enforcement bodies, should become one of the major points of the EU-Russian dialogue and consultations.

The EU should make it clear to the Russian party that any repression of Russian citizens who wage complains to the Tribunal, constitutes a severe breach in the principles of the EU – Russia cooperation and will have adverse consequences for this cooperation.

3.2. Human rights in general The EU should find the right balance in its attitude towards the issue of human rights observance and respect for democracy in Russia. It should not avoid criticism towards Russian authorities, as this would undermine the foundations on which the European community is based and expose the EU to accusations of double standards. However, one should be aware that constant rebuking Russia for violation of democracy and human rights does not significantly improve the situation in this area, either (which can be seen best in case of Chechnya). The Russian authorities neither understand nor accept this message. Constructive criticism of the Russian policy should be supported by long-term activities aimed at a gradual reformation of the Russian society, whose results may not reveal themselves in the short-term perspective.

The EU-Russian regular consultations on human rights should obligatorily involve the NGO representatives from the both sides - as participants or at least observers.

Major EU support should be offered for the extensive projects on training Russian judges, prosecutors, advocates and law enforcement officials in dealing with racially and ethnically-based discrimination and violence as well as religious intolerance. Russian NGOs dealing with those issues should be substantially and operatively supported by the EU, especially in executing projects addressed to the Russian public opinion and local communities. These issues should be kept as one of the priority subjects for the EU-Russian dialogue and consultations. The EU should encourage Russian authorities as well as NGOs to participate in European nets and structures dealing with xenophobia, racism and extremism.

The support for the projects concerning development and assistance for independent Russian (also local) media and journalists should be substantially increased. The EU and EU member states should consider projects on launching Russian-language independent radio or TV broadcasting (from Russia or abroad), in order to increase the people’s access to unbiased information. For the benefit of this goal, the EU and EU member state should pursue a dialogue with Russian authorities.

The EU should keep persuading the Russian authorities to refrain from planed legal changes undermining further political pluralism and development of civil society, including further changes in the electoral law. The plans and possible consequences of introduction of the electronic voting in Russia should be examined by the EU and EU member states.

Major EU support should be offered for extensive projects on the development of self-government in Russia, including legal advice and training for local leaders.

- 15 -

3.2.1. Human rights violations in Chechnya and the Northern Caucasus Financial support and implementation of projects aimed at the improvement of human rights condition and the entire region’s development is a positive element of the EU policy in the Northern Caucasus. However, the aid is provided exclusively within all-Russia programs which often do not consider the region’s unique characteristics. It is, therefore, desirable to encourage Russia’s cooperation in the creation of separate project(s) supporting socioeconomic development of the region.

One of the EU’s priorities in relation to the Northern Caucasus should be its increased presence in the region, which is currently negligible. The international community members’ and Russian NGOs’ presence in the Caucasus prevents Russian authorities from concealing the cases of human rights violations.Therefore, it is of crucial importance that the announced EU representation in Vladikavkaz be opened.

3.3. Institutional weakness The support for the anti-corruption projects in Russia (including the support for NGOs, legal advice, training for civil servants, businessmen and support for development of some kind of codes of conduct or best practices) should be substantially increased.

The EU should substantially increase the support for such Programmes as the European Union Visitor Programme, addressed to young Russian professionals. Russian students should be encouraged to participate in the EU and EU member states cooperation Programmes.

3.4 Terrorism Current EU-Russia cooperation in the area of terrorism-fighting is important but insufficient. However, it is difficult to expect a breakthrough in this matter, the main obstacle being the lack of mutual confidence and the fact that the EU and Russia prefer to cooperate with other partners. An example of the lack of confidence in counter-terrorism cooperation is the fact that Russian allegations of terrorism against Chechens living in the EU are not well-grounded (e.g. against Akhmad Zakayev who was granted a refugee status in the UK). Moreover, in case of tightening of the Russia-EU cooperation in this matter, there is a risk that some Chechens mistakenly accused of terrorism will be extradited to Russia. In this situation, it seems that the EU should primarily focus on the adoption of preventive measures, especially enhancing cooperation of special services and the police of its Member States and further sealing of the EU’s eastern borders in order to minimise terrorist threat coming from this direction. It is also important to enhance the control of refugee influx from the Northern Caucasus, to study their movement within the EU and gather information about Chechen diasporas in each country.

Stronger emphasis should be placed on the analysis of the situation in the Caucasus and Central Asia, expanding knowledge of the countries’ realities and processes taking place in both regions. This will not only facilitate the realistic assessment of the terrorist threat coming from the East, but also help forecast future developments in the above regions and prepare for the possible challenges.

One of the factors that fuel the terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism spreading in the Northern Caucasus is Russia’s policy in the region, especially the human rights abuses by Russian law enforcement structures as part of counter-terrorism operations. In its relations with Russia, the EU should, therefore, more strongly emphasise that it will not tolerate Russia’s justification of human rights violations as well as suppression of democracy and civil society by the necessity to fight against terrorism.

The region’s peripheral situation and isolation is one of the reasons of spreading of Islamic terrorism in the Northern Caucasus. In order to minimise the influence of this factor, the EU should – if possible – allocate funds for the region’s development, not just limit itself to the provision of an emergency humanitarian aid. Support for projects realised by Western and Russian NGOs is also very important. The EU could support Russian authorities’ activities which are likely to expedite the region’s integration with the rest of Russia and improve living conditions of its inhabitants.

3.5. Organised crime Combating organised crime should be sustained as fundamental sphere of EU-Russia cooperation in FSJ as it is one of the few, which bring some practical benefits and additionally is fairly non-controversial. Threats coming from activities of a relatively advanced and diversified nature of Russian organised criminal groups inside the EU, as well as continuing trans-border smuggling along EU’s borders, require practical enhancement of cooperation with Russia.

- 16 - In order to achieve this goal, the co-operation should be upgraded to a higher level of operational activities. In their relations and cooperation with Russia, the EU member states should enhance the mechanisms of information exchange as well as endeavour to work out such solutions, which would unable the signing of the Europol-Russia operational agreement. The corruption and the association of law enforcement agencies and politicians with criminal groups are main hindrances to the efficient crime fighting policy in Russia. Therefore the EU should pay closer attention to aiding Russia in the process of building a capacity system of fight against those pathologies. The co-operation between the police forces of trans-border regions should be significantly enhanced in order to successfully combat the trafficking.

The separate status of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters within the EU framework, the reluctance of member states to share information with Europol, the limited competencies of Eurojust are all factors, which hamper efforts of co-operation with third countries and co-ordination of activities undertaken within the EU framework. Abolishing the “pillar division” in the EU treaties would likely increase the EU’s capacity to develop external co-operation in the field of combating cross-border organised crime.

3.6. Migration Migration challenges (illegal migration, inflow of asylum seekers, labour migration) tend to dramatically influence the internal security and demographic situation of both European Union and Russia. In view of the above, European Union, instead of limiting its practical (not declarative) cooperation agenda to the readmission agreement and fight against illegal migration, ought to put forward a comprehensive sustainable policy, which includes advising Russia on creating a migration management system as well as examining the perspectives of legal immigration from Russia. EU should also insist on Russia improving the standards of treatment of civilian population at the North Caucasus, which would significantly decrease the number of refugees fleeing the region for the UE countries.

The true progress at implementation of EU-Russia agreement on readmission can only be achieved when it is correlated with the enhancement of Russia’s capacity for migration management. Projects related to this, particularly those concerning the fight against illegal migration and rights of migrants, should gain priority within the framework of EU’s technical assistance to Russia (TACIS, new thematic programme on migration and asylum). Close co-operation with specialised international organisations, which are active at Russia, should be continually developed. As far as the reform of the current system of migration management in Russia, the proposal to change the restrictive policy toward migrants should be endorsed. Meaningful EU-Russia co- operation in the area of migration requires a development of relations with other CIS countries.

UE has to avoid being perceived as a “fortress Europe”. It should try to facilitate the access of Russian Federation citizens to its territory. One of the possible mechanisms of that could be the standardisation of member states’ consular policy, simplification in the issuance of tourist visas.

3.7 Border demarcation and management The issue of concluding border agreement with Latvia and Estonia should stay on the top of EU-Russia political agenda. EU should also consider bringing up, in her dialogue with Russia, the issues of border’s delimitation and demarcation with all neighbours, particularly with Ukraine, which suffers from illegal transit migration flowing through her eastern border. Any awarding of technical assistance to Russia, either for the development of the system of management of southern border or other projects, ought to be conditionally tied to Russia’s fulfilment of her obligation in the mentioned areas.

Border management and demarcation, the improvement of operational capacities of Russian border management system as well as upgrading the border crossing infrastructure and facilitating personal movements are also of high priority to EU-Russia cooperation.

- 17 - Short bibliography

1. A Secure Europe in the Better World. European Security Strategy, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf.

2. Annual Report of Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces, National Intelligence Council, Washington, December 2004.

3. Annual Report to Congress on the Safety and Security of Russian Nuclear Facilities and Military Forces, National Intelligence Council, Washington, February 2002.

4. Communication for the Commission, A Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, COM(2005)491 Final, Brussels, 12.10.2005.

5. Conflict Spill-Over Outside the Chechen Republic in 2004-2005 (Ingushetia and Kabardino-Balkaria), Memorial, Moscow, February 2006.

6. European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 14469/3/05 REV 3 JAI 423 ECOFIN 353 TRANS 234 RELEX 639 ECO 136 PESC 1010 COTER 72 COSDP 810 PROCIV 174 ENER 172 ATO 103.

7. European Parliament’s resolution on EU-Russia relations (2004/2170(INI, P6_TA(2005)0207.

8. EUROPOL’s Annual Report 2005, Europol, The Hague, June 2006, http://www.europol.europa.eu/publications/ar2005/EuropolAnnualReport2005.pdf.

9. Europol, 2003 European Union Organised Crime Report, Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, Luxemburg, 1992.

10. Evaluation of Council Regulation 99/2000 (TACIS) and its implementation, DRN-ADE-ECO-NCG, Synthesis Report, Volume 3, January 2006, pp. 101.

11. Falkowski, M., North Caucasus: The Russian Gordian Knot, CES Studies no. 16, Warsaw, December 2004, http://www.osw.waw.pl/files/PRACE_16.pdf.

12. Galeotti, M., “Russian mafiya keeps a low profile in Western Europe’, Jane’s Intelligence Review”, Vol. 17., No. 5, May 2005, pp. 24-25.

13. Galeotti, M.,, “Russian mafiya become more active in Eastern Europe”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Vo. 17., No. 06, June 2005, pp. 22-23.

14. Gannushkina, S. A. (ed.), On the Situation of Residents of Chechnya in the Russian Federation June 2004 – June 2005, Memorial, Moscow, 1 September 2005; http://refugee.memo.ru/For_ALL/RUPOR.NSF/07c2f686b7397675c3256a530068f463/5e2bf6d73fb83a88c3257 076007ca450?OpenDocument&ExpandSection=12,13.

15. Hahn, Gordon M., “The Perils of Putin’s Policies”, The Journal of International Security Policy Affairs, Spring 2006 – Number 10, http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/hahn.php.

16. Ingushetia / North Ossetia / Kabardino Balkaria: The Spread of Chechnya-type Human Rights Violations; Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), 2 June 2005.

17. International Centre for Migration Policy Development, Overview of the Migration Systems in the CIS Countries, Vienna, September 2005.

18. Joint Statement on International Terrorism adopted on the EU-Russia Summit in Brussels on 3 October 2001, http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/images/pText_pict/238/sum41.doc.

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- 18 -

20. Jotsev, V., Ivanhiouk. I., “Russia in the world migration flows: trends of the last decade”, [w:] World in the Mirror of International Migration, Vol. 10, Moscow 2002.

21. Malashenko, A. and Lieven, A., Russia's Restless Frontier: The Chechnya Factor in Post-Soviet Russia, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, March 2004.

22. Malashenko, A., Chechnya and Iraq: Associations Voluntary and Involuntary, Carnegie Centre, Moscow, March-April 2003.

23. Malashenko, A., Chechnya for Internal and External Consumption, Carnegie Centre, Moscow, September- October 2003.

24. McGregor, A., “Islam, Jamaats and Implications for the North Caucasus” – Part 2, Volume 4, Issue 12, (June 15, 2006), http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370033.

25. McGregor, A., “Islam, Jamaats and Implications for the North Caucasus” – Part 1, Terrorism Monitor, Volume 4, Issue 11 (June 2, 2006), http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370014.

26. Murphy, P., The Wolves of Islam: Russia and the Faces of Chechen Terrorism, Brassey’s Inc., Washington, DC, 2004.

27. NATO-Russia Action Plan on Terrorism (9 December 2004); http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b041209a- e.htm.

28. Pain, E., “Moscow’s North Caucasus Policy Backfires,” Central Asia–Caucasus Analyst, June 29, 2005.

29. Rawlinson, P., Russian Organised Crime and the Baltic States: Assessing the Threat, University of Wales, January 2001.

30. Revised EU Action Plan on Terrorism, Commission Staff Working Document, Brussels, 25 April 2006; SEC (2006) 686; http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/terrorism/docs/sec_2006_686_en.pdf.

31. Ryazantsev S. W., Rybakovsky, L., International Migration in the Russian Federation, United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development, UN/POP/MIG/2005/11, 5 July 2005.

32. Russia: National Indicative Programme 2004-2006, adopted by the European Commission on 21 May 2003.

33. Russian Federation: Chechen Republic “Normalization” in whose eyes?, Amnesty International, 23 June 2004, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engeur460272004.

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- 19 - 40. The Situation in Chechnya and Ingushetia Deteriorates, Joint Statement by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture, and Memorial, 8 April 2004, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/04/07/russia8408.htm.

41. The Trauma of Ongoing War in Chechnya: Quantitative Assessment of Living Conditions and Psychosocial and General Health Status Among the War-Displaced in Chechnya and Ingushetia, Médecins Sans Frontières, Amsterdam, August 2004.

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43. Tishov, V., Zayinchkovskaya, Z., Vitkovskaya, G., Migration in the countries of the former Soviet Union, Global Commission on International Migration, September 2005.

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45. V atmosfere strakha. Politicheskiy process i parlementskie vibory v Chechenskoy Respublike, Memorial, Moscow, December 2005 r., http://www.memo.ru/hr/hotpoints/caucas1/index.htm.

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- 20 - Appendices

List of appendices:

Appendix no. 1 Breaches of the judges’ independence: Moscow City Court case

Appendix no. 2 “Military” people (siloviki) in Russian political elite: Olga Kryshtanovskaya findings

Appendix no. 3 Examples of selective application of law or other breaches of the rule of law, made by federal law enforcement structures or courts

Appendix no. 4 Increase of state control over the main national TV channels

Appendix no. 5 Biased news coverage in the state-controlled TV channels

Appendix no. 6 Selected major legal changes in Russia as of 2000, and their adverse consequences for democratic standards, the rule of law and human rights

Appendix no. 7 The law on NGOs: the most important new provisions

Appendix no. 8 Racially and ethnically based violence and xenophobia in Russia

Appendix no. 9 Number of kidnappings in Chechnya in 2002-2005

Appendix no. 10 Examples of kidnappings

Appendix no. 11 Hostage taking

Appendix no. 12 Mopping up operation in the Borozdinovskaya village

Appendix no. 13 Cases of extra-judicial executions

Appendix no. 14 The law enforcement agencies’ activity in Kabardino-Balkaria

Appendix no. 15 Elmurzaev’s case

Appendix no. 16 Osman Boliev’s case

Appendix no. 17 Corruption dynamics in Russia: INDEM findings

Appendix no. 18 State administration reform under Putin: a brief account

- 21 - Appendix no. 19 Main factors of instability in the Northern Caucasus

Appendix no. 20 Possible evolution of terrorist threats originating in the Northern Caucasus

Appendix no. 21 Russia’s system for fighting organised crime

Appendix no. 22 Migration balance of the Russian Federation in 1992-2005 (in thousands of persons)

Appendix no. 23 The problem of irregular transit migration within the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) area

Appendix no. 24 Key provisions of the Russia-EU Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice

Appendix no. 25 The issue of the rule of law in EU/Russia documents

Appendix no. 26 The EU’s and EU member states’ projects on the promotion of the rule of law and legal reform

Appendix no. 27 The issue of human rights in EU/Russia documents

Appendix no. 28 The EU’s and EU member states’ projects on human rights

Appendix no. 29 Documents raising the issue of human rights violation in the Northern Caucasus, adopted by the European Parliament between 1999 and 2006

Appendix no. 30 Activity of EIDHR in the Northern Caucasus

Appendix no. 31 Activity of ECHO in the Northern Caucasus

Appendix no. 32 The EU’s and EU member states’ projects on strengthening the institutions

Appendix no. 33 Main EU counter-terrorism measures adopted in the recent years

Appendix no. 34 Key provisions of Russia-EU documents on combating terrorism

Appendix no. 35 Conventions against terrorism adopted by Russia

Appendix no. 36 Reasons for the weakness of the EU-Russia cooperation in fighting terrorism

Appendix no. 37 The specific nature of Russia’s battle against terrorism

Appendix no. 38 German-Russian cooperation in fighting organised crime

- 22 - Appendix no. 1 Breaches of the judges’ independence: Moscow City Court case

On 30 November 2003, the judge of the Moscow City Court Olga Kudeshkina accused General Prosecutor’s Office of violating the law by exerting pressure on judges during numerous law suits. She also accused the head of the court Olga Yegorova of pressuring the judges to ensure the rulings as demanded by the prosecutors. When refused, the cases were moved to other courts while the resistive judges faced negative consequences. These accusations were publicly supported by 4 other judges. All of them have been removed from office. In May 2004 judge Kudeshkina has been removed from office by the Supreme Qualification Board on grounds of “deliberate diminution of the authority of the judiciary”. In March 2005 Olga Kudeshkina turned to President Putin with an open letter criticising serious breaches of the judges’ independence. According to her, during 4 years more than 80 judges left Moscow City Court, refusing to act under pressure of the prosecutors and the court’s head(65).

Appendix no. 2 “Military” people (siloviki) in Russian political elite: Olga Kryshtanovskaya findings

In mid 2004, Russian sociologist Olga Kryshtanovskaya published the results of her research of the mechanisms of formation and development of political elites in Russia since late 80s. According to her, from 1988 to 2004 the ratio of elite members (federal government, parliament, heads of regions) with military or security service background (siloviki) has increased almost 7 times (from 3,7 % to 24,7 %). In the process of the administrative reform in spring 2004, the number of “militarised” federal institutions has increased from 16 to 20. Among the deputy ministers nominated between 2000 and 2003, 34,9 % had military background (more than 45 % of them came from the security services)(66).

Appendix no. 3 Examples of selective application of law or other breaches of the rule of law made by federal law enforcement structures or courts period ‘victim’ character of breaches May 2000, July 2000 Media-MOST holding, controlled by police and other agencies organised raids Vladimir Gusinski (including the NTV on Media-MOST offices, demonstrative channel) searches and detentions were carried out; Vladimir Gusinski received secret ‘security guarantees’ from the Russian government representative in exchange for his consent to sell NTV to Gazprom July 2000 Interros holding, controlled by Vladimir Prosecutor office demanded US$140 mln Potanin of additional payments for purchasing ‘below real value’ of Norilsk Nickel company during privatisation in 1995, in return for dropping the case April 2001 Media-MOST holding, controlled by local courts in Moscow and Saratov Vladimir Gusinski overnight (!) changed their verdicts concerning the legality of Gazprom takeover of NTV September 2001 TV-6 channel The Arbitration Court in Moscow ruled that TV-6 goes bankrupt, using a “dead letter” law (this law would be amended 3 months later) As of July 2003 Yukos holding, controlled by Mikhail Spectacular arrests and charges against Khodorkovsky Yukos holding’s representatives and its owner ; various breaches of the rule of law including persecutions against attorneys

65 www.newsru.com, 3 December 2003; 11 March 2005. 66 Olga Kryshtanovskaya, Anatomiya rossiyskoy elity, Moscow 2004.

- 23 - Appendix no. 4 Increase of state control over the main national TV channels Name (current name) of previous owner new owner effective state control the channel and its since current share in audience of all TV channels in Russia67 ORT (Pervyi Kanal) mainly companies The state + companies political – effectively controlled by Boris controlled by Roman permanent; 20,8 % Berezovsky Abramovich financial – as of early 2001 RTR (Rossiya) state state permanent

19,1 % NTV Media-MOST holding, Gazprom-media, political and financial - as controlled by Vladimir controlled by Gazprom of April 2001 12,3 % Gusinski gas monopoly (state/private) TV-6 mainly companies - liquidated - controlled by Boris Berezovski and Lukoil oil company (private) TVS private - liquidated - Ren-TV RAO-EES Rossii power Seversal group political and financial – as grid monopoly, headed by (state/private) + RTL of July 2006 5,6 % Anatoly Chubais Group (Bertelsmann)

Appendix no. 5 Biased news coverage in the state-controlled TV channels

According to the report prepared by the Centre for Extreme Journalism (Russian NGO) and published in July 2006 monitoring the news issued by the main national TV channels during prime time, more than 91 % of the news broadcasted concerns the activity of the president and his administration, the government and the pro- Kremlin United Russia party; the information concerning the president is almost exclusively positive. The information concerning the opposition occupied ca. 1 % of the news and tended to be almost exclusively negative. According to Transparency International Russia report published in December 2003, monitoring the usage of the administrative resource by the United Russia party during the campaign before December 2003 parliamentary elections, the party saved around US$7.6 million thanks to the free-of-charge positive information campaign in the state-controlled TV channels(68).

Appendix no. 6 Selected major legal changes in Russia as of 2000, and their adverse consequences for democratic standards, the rule of law and human rights sphere subject of the law date of adoption selected main provisions general by the State Duma consequences State Amendments to the July and August Changing the composition Increased administration laws concerning 2000 of the Federation Council - centralisation of the principles of representatives of the the state; shifting formation of the executive and legislative balance of power

67 Source for the audience data from TV reyting, Itogi 18.09.2006 68Centre for Extreme Journalism http://www.memo98.cjes.ru/?p=3&sm2=on&reports=200604; Transparency International Russia report Ot mifowv k faktam: ispolzovaniye administrativnogo resursa w izbiratelnoy kampanyi v cifrah, www.transparency.ru.

- 24 - Federation Council bodies (but not the heads of between the centre (the upper house of administrations and local and regions for the the Parliament), the parliaments); heads of the benefit of the relations between regions lose parliamentary President; federal and immunity, the President weakening self- regional structures, (with judicial oversight) government self-government has competence to dismiss heads of the regions or dissolve local parliaments should they violate the law; heads of the regions have competence to dismiss heads of the local self- government (excluding in large cities, where this right is reserved for the President) Political system Amendments to the 11 July 2001 tightening the criteria for limiting of law on political political parties to register political pluralism parties (10,000 members, branch offices in the half of the regions, etc.) Judiciary Amendments to the 28 November 2001 introducing term limits for weakening legal laws concerning court chairmen, reduction guarantees of the the status of of immunity of judges, judges’ judges, the court facilitation of the process independence and system, of the judges’ disciplinary impartiality Constitutional dismissal Court, legal defenders Political system Amendments to the 24 December 2002 Making the participation in slight limitation of law on the presidential election more political pluralism presidential difficult (including raising election the support needed to register the candidate from 1 to 2 million signatures) Civil society Amendments to the 9 June 2004 tightening the criteria for limiting freedom law on the freedom organising demonstrations of assembly of assembly in public places (including the ban on demonstrations in the vicinity of state institutions’ buildings) Political system / Amendments to the 11 June 2004 limiting the possibility to limiting the Civil society law on referenda organise national referenda execution of (by toughening the rules political rights and for registering referendum civil initiatives committees, limiting the time needed for accomplishing complicated procedures, etc.) Political system Amendments to the 3 December 2004 tightening the criteria for limitation of law on political registration of political political pluralism parties parties’ (50,000 members in all regions, etc.) State New law on 3 December 2004 abolishing the general a major step in the administration appointing the election of the heads of centralisation of heads of regions regions; henceforth they the state, are to be nominated by the undermining the regional parliaments upon principle of the president’s proposal federalism

- 25 - (the president has a right to dissolve the parliament if it refuses to accept presidential candidate thrice), the president can dismiss the head of region at will Political system Amendments to the July 2005 Changing electoral system serious limitation electoral law from mixed of political concerning the (proportional/majority) to pluralism parliamentary fully proportional, raising elections the electoral threshold for parties from 5% to 7% Civil society New law on NGO 23 December 2005 Introducing more Undermining the (NCO – non- complicated system for development of the commercial registering NGOs and close civil society organisations) supervision of their activity by a new state structure (located in the Ministry of Justice), limitations on financing NGOs from abroad, etc. Political system Adoption of the 16 February 2006 Introducing new state possible presidential decree (decree), February structures: National Anti- undermining of the on measures 2006 (law) Terrorist Committee and principle of counteracting Operational Staff (with separation of terrorism, adoption regional structures) with powers and some of the law on very wide competences human rights counteracting (including coordination of terrorism all ‘militarised’ institutions) in emergency situations; limitations to human rights during emergency situations Civil society Amendments to the 8 July 2006 ‘Public defamation’ of a possible serious law on civil servant executing his limitations to the counteracting office or ‘hindering the freedom of the extremist activity activity of state organs’, speech and media etc. will be considered freedom extremist activity and punished Political system Amendments to the 8 July 2006 abolishing the possibility to slight limitation to electoral law vote ‘against all political pluralism candidates’ in elections and the freedom of (which increases the major expression candidates’ chances of being elected) Political system Amendments to the process of adoption persons charged with possible serious law on electoral ongoing since July publicly voicing ‘extremist limitations to rights 2006 views’ are excluded from political pluralism, election, the procedure of possible breaches registering the candidates of free and fair gets more difficult, the election rules ‘early voting’ in elections (including via post) is introduced, electronic voting is introduced in selected regions

Appendix no. 7

- 26 - The law on NGOs: the most important new provisions The law titled ‘Introducing changes to some legal acts’, which came into force in April 2006, tasks a new federal state structure, the Federal Registration Service (FSR, numbering around 1000 civil servants), with controlling the activity of NGOs. The law makes the procedure of registering an NGO more difficult (allowing registration to be refused on various pretexts). Under this law, NGOs are obliged to present the authorities with detailed financial reports and reports on their activity, including those concerning their partners in cooperation and all external sources of financing. The FSR can forbid particular projects from being executed, or the receipt of financial support from particular sources or partners. The FSR is able to liquidate any NGO which breaks the law, offends public morals, offends national feelings or religious beliefs. NGOs are not allowed in closed territorial entities (such as the ZATO or ‘closed cities’). Convicted prisoners or foreigners declared personae non gratae in Russia are not allowed to be NGO members.

Appendix no. 8 Racially and ethnically based violence and xenophobia in Russia According to the Sova centre (Russian NGO) in 2005 alone, 28 people were murdered and 366 assaulted in Russia on racial and ethnical grounds. The Moscow Bureau of Human Rights (another NGO) presents other figures: 25 dead and more than 200 wounded in 2005 and 17 dead and around 130 wounded in the first half of 2006. It should be noted that the figures presented tend to be underestimated, as there are no official statistics and usually racially and ethnically based violence is registered as mere hooliganism. Despite of the official authorities’ campaign against racial and ethnic hatred, according to official figures there are about 150 extremist groups in Russia with around 5 thousand members, while NGOs put this last figure at around 50 thousands(69). The general rise of xenophobia in Russia in the recent years is reflected in the opinion polls results. As reported in August 2006 by Levada Centre, the slogan “Russia for (ethnic) Russians” has been fully supported by 17% and partially supported by the 37% of respondents; 41% of respondents agree with need to “limit the influence of the Jews” in Russian politics, business and society; 38% admit their hostility towards other nationalities(70).

Appendix no. 9 Number of kidnappings in Chechnya in 2002-2005(71)

Out of them:

Year Number of kidnapped Freed or Found Disappeared “Discovered” in people ransomed murdered detention facilities and jails

2002 538 90 81 367 -

2003 497 157 52 288 -

2004 448 213 24 203 8

2005 316 151 23 127 15

Appendix no. 10 Examples of kidnappings On 7 May 2006 in the centre of Nazran (Ingushetia) unidentified men dragged local resident, a 50-year old Uvays Dolakov into their car and carried in an unknown direction. The men who apprehended him were dressed in camouflage or police uniforms and drove a vehicle with Chechen license plates. As prosecutor’s office

69 Russian Federation: Racism and xenophobia rifle in Russian society, Amnesty International 4.05.2006, www.amnesty.org. 70 Rossiya dlya Russkich, Levada Centre 25.08.2006 71 The Chechen Republic: Consequences of “Chechenisation” of the Conflict, Memorial, Moscow, 2 March 2006, http://www.memo.ru/eng/memhrc/texts/6chechen.shtml.

- 27 - refused to open an inquiry, Dolakov’s family conducted their own investigation. Thanks to a high sum of money they paid to a man connected to local FSB, they finally found a body of their relative in a mass grave, located near Veseloe village, in the neighbouring Republic of Northern Ossetia. The family claims that Dolakov was tortured before being killed(72).

The same happened to three people abducted from the Dagestani village of Novosasitli, Khasaviurt District. In November and December 2004, Mukhtar Makhmudov, Amirkhan Alikhanov and Makhach Khabibov. They were all taken by unidentified people in masks and combat fatigues. On 28 January 2005, all federal TV channels showed how army intelligence liquidated a fighters’ base in the Nozhai-Iurt District of Chechnya. The relatives of the abducted remained ignorant of the connection between this information and their abducted relatives had not Abas Isaev, brother of Mukhtar Makhmudov, heard how Chechens from the Nozhai-Iurt District were describing the incident at the local market. They said that on 25 January 2005 “federals” brought six barely alive people and killed them outside the Zamai-Iurt village. Then the military opened fire to imitate a skirmish. The killed were hastily buried; later the local people took the bodies out in an effort of identifying them. No relatives appeared. Several days later, they were buried in the old cemetery of Zamai-Iurt. Their clothes were left in the gatehouse. In the middle of March, Isaev and other Dagestanis came to Zamai-Iurt in search of their lost relatives. Isaev identified his brother’s clothes; the local people recognised Mukhtarov from his photo. His identity was confirmed by exhumation. Two other bodies with traces of tortures were identified as Amirkhan Alikhanov and Makhach Khabibov(73).

Appendix no. 11 Hostage taking Instances of killing or arresting of militants’ relatives or taking them as hostages have occurred in Chechnya since the beginning of the conflict; however, in 2004 this phenomenon became one of the main methods of fighting against the Chechen underground. Speaking to the Duma on 20 October 2004, Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Ustinov, proposed an amendment to be introduced to the Act on Combating Terrorism which would enable the law enforcement agencies to take terrorists’ relatives as hostages during terrorist attacks. Although his proposal was not accepted by the Duma, it, in a way, sanctions the practice that has been used in the Caucasus for a long time.

The best-known cases of militants’ relatives being taken as hostages include: multiple detention of former Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov’s family members (12 relatives were imprisoned during the Beslan attack); detention of about 40 members of the former defence minister of Ichkeria Magomed Khambiyev, who was then forced to lay down his arms; detention of the father, brother, wife and daughter of the present militants’ leader .

Appendix no. 12 Mopping up operation in the Borozdinovskaya village The Borozdinovskaya village pacification carried out on 4 June 2005 was one of the largest ones in recent years. A unit of the Chechen “Vostok” Batallion composed exclusively of Chechens, but subject to the Russian Ministry of Defense, surrounded the village and brought all men to the local school. They were beaten and tortured for several hours and forced to admit that they provide aid to militants in hiding. A 77-year elderly man was murdered, other 11 men were captured and later probably killed. Several houses were burnt down. The Borozdinovskaya village pacification caused a massive exodus of its inhabitants, who fled to Dagestan. None of the officers participating in this action has ever been punished(74).

Appendix no. 13 Cases of extra-judicial executions On July 20 in Galashki village, Sunzhensky district of Ingushetia the representatives of federal power agencies killed the resident of Ingushetia Beslan Arapkhanov. Probably, the servicemen murdered Arapkhanov by mistake, having taken him for another man (famous Ingush field commander Ruslan Khuchbarov). Arapkhanov was shot dead in front of his wife and seven children(75).

72 Gannushkina, S. A., (edition), On the Situation of Residents of Chechnya in the Russian Federation June 2004 – June 2005, Memorial, Moscow, 1 September 2005. 73 Ingushetia / North Ossetia / Kabardino Balkaria: The Spread of Chechnya-type Human Rights Violations; International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (IHF), 2 June 2005. 74 http://eng.kavkaz.memo.ru/news/?srch_section1=engnews&srch_section2=eng_borozdinovsk. 75 http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/04/07/russia8408.htm.

- 28 - On 18 March 2004, masked men in camouflage uniforms entered the home of the Khambulatov family in the village of Naurskaya in Northern Chechnya and detained twenty-four-year-old Timur Khambulatov. According to relatives, the intruders identified themselves as officials of the Federal Security Service (FSB) and said that they were taking Timur Khambulatov to the local police station on suspicion of belonging to an illegal armed group. Later that morning, Timur Khambulatov died in custody. Video footage of his dead body, which Memorial obtained from relatives, showed a mutilated corpse with marks that were consistent with previously reported evidence of torture(76).

Appendix no. 14 Law enforcement agencies’ activity in Kabardino-Balkaria The Islamic militants’ attack which took place in the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria – Nalchik on 13 October 2005 was preceded by several years of persecutions of the local Muslim community members, who called themselves the Jamaat of Kabardino-Balkaria. It was an informal religious organisation comprising young people who prayed, read the Koran and studied the Arabic language together. The Jamaat’s members had been harassed by the local police and FSB since 2002: they had often been detained, beaten and humiliated, their mosques had been closed. Wifes and sisters of the Jamaat members who wore traditional Muslim dresses were also persecuted. Several people, e.g. a very religious sportsman Ruslan Tsakoev were assassinated. The mounting repressions triggered an armed attack by the young people, which was followed by a new waive of persecutions.

Appendix no. 15 Elmurzaev’s case On 2 April 2005, armed and camouflaged man speaking unaccented Russian abducted Said-Khusein Elmurzaev and his son Suleiman Elmurzaev from their houses in the village of Duba-Yurt. On 8 May, the dead body of Said Khusein was found in the Sunzha River near the village of Ilynskaya (Grozny District). Elmurzaev had filed an application with the European Court for Human Rights after the body of his second son Idris Elmurzaev was found on 9 April on the outskirts of the Serzhen-Yurt among eight other mutilated bodies(77).

Appendix no. 16 Osman Boliev’s case On 11 June 2006 r. the Khasav-yurt court (Dagestan) brought criminal charges against Osman Boliev, the leader of the local human rights organisation “Romashka”. He was accused of illegal possession of arms and participation in an organised criminal group operating in Chechnya. Almost one month earlier, on 18 May, he had been exonerated from similar charges by the Khasav-yurt district court and released from prison, where he had been detained since November 2005. During the arrest, Boliev was repeatedly beaten and tortured. After subsequent criminal proceedings were launched against him, Boliev fled Dagestan and applied for refugee status in Ukraine(78).

Appendix no. 17 Corruption dynamics in Russia: INDEM findings INDEM Foundation (Russian NGO) has prepared a systemic research of corruption in Russia in 2001 and 2005, based on opinion polls. According to this research, ca. 50 % of the respondents came across “social corruption” (in relation of the citizen and a state institution) at least once. The average bribe reached 2,452 rubles (ca. US$92). The risk of being involved in the corruption process was the highest in case of the road police (59.6%; slight rise as of 2001), military commissions for conscripts (57.7%; an almost twofold rise) and higher education institutions (exams, etc.) (52.1%; rise almost by half). The highest rise (threefold) concerned elementary and secondary schools. The “corruption risk” in case of the police and courts has increased by half to around 40 % in both cases. The striking phenomenon is a fivefold (!) rise of an average bribe for avoiding compulsory military service (an average bribe has reached 15,400 rubles = ca. US$578) which also reflects bad treatment of conscripts. Another striking phenomenon is more than a ninefold rise of “commercial corruption” (in relation of a business company with a state institution) which has reached US$316 billion (!) per year. The dominant “commercial corruption” participants are still executive organs (76.6%) and especially organs of “non-financial

76 The Annual Report of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 2006; http://www.ihf- hr.org/documents/doc_summary.php?sec_id=3&d_id=4255. 77 Chechnya Weekly, Volume 6, Issue 23 (June 16, 2005), http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=409&issue_id=3370. 78 http://www.kavkaz.memo.ru/newstext/news/id/1034800.html.

- 29 - control” (38.9 %). In general, according to opinion polls, a perceived level of corruption under Vladimir Putin has raised threefold since 2001 among regular citizens and by 3.5-fold among businessmen(79).

Appendix no. 18 State administration reform under Putin: a brief account State administration reform has been among declared priorities since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s presidency. In the beginning it focused mainly on introducing new division of responsibility between the federal centre and regions (for the benefit of the former; see app. no. 1). The first move (May 2000) was the introduction of 7 federal districts and appointment of 7 president’s envoys to those districts. However, after only one year it became clear that the mechanism of such oversight is not effective. On the other hand, another reform was initiated – a radical 10-year reform plan advocated by German Gref, minister for economic development and trade, which assumed inter alia the limitation of bureaucratic regulations (radical limiting of licenses, simplifying the procedures, etc.). However, due to the resistance from numerous state organs the plan was only partly introduced. In August 2001, the government commission for administration reform was set up and prepared the concept of Russian civil service. In November 2002, the federal programme on civil service reform was approved. Among the goals declared was the reduction of federal state institutions and simplification thereof. However, the changes introduced in spring 2004 (a 3 level system: federal ministries – federal agencies – federal services) brought mixed results. Formally, the number of ministries has been reduced from 23 to 15 (the reduction of deputy prime minister and deputy minister posts followed). On the other hand, the overall number of federal executive organs has increased from 66 to 80. Moreover, as various official sources suggested, it has led to a conflicts of interests, multiplication of bureaucracy (also by setting up federal structures’ representative bodies in the regions), serious decrease of effectiveness or even certain administrative chaos. In august 2005 Mikhail Dmitriev from the governmental Centre for Strategic Research, the main author of the administration reform, assessed the extent of its realisation for only 10 %(80). The criticism on the realisation of reform, expressed by President Putin himself (as reflected in his statements during meeting with Russian Union of Entrepreneurs and Industrialists in November 2004) has led to setting up, in November 2004, another government body (apart from the existing commission) – a special working group on administration reform, headed by the deputy head of the government apparatus Sergei Naryshkin. In July 2005, President Putin signed the decree introducing posts of state secretaries in “militarised” federal ministries and services in order to increase the level of lawmaking. At the same time Sergei Naryshkin has replaced the deputy prime minister Alexander Zhukov as the head of government’s commission on administration reform. President Putin’s decision, in December 2005, to extend the period of realisation of the federal programme on civil service reform (originally planned for 2003 – 2005 and extended to 2006 – 2007) indicated serious problems in realisation of administration reform. It was admitted by the president’s assistant Victor Ivanov, who said in April 2006 that “reforming civil service is not going easy” (at the same time he suggested it would be accomplished on time)(81).

Appendix no. 19 Main factors of instability in the Northern Caucasus The major factors that contribute to the instability in the Northern Caucasus include:

• the military conflict in Chechnya, which is gradually spilling over to other North Caucasian republics (mainly Dagestan and Ingushetia); • the activity of Islamic rebels in all republics of the region (especially in Dagestan, Chechnya and Ingushetia), who aim at overthrowing of the local authorities and introducing the rule of the Sharia (Islamic law); • unsettled ethnic conflicts, i.e. the Ingush-Ossetian conflict, the conflicts in Dagestan, ethnic tensions in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and Adygea, frictions between Russians and Caucasian immigrants in the Stavropol and Krasnodar krays, etc.; • acute socioeconomic problems: the pauperisation of society, enormous unemployment, the refugee problem, overpopulation, high population growth, common access to arms, organised crime, extremely low social welfare and level of medical care, serious ecological threats (mainly in Chechnya), etc.;

79 Vo skolko raz uvelichylas koruptsya za 4 goda, www.indem.ru. 80 Administrativnuyu reformu zhdiot seryoznaya korrektirovka?, www.strana.ru 8.08.2005. 81 ITAR-TASS 24.04.2006

- 30 - • incessant rivalry between clans for political and economic influence, as well as the division of spheres of influence within individual republics (above all in Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and Karachay-Cherkessia); the alienation of the governing elites from their own societies, corrupt officials, and the distrust shown by people to the authorities and law enforcement structures; • policy of the federal and republican law enforcement agencies in the North Caucasus, primarily the human rights violations and abuse of civilian population which lead to escalation of tension in the region and fuel Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism; • the policy of the federal government in the Northern Caucasus, especially the increasing centralisation, the lack of a program of the region’s integration with the remaining part of the Russian Federation and the long-term strategy of resolving regional problems, primarily the difficult socioeconomic situation.

Appendix no. 20 Possible evolution of terrorist threats originating in the Northern Caucasus At present, the EU does not face a serious threat of terrorism originating in the Northern Caucasus. Militants have never organised or even attempted to organise terrorist attacks in Europe. Moreover, unlike international Islamic terrorists, who fight against the entire Western civilisation, Chechens fight only against Russia. Chechen militants’ collaboration with Islamists from other regions as well as the aid that Chechens receive from some organisations based in Islamic countries (which is currently strongly limited because terrorists, including Al-Qaida, perceive Chechnya as a marginal player in the “world jihad”)(82).

However, this situation could change in case the instability in the Northern Caucasus deepened along with further deterioration of socioeconomic conditions in the region. This would most certainly lead to an increased influence of Islamic fundamentalism in the Caucasus and spreading of terrorist organizations. It cannot be excluded that the Chechen diaspora residing on the territory of the EU (especially the young generation) could be affected by radical Islamic organisations, which might attract some Chechens to become members of terrorist networks operating in Europe. This scenario is possible, if Chechens currently living in the EU countries do not become integrated with the European society.

Appendix no. 21 Russia’s system for fighting organised crime In the last few years, the Russian authorities have made some effort to change their ineffective system of fighting organised crime. Common association between criminal structures and law enforcement agencies representatives have so far the main obstacles to this process. Each group has its own cover, the so-called krysha in police structures. For this reason, the creation of a vertically-organised anti-mafia structure, independent of local MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) officials, has been recognised as the main goal of Russia’s current reform of its system for combating organised crime. Such a structure, named Glavnoye upravlyenye po bor’bye z orgpryestupostyu (Chief Bureau for the Fight Against Organised Crime, GUBOP) along with its regional divisions (RUBOPs), existed in the 1990s within the MVD, but was disbanded in 2001. The decision to shut down that unit was caused as much by the illegality of its actions as by its power and independence from the new state authority. Authority over RUBOPs has been ceded to local militia. This reorganisation, however, has brought a decline in the prosecution of organised crime. A new structure formed within the framework of MVD, Departament po bor’bye z orgpryestupostyu i terrorismom (Department for Fight Against Organised Crime and Terrorism, DBOPiT), beside a duty to combat crime, was charged with counterterrorism tasks, which created certain coordination problems and also led to abuses of human rights. In August 2005, the MVD has adapted a strategy for fighting organised crime for the years 2005-2010. The nature of that strategy lies in parcelling out competencies among the DBOPiT and other police agencies. The DBOPiT is to concern itself solely with large criminal organisations, those which actually influence security in a given region. The first stage of reform assumes the creation of a consolidated database of such organisations. The following stages of the reform will focus on combating those organisations. Apart from the DBOPiT, other specialised units function within the framework of MVD to fight organised crime. Those include the department for combating economic crimes and the tax police. The FSB has its own structures as well. The independent Fiedyeralnaya sluzba FR po kontrol’ju za oborotom narkotikow (Russian Federal Drug Control Service, FSKN) is responsible for fighting the drugs trade, while the fight against money- laundering is handled by the Federal Service for Financial Monitoring, which however does not possess prosecuting privileges.

82 In details see: Soldatov, A., Borogan, I., “Al-Qaida: rol’ na Severnom Kavkaze”, http://www.agentura.ru/press/about/jointprojects/novgaz/alqaedainchechnya/.

- 31 -

Appendix no. 22 Migration balance of the Russian Federation in 1992-2005 (in thousands of persons) Year Immigration Emigration Migration balance

1992 849 673 176 1993 913 483 430 1994 1147 337 810 1995 841 339 502 1996 622 288 344 1997 598 233 365 1998 514 213 301 1999 380 215 165 2000 359 146 213 2001 193 121 72 2002 185 107 78 2003 129 94 35 2004 119 80 39 2005 177 70 107 Source: Russian Federal Statistics Service

Appendix no. 23 The problem of irregular transit migration within the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) area Due to ineffective border controls, illegal transit migrants from Russia and neighbouring states - move relatively effortlessly from one CIS country to another. The Eastern European route of migrant smuggling is habitually used by persons from South-East Asia and the Middle East, more rarely by those from Africa. The illegal nature of those procedures makes it difficult to estimate their real scope and dynamics. It is unquestionably a substantial dilemma to the currently forming systems of migration management in CIS countries. Increased pressure from transit migrants may lead to the emergence of challenges to internal stability, and do so much more quickly than is possible in countries with mature migration systems. Similarly, the continued improvement of EU border security, confronted with the simultaneous substantial insecurity of borders within the CIS, may lead to a situation where those who originally wanted to travel west will remain in transit countries, as the CIS states have no functioning mechanisms for their expulsion. An attempt to manage this situation should consist of creating a larger space for legal migration, and facilitating the transfer of migrants from the shadow economy to the legal one. For the time being however, the CIS governments manifest a tendency to regard irregular migration as felony, and focus their attention on repressive methods of combating such migration, which only exacerbates the problem.

Appendix no. 24 Key provisions of the Russia-EU Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice - Principles: • equality between partners and mutual respect of interests • adherence to common values • respect of human rights, adherence to and effective implementation of UN & Council of Europe conventions, as well related protocols and OSCE commitments • respect for generally recognised principles and norms of international law • respect for fundamental freedoms

- Objectives: • freedom: to facilitate human contacts and travel between EU and Russia, ensure smooth, legal border crossing and lawful stays on each other’s territories, work together to tackle illegal migration and illegal cross-border activities • security: to improve cooperation to tackle terrorism and all forms of organised crime, as well as other illegal activities in order to increase security • justice: to contribute to the efficiency of the judicial system in EU member states and Russia and to the independence of the judiciary, to develop judicial cooperation between EU and Russia

Appendix no. 25 Issue of the rule of law in EU/Russia documents

- 32 - The issue was reflected inter alia in: the EU Common Strategy towards Russia of 1999, where a strengthened rule of law was singled out among other important goals of the EU policy(83). The rule of law was mentioned also in the EU-Russia Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice of 2005, among the common values that constitute the principles of the mutual cooperation(84). In a more specific way, the EC Communication on a Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice identifies ‘independent and efficient judiciary’ as indispensable for upholding the rule of law and for ensuring the protection of human rights which is the objective of the EU policy (similar idea is mentioned in the EU- Russia Road Map).

Appendix no. 26 EU’s and EU member states’ projects on the promotion of the rule of law and judicial reform Among the projects executed have been those referring to the training of judges and court administrators (both general jurisdiction and arbitrary courts) in 2001-2003 APs, assistance to the arbitration court system and training of bailiffs in AP 2002. In all APs in 1998-2003, some € 24 mln for the support of the judicial reform were allocated. In 2004-2006, the cooperation continued to focus on the training of judges and other staff, development of the legislation concerning judicial reform (including the offers of legal assistance to the State Duma), as well as on the development of the punishment alternatives to imprisonment, with an indicative budget of € 32 mln(85).

Under the bilateral framework of cooperation between individual EU member states and Russia, the projects intended to strengthen the rule of law (including support for judicial reform) were offered by France (including the assistance to courts and other state institutions, twinning of institutions and cooperation of law schools), Germany (under TRANSFORM Programme), Finland, United Kingdom. What concerns the external partners, the support of the United States (by USAID) and Canada is worth to note(86).

Appendix no. 27 Issue of the human rights in EU/Russia documents Among the goals of the EU-Russia cooperation, the PCA of 1994 lists strengthening political and economic freedoms as well as support to Russian efforts to consolidate its democracy (87). The Common Strategy almost repeated that (88), and the Russian Federation TACIS National Indicative Programme (NIP) 2004-2006 underlines, among other things, a mutual (sic!) commitment to develop and strengthen civil society based on respect for democratic principles and human rights(89). In the Road Map the two parties referred to human rights only in the Preamble, as their common values. On the other hand, however, the Preamble does enlist these rights(90). EC Communication stresses that projection of values underpinning the JLS area (including protection of human rights) is essential in order to safeguard the internal security of the EU (91).

Appendix no. 28 EU’s and EU member states’ projects on human rights As to the subjects of the concrete projects, the focus placed in the 2000 AP was on promotion of independent media (including trainings of journalists), on developing local democracy and self-government, on developing partnership between NGOs and state administration, especially in the sphere of welfare policies and protection of the vulnerable groups. Projects in the 2003 AP focused on raising public awareness of the legal system

83 Art. 1 CS, 1999/414/CFSP. 84 COM (2005) 491 final. 85 The information cited is based mainly on TACIS Russia NIP 2004-2006, op. cit. 86 The information cited is based mainly on TACIS Russia NIP 2004-2006, op. cit., Annex 3. 87 Art 2 of PCA, http://ec.europa.eu/comm/external_relations/ceeca/pca/pca_russia.pdf 88 In slightly different wording: consolidation of democracy, the rule of law and public institutions. 89 Cf. RF NIC 2004 – 2006. 90 Namely: countering any form of intolerance and racism, respect for the rights of individuals including immigrants and persons belonging to minorities, respect for fundamental rights and freedoms, including respect for free and independent media, set out in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Council of Europe) and Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (UN), as well as in the other Council of Europe, UN and OSCE documents. All this is referred to as mutual commitment. 91 Communication, COM (2005) 491 final. 92 The information cited is based mainly on TACIS Russia NIP 2004-2006, op. cit. 93 The meeting focused on the issues of human rights abuse in Chechnya and other parts of Northern Caucasus, the situation of the media freedom and the national minorities in Russia. Also, Russia has raised its concerns towards human rights in the EU. 94 The information cited is based mainly on TACIS Russia NIP 2004-2006, op. cit., Annex 3.

- 33 - (promoting knowledge of the citizens’ rights), as well as on regional media awareness. In 2004, the AP projects aimed at stimulation of the civil society participation in environmental decisions have been carried out. In 2004- 2006, the focus was placed on the support for the civil society in Russia (including spreading knowledge among citisens on their rights, on the development of partnership between Russian and European NGOs, on the development of independent media, on promoting tolerance and fighting discrimination), with indicative budget of € 20 mln. Another TACIS instrument introduced in 2000 was the Core Action Programme focused on legal protection of individual rights (which was a considerable support for the civil society) as well as on promotion of tolerance and improvement of interethnic relations (including strengthening state institutions, conflict prevention, combating extremism and xenophobia) with allocations totaling € 8 mln(92). Another new instrument in the sphere of human rights are the EU-Russia regular consultations (taking place twice a year) on human rights, set at the EU-Russia summit in the Hague on 25 November 2004 and inaugurated (first meeting) on 1 March 2005 in Luxembourg(93). Next meeting took place on 8 September 2005 in Brussels and third in Vienna on 3 March 2006. Under bilateral framework of cooperation between individual EU member states and Russia, the projects concerning human rights were offered by Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands (under Matra Programme, including twinning of NGOs), Sweden. What concerns external partners, the support of the United States (by USAID), Norway, Switzerland, Canada is worth to note(94).

Appendix no. 29 Documents adopted by the European Parliament between 1999 and 2006 which raised the issue of human rights violation in the Northern Caucasus 1. European Parliament resolution on the war in Chechnya; 7 October 1999; B5-0142/1999;

2.European Parliament resolution on Chechnya; 18 November 1999; B5-0259/1999;

3. European Parliament resolution on the situation in Chechnya; 15 December 1999; B5-0326/1999;

4. European Parliament resolution on the situation in Chechnya; 20 January 2000; B5-0048/2000;

5. European Parliament resolution on the case of , freedom of the media and violations of human rights in Chechnya; 17 February 2000; B5-0153/2000;

6. European Parliament resolution on violations of human rights and humanitarian law in Chechnya; 16 March 2000; B5-0245/2000;

7. European Parliament resolution on Chechnya; 13 April 2000; B5-0363/2000;

8. European Parliament resolution on the situation in Chechnya; 15 February 2001; B5-0097/2001;

9. European Parliament resolution on the situation in Chechnya; 10 April 2002; P5_TA(2002)0174;

10. European Parliament resolution on non-prolongation of the OSCE mandate in Chechnya; 16 January 2003, P5_TA(2003)0025;

11. European Parliament resolution on Chechnya; 3 July 2003; P5_TA(2003)0335;

12. European Parliament resolution on the EU-Russia Summit held in The Hague on 25 November 2004; 15 December 2004; P6_TA(2004)0099

13. European Parliament resolution on the EU's priorities and recommendations for the 61st session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva (14 March to 22 April 2005); 24 February 2005; P6_TA(2005)0051;

14. European Parliament resolution on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2004 and the EU's policy on the matter (2004/2151(INI)); 28 April 2005; P6_TA(2005)0150;

15. European Parliament resolution on EU-Russia relations (2004/2170(INI)); 26 May 2005; P6_TA(2005)0207;

16. European Parliament resolution on and the new NGO legislation; 15 December

- 34 - 2005; P6_TA(2005)0534;

17. European Parliament resolution on the European Neighbourhood Policy (2004/2166(INI)); 19 January 2006; P6_TA(2006)0028;

18. European Parliament resolution on Chechnya after the elections and civil society in Russia; 19 January 2006; P6_TA(2006)0026;

19. European Parliament resolution on the Annual Report on Human Rights in the World 2005 and the EU's policy on the matter (2005/2203(INI)); 18 May 2006; P6_TA-PROV(2006)0220;

20. European Parliament resolution on the EU-Russia Summit held in on 25 May 2006; 15 June 2006; P6_TA-PROV(2006)0270.

Appendix no. 30 Activity of EIDHR in the Northern Caucasus One of the EU activity aimed at the improvement of the condition of human rights observance is its financial support for Russian NGO’s projects realised in the Northern Caucasus within the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR)(95). These mainly include trainings and seminars for human rights activists, journalists, lawyers, etc. Human rights projects currently implemented in the Northern Caucasus with the support of the EIDHR(96):

1. "Accessibility of Information in Chechnya for Peace and Human Rights: "The Russian-Chechen Information Agency"; • the project is to promote the respect of human rights in the Chechen Republic and a peaceful resolution to the armed conflict through the provision of independent and unbiased information on the situation in Chechnya to Russia and the international community;

2. "Towards accountability for human rights violations in the North Caucasus";

• this project will work towards greater accountability for human rights violations in the North Caucasus (Ingushetia/Chechnya) by increasing the effectiveness of legal work on individual cases. А secondary aim is to raise awareness about civil and political rights and the rule of law;

3. "Human Rights NGOs Contribution to Governmental Policy-Making and Influence on Public Opinion";

• the aim of the project is to increase the contribution of human rights NGOs to policy-making by strengthening their organisational capacity, quality of advocacy and networking in the North Caucasus, Volga Basin and North-West Russia;

4. "X International Film Festival on Human Rights (IFFHR) "Stalker" in Moscow and charitable actions of the IFFHR "Stalker" in Russian regions";

• the goal of the project is to raise human rights consciousness especially among young people through the International Film Festival on Human Rights "Stalker", shown in Moscow and through a selection of films to be shown in Makhachkala, Petrozavodsk and Velikii Novgorod.

Appendix no. 31 Activity of ECHO in the Northern Caucasus Humanitarian aid for the region provided by the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) is also very important. The ECHO has been operating in the Northern Caucasus since 1994. It has assisted Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and other vulnerable groups. Its activity in the Caucasus focuses on providing financial support to programs implemented by the agencies of the United Nations (UNICEF, the HCR, the WFP, etc.), the Red Cross movement and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which supply IDPs with food, basic non-food items and provide medical assistance. Since the beginning of the second Chechen war in autumn of 1999 ECHO assistance has focused on the humanitarian needs of the local

95 For details see: http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/images/pText_pict/326/brochure_en.pdf. 96 http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/p_324.htm.

- 35 - population affected by the conflict, mainly in Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan. ECHO also aims at improving access to healthcare by providing medical supplies and equipment to hospitals and primary health centres, and by distributing essential first aid medicines. ECHO also supports surgical, traumatology, and orthopaedic care units (mines and other unexploded ordnance constitute a serious threat to the civilian populations).

Since 1999 the UE has provided more than €148 million to aid those affected by the conflict(97):

1999 €2 mln 2000 €22,7 mln 2001 €40,5 mln 2002 €28 mln 2003 26 mln 2004 €28,5 mln 2005 €26,3 2006 €26

Appendix no. 32 EU’s and EU member states’ projects on strengthening institutions In all APs of 1998-2003, some € 14 mln were allocated for the support of administrative reforms, including projects on the civil service reform, development of the human resources policy and training Program, organisation and management of the Russian government structure and development capacity for regional development formulation and implementation. In 2004-2006, the focus has been placed on demarcation of power between federal, regional and local authorities, development of legislation and human resources management, with an indicative budget of € 30 mln .98 Another important effort aimed at strengthening the institutions and supporting administrative reform in Russia is put under bilateral framework of cooperation between individual EU member states and Russia. Among them it is worth to note the German TRANSFORM Program, financed both by federal government and federal regions. Projects under this Program were focused, among other issues, on legal advice for the Russian government and the State Duma, as well as on training personnel for administration.99 Support for a similar goal was also offered by the governments of France, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. What concerns external partners, the support of the United States (by USAID) and Canada is worth to note.100

Appendix no. 33 Main EU counter-terrorism measures adopted in recent years The most important measures adopted in recent years include: the development of cooperation of member states within EUROPOL(101); adoption of the European Security Strategy (12 December 2003)(102); appointment of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator to the European Council (30 March 2004)(103); adoption of the European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (30 November 2005)(104) and subsequent action plans on combating terrorism(105); intensified cooperation in the Justice and Home Affairs area; introduction of biometric identifiers; sealing of external borders; strengthening of cooperation with other organisations and countries (especially with the U.S.) in this area, etc.(106).

97 http://ec.europa.eu/echo/field/russia/index_en.htm; http://www.delrus.cec.eu.int/en/p_329.htm. 98 The information cited is based mainly on TACIS Russia NIP 2004-2006, op. cit., Annex 3. 99 Under the ProgramProgram during 1993 – 2002, more than 300 projects were carried out, worth some € 200 mln, substantial part of that being aimed on strengthening the state and public institutions. TACIS Russia NIP 2004 –2006, op. cit., Annex 3. 100 ibidem 101 For details on counter-terrorism activity of Europol see: EUROPOL’s Annual Report 2005, Europol, The Hague, June 2006. 102 A Secure Europe in the Better World. European Security Strategy, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf 103 For details on EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator activity see: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=772&lang=PL&mode=g. 104 14469/3/05 REV 3 JAI 423 ECOFIN 353 TRANS 234 RELEX 639 ECO 136 PESC 1010 COTER 72 COSDP 810 PROCIV 174 ENER 172 ATO 103. 105 The last Action Plan on Terrorism was adopted by the European Commission on 24 May 2006; see: SEC (2006) 686. 106 For more details about EU’s counter-terrorism activity see: http://www.eurunion.org/partner/EUUSTerror/EURespUSTerror.htm.

- 36 - Appendix no. 34 Key provisions of Russia-EU documents on combating terrorism In the ratified documents the parties committed themselves: • to intensify EU-Russia cooperation in the area of counter-terrorism in accordance with the international law, especially international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian law; • to cooperate fully in the fight against terrorism in order to find, deny safe haven and bring to justice, on the basis of the principle to extradite or prosecute any person who supports, facilitates, participates, or attempts to participate in the financing, planning, preparation, or commission of terrorist acts or provides safe havens; • to sign, ratify and implement all 12 UN counter-terrorism conventions and protocols; • to develop cooperation including through exchange of know-how and typologies / models to strengthen the fight against the financing of terrorism, including by freezing of funds and other terrorist assets, in accordance with the relevant international instruments; • to exchange legislation models in due course on the fight against the financing of terrorism, including on the abuse of non-profit/charitable sector and the confiscation of assets; • to consider the conditions for an exchange of information on: the activities and movements of individuals or groups belonging to terrorist networks, tickets of dubious authenticity, supplies of arms, explosives or dual-use goods, financial transactions likely to be used in support of terrorist intrigue etc.

Appendix no. 35 Conventions against terrorism adopted by Russia(107) 1. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On Board Aircraft ("Tokyo Convention", 1963);

2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft ("Hague Convention", 1970);

3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation ("Montreal Convention", 1971);

4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons (1973);

5. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages ("Hostages Convention", 1979);

6. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material ("Nuclear Materials Convention", 1980);

7. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Extends and supplements the Montreal Convention on Air Safety), (1988);

8. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, (1988);

9. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988);

10. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing (1997);

11. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999).

Russia has not adopted Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991).

Appendix no. 36 Causes of the weak EU-Russia cooperation in the fight against terrorism One of the main factors affecting the weak counter-terrorism cooperation between the EU and Russia is the lack of mutual confidence between partners and the fact that this area predominantly falls within the competence of the special services which do not cooperate or share information. Apart from this, Russia is much more focused on counter-terrorism cooperation with the CIS countries (especially the republics of Central Asia) and China, e.g. within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. Unlike the EU, these countries do not limit the fight against terrorism with the necessity to observe human rights and – like Russia – define the term very broadly (e.g.

107 http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2005/65388.htm.

- 37 - Russia perceives the conflict in Chechnya as a part of the international war on terror and, with no exceptions, treats all Chechen separatists as terrorists, with which the EU does not agree(108)).

Another factor is the specific nature of Russia’s fight against terrorism (see: appendix no. 31).

Appendix no. 37 The specific nature of Russia’s fight against terrorism In Russia the fight against terrorism is regulated by the Act on Terrorism Prevention adopted on 26 February 2006. It defines terrorism as an “ideology of violence and a practice of extorting decisions from the authorities”. The National Counter-terrorism Committee was set up by Vladimir Putin’s decree of 15 February 2006 as an institution coordinating and supervising the fight against terrorism. Its head, the FSB chief Nikolay Patrushev, has the authority to launch a “counter-terrorism operation” and define its territorial range, duration and character. The special service (FSB) has the largest powers in combating terrorism, which further strengthens its huge countrywide influence. The federal army also has specific tasks and powers exercised in the fight against terrorism; according to the Russian law, it may be deployed for this purpose outside Russian borders (introduction of this provision into counter-terrorism legislation demonstrates Russia’s superpower aspirations and its eagerness to catch up with the U.S.).

Russia’s fight against terrorism differs significantly from counterterrorism measures taken by the EU and the U.S. Since 1999 (the outbreak of the second Chechen war), the terrorist threat is used by President Putin’s administration in order to strengthen the position of law enforcement structures (especially the FSB, the Federal Army and the Ministry of Internal Affairs) and to tighten the control of the Russian society. Fuelled by the government and state-controlled media, the terrorism threat also serves the gradual introduction of authoritarian rule in the country, suppression of the opposition and the curbing of the freedom of speech. The fight against terrorism also constitutes an important element of Russia’s current national ideology which aims to gather the people around the president in fear of the actual or imaginary terrorist threat.

Appendix no. 38 German-Russian cooperation in fight against organised crime Relatively high level of co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs was achieved by Germany and Russia. In May 1999 both sides concluded agreement on co-operation in combating particularly dangerous crime. The agreement provided a way for systematizing practical co-operation of the Russian public prosecution authorities, the ministry of the interior, the FSB (security service), the customs committee and the border service with the German interior ministry, Federal Criminal Police Office, border guards and customs & criminal police. The further intensification of the Russian-German in JHA included inter alia exchange of liaison officers, holding common actions (including joint operations) and mutual training of specialists. In December 2003 both sides inaugurated the work of High Level Working Group on Security.

108 This is reflected by many EU documents and statements by EU representatives, e.g. the European Parliament resolutions on EU-Russia relations and the situation in Chechnya; see: e.g : P6_TA-PROV(2005)0207.

- 38 -