Comments Concerning Final Environmental Impact Statement
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Comments Concerning Final Environmental Impact Statement Regarding Virginia Avenue Tunnel Reconstruction August 14, 2014 The Committee of 100 on the Federal City1 offers the following comments and recommendations concerning the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) regarding enlargement of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel (VAT). The Committee of 100 has previously submitted comments about the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), the Draft Memorandum of Agreement Under Section 106, and Supplemental Comments concerning erroneous and misleading information contained in the DEIS. The FEIS falls short in several areas; The EIS Refuses to Consider Commuter and Passenger Rail Commuter and passenger Rail are very much in the public interest of the District of Columbia. The DC Office of Planning, the National Capital Planning Commission and Amtrak have prepared the Maryland Avenue Plan, the SW Ecodistrict Plan, and the Union Station Plan that need to be implemented to advance the interests of commuter and passenger rail. Those plans, as well as the expansion plans of VRE and MARC, have been ignored in the FEIS Expanding the Virginia Avenue Tunnel Will Adversely Impact Commuter Rail The FEIS ignores the impact that the proposed expansion of the tunnel will have on the ability of commuter and passenger rail to serve the needs of the Washington Area. This Proceeding Needs to Address Limitations of the SW Tracks and the Long Bridge By limiting the FEIS to addressing only the tunnel, the physical constraints that limit the ability to expand the SW Tracks and the Long Bridge to accommodate increased freight, 1 The Committee of 100 on the Federal City is a 90-year-old nonprofit organization dedicated to safeguarding and advancing Washington’s historic distinction, natural beauty and overall livability, advocating for responsible planning and land use in Washington, D.C. Our work is guided by the values inherited from the L’Enfant Plan (1791–92) and the McMillan Commission (1901–02), while responding to the challenges, needs and opportunities of the 21st century city. 1 passenger and commuter traffic are ignored. Indirect Effects and Cumulative Impacts Are Not Addressed The FEIS limits the Area of Potential Effects to the immediate space surrounding the construction activity that would occur if the tunnel were rebuilt and enlarged, and limits the time frame to the projected completion of construction. The NEPA Process Was Not Objective CSX and DDOT entered into agreements well before the NEPA process began that committed resources and prejudged the NEPA Process The Norfolk Southern Route Should be Reevaluated Using Correct Information The Supplemental Comments that the Committee of 100 provided on February 27, 2014 described the fact that the DEIS did not reflect the current condition of those tracks, but rather, the conditions that existed in 2005. The FEIS continue to rely on this erroneous information as justification for rejecting that option The Shepherds Branch Route Needs to be Evaluated as a Rerouting Option The FEIS fails to even consider the Shepherds Branch right-of-way that CSX owns, that is located in the City, and that has a long history of use by freight railroads. The EIS Refuses to Consider Commuter and Passenger Rail The basic problem with the FEIS is that it forecloses evaluation of essential considerations by refusing to consider them. The FEIS claims that: This is a private project that requires permits from FHWA, DDOT and other federal and District agencies as appropriate. Therefore, expansion of passenger and commuter rail service is outside the scope of this project [emphasis added].2 The failure of the FEIS to consider the implications of commuter rail isn't neutrality -- it is foreclosure of options without ever having considered them. The fact that this is a private project, pursued by a profit-making entity with no interest in commuter rail,3 argues for -- not against -- including commuter rail in the statement of 2 In the FEIS response to the DEIS Comments of the Committee of 100 on the Federal City, this formulation appears first as Comment 20-5, page L-105 of Appendix L. The same disclaimer of responsibility appears several times in responding to the Committee of 100’s DEIS Comments (Comment 20-6, p. L-106: Comment 20-7, p. L-106; Comment 20-20, p. L-112; Comment 20-22, p. L-114; Comment 20-24, p. L-118; Comment 20-40, p. L-130). 3 Both locally and nationally, CSX’s leadership has been quite vehement that it will resist any passenger rail proposals that threaten its own bottom line (Mark Szakonyi, “CSX CEO Ward rejects high-speed rail,” Jacksonville Business Journal, April 7, 2011 http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/blog/trade_trucks_trains/2011/04/csx-ceo-ward-rejects- high-speed-rail.html): 2 Purpose and Need and in clearly articulating indirect effects and cumulative impacts on passenger and commuter rail, (See 40 C.F.R. § 1508). Both the NEPA process and approvals from FHWA, DDOT, and other federal and District agencies are necessary because governments have recognized and acknowledged that this is precisely the kind of situation in which the public interest is likely to be sacrificed unless there is a robust process in which it is represented and the public interest is carefully considered. Commuter and Passenger Rail are Very Much in the Public Interest of Washington DC. Two-thirds of the cars on DC’s streets during rush hour are from out of state and those cars impose increasing demands on parking and pressures on congestion. Of US cities with more than 100,000 residents, DC has the highest daytime percentage increase in population due to commuters, and in terms of absolute numbers of people coming into the city each workday, DC is second only to Manhattan.4 DC’s car problem is largely a commuter problem; the major challenge is getting large numbers of people in and out of the city efficiently. This is a problem that will only get bigger in the future. As the Metrorail system reaches capacity and starts to lose riders due to crowded conditions and unreliability, commuter rail has been gaining ridership.5 In terms of the percentage of those commuters using cars, trucks or vans, DC again has the highest percentage at 54%, compared to Manhattan at 13% and Boston at 50%. DC is the lowest in the use of commuter rail: DC, 2.8%; Manhattan, 11%; and Boston, 8%. Manhattan has just under three times the number of commuters coming in each day as DC, but more than 12 times as many traveling by commuter rail.6 Our regional transportation CSX Corp. CEO, President and Chairman Michael Ward told Bloomberg News yesterday that he “can’t be part of” President Barack Obama’s push for high- speed rail. Ward said high-speed passenger rail service won’t make enough money and freight rail systems can’t withstand trains moving as fast as 110 mph. Class I railroads have expressed concern over high-speed rail’s impact on their freight rail systems, but Ward’s recent criticism takes a more aggressive stance. “I’m a corporation. I exist to make money, OK?” Ward said. “You can’t make money hauling passengers, so why would I want to do that? That wouldn’t be fair to my shareholders.” 4 DC has 773,635commuters each day and Manhattan has 2,334,100 (US Census Bureau, 2007- 2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates) 5 Kytja Weir, “Commuter trains attract riders even as numbers flag on Metro,” May 29, 2013 http://washingtonexaminer.com/commuter-trains-attract-riders-even-as-numbers-flag-on- metro/article/2530789. 6 US Census Bureau, 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates: 3 priorities must include a serious focus on how to expand passenger and commuter rail service through MARC and VRE, as well as Amtrak. The Expansion Plans and Capabilities of MARC and VRE Need to Be Evaluated The quotation that appears several times in Appendix L emphasizes the refusal to consider the expansion of commuter rail: This is a private project that requires permits from FHWA, DDOT and other federal and District agencies as appropriate. Therefore, expansion of passenger and commuter rail service is outside the scope of this project [emphasis added]. The potential to expand commuter rail through MARC and VRE are considerable and could significantly reduce crowding and congestion of other forms of transit. VRE’s ridership growth has averaged 6 percent annually between 2002 and 2012 and VRE is predicted to grow between 60 and 85 percent by 2025.7 By 2020, Phase I of the VRE System Plan calls for maximizing the number of trains VRE can operate under existing agreements, which effectively limits VRE capacity to about 25,000 weekday passengers. Railroad capacity investments proposed for Phases II and III will provide the additional capacity needed to enable VRE to carry up to 50,000 weekday passenger trips by 2040, which is consistent with identified demand.8 MARC’s plan shows that ridership has doubled in the last 15 years to 36,000 daily riders and will increase to 75,000 daily riders by 2040. MARC has instituted reverse commute and weekend service. In the future, MARC plans to "thru-run" trains from Maryland, through Union Station to L’Enfant Station and on to Virginia.9 Commuter rail is the most efficient and cost-effective means of providing practical alternatives to automobile commuting. Two-thirds of the cars on DC streets during the day are non-DC residents. As a result of this commuter traffic, the bridges that bring Metrobuses, commuter buses, intercity buses and private vehicles in from Virginia are badly congested during rush hour.