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Science Vs. the Art of War

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Science Vs. the Art of War COMMENTARY | Science vs. the Art of War ShinyCapstar.com SCIENCE vs. the Art of Germans confront Serbs in World War I (drawing by Richard Caton Woodville) War eople generally do not feel comfortable with uncer- By MILAN VEGO tainty. Hence, there is a constant search in life—includ- ing in the military—for deriving various principles Por rule sets and making things more controllable and predictable. Since ancient times, militaries have been engaged in an endless quest for certainty in the command in war.1 They have striven War is an art and as such is not to precisely know all the key elements of the situation including the enemy force and its intentions and reactions to their own actions. susceptible of explanation by Warfare as a Science The idea that the conduct of war is a science is almost as old as fixed formula. warfare itself. In ancient times, military theorists started to search for certain principles and rules guiding the conduct of war. During —GENEral GEorgE S. PattoN the Renaissance, art, music, philosophy, government, science, and warfare underwent a gradual but profound transformation.2 In that era, Europeans rediscovered the military treatises written by ancient military theorists, specifically Xenophon (430–354 BCE), Julius Dr. Milan Vego is Professor of Operations in the Joint Military Operations Caesar (100–44 BCE), and Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus (4th Department at the Naval War College. century CE). The classical legacy formed the intellectual background 62 JFQ / issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 ndupress.ndu.edu VEGO in ballistics. The most influential practitioner Saxe argued that without knowledge of the of siegecraft was the French Marshal Sébastien human heart, one is dependent on the favor of Le Prestre de Vauban (1633–1707). He used his fortune, which sometime is inconsistent.13 understanding of geometry, architecture, and gunnery to advance the science of fortifica- The Enlightenment Era, 1750–1800 tions.6 In his 30 years of professional activity, The scientific revolution of the 17th Vauban personally designed a number of century, and the beginning of Newtonian fortresses and conducted nearly 50 sieges—all science in particular, led to widespread belief of them successful.7 among European intellectuals that the human The Italian-born Austrian field marshal mind is capable of mastering all realities. Raimondo Montecúccoli (1609–1680) was Another influence during the Enlightenment one of the most influential practitioners and was French neoclassicism, which taught that theorists in the late 17th century. He was one of each art is governed by certain universal and the first who tried to explain warfare “scientifi- immutable principles and rules.14 cally.”8 Montecúccoli observed that like all sci- Military officers, mostly from the ranks ences, the science of war aims to reduce experi- of nobility, became influenced by the philo- ences to universal and fundamental rules. sophical, intellectual, and cultural trends of The French marshal Jacques-Francois de the late 18th century. They concluded that war, Chastenet, Marquis of Puységur (1656–1743), like other sciences, has to be studied system- was a distinguished soldier who undertook atically, and then a clear and universal theory a systematic treatment of war. He believed of war could be created. Hence, the military that experience was not the only approach to profession must be studied theoretically and understanding war. Puységur’s intent was to not only by using combat experiences. This reduce warfare to a set of rules and principles, new emphasis on the study of war resulted as had already been done for sieges.9 Like in a significant increase of published works Montecúccoli, he observed that war was the dealing with military theory. most important of all sciences and arts. He Dominant ideas in military thought further claimed that war during his life lacked during the Enlightenment were rudiments a systematic theoretical study, with people of appreciation of the political side of war, relying on tradition and personal experiences. especially in Prussia under Frederick the In his view, field warfare needed to be made Great (1712–1786); the realization of the role as scientific as siegecraft had been by Vauban. of psychological factors in combat; and the Hence, the emphasis should be on the study unprecedented application of pseudoscientific of geometry and geography and their applica- principles to the study of warfare.15 The most tions to the art of war.10 important military theorists of the Enlighten- The writings of French military ment were Count Turpin de Crissé (1709– theorist and soldier Jean-Charles de Folard 1799), Paul Gideon Joly de Maizeroy (1719– (1669–1752) were the main precursors of 1780), Frederick the Great, Pierre-Joseph de and source of historical reference for military “enlightened military thought.” Folard was Bourcet (1700–1780), Jacques Antoine Hip- thinking until the end of the 18th century.3 fascinated with classical Greece and Rome. polyte, Comte de Guibert (1743–1790), Henry The scientific revolution in the late 17th He examined war from a scientific perspec- E. Lloyd (1720–1783), and Dietrich Heinrich and 18th centuries was the result of new ideas tive in order to discover universal principles Freiherr von Bülow (1757–1807). and advances in physics, chemistry, astronomy, guiding its conduct. He also addressed In the late Enlightenment era, military biology, and medicine. Because of great think- psychological dimensions in combat. His theory was dominated by the advocates of ers such as Isaac Newton (1643–1727), scientific writings influenced many military theorists the so-called geometrical or mathematical discourse took the preeminent role in reorder- and practitioners of the Enlightenment era, school. These proponents firmly believed that ing society within Western civilization. There such as Maurice de Saxe, Frederick the Great, the true art of war was not in fighting bloody was a closer association with technology.4 The and Napoleon Bonaparte I (1769–1821).11 Saxe battles but in conducting skillful maneuvers first techno-scientific revolution in European (1696–1750) was one of the most successful to checkmate the enemy through calculated warfare was articulated around a clockwork generals of the era of musketry. He wrote the marches and movements.16 The ideal was to metaphor, which became the symbol of order, famous Reveries on the Art of War (1757). In defeat the enemy not by fighting a bloody battle regularity, and predictability. The clock concept the preface, he stated that “war is a science but to skillfully outmaneuver him. Strategy was was emulated by European militaries as exem- so obscure and imperfect that custom and based on abstract mathematical foundations. plified by Frederick the Great (1712–1786).5 prejudice confirmed by ignorance are its sole The commander was required to be like a chess Moreover, bombardments and for- foundation and support; all other sciences are player capable of mastering all combinations, tifications became increasingly guided by established upon fixed principles . while this while the army in the field was like a figure on a geometrical principles and the great advances alone remains destitute.”12 To understand war, chessboard. Personal and creative performance ndupress.ndu.edu issue 66, 3 rd quarter 2012 / JFQ 63 COMMENTARY | Science vs. the Art of War the advent of decisive warfare as practiced by Hannibal, leader of Carthaginian forces, transiting river to the French revolutionaries and Napoleon I. battle against Rome in Second Punic War However, the proponents of the military ideas of the Enlightenment did not lose influence. Their ideas were largely adopted, although in a modified form, by Antoine-Henri Jomini (1779–1869) and the Austrian Archduke Charles (1771–1847). In fact, the great major- ity of military theoreticians in the 19th century based their ideas on the theories developed during the Enlightenment.24 The Swiss-born French general Jomini avoided the trend of developing increasingly complex geometric systems of warfare, yet he built his theories on foundations laid in the Enlightenment. This, in turn, led him to take a fundamentally reductionist and predictive approach.25 Jomini wrote that “war in its ensemble is not a science, but an art, and strat- egy in particular may be regulated by fixed laws resembling those of positive science but this is not true if war is viewed as a whole.”26 He argued that tactics are the only part of war that can be subjected to fixed rules.27 Jomini sought to identify universal principles central to the art of war and to on the battlefield did not play a great role. The In his view, the modern conduct of war was discern them through his study of the cam- actions of the great captains were explained by based on lines of operation and the introduc- paigns conducted by Frederick the Great. In their adherence to rules of the art of war.17 tion of firearms.21 Bülow provided mathemati- his seminal Summary of the Art of War (1838), The Welsh general and theoretician cally precise theory. He firmly believed that Jomini wrote that there are some fundamen- Henry E. Lloyd was one of the strongest pro- his theories could offer the key to victory by tal principles of war that cannot be deviated ponents of the scientific approach to the study enabling scientific precision of the outcome from without danger, while their application of war. He compared the army to a mechani- before armies engaged in battle. He claimed has been always crowned with success.28 He cal device, which, “like all other machines,” to discover mathematical secrets of strategy provides a list of four maxims that made an is composed of various parts. Its perfection and established them as a science. In Bülow’s overarching principle; even seemingly simple depends first on its parts, and second, on the view, “From now on, there will be no need principles consisted of a set of subordinate manner in which these parts are arranged.
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