i
UGWU, PAUL OKWUDILICHUKWU
PG/M.Sc./12/62259
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND MOCRATIC TRANSITION IN LIBYA
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
Faculty of Social Sci ence
Digitally Signed by: Content manager’s Name Nwamarah Uche DN : CN = Weabmaster’s name
O= University of Nigeria, Nsukka
OU = Innovation Centre
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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
IN LIBYA
BY
UGWU, PAUL OKWUDILICHUKWU
PG/M.Sc./12/62259
A Project
Paper Presented, in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award
of M.Sc. in Political Science (International Relations)
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES
UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA
SUPERVISOR: PROFESSOR JONAH ONUOHA
SEPTEMBER, 2013 iii
TITLE PAGE
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION IN LIBYA
BY
UGWU, PAUL O.
PG/M.Sc./12/62259
A Project
Paper Presented, in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Award
of M.Sc. in Political Science (International Relations)
Department of Political Science
Faculty of the Social Sciences
School of Postgraduate Studies
University of Nigeria, Nsukka
Supervisor: Professor Jonah Onuoha
September, 2013 iv
APPROVAL PAGE
This project research has been approved for the Department of Political
Science, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
By
……………………………. …………………………….
PROF. JONAH ONUOHA PROF. JONAH ONUOHA
PROJECT SUPERVISOR HEAD OF DEPARTMENT
Date………………………. Date…………
………………………………………………..
EXTERNAL EXAMINER
Date……………………………..
……………………………………………….
PROFESSOR C.O.T. UGWU
DEAN OF THE FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
Date…………………………….. v
DEDICATION
This work is dedicated to Almighty God Jesus Christ and also to those who lost their lives in the Libyan uprisings and most especially to the bereaved families.
vi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I wish to use this ample opportunity to pledge my profound gratitude and appreciation to God Almighty Jesus Christ for his unalloyed support to my life and education, because without his grace, provisions and protection, my academic pursuits could have been in shambles.
More so, I appreciate the love and care of my family, especially my parents Mr. & Mrs. Ugwu, Linus and Theresa for their encouragement and teachings which helped to mould me into a responsible man. I also appreciate the love and encouragement of my siblings especially Mr. Ugwu James C. And to my uncles support especially, Uncle Ugwu John C.
I sincerely wish to appreciate and pledge my profound gratitude to my supervisor Prof. Jonah Onuoha for his fatherly teachings and guidance via master’s degree programme. I also appreciate all my lecturers in Political
Science department UNN. Nevertheless, I also appreciate all my colleagues in
Political Science Masters class of 2012/13, especially Ogude Ifeoma,
Mohammed Yunusa and Kelvin Sorkaa for having been there for me. May God
Almighty bless you all in your future endeavours, Amen.
Finally, in a very special way, I want to appreciate Monsignor Prof.
Obiora Ike, for his love and guidance throughout my master’s degree programme. vii
PREFACE
The political crisis in Libya uprisings in 2011/12 has generated a lot of interest of scholars and researchers all around the globe. The US/NATO attack in Libya has generated a lot of issues and concerns for the International community, on the desires of US and democratic transition in Libya. However as much as it has generated concerns and reactions, no conclusive evidence seems to be shared in the world, that one is independent of the other, as they affect one another. This have propelled the researcher to explore the relationships between the US and democratic transition in Libya.
Moreover, this research work is pertinent in its modesty, to document and
place analytical emphasis on what culminated in the uprisings that gave birth to
Libyan contemporary democracy. In presenting the facts and statistics,
conscious effort was applied to look into the real details and rationale behind
the current democratic transition in Libya. This research work: United States
government and democratic transition in Libya was basically divided into five
Chapters.
Chapter one is about introduction. Chapter two examines the articulation
of US interests in Libya. Chapter three centered on the determinants of the US
foreign policy initiatives. Chapter four, analyses the US interest in Libya, the viii timeline of the Libyan uprisings and national transitional council. While the final chapter centered on summary, conclusion and recommendations. vii
ABSTRACT
The United States obviously is the most powerful country in world affairs since
the fall of the U.S.S.R, with the capability to influence the world politics. In her
new relationship with Libya, America lays emphasis on democracy and trade.
Adopting qualitative method, the theory of Marxian political economy, ex-post-
facto research design , and qualitative descriptive analysis, this work investigates the thrust of the US government foreign policy in Libya and discovered that the
US government wants Libya to democratize in order to have a conducive atmosphere for trade and investment, particularly in oil. We therefore contend that the major thrust of the U.S. foreign policy in Libya remains the pursuit of her national interest using the NATO.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title page ------i
Approval page ------ii
Dedication ------iii
Acknowledgement ------iv
Preface ------v
Abstract ------vi
CHAPTER ONE :
1.1 INTRODUCTION ------1
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM - - - - - 4
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY ------6
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY - - - - 7
1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW ------7
1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ------12
1.7 HYPOTHESIS ------15
1.8 METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION - - - - - 15
CHAPTER TWO: THE ARTICULATION OF US INTEREST IN LIBYA
2.1 WHAT DOES U.S WANT IN LIBYA? - - - - - 23
2.2 THE LIBERAL IDEOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK - - - 26
2.3 GLOBALIZATION AND COMPATIBILITY OF THE U.S - - 29
2.4 THE BILL CLINTON’S DOCTRINE ------34 iii
2.5 ANALYSIS OF US FOREIGN POLICY - - - - 38
CHAPTER THREE: THE DETERMINANTS OF US FOREIGN POLICY
3.1 THE PROCESS AND MAKERS OF UNITED STATES POLICY - 45
3.2 INTERNATIONALISM ------49
3.3 AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS / AFFAIRS - - - - 52
3.4 THE DETERMINANT OF THE AFRICAN STATES FOREIGN
POLICIES ------54
3.5 WHAT DID AMERICA WANT IN AFRICA - - - - 57
CHAPTER FOUR: THE ANALYSIS OF US INTERESTS
AND DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN LIBYA
4.1 U.S GOVERNMENT OIL INTEREST AND DEMOCRATIC
TRANSITION IN LIBYA ------60
4.2 TIMELINE OF LIBYAN UPRISINGS ON THE ONE YEAR
ANNIVERSARY ON FEBURARY 15/16, 2011 - - - 65
4.3 LIBYA MARKS ANNIVERSARY OF REVOLT WHICH
OUSTED QADDAFI ------68
4.4 THE UNITED STATES RECOGNISES LIBYA’S
TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL COUNCIL - - - - 71
4.5 TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL COUNCIL - - - - 75
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CHAPTER FIVE: SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND
RECOMMENDATION
5.1 SUMMARY ------105
5.2 CONCLUSION ------106
5.3 RECOMMENDATION ------106
Bibliography ------108 1
CHAPTER ONE
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Socio-economic and political crises are the bane of democracy in Africa.
The crisis in Libya that led to the fall of Muammar al Gadhafi in 2011/2012 is one of such crises. The North African territory which comprises Morocco,
Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, among others has a long history as a centre of
Phoenician, Carthaginian, Greek, Roman, Berber, and Arab civilizations.
Modern Libya is a union of three historically distinct regions, namely
Northwestern Tripolitania, Northeastern Cyrenaica or Barga, and the more remote Southwestern desert region of Fezzan. In the 19 th century, the Ottoman
Empire struggled to assert control over Libya’s coastal cities and interior. Italy invaded Libya in 1911 on the pretext of liberating the region from Ottoman hegemony. The Italians subsequently become mired in decades of colonial abuses against the Libyan people and faced a persistent anti-colonial insurgency. Libya was an important battle ground in the North Africa campaign of the Second World War and emerged from the fighting as a ward of the allied powers (Blandard 2013).
On December 24, 1951, Libya became one of Africa’s first independent states with U.N. supervision and assistance. A Libyan National Constituent
Assembly drafted a Constitution establishing a federal system of government with central authority vested in King Idris Al Sanisi while legislative authority was rested in a Prime Minister, a council of ministers, and a bicameral 2 legislature. The first parliamentary election was held in February 1952, one month after independence. The king banned political parties shortly after independence, and Libya’s first decade was characterized by continuous fighting over taxation, development, and constitutional powers (Blandard 2013).
In 1963, King Idris replaced the federal system of government with a unitary monarchy that further centralized royal authority in an attempt to streamline the development of the country’s newly discovered oil resources.
Prior to the discovery of oil in a commercial quantity in 1959, the Libyan government was largely dependent on economic aid and technical assistance from international institutions as well as the proceeds from the military base agreements with the United State and United Kingdom. The U.S. operated air base at Wheelus Field outside Tripoli. This served as an important strategic air command base and centre for military intelligence operations throughout the
1950s and 1960s.
The discovery and exploitation of oil in the 1960s brought enormous wealth, rapid economic growth and greater financial independence to Libya, but the weakness of national institutions and Libya elites’ growth identification with the pan-Arab socialist ideology of Egyptian leader - Gamal Abdel Nasser contributed to the gradual marginalization of the monarchy. Popular criticism of
U.S. and British base agreements grew and, in fact, became amplified in the wake of Israel’s defeat of Arab forces in the 1967 six day war. 3
King Idris left the country in the mid-1969 for medical reasons, setting the stage for a military coup led by a young, devoted Nasserite army captain named Muammar Al Gadhafi (Blandard 2013). The United States did not actively oppose the coup, as Gadhafi and his co-conspirators initially presented an anti-Soviet Union and reformist platform. Gadhafi focused intensely on securing the immediate and full withdrawal of British and U.S. forces from military bases in Libya, which was completed by mid 1970. The new government also presumed U.S. and other foreign oil companies to renegotiate oil production contracts but some British and U.S. oil operations eventually were nationalized. In the early 1970s, Gadhafi and his allies gradually reversed their stance on their initially icy relationship with the Soviet Union and extended Libyan support to revolutionary, anti-western, and anti-Israel movements across Africa, Europe, Asia, and Middle East. These policies contributed to a rapid souring of U.S/Libyan political relations. This persisted for decades and was marked by multiple military confrontations, state- sponsored acts of terrorism by the Libyan government against U.S. nationals, covert U.S. government support for Libyan opposition groups, Gadhafi’s pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, U.S. and international sanctions (Blandard
2013).
Gadhafi’s policy reversals on Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) and terrorism led to the lifting of international sanctions on Libya in 2003 and 2004.
This was followed by economic liberalization, increase in oil sales, and foreign 4 investment that brought new wealth to some Libyans. Political change in neighbouring Tunisia and Egypt pushed the long-simmering Libya reform debates to the boiling point in January and early February 2011. This eventually culminated in a nationwide political uprising. Meanwhile, the February 2011 political uprising in Libya was triggered off by a number of events in Benghazi and other eastern cities that quickly spiraled out of Qaddafi’s control and eventually culminated in the death of Gadhafi on the 20th September and the subsequent political transition in 2012.
Against this background, this study examines the role of the U.S. government in the 2012 political transition in Libya. The link between the US government interest in the Libyan oil and political transition in Libya in 2012 will particularly come under detailed examination.
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
After the political uprising in Libya which resulted in the death of
Muammur Al Gadhafi, the US-led NATO forces that ousted Gadhafi created a fertile ground for political transition in 2012. On July 7, 2012 precisely, Libyan voters chose 200 members of the General National Congress in the country’s first national election since 1965. Domestic and international observers commended the electoral officials and voters for the orderly conduct of the election despite the short time frame and significant logistical challenges. 5
The election featured a mixed electoral system of 120 individual candidate seats and 80 political entity list seats. Seats were distributed nationally on the basis of population, with Western Libyan districts receiving
100 seats, Eastern districts receiving 60 seats, and Southern districts receiving
40 seats.
The next major step in Libya’s transition process was the drafting and approval of a new Constitution. The transition followed ways laid out in an interior Constitutional declaration issued by the Transitional National Council
(TNC) in August 2011. The interior Constitution has been amended to reflect political developments over the last year, particularly with regard to resurgent debates about federalism and regional representation in national decision- making bodies. Nevertheless, some in Eastern Libya feared that a consolidation of power at the national level would continue a pattern that they claim marginalized the East and neglected its development.
However, since late 2011, sporadic outbreaks of violence among rival militia groups, criminals, and armed citizens have shaken Libyan’s confidence in transitional leaders. International human right entities and United Nations have observed and criticized incidence of torture, unacceptable detention conditions, and extra judicial punishment by official security forces and militia groups across Libya. The TNC urged militia groups to abstain from abusing prisoners or settling scores with arms, and the GNC-appointed government is likely to continue to rely on militia groups to secure some areas of the country 6 and hold Gadhafi era detainees until national security forces are more developed.
Writers on US-Libyan relations have variously and exclusively concentrated on either the description of the American policy spring of 2011, have variously and exclusively concentrated on either the description of the
American policy (Gaddis, 1992), or on the legality or otherwise of the U.S government intervention (Cole, 2011, Tenson, 2003 and Hozgrefe. 2003), or the explanation of the causes of autocratic and tyrannical rule as well as the Arab spring in North Africa Harvey (2010). Despite the efforts of writers, the extant literature appears to neglect the link between the U.S government economic interest and political transition in Libya. To this end, this study investigates the foregoing in the context of the understated research question:
Is the US government interest in the Libyan oil implicated in the 2012
political transition in Libya?
1.3 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY
Broadly, this study investigates the role of the United States government in the 2011 political transition in Libya. The study, however, pursues the following specific objective:
to establish if the US government interest in the Libyan oil is implicated
in the 2012 political transition in Libya.
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1.4 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY
The significance of this study is twofold: theoretical and practical.
Theoretically, this study explores the role of the United States government in the 2011 political transition in Libya.
Practically, the study will be of immense importance to governments, groups, agencies and institutions who may desire to use it as a veritable material to proffer enduring solutions to the lingering political problems engulfing the
Northern African states. The study will also be of benefit to policy makers, researchers and students who may have interest in this area of study.
1.5 LITERATURE REVIEW
This study examines the role of the United States government in the 2011 political transition in Libya. Accordingly, the aim of this review is to examine pertinent literature with respect to the following research question in other to locate the gap in the literature:
Is the US government interest in the Libyan oil implicated in the 2012
political transition in Libya?
In his study of the incidence and practice of tyrannical rule in the Arab world using Egypt as case study, Harvey (2010) observed that the “truth” if there is such practice of the rule of law it was to the extent that the extant law coincided with the momentary whims of Mubarak, but in any case, such whims 8 wee above the laws which were ever apt to rationalize them. He concluded that what accounts for the phenomena is the absence of the rule of law in the region, particularly in Egypt? Harvey responds by highlighting a number of factors, which include the nature of Islam and the need to create certain solidarity of a people that feels oppressed by the prevailing world order.
Reduced to essentials, what Harvey holds is that it is in the naturel of
Islam to conform unthinkingly to forms and patterns, above all, irrationally.
Surrender to authority is to Islam what submission is to Hindu. In the light of this, maintains Harvey, dictators who are bound to strangle the rule of law are most likely to emerge. On the second point of creation of mindless solidarity across class lines, Harvey argued that the necessity for such is hinged on the fact that in the Arab World, the anti-west sentiment drove the masses to align with their elites even when it is known that their elites wish them more evil than the west.
Many observers in the Middle East upheaval have focused on Egyptian economy’s dismal performance and the degree of deprivation the masses got during the reign of Mubarak. Maher (2011) asserts that poverty, unemployment and malnutrition were the major problem of Egypt between 1990 and 2008.
Worse still, he says, most workers worked long hours and earned a wage that would not pay for basic necessities. This, coupled with the undemocratic nature of the regime to the extent that the Egyptian Trade Union Congress (CTUF) was made an obedient rubberstamp, led to an unprecedented wave of strike. Between 9
2004 and 2010 there were more than three thousand labour actions. By 2008, food prices in Egypt had jumped higher, above 30 percent and had worsened the conditions of masses. The healthcare sector had deteriorated grossly by the persistent industrial actions of the workers given the fact that under a regime of hyperinflationary economy, real incomes and purchasing power of the currency were ever on the decrease. In addition, according to official statistics there were more than two million Egyptians unemployed between 1980 and 1990. The figure grew astronomically to the point that in early 2000, more than four million youths in Egypt, hale and hearty, were totally out of job. This estimate, says Maher, represents only those who were unemployed and does not take into account underemployment.
However, Maher rightly enumerated most of the indices of poor standard of living of the populace among which hunger, pervasive huger, was at the echelon, he nevertheless, beyond the position that workers went open strike, failed to show how these conditions instigated some of the protests that culminated in the termination of the rule of Hosni Mubarak. Even when Maher appears concerned about discussing the pressured resignation of Mubarak in the light of a populist protest, he ascribed it to the consequences of the internationalization of the media, indeed globalization, that had aided the spread of protests in Egypt is far from the annoyance of the people over their objective conditions; rather it was instigated by the broadcast of violence in some other countries. This claim is misleading given the fact that long before the 2011 10 protest that saw the end of Mubarak’s regime, there were so many other protests which the government had brutally suppressed. In short, almost all the labour actions in Egypt, especially between 2002 and 2008, never only sought to effectuate better wages for the workers but most importantly to bring about better conditions of living for the populace, and they invariable expressed themselves in opposition to the regime of Mubarak.
A number other scholars who tried to illuminate the nexus between the level of Egyptians standard of living and the protests which were imminent during the rule of Mubarak, apart from Macy (2010) who came close to associating them vaguely to the unresponsive posture of the government to needs of the people, all didn’t quite succeed in determining the extent to which the government’s neglect of the welfare of the people fanned the embers of protests. Finally, the age-long neglect of the welfare of Egyptians was a reality which the protest that brought down the regime of Mubarak seemed to formalize.
Valentino (2011) noted that even if the united states-led intervention in
Libya does ultimately give birth to a stable and prosperous democracy, this outcome will not prove that intervention was the right choice in Libya or that similar interventions should be attempted elsewhere. To establish that requires comparing the full costs of intervention with its benefits and asking whether those benefits could be achieved at a lower cost. The evidence from the last two decades is not promising on this score, although humanitarian intervention has 11 undoubtedly saved lives, Americans have seriously underappreciated the moral, political, and economic price involved.
He however, reiterated that it does not mean that United States should stop trying to promote its values abroad, even when its national security is not at risk. It just needs a different strategy. Washington should replace its focus on military intervention with a humanitarian foreign policy centered on saving lives by funding public health programs in the developing world, aiding victims of natural disasters, and assisting refugees fleeing violent conflict. Abandoning humanitarian intervention in most cases would not mean leaving victims of genocide and repression to their fate.
Guraziu (2008) opines that “the main problem with humanitarian intervention is not the lack of consensus in defining the concept but rather the more contentious issues such as the legality and legitimacy of an intervention”.
For some schools of thought, humanitarian intervention will be legitimate if it is authorized by the United Nations – considcdered the legitimate institution to do so as the world body entrusted with peace and security of the world, as Kurth
(2005) put it “the Nations”. For some others, humanitarian intervention will always be illegitimate and illegal because it violates the sovereignty of nation states. Thus, the illegality or justification argument and the violation of sovereignty thesis form the central focus of the most theoretical/practical concerns on humanitarian intervention. 12
GAP IN LITERATURE
Scholars such as Morgenthau (1957) and (1962), Blanchard (2012),
Leopold (1962), Frederick (1960), Rosati (1998) and, Harbeson and Rothschild
(1995), Guraziu (2008), Kurth (2005), Valentino (2011), Harvey (2010),
Maher (2011) and others have contributed in one way or another in
illuminating the U.S. foreign policy initiatives but none was able to critically
analyze the link between transition process in Libya and the government oil
interest. It is this notable gap that this research work attempts to address.
1.6 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
For an in-depth explanation and understanding of the US government led
NATO invasion of Libya, we predicated our analysis on the theoretical
perspective of political economy derived from orthodox Marxian political
economy as popularized by Marxist epigones as V.I Lenin, Samir Amin, Claude
Ake, Okwudiba Nnoli and others.
The political economy deals with the general laws governing the development of both nature and society. It is fundamentally concerned with the analysis of the economic role of the states, its impact upon the economic system and its socio-economic consequences (Nikitin, 1983: 13). It involves taking comprehensive view of the relations that evolve and exist within or between states in the course of production, distribution, exchange and consumption of the material benefits. This approach also focuses essentially on identifying the 13 laws of capitalist development. It focuses on the production of material wealth which is basis of the life of human society. It sees the production process, the contradictions in the global movement of capital as well as the global relations of production and exchange as determining, conditioning and sustaining behaviour of states. It assumes the primacy of material conditions as determining the behaviour of social group. Studying development as a dynamic process of holistic change, this approach contends that issues of production and distribution of wealth should be located within the broader historical context, embracing social, economic and political variable. It also highlights how the industrialized capitalist countries reinforce and consolidate their grips on international economy by hijacking and appropria ting the global resources.
Political economy studies the basis of the development of society. It studies the development of socio-production. It shows how society develops from lower to higher stages. It touches on the aspects of the economic interrelations between people and social group especially as it concerns their vital interest. It clarifies the laws governing production, distribution, exchange and consumption of the material wealth in human society
In terms of method, political economy utilizes dialectical materialism which presupposes the investigation of the production relations in the process of 14 their emergence and development, consideration of this process as an objective reality, and revelation of the internal contradictions of development inherent in production and distribution process. To this end, it shows that oppression and impoverishment of working people depends on the arbitrary sway of the entire capitalist system. It reveals to the developing countries the true reasons for their backwardness and poverty (Nikitin,1983:26-27).
This theory is very suitable in explaining the rationale behind the US government led NATO invasion of Libya. This is because when Libya is put in its proper context as an oil producing state, a state in which militant nationalist
Muammur Al Gadhafi was equally at the helm of affairs; it becomes evident why Libya should be the target of American hegemonic aggression.
This theory therefore helps us understand that economic interest was at the root of US-led NATO invasion of Libya, and not necessarily the claim of humanitarian intervention. This becomes glaring when it is known that Foreign oil companies operating prior to the insurrection in Libya include France’s
Total, Italy’s ENI, The China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), British
Petroleum, the Spanish Oil consortium REPSOL, ExxonMobil, Chevron,
Occidental Petroleum, Hess, Conoco Phillips.
An invasion of Libya under a humanitarian mandate would serve the same corporate interests as the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. The underlying objective is to take possession of Libya’s oil reserves, destabilize the 15
National Oil Corporation (NOC) and eventually privatize the country’s oil industry, namely transfer the control and ownership of Libya’s oil wealth into foreign hands. It is within this context that the link between the role of the US government in the 2012 political transition in Libya and her interest in the
Libyan oil is explained.
1.7 HYPOTHESIS
The following hypothesis was raised to guide the study:
The US government interest in the Libyan oil is implicated in the 2012
political transition in Libya.
1.8 METHODS OF DATA COLLECTION
To generate data for this study, therefore, we shall use the qualitative method based on the analysis of documents and materials and unstructured elite interview. Qualitative approach, according to Leedy and Ormrod (2001: 155) is
“a detailed and systematic examination of the contents of a particular body of materials for the purpose of identifying patterns, themes, or biases”. In agreement, Strauss and Corbin, (1990: 17) broadly defined qualitative research as "any kind of research that produces findings not arrived at by means of statistical procedures or other means of quantification"According to Biereenu- 16
Nnabugwu (2006), qualitative method is used to obtain in-depth information and concept clarification so as to facilitate instrument designs.
Meanwhile, due to the nature of evidence required to test and validate our hypothesis, this study relied on secondary sources of data. Secondary sources of data, as explained by Ikeagwu, (1998) and Asika (2006) refer to a set of data gathered or authored by another person, usually data from the available data, archives, either in the form of document or survey results and code books.
Selltiz et al. (1977) articulates the advantages of secondary sources of data to
include that of economy. Again, the information of this sort is collected
periodically thereby making the establishment of trends over time possible.
More importantly is the obvious fact that the gathering of information from such
sources does not require the co-operation of the individual about whom
information is being sought.
Therefore, the study relied on institutional and official documents as well as other secondary sources of data such as textbooks, journal articles, magazines, conference papers and other written works sourced from Nnamdi
Azikiwe Library, UNN.
Research Design
Research design is the plan and structure of investigation so as to obtain the answers of research questions (Sun, 2009). Against this background, this study adopts ex-post-facto research design. Ex-post-facto or after-the-fact 17 research design is based on the examination of the independent and dependent variables after the events have taken place and the data already in existence. It is aimed at the discovery of possible causes for a behaviour by comparing study participants in whom the behaviour is present with similar participants in whom it is absent, after the independent variable had occurred (Sun, 2009). In ex post facto research design, the test of hypothesis involves observing the independent and dependent variables at the same time because the effects of the former on the latter had already taken place before the investigation. Kerlinger (1977) defines the ex-post-facto research design as a form of descriptive research in which an independent variable has already occurred and in which an investigator starts with the observation of a dependent variable, and then studies the independent variable in retrospect for its possible relationship to and effects on the dependent variable.
As Cohen and Manion (1980) further clarifies, the phrase ex-post-facto
means “after the fact” or “retrospectively” and refers to those studies which
investigates possible cause-and effect relationships by observing an existing
condition and searching back in time for plausible causal factors.
The ex-post-facto or single-case design assumes the form of an
experimental design where an existing case is observed for sometimes in order
to study or evaluate it. The single case design is represented as follows:
R B1 B2 B3 A1 A2 A3 18
X
Where:
O = Observation
R
= Random assignment of subjects
X = Independent variable
Y = dependent variable
B = Before observation
A = After observation
The analytical routines involved in testing the independent variable ( X) and the dependent variable ( Y) is based on concomitant variation. This is to demonstrate that ( X) is the factor that determines ( Y). This implies that whenever ( X) occurs, there is the likelihood that ( Y) will follow later. The criteria for inferring causality have been summarized by Selltiz et al. (1977: 32) as follows: 19
(a) Covariation between the presumed cause and presumed
effect.
(b) Proper time order with the cause preceding the effect.
(c) Elimination of plausible alternative explanations for the
observed relationship.
In applying the ex-post-facto research design to our study, the test of hypothesis involves observing X, that is, the independent variable (the US government interest in the Libyan oil), and Y, that is, dependent variable (the
2012 political transition in Libya) simultaneously and in retrospect because the effects of the independent variable on the dependent variable had already taken place before the study.
Method of Data Analysis
The mass of qualitative data generated in the course of this study was analyzed using qualitative descriptive analysis. Qualitative descriptive analysis, as described by Asika (2006), essentially has to do with summarizing the
20 information generated in the course of research verbally. It is a dynamic form of analysis of verbal and visual data that is oriented toward summarizing the informational contents of that data 22
LOGICAL DATA FRAMEWORK
Research Hypothesis Major variables Indicators Source of data Method of data Method of
question collection data analysis
Is the US The US X • Destabilization of the Libya’s Textbooks, Qualitative Qualitative government government US government National Oil Corporation journal articles, method descriptive interest in the interest in interest in the • Establishing US hegemony in internet, analysis
Libyan oil the Libyan Libyan oil North Africa, a region hitherto newspapers, implicated in oil is dominated by France and to unpublished work the 2012 implicated lesser extent by Italy and Spain etc political in the 2012 • Redging out China’s National transition in political Petroleum Corp from Libya
Libya? transition in
Libya Y • Formation and installation of a
The 2012 political US puppet regime
transition in Libya 23
CHAPTER TWO
ARTICULATION 0F U.S INTERESTS IN LIBYA
2.1 WHAT DOES U.S WANT IN LIBYA?
The United States aims and objectives, determine the direction of her foreign policy in Libya and Africa in general. And she has the well wither to achieve those objectives. Now the squabble with the U.S.S.R is over, the U.S. is no longer committed with the containment policy in Africa. Their focus now is on trade; contend that
America is looking for natural resources or raw materials for her industries especially the oil. In furtherance to spread democracy in Africa (Libya), America believes that whenever democracy is attained by any nation, it can breathe in good atmosphere for free trade and peace since “free trade and peace were one of the same coins.” We are now in a modern age where globalization is the order of the day. This perhaps means the integration of all the economies of the world. This is driven by the revolutions in information and communication systems. The collapse of communism also ensures “the inevitability of globalization.” The emphasis now, is not only on political reforms rather economic liberalization. This is to ensure that private enterprise prevails all over the globe.
Nevertheless, whether US want gold, oil, etc. or whether she want to help Libya in the democratization process or whether U.S wants massive aid to Libya (Africa) or debt reduction /cancellation, the whole thing boils down to liberalism. US wants a 24 friendly atmosphere in Libya where her economic interests will be achieved and protected. In order to attain this, America had resorted to her goals of promoting democracy, freedom and human rights. The US foreign policy during the cold war era in
Africa was to contain the Soviet Union from expansionism.
In view of the foregoing, the America tolerated repressive regimes in Morocco,
Angola, Zaire, Ethopia, South Africa, etc. In this regard, Larry Diamond noted that the
United States, “generally failed in its more noble professed goals- to promote development, democracy, and peaceful resolution of conflicts.” However, since this is a realistic approach to the analysis of foreign policy, we are not passing value judgment on the United States, hence whatever she did, was to promote and protect her national interest and security threatened by communism. The threat is over, what US wants in
Libya (Africa) is “to promote development, democracy and peaceful resolution of conflicts.” We shall see how United States does this and at the same time, protects her national interest.
We have noted from the foregoing that since the end of the cold war and from the inception of bill Clintons rein or rather administration, diplomacy and aid conditions have become important foreign policy instruments for the promotion of democracy in
Africa. During the cold war, aid was mainly given to client states to checkmate the spread of communism in Africa. 25
Now, the aim of the America in granting aid to Africa is to promote democracy, human rights and liberty. To this effect, the united states have given massive aid support to individuals, independent organizations and media working to promote democracy.
The United States devotes $1 million annually for economic assistance to Africa.
The national endowment for democracy (NED), formed in 1983, also funds wide range of efforts to promote democracy. NED supported human rights efforts in Nigeria,
Liberia, Burkina Faso, Ethopia, Sudan and Zaire. In 1994, via NED, USAID invested tens of millions of dollars in helping South Africa in her first non-racial multiparty elections.
Clair Apodea noted thus U.S. bilateral foreign assistance would be contingent on the recipient country’, human right record.” In 1993, President Clinton announced that his administration “has made human rights a corner stone of our foreign policy.”
Finally, in this era of globalization, human rights could only be promoted where democracy is in vogue and prevails. More so, democracies can only guarantee individual liberty. Therefore it shows while the United States is prepared to promote human rights and democracy in Libya (Africa), via aid, she also prepares the ground for trade liberalization and this is the only way to promote her foreign interest in Libya and
Africa at large.
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2.2 THE LIBERAL IDEOLIGICAL FRAMEWORK.
The America, without missing word is the most powerful country on the surface of the earth today and the ideology which the espouses, is the liberal ideology. The cold war was an ideological war between capitalism and communism. The end of the cold war, and the triumph or rather the victory of Capitalism over Communism. The United
States often equates capitalism with democracy. We know that neither capitalism nor democracy originated from United States. Today, United States has evolved as the only state with the ability and capability to spread both capitalism and democracy all over the world as a matter of foreign policy.
In view of historical materialism, Karl Marx postulated five stages of social development. The primitive communalism, slave-owning, feudal, capitalist and communist stages. The Marxist theorists believed that communism will triumph over capitalism but the reality of the triumph over capitalism but the reality of the international environment has proved this theory wrong. The power theorist believed that society works under certain laws or forces and “to improve the world, one must work with those forces not against them.” The Marxist theorist agreed with the fact that:
Society develops in accordance with certain laws which are independent of the wishes and desires of people, independent of whether man knows of their existence or not. As soon as a person gets through to these laws, he puts them to good use in his own 27 interests. People are rational beings endowed with will power and with desires that enable them to set and achieve certain goals. This is why their activities influence the progressive development of society.
America has identified those forces, put them to good use in order to improve the world and yet in her own interest. Since ideology is the perceptive prism through which a nation views the world, America embraced the liberal ideology which is the same as capitalism. Palmer and Perkins noted that: “without power of some kind, is ideology - even one which aspires to universalism- is passive, harmless pattern of related ideas... and that “without power, communism would be an impotent psychosis.” One can therefore logically add at this point that “without power of some kind, America would not be able to pursue, defend and spread her ideology in the whole world, since this forms the basis of her foreign policy.
Currently, liberalism is the dominant ideology of the contemporary world and this ideology is the United States ideology. (Echezona 1998) noted that the key element of liberal thought is the individual. According to him:
The individual is the key actor. He will purse the greatest profit for himself but in so doing, he will further the economic good, the pursuit of self-interest will lead to competition, innovation, efficiency, higher levels of material well-being for all.
In doing this, the individual must be free. This is why capitalism allows for private ownership of means of production, distribution and exchange much emphasis is 28 laid on free trade and freedom of individual to choose his government which is the essence of democracy. We will therefore use the concepts liberalism, democracy and capitalism interchangeably. In her determination to have a stable international economic system, America attempts in the post-cold war era, to globalize her liberalism and to this effect, Echezona noted that:
The key to this new system is multilateralism- reduction in trade barriers, decrease obstacles to the movement of goods and capital; promote the international division of labour, the same thing with free trade.
America believes that this trade liberalization and the overall liberalization of democratic principles, will lead to increased peace, welfare and equal access to global markets. This becomes the cardinal objective of American foreign policy in Libya in the post-cold war era. The cold war in which communism posed a big threat is no more.
Libya is ravaged by civil war that led to the murder of Muammar Al Qadhafi in
2011/12. America therefore believes that democracy is a condition sine-qua-non for free trade and peace development. In order to promote trade and investment, the United
States is involved in the democratization of Libya.
Some critics interpret America’s policy aim and objective in Libya as “American imperialism.” Morgenthau as we have noted posited imperialism as one of the policy options opens to every nation in the international system. Morgenthau noted that
“imperialism” is today, “indiscriminately applied to any foreign policy, regardless of its 29 actual character, to which the user happens to be opposed.” Owing to this, the term “has lost all concrete meaning” and “everybody is an imperialist to someone who happens to take exception to someone who happens to take exception to his foreign policies”
Nonetheless, imperialism still involves the expansion of a state power beyond its borders. The protagonists of imperialism believe that it is the white man’s burden to civilize and develop Africa while critics equated imperialism with operant controversy, palmer and Perkins, maintained that imperialism is an elusive and controversial term. “It can be discussed, denounced, defended and died for but it cannot be defined in any generally acceptable way. It means different things to different people.”
If we accept Morgenthau view on imperialism, then we must agree that whenever any nation seeks to expand its power, it pursues a policy of imperialism.
2.3 GLOBALIZATION AND COMPATIBILITY OF THE U. S.
The United States foreign policy in Libya (Africa) in the post cold war be better understood when it is viewed within the globalization process which has gained some momentum. Since the end of the cold war, we subscribe to the view that globalization is not only a creature of the U.S. but a creature controlled by it. A creature of such status could only be controlled via the effective utilization of all the advantages of power.
The world is now referred to as a global village. According to Wilfred C. Jenks, we live in a new world and this new world is one world. It is one world in the sense that all leading Centre’s of power and decision in the world are immediately sensitive to the 30 happening in all its parts. He states further that “irresponsibility in any part of the world is liable to produce disaster throughout the world. “Innovations in science, technology and communication have the world look so small and closely knitted together that what affect one country directly or indirectly affects all. Globalization is a process and is
“unfinished. “According to Anthony G. McGraw, global politics represents a
“transitional world.”
In this process, liberalism and marketization, becomes the global norm.
According to Fukuyana, the system which emerged at “the end of history,” “is liberal in so far as it exists only with the consent of the governed.” We are talking about liberal democracy (the U.S. model) which goes with individual freedom, human rights and liberty.
Now, liberal democracy has appeals to universal values and visions of a global community or global village. Grieves has argued that a major quality of ideology is that a nation must be prepared to defend it and if possible, spread it to other nations. In 1917,
Wilson proclaimed a struggle and fight for democracy. To this task, the United States, has dedicated her life and fortunes. Thus, American’s aim is to “do no other”. In 1961,
J. F. Kennedy reiterated this noble objectives by saying that America “shall pay any price; bear any burden... to assure the success and survival of liberty”. Democracy, human rights, free trade, terrorism, drug trafficking, liberty, refugee problems etc., have become global issues. The globalization process is therefore an attempt to spread 31 liberalism and in so far as this remains America’s vital interest, it is compatible with her over all foreign policy objectives. Anthony G. McGrew contends that:
Certainly the fact that no modern society can insulate itself from the vagaries of the world market, or transnational movement of capital, ideas, beliefs, crime, knowledge and news, seems evidence enough of the emergence of a truly global society.
Liberalism encourages the transnational flow of capital, finance and trade. The revolution in communication and transport technologies have facilitated greatly, the global interplay of culture, values, ideas, knowledge, etc. the domain of international relations “is inherently political because it involves the exercise of influence, power and force by governments in the pursuit of their own national interest.” Globalization involves a cobweb of interactions and relations which cut across national boundaries.
Because America supplies the power behind this processes, some critics calls it a new form of “American imperialism.” Decisions taken in America came to have significant effect and influence in Libya (Africa). For instance, speculation at the U.S. market can ruin millions of lives in Africa. Realism contends that power gives a state the ability to promote and protect its national interest and if necessary impose its will on others.
The liberal pluralist paradigm sees global politics in terms of “pressure group politics” because of the multitude of actors; politics involves a process of bargaining, mutual adjustment of interests and authoritative decision making. However, the idea of imperialism comes from the neo-Marxist paradigm which stresses conflict and 32 contradiction between the global economic orders in which capitalism is becoming increasingly organized on a transnational basis. This conflict brings out the so called exploitative tendencies of capitalism. But capitalism, liberalism or democracy has become a global norm. The feature of communism has rendered all arguments against capitalism impotent. No nation can exist in isolation now. Globalization has therefore become a norm. Imperialism or not, globalization refers to:
The multiplicity of linkages and interconnectedness between the states and societies which make up the modern world system. It describes the process which events, decisions and activities on the part of the world can come to have significant consequences for individuals and communities in quite distant parts of the globe.
The super power rivaling is no more. Technological innovations have compressed the world into a “global village.” The internationalization of production and exchange is the order of the day. The gospel America brings to Africa is modernization. The tendency is for Africa to industrialize, democratize, bureaucratize, and urbanize. To achieve this, America has penetrated Africa culturally, economically, politically and otherwise. Because of the conflicts involved, the neo-Marxists call this imperialism but both the realist and the liberal- pluralist acknowledge the presence of competition, conflict and co-operation and with a combination of diplomacy and negotiation, states co-operate to achieve common ends. It is against this background that we will view
President Clinton’s epic diplomatic visit to Africa in 1998. 33
Third world critics of capitalism have called on Africa to “to-link.” Walter
Rodney said “that African development is possible only on the basis of a radical break with the international capitalist system, which has been the principal agency of underdevelopment of Africa over the last five centuries". However, the realities of the post-cold war era have shown that neither “isolationism, nor “de-linking” can bring about Africa’s development.
Therefore modernization appears to be the only reasonable, logical and realistic option for Africa. To a large extent, according to Echezona (1998), modernization theory became not only a paradigm of development but an ideology and policy thrust of the American government to get, Africa to toe the line of development of capitalist societies. How can America achieve or realize this policy objective with the use of power? Morgenthau has defined power as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men”. This control could derive from three sources: the expectations of benefits, the fear of disadvantage and the respect for institutions. Political power can be exerted through orders, threats, persuasion, diplomacy, aid, negotiation, etc., and compliance obtained through sanctions, threat of force or actual use of force.
The realist lay great emphasis on human nature and in view of this, E.H. Carr noted man in society reacts to his fellow men in two opposite ways. Sometimes, he displays egoism or the will to exert himself at the expense of others. At other times, he displays sociability or the desire to co-operate with others, to enter into reciprocal relations of goodwill and friendship with them.” Because man is a rational being, he 34 seeks areas of co-operation. Our argument here is that what America does in Africa is generally “to increase the size of the pie and in the final analysis, we will all be better off without anyone being worse off.” So what America does in Libya (Africa) is to encourage modernization which emphasizes democracy and trade liberalization to enhance America’s trade and investment. This is the main thrust of Clinton’s mission in
Africa.
2.4 “THE BILL CLINTON DOCTRINE”
Africa has been ignored for a long time in history by the United States. The long years of the US foreign policy of isolationism was the cause of Africa neglect by the US with the intensification of the cold war and its consequent spread to Africa, America become involved in Africa. Containment was her foreign policy objective. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989 marked a shift in emphasis by the U.S. globalization is now the main issue.
Jimmy Carter was the only America’s president before Clinton to visit Black
Africa. As a friend of Africa, Carter criticized Clinton for paying insufficient attention to Africa. Jimmy Carter, who visited Nigeria in 1978, reminded the president that “the president is the pre-eminent leader in foreign policy. He has to take leadership. He has to state priorities and he has to fulfill them.” This emphasis, reinforces the role of public opinion and leadership in foreign policy. Therefore, “who is president matters”.
Beginning from March 22, 1998, President Bill Clinton visited, six (6) African states. 35
These African countries include Ghana, Uganda, Botswana, South Africa, Senegal and
Rwanda. Alabi Williams likened the once-in-a life time appearance of Harley’s comet.”
Before the trip, Clinton said that “I want to see for myself what America can learn from
Africa and how we can work with you as partners to build a better future for all our children”. He also said that his visit will Centre on four central goals of offering support for African democracy; increased levels of trade and investments; conflict resolution and the protection of Africa’s unique environment and natural treasures or resources.
In seeking the areas of co-operation, Clinton said that “together, we can create a global community of nations that respect and promote human rights, tolerance and broad participation in public life”. On the improvement of trade in Africa, the American
House of Representatives before then passed an African trade bill called “African growth and opportunity act (AGOA).” This bill was to re-shape trade relations between
America and Africa.
Alabi Williams noted that America expects that, “a stronger, stable, prosperous
Africa will be a better economic partner for security and peace, and a better partner in the fight against the new transnational threats of drug trafficking, crime, terrorism, the spread of diseases and environmental degradation.” This is part of the globalization process and it forms the objective of American that necessitated the visit.
In Ghana, Clinton said that: currently, Ghana again lights the way for Africa.
Democracy is spreading, Business is growing. Trade and investment is rising. Ghana 36 has the only African owned company today in our New York Stock exchange.” In his gospel of democracy, Clinton said that: Democracy requires more than insults, injustice and America have known. Democracy requires human rights for everyone, everywhere.
For men and women, for children and the elderly, for people of different cultures and tribes and backgrounds.
A good society honour’s its entire family.” He said also that “we must allow democracy and prosperity to take root without violence”. In order to encourage Ghana’s democratic efforts, Ghana was to benefit from a 67 million U.S. infrastructure help to finance the purchase of two power generating barges.
In south Africa, where violence, drugs and crime sauged up with the birth of democracy, Clinton declared America’s intention to work hand in hand with south
African government to channel the energy of her youths from manifesting violence via
Apartheid to a culture of peace. This, Clinton said will be done through educational co- operation with south Africa, and through an effective police training in alliance with the south African office of America’s federal Bureau of investigation (FBI).
Clinton carried this message of “growth and opportunity Act” to all the Africa countries he visited. He pledges assistance and co-operations in the areas of trade and investment and support for democracy. While we don’t want to be involved in the debate on why Clinton chose to visit Africa at the heat of domestic pressure or why he visited some selected countries, our analysis revolves round the implications of the 37 policy thrust in the Afro-American relations. Hillary Clinton wife of Bill Clinton remarked after the visit that Africa was undergoing, “a renaissance and that there was a new, positive face of the continent that all Americans needed to see and be part of”.
She noted that America’s view about Africa was based on “misconceptions” and that America sees only pictures of wars, brutal dictatorships, famine and poverty. She went further to say that “we see America’s role in Africa characterized solely in terms of aid. Yet America’s private investment in Africa earns a return of more than 30 percent a year, higher than on any other continent”. She concluded by saying that “we all came from Africa and we have so much to learn and gain from Africa”.
In the post-cold war era, America now looks forward to dealing with Africa in terms of trade and co-operation rather than on aid. In view of this, some analysts fear that this visit by Clinton would serve as the first move towards the removal of U.S. development assistance to sub-Saharan Africa which is currently put at $700 million.
Yet, some believe it is an attempt to re-colonize Africa which is a part of what Nkrumah called Neo-colonialism. Yet, Rev. Jesse Jackson a member of the delegates that visited
Africa and the presidential special envoy for the promotion of democracy in Africa saw the visit as the zenith of U.S.-Africa relations down the ages. Jackson recalls that:
From slavery to neglect to the use of aid, working with the United States to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
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2.5 ANALYSIS OF US FOREIGN POLICY
In an attempt to define the nature of foreign policy, F. S. Northedge focused on five main themes. One of these includes the forces of change and continuity; change involves the implementations of strategies while continuity involves policy objectives.
We noticed this trend in America’s foreign policy.
The ideology of America remains the same even though there are changes in the international environment. America continues to pursue the capitalist ideology all over the world. America’s goal could not be realize without employing the element of power.
We employ the analytical framework which maintains that policy rests on multiple determinants including states historic tradition, geographical location, national interest, and security and other factors. All these determinants help to explain why America deliberately or otherwise ignored Africa for a many years. America’s involvement in
Africa supports the claim to “hierarchy of interest in international obligations.
Certain interests must be defended at all costs, others should be safeguarded under particular circumstance; and certain others, although desirable, can almost never be defended.
The interests of states and their power to purse them are inseparable. Macrides maintains that in evaluating foreign policy, the analyst is often confronted with the questions, “Have the policy makers made a “good” or “bad” decision? Has the foreign policy pursued by a given country been ‘successful’ or unsuccessful’? The first 39 question is ethical question which is always difficult for a general agreement. Many critics of American foreign policy do so on ethical grouped. However, in our realistic approach, we are concerned with what is and not what ought to be.
Morgenthau maintains that even though the realist is aware of the moral significance of political action, “there can be no political morality without prudence.”
E.H. Carr noted that man in society reacts to his fellow man in two opposite ways: something he displays egoism or the will to assert himself at the expense of others. At other times, he displays sociability or the desire to co-operate with others, to enter into reciprocal relations of good will and friendship with them.
The realists generally, believe in the composite nature of man. The pluralistic conception of man shows that the real man is both “the economic man”, the political man”, “moral man”, etc.
E.H. Carr said that even though politics cannot be divorced from power yet, the homo politic us” who purses nothing but power is as unreal a myth as the “homo economic us” who purses nothing but gain.” political action must be in union with morality. May be one can explain America’s foreign Aid, technical assistance and humanitarian gestures in terms of morality. But behind all these things lies the notion of power. There are many ways of exerting influence and control, foreign aid is one of them. However, foreign policy is best evaluated “in terms of the success and failure to implement the goals they purse”. Macrides noted that: 40
In the international community, each and every state is allotted some power, which alone or in combination with others allows it to keep its economy and way of life or, conversely, prevents its destruction by others.
Power relations express themselves in many ways. It could be through alliances, international law, co-operative schemes or integrative scheme and war is the extreme form of power relations. For the U.S., the primary objective is to increase her power and influence in the world. Therefore, at every point in time, she relies heavily on the quality of her diplomacy. This involves a clear conception of national purpose; at another time, it involves prudence and skill in the use of the tools of state craft.
At the end of the cold war, American diplomacy took a new dimension in Africa.
The historic visit by President Bill Clinton to Africa was a successful foreign policy initiatives, it will help America to realize her objective of “Growth and opportunity” in
Africa. Notwithstanding one, can still ask what really does America want in Africa? “Is it peace or Power or Prosperity?” The truth remains that America seeks all of them. Yet,
Thomposn and Macrides contend that power is not an end in itself. “It is an instrument for preserving a national community and its way of life.” The use of power according to them must always be subjected to this test:
Does it preserve the national community? Does it enhance its security and well- being? Is its use consistent with the basic interests of the national community? 41
America therefore, seeks “to increase her security, power, or influence,” in Africa. In this sense, America takes both defensive and promotes decisions which aim at creating conditions conducive to the exercise of American influence and power. This is the reason why we base our analysis on the Marxian political economic theory of international politics in which the ultimate analysis of “success” and “failure” can be measured in terms of the plusses and minuses in this context of American foreign policy in Libya.
America during her formative years pursued vigorously the policy of isolationism aimed at preserving her values from being contaminated by Europe. She consolidated the gains of this policy and emerged then at, the end of the second world war a super power. This long year of isolationism could be an explanation why Africa was ignored by America. Clinton had on March 1998 apologized for America’s “sins of neglect and ignorance”. The containment policy was also to great extent aimed at preserving
America’s democratic norms. Having acquired and utilized all the various indices of national power and effectively managed the determinants of foreign policy, America pursued the containment policy in all parts of the world which was aimed at preserving capitalism. By 1989, America triumphed and became successful policy wise.
At the end of “Growth and opportunity” to Africa. Growth may imply progress and development but one may ask, opportunity for what? From our analysis, the answer is “opportunity” to democratize and partake in the globalization process. 42
Susan Rice noted that: “the days of apartheid, cold war conflict and one party state are over,” the numbers of democracies and economic growth have risen. In situation like this, America seek Africa’s co-operation in combating terrorism, drug trafficking and crimes and environmental problems which have become global issues.
Behind this, lies America’s interest in the promotion of trade and investment in Africa.
This therefore, is the meaning of “Growth and development.” No doubt the new wave of globalization and democratization processes in Libya (Africa) is beginning to point to the success of this policy thrust.
Some Africans regarded this as imperialism. We have discussed imperialism and come to the conclusion that it mean different thing to, different people. On often regard any policy one is opposed to as imperialism. In this case, any nation can be an imperialist. Morgenthau claimed that:
A nation whose foreign policy aims at acquiring more power than its actually has, through a reversal of existing power relations-worse foreign policy, in other words, seeks a favourable change in power status-pursues a policy of imperialism.
One can argue here that America pursues imperialism just like any other nation.
The successful pursuance of this policy is yet a function of a nation’s power. Otherwise, how can any nation deserve change or influence existing power relations without having sufficient power in all its ramifications which include political power, economic power and military power must also be taken into consideration. Therefore, from the power 43 theorists point of view, imperialism is a policy option open to every nation-state in international politics. America has been able to utilize various forms or tools of imperialism in order to exert her power and influence in her relation with Africa. Under economic imperialism, she preaches trade and investment (capitalism); under political imperialism, she preaches democracy; under cultural imperialism, she targets the mind of Africa’s through the USIA-the VOA, the CNN, the internet, etc., now serve this purposes without contradiction, we agree with Han. J. Morgenthau that people can still seek power for itself hence “whatever the ultimate aim of international politics, power is always the ultimate aim of international politics, power is always the immediate aim”.
This is why any nation can reverse the existing power relations, add more power to the one it already has or demonstrate the power it has.
In her relation with Africa, as well as with any other part of the world, America enacts to her external or international environment in two ways. First, sometimes, she displays egoism and second, sometimes she exhibits her desire for co-operation. Egoism is a manifestation of self-interest of America which is also called national interest.
While America is prepared to co-operate with Africa through the gospel of “Growth and opportunity Act”, she is also prepared to reverse, change or alter the existing power structure or relations. She is always prepared at any point in time to demonstrate her power as was the case with Libya and Sudan. This is what power politics is all about.
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CHAPTER THREE
DETERMINANTS OF US FOREIGN POLICY IN LIBYA
3.1 THE PROCESS AND MAKERS OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN
POLICY
The foreign policy of any country is a product of environmental factors both internal and external to it. Moreover, both the domestic and international structures determine and influence the process of foreign policy of any nation-state. Some intellectual opine that foreign policy emanates where ever domestic policy ends. Henry
Kissinger noted that: “a systematic assessment of the impact of domestic structures on the conduct of international affairs would have to treat such factors as historical traditions, social values and economic system”. One important aspect of the internal structure which determines the process of foreign policy is the administrative structures or the bureaucracy which handles the decision making process.
Decision making theorists may grant that the state, is the basic unit in international relations, yet they would maintain that the state, is the action or behavior taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence the state is its decision makers therefore, to say that the United States is internationalizing, globalizing, or spreading democracy or capitalism in Africa, is to say that certain decision-makers “acting in the name of the state”, had taken the decision. In America, decision making process is a series of interactions involving the decision makers who is at the center of the process; who is influenced by and has influence on international constituency and domestic constituency. The international arena is determined by the international environment. In 45 this same vein, both behaviours or actions of nation-states and non-nation-state actors come to play it, is against this back drop that we will understand the economic activities of United States multinational corporations in Africa and in particular Libya.
Leadership is a vital aspect of the internal structure and in the case of the U.S.,
“who is President matters”. Roger Hilsman said that the process of the U.S. foreign policy is a complex process involving many individuals and institutions. Elsewhere, he distinguished three kinds of decision: crises decision, declaratory decision and programme decision. While the first two involves mainly the president and the congress, program decision involves a far larger number of participants. In the United States, it involves all the various foreign policy bureaucracies including the president and other institutions.
In U.S, the president is the chief diplomat, he has the power to make decisions in foreign matters, but, things began to change after the long, frustrating and costly war in
Vietnam, Cambodia (1970), and Laos (1971). Americans were so disillusioned that critics attacked the powers of the president in decision making. Henry Kissinger noted thus:
The more elaborate the administrative structures, the less relevant an individual’s view becomes-indeed, and one of the purposes of bureaucracy is to liberate decision-making from the ancients of personalities.
Kissinger went further to opine that advance countries notably, the United States, suffer from “over administration”. This “over administration” is a result of many individuals, institutions and agencies involved in foreign policy making. Roy C. 46
Macrides divided the agencies into two broad groups. First, are the government agencies which includes; i. The executive ii. The legislature
Secondly, the non-governmental agencies which include: i. Political parties ii. Interest groups iii. Media of communication iv. Characteristics of public opinion.
There are two approaches to the study of foreign policy. The ideology which is based on the “expression of prevailing political, social and religious beliefs.” In this approach, foreign policy is characterized as democratic or totalitarian libertarian or socialist, peace-loving or aggressive. The other is the analytical approach which believes that foreign policy “rest on multiple determinants, including the states historic tradition, geographical location, national interest and security needs determine U.S. foreign policy in African during and after the cold war era.
We accepted the perception that foreign policy depends on multiple determinants which also, included ideology. We have opined in our introductory chapter, the determinants of national power and those were also the determinants of foreign policy.
These elements when they are effectively produced can increase a state’s power and will lead to effective foreign policy. Macrides listed seven elements, grouped under three headings. They are: 47 i. The relatively permanent material elements such as geographical and natural resources; ii. The less-permanent material elements such as industrial and military establishments, and iii. The human elements.
The effective harmonization of all those depends on the human elements especially leadership and national morale. However, the whole thing boils down to “national interest. Therefore, all the policy making agencies starting from the president down to public opinion, take US national interest into consideration. The department of state for instance was created in 1947, apart from advising the president on foreign policy affairs, has the responsibility of looking after the business and personal interests of Americans.
The United States Information Agency (USIA) has as its responsibility, the duty to make American policies understood sympathetically abroad via such means as broadcasting (VOA), motion pictures and the distribution of American publications.
The USIA is an image laundering-public relations outfit for the United States. It attempts, to persuade people to understand and appreciate the policies of the America.
In fact, it is an American foreign policy instrument for “psychological warfare”, hence, its primary target is the peoples mind. This is cultural imperialism aimed at changing power relations. The ultimate aim is to promote America’s interests by changing the mind of the opponent”. The United States Agency for International Development
(USAID) concerns itself with carrying out programmes on economic growth and development of foreign countries. The numerous aid programmes were handled by this 48 agency. Other agencies include the United States Arms control and disarmament agency, the defence department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the national Security Council, the central intelligence agency (CIA), and the American congress. Aside from these, there are interest groups both political and religious organizations which determine, influence and contribute in the foreign policy formation and making.
3.2 INTERNATIONALISM
Geography is a very crucial issue or matter in shaping and determining the foreign policy of a nation-state. U.S. as we know was geographically isolated from
Europe as well as Africa. Socio-historical background is also very vital in foreign policy formation. In view of the above assertion, the foreign policy of isolation dominated U.S. foreign policy from 1776 – 1945. U.S. attitude towards international politics was
“influenced by the values, beliefs and historical experience of American democracy”.
One of these historical experiences” was her “lengthy isolation from the squabble or quarrels of the great European powers”. America in view of this devoted herself to domestic affairs. “Strengthening the bonds of national unity, westward expansion, absorbing the millions of immigrants attracted by the opportunities of the country to industrializing and urbanizing the entire continent.”
The socio-cultural influence on foreign policy is portrayed by American moralism which made U.S. to see herself as “the chosen people”. America also sees herself as
“the world’s first democracy committed to the improvement of the life of the common man”. While the old world represented by Europe stood for “poverty, exploitation and 49 war”, the new world represented by U.S., stood for opportunity, democracy and peace”.
This consequently forced America to reject the power politics of European powers. The policy of neutrality permitted America to remain aloof from war between other states.
By staying aloof, U.S. does not favour and this will make America “to trade uninterruptedly with all nations, those at war as well as those at peace”.
Micheal Akehaust opined that “neutral states must refrain from fighting in an international war”. He also added that neutral states must refrain from allowing their territories to be used by either side from the movement of troops or military supplies for training of troops or as a base for military operations, they must not supply either side with arms and money and they must not allow either side to open recruiting outfits or offices in their territories. In view of this, the UN general assembly resolution 2131 (xx) declares’ thus:
No state shall organize, assist, ferment, finance, incite or tolerate subversive, terrorist or armed activities directed towards the violent overthrow of the regime of another state or interfere in the civil strife of another state.
All these changed from 1945 which signaled the beginning of the cold war. It also changes the nature, scope and the direction of U.S. foreign policy. Prior to this time,
U.S. had the first test of her “new international position’ between 1905 and 1921. More so, in a message to the congress on April 2, 1917, Wilson proclaimed a struggle and fight:
For democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberates of small nations, for a universal dominion 50 of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the world itself at last free. To such a task we can dedicate our lives and our fortunes, everything that we are and everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she has treasured. God helping, she can do no other.
This declaration actually marked U.S. internationalist approach to foreign policy.
In the post-world war II period, American foreign policy became revolutionalized and hence “she became entangled with literally, most of the world”. By committing “her might” for the principles of democracy, America once again came into terms with the realities of power politics. We know that foreign policy involves two issues which are national objectives. It is therefore, logical to conclude that the Wilson Doctrine would not be achieved if it was not backed with power.
With the destroyer-bases agreement of September 2, 1940, the United States ceased to be a neutral state in the sense that she has used the term since 1776. Again, drove the final nail into the coffin of neutrality. This agreement was aimed at promoting
American security by supplying material and to nations fighting the potential and actual foes of America. It was under this circumstance that America entered the Second World
War. The period immediately after the war, presented the world with perplexing problems. Europe was devastated and needed urgent re-building. There were nationalistic aspirations in the less developed world especially, Africa. Above all there was a big threat to communism. 51
America therefore, in order to meet the threat, was forced to abandon isolationism, and neutrality for internationalism. More than ever before, U.S. became interested and committed to the Wilsonian injunction of 1917, to fight for democracy, human rights and liberty. This brings to focus the role of ideology in foreign policy.
Ideology thus became the notion and motive force behind America’s internationalism. A threat to U.S. ideology, become a threat to her national interest globally and to “do not other”.
3.3 AFRICA IN WORLD AFFAIRS/POLITICS
It is pertinent at this juncture to present Africa as it really is so as to be able to analyze properly the nature and character of her relationship with U.S. Hans J.
Morgenthau had given us three cardinal patterns to which international politics correspond. However, L.U. Ejiofor as cited in Ejefonye C.A. (1999) had asked: can
African states be reliably assessed on Morgenthau’s parameters? He opined thus:
Africa is not at the moment considered a world power and as such cannot keep what it hasn’t. Africa has limited instruments and hadn’t that self-confidence needed for domineering and acquiring more power. It cannot therefore, pursue a policy of imperialism. Nor can it fittingly pursue a strong policy of prestige because it has little or no superior power to demonstrate.
Africa’s emergence and participation in world affairs is a current phenomenon. This was the result of centuries of enslavement and colonialism. Before 1945, Africa was pertinent to the world as a vast field for adventure, for asserting imperial supremacy and 52 for experimentation by different “civilizing mission”. Consequently, Africa was massively exploited by the European powers. In the concluding analysis, Africa as a result of her unequal relationship with Europe became underdeveloped. In the post- colonial era, Africa remained appendage to world powers. In the 1960’s Africa was drafted into the cold war. Then, the America became actively involved. The two superpowers recognized that Africa even though considered peripheral in the cold war geographically, militarily, politically incremental potential to add to or subtract from the strength and security of the cold war alliances.
America then deviated from her avowed goal of liberty and democracy in Africa. She became more interested in preserving her national interest and security by containing soviet’s expansionism in Africa by any means. While the cold war rages, Africa suffers.
However, the dawning of the post-cold war era in Africa has inspired new desires for economic and political development. The problem of governance and economic survival in Africa created some conflicts which have their roots in the cold war period. From
1989, there are new prospects for African development. Africa collectively, is endowed with huge natural and human resources. These resources are potentials for development.
Is the exploitation and exploration of all these resources that is the ultimate aim of U.S. in Africa? The dependency’s school tent to blame Africa’s underdevelopment on colonialism and her mode, if incorporation into the international capitalist system.
Unfortunately or fortunately the modernization school emphasizes liberalism and this has become the dominant ideology since the end of the cold war. It is true that African 53 economics are dominated by transnational monopolies under the yoke or foreign investment. This is what critics call imperialism or neo-colonialism.
In the post-colonial Africa, the economy, remained generally disarticulated,
“consequently, the productive base remained low and the capacity for self-expansion very limited” and the final result was overall poverty. A look at all the regions of the world shows that Africa is the poorest.
This state of poverty breeds inequality and instability in the forms of political crisis, industrial strikes, coup d’état and armed revolutionary struggles that is prevalent in most African states of today. From the east to the West Africa, from north to southern
Africa, there are political conflicts everywhere. It is in situation like this that we can know what America actually wants from Africa.
Africa in the words of Frantz Fanon, is “the wretched of the earth”. She is a typical example of Thomas Hobbes ‘state of nature” where life was solitary, brutish, poor, short and nasty. Under this condition, how can Africa relate with the U.S. and what determines her foreign policies?
3.4 THE DETERMINANT OF THE AFRICAN STATES FOREIGN POLICIES
Foreign policy as we have noted earlier, is a product of both domestic and international factors. What then are the internal and external factors that determine the foreign policies of Africa states? Dr Olajide Aluko, opined that even though it would be difficult to exercise, discuss the external behaviour of more than 42 independent African states, it is still necessary to make a broad generalization that will embrace most, if not 54 all African states”. There is no doubt that the environment under which the foreign policies of Africa states operate is in reality limited by their glaring economic, political and military weakness. Their general state of under development, limits the pursuance and realization of their objectives in the world arena. After independence, Africa started searching for development which is “a process involving the borrowing of whatever that works from the ideologies, politics and economics of the first and second worlds…, most especially from the U.S. since the end of cold war.
In the domestic setting, Aluko listed such factors as “the nature of the economy, municipal political pressure and colonial heritage, and the nature and ideological orientation of the ruling class”. Under the external environment he treated such issues as the geographical location, the existence of colonialism and the cold war environment”.
Obviously, colonialism is over but the issue had degenerated to neo-colonialism or imperialism. The cold war has since ended; it no longer determines Africa’s relation to her external affairs. Geography as we have noted is an important determinant of foreign policy. This has put Africa in an enviable position, considering the vast natural resources that are embedded in the soil. However, Africa lacked the capital and the know-how to develop these into actual power. The colonial heritage of Africa ensured that Africa remained appendages of her erstwhile colonial masters. The bulk of Africa’s trade remains with Europe and North America. Without a strong economic base no
African state could be able to pursue a vigorous and adventurous foreign policy.
Leadership and ideology of the government elites play important roles too. Unlike the 55
U.S. which suffers from over administration, Aluko opined that “there are no serious domestic institutional restraints on the behaviour of the African rulers”.
This makes most of the Africa leaders to be too powerful and this has implications in their relationships with the great powers especially, the US Aluko also opined thus:
Where the rulers are militant and socialist in outlook, and where they are of humble birth without wealth such as Dr. Nkrumah, Sekon, Toure, Modibo Keita, Colonel
Gadhafi, one can expect a radical foreign policy stance from their countries. But where the rulers are conservative with aristocratic background, such a king Hassan of morocco, or with plenty of wealth such as President Felix Houphout –Boigny of Ivory coast.
Apart from the huge deposit of natural resources which made Africa an important source of raw materials to the America, leadership in Africa remains an important determinant of the direction of the foreign policies of African states. With military rule, one party democracy, “sit-tightism” leadership became personalized. The leaders alone determine the course of foreign policy. Neither cold war; communism nor non- alignment, make much sense to Africa today. A new wave of democracy started blowing in 1989 and the greatest challenges facing Africa today are democracy and development.
Grieves observed that one of the obvious conclusion from any study of the problems of development is that developing countries could probably use help from 56 developed countries. In this regard, foreign aid appears attractive. However, in this post- cold war era, the problem now is not just foreign aid but as John Spanier noted:
A lack of national cohesion, a far too rapidly growing population, a dearth of capital and a traditional social structure and values all have impeded the modernization of their societies, with the result that grave foreign policy implications have ensued. A side from lack of national cohesion which accounts for the social and political crisis all over
Africa, the dearth of capital has led to serious challenges of debt burden.
The financial trouble of African economics continues to mount. There is a saying that note; he who pays the piper, dictates the tune. The foreign donors dictate how the loans are to be used. And this debt burden, determines also the direction of African foreign policy initiatives.
We have seen all the developmental, both the economic and political designing
Africa. The dependents theorist suggested “delinking” but the post-cold war period has left Africa with no option than to follow the path of modernization. Therefore, Africa operates from a weak and powerless position and in this situation, we can ask: what does America want in Africa.
3.5 WHAT DOES AMERICA WANT IN AFRICA?
The United States aims and objectives, determines the root and direction of her foreign policy in Africa (in particular Libya) and has the means to achieving those objectives. Now the threat by communism is gone, the America is no longer at par with the containment policy in Africa. The gospel and sermon is now on trade liberalization, 57 investment and democracy. Some critics contend that the U.S. is looking for natural or rather raw material for her industries, especially the oil. In an attempt to spread democracy in Africa, U.S. believes that only democracy can bring about free trade and peace since “free trade and peace was one and the same thing”. We are now “in the age of globalization”. This means the integration of all the economies of the world. This is driven by the revolutions in communication and information systems. The collapse of communism also ensures “the inevitability of globalization”. The emphasis is now on political reforms and economic liberalization. This is to ensure that private enterprise prevails in the world over.
Nevertheless, whether U.S. is interested in oil, gold, diamond etc., or whether she wants to help develop and democratize Africa, in the democratization process or whether she wants massive aid to Africa or debt relief/cancellation, the whole thing boils down to liberalism. US wants a friendly atmosphere in Africa where her economic interests will be protected. In order to achieve this, the United States had resorted to her goals of promoting freedom, democracy and human rights protection. During the cold war, the overriding strategic goals of the US in Africa were containing the soviet expansionism. In view of the foregoing, the America tolerated repressive regimes in morocco, Angola, Zaire, Ethopia, South Africa, etc. In this regard, Larry Diamond opined that the US “generally failed in its more noble professed goals to promote development, democracy, and peaceful resolution of conflicts.” More so, since this is a realistic approach to the analysis of foreign policy, we are not passing value judgment on the US hence whatever she did was to protect her national interest and security 58 threatened by communism. The threat is over what US wants in Africa is “to promote development, democracy and peaceful resolution of conflicts”. We shall see how
America does this and at the sometime, protects her national interest.
We have noted from the foregoing that since the end of the cold war and from the inception of bill Clinton’s administration, diplomacy and aid conditions have become important foreign policy instruments for the promotion of democracy in Africa. During the cold war, aid was mainly given to client states to checkmate the spread of communism in Africa. Now, the objective of America in granting aid to Africa is to promote democracy, human rights and liberty. To this end, America has given massive aid support to individuals, independent organizations and media working to promote democracy. The United States devotes $1 million annually for economic assistance to
Africa.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN LIBYA
4.1 US GOVERNMENT OIL INTEREST AND POLITICAL TRANSITION IN
LIBYA
With 46.5 billion barrels of proven reserves, Libya is the largest oil economy in the African continent followed by Nigeria and Algeria. In contrast, US proven oil reserves are of the order of 20.6 billion barrels (December 2008)
(http:www.eia.doe.gov/ oil-gas/data-publications ). The most recent estimates place
Libya’s oil reserves at 60 billion barrels. Its gas reserves at 1,500 billion m3. Its production has been between 1.3 and 1.7 million barrels a day, well below its productive capacity. Its longer term objective is three million b/d and a gas production of 2,600 million cubic feet a day. The BP Statistical Energy Survey (2008) places
Libya’s proven oil reserves at 41.464 billion barrels at the end of 2007 which represents
3.34 % of the world’s proven reserves (http://www.mbendi.com/indy/oilg/af/ib).
Foreign oil companies operating prior to the insurrection in Libya include
France’s Total, Italy’s ENI, The China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC), British
Petroleum, the Spanish Oil consortium REPSOL, ExxonMobil, Chevron, Occidental
Petroleum, Hess, Conoco Phillips. Of significance, China plays a central role in the
Libyan oil industry. The China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) had a workforce of some 400 employees. The total Chinese workforce in Libya was of the order of 30,000. 60
Eleven percent (11%) of Libyan oil exports are channelled to China. While there are no figures on the size and importance of CNPC’s production and exploration activities, there are indications that they are sizeable. More generally, China’s presence in North
Africa was considered by Washington to constitute an intrusion. From a geopolitical standpoint, China was seen an encroachment. Also of importance was the role of Italy.
ENI, the Italian oil consortium puts out 244,000 barrels of gas and oil, which represented almost 25 percent of Libya’s total exports. The military campaign directed against Libya was intent upon excluding China from North Africa
(http://www.skynews.com.au/businessnews/articles).
Among US companies in Libya, Chevron and Occidental Petroleum (Oxy) decided in October 2010 not to renew their oil and gas exploration licenses in
Libya (http://www.skynews.com.au/businessnews/articles). In contrast, in November
2010, Germany’s oil company, R.W. DIA E signed a far-reaching agreement with
Libya’s National Oil Corporation (NOC) involving exploration and production sharing
(http://www. Aficannews.com/site/list-messages).
An invasion of Libya under a humanitarian mandate would serve the same corporate interests as the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq. The underlying objective is to take possession of Libya’s oil reserves, destabilize the National Oil
Corporation (NOC) and eventually privatize the country’s oil industry, namely transfer the control and ownership of Libya’s oil wealth into foreign hands. The National Oil
Corporation (NOC) is ranked 25 among the world’s Top 100 Oil Companies.
(http://www.libyaonline.com/business/details.php ). The invasion of Libya was part of 61 the broader “Battle for Oil”. Close to 80 percent of Libya’s oil reserves are located in the Sirte Gulf basin of Eastern Libya. (See map below)
Wall Street, the Anglo-American oil giants, the US-EU weapons producers would be the unspoken beneficiaries of a US-NATO led military campaign directed against
Libya. Libyan oil is a bonanza for the Anglo-American oil giants.
Libya has the largest oil reserves in Africa. The objective of US-NATO interference is strategic: it consists in outright theft, in stealing the nation’s oil wealth under the disguise of a humanitarian intervention. This military operation is intent upon establishing US hegemony in North Africa, a region historically dominated by France and to lesser extent by Italy and Spain.
US-NATO intervention leading to the eventual formation of a US puppet regime was also intent upon excluding China from the region and edging out China’s National
Petroleum Corp (CNPC). The Anglo-American oil giants including British Petroleum which signed an exploration contract in 2007 with the Qadahfi government are among the potential “beneficiaries” of the proposed US-NATO military operation.
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Figure 1: The Map of Libya
Source: “Oil and Gas in Libya – Overview” http://www.mbendi.com/indy/oilg/af/ib , retrieved 29/07/2013.
63
More generally, what is at stake is the redrawing of the map of Africa, a process of neo-colonial redivision, the scrapping of the demarcations of the 1884 Berlin
Conference, the conquest of Africa by the United States in alliance with Britain, in a
US-NATO led operation.
US interference in North Africa redefines the geopolitics of an entire region. It undermines China and overshadows the influence of the European Union. This new redivision of Africa not only weakens the role of the former colonial powers (including
France and Italy) in North Africa. It is also part of a broader process of displacing and weakening France (and Belgium) over a large part of the African continent. US puppet regimes have been installed in several African countries which historically were in the sphere of influence of France (and Belgium), including The Republic of the Congo and
Rwanda. Several countries in West Africa (including Côte d’Ivoire) are slated to become US proxy states.
The European Union is heavily dependent on the flow of Libyan oil. 85 percent of its oil is sold to European countries. In the case of a war with Libya, the supply of petroleum to Western Europe could be further disrupted, largely affecting Italy, France and Germany. Thirty percent of Italy’s oil and 10 percent of its gas are imported from
Libya. Libyan gas is fed through the Greenstream pipeline in the Mediterranean.
On the basis of the qualitative data presented above, we accept our hypothesis.
Hence, US government interest in the Libyan oil is implicated in the 2012 political transition in Libya. 64
4.2 TIMELINE OF LIBYAN UPRISINGS ON THE ONE-YEAR
ANNIVERSARY FEBRUARY 15/16, 2011 :
The arrest of human rights activist Fethi Tarbel starts a riot in Benghazi. Security forces respond with live fire, snipers, helicopter and gunships as protests spread to
Zintan, al Bayda and Quba. Within one week, there are reports of 1,000 people having been killed by government troops. February 21: David Cameron calls violence
“appalling and unacceptable”. Other world leaders later follow his lead in condemning the government’s attacks on its own people. February 22: Gaddafi denounces protesters as spies who have been drugged and manipulated, vowing to “fight until the last drop of blood is spilt” and die a martyr.
February 23: al-Qaeda reportedly backs Libyan protesters. February 24: Anti- government militias take control of central coastal city of Misrata after evicting forces loyal to Gaddafi, while David Cameron warns Gaddafi of “consequences” and Obama call violence outrageous. February 26: The UN Security Council imposes sanctions on
Gaddafi and his family, and refers the crackdown on rebels to the International Criminal
Court. SAS makes daring desert rescue mission to pull dozens of Britons to safety.
February 27: Britain freezes Libyan assets held in the UK. February 28: EU governments approve sanctions against Gaddafi and his closest advisers.
March 5: The rebel National Transitional Council (NTC) in Benghazi declares itself
Libya’s sole representative. March 17: The UN Security Council votes to authorize a no-fly zone over Libya and military action — to protect civilians against Gaddafi’s 65 army. March 19: The first air strikes halt the audience of Gaddafi’s forces on Benghazi and target Libya’s air defenses. April 30: A NATO missile attack on a house in Tripoli kills Gaddafi’s youngest son and three grandchildren, his government says. June 27:
The ICC issues arrest warrants for Gaddafi, his son Saif al-Islam and interference chief
Abdullah al-Sanusi on crimes charges against humanity. August 21: Rebels enter Tripoli with little resistance. Gaddafi makes audio addresses over state television calling on
Libyans to fight off the rebel “rats”. August 23: The rebels overrun Gaddafi’s fortified
Bab al-Aziziya compound in Tripoli, trashing the symbols of his rule. August 29:
Gaddafi’s wife, his daughter Aisha and two of his sons enter Algeria. Aisha Gaddafi gives birth in a clinic in a border town hours after crossing the frontier. September 1:
Libya’s interim rulers meet world leaders at a conference in Paris to discuss reshaping
Libya. Gaddafi, on the 42nd anniversary of his coming to power, urges his supporters to fight on. September 8: Interim Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril arrives in Tripoli on his first visit since it was taken by his forces.
September 11: Libya starts producing oil again. Niger says Gaddafi’s son Saadi has arrived there. September 13: Interim government Chief Mustafa Abdel Jalil makes his first speech in Tripoli to a crowd of about 10,000.
September 15: France’s Nicolas Sarkozy and Britain’s David Cameron land in Libya to a heroes’ welcome. September 16: The UN Security Council eases sanctions on Libya, including on its national oil company and central bank. The U.N. General Assembly approves a request to accredit interim government envoys as Libya’s sole representatives at the UN, effectively recognizing the NTC. 66
September 20: US President Barack Obama calls for the last of Gaddafi’s loyalist forces to surrender as he announces the return of the U.S. ambassador to Tripoli. Gaddafi taunts NATO in a speech broadcast by Syrian-based Arrai television station.
September 21: The interim rulers say they have captured most of Sabha, one of three main towns where Gaddafi loyalists have been holding out since the fall of Tripoli.
Gaddafi’s birthplace Sirte and the town of Bani Walid continue to resist. September 25:
The first Libyan crude oil to be shipped in months sails from the Eastern Port of Marsa el Hariga for Italy.
September 27: NATO says Libya’s interim rulers have taken full control of the country’s stockpile of chemical weapons and nuclear material.
October 12: Government fighters capture Gaddafi’s son Mo’tassim after he tried to escape Sirte. October 13: NTC forces say they have control of the whole of Sirte except neighbourhood ‘Number Two’ where Gaddafi forces are surrounded. October 14:
Gunfights break out in Tripoli between Gaddafi supporters and NTC forces, the first sign of armed resistance to the new government. October 17: NTC forces celebrate the capture of Bani Walid, one of the final bastions of Gaddafi loyalists. A Syrian television station confirms Gaddafi’s son Khamis died in fighting in southeast of Tripoli on Aug.
29. October 18: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton arrives in Libya on an unannounced visit, urges militias to unite. October 20: NTC fighters capture Site,
Gaddafi’s hometown, ending a two-month siege and extinguishing the last significant hold out of troops loyal to the deposed leader. October 20: Gaddafi is killed after rebels find him cowering in a sewer in his hometown of Site. October 25: Gaddafi is buried in 67 a secret desert location. November 19: Saif Gaddafi is arrested in the desert and is jailed. December 15: The International Criminal Court says Gaddafi’s death could amount to a war crime. (Telegraph Media Group Limited 2013)
4:3 LIBYA MARKS ANNIVERSARY OF REVOLT WHICH OUSTED
GADDAFI
Libyans have been marking the anniversary of the uprising that led to the overthrow of
Col Muammar Gaddafi after his rule of more than 40 years.
Celebrations have been taking place across the country, including in the capital Tripoli and in the eastern city of Benghazi, where the revolt began.
The White House congratulated Libyans but urged the new government to protect “the rights of all the Libyan people’.
But the anniversary comes amid fears of continuing instability in the country. Hundreds of militias are roaming the country unimpeded and observers point to an institutional void.
Libyan interim leader Mustafa Abdul Jalil on Thursday vowed a tough response to anyone who threatened national security during Friday’s celebrations.
The White House said in a statement that the revolutionaries had a “responsibility to protect their freedoms by working with the government to establish stability, peace and reconciliation”.
Meanwhile members of Col. Gaddafi’s former government outside Libya have told the
BBC they are starting a political movement aimed at radical change in the country. 68
‘There was atmosphere of Joy everywhere’
Friday 17 February marks one year since the first major demonstration against Col.
Gaddafi’s rule in Benghazi, which became the rebel stronghold.
The uprising quickly spread around the country and led eventually to NATO’s military intervention in the conflict. Col. Gaddafi was killed in his hometown of Site on 20
October.
No official celebrations were organized, as a mark of respect for the thousands who died in the battle for Libya, but locally arranged events have been taking place.
Spontaneous commemorations began in Benghazi on Thursday, with residents setting off firecrackers, honking car horns and flashing “V for victors’ signs.
On Friday, mothers in the city held pictures of their sons killed in the fighting, while singers and poets performed for the crowds, AFP reports.
Addressing crowds in Benghazi, interim Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keib said, quoted by Reuters: ‘We promise to find Gaddafi loyalists who are abroad, who were involved in killing or stealing Libyan money.”
“We promise to build up our national army ... Let’s stay united until we reach the safe land,” he added.
In the capital Tripoli and other cities, roadblocks were set up to search for any attempt to disrupt the festivities.
Around 2,000 people gathered after Friday prayers in Tripoli’s Martyrs’ Square, where the celebrations had a carnival atmosphere, the BBC’s Gabriel Gatehouse reports.
Only small numbers of armed men were in evidence among the crowds, he adds. 69
Tripoli resident Naima Misrati told AFP news agency she was celebrating the freedom the revolution had brought her. “I have no work to describe my happiness. There is joy everywhere in Tripoli,” she said.
“Despite the problems that remain in the country, this is an amazing day and we want to celebrate,” Sarah, an engineering student celebrating with friends in central Tripoli, told
Reuters.
“.just looks at what was achieved in this past year.’
In a TV address on the eve of the anniversary, Mr. Abdul Jalil insisted his government had “opened our arms to all Libyans, whether they support the revolution or not”.
“But this tolerance does not mean we are incapable of dealing with the stability of our country,’ he warned.
We will be tough towards people who threaten our stability. The thuwwar [brigades of former rebel fighters] are ready to respond to any attack aimed at destabilizing” the country, he added.
Many of those celebrating in Tripoli today say they trust the thuwwar to protect them, but the government’s lack of control over the
Fighters is seen as one of the central factors in Libya’s continued instability, our correspondent reports.
Gunfights between rival militias can be heard in Tripoli and many other Libyan towns and cities almost every night, he adds. (BBC Africa 2013)
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4.4 THE UNITED STATES RECOGNIZES LIBYA’S TRANSITIONAL
NATIONAL COUNCIL
The Obama administration’s decision to formally recognize the so-called Transitional
National Council as Libya’s “legitimate governing authority” is an unlawful act of political banditry; further exposing the imperialist character of the US-NATO war against Libya.
Announced by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton last Friday, it gives pseudo- legal cover for the US to steal billions in Libyan state assets and give them to the Benghazi- based TNC, which serves as NATO’s proxy land force in the war. TNC officials have previously obtained funding by touring the US, Europe and the Arab Gulf states.
Washington can now offer $34 billion in Libyan funds frozen by Western banks.
The US recognition of the TNC is itself a violation of international law. Former US
State Department legal advisor John Bellinger noted that the US recognition of the TNC
“is especially unusual under international law because the TNC does not control all of
Libyan territory, nor can it claim to represent all of the Libyan people ... International lawyers have viewed recognition by states of an insurgent group, when there is still a functioning government, as an illegal interference in a country’s internal affairs.”
There is a clear element of desperation in Washington’s recognition of the TNC. The
NATO war in Libya is now in its fifth month, yet it appears no closer to toppling the government of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi due largely to the weakness and unpopularity of the TNC in the Libyan population. 71
US recognition of the TNC is the final refutation of Washington’s initial claims that its goal in backing the TNC was to protect Libyan civilians from harm at Gaddafi’s hands.
In fact, Washington aimed at regime change in Libya and dictating the policy of the
Libyan government—at the cost of untold numbers of Libyan civilians’ lives, as NATO repeatedly bombs Tripoli and other major Libyan cities. The Western powers initially justified their intervention in Libya this March by cynically promoting the TNC as the leadership of a struggle for Libyan democracy against the Gaddafi regime. It was nothing of the sort. In fact, as press reports have made clear, the TNC is a disparate alliance of ex-Gaddafi regime officials, tribal chiefs, exiled businessmen and other operators including CIA assets and Al Qaeda operatives of the Libyan Islamic Fighting
Group (LIFG). Such forces, hostile to the overwhelming majority of the Libyan population, could not play any role in creating a democratic regime in Libya. However, they could offer Washington and its European allies a chance of installing a client regime to further open up Libya’s multi-trillion-dollar oil reserves to major oil firms, and to reassert their hegemony in a region shaken by the working class uprisings in
Egypt and Tunisia.
With its formal recognition by Washington, the TNC stands even more exposed as a tool of imperialist intrigue. Hillary Clinton made clear last week that US had recognized the TNC because it had promised to do Washington’s bidding. She said that the
Benghazi leadership “has offered important assurances ... which reinforce our confidence that it is the appropriate interlocutor for us in dealing with Libya’s present and addressing Libya’s future.” 72
Clinton claimed that the TNC had promised “democratic reform” and would use the seized funds in a “transparent manner.” This is absurd; even if the TNC’s reactionary operatives offered such assurances, no one could seriously believe them. The assurances
Clinton sought no doubt involved commitments to give Western oil firms access to
Libya’s reserves and open up its economy to major investors. As the TNC is utterly dependent on NATO military support against Gaddafi, it is likely that it also accepted demands that NATO military and intelligence assets be stationed in Libya after the war.
Remarkably little has been made in the US press reports that about 500 TNC fighters are LIFG members. Many have experience fighting the US military in Iraq or
Afghanistan. One LIFG commander now fighting Gaddafi under US-NATO auspices,
Abdel-Hakim al-Hasidi, told the Italian newspaper II SoIe24 Ore that he had fought in
Afghanistan after 2001 before being captured in Pakistan in 2002 and deported to Libya, where he was imprisoned until 2008.
He said he had recruited “around 25” men from eastern Libya to fight in Iraq, some of whom “today are on the front lines in Ajdabiya.” He said his forces were not terrorists, adding that “members of Al Qaeda are also good Muslims and are fighting against the invader.”
This is a devastating exposure of the fraud of the so-called “war on terror.” Terrorists are declared “evil” and targeted for assassination in some cases—but in others, they function as useful tools of imperialist policy. Washington bases its policy not on some unwavering opposition to Al Qaeda, but on the changing calculation of its imperialist interests. 73
The US decision to openly move for regime change in Libya will have deep consequences internationally. After the formal re-establishment of US-Libya relations finalized by the Bush administration in 2003, Gaddafi was feted in Washington and internationally. Before the outbreak of revolutionary struggles in the Arab world this winter, he was an ally of the major Western powers. Virtually overnight, however,
Libya went to being the target of NATO-led regime change, with Gaddafi and his family facing repeated assassination attempts.
This extraordinary shift is a warning to governments and political movements around the world, which will have lasting consequences. Regimes such as Iran and
North Korea, even if they were able to re-establish ties with the US as Libya did, must assume that in the long term, Washington’s declarations that it has peaceful intentions are not worth the paper they are printed on. More broadly, any political figure or tendency can be praised by the White House one day, and the target of assault and assassination by US forces the next.
Above all, the US-NATO war on Libya has exposed the various “left” and liberal political tendencies which backed the TNC and the NATO intervention in Libya on
“humanitarian” grounds. They uncritically accepted claims that the TNC was an insurgent democratic movement that had to be protected by Western military forces at all costs. From France’s New Anti-Capitalist Party to the Nation magazine and US academic Juan Cole, these forces have proven to be nothing more than pseudo-left spokesmen for US imperialist policy. They now bear political responsibility for the violence inflicted on the people of Libya. These positions were the polar opposite of the 74 perspective advanced by the World Socialist Web Site and the International Committee of the Fourth International. Based on an analysis of the class forces in the Libyan conflict, it warned that the US and its allies were preparing a colonial-style war against the North African working class—insisting that working class opposition to the Gaddafi regime would have to begin by adopting the most intransigent hostility to the imperialist forces controlling the TNC. This analysis has been vindicated. (O’Connor 2011).
4.5 THE NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL COUNCIL OF LIBYA :
Transitional National Council was the de facto government of Libya for a period during and after the Libyan civil war, in which rebel forces overthrew the regime of Muammar
Gaddafi. The NTC governed Libya for a period of ten months after the end of the war, holding elections to a General National Congress on 7 July 2012, and handing power to the newly elected assembly on 8 August.
The formation of the NTC was announced in the city of Benghazi on 27 February 2011 with the purpose to act as the “political face of the revolution”. On 5 March 2011, the council issued a statement in which it declared itself to be the “only legitimate body representing the people of Libya and the Libyan state” An executive board, chaired by
Mahmoud Jibril, was formed by the council on 23 March 2011 after being de facto assembled as an “executive team” since 5 March 2011. The NTC issued a Constitutional
Declaration in August 2011 in which it set up a road-map for the transition of the country to a constitutional democracy with an elected government. 75
The council gained international recognition as the legitimate governing authority in
Libya and occupied the country’s seat at the United Nations. In referring to the Libyan state, the council used simply “Libya”. The UN formally recognized the country as
“Libya” in September 2011, based on a request from the Permanent Mission of Libya citing the Libyan interim Constitutional Declaration of 3 August 2011. In November
2011, the ISO 3166-1 was altered to reflect the new country name “Libya” in English,
“Libye (Ia)” in French.
After popular movements overturned the rulers of Tunisia and Egypt, Libya’s immediate neighbours to the west and east, Libya experienced a full-scale uprising beginning in February 2011. By 20 February, the unrest had spread to Tripoli. Much of
Libya had slipped out of Gaddafi’s control, falling to anti Gaddafi forces. Eastern Libya, centered on the second largest city and vital port of Benghazi, was firmly under the control of the opposition. The opposition began to organize themselves into a functioning government Anti-Gaddafi forces marched on Sirte (Gaddafi’s hometown) on 28 September 2011. Gaddafi loyalists delayed the attack with the use of their snipers.
The fight for Sirte ended on 20 October with the capture of the town and the death of
Colonel Gaddafi.
Early efforts to form a government, opposition meeting in Bayda, 24 February
2011
On 24 February 2011, politicians, former military officers, tribal leaders, academics and businessmen held a meeting in the eastern city of Bayd1The meeting was chaired by former justice minister Mustafa Abdul Jalil, who quit the Jamahiriya government a few 76 days before. The delegates discussed proposals for interim administration with many delegates asking for UN intervention in Libya. The podium at the meeting displayed the pre-Jamahiriya flag. On 25 February, Al Jazeera TV reported that talks were taking place between “personalities from eastern and western Libya” to form an interim government for the post-Gaddafi era. The following day, former justice minister
Mustafa Abdul Jalil was announced to be leading the process of forming an interim body, to be based in Benghazi. Jalil stated that “Gaddafi alone bore responsibility for the crimes that have occurred” in Libya; he also insisted on the unity of Libya and that
Tripoli was the national capital. The efforts to form an alternative government have been supported by the Libyan ambassador in the United States, Ali Suleiman Aujali.
The Libyan deputy ambassador to the United Nations, Ibrahim Omar Al Dabashi, stated that he supported a new alternative government “in principle”.
Establishment of a national council
A National Transitional Council was formed on 27 February to act as “the political face of the revolution” Its spokesman, Hafiz Ghoga, made clear at the launch press conference that the national council was not a provisional government and added that the newly formed council was not in contact with foreign governments and did not want them to intervene. He later clarified that an air strike mandated by the United Nations would not be considered a foreign intervention.
An Al Jazeera journalist in Benghazi reported that a fully fledged interim government would not be formed until Tripoli was under opposition control. This contradicted 77
Jalil’s statement of the previous day about the formation of a provisional government.
These comments were later clarified by the council as Jalil’s “personal views”.
On 5 March, the council issued a statement in which it declared itself to be the “sole representative of all Libya”. Mustafa Abdul Jalil was named as chairman of the council.
On 10 March, France became the first country to recognize the council as Libya’s only legitimate government.
Formation of an executive board
On 23 March, the council established an Executive Board to act as a transitional government for Libya. Jibril, who had served as chairman of the informal “executive team” since 5 March, was appointed as Chairman of that board, stating that council would serve as the “legislative body”, and the new Executive Board would serve as the
“executive body”. Jibril led the meeting and negotiations with French President Nicolas
Sarkozy, a meeting that resulted in France officially recognizing the council as the sole representative of the Libyan people.
Instability in 2012
In mid-January 2012, protesters against the NTC stormed its Benghazi headquarters, demanding greater transparency on expenditures, that Gaddafi era officials be sacked, and that Islamic sharia law is the source of the country’s future constitution. Jalil was in the building, but slipped out the back before protesters broke in and stole computers and furniture. A few days earlier, Abdul Hafiz Ghoga, vice president of the NTC, was 78 surrounded and jostled by a group of university students in Benghazi, before being pulled to safety by supporters.
Dissolution
In a ceremony on 8 August 2012—held in the evening due to the daytime fast of
Ramadan—the NTC formally transferred power to the General National Congress. Jalil stepped down as chairman, passing the position to the GNC’s oldest member,
Mohammed Ali Salim. The NTC was then dissolved, while the GNC members took their oath of office, led by Salim. Hundreds of people gathered in Tripoli’s Martyrs’
Square with candles symbolizing reconciliation. The date of the transfer—20 Ramadan on the Islamic calendar—had also been selected for symbolic reasons, as 20 Ramadan the previous year had fallen on 20 August, the date that the rebels attacked Tripoli, leading to Gaddafi’s flight. As Jalil addressed the crowd, attendees chanted “Allahu
Akbar!” or another phrase meaning “The blood of martyrs will not go wasted!”
According to BBC News, the transfer was “the first peaceful transition of power in
Libya’s modern history”.
Aims and objectives
Further information: Libyan interim Constitutional Declaration
The “Declaration of the founding of the National Transitional Council” stated that the main aims of the council were as follows:
• Ensure the safety of the national territory and citizens
• Coordination of national efforts to liberate the rest of Libya 79
• Support the efforts of local councils to work for the restoration of normal civilian life
• Supervision of the Military Council to ensure the achievement of the new doctrine of the Libyan People’s Army in the defense of the people and to protect the borders of
Libya.
• Facilitate the election of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution for the country; be put to a popular referendum
• Form a transitional government to pave the holding of free elections
• Guide the conduct of foreign policy, and the regulation of relations with other countries and international and regional organizations, and the representation of the
Libyan people.
In another statement clarifying the goals for a post-Gaddafi Libya, the council committed itself an eight-point plan to hold free and fair elections, draft a national constitution, form political and civil institutions, uphold intellectual and political pluralism, and guarantee citizens’ inalienable human rights and the ability of free expression of their aspirations. The council also emphasized its rejection of racism, intolerance, discrimination, and terrorism. Article I further declares Tripoli the state capital and Arabic the official language while reserving the linguistic and cultural rights of ethnic minorities as well as the freedom of religion for religious minorities.
The stated aim of the NTC was to form a de jure interim government based in Tripoli and hold elections for a Public National Conference to replace it. The PNC would then elect a prime minister, appoint a Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution subject to 80 its approval by the PNC and by referendum, and then oversee free elections for a representative government.
Structure and membership
Legislative body.
National Transitional Council
Al-majlis al-wa/ant al-in tiqahi
Type: Unicameral
Leadership: Chairman Mustafa Abdul Jalil
Vice Chairman Mustafa Honi
Seats: 51 members
Meeting place: Tripoli, Libya
Website: ntclibya.com
The National Transitional Council claimed to be, and was widely recognized as, the
“only legitimate body representing the people of Libya and the Libyan state”. Starting off at 33 members, it rose to 51, with proposals to increase its size further to 75 or even
125.
Al Jazeera English reported that each city or town under opposition control will be given five seats on the new council and that contact will be established with new cities that come under opposition control to allow them to join the council. The identities of members of the council were not disclosed at the launch conference. Human Rights lawyer Hafiz Ghoga was the spokesperson for the new council. An Al Jazeera English journalist in Beñghazi stated that Mustafa Abdul Jalil still had a leadership role within 81 the new council. The Council declared that Jalil was the head of the council. The council met formally for the first time on 5 March 2011, when it was announced that the council had 33 members. The names of some of the members were kept secret to prevent threats to their families that were still in Gaddafi-held areas of Libya. In
September 2011, some of the NTC’s members were in Benghazi, while some had moved to the de jure capital Tripoli. On 8 September, the head of government
Mahmoud Jibril became the highest-ranking NTC official yet to move to Tripoli. Prior to Jibril’s relocation, Deputy Chairman Ali Tarhouni was the de facto leader of the NTC in Tripoli.
Members
The members of the council included:
Council Members:
• Mustafa Abdul Jail! - Chairman of the Council
• Mustafa Toni - Vice Chairman of the Council
• Zubeir Ahmed El-Sharif - Political Prisoners representative
• Omar El-Kariri - Military Council representative
City Representatives:
• Hassan Fadeel - City of Ajdabiya
• Salih Dirssi - City of Bayda
• Ahmed Dayikh - City of Bayda
• Mustafa Houni - City of Jufra 82
• Abd al-Oadr Minsar - City of Khoms
• Emadaldeen Nussayr - City of Zawiya
• Khaled Nassrat - City of Zawiya
• AbdAllah Turki - City of Zintan
• Mukhtar Jadal – City 0f Ajaylat
• Intisar Ageeli - City of Benghazi
• Abd al-Basset Naama - City of Tarhuna
• Ihbaybil Doii - City of Jadu
• Ashour Bourashed - City of Derna
• Khaied Ahmed ShikShik - City of Zliten
• Othman Ben Sassi - City of Zuwara
• Abd al-Majeed Sayf-alNasser City of Sabha
• Abd al-Nasser Nafaa - City of Tripoli
• Salih Darhub - City of Tripoli
• Osama AbuKraza - City of Tripoli
• Milad Oud - City of Tripoli
• Ali Manaa - City of Ghadames
• Idris AbuFayid - City of - Gharyan
• Jamal Issa - City of Kabaw
• Ali Gamma - City of Murzuk
• Ahmed Zway - City of Kufra
• Mustafa Lindi - City of Kufra 83
• Abdullah Moussá A lMayhoub - City of Quba
• Taher Dyab - City of Marj
• Mussa Balkami - City of Ubari
• Mohamed ZaynAbideen - Lower Nafusa
• Fathi Mohammed City of Benghazi
• Ahmed Al-Abbar - City of Benghazi
• Salwa Fawzi El Deghali - City of Benghazi
• Khaled Sayih - City of Benghazi
• Mansour Kikhia - City of Benghazi
• Mohamed Rimash - City of Sirte
• Fraj Shoeib - City of Shahhat
• Ali al-Juwani - City of Sabratha
• Farhat Shirshari - City of Sorman
• Othman Mgayrhi - City of Tobruk
• Alameen Bilhaj - City of Tripoli
• Abd al-Razzag Aradi - City of Tripoli
• Mohamed Hrayzi - City of Tripoli
• Abd al-Razzag Abuhajar - City of Tripoli
• Ali Shitwi - City of Tripoli
• AbdAllah Banoon -. City of Tripoli
• Abd al-Nasser Salem - City of Tripoli
• Abd al-Basset Abadi - City of Tripoli 84
• Abd al-Hadi Shaweesh - City of Murzuk
• Ramadan Khaled - City of Msallata
• Ibrahim BenGhasheer - City of Misrata
• Suleiman Al-Fortia - City of Misrata
• Mohamed Al Muntasir - City of Misrata
• Salem Gnan - City of Nalut
• H.assan Sghayir - City of a! Shatii
• Saad Nasr - City of al Shatii
• Abd al-Razzag Madi- City of Yafran
• Mubarak al Futmani - City of Bani Walid
Later AbdAllah Banoon of Tripoli resigned to form a political party.
Executive Board
On 5 March 2011, a crisis committee was set up to act as the executive arm of the council. An Executive Board was announced on 23 March. 2011. It originally had 15 members, but a minor reorganization apparently removed the post of Military Affairs from the council proper and created a successor position for Defense on the board, expanding the bureau to 16 members. The Executive Board was dismissed on 8 August
2011 due to administrative mistakes in investigating the assassination in July of Free
Libyan Army commander General Abdel—Fatah Younes. Chairman Mahmoud Jibril, the only designated member of the Executive Board who was not fired, was tasked with forming a new Board.
Members (March—August 2011) 85
Prior to the re-shuffle in August 2011, the board members were:
• Mabmoud Jibril — Chairman and head of International Affairs
• Ali Al-Issawi — Vice-Chairman
• Abdullah Shamia — Economic
• Ali Tarhouni — Finance and Oil
• Anwar Fituri — Transportation
• Ahmed Hussein Al-Darrat — Internal Affairs and Local Government
•. Abulgassim Nimr — Environment
• Jalal al-Digheily — Defence (formerly Military Affairs)
• Atia Lawgali — Culture and Community
• Mahmoud Shammam — Media
• Abdulsalam Al-Shikhy — Religious Affairs and Endownments
• Naji Barakat — Health
• Mohammed Al-Allagi_ Justice and Human Rights
• Ahmed Al-Jehani — Reconstruction and Infrastructure
• Hania Al-Gumati — Social Welfare
• Suliman El-Sahli — Education
Members (October 2011)
A new cabinet was unveiled in early October 2011, though not all of its members were announced at once. Individuals confirmed to be part of the new board included.
Mahmoud Jibril as prime minister, Ali Tarhouni as deputy prime minister, and Jalal al-
Digheily as defence minister. On 23 October, Jibril resigned as Mustafa Abdul Jalil 86 declared an end to the Libyan civil war, and Abdurrahim El-Keib succeeded him as prime minister on 31 October.
The executive board was dissolved on 22 November 2011 as per the Interim constitution which stated that the Executive board must be dissolved upon the formation of the Interim Government.
El-keib unveiled the interim government on 22 November 2011
• Abdurrahirn El-Keib — Prime Minister
• Mustafa A.G. Abushagur- Deputy Prime Minister
• Hamza Abu Faris — Minister of Awqaf & Islamic Affairs
• Ali Ashour — Minister of Justice
• Anwar Fituri — Minister of Communications and Information Technology
• Mustafa Rugibani — Minister of Labor
• Fatima Hamroush — Minister of Health
• Fawzi Abdel A’al — Minister of Interior
• Awad Beroin — Minister of Energy
• Taher Sharkas — Minister of Trade and Commerce
• Sulaiman al-Sahli — Minister of Education
• Ashour Bin Khayal — Minister of Foreign Affairs
• Osama al-Juwali — Minister of Defense
• Isa Tuwaijir — Minister of Planning
• Mabrouka Jibril — Minister of Social Affairs
• Abdulrahman Ben Yezza — Minister of Oil 87
• Hasan Zaglam — Minister of Finance
• AbdulHamid BuFruja — Minister of Agriculture
• Mahmoud Fetais — Minister of Industry
• Naeem Gheriany — Minister of Scientific Research and Higher Education
• Ahmed Attiga — Investment Authority
• Abdul Rahman Habil — Minister of Culture and Civil Society
• Awad al-Baraasi — Minister of Electricity
• Ashraf bin Ismail — Martyrs Authority
• Mohammad Harari — Minister of Local Government
• Ibrahim Alsagoatri — Minister of Housing
• Yousef Wahashi— Minister of Transportation
• FathiTerbil— Minister of Youth
•Ibrahim Eskutri — Minister of Construction
Local Government
During the war, in opposition-held Benghazi, a 15-member “local committee” made up of lawyers, judges and respected local people was formed in order to provide civic administration and public services within the city Residents have organized to direct traffic and collect refuse. Many shops and businesses have opened again. A newspaper and two local radio stations were also established.
Similar “local committees” were formed in other cities controlled by opposition.
Commercial bodies 88
The council established the following commercial bodies to manage its financial affairs:
• The Central Bank of Benghazi — to act as the “monetary authority competent in monetary policies in Libya”
• Libyan Oil Company — to act as the “supervisory authority on oil production and policies in the country”
Armed forces
Main articles: National Liberation Army (Libya) and Libyan National Army. The anti-
Gaddafi forces were Libyan armed forces which were constituted during the 2011 war by defected military members and armed citizens in order to engage in battle against remaining members of the Jamahiriya’s armed forces, hired mercenaries and paramilitary loyal to the rule of Muammar Gaddafi. The National Liberation Army, formerly known as the Free Libyan Army, was the NTC’s military arm, with the small
Free Libyan Air Force operating assets including captured and defected fighter jets and helicopters.
Omar El-Hariri was the first military affairs minister the NTC named, holding that position from 23 March 2011 forward. By 19 May 2011, however, Jalal al-Digheily had replaced El-Hariri. Then on 8 August 2011, Digheily along with 14 other members of the Executive Board were fired and the position left vacant, but was reappointed in early
October 2011 after continuing in the role of interim defense minister for almost two months. Then on 22 November 2011, the Executive Board was dissolved for the formation of the Interim Government and Osama al Juwali became the new Defense
Minister. 89
On 1 April 2011, Abdul Fatah Younis was announced as commander of the NTC’s forces, in an attempt to form an organized fighting structure due to a string of failures.
Younis was killed in an attack on 29 July 2011 which was variously blamed on pro-
Gaddafi agents, rogue rebel militiamen, and the NTC itself. Suleiman Mahmoud,
Younis’s top lieutenant, replaced him as army commander.
Foreign relations:
In Libya, Countries that recognized the NTC as the sole legitimate representative of Libya during the civil war. Countries that did not recognize the NTC prior to voting for it to take Libya’s UN seat, Countries that said they would not recognize the NTC,
Other countries which opposed recognition of the NTC at the UN. Foreign relations of
Libya and International recognition of the National Transitional Council
In July 2011, the Libya Contact Group of representatives of many nations announced its participants’ agreement to deal with the National Transitional Council as the “legitimate governing authority in Libya”. The council also received the backing of the Arab
League and the European Union. On 16 September 2011, the United Nations General
Assembly voted to award Libya’s UN seat to the NTC. On 20 September 2011, the
African Union officially recognized the NTC as the legitimate representative of Libya.
Mohammed El Sanussi, the pretender to the throne of Libya, also voiced his support for the NTC. While NTC forces were working to secure military victory on the ground, the
NTC’s chairman, Mustafa Abdul Jalil, was working to foster good diplomatic relations overseas. Before Gaddafi was killed Abdul Jalil negotiated a deal with the British 90 government to pay millions in compensation to victims of IRA attacks that used
Jamahiriya-supplied arms.
Military intervention:
In 2011 military intervention in Libya, United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1973 authorized a multi-national effort to establish a no-fly zone. On 19
March, British, French and US air forces began attacking targets in Gaddafi-controlled
Libya, thereby initiating the UN military intervention. Operations were led by NATO under Operation Unified Protector, after initially being led by a joint UK, US and
French command. Non- NATO states such as Jordan, Qatar, Sweden, and the United
Arab Emirates also contributed to the military mission.
4.5 Political Developments and Challenges
The attacks occurred at a particularly sensitive political juncture for Libya. Voters elected the 200-member GNC on July 7, 2012, in the first national election in nearly 50 years. GNC members elected Mohamed Magariaf as GNC President in August and elected Mustafa Abu Shugur as interim prime minister-designate on September 12. Both spent considerable amounts of time in the United States while members of opposition movements in exile. Abu Shugur spent weeks negotiating with political groups over the makeup of a new cabinet, but was removed in a vote of no confidence after his proposed cabinet lists drew criticism from some elected officials and members of the public. Abu 91
Shugur struggled to reach consensus on the cabinet plan with Mahmoud Jibril, the former interim Prime Minister and narrow runner-up to Abu Shugur in last month’s election. Jibril’s National Forces Alliance won nearly half of the 80 party list seats in the recent election, and Jibril reportedly sought assurances that his coalition’s policy preferences will be reflected in the interim cabinet’s programs. The Muslim
Brotherhood-affiliated Justice and Construction Party along with powerful interest groups from various Libyan cities sought to influence the selection of a new prime minister-designate and will have opportunities to vote on the composition of a new cabinet. The GNC voted to select Ali Zeidan as prime minister designate on October 14.
Anecdotal reporting from Libya suggests that some groups and movements may withhold support for the government based on the individuals selected for cabinet positions.
Once a cabinet is agreed upon, the GNC is expected to turn to a series of challenging policy issues, including determining the method for selecting members of a drafting committee to prepare a new constitution. Many Libyans have hoped the elected GNC and the yet-to-be- appointed cabinet will enjoy greater legitimacy that will enable them to act decisively on security issues. Those hopes have been tested as Libya has been reeling from deteriorating security conditions in the wake of the election. Attacks on international targets, a series of aggressive attacks by armed Salafists on religious buildings around the country, and an assassination campaign against senior security officers have fueled widespread criticism of interim leaders since early 2012. 92
The government’s response to the attack on the U.S. mission in Benghazi will be an even greater test of elected Libyan officials and their ability and willingness to assert state authority, which to date have been very much in question. In order to investigate and punish those responsible, Libyan security authorities are likely to have to confront armed non-state actors in a political context in which some Libyans may question the legitimacy of the elected government to do so and in which other Libyans may view anti-U.S. protests as legitimate or the attack as having been somehow justified.
Key steps in the transition process, such as cabinet selection and debate over constitutional issues, are, now further complicated by the need to respond to the security threats clearly illustrated by the attack. Among the most pressing and potentially divisive political issues are:
Islam and the State: Most Libyans support a prominent role for Sunni Islamic traditions in public life, but differ in their personal preferences and interpretations of their faith.
Libyan social norms are relatively conservative and traditional, and Libyans remain engaged in a long-running public debate about the proper role for Islam in public life. In the past, that debate led to violence between the Qadhafi government and armed
Islamist opponents. In the present, the debate has taken on new urgency given the opportunity to define a new constitution. Calls for and against strict interpretations and enforcement of sharia have featured regularly in public discourse since the fall of the
Qadhafi ‘regime. Libyans hold a wide array of views on these questions and are, now freely sharing them. During January 2012, public gatherings in the low thousands emerged in Benghazi and Misrata to demand that sharia be codified and enforced as the 93 primary component of Libya’s new constitution. Salafist groups such as Ansar al Sharia and Hizb al
Tahrir, which support that position, are growing more organized and have been increasingly publicly active. Muslim Brotherhood leaders have indicated they “are calling for the establishment of a civilian state but with an Islamic reference.
In an October 2012 interview, GNC President Magariaf said, “We want to build a constitutional, democratic, civil, and secular state. But this does not mean at all that the constitution or any laws and legislation should contain anything that clashes with or is in contradiction to Islamic sharia and its objectives. He called for separation of religion and state “in the sense that parliament, the government, and the authorities, under this constitution, are the bodies that define the laws, legislation, and decisions, and that they are not issued by a religious body.” His remarks sparked an outcry from Libyan
Islamists, and while he did not fully retract them. President Magariaf said publicly that it was inappropriate for him to have made the original statements because of the responsibilities of his position and the limits on his authority to determine constitutional principles. In July 2012, the TNC issued a declaration advising the newly elected government and the yet-to-be appointed constitutional committee to preserve sharia as the principal source of legislation under the new constitution and to not submit the matter to a national referendum.
Federalism and Regional Politics: Discussions about federalism in Libya combine general debates about centralized administration versus decentralization and specific historical claims of inequality among Libya’s regions. A widely espoused commitment 94 to national unity and solidarity has defined much of the political rhetoric of the post-
Qadhafi transition period. Nevertheless, some eastern Libyans fear that a consolidation of power at the national level will continue a political pattern under Qadhafi that they believe marginalized the east and neglected its development. As such, procedures for selecting a new constitutional drafting body have been amended twice, each time in an effort to respond to calls from activists in eastern Libya concerned that the constitution would be drafted on the basis of proportional differences in population rather than equal regional representation. The TNC’s allocation of seats for the GNC election granted more populous western Libya more seats than the east or the south, but fewer seats than a directly proportional ratio would have guaranteed. Broader debate focuses on the relative merits of administrative decentralization or regional autonomy in a federal system.
National reaction to easterners’ demands has been mixed at best. Many Libyans have embraced calls for decentralization while expressing concern that the political assertion of regional identity and calls by some easterners for autonomy risk dividing the country and may spark renewed conflict. Similar debates, concerns and risks featured prominently during Libya’s founding as a unified state under United Nations auspices in the early 1 950s. Resentment of the centralization of state authority, first under the easterner-dominated monarchy in the 1960s and then under Qadhafi from the 1970s onward, divided Libyans on regional lines. GNC President Magariaf is a native of
Ajdabiya in eastern Libya. 95
Security and the Rule of Law: Qadhafi used the security bodies of the state to crush political dissent and interfere in the daily lives of Libyans. As a result, debates among
Libyans over the relative powers of security authorities and the rule of law are very sensitive. The dispersion of authority in the hands of armed groups and the existence of what one analyst has called “local monopolies of violence” further complicates matters.
Deteriorating security conditions in general and clashes in the wake of the Benghazi attacks have intensified these debates. The GNC reportedly has begun debate on a draft emergency law that could grant the government limited powers to curtail political rights and use force to establish public order. Critics of the law argue it risks restoring
Qadhafi-era abuses. Supporters highlight proposed legislative checks on the scope and duration of emergency powers and argue that the gravity of the current security
Challenges facing the country demands immediate action.
Domestic and Regional Security Issues
Security conditions are the immediate and overarching concern for Libyan authorities.
Armed non-state groups continue to operate in many areas of the country, government authorities rely on militias to provide security for key cities and facilities, and the country’s borders, infrastructure, and military sites are unevenly secured. The
September 11, 2012, terrorist attacks on U.S. interim diplomatic offices in Benghazi underscored the serious security challenges that have faced Libya’s citizens and leaders since the end of the revolution. Since late 2011, sporadic outbreaks of violence among rival militia groups, criminals, and armed citizens have shaken Libyans’ confidence in transitional leaders and in each other. From one perspective, the number of security 96 disruptions is smaller than might otherwise be expected in a post-conflict environment awash in
Weapons and dominated by dozens of armed groups with varying relationships to state authority. From another perspective, the level of crime, the continuing independence of local militia, the broad availability of weapons, and the relative limitations of national security bodies suggest that Libya’s security remains a function of Libyans’ self- restraint rather than the capability of national security authorities.
Militia Integration and Security Sector Reform
In July 2012, the U.N. Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) judged that, “Libya’s revolutionary brigades do not seek to remain in separate existence and to challenge
State authority,” and the affiliation of several prominent militia groups with the
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior-sponsored Supreme Security
Committees (SSCs) supports that view. Nevertheless, UNSMIL also argued that “efforts to date to integrate revolutionaries and brigades have lacked an overall concept and coordination, and need urgent review as part of the security reform agenda for the police and defense forces, including integrated border security and management.” Many
Libyans and outside observers see the identification of cabinet ministers for Defense and Interior be an important first step in such a process. (Blanchard 2012)
While the outstanding issues are formidable, Libyan authorities have moved since the
Benghazi attacks to assert greater control over militia groups, collect weapons from civilians, and intensify discussion of a comprehensive security sector reform strategy.
After large anti-militia demonstrations on September 16, the government ordered armed 97 groups to formally submit to state authority and named military officers to serve as commanders of some prominent militias. Some security officials have been replaced, and turnout reportedly was high at September 30 public weapons collection events in
Tripoli and Benghazi. UNSMIL personnel remain engaged with Libyan security officials on efforts to draft and implement a security sector reform plan. A white paper on the subject reportedly was developed prior to the election, but it has not been publicly released or discussed. Some reports suggest that the SSCs may be dissolved by the end of 2012, potentially as part of a renewed effort to incorporate militia volunteers into formal security forces.
U.S. Security Policy Considerations
U.S. officials must weigh demands for a response to the immediate threats posed by the perpetrators of the attack along with longer-term concerns for Libya’s stability, the success of its nascent democratic institutions, and the future of U.S.-Libyan relations.
Decisions about responding to the incident are complicated by the relative weakness of the Libyan state security apparatus and the risk of inflaming public opinion or undermining the image of the elected Libyan government through a direct or overt U.S. security response. Press accounts in recent months have detailed reported unmanned aerial surveillance operations over areas of eastern Libya where violent extremist organizations are suspected of operating. Some Libyan observers, including extremist groups, have been critical of these reported operations. A Ministry of Interior official who has subsequently been replaced told reporters that Islamist militia groups fired on
U.S. unmanned aircraft sent to survey the attack site. (Blanchard 2012) 98
Press reports suggest that senior U.S. national security officials have been considering a range of options for combating the influence of AQIM, reportedly through increased security assistance for regional governments and/or direct action. It is unclear what legal authority the President might cite if he seeks to militarily target AQIM or any non-Al
Qaeda affiliated entities in Libya or elsewhere in the region. On September 14,
President Obama reported to Congress, “consistent with the War Powers Resolution,” that he had authorized the deployment of security forces from U.S. Africa Command to
Libya and “for the purpose of protecting American citizens and property.” The notification states, “These security forces will remain in Libya... until the security situation becomes such that they are no longer needed.”(Blanchard 2012)
U.S. military intervention in Libya through the offensive use of U.S. ground forces or remote strikes would likely be politically controversial in Libya and could jeopardize
Libyan public support for the interim government. Press reports suggest that the
Department of Defense directed two U.S. Navy vessels toward the Libyan coast after the attack. Rescinding or conditioning U.S. security assistance to Libya may provoke criticism among some Libyans and limit channels for U.S. engagement with authorities that could partner with the United States in pursuing the Benghazi attackers and conducting other counterterrorism and security missions. (Blanchard 2012)
U.S. Assistance Programs and Related Legislation
The attacks in Benghazi and the deaths of U.S. personnel are reshaping public and official debates in Washington about U.S. policy toward Libya. Many Members of
Congress welcomed the announcement of Libya’s liberation, the formation of the 99 interim TNC government, and the July 2012 national GNC election, while expressing concern about security in the country, the proliferation of weapons, and the prospects for a smooth political transition. To date, the Obama Administration and Congress have agreed to support a range of security and transition support assistance programs in
Libya, some of which respond to specific U.S. security concerns about unsecured weapons and border security. Identifying and bringing those involved in the Benghazi attack to justice has become a decisive issue in the bilateral relationship, as has confronting any Al Qaeda affiliated groups present in Libya. Securing stockpiles of
Libyan conventional and chemical weapons also remains an issue of broad congressional concern, as does ensuring that transitional authorities act in accordance with international human rights standards in pursuing justice and handling detainees.
Unidentified State Department officials told the press that Secretary Clinton offered to expand security assistance to Libya in her September 2012 meetings in New York with
Libyan GNC President Mohammed Magariaf. (Blanchard 2012)
Administrative officials and congressional decision makers have worked together to identify and reprogram an array of previously appropriated funding to respond to developments in Libya since 2011. Congress has enacted legislation encouraging cost- matching by Libya, given its resource wealth, and prohibiting U.S. grant funding of rehabilitation or reconstruction of infrastructure in Libya using FY2012 funds. Congress continues to exercise oversight over U.S. diplomatic, security, and assistance efforts in
Libya and is considering appropriation and authorization requests and notifications 100 related to Libya programs. Members may also debate Libya’s regional influence, whether as a political example or a potential source of instability. (Blanchard 2012)
On a practical level, the evacuation of all non-emergency personnel from Libya has interrupted some ongoing assistance programs at least temporarily. Beyond that, some
Members of Congress have called on future US assistance to be made contingent upon full Libyan cooperation in the Benghazi investigation—or absolute cuts in aid as a response to the attacks, while others have demanded a wholesale suspension of foreign aid to Libya, Egypt, and other countries, and still others are, including senior
Administration officials are advising that the attackers should not be permitted to damage U.S. efforts to help Libya transition to democracy.
FY2013 Appropriations and Pending Funding Issues
For FY2013, the Obama Administration requested $150,000 in Foreign Military
Financing (FMF), $250,000 in International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding, and $1.25 million in Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related
Programs (NADR) funding to continue engagement programs with Libyan security forces and to improve border security. In August and September 2012, the
Administration notified Congress of its intent to reprogram $4 million in funds from the
FY2012 Pakistan Counter insurgency Capability Fund and $7.8million in FY2012
Defense Operation and Maintenance Funds to support Global Security Contingency
Fund programs for Libya. One program would support the creation of Libyan Special
Operations Forces “to conduct special operations missions, including counter terrorism operations to fight Al Qaeda and its affiliates.” The other seeks to enhance border 101 security management. As of October 18, Congress was reviewing the fund reprogramming notifications. A full program notification had not yet been submitted for review. Other U.S. funding for assistance programs in Libya is reviewed, established inter-branch consultation and notification mechanisms will remain the primary venue for determining the use of any FY2013 funding for Libya under the continuing resolution, which expires March 27, 2013. (Blanchard 2012)
In addition, a portion of requested $770 million Middle East North Africa Incentive
Fund (MENA-IF) also may benefit Libyans, if appropriated. As of October 2012, the
House Appropriations Committee had declined to include funding for the MENA-IF initiative in its version of the FY2013 Foreign Operations appropriations bill (H.R.
5857) The Senate Appropriations Committee included $1 billion for the MENA-IF, an increase over the Administration’s request (S. 3241).
As noted above, some Members of Congress have sought to condition or rescind U.S. assistance funding for Libya in aftermath of the attacks. Recent legislative action related to these issues includes:
• On September 19, Senator Rand Paul introduced S. 3576 which would have prohibited the obligation or expenditure of funds for assistance to the governments of
Egypt, Libya, Pakistan, and other governments of countries where U.S. diplomatic facilities have been “attacked, trespassed upon, breached, or attempted to be attacked, trespassed upon, or breached on or after September 1, 2012.” The bill failed on a 10-
81vote. The bill would have allowed for suspension of the prohibition following a certification and request by the executive branch. The President would have had to 102 certify that host nations were cooperating with the United States in investigating incidents, working to improve local security, and that persons involved in the organizing, planning, or executing of related incidents have been identified by U.S. law enforcement officials and are in U.S. custody. Representative Jeffery Landry introduced companion legislation (H.R. 6452) in the House of Representatives.
• On September 12 and 13, Senator Rand Paul offered amendments to 5. 3457
(S.Aindt. 2815 and S.Amdt. 2838) to prohibit the obligation or expending of
Funds for Pakistan, Egypt, Yemen, or Libya.
• S.Res. 556, introduced by Senator James Inhofe, would express “the sense of the
Senate that foreign assistance funding to the Governments of Libya and Egypt should be suspended until the President certifies to Congress that both governments are providing proper security at United States embassies and consulates pursuant to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations.”
• H.Res. 783, introduced by Representative Michael McCaul, would express the sense of the House of Representatives that “the President should immediately suspend all
United States foreign assistance” to Libya and Egypt, “until the Governments of Libya and Egypt formally apologize to the United States and condemn in the strongest possible terms the savage attacks on United States diplomats in Benghazi, Libya, and
Cairo, Egypt, and assure the safety of United States diplomats in Libya and
Egypt.”(Blanchard 2012)
103
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
5.1 SUMMARY:
This research work was to investigate the role of the United States government in the 2011/12 democratic transition in Libya. Thus, we raised the following question;
Is United States government implicated in the 2011/12 democratic transition in Libya?
In other to provide valid judgment or answer to the question, we raised the following hypothesis;
United States government is implicated in the 2011/12 democratic transition in
Libya.
The analysis of the hypothesis was discussed in five Chapters. Chapter one was the introductory part of the research work, while the Chapter two centers on what the
US wants in Libya, while the Chapter three centers on the determinants of US foreign policy. Chapter four discussed the analysis of the US involvement in the 2011/12 democratic transition in Libya, timeline on the Libyan uprising and the analysis of the transitional national council in Libya. Finally, Chapter five was for summary, conclusion and recommendation.
In this research work, we relied on the Marxian political economy as our framework of analysis and collected data via qualitative method or secondary sources 104 such as; books, magazines, newspapers, unpublished works, journals, official documents, etc.
At the end, we discovered that the US is implicated in the 2011/12 democratic transition in Libya. The US employed whatever means possible to protect her foreign policy initiative in Libya.
5.2 CONCLUSION
This study reveals that the US government interest in the Libyan oil is implicated in the 2012 political transition in Libya. This means that the United States involvement in Libya democratic transition has political and economic undertones. The use of NATO forces to remove Gaddafi was essentially to create enabling atmosphere for trade and investment to strive in Libya.
5.3 RECOMMENDATIONS
We therefore recommend that since the strategies of America’s penetration and domination of oil producing countries have engendered intense crisis with serious repercussions on the welfare of the people of those countries, the US government policy/attitude toward oil and oil producing nations needs to be completely redrafted.
Military action should be eschewed in favour of truly diplomatic and multilateral approaches. 105
Secondly, the US government should completely do away with the geopolitical security thinking of the Cold War policy in favour of a post-cold war policy that understands and captures the present mood of the global economy with its interdependence and linkages which now transcend both the rigid boundaries of the nation-states and the imaginary ones of civilization.
Finally, there is urgent need for a policy shift and the shift should be in energy conservation and the search for alternative and affordable energy sources. The US government should move towards generous funding of research for alternative sources of energy that are renewable.
106
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