THE ANGLO-FLEMISH TREATIES AND FLEMISH SOLDIERS IN ENGLAND 1101–11631

Eljas Oksanen University of Cambridge

The geographical proximity of medieval England and Flanders was conducive to a wide variety of relations, including political, economic, military, social and cultural exchanges.2 Immigrant soldiers, mercenaries and paid men are a particularly interesting topic in this respect; not only as examples of individuals travelling from one place to another, but as a means of examining the political frameworks and social circumstances which surrounded the travel of people across the Channel. My focus will be on the interplay between the wider context of the experiences of itinerant Flemings, and the series of diplomatic treaties that were concluded between the kings of England and the counts of Flanders over the course of the twelfth century. Three examples of these treaties survive to the present day, all concluded in Dover in 1101, 1110 and 1163, though these represent only a sample of the diplomatic exchanges that took place between England and Flanders. The Dover treaties concern an arrangement by which the counts of Flanders promised to provide a force of knights in return for an annual money fi ef. While records of money fi ef payments being made to the counts survive, there is no clear-cut case of Flemish military obligations being activated exactly in the manner outlined in the clauses. That the Anglo-Flemish treaties were concluded over and over again during the twelfth century nevertheless demonstrates the keen interest that rulers on both sides of the Channel had in regulating and encouraging the fl ow of armed men. While long known to scholars, the Anglo-Flemish treaties have not been comprehensively analysed as a set of source materials. I will use them in examining fi rstly what kind of men the mercenaries were, and secondly what role mercenaries, mercenary recruitment, and military service played in the socio-political continuity from the Nor- man Conquest to the second half of the twelfth century. The oldest of the surviving treaties was concluded in 1101, but it is probable that this treaty represented a continuation of an earlier, perhaps oral, 262 eljas oksanen agreement. William the Conqueror (duke of Normandy 1035–87, king of England 1066–87) had granted Count Baldwin V (1053–67) and Count Baldwin VI (1067–70) an annual money fi ef of 300 marks, a practise that was later reinstated between the Conqueror’s son King William Rufus (1087–1100) and Count Robert II (1093–1111). Robert and Rufus met in Dover in the summer of 1093, a year before Rufus went to war against his brother Duke Robert Curthose in Normandy; it seems likely that the money fi ef and accompanying military ser- vices were negotiated at this meeting. By the time Henry I (1100–35) ascended to English throne, the Anglo-Flemish money fi ef had thus acquired historical weight—upon returning from the First Crusade in 1100 and fi nding Henry on the throne of England, Robert II reputedly demanded, ‘almost in the tone of command’, the new king to respect the pact. William of Malmesbury remarks that Henry I was quick to rebuke such posturing, but as we shall see he was also quick to recognise the advantages of an Anglo-Flemish alliance.3 On 10 March 1101 Henry I and Robert II met at Dover to con- clude a political and military pact between their realms.4 The core of the treaty was simple: the count of Flanders swore to defend the king of England and his kingdom against all enemies, subject only to the fealty that Flanders owed to the king of France. Specifi cally, when summoned the count was to gather one thousand mounted soldiers and to lead them in person to the service of the king. Only illness, loss of land, or pre-existing obligations to the kings of France and Germany could excuse the count from appearing in person. The possibility of confl icting obligations was taken into account: in case the king of France made war on the king of England, the count was to go and serve the former with only his household troops (20 milites), and send the remaining men (980 milites) to join the king of England. The king had the right to activate the treaty should an enemy invade England, or if his own barons turned rebel. Attention was paid to how the transport of the troops was to be handled: specifi c port towns in Flanders were named from which the soldiers were to be collected, and the responsibilities for arranging and paying for the shipping were negotiated. Once in England, the king was to provide for the Flemish soldiers as if they were his own household troops. Furthermore, the count was always to allow free passage through his county to all men intending to enter into the king’s service, and to withhold from offering refuge to the enemies of the king. The treaty also allowed the king to