President Medvedev's First Year — Expectations and Progress

September 2009

THE EU-RUSSIA CENTRE REVIEW

Issue Ten

CONTENTS

Introduction 3 Fraser Cameron, EU-Russia Centre

EU-RC New Survey: President Medvedev - A Force for Change or Continuity? 4 Maria Ordzhonikidze, Secretary General, EU-Russia Centre

Assessing Dmitry Medvedev's Role 16 Marie Mendras, Professor, London School of Economics

Between the Important and the Possible 20 Lev D. Gudkov, Director, Levada-Centre

The EU as Seen in the Mirror of Russian TV 25 Elena Prokhorova, Analyst, and Eugenia Vesanto, Information Centre Director, EU-Russia Centre

Introduction

Russia is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma.’ This famous quote by Winston Churchill has retained its relevance over the years. The lack of transparency in the governance structures, the absence of any separation of powers, and the absence of a free media, make it difficult for outsiders – and for most Russians - to understand the power dynamics in today’s Russia.

The recent survey by the EU-Russia Centre on ‘Expectations under Medvedev’ demonstrates that, at least among elite opinion in the EU and Russia, there is a consensus on some of the main problems, especially corruption and the lack of an independent judiciary.

These points are summed up persuasively in the articles by Maria Ordzhonikidze and Marie Mendras. While agreeing that little has changed under Medvedev, Professor Mendras notes that there is some overlap in elite opinion in Russia and the EU and that there are grounds for modest optimism in EU-Russia relations.

A further article by Lev Gudkov of the renowned Levada-Centre assesses the results of a second survey this summer, which asked Russians how they viewed their government. The most startling conclusion was that four-fifths of the population did not consider that the state and society shared the same priorities and that they had no influence on political decisions. Similarly, a large majority agreed that corruption was the most important problem in Russia but held that the situation was unlikely to change under the current rulers. There was a similar response concerning independent courts.

Finally, Elena Prokhorova and Eugenia Vesanto, analyse how Russian television has reported on some of the major stories over the past twelve months. One of the most sensitive issues was how to portray the new President after Vladimir Putin had enjoyed a complete monopoly of uncritical coverage for several years. The distinguishing feature of Russia’s new president was that he was ‘more gentle and subdued’ than his predecessor. Other major issues covered by the authors include the Georgian conflict, the financial crisis and Russia-EU relations. President Medvedev’s visits to ‘friendly’ EU countries such as Germany and Spain were given extensive coverage while the EU as such was nearly always portrayed in a negative manner.

This Review sheds further light on the huge gulf between rulers and ruled in Russia. It is an important contribution to the efforts to understand the complexities of Russian government and society. Churchill would have approved.

Fraser Cameron Director, EU-Russia Centre

EU-RC New Survey: President Medvedev - A Force for Change or Continuity? by

Maria Ordzhonikidze Secretary General, EU-Russia Centre

SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS

An expert survey undertaken by the EU-Russia Centre in May 2009 shows that both Russians and Europeans consider the fight against corruption in the police, army and civil service to be the most pressing issue that Dmitry Medvedev should address (89%) as he completes his first year as President. However, only nine per cent believe that anything will change in the future.

Other priority areas for the Russian president’s attention included ensuring the independence of the judiciary (88%) with only 11% believing that there would be a change, and the need to diversify the Russian economy away from its base of oil and gas (85%). The introduction of jury trials in Russia was lower down the list of priorities, though 58% of respondents ranked it as important or very important.

Specific findings included:

• Ninety six per cent of Russians responding to the survey believed that the fight against corruption to be the most important area for change (only 14% believed that this is likely), while the corresponding figures for non Russians were 87% and 8%.

• Over a quarter of respondents believed that there would be further improvement in relations between Russia and its European and North American counterparts.

• There was a marked difference in the priority given to Russia’s relationship with its neighbours; this was cited as very important by three quarters (74%) of non Russians against only 56% of Russians.

• A quarter (23%) believed that Russia will implement laws to protect foreign investments in its economy.

• Two thirds (67%) believed that there should be improved facilitation of the registration and development of NGOs, though only 10% believed that this would happen.

• Respondents were most pessimistic about the probability of freeing political prisoners (77% considered it unlikely or highly unlikely). 74% of non-Russian respondents versus 67% of Russians rated this measure as important/ very important.

• Russians tended to be more optimistic than Europeans in their assessment of those measures most likely to be implemented. The only area where they were less optimistic was the diversification of the Russian economy away from oil and gas: 12% of Russians considered this to be likely/very likely versus 14% of non-Russians.

• According to the data collected by a survey undertaken by the Levada-Centre which posed the same questions to an all-Russian sample of respondents, the general Russian population places corruption in the police, army and civil service, and the need to diversify the economy at the top of a list of the most important problems facing Russia (95% and 91% accordingly). However, the general population is much more worried about the need to improve relations with Russia’s international partners – 87% rated this as important or highly important.

• Levada-Centre survey respondents perceived that freeing political prisoners as the least important of 11 problems ranked – only 49% believed it to be important and they also believed it to be the problem that was least likely to be tackled.

METHODOLOGY

237 people from 34 countries responded to 11 questions posted on the EU-Russia’s www.eu- russiacentre.org web-site from November 2008 to February 2009. The profile of respondents varied from MEPs and academics to NGOs, journalists, businessmen, ministry officials, civil servants, students and ordinary interested citizens. The respondents were invited to rate 11 measures according to their importance and their likelihood of being implemented during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency.

On average, respondents spent eight minutes answering the survey questions.

Sample Profile

As well as visitors to EU-RC web-site, respondents included members of the EU-RC mailing database who received an invitation to participate. Responses were received from members of the European Parliament, journalists and NGOs following Russia, a third of the responses came from the academic and think-tank community, and the remainder from higher educated professionals with diplomatic, business or commercial background, as well as students.

The majority of replies came from people aged between 25 and 54 years, with one in four aged 55+.

Respondents came from 34 countries, with the majority residents coming from the European Union and almost one fifth from Russia. Specific countries included: Albania, Andorra, Canada, Iceland, Malta, Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Ireland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Romania, Austria, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Ukraine, Italy and Finland.

QUESTIONNAIRE

Respondents were invited to rate each of the 11 scorecard problems in order of their importance to Russia and the likelihood that they will be tackled by President Medvedev while in he is power. The rating was from 1 to 5: with one being least important and very unlikely and 5 being most important and very likely.

ANALYSIS

How Important vs. How Likely

Respondents identified corruption in the police, army and civil service as the most acute problem in Russia, with 89% rating it first. This was closely followed by the need to ensure the independence of judiciary – 88%. Eighty five per cent cited the necessity to diversify the economy away from one based on oil and gas as highly important.

The need for wider introduction of jury trials was rated as least important of the 11 listed in the scorecard, with only 58% seeing it as very important.

In terms of likelihood of the above problems being tackled, respondents were most pessimistic about the probability of freeing political prisoners (77% considered it unlikely or highly unlikely and only 5% considered it likely or very likely). They were most optimistic for the prospects for Russia and the EU to work together on resisting the global economic crisis (37% considered it likely or very likely).

Twenty eight per cent of respondents believed that relations between Russia and ‘the West’ (USA and Europe) were likely to improve. However, only 11% expected any improvement in relations between Russia and its neighbouring states such as Georgia and Ukraine.

The respondents had an option to list other problems that they considered important for President Medvedev to resolve. Internal issues raised by survey participants were:

• Improve the situation in Chechnya • Resolve ethnic conflicts and diminish racial attacks • Develop education, particularly on the subject of civic values • Fight legal nihilism • Change the penitentiary system • Give more freedom to civil society • Stabilise the business climate in order to make Russia attractive to foreign investments • Open KGB archives and do not rehabilitate Stalinists

External issues listed were:

• Play an active role in resolving international conflicts • Fight Islamic terrorism and international criminal groups alongside other countries • Become a full and equal member of the world community • Become a partner, not an enemy of the West • Improve relations with the EU, rather than the US • Stop playing the ‘spheres of influence’ game (following the USSR’s example) • Bring back the USSR and help the working classes all over the world

How Important vs. How Likely: Russian respondents

Ninety six per cent of Russian respondents named corruption as the most important problem that President Medvedev should work on. They were not overly optimistic about the prospects for his addressing this issue; with only 14% rating it as likely or highly likely.

Second in importance was the need to diversify the Russian economy, with 90% of Russians rating it as important or highly important, and only 12% believing that it was possible to tackle this.

The necessity for independent court system seemed obvious to 88%, but only 16% believed that this is something that the President would tackle.

Least important from the Russian respondents’ point of view was the issue of NGOs: only 43% saw it as important or very important that the President work on facilitating their registration and future development.

Russians were quite optimistic about their country’s potential to work with the EU to resist the global economic crisis (51% rated it likely or highly likely), improving relations with USA and Europe (38%) and introducing laws to protect foreign investments in the Russian economy (33%).

How Important vs. How Likely: Non-Russian respondents

For non-Russian respondents the need to fight corruption and increase the independence of judiciary topped the list of the most acute problems, with 87% rating it important or highly important. Only 8% of non-Russians believed Mr. Medvedev will succeed in solving it.

The non-Russian respondents were also optimistic about the perspectives of working with Russia to resist the global economic crisis (33% rated it likely or highly likely), as well as improving relations with USA and Europe (26%). They were significantly less optimistic about the introduction and implementation of laws that would protect foreign investments in Russia (only 21% vs. 33% for Russian respondents).

Differences between Russian and Non-Russian respondents

How important How likely

Generally, there were no significant differences between how Russian and non-Russian respondents rated the importance of existing problems. As mentioned above, three key issues of corruption, the lack of judiciary independence and the need to diversify the economy were equally important to both groups of respondents.

Both groups rated the possibility of freeing political prisoners as the least likely problem to be solved.

Russians were anything from 1 to 18% more optimistic than non-Russians about the likelihood of President Medvedev solving each of the issues. One exception was diversification of economy, with only 12% of Russians believing this was possible vs. 14% of non-Russians.

Level of Pessimism: Expectations Least Likely to Come True

Both groups were pessimistic about the prospects for freeing political prisoners, establishing truly independent media and an effective fight against corruption. An improvement in political and trade relations between Russia and the EU was a more likely area for success according to both Russians and non-Russians.

COMPARISON WITH THE ALL-RUSSIA SURVEY RESPONSES

Important for Russian Experts vs. for General Russian Population

Following its own survey, the EU-Russia Centre engaged leading Russian polling organisation, the Levada-Centre to put the same questions to an all-Russia sample of 1600 people. According to the results of this survey, undertaken in June 2009, the leading two problems that worry the population and experts are the same: corruption in the police, army and civil service, and the need to diversify the economy. However, the general population was much more worried about the need to improve relations with Russia’s international partners. Interestingly, Russians regarded the need to improve relations with former USSR countries, Europe and US as equally important. 85% of respondents from this all-Russian sample considered it important or very important for Russia to work with EU to resist the global economic crisis. Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that crisis is felt more acutely in the Russian regions where the majority of Levada-Centre respondents came from, rather than those in the offices of NGOs and think-tanks.

The necessity to establish a genuinely independent judiciary was also among the most important problems, with 82% of all-Russia respondents rating it as such.

The least important problem for ordinary Russians was freeing political prisoners. This may be due to the fact that Russian television, the main source of information and news for the majority of population, does not cover such uncomfortable topic.

Likely for Russian Experts vs. for General Russian Population

The general Russian population was much more optimistic about Mr. Medvedev’s likelihood of tackling the above problems than the Russian experts surveyed by the EU-Russia Centre. Like the experts, they believe that the prospect of Russia working with the EU to resist the economic crisis the most likely of all to happen (77%), closely followed by the probability of improving relations with the EU and the USA (76%).

68% of Levada-Centre respondents versus just 12% of Russian experts believed that Russia will diversify its economy.

While more optimistic, the general population shared the experts’ view that freeing political prisoners was the least likely problem to be tackled (38%).

CONCLUSIONS

There are three main conclusions of EU-RC’s expert survey:

• All three groups surveyed (Russian expert community, international expert community and Russian general public) identify largely the same burning issues that need to be tackled by the current administration. But while this is the case, we see significantly more optimism in general public opinion that these problems might be addressed in the immediate future. This can partly be explained by their exposure to the Russian state- owned (and controlled) television and the fact that they rarely actively seek alternative sources of independent information.

• Western respondents’ scepticism of the President’s ability, and desire, to address these problems can also be explained by the diversity of information sources that are available to this group. Their analysis of facts and figures and their predictions outlined in this survey are more objective than those of the Russian general public and even Russian analysts. Therefore, there is an obvious gap between the messages that the Kremlin wants to send to its international counterparts, and the perception of those counterparts of the real picture.

• All surveyed groups saw the outward-looking policies of Russia working with EU and improving its relations with the West as more realistic than the domestic challenges of freeing political prisoners, introducing jury trials and allowing the development of a truly independent media. This demonstrates the relative success of the current administration in communicating the importance of Russia’s constructive interaction with the outside world. At the same time, it shows a lack of hope for the much needed internal democratic changes.

RESPONDENT COMMENTS

“Helps the mutual understanding of EU - Russia goals in a partnership context, there needs to be paradigm change in relations of peoples and policies” EU Council Secretariat Member “Russians are good pupils. Right now they are quite cautious of turning their own bureaucracy and corruption, transparent, well-known and expensive, into EU-style bureaucracy and corruption - unknown, unpredictable and much more expensive. Learning from what EU and US SAY, led to effective destruction of the state; learning from what EU and US DO - turns it into a stable state under obstruction. The problem now is there are no good examples of success, except China. Which is not an option” Russian Think Tank “There is not much point in focusing on Medvedev. It seems Putin is coming back to the presidency. How else can one explain the urgent changes to the constitution after eight years in which the president claimed that it was not necessary to change it? If there is no free press, civil society, or political opposition, efforts to fight corruption are meaningless” US Think Tank “I am afraid there will be a huge gap between what is needed and what is likely. I only think that fight against corruption will increase since there is interest among elites in fighting corruption (and therefore strengthen state apparatus on local level)” Czech Think Tank “Very interesting. Having lived through the 'cold war' years it is a real pleasure to see Russia opening up. I have a lot of confidence in both President Medvedev and PM Putin” British Businessman “I'm extremely interested in the relations between Europe and Russia. For me, Russia belongs more to Europe. Russian history, art and culture have made an impact on European culture throughout history. We have to be together even if we think differently” Belgian Student “Mr. Medvedev remains a dependent (ex-KGB oligarchy with Mr. Putin at its head) figure that will not change anything substantially in the current "balance of interests" of various power- groups in Russia” Lithuanian Think Tank “Words for Mr Medvedev: “Don't let Putin bulldoze your own plans. If you cannot perform the duties and responsibilities of the presidency independently and with your own vision, then the best course is to resign and call new elections. Just don't hand the presidency to Putin. He has bullied the constitution long enough.”“ Worldwide NGO Member “Mr Medvedev doesn`t show himself as an independent figure. Everything we see now looks like Mr Putin`s work. I cannot find any difference between them.” Russian Journalist “Excellent but to be repeated on a very regular basis to adequately measure the ongoing evolution” Swiss Financier “Very good idea. Let us be more interactive and faster in thinking and in action as the changes are faster than ever” Polish Academic “Very timely survey. I would like to suggest a follow-up conference with European Russia experts and politicians on exactly these issues” German Politician

Assessing Dmitry Medvedev's Role

Marie Mendras

Professor, London School of Economics

More than a year has passed since Dmitry Medvedev took office in May 2008, and a general consensus has emerged in Russia and abroad as to his position: the new President is a loyal and efficient Number Two in a system of rule which is still dominated by Vladimir Putin. Some observers like to use the term "tandem", while others refute it and instead emphasise the limits of Medvedev's say in decision making.

A SURVEY OF CRITICAL OPINIONS

The EU-Russia Centre survey sheds new light on the issue of how Russia is ruled. It is a survey that does not claim to be representative of Russian and non Russian élite’s views of Medvedev. Questions were posted on the Centre's website and 237 individuals responded. Those who decided to take the time to give their opinion were people with a high level of interest in Russian politics and a critical view of the Putin regime. Most of the questions asked would have put off those Russians and non Russians who strongly support Moscow's policies.

The survey questions were devised with an emphasis on issues surrounding the rule of law and the accountability of government. They are worded in a way that makes the concerns of the EU-Russia Centre clear: the crippled rule of law, the absence of an independent judiciary and the rise of arbitrary rule-making and corruption. It explains the choice of a question such as: "How important, and how likely, is it that the Medvedev administration will free political prisoners?"

For example, many in Russia and in Europe do not agree with the proposition that Mikhail Khodorkovsky is a political prisoner. By and large, all survey respondents seemed to agree that he and his former Yukos associates are political prisoners. This shows that the individuals who wished to answer the questions are more critical of the Russian regime than average, and are more convinced that human rights and rule of law are essential conditions for the successful modernisation of Russia. They belong to the enlightened and engaged élites.

THE MOST IMPORTANT NEEDS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE MET UNDER THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP

The most powerful finding of the survey was the surprisingly large gap between what respondents saw as urgent issues and the likeliness of their implementation. Eighty Nine per cent considered the fight against corruption to be the main issue that President Medvedev should address, but only 9% thought it likely. On this score, Russians and non Russians alike were very pessimistic about

the probability of corruption, criminality and dependent judiciary being seriously tackled by the current administration in Moscow.

More interesting still is the political implication of the findings. The most crucial matters are the least likely to be successfully solved by the current administration. This daunting conclusion raises another fundamental question: What is actually possible? Would it be possible for a different Russian government to fight corruption, make the courts more independent and administrations more accountable? Would it be possible for a different leadership to accept political opposition, pluralism and free elections?

The survey data clearly suggest that, if asked, the majority of the respondents would answer that most of the needed reforms and actions could be possible if the current leadership really wanted to implement them. But the stumbling block is the Medvedev/Putin ruling group which does not intend to follow such recommendations and modernise Russia in a democratic way. More and more hints are filtering out from official think tanks and spin doctors in Moscow that "Russia does not need to be democratic", "Russia does not have to go for Western values nor to abide by European directives".

If the leadership wanted to steer another course, progress in all of the issues raised in the survey would be possible. One can safely assume that, if allowed to think that an alternative to the present ruling group is not impossible, most respondents would say that methods of government in Russia could be improved. Russia is not a poor country, its energy resources remain a considerable asset, its national security is not threatened by any foreign power, even if it claims to be "besieged" by NATO enlargement ambitions. As a result, given these conditions, why can’t Russia fare better in political and social reforms?

An interesting finding of the survey is the assessment of European-Russian cooperation. An improvement of the relationship is the only ray of hope in the expectations of the respondents, probably because the issue is not strictly an internal Russian affair. When progress depends not only on Moscow's attitude, but also on European governments' attitudes, more optimism was voiced.

THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF THE "NON-SUCCESSION" SCENARIO

Dmitry Medvedev's appointment was not a succession to Putin; it was a twist of the institutional machinery to make it possible for the leader to stay on in a revamped position of head of government and president of the ruling party.

The scenario of "no-succession" was thought out in the Kremlin during 2006 and 2007, when it was decided that Putin should stay as the supreme leader of Russia, whatever the "institutional" device used. This final scenario was the following: Dmitry Medvedev was presented as Putin's protégé, in a "race" that only he could win, and Russian voters were asked to confirm the decision in an unfair electoral process.

Vladimir Putin had become the head of the dominant party, United Russia, in October 2007, two months before the Duma elections - a clear indication that he would be appointed Prime Minister by the new President immediately after taking the oath. And this is indeed what happened in a neatly organised ritual with no pretence that things had not been planned in advance. No detail had been left to chance.

This preordained game of musical chairs was devised in a time of economic growth and Russian energy supremacy in Europe. It did not take into account the possibility of an economic downturn and a weakening of Russia's position in world affairs. Now that Russia has been severely hit by the economic crisis, both the relevance of the Medvedev scenario and the efficiency of the Putin/Medvedev administration are called into question in the context of aggravated economic and social ills.

This raises the question of Medvedev's, and ultimately, Putin's legitimacy. As Prime Minister, Putin is officially in charge of the economy and social policies. When he was President, he already ran the economy. The difference now is that he can be targeted as directly accountable for economic mismanagement and social disturbances. The oligarchic structure that presides over the most powerful state and private companies has been thrown off balance by the financial downturn. On no major issue did President Medvedev clearly stand out with his own policies and defy Putin's authority.

The irony of the situation is that the "after Putin, Putin" scenario was conceived at the time of an all time high in economic growth. The ruling group did not have to worry about legitimacy because they enjoyed support from a population satisfied with its rising living standards. It also benefited from a benign attitude on the part of the European partners. Since the end of 2008, the issue of poor government and ill management of the crisis has been on everyone's lips, and the rulers have to face growing discontent and distrust, alongside gloomy prospects. The question of the legitimacy of an authoritarian regime crops up when rulers can no longer deliver and mass repression is no longer a practical alternative.

MEDVEDEV AND THE RULE OF LAW

The new President has been given free rein to renew the rhetoric on law enforcement, independent judiciary and civil liberties. Was he meant to improve the situation in the realm of human rights and liberties, thereby reversing Putin's policies of controlling the media and thwarting the rights of any opposition?

A more likely explanation is that Medvedev is free to entertain this part of the political debate because the sphere of human rights, NGOs and civil liberties are not deemed to be strategic by the leadership. Medvedev can talk about it, gather councils and commissions, but not much needs to happen. What appears to be useful to the leadership is that it raises some curiosity and creates a blurred veil around the possibility of a very modest improvement. At the beginning of 2009, some

Russian intellectuals even played with the idea of a new political thaw and have readily accepted being co-opted into official organisations.

In the meantime, several events have taken place which reminded everyone of the continuation of authoritarian methods, in particular the second trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev, which is being undertaken in the most unfair conditions. Impunity for the assassins of journalists and lawyers still appears to hold.

PUTIN: PRESIDENT AGAIN?

Since the autumn of 2008, various moves have hinted at Putin's preparation for an early return to the Presidency. The major sign was the rushed constitutional revision. The next President will be elected for six years (instead of four), the next Duma for five years (instead of four). In May 2009, Medvedev pushed through a reform of the constitutional court that did not go unnoticed. The chair and deputy chairs of the highest judiciary will no longer be elected by their peers, but appointed by the President of Russia.

The question of which position Putin officially occupies may not be as significant as we naturally tend to think. The leader undoubtedly would have preferred to remain head of state. But now that executive powers have been reorganised in his favour, and Medvedev has proved to be very loyal, the new set-up may turn out to be sustainable. The reality is that in today's Russia, institutions do not matter that much. In a reply to French journalists concerned about the new division of prerogatives between him and Medvedev, Putin said: "The way in which roles and ambitions are divided is secondary. (…) If Russia succeeds in modernising itself, the organisation of power at the top will not be that significant." (Le Monde, 1st June 2008). It needs also be stressed that Vladimir Putin can stay on indefinitely as Prime Minister, just as long as Medvedev and the Duma remain loyal to him.

To conclude, the positive message conveyed by the survey is the concordance of Russian and non Russian liberal élites' views and expectations. There appears to be no significant gap between the two groups of respondents. Those are fruitful grounds for further communication and partnership.

Marie Mendras is Professor at the London School of Economics and Political Science and chairs the Observatoire de la Russie at CERI - Sciences Po. She is a member of the Board of the EU-Russia Centre. Her last book is Russie. L'envers du pouvoir (Odile Jacob, 2008).

Between the Important and the Possible

The Political Priorities of the Russian Leadership as Seen by the Country’s Citizens by

Lev D. Gudkov

Levada-Centre Director

In June 2009 the Levada Analytical Centre carried out a survey, commissioned by the EU-Russia Centre, to determine what importance Russian citizens attach to the State’s various policies. The results indicate that there is a strong divergence in popular opinion between what people regard as important and significant for the country as a whole (i.e. to safeguard national interests), and what they believe can realistically be achieved. The latter depends on the perceived desire and readiness of the Russian authorities to implement such a policy and whether they have the opportunity and resources to do so. The poll was conducted between 19 and 22 June 2009 among a representative sample of 1,600 individuals, aged 18 years and over. Table1 A. How important do you consider the measures listed below to be as means of reform in Russia? B. How likely do you think it is that these measures will be implemented?

А B

Most Least Very likely Unlikely important important + + Fairly Not important important*

Fight corruption in the police, army and the 86 5 27 31 civil service

Diversify the economy away from one based 80 9 39 22 on oil and gas

Introduce juries into more trials 69 29 36 24

Improve relations with neighbouring states 69 13 35 24 (Georgia, Ukraine etc)

Work with the EU on resisting the global 67 14 46 14 economic crisis

Improve relations with the USA and the EU 65 13 40 15

Work towards increasing genuine 62 18 20 35 independence of judiciary system

Allow the development of truly independent 51 22 23 35 media

Introduce and implement laws to protect 40 35 30 20 foreign investment in the Russian economy

Facilitate the registration and development of 32 43 21 27 NGOs

Free political prisoners 25 51 15 39

* including ‘Don’t Know’ or ‘Undecided’

Respondents considered that a low priority was assigned to those areas of State policy that might be and should be aimed at developing civil society and regularising its relations with the State. The suggestion that favourable conditions be established for the functioning of NGOs; that limits be placed on State authoritarianism and police abuse of power; and an end be put to politically motivated criminal cases were not popular. They did not see a high priority given to efforts to make Russia’s society and economy more open and create conditions to attract Western capital and technology. Even when expressed in the most general and non-committal terms, such tasks were rated as significant by a minority of no more than 25-40%. An additional and indirect confirmation of the low importance of these policies is the high percentage of those who do not believe that the authorities intend to implement such changes (from 20 to 39%). The lowest priority in the list, which is the subject of no discussion whatsoever, let alone public influence, is given to issues relating to the conduct of the political police and the punishment or harassment of individuals on political grounds. The will of the country’s top leadership in matters which they consider to be their own sphere of interest (“politically motivated” areas) remain off-limits for discussion in the eyes of the majority of Russia’s citizens. As in Soviet times, these subjects are taboo.

For illustration let us look at the data in table 1 (by showing the difference between positive and negative responses) and classify the answers according to their perceived degree of importance:

Table 2

How Important vs. How Likely

Inportant (- Likely (- Least important) Unlikely)

Fight corruption in the police, army and the civil service 81 - 4

Diversify the economy away from one based on oil and gas 71 17

Improve relations with neighbouring states (Georgia, Ukraine 56 11 etc)

Work with the EU on resisting the global economic crisis 53 32

Improve relations with the USA and the EU 52 25

Work towards increasing genuine independence of judiciary 44 -15 system

Introduce juries into more trials 40 12

Allow the development of truly independent media 29 -12

Introduce and implement laws to protect foreign investment 5 10 in the Russian economy

Facilitate the registration and development of NGOs -9 -6

Free political prisoners -26 -24

We can distinguish two kinds of priority among these political goals.

1. The first concerns limiting the official abuse of power and raising the efficiency of the State; the development of the economy, its diversification and the necessity and desirability of redirecting the economy towards people’s real interests, i.e. making it a priority for the economy to respond to internal demand; stimulating the real sector of the economy and not just those profitable branches, e.g. the oil and gas industry, which provides the State with its highest income but do not directly lead to any improvement in the lives of the majority of the population.

2. Ensuring peaceful relations with neighbouring countries by normalising Russia’s existence as a State, and recognising the undesirability of maintaining a constant state of mobilisation and external threat. This requires a consistent policy of improving relations

both with Russia’s immediate neighbours and with its main or symbolic opponent, the West (the USA and the European Union).

Table 3

What is your view of relations between the authorities and the ordinary people in Russia?

Replies ranked according to responses given in 2000 survey April 2000 February 2008

The regime and the people have different interests. In 37 42 difficult times when there is of internal upheaval and external threats, however, they act as one Even in the most difficult times the regime lives its own lif 31 28 separate from that of the ordinary people The regime and the people are always working against on 11 8 another The regime and the people are usually united in their goal 9 11 and aspirations Don’t know 12 11

Table 4

What's your general opinion: do the processes of government in Russia today benefit a small group of people who are only concerned with their own interests or the majority of the population?

February 1998 June 2008

Benefit most people 8 28

Benefit a small group of people who are 80 56 only concerned with their own interests

Don’t know 12 16

How respondents rank these political tasks differs markedly from their view as to the likelihood of their implementation, i.e. the readiness of the present Russian leadership to strive to fulfil the tasks that are important in the eyes of ordinary citizens. Moreover, this divergence between the interests of the population as a whole and those of the regime do not seem extraordinary to 23

Russia’s citizens. On the contrary, they are part of an established contradiction between a society that is dependent on the State and yet has no means of influencing let alone monitoring and supervising the activities of that State.

Only one in ten Russians believes that the interests of society and the State coincide in everyday life. The overwhelming majority (up to 80%) consider the two to be fundamentally divergent. An even greater number among those polled (87%) say that people like themselves are in no position to influence the course of political events, i.e. the taking of political decisions, in Russia. These views are strengthened in times of crisis, and those preceding a crisis, and weakened in periods of well-being. In either situation they remain the predominant attitude among the mass of the population towards the authorities and to what is going on in Russia.

Russian society sees the most important task among those cited in the survey as the fight against corruption. At the same time, respondents do not just view the probability that the authorities will implement such a policy as minimal: they are firmly convinced that the authorities will not engage in such a policy. Less important, but still given a high priority by the public, is the task of creating independent courts and freedom for the media – whether from the authorities, from oligarchs or from the rich. This is seen as even less likely to be implemented.

It is important to emphasise that social and group differences can be linked to the significance or priority attributed to particular political goals, but not to the probability that such policies might be implemented.

The higher the level of education, training, income and status of the individual, and the more well- informed she or he is (representing the individual’s total social and cultural capital), the more definite his or her concern about political punishment and persecution, the prospects for democracy, and the formation of a more open economy and civil society.

These differences have no influence, however, on the degree to which the individual believes that the authorities will or will not implement a certain political programme. In other words, views about the importance of one or another policy are linked to the social position and resources of a group while their assessment of the likelihood of a policy being implemented arises from more general, undifferentiated collective views about the nature of power in Russian society, the interests of the regime and its readiness or unwillingness to implement the corresponding set of polices.

The EU as Seen in the Mirror of Russian TV: Retuning the Old System, or Giving it a Complete Upgrade? by

Elena Prokhorova, Analyst, and Eugenia Vesanto, EU-RC Information Centre Director

Since early 2007, EU-Russia Centre analysts have constantly monitored and analysed the news and commentary on Russian television dedicated to the development of relations between the European Union and Russia, and within EU member states themselves.

The accession of a new president in May 2008 forced Russian television, by then clearly under the influence of the Kremlin, to seek a new approach. It had to adopt a new tone, even a new language, in which to present news to Russia’s citizens. President Medvedev was looking for different ways of communicating with ordinary Russians, the country’s elite and those of other states, as well as local and foreign journalists. This quest extended to the coverage by Russia’s national TV channels of political events abroad. In this survey, we analyse the changes that have taken place during the first year of Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency. It reveals clearly defined phases.

From May to July 2008, TV propagandists attempted to define the new president’s approach to foreign policy. The following two months were marked by a fierce information war with the West (which Russia lost), prompted by the conflict in Georgia. From October to December 2008, the focus shifted to explaining the causes of the financial crisis.

This year opened with Russian TV analysing the reasons behind the ‘gas war’. In spring, from March to April 2009, Russian commentators cooled rapidly in their assessment of the EU’s stance towards Russia. Finally, at the end of April, the country’s major TV channels began to actively promote President Medvedev’s credentials as an innovative politician offering a solution to complex, shared problems.

MAY-JULY 2008: SEEKING DEFINITION

After the presidential elections, Russian television displayed clear signs of confusion. For the previous eight years this omnipresent medium had revolved around a single political figure, Vladimir Putin. As president he had imbued the TV ‘reality show’ with meaning and structure. Images of Putin scolding ministers or unmasking Western plots to weaken Russia were shown clearly and transmitted powerful messages. All TV editors and commentators had to do was supply these close-up images with appropriate commentary.

It was not surprising therefore, that May 2008 on Russian TV was the quietest and most uneventful month of the year to date. As it sought for ways in which to reflect the personality of the incoming president and his views on the foreign policy agenda, Russian television refrained from any meaningful foreign policy discourse. This was in stark contrast to the heated debates about Russia’s role in European and global affairs, which had marked President Putin’s last 12 months in office.

May 2008 also saw the first attempts to formulate the new Medvedev approach to international relations as a whole and to the EU in particular. The tentative atmosphere was summed up on Russian television by Alexei Pushkov, on the ‘Postscriptum’ analytical programme, when he outlined the key tasks facing Russia’s new leadership. In his view, the Kremlin had “to strike a happy balance between the need to modernise the country and the need to protect its legitimate interests in the outside world” (TV Centre, 10 May 2008)

Pushkov attacked the liberal wing of Russia’s political establishment, (which was believed to include Medvedev and some members of his inner circle), for advocating “a Russian version of the Chinese model”. He pointed out that the liberals wanted Russia to seek a leading role in global affairs through technological modernisation and improvement of its citizens’ quality of life. According to Pushkov, the main thrust of such a foreign policy would be to maintain a favourable external environment for internal development, by withdrawing from confrontation and attempting to iron out conflict and disagreements with other major world players.

Hardliners in Moscow’s corridors of power found this stance to be weak and risky. Pushkov sided with these hawks, warning that such a position would inevitably render Russia vulnerable to external threats. The outside world, he declared, was too brutal for Russia to relax. The list of threats and challenges remained formidable: Japan plotting to annex the Kuril Islands; Ukraine knocking on NATO’s door; abuses of the rights of Russian minorities in the Baltic States; and the simmering crisis in the Caucasus ignited by Tbilisi’s ‘conspiracy’ to re-absorb Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Throughout the summer of 2008, Russian TV worked to develop a new image for President Medvedev. The distinguishing feature of Russia’s new president was that he was more gentle and subdued than his predecessor. Medvedev’s good ‘table manners’ and friendly tone were manifest during his official visit to Germany in early June, which received extensive coverage by all nationwide television channels. Presenters and commentators repeatedly stressed the special character of relations between Russia and Germany. Chancellor Angela Merkel was portrayed as seeking to personally ensure the continuity of a close partnership between the two countries, an achievement largely attributed to Vladimir Putin.

All TV reports and comments from the summit meeting in Berlin that month highlighted signs of personal chemistry between the two leaders and stressed that they had many features in common: both belong to a post-Cold War generation; and both seek to build “relations based on mutual respect, candour and healthy pragmatism” (‘Vremya’, Channel One, 5 June 2008). The two leading nationwide channels, Rossiya and Channel One, reported that Germany faces a complex task in 26

navigating its way in a European Union torn between the conflicting positions of its member states. According to the ‘Vesti’ news programme, Chancellor Merkel made it clear in her talks with Medvedev that she was unhappy about the New Europeans’ obstructive behaviour, questioning whether they were attempting to delay negotiations on a new EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, or to obstruct plans to build the Nord Stream gas pipe line (‘Vesti’, Rossiya, 5 June 2008).

All TV channels widely commented on Medvedev’s idea of creating a new ‘Europe-wide political and security structure’, extending from Vancouver to Vladivostok, which was presented as a new Helsinki Act for the 21st century. After the end of the Cold War, Medvedev was quoted as saying, Russia, the EU and the USA enjoyed all the necessary preconditions for equal cooperation. However, he added, Russia does not see enthusiasm in the West for the idea of rapprochement (‘Vremya’, Channel One, 5 June 2008).

Several TV channels broadcast comments by German officials and business leaders praising Medvedev as a modern progressive statesman. Some were quoted as saying, for example, that “the election of Medvedev was a great opportunity for Russia and a stroke of luck for Europe as well”. Others expressed the hope that Russia’s president would find solutions to problems which were dividing Europe and Russia (‘Vremya’, Channel One, 8 June 2008).

The softer, ‘European’ image of Russia’s new president often conflicted with harsh assessments of events within the EU. This undoubtedly continued a trend that had been firmly adopted under President Putin - itself a legacy of the Soviet coverage of events in the Western world. In June 2008, for instance, the collapse of the Irish referendum on the European Constitution provoked a torrent of sarcastic comment. Presenters and commentators competed to find metaphors dramatic enough to describe the depth of the political crisis that had seized the European Union on the one hand, and the size of the gap separating grass-roots Europeans from the malevolent Brussels bureaucracy, on the other.

The ‘Vesti’ news programme on Rossiya went furthest. “… a small country, Ireland, has inflicted an irreparable blow to Brussels’ global ambitions”, the presenter announced, “by rejecting the so- called underground Constitution” (the Lisbon Treaty). “Once again the Eurocrats have tried to impose the Constitution by stealth.” He concluded: “This will have far-reaching consequences as the document has no alternatives.” A guest commentator then declared that “the ideas of European integration have suffered a complete fiasco”. He expressed a view, widespread among Russian experts, that the treaty’s current failure could be largely attributed to a deep-seated and growing unease among Europeans about the consequences of EU enlargement to the East (‘Vesti’, Rossiya, 13 June 2008).

More reflections on Russia’s political choices were provoked by the EU-Russia summit in Khanty- Mansiisk. This kick-started the long overdue negotiations on a new Partnership and Cooperation Agreement and reports from Siberia were largely balanced, describing the atmosphere at the high level meeting as friendly and relaxed. A post-mortem on the summit conducted by a number of commentators led them to conclude that Europe had moved some way towards understanding that 27

Russia deserved to be treated as an equal partner. However, the general view was still that “the EU is making excessive demands”, to quote one of Moscow’s leading political analysts, Sergei Karaganov.

In Karaganov’s view, the EU still tended to approach Russia with a yardstick it normally applied to the countries of North Africa, for example, on energy issues. The analyst specifically referred to Western companies seeking to acquire Siberian oil and gas fields. It was only natural, he maintained, that Russia should try to curb foreign involvement in strategic sectors. Why not build joint pipelines, such as Nord Stream, argued Karaganov, and cooperate over energy security (‘Segodnya’, NTV, 29 June 2008)?

Since hopes of liberalisation had proved short-lived, Russian TV did not need to seek any new ideas. It quickly became clear that the media were committed, under the banner of ‘sovereign democracy’, to preserving an unchanged political course. Accordingly, television did not shift one iota towards performing its normal role of holding up a mirror to society and giving a critical analysis of the current state of affairs. Instead, it remained a powerful instrument of propaganda and persuasion in the hands of the ruling elites.

That it was ‘business as usual’ in Russia became apparent in mid-July when President Medvedev unveiled a ‘new’ foreign policy doctrine before a formidable gathering of 250 Russian ambassadors. Numerous comments and interpretations followed, guiding the public through the intricacies of the modern challenges facing the country. Summing up the President’s message, Russia’s ambassador in Afghanistan, Zamir Kabulov, told Channel One that Medvedev had reiterated the need for an “offensive, even aggressive foreign policy”.

On another occasion, a TV anchorman pointed out that a new assertive role as one of the world’s leading powers also gave Russia a responsibility to table practical solutions to outstanding problems, such as the ‘frozen conflicts’ in the former Soviet Union. This led to a discussion of the latest peace initiative for Georgia and Abkhazia put forward by German Foreign Minister, Frank- Walter Steinmeier. The presenter dismissed the plan because it envisaged a return of Georgian refugees at an early stage in a step-by-step blueprint for the conflict’s resolution (‘Postscriptum’, TV Centre, 19 July 2008).

In July, the European Union featured in a mainly negative light on Russian television, portrayed as a bloc of countries with great ambitions, but mired in a profound systemic crisis. By way of illustration, TV programmers exploited the repercussions of the Irish ‘No’ vote to the Lisbon Treaty to the full. National TV channels hurried to report that the Treaty was encountering immense opposition across Europe, especially in the Czech Republic and Poland. It was, therefore, doomed (‘Segodnya’, NTV, 1 July 2008). The EU was also featured in a series of newscasts about the arrest of Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb war criminal. The main conclusion was that the West, and Europe in particular, was heavily biased against Serbia. It placed blame for the atrocities in the last Balkan war wholly at Belgrade’s door, while perpetrators from the Bosnian or Albanian side remained at large. NTV showed Serb nationalist leader, Tomislav Nikolic, accusing his country’s government of “surrendering a national hero to win a few points in Brussels”, in the hope of 28

securing a clear passage to membership (‘Segodnya’, NTV, 23 July 2008). Some commentators claimed that the Karadzic arrest had been orchestrated and stage-managed by the Western secret services, since for three days after his arrest his whereabouts had been unknown to the Serb police. According to a presenter on the Vesti news programme, the Serb parliament broke up for an unexpected recess in order to prevent an outbreak of public indignation against “selling out Serbia to the West” (‘Vesti’, Rossiya, 23 July 2008).

Individual EU member states continued to be classified as friends or enemies of Russia by most nationwide TV channels. This time Italy was a friend, following a meeting in Moscow between Medvedev and Giorgio Napolitano, the Italian President. The latter was widely quoted as supporting Medvedev’s idea of launching multilateral consultations in order to draw up a new security treaty for Europe (‘Vremya’, Channel One, 16 July 2008). The group of enemies was invariably led by Britain. Anti-British rhetoric on television followed a new exchange of ripostes between Moscow and London in their year-old war of words. This time TV commentators rebuked Downing Street, following MI6 allegations that the Russian State was behind the murder of Alexander Litvinenko, the former Russian KGB agent poisoned with polonium. Soon, Russian secret services exposed an alleged British spy working under the guise of counsellor at the UK’s Moscow embassy. Certain reports hinted vaguely that this ‘spy’ was also somehow implicated in the BP-TNK affair. Russia’s ambassador in the UK described the tension between Moscow and London as follows: “There is a faction, a group of forces in Britain, which wants to prevent the normalisation of our relations. I mean the political sphere above all, since everything is going very well in the economic domain” (‘Segodnya’, NTV, 11 July 2008).

Not surprisingly, the group of Russia’s enemies within the EU included Estonia. This time its President, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, dared to suggest in a formal speech that Russia’s Karelians who, like Estonians, are members of the Finno-Ugric family of ethnic groups, might also ‘choose freedom’ one day. A newscast on TV Centre reported this event as “An Estonian provocation at Presidential level” (‘Postscriptum’, 12 July 2008). Like Estonia, Lithuania was seen as a country seeking to rewrite history and thus split the EU’s ranks. A new wave of criticism against the Baltic state on Russian television was prompted by the Lithuanian parliament’s decision to ban Soviet symbols in a move which implied parallels between the Soviet regime and Nazi Germany. A commentator on TV Centre pointed out that “a large part of Lithuania’s present leadership were people who lived very well under the Soviet regime … Twenty years ago many of them were staunch Communists” (‘Postscriptum’, 12 July 2008).

Such stark images of the world were too primitive to accommodate certain political developments. So, these either did not make it to the TV screen or left more questions than answers. Take the interpretation of Bulgaria’s foreign policy. Russian propaganda had more or less digested the fact that Bulgaria, a historically and fraternal Slavic nation, now formed part of the transatlantic arena. When Sofia moved to recognise Kosovo, however, this was met with a measure of bewilderment. REN TV, one of the few semi-independent national channels, remarked that “the policy of Balkan diplomats has become bizarre. Alongside Croatia, Bulgaria had now recognised Kosovo’s

independence, which complicated relations with Russia”. No attempt was made to explain or discuss why Bulgaria took this decision (‘24’, 7 July 2008).

AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 2008: INFORMATION WAR

The coverage of the Caucasus crisis by Russian television began as a communications disaster. Then, gradually, it grew into a large-scale PR campaign targeting both domestic and foreign audiences. The TV narrative after 7 August helped measure the temperature of public perceptions and political thinking in Russia following an event which President Medvedev likened, in terms of its potential fallout for world affairs, to America’s 9/11.

Given the failure to render a coherent picture on television in the early days of the war, Russia’s claims that it was caught off-guard by Georgia’s attack on Tskhinvali might well have been true. No information strategy was in evidence. TV managers and editors seemed at a loss on how to report the events. Amid inconsistent messages and conflicting interpretations, commentators fell back on the dusty cliché of the ‘evil West’ as the force behind Georgia’s aggression. For a while, this assumption provided the much-needed logical framework for interpreting Russia’s seemingly dubious moves in the Caucasus.

Anti-Western hysteria reached its peak on 25 August when two nationwide TV channels, Rossiya and Channel One, broadcast debates taking place in the Russian parliament. At issue was the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Inflammatory speeches by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, Gennady Zyuganov and other Duma deputies provided a massive dose of nationalist propaganda as they portrayed ‘Washington and Brussels’ as Tbilisi’s ‘bosses’ and ‘sponsors’. Emotions ran high. This contributed to a sharp surge, registered by several polling institutes shortly afterwards, in public support for Moscow’s macho foreign policy.

By late August, Russian spin doctors had apparently concluded that Moscow was not up to the mark in handling the looming PR crisis. Some damage control measures were promptly taken. TV commentators started to closely follow Western reactions to Russia’s questionable moves in the Caucasus. The initial negative response in the West was seen as a sign of a propaganda offensive against Russia. Later, as Russia’s own information campaign became more nuanced, Russia’s West-watchers reported a definite shift in public perception across Europe. Leading national TV channels instantly announced that Russia’s arguments had finally been heard.

TV commentators started stressing that the West was not monolithic in its attitude. Instances of positive or neutral remarks by Western politicians were duly reported in newscasts. Spanish and German media were particularly praised for taking a balanced view. Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister, Karel De Gucht, was commended for saying that events in the Caucasus had been caused by “Georgia’s big mistake which brought the world to the verge of a new Cold War” (‘Vremya’, Channel One, 14 September 2008). An interview given by Czech President, Vaclav Klaus, to a Japanese daily newspaper was broadcast by all of the nationwide TV channels. “It would be a tragic

mistake to picture Russia as a villain and again divide the world in two. Russia is not the former Soviet Union,” he was quoted as saying. Klaus’ remarks were extensively used to substantiate Russia’s official position, i.e. that “Georgia was the first to attack South Ossetia” and “If there had been no Kosovo, no recognition of its independence would have taken place” (‘Vremya’, Channel One, 15 September 2008). With time, the primitive image of the ‘evil West’ gave way to a clear distinction between the US on the one hand and Europe on the other.

Shuttle diplomacy by the EU presidency played a key part in rebranding the image of Europe in the eyes of Russian TV viewers. The tone of the comments changed drastically when Nicolas Sarkozy emerged as the face and voice of Europe, bringing with him the energy of personal engagement. Sarkozy’s initiative had already received a cautious welcome among political observers at the time of the first round of talks in Moscow on 12 August. Following the second round on 8 September, Foreign Affairs Minister, Sergei Lavrov, declared that the EU could be fully trusted as a guarantor of peace in the region (‘Vremya’, Channel One, 15 September 2008).

Europe emerged as a counterweight to the United States. Remarks by Sergei Markov, director of the Institute of Political Studies in Moscow, typify the apparent change of attitude in Moscow: “In this situation, the EU is our ally rather than adversary, since it is also interested in preserving peace and security in the Caucasus and elsewhere in Europe. It is not Washington which wants to drive a wedge between us [and Europe], but a narrow grouping of neo-cons embodied by Dick Cheney and [presidential] candidate John McCain who are trying to simulate the Cold War. We do not want another Cold War. Together with the Europeans we shall stand in the way of such plans.” In his words, “while the EU is keen to preserve peace and stability in the Caucasus, the US is interested to see a war break out there. We are in for a very hard period. We need to preserve maximum calm and reserve. The focus should be on negotiating with our partners” (‘Sobytiya’, TV Centre, 26 August 2008)

Judging by the television narrative over the previous month, most Russian political observers blamed the US for playing a dangerous geopolitical game in Russia’s backyard, namely arming Tbilisi, pressing ahead with the missile defence plans in Eastern Europe and supporting pro-NATO factions in Georgia and Ukraine. Perceptions of Europe varied. Some commentators took a positive view; others warned that the EU could not be trusted.

Talking on analytical programme ‘Postscriptum’, Mikhail Demurin (ex-diplomat turned political observer) pointed to the EU role in the Balkans. In his words, Russia had already failed once before “to contain the aggression of EU and NATO countries in the former Yugoslavia”; now it might fail again in the Caucasus. His worst case scenario was that European observers in the region might, at some stage, “turn a blind eye to Georgian incursions into Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while preventing Russian retaliation” (TV Centre, 13 September 2008).

Russia’s ambivalent attitude towards Europe was neatly summed up by Mikhail Margelov, Chairman of the Duma’s Foreign Affairs Committee. “We should not allow others to drive a wedge between us and Europe. On the other hand, we should discourage our European partners from usurping the notion of ‘Europe’. Russia is also Europe, to no less a degree than Paris, Brussels, 31

Lisbon or London. Geographically, they are oriented towards the Atlantic, while we are oriented towards the Pacific. So, let us skip the ideology and build our foreign policy on pragmatic grounds” (‘Sobytiya’, TV Centre, 9 September 2008).

The Caucasus crisis breathed new life into the debate about Russia’s national interests. President Medvedev solemnly declared on all nationwide TV channels that Russia had lost its final illusions as far as the current security system was concerned and he invoked his earlier calls for the construction of a new security system that would “insure against yet another Saakashvili going off the rails” (‘Vremya’, Channel One, 14 September 2008). Pro-Kremlin observer Mikhail Leontyev summed up the lessons learned by Russia: “We should stop lamenting that nobody likes or understands us … They [the West] will not appreciate Russia. To survive, we should forget, at least for the time being, about the so-called international community. It does not exist. We should do what our conscience and our obligations prompt us to do” (‘Odnako’, Channel One, 10 August 2008).

The war emboldened the hawkish camp of Russia’s political classes, who now felt vindicated by the turn of events. Since the start of hostilities, hard-line commentators were given a free hand on all nationwide TV channels. In their view, the war in the Caucasus merely exposed the deep systemic crisis in East-West relations, which had been in evidence long before August 2008.

For observant TV viewers, the coverage of the Caucasus crisis by Russian television provided some useful food for thought. It was instructive to re-read some of the statements by President Medvedev in the early days of the war. Categorical and harsh, they were apparently prompted by the need to create the image of a strong leader in charge of the situation. Subsequently, a more conciliatory line emerged, with both Medvedev and Putin stressing that Russia’s integration into the West, especially into Europe, should not be derailed. Which of these two distinctly different lines would eventually prevail at this historical juncture was not yet clear.

OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 2008: FINANCIAL CRISIS

Two themes dominated Russia’s television screens during the next two months: the after-effects of the war with Georgia and the worldwide financial crisis. TV narrative sought to justify Moscow’s actions in the Caucasus and to portray Russia as largely immune to the global economic turmoil. The image of the West as Russia’s collective antagonist was fading away. The US and Europe were now largely seen as actors with increasingly divergent interests.

Despite Russian policy makers’ bravado, which had been particularly vociferous during and after the military intervention in the Caucasus, Moscow appeared to care deeply about its reputation. Its sensitivity to criticism was conspicuous when all the nationwide TV channels broadcast the autumn plenary session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). PACE’s proceedings were under the spotlight of the Russian media due to the emergency debate on the Caucasus conflict. The failure to pass a motion suspending Russia’s membership of the Council was met with great relief. Most newscasters pointed to deep political divisions between ‘Old Europe’ and ‘New Europe’ over Russia, concluding that, in the end, common sense had prevailed.

According to many TV observers, Europe’s initial emotional reactions to Russia’s military campaign in the Caucasus had been induced by the US. In the end, the Europeans drew their own conclusions and adopted a more conciliatory attitude, Boris Mezhuyev, political scientist and historian of philosophy, pointed out. In his words, “this happened because American influence in Europe is rapidly shrinking, especially with the escalation of the credit crunch, and also because the Europeans are increasingly annoyed that the US is pressuring them into taking a coordinated tough stance on Russia”. Mezhuyev believes that Europe, “especially ‘Old Europe’, does not seek confrontation [with Russia] but is looking for pragmatic solutions to the current acute economic challenges”.

In a U-turn from recent belligerent rhetoric, Russia’s leaders were now apparently seeking to strike a conciliatory tone. At the political forum in Evian (France), President Medvedev elaborated on his earlier proposal for a major overhaul of the European security architecture and spoke against granting certain states “exclusive rights to conduct peace-keeping operations in conflict zones” (‘24’, REN TV, 8 October 2008). The French President featured widely in reports from Evian, with TV commentators praising his role in brokering a peace deal in Georgia and pointing to the personal affinity between the Russian and French leaders. By and large, France now featured as a partner and ally in Russian TV narrative.

Germany was also portrayed as one of Russia’s major partners and the embodiment of the legendary pragmatism of ‘Old Europe’. TV cameras followed President Medvedev and Chancellor Merkel during their encounter in St. Petersburg at the so-called ‘St. Petersburg Dialogue’ to discuss bilateral economic and trade issues. Energy predictably topped the agenda. The two leaders signed a deal which gave Germany’s E.ON the privilege of being Gazprom’s key partner in developing the Yuzhno-Russkoye oil and gas field. This enabled Medvedev to declare that “relations between Russia and Germany will remain strategic, irrespective of any cataclysms” (‘Novosti’, Channel One, 5 October 2008). 33

In October, Russian television closely followed the dynamic of Western attitudes to the Kremlin’s foreign policy. While seeing the EU’s role in the Caucasus as constructive, many analysts pointed out that Europe had not come to terms with, and was unlikely to accept, the new status quo which resulted from Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In the future, some insisted, these fundamental disagreements might become an insurmountable obstacle to the rapprochement between Russia and the EU. Commentators stressed that Europe would continue to support Georgia as a country striving to follow the democratic path. They pointed out that Western backing had come in a tangible material form, with the recent donors’ conference in Brussels pledging a $4.5 billion package to boost post-war rehabilitation and economic development – considerably more than expected.

External reaction to Russia’s latest foreign policy moves remained in the spotlight. Newscasts regularly featured the positions adopted by policy-makers and leading international organisations. For example, NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, was cited as calling on Russia to renounce its recognition of Georgia’s two breakaway provinces. Many observers believed that the issue would be raised again in PACE and, before long, lead to a debate about Russia’s membership of the Council of Europe (‘Postscriptum’, TV Centre, 11 October 2008).

At the same time some analysts pointed out that, while calling on Russia to renounce its decision to recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia, European leaders did not really expect Moscow to take this seriously. According to Boris Shmelyov, an expert at the Academy of Sciences’ Institute of Economics, “No self-respecting state would ever do this”. He stated that Europeans were realists and understood all the constraints, adding that the main purpose of Western appeals was different. “This is powerful leverage that secures a solid bargaining position. The West can now pressure Russia into making concessions elsewhere” Shmelyov concluded (‘Postscriptum’, TV Centre, 11 October 2008). Besides, the analyst believed, many in the West were keen to see Russia’s image merge with that of the Soviet Union. Russia as an aggressor revives old fears, he explained, which made it easier to sell Western constituencies projects such as NATO’s further enlargement or the deployment of new missile defence systems in Eastern Europe.

The prospect of Russia’s isolation was still occasionally touched upon in TV talk shows. However, at a time when Russia found itself close to becoming a pariah state, a miracle happened. Russia’s spin doctors could not believe their luck when the global economic crisis started unfolding. They jumped at the opportunity to extract hefty political dividends from the situation, digging for proof that the Western socio-political system was collapsing – as predicted. Francis Fukuyama was particularly helpful. His prophecies were in huge demand in the mainstream media, since they appeared to corroborate what Russia’s leaders had been saying to the West in more recent times. TV observers eagerly echoed Fukuyama’s words that America’s two signature ideas – deregulation and liberal democracy (especially its export brand) – had been badly discredited, while “other models – whether China’s or Russia’s – are looking more and more attractive” (‘Vesti’, Rossiya, 16 October 2008).

Plummeting oil prices and growing economic uncertainties, it appeared, sobered Russia’s political classes. This was highlighted by a narrative on Russian television that was rapidly adjusting to the new realities. To suggest that Russia would remain an oasis of stability amid the storms battering the global economy no longer sounded credible. The myth about Moscow leading a global revolt against Western dominance had apparently fallen to pieces. Both the Kremlin and the Russian government now promoted solidarity with yesterday’s adversaries in an effort to address global challenges.

The change of message was matched by a change of tone and style. In contrast to his harsh speeches in the wake of the war with Georgia, Medvedev now came across on TV as a liberal minded statesman. The president’s trademark soft spoken manners were back, in a sign that the Kremlin had reversed its aggressive anti-Western stance. At issue now was the need to secure a dignified role for Russia among nations shaping the world’s financial, political and security architecture.

TV commentators often stressed that Moscow already plays a major part in this elite club, pointing out for example that it was Russia, alongside France, that proposed convening an emergency G20 summit to address the current economic crisis. Medvedev’s ideas for reforming the European security architecture also featured regularly in TV newscasts and analytical programmes. Rossiya, one of the two main nation-wide channels, recently quoted presidential assistant, Sergei Prikhodko, who said Medvedev would push for a legally binding agreement on European security. “The new pact should set forth common ground rules renouncing the practice of double standards and making sure that no single sovereign state is marginalised,” Prikhodko was quoted as saying (‘Vesti’, Rossiya, 12 November 2008).

Judging by the TV narrative, tensions clouding Russia’s relations with the European Union over the last few years had eased somewhat. Even Britain, the staunchest critic of Moscow’s aggressive neighbourhood policy and its poor democracy track record, now enjoyed neutral to positive TV coverage. The Litvinenko affair had fallen into oblivion; the British Council and the TNK-BP conflicts had exhausted themselves. Medvedev was reported as having had a telephone conversation with Prime Minister Gordon Brown. As Rossiya pointed out: “Both sides stressed the need to coordinate positions on the eve of the G20 summit in Washington; they assessed as positive recent bilateral contacts; and they pledged to enhance the dialogue” (‘Vesti’, Rossiya, 3 November 2008).

These words appeared more than diplomatic niceties. There was a turn-around in the official Russian line as far as London was concerned. This new development may have been helped in part by Britain’s iconic public broadcaster, the BBC. At the end of October, its World Service showed a documentary about the August events in South Ossetia, which was immediately deemed by most Russian commentators as ground-breaking. The film by Tim Whewell featured the capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, crippled by Georgian missile attacks. Numerous accounts by local residents substantiated claims of atrocities perpetrated by the regular Georgian army.

“For the first time ever Western media have given the floor to the eyewitnesses of the hostilities offering an impartial view,” pointed out a commentator on Channel One. “The film is an eye-opener 35

for world public opinion,” he went on to say, adding that the facts revealed in the film radically changed the perspective (‘Novosti’, Channel One, 29 October 2008). Another commentator on Rossiya praised the BBC for choosing to broadcast the documentary in prime time, stressing that it even “came before the breaking news on the American elections and the collapse of financial markets” (‘Vesti’, Rossiya, 30 October 2008).

There are good reasons why the BBC film, seen as the first honest Western account of the events in the Caucasus, triggered an array of comment on Russian television. Russia’s leaders were increasingly concerned about their country’s image, the extent of their concerns being perhaps proportionate to the pace with which the financial crisis was eating into the country’s stabilisation fund. In the wake of the conflict with Georgia, worries were widespread among the Kremlin- connected observers that the underlying motives for Russia’s disproportionate response to the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali had been misinterpreted in the West and had led to Moscow losing ‘the information war’. In a number of post-mortems that followed, voices were raised in favour of a more forthcoming approach towards Western media. Subsequently, an apparent adjustment of the information strategy occurred. The BBC film was seen as a sign that a more liberal information policy bears fruit. Furthermore, Britain enhanced its reputation by adopting a constructive stance over the new comprehensive Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia. On the eve of the recent EU-Russia summit in Nice, London dropped its objections to the talks (alongside Stockholm and Warsaw) which had been suspended earlier in 2008 as a result of Russia’s intervention in the Caucasus.

Moscow toned down considerably its criticism of the West, but did not drop it entirely. For example, international financial institutions were portrayed as dominated by Western interests which were pursuing unscrupulous political goals. TV commentators lamented the fact that countries receiving IMF assistance were “trading their independence for anti-crisis financial packages”. Ukraine was customarily depicted as the latest ‘victim’. Having accepted the terms of the IMF loan in order to survive the present turbulent times, “Kiev has slid deep into the debt pit, leaving the task of clearing up the mess to future generations,” a commentator pointed out (‘Vremya’, Channel One, 4 November 2008). To quote Vyacheslav Nikonov, a political analyst, “IMF loans have always been driven by political motives, with resources being allocated according to the decisions taken in Washington” (‘Vesti’, Rossiya, 3 November 2008). Judging by numerous TV comments, the overall conclusion was that the world financial institutions had to be fundamentally overhauled, with Russia playing a major part in the reform.

The same message lay in a series of reports covering the EU-Russia summit in Nice on 14 November. The high level meeting itself received relatively modest coverage this time, compared with the Round Table of European and Russian industrialists (IRT) in Cannes the day before. This was not surprising given that it “embraces people, who stand for constructive cooperation and loath it when politics gets in the way of economic interests” to quote ‘Vesti’ on Rossiya (13 November 2008).

This was precisely what the Medvedev-Putin tandem was advocating: business and politics should be decoupled; cooperation ought to be based on pragmatic interests rather than common principles and values. While this logic seemed perfectly valid for some of Russia’s European partners until recently, the current economic turbulence may put it into question. Solidarity without common vision looked a superficial slogan.

JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2009: GAS WAR

January was not the easiest time for Russian TV. Russian spin doctors had to work hard in order to present the gas conflict (stretching over most of January) ‘correctly’ and then to explain its outcome ‘correctly’. Most of all, journalists were hindered in their work by the large number of, at times, conflicting news reports. Therefore, immediately after New Year, no ‘conceptual framework’ was provided. The TV effectively broadcast purely information – announcements by Putin, Medvedev and Alexei Miller – while avoiding commentary by journalists. One sacred rule was observed: not a word was given to the Ukrainian side.

By the middle of the month, just before the exit from the ‘gas war’, the need to give some kind of appraisal of what was happening and to offer a conceptual framework, became apparent. Sometimes the style of presentation was completely unexpected. Russian TV channels frequently portrayed the renewal of gas supplies, for instance, as a festivity in the style of old Soviet-era reports on Komsomol construction projects. This was Channel One, for instance, describing renewal of gas supplies to the Ukrainian pipeline system: “One by one, the gas firms are opening all five export gas pipes through which gas will travel first to Slovakia, then to other European countries. The opening of a gas valve was a short solemn ceremony, and workers at the station hurry back to work” (‘Novosti’, Channel One, 20 January 2009). On the next day, the Rossiya channel announced to its viewers that “the European Union was grateful to Russia for solving the problem of gas transit” (‘Vesti +’, Rossiya, 21 January 2009).

At the end of January, television channels began to make attempts to analyse the reasons for, and consequences of, the gas conflict. Naturally, they named the primary reason as the Ukraine’s ill- intentioned desire to get gas on the cheap. Russia stubbornly positioned itself as a power which saved Europe from freezing and which took the Ukraine in hand. The thought, which was distinctly discernible, was that the EU’s interference did not assist in solving the conflict but, on the contrary, prolonged it: “It turned out that a host of problems which resulted in the chronic obstruction of Ukrainian pipes could be solved only through direct negotiations. Russia spoke of this earlier. This was also confirmed following the failure of the European Union’s mediation in the conflict. Control was established over the gas metering system in Ukraine, despite Ukraine’s resistance, naturally. Certainly, they brought up the responsibility of the transit country to supply gas entirely unconditionally. But Kiev nevertheless only lifted the gas blockade of Europe after the prime ministers of the two countries succeeded in agreeing the price of gas for Ukraine. Prime Minister Putin made no secret of his desire for the question not to be reopened” (‘Voskresnoye vremya’, Channel One, 25 January 2009). 37

Television analysts also warned the European Union against falling into another ‘gas trap’, the implementation of the Nabucco project. “This means that instead of one political bomb, called Ukraine, the European Union wants to put itself in the way of another political bomb, called Turkey. Turkey will inevitably blackmail the European Union by demanding entry into the EU in return for use of this new gas pipeline system, since all the gas pipelines one way or another must cross Turkish territory” (Konstantin Simonov, the Foundation for National Energy Security, ‘Voskresnoye vremya’, Channel One, 25 January 2009).

In January, the session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), assessing events in South Ossetia, came to the notice of Russian television. Just before the session, Russian television predicted that PACE could offer a fresh assessment of events in South Ossetia. However, PACE’s position remained unchanged. It was described as follows: “In the opinion of our delegation, the reason is that PACE still erroneously treats the events of August last year as a war between Georgia and Russia” (‘Vremya’, Channel One, Moscow, 28 January 2009).

During January, Russian television also covered the economic crisis in EU countries. Practically all the news channels showed reports of the strikes in France. The economic problems of the Baltic States also came to the notice of Russian television. Their exit from the USSR and entry into the European Union were cited as the reason for these republics’ miserable economic position. “In the years since its independence, Latvia has lost almost everything amassed during the Soviet period. The volume of agricultural production in monetary terms has declined by a factor of 30, the industrial sector by a factor of 9, and the fishing industry by a factor of 13. In those years, Latvia was indeed working hard, but it was not occupied with the sale of imported products of questionable quality, real estate and forestry. Transit, which has existed since the Middle Ages, shrank to an unprecedented volume. The most valuable resource of all, the people themselves, the country’s population, its citizens, abandoned their homes and went abroad in search of earnings” (‘Sobytiya’, TV Centre, 23 January 2009).

Of all the analytical television programmes during January, the NTV programme ‘Chisty ponedelnik’ [Clean Monday] attracted the greatest response. In the printed press and on the internet there was discussion of the themes brought up in the programme and the opinions expressed by its participants. The subject was Russia’s potential response to foreign threats. One of its participants, a young man whose friend had fought in South Ossetia, refused to buy Georgian and Ukrainian goods (the latter because he believed that Ukraine supported Georgia in the conflict). Duma deputy chairman (speaker) Vladimir Zhirinovsky and one of the leaders of the Right Cause party, Leonid Gozman, also took part. The essence of the programme was captured in the following comment by Vladimir Zhirinovsky: “In the event of a threat to Russia, we need to deploy weapons and wage war. If Russia’s admission to any trade organisation is voted down, it is essential to apply sanctions and to declare this intention in advance of negotiations. Then, those countries will not adopt an anti- Russian position. For nations never quarrel – governments do the quarrelling” ('Chisty ponedelnik', NTV, 26 January 2009).

In February 2009, Russian television focused its attention on a small number of foreign policy events. The main theme was the looming financial crisis and predictions about its likely evolution. There were many reports about the disturbances the crisis was provoking in West European countries. Overall, Russian TV tried to maintain a neutral tone. From time to time, however, some rather exotic accusations were made against the IMF and the USA. During his ‘Odnako’ commentary on Channel One (25 February 2009), for example, presenter Mikhail Leontyev announced: “The IMF always imposes shock therapy on the economy of applicant nations, in other words, a deepening recession. Meanwhile the countries that are among the ‘leaders of the global economy’ always relax their monetary policy, i.e. they do just the opposite. That is why the so-called developed countries never apply to the IMF simply for money. They want its remedies since they are quite capable of printing more money. IMF credits are always the lot of the under-developed. ... The European Union is incapable of devising an anti-crisis policy which is remotely independent of the USA. As the generating force behind the crisis, the US will keep on promoting this instability by pumping unsecured funds into its sick economy. The Americans do not want to receive treatment while their satellites cannot be cure”

On the whole, however, Russia’s TV tried to refrain from criticising the West. Even such a sensitive subject for Russia as the discussion of the situation in Georgia at the UN Security Council was presented in a quite neutral fashion. Television gradually abandoned this subject, concentrating instead on aspects of EU-Russia relations that did not involve particular stress and tension. All the main State-run TV channels, for instance, covered the first Council of Europe conference on social stability. It took place in Moscow on February and one of the speakers was Prime Minister Putin. “The venue was not selected by chance,” commented Channel One, in its account of the event. “Participants stressed that Russia, by remaining faithful to its social obligations when faced with the world financial crisis, provided an example worthy of study and emulation” (‘Novosti’, 26 February 2009).

On the other hand, only REN TV told its viewers of the success of former Moscow City Court judge, Olga Kudeshkina, at the European Court of Human Rights. She had complained to Strasbourg that she had been deprived of her position because she publicly resisted the pressure exerted on her during a number of court hearings.

MARCH TO APRIL 2009: RELATIONS COOL

The first foreign policy event to which Russian television devoted its active attention this spring was Medvedev’s visit to Spain. The reports were emphatically positive and journalists emphasised that there were no serious disputes in relations between the two countries. The shared view was expressed by the NTV correspondent: “President Medvedev’s first state visit to Spain passed, one may say, without excess or incident. If only our relations with other European countries were to develop just like this, then things would be wonderful” (‘Segodnya’, NTV, 3 March 2009).

NATO’s decision, taken soon after Medvedev’s visit to Spain, to resume full-scale relations with Russia also helped to soften the tone towards the West. Reports about the meeting between Russian and Hungarian prime ministers were idyllic in tone. In referring to relations with the West, Russia’s journalists frequently made use of the term ‘relaunch’, first used by US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton during her meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. For a few days, the concept became exceptionally popular and commentators explained to their viewers that Russia and the West had been forced to make concessions to each other, faced by the common economic crisis, moving from confrontation to compromise. “In the West, they quite quickly realised that a negative attitude to Russia would do Europe itself no good. European politicians have already begun to say that any break with Russia is full of consequences, above all for European countries” (‘Vremya’, Channel One, 9 March 2009).

If the stance of Russian television softened towards Western European countries, the reaction to the policies of the Baltic States remained extremely tense. Often, it seemed, criticism directed at those countries was aired without any serious pretext. On 12 March, for instance, REN TV discussed the educational problems that Russian children were facing in Estonia. The focus of the item was a Russian girl studying in an Estonian school who was forbidden to speak in her own language during break periods. The same day Channel One broadcast a report about the participation of Estonians and Latvians in punitive operations on Russian territory during World War II.

After mid-March, however, the benevolent attitude towards the European Union vanished. The reason was the statement issued in Brussels regarding the EU and Ukraine and the modernisation of the latter’s gas supply system. Russian television, reflecting the extremely sharp response by President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin to the event, said a great deal about this ‘short- sighted’ and ‘hasty’ move. Discussing the consequences of this declaration, journalists emphasised that without the participation of Russia, Ukraine’s only gas supplier, the plans to modernise the system were not viable.

In particular, journalists voiced the following assumptions: Ukraine would not receive the promised funds from the EU; without Russian specialists nothing could be done, since the supply system was built as part of a unitary network in the Soviet period; and as a consequence, tension between Russia and Ukraine would be further increased.

The signing of such a declaration was presented by TV journalists as a ‘mistake’ by the Eurocrats, since they had not considered the opinions of European gas corporations. The common view of Russian television was most succinctly expressed on NTV: “EU officials now insist that they have been misinterpreted. Russia is welcome to join the project. For the time being, the Russian Federation will not accept such an invitation post factum. The bilateral agreement between Kiev and Brussels cannot work in practice, many believe, and will quietly die a death. If, however, this is part of a systematic and long-term strategy towards Russia then conclusions will be drawn” (NTV, Segodnya: Itogovaya programme, Moscow, 29 March 2009).

In April, the most important foreign events attracting national TV channels in Russia were the G20 summit in London and the meeting, during that summit, between the US and Russian presidents. 40

In their coverage, journalists again began to make active use of the term ‘relaunch’, welcoming the resumption of talks between the USA and Russia about mutual reductions in nuclear arsenals. The analysis of the summit itself was rather muted since none of the journalists – perhaps picking up the mood of the summit participants – could say with any certainty whether the agreed measures would help the world to overcome the crisis or, indeed, what measures had actually been adopted. In unusually diplomatic terms, the atmosphere of uncertainty shrouding the summit was expressed by Arkady Dvorkovich in an interview with the Vesti news programme. “From what I saw, change is really happening,” said the presidential aide, “and there is a visible readiness to listen and to give consideration to the arguments of our partners. That is the most important thing” (‘Vesti’, Rossiya, 4 April 2009).

This pacifying tone extended to reports of the NATO jubilee summit. After the very sharp reaction to the EU-Ukraine declaration, Russian television again reached the conclusion that no news is good news: “It was not long ago that NATO intended to admit Ukraine and Georgia to membership of the alliance at this summit. Now, that idea has been dropped. As many admit, this is simply because Russia’s opinion counts – she must be heeded” (‘Vesti’, Rossiya, 3 April 2009).

Russian TV devoted a large amount of time and attention to President Medvedev’s visit to Finland. In the first place, the media were trying to give their backing to Russia’s proposal for a new idea for energy security. “This is a universal conception, which is obligatory for all and open to third parties, i.e. it embraces all aspects of our energy relations, in which Russia envisages the new system of agreements. One of the proposed documents concerns guarantees about the transit of these resources across third countries, so that no one can arbitrarily turn off the tap as happened during the last gas war. This proposal extends beyond gas and oil, moreover, to nuclear fuel, electricity and coal” (‘Vremya’, Channel One, 26 April). Journalists also eagerly commented on Medvedev’s suggestion that there could be a Europe-wide security agreement.

It was the visit to Finland that finally confirmed how Russian TV would present foreign policy issues under Medvedev. The concept of energy security was offered as a universal solution to the problem of Europe’s energy supply (including Ukrainian gas transit, construction of the Nord Stream and South Stream gas pipelines, etc). Meanwhile the conclusion of a new Europe-wide security agreement, which President Medvedev suggested might be called Helsinki Plus, was linked by journalists to negotiations between Russia and the USA on strategic offensive weapons. After the notorious signing of the declaration about modernising Ukraine’s gas supply system, it was extremely important for Russian TV to show that Medvedev was taking pre-emptive measures, and proposing solutions before problems reached crisis point.

CONCLUSIONS

Our analysis of the coverage of EU-Russian relations by Russia’s principal nationwide TV channels during President Medvedev’s first year in office permits an assessment of how successful they have been in creating a foreign policy image for the Russian Head of State.

Naturally, Russian television devoted most attention to the visits made by President Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin to other countries, and to high-level meetings in Russia. Events in the EU that had no effect on Russia were hardly mentioned by nationwide TV. The politically unaware viewer might therefore gain the impression that the EU leaders and institutions gathered with the sole purpose of issuing unpleasant statements about Russian policies.

Russia’s tele-propagandists have allotted each EU member state a specific role. Spain, Italy and Germany are always presented as friends of Russia and a counterweight to Britain and the Baltic States. Russian television maintained a rather disdainful tone when speaking of the new EU member states, emphasising, on the one hand, their dependence on the Union’s older members and, on the other, their elites’ ‘unfounded’ hatred for Russia.

Russian television is the main instrument for shaping public opinion about the country. Over the last year it has faced a complicated task: it had to show President Medvedev as a focused and strong-willed national leader while, at the same time, creating an image that is different to his predecessor. During the period preceding the conflict in Georgia, Russian TV tried various ways of presenting Russian positions and those of its president on foreign policy issues. During the subsequent information war and the following period, the medium encountered an unexpectedly harsh and unanimous reaction from the Western media to Russian actions in Georgia. It had to react to a rapidly changing environment. Naturally, this seriously damaged attempts to create a coherent image of the president and give a logical presentation of Russia’s position towards the EU.

After New Year 2009, Russian TV paused. The rhetoric became more restrained and the country’s tele-propagandists may have decided not to ‘overreact’ to every small irritant. Finally, in April 2009, Russian television was able to present its viewers with a rounded image of their new president, as a world leader who was educated and up to date, offering a new approach to long-term pressing European problems. Predictably, this image will be further developed during the second year of Medvedev’s presidency. Not only is it evidently effective, it also has many further advantages and, in particular, can depict the EU bureaucrats as obstructing European progress towards security and cooperation. Such an image of the Russian leader provides a convenient backdrop to the active promotion of ideas about re-ordering the greater Europe according to Moscow’s scenario.

Recently a new integrationist initiative targeting Russia’s immediate neighbours, but excluding Moscow itself, the Eastern Partnership, was launched by the European Union. This suggests that the competitive struggle over the future of a wider Europe will only intensify.

SOURCES

News and commentary were monitored on the five major TV channels — Channel One, Rossiya (RTR), TV Centre, NTV and REN TV. Certain programmes have characteristic titles, e.g. ‘Odnako’ (However), ‘Postscriptum’, and ‘Chisty ponedelnik’ (Clean Monday). Daily news broadcasts are given conventional names, such as ‘Novosti’ (News), ‘Segodnya’ (Today), ‘Sobytiya’ (Events), ‘Vesti’ (Tidings), and ‘Vremya’ (Time).