COMMENTARY | Science vs. the Art of War
ShinyCapstar.com Science vs. the Art of Germans confront Serbs in World War I (drawing by Richard Caton Woodville) War
eople generally do not feel comfortable with uncer- By Milan Vego tainty. Hence, there is a constant search in life—includ- ing in the military—for deriving various principles Por rule sets and making things more controllable and predictable. Since ancient times, militaries have been engaged in an endless quest for certainty in the command in war.1 They have striven War is an art and as such is not to precisely know all the key elements of the situation including the enemy force and its intentions and reactions to their own actions. susceptible of explanation by Warfare as a Science The idea that the conduct of war is a science is almost as old as fixed formula. warfare itself. In ancient times, military theorists started to search for certain principles and rules guiding the conduct of war. During —General George S. Patton the Renaissance, art, music, philosophy, government, science, and warfare underwent a gradual but profound transformation.2 In that era, Europeans rediscovered the military treatises written by ancient military theorists, specifically Xenophon (430–354 BCE), Julius Dr. Milan Vego is Professor of Operations in the Joint Military Operations Caesar (100–44 BCE), and Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus (4th Department at the Naval War College. century CE). The classical legacy formed the intellectual background
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in ballistics. The most influential practitioner Saxe argued that without knowledge of the of siegecraft was the French Marshal Sébastien human heart, one is dependent on the favor of Le Prestre de Vauban (1633–1707). He used his fortune, which sometime is inconsistent.13 understanding of geometry, architecture, and gunnery to advance the science of fortifica- The Enlightenment Era, 1750–1800 tions.6 In his 30 years of professional activity, The scientific revolution of the 17th Vauban personally designed a number of century, and the beginning of Newtonian fortresses and conducted nearly 50 sieges—all science in particular, led to widespread belief of them successful.7 among European intellectuals that the human The Italian-born Austrian field marshal mind is capable of mastering all realities. Raimondo Montecúccoli (1609–1680) was Another influence during the Enlightenment one of the most influential practitioners and was French neoclassicism, which taught that theorists in the late 17th century. He was one of each art is governed by certain universal and the first who tried to explain warfare “scientifi- immutable principles and rules.14 cally.”8 Montecúccoli observed that like all sci- Military officers, mostly from the ranks ences, the science of war aims to reduce experi- of nobility, became influenced by the philo- ences to universal and fundamental rules. sophical, intellectual, and cultural trends of The French marshal Jacques-Francois de the late 18th century. They concluded that war, Chastenet, Marquis of Puységur (1656–1743), like other sciences, has to be studied system- was a distinguished soldier who undertook atically, and then a clear and universal theory a systematic treatment of war. He believed of war could be created. Hence, the military that experience was not the only approach to profession must be studied theoretically and understanding war. Puységur’s intent was to not only by using combat experiences. This reduce warfare to a set of rules and principles, new emphasis on the study of war resulted as had already been done for sieges.9 Like in a significant increase of published works Montecúccoli, he observed that war was the dealing with military theory. most important of all sciences and arts. He Dominant ideas in military thought further claimed that war during his life lacked during the Enlightenment were rudiments a systematic theoretical study, with people of appreciation of the political side of war, relying on tradition and personal experiences. especially in Prussia under Frederick the In his view, field warfare needed to be made Great (1712–1786); the realization of the role as scientific as siegecraft had been by Vauban. of psychological factors in combat; and the Hence, the emphasis should be on the study unprecedented application of pseudoscientific of geometry and geography and their applica- principles to the study of warfare.15 The most tions to the art of war.10 important military theorists of the Enlighten- The writings of French military ment were Count Turpin de Crissé (1709– theorist and soldier Jean-Charles de Folard 1799), Paul Gideon Joly de Maizeroy (1719– (1669–1752) were the main precursors of 1780), Frederick the Great, Pierre-Joseph de and source of historical reference for military “enlightened military thought.” Folard was Bourcet (1700–1780), Jacques Antoine Hip- thinking until the end of the 18th century.3 fascinated with classical Greece and Rome. polyte, Comte de Guibert (1743–1790), Henry The scientific revolution in the late 17th He examined war from a scientific perspec- E. Lloyd (1720–1783), and Dietrich Heinrich and 18th centuries was the result of new ideas tive in order to discover universal principles Freiherr von Bülow (1757–1807). and advances in physics, chemistry, astronomy, guiding its conduct. He also addressed In the late Enlightenment era, military biology, and medicine. Because of great think- psychological dimensions in combat. His theory was dominated by the advocates of ers such as Isaac Newton (1643–1727), scientific writings influenced many military theorists the so-called geometrical or mathematical discourse took the preeminent role in reorder- and practitioners of the Enlightenment era, school. These proponents firmly believed that ing society within Western civilization. There such as Maurice de Saxe, Frederick the Great, the true art of war was not in fighting bloody was a closer association with technology.4 The and Napoleon Bonaparte I (1769–1821).11 Saxe battles but in conducting skillful maneuvers first techno-scientific revolution in European (1696–1750) was one of the most successful to checkmate the enemy through calculated warfare was articulated around a clockwork generals of the era of musketry. He wrote the marches and movements.16 The ideal was to metaphor, which became the symbol of order, famous Reveries on the Art of War (1757). In defeat the enemy not by fighting a bloody battle regularity, and predictability. The clock concept the preface, he stated that “war is a science but to skillfully outmaneuver him. Strategy was was emulated by European militaries as exem- so obscure and imperfect that custom and based on abstract mathematical foundations. plified by Frederick the Great (1712–1786).5 prejudice confirmed by ignorance are its sole The commander was required to be like a chess Moreover, bombardments and for- foundation and support; all other sciences are player capable of mastering all combinations, tifications became increasingly guided by established upon fixed principles . . . while this while the army in the field was like a figure on a geometrical principles and the great advances alone remains destitute.”12 To understand war, chessboard. Personal and creative performance ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 63 COMMENTARY | Science vs. the Art of War
the advent of decisive warfare as practiced by Hannibal, leader of Carthaginian forces, transiting river to the French revolutionaries and Napoleon I. battle against Rome in Second Punic War However, the proponents of the military ideas of the Enlightenment did not lose influence. Their ideas were largely adopted, although in a modified form, by Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779–1869) and the Austrian Archduke Charles (1771–1847). In fact, the great major- ity of military theoreticians in the 19th century based their ideas on the theories developed during the Enlightenment.24 The Swiss-born French general Jomini avoided the trend of developing increasingly complex geometric systems of warfare, yet he built his theories on foundations laid in the Enlightenment. This, in turn, led him to take a fundamentally reductionist and predictive approach.25 Jomini wrote that “war in its ensemble is not a science, but an art, and strat- egy in particular may be regulated by fixed laws resembling those of positive science but this is not true if war is viewed as a whole.”26 He argued that tactics are the only part of war that can be subjected to fixed rules.27 Jomini sought to identify universal principles central to the art of war and to on the battlefield did not play a great role. The In his view, the modern conduct of war was discern them through his study of the cam- actions of the great captains were explained by based on lines of operation and the introduc- paigns conducted by Frederick the Great. In their adherence to rules of the art of war.17 tion of firearms.21 Bülow provided mathemati- his seminal Summary of the Art of War (1838), The Welsh general and theoretician cally precise theory. He firmly believed that Jomini wrote that there are some fundamen- Henry E. Lloyd was one of the strongest pro- his theories could offer the key to victory by tal principles of war that cannot be deviated ponents of the scientific approach to the study enabling scientific precision of the outcome from without danger, while their application of war. He compared the army to a mechani- before armies engaged in battle. He claimed has been always crowned with success.28 He cal device, which, “like all other machines,” to discover mathematical secrets of strategy provides a list of four maxims that made an is composed of various parts. Its perfection and established them as a science. In Bülow’s overarching principle; even seemingly simple depends first on its parts, and second, on the view, “From now on, there will be no need principles consisted of a set of subordinate manner in which these parts are arranged. of crude considerations and the hazardous tenets. Although he revised his system of He wrote that war is a branch of Newtonian trial of battle in order to plan and decide the principles, he never significantly diverged mechanics. Lloyd believed that the exact fate of campaign. If the attacker relied on an from the ideas that he developed by studying knowledge of the country, as well as the science unsound base [of operations], the defender Frederick the Great’s campaigns through the of position, camps, and marches, were essential could force him to retreat without resorting lenses of Lloyd and Bülow.29 disciplines to be mastered by a general.18 to battle.” Battle was made unnecessary by the Despite his obvious fixation on the Unlike the other representatives of the scientific perfection of strategy: “War will be principles of war, Jomini recognized the geometrical school, Lloyd was one of the no longer called an art, but science. . . . The importance of moral factors in war. In his first thinkers who highlighted the need to art itself will be a science, or be lost in it.”22 In view, these factors prevented a theoretical pay attention to the morale of the troops. contrast to Lloyd and some other theorists of determination of tactics. He firmly believed This was evident in his discussion of human the Enlightenment, who alongside the scien- that despite technological changes, “strat- passions as motivating factors including tific parts of war left room for the creativity egy alone will remain unchanged, with the fear, honor, shame, and desire for riches. He of a genius, Bülow asserted that “the sphere principles the same as under Scipios and wrote that the most powerful of all is the of military genius will at last be so narrowed, Caesars, Frederick and Napoleon, since they love of liberty and religion.19 that a man of talents will no longer be willing are independent of the nature of the arms and The Prussian officer Freiherr von Bülow, to devote himself to this ungrateful trade.”23 organization of the troops.”30 one of the most influential theorists of the Archduke Charles, the son of Emperor Enlightenment, wrote Spirit of the New System Postmilitary Enlightenment Era Leopold II, was regarded as one of the best of War (1799). He reinforced Lloyd’s scientific The views of the proponents of the generals of the Habsburg monarchy and of approach or geometric science of strategy.20 geometrical school were proved false with Continental Europe as well. The Archduke
64 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu Vego was also one of the better known military power was based on weapons and military The effects-based warfare proponents theorists of his era. His work was based on the equipment whose quality was dependent on embraced so-called systems of systems ideas of the late Enlightenment. In his Prin- the status of the development of what he and analysis (SoSA) to assess situations and then ciples of Higher Art of War (1806), he stated other Marxists called “production forces.”36 identify centers of gravity. SOD is based on that “The principles of the science of war are The Soviet obsession with scientific both general systems theory and complex- few and unchanging. Only their application Marxism-Leninism and its attendant preoc- ity theory.38 Design itself is defined as a is never the same. Every change in the condi- cupation with history, laws, principles, norms, “repeatable methodology of reasoning that tions of armies; in their arms, strength and positions, and every new invention, involved a different application of these rules.”31 In his Fuller wrote that scientific methods are a common sense Principles of Strategy (1814), Archduke Charles approach on how to know the truth about the past and how also adopted almost entirely Bülow’s general theory of war and his geometrical concept of we can apply this truth to the conditions that surround us now operations, but with less emphasis on math- ematical aspects.32 The view that the conduct of war is and rules and its attention to “objective” algo- helps commanders understand how to change largely a science and not an art was not rithms and formulae all artificially reduced the a complex-adaptive system.”39 Its declared limited to Jomini’s interpreters and follow- dynamics of the battlefield to a sterile process purpose is to bridge the gap from the situation ers. One of the leading military theorists in more akin to calculus than human struggle.37 that exists at the beginning of an operation— the 20th century, British General J.F.C. Fuller that is, the observed-system—to the situation (1878–1966), was also a firm believer that Modern Theories when operations end—that is, the desired the conduct of war is largely a science. He Traditionally, the Western approach system. The design uses some theoretical was much influenced by Lloyd’s theories. In to conducting war has been influenced by aspects of SOD and EBO but supposedly does his Foundations of the Science of War, Fuller the Newtonian quest to identify universal not rely on either concept to achieve its main wrote that scientific methods are a common laws of combat by which all problems can be purpose.40 Proponents of design acknowledge sense approach on how to know the truth resolved and the results of combat predicted. that warfare is a complex, adaptive system about the past and how we can apply this Hence, extensive efforts are made to quantify rather than a closed system. This, in turn, truth to the conditions that surround us now everything in war. Since the mid-1990s, the makes anticipating and evaluating the effect and that will probably exist during the next systems (or systemic) approach to warfare has of one’s physical actions on the enemy’s war.33 Fuller asserted that war is as much a gradually emerged as the dominant school behavior a significant challenge.41 science as any other human activity because of thought in the U.S. military, most other it is built on facts and that war must be Western militaries, and the North Atlantic Quantifying the Unquantifiable reduced to science before it can be practiced Treaty Organization (NATO). This was exem- Since the advent of the modern era, correctly as an art.34 plified by the wide acceptance in the United there have been numerous attempts to apply The Marxist-Leninist theoreticians States and NATO and some other militaries some elements of quantitative analysis to believed that war was essentially based on of the claims by advocates of network-centric understanding the sources of victory. This is scientific principles. Vladimir Lenin’s (1870– warfare (NCW)/network-centric operations especially the case with those who view the 1924) predilection for dialectical-materialist (NCO), effects-based operations (EBO)/ conduct of war as a science. Claims have been principles of objectivism, regularities in the effects-based approach to operations (EBAO), made that the use of various quantifiable nature of society, and the possibilities of and systemic operational design (SOD), which methods is more “objective” than using the knowledge strongly influenced the post-1917 mutated to operational design and ultimately commander’s judgment and experience. Yet development of Soviet military theory. Lenin’s to design. Since their heyday in the early this is not true because, among other things, philosophical views were compatible with 2000s, the influence of NCW/NCO advo- the decision of what to measure is highly more objective scientific methods in military cates has been greatly diminished. U.S. Joint subjective. Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) affairs and led toward the development of mil- Forces Command officially abandoned the warned that so-called mathematical factors itary foresight. Hence, in the Soviet military, more mechanistic elements of EBAO in the can never find a firm basis in military calcula- virtually every aspect of military affairs was summer of 2008. However, some theoretical tions. In his view, war most closely resembles a influenced by Lenin’s ideological views.35 The aspects of EBAO were retained in the main game of cards.42 main reason for those and for similar beliefs U.S. joint doctrine documents and are still The Russians relied on various mathe- was an unbounded faith in the extraordinary used, although in a modified form, by NATO. matical solutions to military forecasting prob- value and impact of materiel on the conduct of A common characteristic of NCW/EBO/ lems since the late 19th century. The Soviet war. Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), one of the SOD is that they are based on new and largely propensity to use mathematical methods early and influential Marxist military theo- unproven technologies. They were adopted was the result of more than 75 years of study, reticians, believed that all great revolutions in without proper testing and were not backed self-criticism, and refinement.43 The Russians warfare were the result not of great masters by empirical evidence. They reflect the neo- derived multiple combat models for optimiz- of war but of inventions of better weapons Newtonian, not the Clausewitzian, view of the ing courses of action and predicting relative and changes in materiel. For him, military nature of war. rates of advance on the battlefield. These ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 65 COMMENTARY | Science vs. the Art of War measurements were based on the outcomes Systems analysis (now known as policy independence of execution.53 The use of of major operations and battles in the Great analysis) is another quantifiable method metrics is highly subjective because higher Patriotic War (1941–1945). The Soviets con- used in the public sector and adopted by the authority arbitrarily selects which aspects of sidered their methodologies dialectically and military. This method is concerned with the the situation should be counted and evaluated. scientifically sound and, moreover, consistent allocation of resources and is aimed to maxi- But even if the metrics are correctly deter- with Marxist-Leninist teachings. By the early mize the value of objectives achieved minus mined, it is often difficult to evaluate hidden 1960s, the mathematics of armed conflict was the value of resources used. In business, elements in the situation. categorized as a branch of Soviet operations this reduces itself to maximizing profits.49 The proponents of the systems research, the social science that rationally By using mathematical methods, analysts approach to warfare also rely on some organizes goal-directed human activity.44 The systematically emphasized quantifiable quantifiable methods to evaluate the combat Soviet operations research tried to reduce aspects of warfare, which were susceptible to potential of the opposing forces and the certain tactical and technical aspects of mili- being integrated into mathematical models rate of accomplishing one’s objectives. For tary science to measurable objective indices so and input-output calculations. Anything example, the effects-based warfare propo- decisions could be made or substantiated. The that could not be quantified was therefore nents expanded the use of various metrics Soviets especially emphasized the so-called excluded. Such elements of the commander’s compared with their use in the traditional correlation of forces method as a tool for personality as intuition, courage, and will- Military Decision Making Process. The main tactical and operational commanders to make power were devalued.50 quantifiable methods used in EBO are so- sound decisions. This method dealt with One of the strongest advocates of called measures of merit. These are in turn direct or numerical comparisons of forces, systems analysis in the U.S. military was divided into measures of effectiveness and quantification of selected battlefield elements, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. measures of performance. and mathematical expressions or equations During his tenure (1961–1968), he extensively related to those elements in such a manner as used systems analysis for making key deci- War as an Art to support decisionmaking.45 Yet the Soviets sions pertaining to force requirements and The view that the conduct of war is largely an art is not entirely new. Several military theorists during the Enlighten- Clausewitz warned that so-called mathematical factors can ment, notably Saxe and Lloyd, realized the never find a firm basis in military calculations great importance of psychological factors in warfare. Yet they never went a step further and viewed warfare as complex and full of did not rely solely on quantitative methods weapons design and procurement. McNa- uncertainty, chaos, unpredictability, and such as correlation of force and means. They mara is perhaps best known for using quan- even irrationality. also took into account the enemy’s use of sur- tifiable methods not only in assessing the The most dramatic changes in military prise and deception.46 progress of the war in South Vietnam but in theory that led to a more refined view of In the West, various mathematical making decisions based on these methods— warfare occurred in Germany in the late 18th methods known as operations research (OR) that is, trying to conduct war as a science and early 19th centuries. The major cultural were used for enhancing the effectiveness rather than an art. The Pentagon applied the trends in Germany were romanticism, nation- of certain weapons and developing tactics so-called body count as the principal mea- alism, and idealism. German romanticism in their employment. The origins of OR are surement to determine what the United States challenged the fundamentals of the French- found in World War I. In 1914, the British should be doing to win in Vietnam while dominated Enlightenment’s worldview. It mathematician F.W. Lanchester devised the putting U.S. troops at the least risk.51 Yet such was opposed to the French cultural and so-called N-square law, which quantified the metrics proved meaningless. The statisti- political imperialism. It led to the awaken- relationship between victory and superiority cal indicators pointing to U.S. success were ing of German national sentiment. German in numbers.47 The OR was used in the United frequently erroneous and misleading. The thinkers of the “counter-Enlightenment” Kingdom in the late 1930s to find a solution models on which war managers relied were believed that concepts of knowledge and to the seemingly impossible problem of suc- equally faulty. Trapped in the mindset that reality are fundamentally false, or at least cessful defense against the enemy’s air attacks the war was a purely technical problem, U.S. exaggerated. For them, the world was not on the British Isles. In World War II, OR was high officials failed to grasp the sheer deter- simple but highly complex, composed of generally used in scarce radar stations and mination of their opponents and the extent of innumerable and unique elements and events, in devising the optimal search techniques the success of their political strategy.52 and always in a state of flux. They were not as and the size of convoys in antisubmarine The Pentagon’s emphasis on business enthusiastic about Newtonian science.54 The warfare (ASW). OR also reduced the loss rate practices has led since the late 1990s to an German Romanticists increasingly focused of convoys when analysts realized that larger extensive reliance on various “metrics” in on the inherent complexity of nature. They convoys could travel more safely.48 The United evaluating progress toward accomplishing argued that this complexity could not be States followed the British lead and used OR objectives on the battlefield. These quanti- explained by the Newtonian scientific model. in greatly increasing the effectiveness of mine fication methods in essence have replaced The German Romanticists took a historical warfare, ASW, and air attacks. the commander’s judgment, intuition, and approach to their understanding of reality.
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Soldiers return fire during firefight with Taliban forces in Barawala Kalay Valley, Afghanistan U.S. Army (Cameron Boyd) U.S. Army (Cameron
All comprehension was seen as the subjective troops; therefore, they are a major factor in of German romanticism, he saw the world result of the dynamics of one’s time and place. the conduct of war.57 Berenhorst believed that differently from the military thinkers of These and similar ideas led German intellec- war, in contrast to mathematics or astronomy, the Enlightenment. He was also greatly tuals to believe that reality does not conform could not be formulated as a science. He con- influenced by Scharnhorst’s pragmatism and to universal laws or principles.55 sidered various rules and principles derived relativist approach. He considered war as a The new cultural trends that started from experiences as artificial and dogmatic. complex and unpredictable phenomenon. as a reaction to the Enlightenment also had They were often applied indiscriminately to a Clausewitz believed only in broad generali- considerable influence on German military changed situation.58 ties, none of which consistently held true in theorists and practitioners, notably Georg Scharnhorst viewed the systems of the fog and friction of actual combat.61 He Heinrich von Berenhorst (1733–1814), Johann conducting operations that were fashionable argued that a system fails to account for the Gerhard von Scharnhorst (1755–1813), and in his day as artificial and one-sided. The art “endless complexities involved” in war and Clausewitz. The first work that challenged the of war was a practical science and its meaning therefore results in a theoretical construct that prevalent ideas of the military Enlightenment could only be based on the study of reality. If bears little resemblance to the actual practice was Berenhorst’s three-volume Reflections that link is broken, then the art of war leads to of war.62 Hence, he considered any attempt on the Art of War: Its Progress, Contradic- abstractions.59 In his essay “The Use of Mili- to reduce the complex phenomena of war to tions and Certainty (1796–1799). Berenhorst tary History, the Causes of Its Deficiencies” a simple system of universal principles as an observed that the ancient Greeks and Romans (1806), Scharnhorst wrote that great generals exercise in futility.63 brought the art of war to the pinnacle of throughout history studied the principles of Clausewitz believed that war belongs perfection. For him, they were more “artistic” the art of war. Some branches of this art are to the domain of social life; it is neither a than anyone else.56 He wrote that during the even susceptible to mathematical formulation, science nor an art. It is not a science because Enlightenment, the art of war, like the rest of but others are dependent on circumstances it is a matter of action, and it is not an art the sciences and arts, advanced knowledge and cannot be studied mechanically. This is because it exerts itself not on inanimate or and supported innate talent. In his view, the why study alone without genius will never passive human material but on reacting, living art of war is not based on immutable laws make a great general.60 force.64 Clausewitz wrote that the “art of war but rather is associated with the unknown Clausewitz was the first theoretician must always leave a margin for uncertainty and uncontrollable modifications of the who systematically presented a philosophy in the greatest things and in the smallest. The human spirit. Moral forces animate the of war in all aspects. Influenced by the ideas greater the gap between uncertainty on the
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 67 COMMENTARY | Science vs. the Art of War one hand and courage and self-confidence on which in addition like fog or moonlight, a multitude of acts, could ever be compressed the other hand, the greater the margin that gives the objects an exaggerated size and a into a formal system of rules and principles. can be left for accidents.”65 grotesque view.”76 He pointed out that the This cultural premise was introduced by The human factor largely determines only situation a commander can know fully Clausewitz.84 The Germans considered what is called the “nature” of war—those is his own. The commander’s knowledge warfighting more of an art than a science. constant, universal, and inherent qualities of the enemy’s situation is often based on They believed no one could control events in that characterize any war throughout the unreliable information. His evaluation a war. Any war is full of ambiguity, confu- ages. The nature of war is unchangeable therefore may be mistaken and can lead him sion, and chaos. In a war, the absolute cannot regardless either of shifting motives and to assume that the enemy has the initiative be achieved, nor can uncertainty be mastered. forms of war or of technological advances.66 when in fact he himself could have it. Such A margin must always be left for uncertainty. Human behavior is a major part of the nature a faulty appreciation is as likely to lead to Moltke explained that in war, “everything of war. Clausewitz’s greatest contribution to ill-timed action as to ill-timed inaction.77 was uncertain; nothing was without danger, our understanding of war was his analysis Clausewitz argued that friction is the only and only with difficulty could one accom- of the importance of the human factor and concept that quite generally fits the differ- plish great results by another route. No the psychological element in particular in ence between real war and war on paper.78 calculation of space and time guaranteed the conduct of war. He wrote that warfare He argued that this “tremendous friction, victory in this realm of chance, mistakes, and is shaped by human nature, complexities of which cannot as in mechanics, be reduced to disappointments. Uncertainty and the danger human behavior, and limitations of human a few points, is everywhere in contact with of failure accompanied every step toward and physical conditions. The material and chance, and brings about effects that cannot the objective.” The Germans accepted the psychological aspects of a war form an organic be measured, just because they are largely confusion of battle as an unending source of whole; they are inextricably linked.67 He wrote due to chance. Friction is the force that potential opportunities and built a command that war is not the action of a living force on makes the apparently easy so difficult.”79 and control philosophy, known as the mission a lifeless mass but the collision of two living Friction encompasses uncertainties, errors, command (Auftragstaktik), in which that forces that interact.68 Victory does not consist accidents, technical difficulties, and the potential could be realized through decen- only in the conquest of the battlefield, but unforeseen, and their effects on one’s deci- tralized decisionmaking.85 in the destruction of the physical and moral sions, actions, and morale.80 During the interwar years (1919–1939), fighting forces.69 Helmuth von Moltke, Sr., stated that the Germans considered war a free and The principal psychological features most of what constitutes the operation of creative activity, or an art. It makes high of any war are hatred, hostility, violence, armies is essentially grounded in science, demands on human personality. At the uncertainty (or fog of war), friction, fear, while the art comes to the fore when the wills same time, warfare is founded on scientific danger, irrationality, chance, and luck.70 For of opposing commanders meet.81 For him, the principles. New weapons dictate ever- Clausewitz, a war was a trinity composed of scientific method was anathema. He held that changing forms. Their appearance must be primordial violence, hatred, and enmity—a nothing in war is certain. Therefore, in war as anticipated and their influence evaluated. Afterward, they must be put in service quickly. Combat situations are diverse; they Clausewitz’s greatest contribution to our understanding of war change often and suddenly and can seldom was the importance of the human factor and the psychological be anticipated in advance. Incalculable elements have a decisive influence, particu- element in particular larly as one’s own will is pitted against the independent will of the enemy. Friction and errors are daily occurrences.86 blind natural force.71 Clausewitz observed in art there “exist no general rules; in neither Clausewitzian views on the true nature that danger is “a part of the friction of war can talent be replaced by precepts. And given of war remain valid today. The human and without accurate conceptions of danger the uncertainty of war, Moltke concluded that element is the single most critical aspect of one cannot understand war.”72 Moreover, war strategy could not be more than a system of warfare. Human nature has changed little is “the realm of physical exertion and suffer- expedients.”82 He created an environment that despite vast changes in military technologies. ing.”73 It is full of chances and probabilities cultivated creativity, improvisation, inventive- Warfare is too complex and unpredictable within which the creative spirit is free to ness, and open-mindedness.83 an activity to be taken over by machines or roam.74 Clausewitz wrote that nowhere do During the tenure of Field Marshal explained and managed by pseudoscientific accidents have such a free playing field as in Moltke, Sr., as chief of the Prussian/German theories. Only the human brain is fully war. Not only its objective but also its subjec- Great General Staff (1857–1888), the Clause- capable of reacting in a timely and proper tive nature makes war a gamble.75 witzian teachings on war were widely shared fashion to the sudden and unanticipated Clausewitz observed that “The great by the Prussian/German theorists and changes in the situation and countering the uncertainty of all facts presents a peculiar practitioners. The Germans believed that no enemy’s actions and reactions. The enemy difficulty in war, because all actions take sphere of human activity, conditioned as it has his own will. He can react unpredictably place in something virtually akin to dusk, was by its historical setting and dominated by or irrationally.
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The timing and scope of irrationality is progressively diminished when they are 13 Ibid., 294. 14 cannot be predicted or measured. Irratio- applied at the operational and strategic levels Cited in Gat, 31. 15 nal decisions on either side in combat can of war where intangible elements play a major Miakinkow, 29. 16 Guenther Blumentritt, Die Gedanklichen have significant consequences on both the role in the course and outcome of war. Grundlagen des Alten O.K.H in O.v. Natzmer, Die course and the outcome of a war. Perceived In short, there is a huge difference Gedanklichen Grundlagen des OKH und deren Aus- irrationality is often the reflection of one’s between using science and technology wirkungen auf seine Organisation. Ein Schlusswort cultural values in evaluating the enemy’s to enhance the combat potential of one’s zur Gesamtarbeitt “OKH,” December 1949, ZA/1 actions and reactions. An enemy commander forces and applying scientific methods in 1935 P-041kk, Freiburg, i.Br, Bundesarchiv- Miliaterarchiv, 10. 17 Reinhard Hoehn, Scharnhorts Vermaechtnis during the interwar years, the Germans considered war a free (Bonn: Athenaum Verlag, 1952), 67. 18 and creative activity, or an art Cited in Armstrong Starkey, War in the Age of Enlightenment, 1700–1789 (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2003), 57. 19 Ibid., 58. is a product of a different society, traditions, the conduct of war. Our knowledge and 20 Mark T. Calhoun, “Clausewitz and Jomini: and culture. Hence, he may make decisions understanding of warfare is a science, Contrasting Intellectual Frameworks in Military that are considered irrational although they but the conduct of war itself is largely an Theory,” Army History, no. 80 (Summer 2011), 25. are fully consonant with his own societal art. This will not change in the future 21 Gat, 81. values and military culture. Psychological regardless of scientific and technological 22 Ibid., 84. states of the individuals or groups and their advances. As in the past, the character of 23 Ibid. possible reactions under stress cannot be war will change, even dramatically, but 24 Ibid., 142. entirely known. This is even more true when the nature of war as explained by Clause- 25 Calhoun, 27. dealing with enemy forces. witz will not. Warfare would be relatively 26 Cited in Gurbachan Singh, “The Science of simple, predictable, and controllable but for War,” available at
ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 69 COMMENTARY | Science vs. the Art of War
Operations,” Australian Army Journal 2, no. 1 Gilbert, 202 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University NEW (Winter 2004), 90. Press, 1986). 42 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. 81 Daniel Hughes, Moltke on the Art of War: from NDU Press Michael Howard and Peter Paret (New York: Knopf, Selected Writings (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, for the 1993), 97. 1993), 172. Institute for National Strategic Studies 43 Womack, 84. 82 Gabriel Serbu, “The Dangers of Anti- 44 Ibid., 2. Intellectualism in Contemporary Western Armies,” 45 Ibid., 32. Infantry (November/December 2010), 45. 46 Ibid., 81. 83 Ibid., 47. 47 Cited in M. Kirby and R. Capey, “The 84 Gat, 332. Air Defense of Great Britain, 1920–1940: An 85 Hughes, 175. Operational Research Perspective,” The Journal 86 Bruce Condell and David T. Zabecki, eds., of the Operational Research Society 48, no. 6 (June On the German Art of War: “Truppenfuehrung” 1997), 558. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 17. 48 Bousquet, 141. 49 Ibid., 149–150. 50 Ibid., 151. 51 Robert McNamara with Brian Vandemark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Random House, 1995), 237–238. 52 Bousquet, 157. 53 Dieter Stockfisch, “Im Spannungsfeld zwischen Technologiefortschritt und Fuehrungs- Strategic Perspectives, No. 9 verstaendniss. Auftragstaktik,” Marineforum 12 (December 1996), 13. John Parker’s Russia and the Iranian Nuclear 54 Gat, 144. Program studies the recent history of Russia’s 55 Calhoun, 27. relationship with Iran, the outsize personalities 56 Cited in Gat, 154. involved, and how the United States has an effect 57 Ibid., 155. on Russia’s dealings with the Persian state. As 58 Vladimir Putin returns to the presidency, will he Ibid., 156. 59 replay his 2004–2008 approach to Iran, during Reinhard Hoehn, Scharnhorts Vermaechtnis which Russia negotiated the S-300 air defense (Bonn: Athenaum Verlag, 1952), 73. system contract with Tehran? Or will he continue 60 Gat, 168. Russia’s breakthrough in finding common ground 61 Calhoun, 25. with the United States on Iran seen under former 62 Ibid., 28. president Dmitriy Medvedev, who tore up the 63 Ibid., 27. S-300 contract? Although Russia did not close the 64 Trythall, 116–117. door to engagement with Tehran, Moscow voted 65 Clausewitz, 97. for new, enhanced sanctions against Iran at the 66 Michael Sheehan, “The Changing Character United Nations Security Council and it continues to insist that Iran cooperate fully with Interna- of War,” in The Globalization of World Politics: An tional Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. Parker’s Introduction to International Relations, ed. John paper also factors in Putin’s resentment of U.S. Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patricia Owens, 216, 4th ed. power and suspicion of American motives. While (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). the U.S.-Russia relationship continues toward a 67 Clausewitz, 216. diplomatic “reset,” Russia’s “step-by-step” engage- 68 Ibid., 86. ment with Iran is more of a regional issue. This 69 Cited in Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz paper details many salient issues including the (London: Random House, 2002), 81. history of the S-300 air defense system between 70 Sheehan, 216. Russia and Iran, the recent Arab Spring, Iran’s 71 Cited in Ian Roxborough, “Clausewitz and nuclear development, U.S. withdrawal from Af- ghanistan, and American missile defense systems the Sociology of War,” The British Journal of Sociol- in countries bordering Russia. ogy 45, no. 4 (December 1994), 625. 72 Clausewitz, 133. 73 Ibid., 116. 74 Cited in Roxborough, 625. 75 Clausewitz, 96. 76 Cited in Heuser, 89. 77 Clausewitz, 95. 78 Cited in Heuser, 88. 79 Clausewitz, 139–140. 80 Peter Paret, “Clausewitz,” in Makers of Visit the NDU Press Web site for more information on publications Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear at ndupress.ndu.edu Age, ed. Peter Paret, Gordon Craig, and Felix
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