Comments Concerning

Final Environmental Impact Statement Regarding Tunnel Reconstruction

August 14, 2014

The Committee of 100 on the Federal City1 offers the following comments and recommendations concerning the Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) regarding enlargement of the (VAT). The Committee of 100 has previously submitted comments about the Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS), the Draft Memorandum of Agreement Under Section 106, and Supplemental Comments concerning erroneous and misleading information contained in the DEIS.

The FEIS falls short in several areas;

The EIS Refuses to Consider Commuter and Passenger Rail Commuter and passenger Rail are very much in the public interest of the District of Columbia. The DC Office of Planning, the National Capital Planning Commission and have prepared the Maryland Avenue Plan, the SW Ecodistrict Plan, and the Union Station Plan that need to be implemented to advance the interests of commuter and passenger rail. Those plans, as well as the expansion plans of VRE and MARC, have been ignored in the FEIS

Expanding the Virginia Avenue Tunnel Will Adversely Impact Commuter Rail The FEIS ignores the impact that the proposed expansion of the tunnel will have on the ability of commuter and passenger rail to serve the needs of the Washington Area.

This Proceeding Needs to Address Limitations of the SW Tracks and the Long Bridge By limiting the FEIS to addressing only the tunnel, the physical constraints that limit the ability to expand the SW Tracks and the Long Bridge to accommodate increased freight,

1 The Committee of 100 on the Federal City is a 90-year-old nonprofit organization dedicated to safeguarding and advancing Washington’s historic distinction, natural beauty and overall livability, advocating for responsible planning and land use in Washington, D.C. Our work is guided by the values inherited from the L’Enfant Plan (1791–92) and the McMillan Commission (1901–02), while responding to the challenges, needs and opportunities of the 21st century city.

1 passenger and commuter traffic are ignored.

Indirect Effects and Cumulative Impacts Are Not Addressed The FEIS limits the Area of Potential Effects to the immediate space surrounding the construction activity that would occur if the tunnel were rebuilt and enlarged, and limits the time frame to the projected completion of construction.

The NEPA Process Was Not Objective CSX and DDOT entered into agreements well before the NEPA process began that committed resources and prejudged the NEPA Process

The Norfolk Southern Route Should be Reevaluated Using Correct Information The Supplemental Comments that the Committee of 100 provided on February 27, 2014 described the fact that the DEIS did not reflect the current condition of those tracks, but rather, the conditions that existed in 2005. The FEIS continue to rely on this erroneous information as justification for rejecting that option

The Shepherds Branch Route Needs to be Evaluated as a Rerouting Option The FEIS fails to even consider the Shepherds Branch right-of-way that CSX owns, that is located in the City, and that has a long history of use by freight railroads.

The EIS Refuses to Consider Commuter and Passenger Rail

The basic problem with the FEIS is that it forecloses evaluation of essential considerations by refusing to consider them. The FEIS claims that:

This is a private project that requires permits from FHWA, DDOT and other federal and District agencies as appropriate. Therefore, expansion of passenger and commuter rail service is outside the scope of this project [emphasis added].2

The failure of the FEIS to consider the implications of commuter rail isn't neutrality -- it is foreclosure of options without ever having considered them.

The fact that this is a private project, pursued by a profit-making entity with no interest in commuter rail,3 argues for -- not against -- including commuter rail in the statement of

2 In the FEIS response to the DEIS Comments of the Committee of 100 on the Federal City, this formulation appears first as Comment 20-5, page L-105 of Appendix L. The same disclaimer of responsibility appears several times in responding to the Committee of 100’s DEIS Comments (Comment 20-6, p. L-106: Comment 20-7, p. L-106; Comment 20-20, p. L-112; Comment 20-22, p. L-114; Comment 20-24, p. L-118; Comment 20-40, p. L-130).

3 Both locally and nationally, CSX’s leadership has been quite vehement that it will resist any passenger rail proposals that threaten its own bottom line (Mark Szakonyi, “CSX CEO Ward rejects high-speed rail,” Jacksonville Business Journal, April 7, 2011 http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/blog/trade_trucks_trains/2011/04/csx-ceo-ward-rejects- high-speed-rail.html):

2 Purpose and Need and in clearly articulating indirect effects and cumulative impacts on passenger and commuter rail, (See 40 C.F.R. § 1508).

Both the NEPA process and approvals from FHWA, DDOT, and other federal and District agencies are necessary because governments have recognized and acknowledged that this is precisely the kind of situation in which the public interest is likely to be sacrificed unless there is a robust process in which it is represented and the public interest is carefully considered.

Commuter and Passenger Rail are Very Much in the Public Interest of Washington DC. Two-thirds of the cars on DC’s streets during rush hour are from out of state and those cars impose increasing demands on parking and pressures on congestion. Of US cities with more than 100,000 residents, DC has the highest daytime percentage increase in population due to commuters, and in terms of absolute numbers of people coming into the city each workday, DC is second only to Manhattan.4

DC’s car problem is largely a commuter problem; the major challenge is getting large numbers of people in and out of the city efficiently. This is a problem that will only get bigger in the future. As the Metrorail system reaches capacity and starts to lose riders due to crowded conditions and unreliability, commuter rail has been gaining ridership.5

In terms of the percentage of those commuters using cars, trucks or vans, DC again has the highest percentage at 54%, compared to Manhattan at 13% and Boston at 50%. DC is the lowest in the use of commuter rail: DC, 2.8%; Manhattan, 11%; and Boston, 8%. Manhattan has just under three times the number of commuters coming in each day as DC, but more than 12 times as many traveling by commuter rail.6 Our regional transportation

CSX Corp. CEO, President and Chairman Michael Ward told Bloomberg News yesterday that he “can’t be part of” President Barack Obama’s push for high- speed rail. Ward said high-speed passenger rail service won’t make enough money and freight rail systems can’t withstand moving as fast as 110 mph. Class I railroads have expressed concern over high-speed rail’s impact on their freight rail systems, but Ward’s recent criticism takes a more aggressive stance.

“I’m a corporation. I exist to make money, OK?” Ward said. “You can’t make money hauling passengers, so why would I want to do that? That wouldn’t be fair to my shareholders.”

4 DC has 773,635commuters each day and Manhattan has 2,334,100 (US Census Bureau, 2007- 2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates)

5 Kytja Weir, “Commuter trains attract riders even as numbers flag on Metro,” May 29, 2013 http://washingtonexaminer.com/commuter-trains-attract-riders-even-as-numbers-flag-on- metro/article/2530789.

6 US Census Bureau, 2007-2011 American Community Survey 5-Year Estimates:

3 priorities must include a serious focus on how to expand passenger and commuter rail service through MARC and VRE, as well as Amtrak.

The Expansion Plans and Capabilities of MARC and VRE Need to Be Evaluated The quotation that appears several times in Appendix L emphasizes the refusal to consider the expansion of commuter rail:

This is a private project that requires permits from FHWA, DDOT and other federal and District agencies as appropriate. Therefore, expansion of passenger and commuter rail service is outside the scope of this project [emphasis added]. The potential to expand commuter rail through MARC and VRE are considerable and could significantly reduce crowding and congestion of other forms of transit.

VRE’s ridership growth has averaged 6 percent annually between 2002 and 2012 and VRE is predicted to grow between 60 and 85 percent by 2025.7 By 2020, Phase I of the VRE System Plan calls for maximizing the number of trains VRE can operate under existing agreements, which effectively limits VRE capacity to about 25,000 weekday passengers. Railroad capacity investments proposed for Phases II and III will provide the additional capacity needed to enable VRE to carry up to 50,000 weekday passenger trips by 2040, which is consistent with identified demand.8

MARC’s plan shows that ridership has doubled in the last 15 years to 36,000 daily riders and will increase to 75,000 daily riders by 2040. MARC has instituted reverse commute and weekend service. In the future, MARC plans to "thru-run" trains from Maryland, through Union Station to L’Enfant Station and on to Virginia.9

Commuter rail is the most efficient and cost-effective means of providing practical alternatives to automobile commuting. Two-thirds of the cars on DC streets during the day are non-DC residents. As a result of this commuter traffic, the bridges that bring Metrobuses, commuter buses, intercity buses and private vehicles in from Virginia are badly congested during rush hour.

Total Commuters Work in Place of Commute by Commute by Residence Car/Truck/Van Railroad District of 773,735 220,409 420,454 21,523 Columbia Manhattan 2,334,100 769,884 321,070 270,690 Boston 555,227 209,100 278,990 44,295

7 Virginia State Rail Plan, November 2013, p. 3-25.

8 Virginia Railway Express System Plan 2040 Brochure, March 27, 2014, p. 3.

9 MARC Growth and Investment Plan Update 2013 to 2050, September 9, 2013.

4

The recent opening of the Silver Line of Metro and its capability of carrying 20,000 commuters a day provides a relevant comparison: MARC and VRE will be able to provide service to 125,000 commuter rail riders by 2040, that is equivalent to five Silver Lines. If the Silver Line is important as a significant and desirable transit addition, then expansion of MARC and VRE is five times more significant.

The expansion of the Virginia Avenue tunnel will inevitably result in an increased amount of CSX freight traffic through the heart of DC. However, CSX as well as the state and federal government agencies responsible for this NEPA review process have failed to provide any estimate or analysis of the expected increase in freight traffic. The absence of this information effectively precludes any meaningful analysis regarding the impact of the tunnel expansion on commuter rail. In fact, the FEIS altogether fails to address this essential issue. This NEPA proceeding must address the impact of the increased amount of CSX freight traffic on the ability of commuter rail to increase the number of trains that they plan to operate to provide a practicable alternative to Metrobus, Metrorail and vehicular commuting.10

The SW Ecodistrict Plan Needs to be Implemented. Commuter rail will have to be greatly expanded to move the projected 28,000 people a day into and out of the city that are needed to make the SW Ecodistrict work11. MARC and VRE are finalizing arrangements for VRE to run past Union Station into Maryland, and for MARC to run past Union Station into Virginia.12 To do so will require an expanded L’Enfant Station, with an additional and longer station platform. The Maryland Avenue and SW Ecodistrict Plans propose expanding L’Enfant Station and providing a connection between L’Enfant Rail Station and L’Enfant Metro to provide access to the Blue/Orange and Yellow/Green Metro lines. Through-running MARC and VRE will not only provide additional cross-river commuter capacity, but will also provide a link between the Red Line at Union Station and the Green/Yellow and Blue/Orange Lines at an integrated L’Enfant Rail and Metro Station. But all of those elements of the SW Ecodistrict

10 And that evaluation needs to address 40 CFR 1502.16 "The discussion will include the environmental impacts of the alternatives including the proposed action, any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, the relationship between short-term uses of man's environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and any irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposal should it be implemented."

11 SW Ecodistrict Plan, Overview, page xiv

12 In May of this year MARK and VRE announced they are planning a true regional rail partnership to thru-run MARC to L’Enfant Station and on to Virginia and to extend VRE from Union Station into Maryland (http://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/MARC-VRE-Discuss- Regional-Rail-Partnership-259

5 Plan require the use of the SW tracks that are owned by CSX and with expanded freight traffic, that freight traffic, rather than the commuter and passenger rail benefits of the SW Ecodistrict will likely be given priority.

DDOT Needs to Address These DC-Specific Issues On June 26, 2014, the Committee of 100 wrote to the Mayor about the need for DDOT to comply with DC environmental laws, in particular the requirement for DDOT's independent assessment of the DC-specific aspects of this project.13 The DDOT manual (and the applicable NEPA regulations) suggest the need for an integrated approach, but do not excuse DDOT from complying with the separate requirements of DC law. NEPA takes into account state and local law and regulations. States requires their own environmental review law be enforced regardless of NEPA14

Expanding the Virginia Avenue Tunnel Will Adversely Impact Commuter Rail .

Expanding the tunnel will transfer the bottleneck to the shared tracks in SW and the Long Bridge. CSX uses the SW tracks to access the Virginia Avenue Tunnel. Passenger and commuter trains use those same SW tracks to access Union Station. The rail tracks from Virginia are double-tracked across the Long Bridge, until they reach 12th Street SW where they become triple-tracked, with double-tracks for passenger and commuter trains branching off to the north to Union Station through the . At Twelfth Street, double tracks for freight trains continue east until they become a single track entering the Virginia Avenue Tunnel.

These SW tracks provide the only means for passenger and commuter trains to access Union Station from the south and for trains originating at Union Station to travel south.

VRE’s expansion is already being limited by its agreement with CSX – at this point its rush hour trains are filled to capacity and typically have standees, trains are as long as existing platforms allow, and bi-level cars are in use. Thirty-six of forty slots allocated to VRE are currently in use, which means that only one more round-trip can be added to each of the two routes that operate along this route.15 MARC, too, has seen the expansion

13 The June 26 letter is include as Attachment A to these Comments

14 E.g., New York requires its own environmental review law (called SEQR) be enforced regardless of NEPA: http://www.dec.ny.gov/permits/50607.html. Minnesota and California have similar requirements that the requirements of state law remain operable: · _http://news.dnr.state.mn.us/2013/12/06/state-and-federal-agencies-release-northmet- supplemental-draft-environmental-impact-statement-opening-public-comment-period/ · _http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/nepa_and_ceqa_draft_handbook.pdf.

6 of its Brunswick line constrained by CSX.16 The Union Station Master Plan proposes to triple the number of passengers and double the number of passenger and commuter trains17 and the SW Ecodistrict Plan proposes through-running MARC trains to Virginia and increasing the number of commuter trains using L'Enfant Station.18 The increased rail traffic from passenger, commuter and freight will severely test the ability to safely coordinate these operations, and DC has no Rail Plan or Office of Rail Safety or the capability of inspecting the rail tracks or evaluating rail operations.19 The combined pressure of increased freight and passenger/commuter rail demand seems likely to overwhelm the carrying capacity of the Long Bridge and the SW rail tracks. Since those facilities are owned by CSX, it is likely that CSX will resolve that competition in its own favor and, thereby, frustrate the proposed increases in Amtrak, VRE, and MARC service.

This Proceeding Needs to Address Limitation of the SW Tracks and the Long Bridge

If the Virginia Avenue tunnel is expanded to two tracks, the Southwest tracks and the Long Bridge will present bottlenecks for passenger, commuter and freight rail operations. The suggested solutions are to provide four tracks in SW and a four-track Long Bridge,

15 Parsons Brinckerhoff, VRE System Plan Operations Board Workshop Summary Report, August 2013, pp.2, http://www.prtctransit.org/docs/commission/Sep2013/Item_10C_VRE_Info-- VRE_System_Plan_Operations_Board_Workshop_Summary_Report_(08-13).pdf

16 Michele Whelley, “MARC: Rolling in the Right Direction,” The Baltimore Sun, May 26, 2013; http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-05-26/news/bs-ed-marc-expansion-20130526_1_marc-penn- line-camden-line-marc-service

17 Union Station Master Plan, Washington, DC (July 25, 2012), Executive Summary, page 2.

18 The Southwest Ecodistrict Plan proposes transportation strategies to revitalize and reconnect the community that will “build on existing road, rail and bus infrastructure to enhance transportation capacity … and better connect all modes of travel.” (Page 13) The SWE Plan builds on the District’s Maryland Avenue SW Small Area Plan through an expanded L’Enfant commuter rail station that will serve VRE, MARC, and Amtrak commuters.

19 DC is a growing hub of commuter and long distance rail transportation. Virginia and Maryland have their own rail plans, but DC has been approaching individual rail-related projects without adequate understanding of their long-range impacts. Statewide Rail Plans are required under the Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-432) (PRIIA). The regulations that implement these requirements are contained in U.S. Code, Title 49, Subtitle V, Part B, Chapter 227. Safety-focused performance metrics would be established by DC and the railroads operating within DC. The DC Rail Plan is required to address ongoing projects and programs to improve rail safety and security of rail transportation (49 USC § 22075). The current DC budget includes funding to prepare a DC Rail Plan that will both coordinate numerous existing plans and protect the public interest. Until that Plan is in place, we should not add to the congestion and competition for use of the SW tracks and Long Bridge

7 possibly with an additional bridge span. But these changes will not solve the problem.

There are Physical Constraints to Expanding the SW Tracks The SW Ecodistrict Plan recognizes that the southwest tracks and the Long Bridge present bottlenecks for passenger, commuter and freight rail operations and suggest the importance of adding a fourth track in SW (SWE Plan, pp. 72 and 75) in order “to accommodate freight and maximize commuter rail” (id., p.70). But because of the narrow width of the depression in which the tracks are located along Maryland Avenue, the three SW tracks (in some places, only two tracks) cannot be expanded to four tracks. In addition to the limitation imposed by the 58 foot authorized rail right-of-way,20 dense surrounding development makes widening the depression and adding a fourth track impossible. Additionally, the concepts for adding a fourth track are based on the 160-foot original width of Maryland Avenue, but a section of the 160-foot original right-of-way of Maryland Avenue is currently closed. The Maryland Avenue Plan explained at page 1-8:

The Avenue right-of-way has been formally closed between 9th and 12th Streets SW. Reestablishing the 160’ wide Avenue will require the cooperation of multiple property owners.

Property ownership along the SW tracks has further reduced the space for rail tracks (MD Ave Plan, page 1-9):

Using the design criteria that CSX has proposed in the Virginia Avenue Tunnel FEIS (FEIS, page 3-7) would mean the current three track configuration of the SW tracks, with its width of 58’, does not have sufficient side clearance to meet current design standards (46 feet for two tracks, plus 3 feet, plus 18 feet, plus 3 feet for the third track equals 70 feet). To add a fourth track would require a width of 92 feet (46 feet for two tracks times two for four tracks). Using the criteria that CSX has used in designing the Preferred

20 In specifying the section of the tracks that are open and below grade along Maryland Avenue, Section 6 of the 1901 statute (31 Stat. 767) was precise, stating that the space to be used where the "tracks are depressed on Maryland avenue shall not exceed fifty-eight feet between the inside faces of the parallel retaining walls, measured at the level of the said tracks, as shown on said plans and profiles."

8 Alternative, the existing width of the right-of-way for the SW tracks cannot accommodate a fourth track.

Plans to Expand the Long Bridge Will Not Solve the Problem. The current two-track Long Bridge is at capacity today and a new four-track bridge shared by passenger, commuter and freight rail as proposed in the Long Bridge Study will be at capacity by 2040. However, the data contained in the current Long Bridge Study considerably understate the number of freight and commuter trains that will need to cross the Potomac River by 2040. As explained in the attached January 7, 2014 letter to the Long Bridge Project Manager,21 a new four-track bridge will barely provide the capacity needed for the Amtrak, VRE and CSX trains that are projected to use the rebuilt bridge. Both the Office of Planning’s Maryland Avenue Southwest Plan and NCPC’s SW Ecodistrict Plan recommend that MARC trains though-run from Union Station to Alexandria. If more than three MARC trains attempt to use the projected four-track Long Bridge the capacity will be exceeded. If the goals and objective of the Maryland Avenue and the SW Ecodistrict Plans are to be realized, the criteria for evaluation and the recommendations of the Long Bridge Study need to change.

In fact, the capacity of a four-track bridge will be even less adequate because the projections for commuter expansion are understated in the Long Bridge Study. The figures in DDOT’s draft moveDC Plan that were used in the Long Bridge Study understate the current number of VRE passengers by 20 percent and understate current MARC passengers by a similar factor. In fact, in 2012, VRE carried upwards of 19,000 passenger trips per day, not the 16,000 as stated in the moveDC draft .22 MARC’s ridership has doubled in the past 15 years, and in 2012 amounted to 36,000 daily riders, not the 30,000 stated in the draft moveDC Plan.23

Providing Four Tracks in SW and on the Long Bridge Will Not Be Adequate These comments have discussed the physical constraints and the growth projections, but there is a simpler way to understand both the problem and the kind of solution that is needed. There are commuters in Maryland just as there are commuters in Virginia that would use commuter rail. Amtrak wants to expand high speed rail south of Union Station. The freight that travels through Maryland travels through Virginia. The infrastructure north of Union Station can provide a useful framework with which to consider what is needed south of Union Station.

21 The January 7, 2014 Committee of 100 letter is included as Attachment B to theses Comments

22 Virginia State Rail Plan, November 2013, p. 3-25.

23 MARC Growth and Investment Plan Update 2013 to 2050, September 9, 2013.

9 North of Union Station MARC operates on shared tracks with CSX and Amtrak:

• The Brunswick line operates on the 2-track CSX , • The Penn Line operates on the 3-4-track Amtrak NE Corridor tracks, and • The Camden line operates on the 2-track CSX Capitol Subdivision

In this context the question becomes: Why are we talking about increasing the 3-track bottlenecks south of Union Station to 4-tracks, when similar rail operations north of Union Station require7-8-tracks?

Increasing the SW tracks to four tracks does not appear possible but additional track capacity is clearly needed. If that additional track capacity can separate freight from commuter and passenger rail, we could likely get by with less than 7-8 tracks. What we need to look at is how to provide at least five tracks: three SW tracks serving passenger and commuter rail with access to Union Station and the expanded L’Enfant rail station, together with two tracks to serve freight, with a new river crossing for freight located to separate freight from commuter and passenger rail operations.

Indirect Effects and Cumulative Impacts Are Not Addressed

The FEIS claims that Indirect Effects and Cumulative Impacts of this project are addressed in sections 5.17 and 5.18 of the FEIS. In fact, the discussion of indirect effects simplistically claims there will be none because the Project is rebuilding exiting infrastructure (FEIS Page 5-100). The indirect effects of increased freight trains coming through the enlarged tunnel and competing with passenger and commuter operations on the shared SW tracks are likely to “occur later in time or further removed in distance” (40 C.F.R. § 1508.8) but they are ignored.

In terms of cumulative effects, the FEIS claims that the vast majority will occur during construction and thus the discussion in the FEIS focused on the construction period of the project. The FEIS fails to address what happens after the tunnel is enlarged and CSX freight traffic is increased, while at the same time passenger and commuter rail is trying to expand to meet the commuter demand. These “reasonably foreseeable future actions” (40 CFR §1580.7) are critical effects of the Virginia Avenue tunnel project that must be addressed.

The current balance between freight and passenger/commuter rail operations on the CSX- owned shared-use infrastructure south of Union Station is currently constrained. Quadrupling the capacity of the Virginia Avenue tunnel creates the very real possibility that CSX will satisfy its own needs for increased rail capacity at the expense of other rail users.

10 Resolving CSX’s Conflicts with Amtrak and VRE Does Not Require a Two-Track Tunnel CSX claims that by relieving the Virginia Avenue bottleneck, the efficiency of freight will increase, to the benefit of commuter and passenger rail (FEIS, page 5-83):

The two-track operation will allow for trains moving simultaneously through the tunnel, which will reduce the overall time trains spend idling and improve the efficiency for the eastern seaboard freight rail network. Some of this efficiency may extend to passenger rail service, such as AMTRAK and VRE, since they use CSX rails in the Washington Metropolitan Area.

This is true only in terms of CSX’s operational procedures: currently, if two CSX trains are about to meet at the tunnel, the northbound train waits on the SW tracks (and on a long train, it would extend to the Long Bridge). After the southbound train clears the tunnel, the north-bound train can then proceed, with the result that during this time, two of the three SW tracks and both tracks on the Long Bridge are occupied by CSX trains, preventing Amtrak and VRE from operating on those tracks. Obviously, if the northbound CSX train could travel through a two-way tunnel at the same time as a south bound train travels on the other set of tunnel tracks, there would be no need for the north-bound train to wait and idle on the SW tracks and Long Bridge. The two CSX trains would still occupy two of the SW tracks and both tracks on the Long Bridge, but for a shorter period of time. This is the increased efficiency that CSX claims would benefit Amtrak and VRE.

But the problem that CSX describes and seeks to solve with the proposed new tunnels is an operational problem that can be solved by a simple operational change: if two CSX trains are about to meet at the tunnel, then the south bound train could and should wait on the CSX tracks north of the tunnel, where CSX has double tracks. The SW tracks and Long Bridge would not be blocked with a waiting CSX train, and CSX would utilize a single track south of the tunnel, that would not impact Amtrak or VRE.

The NEPA Process Was Not Objective

After going through thousands of pages evaluating purported alternatives, the Preferred Alternative that emerged in the June 2014 FEIS was in fact the exact alignment agreed to by CSX and DDOT almost two-years before the Draft EIS process began.24 On August 23, 2010, CSX and DDOT entered into a Memorandum of Agreement concerning the Virginia Avenue Tunnel and the 11 Street Bridge.25

24 The environmental impact process, which is required under the National Environmental Policy Act, officially began in May 2012. (http://www.virginiaavenuetunnel.com/media/uploads/downloads/VAT_Display_Boards_7.1.pdf

25 FEIS, Appendix A, pages 3-9.

11 Permanent Use of Public Space for the Expanded Tunnel Was Improperly Authorized Throughout the EIS proceeding there have been questions about how the build alternatives that involve location of the enlarged tunnel under Virginia Avenue can be accomplished. Faisal Hameed, DDOT’s Manager of the EIS process, stated:

Actually, the existing tunnel lies somewhere underneath Virginia Avenue itself too. Our understanding is that D.C. owns and operates Virginia Avenue. We are looking for keeping that right-of-way and part of the alternative development process is that: how can the tunnel reconstruction occur while maintaining that? At this point, DDOT has no intention to do away with right-of-way.26

Page 3-5 of the DEIS offered an oblique answer that concedes there may be a permanent incursion into public space:

Because all three Build Alternatives described in this Draft EIS contemplate that the reconstructed tunnel would only be located within CSX owned or public property, rather than intruding into or under any private property, no additional detail beyond those already presented here is warranted [emphasis added].

In fact, in implementing the 2010 Memorandum of Agreement,27 DDOT obligated DC to issue a permit that would transfer a substantial part of the Virginia Avenue right-of-way to CSX. That permit was reissued on March 30, 2014.28 The reissued permit provides that, upon completion of CSX’s tunnel enlargement in accordance with the ROD, the permit shall be automatically amended to reflect the as-built location of the reconstructed tunnel. Why were the documents contained in Appendix A of the FEIS withheld from the public, despite years of community questions about the process for permitting and other approvals associated with this NEPA process?

26 VA Ave. Environmental Assessment and Section 106 Public Meeting November 30, 2011, Transcript 38 (emphasis added).

27 The implementation was accomplished by the December 21, 2012 Term Sheet (FEIS Appendix A, pages 16-20) that included as Exhibit B a Public Space Permit (id., page 46) that granted CSX permission “to use and occupy exclusively a portion of the Public Right of Way located under Virginia Avenue, SE … where Permittee will occupy the Virginia Avenue ROW with a tunnel, railroad tracks and related appurtenances for railroad purposes.”

28 The 2014 reissued Permit is contained at page 114 of Appendix A of the FEIS. Article I.B. of the Terms and Conditions associated with that reissued permit provides (id., p122): “upon completion of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel Reconstruction Improvements in accordance with the Record of Decision, this permit shall automatically and without further action amended to reduce the Virginia Avenue Tunnel ROW shown in Exhibit A to reflect the as-built location of the Virginia Avenue Tunnel Reconstruction Improvements.”

12 These withheld documents demonstrate that the Preferred Alternative was determined before the NEPA process officially began and that a substantial amount of public property will be converted to private use. The existing tunnel is roughly 45 feet wide (p. 2-5 of FEIS), but the width of the two new tunnels varies from 68 feet to 93 feet (p. 2-6; 3-7). In other words, CSX will require between a 50%-100% increase in the width it will occupy under Virginia Avenue for the Preferred Alternative. Taking the minimum expansion figure, 92,000 sq ft or more than 2 acres of new land (23 feet x 4,000 ft tunnel length) will be converted from public use to private use. The only charge to CSX is a $10 permit fee.

Under traditional public utility law, utilities are allowed to use the space in public rights- of-way to install their lines in return for providing a public service to the adjacent residents and subjecting the rates they charge for the utility service to regulation by the City. CSX is not a public utility. CSX is a private, for-profit corporation and this property transfer will allow them to increase operational capacity and thereby increase profits, with no public service being provided to the City or benefits to its residents.29

Changing the 11th Street Bridge Configuration Prejudged the NEPA Process As early as 2009-2010, the design and construction of the 11th Street Bridge was changed, at a cost of over $4 million, to accommodate the Preferred Alternative that emerged in the June 2014 FEIS.30 The changes involved redesigning and reconstructing one of the access ramps of the bridge to accommodate CSX’s plans for the east portal of an enlarged, two track tunnel. Why would over $4 million have been invested four years ago in a change that would be necessary only if the bridge configuration that those changes accommodated ended up, in the 2014 FEIS, as the Preferred Alternative?

If the 11th Street Bridge was reconfigured to accommodate the double track alignment that ended up as the Preferred Alternative, the physical need for the change is understandable. As originally designed, DDOT's bridge ramp transitioned to street paving at about the midpoint of CSX's proposed second tunnel, which necessitated extending the bridge ramp. But the financial responsibilities of the 11th Street Bridge reconfiguration are questionable. Article III of the 2010 Memorandum of Agreement says DDOT will pay (credit) that same $4,171,044 to CSX for the cost of restoring Virginia Avenue after the new tunnel is rebuilt. Under this arrangement, DDOT is providing CSX with a credit for something that CSX would normally be required to pay for. Not only was the bridge redesigned to accommodate CSX, but CSX does not have to pay the cost of restoring Virginia Avenue

29 Granting CSX a permit to occupy the space under Virginia Avenue is space that has previously been granted to utilities for gas, electric, water, sewer, cable and telephone lines. Clearly utilities will have to be relocated, but will they also have to obtain permission from CSX or the City to occupy the space?

30 Article IV. C of the 2010 Memorandum of Agreement requires $4,181,044 in “credits" from CSX to DDOT related to the 11th Street bridge for the expense of redesigning the bridge to accommodate CSX’s plans (FREIS, Appendix A, page 6).

13 after construction of the new tunnel. DDOT’s credit to CSX means that CSX effectively pays nothing for the bridge redesign.

The 2010 and 2012 Actions Prejudiced the NEPA Process The alternatives analysis has consistently been described as the “heart” of the NEPA process. To ensure the effectiveness and impartiality of the alternatives analysis, NEPA prohibits actions from being taken prior to the issuance of a record of decision that would limit the choice of reasonable alternatives. 40 C.F.R. § 1506.1(a). Here, the alternatives analysis has been systematically compromised throughout this NEPA review. The prior actions of issuing the 2012 permit and the credit to CSX associated with the cost of redesigning the 11th street bridge served to limit the range of reasonable alternatives, determine subsequent development, and ultimately prejudice the FHWA/DDOT’s alternative selection process in the EIS. See 40 C.F.R. § 1506.1(c)(3). DDOT’s pre- approval in 2010 of what emerged in the 2014 FEIS as the Preferred Alternative occurred before any plans had been shared with the public or any environmental analysis had been done.

The process of evaluating or even considering reasonable alternatives to enlarging the tunnel under Virginia Avenue were purposefully ignored or rejected. The rerouting options discussed in the FEIS that would involve a new Potomac River crossing are the three alternative alignments that were proposed by the National Capital Planning Commission in their 2007 study, the Railroad Realignment Feasibility Study.31 These are Concept 8, a Deep Bore Tunnel, Concept 9, the Indian Head Alignment and Concept 10, the Dahlgren Alignment. These alternatives are more full discussed at pages 17- 18 of these Comments.

The Norfolk Southern Route Should be Reevaluated Using Correct Information

On February 27, the Committee of 100 submitted Supplemental Comments pointing out that the evaluation of rerouting alternatives was based on the erroneous premise that there are no feasible options to reroute CSX trains away from the Virginia Avenue Tunnel either permanently (that would avoid having to rebuild the tunnel) or temporarily (while the tunnel is being reconstructed).32 But the “facts” in reaching that conclusion33 are just plain wrong in the case of rerouting on the Norfolk Southern tracks. The erroneous information in the DEIS did not reflect the current condition of those tracks, but rather, the conditions

31 FEIS, pages 3-55 through 3-61.

32 The February 27, 2014 Committee of 100 Supplemental Comments are include as Attachment C to these Comments

33 See Appendix B, "Concepts Evaluation Technical Report," contains the DEIS’s erroneous analysis claiming that rerouting traffic onto Norfolk Southern tracks is not a viable option.

14 that existed in 2005.34 Track upgrades, completed in 2010 as part of the Crescent Corridor Phase 1 Project, eliminated the obstacles cited in the DEIS. These upgrades were not considered in the alternative routing analysis. The DEIS also misrepresented the difficulty of getting access to those tracks.35

The DEIS identified operational problems that would preclude the use of Norfolk Southern tracks as an alternative route: constrained capacity, single rather than double tracking, limited sidings, sharp curves and speed limitations. However, all of those problems were eliminated by the 2010 capacity improvements that allowed the NS tracks to handle more trains at higher speeds.36

Under the standard articulated in 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (a), when a “draft statement is so inadequate as to preclude meaningful analysis, the agency shall prepare and circulate a revised draft of the appropriate portion.” The errors and omissions highlighted in the Committee of 100’s Supplemental Comments, and the inadequate and erroneous analysis contained in the DEIS, require the preparation of a revised Draft Environmental Impact Statement. A revised DEIS was not prepared and the only response to the Committee of 100 was a March 4, 2014 email from Michael Hicks of the FHWA, to the effect that the comments would not be considered.37 The FEIS contains a single paragraph about the

34 The description contained in Appendix B matches the pre-2005 condition described in the 2005 Tier I Draft Environmental Impact Statement: I-81 Corridor Improvement Study. This erroneous information was the basis for eliminating rerouting options in the Concepts Evaluation Matrix (table 3-1, DEIS 3-26). Those NS tracks were upgraded under the Crescent Corridor Phase 1 Project that was completed in 2010, but nowhere in the DEIS is that information even mentioned. That erroneous and misleading information was the basis for eliminating those rerouting options in the Concepts Evaluation Matrix (table 3-1, DEIS 3-26).

35 Appendix B, page 14, claims that rerouting on the tracks of another railroad is generally reserved for emergency conditions and for short durations (less than two years). In fact, 20% of the tracks on which CSX operates in Virginia alone consist of trackage rights on other railroads. Virginia Statewide Rail Plan, November 2013, page 3-1:

36 The Crescent Corridor Phase 1 Project was completed in 2010.

37The email was addressed to Mr. Adams, the Committee of 100 Office Manager: Mr. Adams, thank you for comments on behalf of the Committee of 100. As I understand it, these comments are: “Supplemental Comments Requesting a Revised Draft Environmental Impact Statement Regarding Reconstruction of the Virginia Avenue

15 Norfolk Southern/Hagerstown Route that merely summarizes what was in the DEIS (FEIS, page 3-55).

The Shepherds Branch Route Needs to be Evaluated as a Rerouting Option

The Committee of 100’s September 25, 2013 Comments on the DEIS pointed out that the DEIS had failed to consider all reasonable rerouting alternatives, in particular the Blue Plains or Shepherds Branch right-of-way, located in the City, that is owned by CSX and has a long history of use by freight railroads.

The Shepherds Branch segment of CSX’s right-of-way has been used for freight service to and through the region going back to 1874. Between 1874 and 190638 this was the main north-south line of the B&O railroad.39 The Blue Plains sewage treatment plant, located at

Tunnel”. Footnote #2 on the first (1st) page of the Supplemental Comments states: “ These comments are supplemental to the Committee of 100 comments submitted September 25, 2013 in response to the Draft Environmental Impact Statement and the comments submitted February 11, 2014 in response to the “January 2014 Draft Memorandum of Agreement related to Section 106.” It was assumed the Committee of 100 was aware that Section 106 regulations, 36 CFR Part 800, regard the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) which is germane to your February 11, 2014 comments on the draft Memorandum of Agreement concerning historic resources affected by the Virginia Avenue Tunnel (VAT) project. However, your submitted comments intended to supplement your September 25, 2013 response to the VAT DEIS are germane to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) vis-à-vis the NEPA process regarding the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS). The two “Act’s” while related have different requirements and processes. It appears the Committee of 100 seeks to use the NHPA Section 106 process to submit comments concerning the NEPA process when all comments regarding that specific process (NEPA) closed on September 25, 2013. FHWA values all public input on the NEPA process; however, these comments arrive well beyond the end of the comment period for the VAT draft EIS (NEPA); therefore, they are not officially acceptable with regards to the NEPA process. Furthermore, they don’t appear to address issues related to historic preservation in general or the draft MOA specifically and arrive well beyond the 30 comment period granted for the Section 106 process; therefore, they are not acceptable in that regard either. I believe similar comments have been made in past submittals by the Committee of 100, if those comments were submitted appropriately, they will be address accordingly. Thank you.

38 At Shepherds Landing, up until 1906, B&O ferried its traffic across the river on car floats. In 1906, the rival railroads reached a compromise that granted the B&O use of the Long Bridge and trackage rights to reach its railroad connections in Alexandria. http://ctr.trains.com/en/Railroad%20Reference/Operations/2001/12/The%20history%20of%20Balti more%20and%20Ohios%20Shepherd%20Branch.aspx

39 The 6 miles of B&O's line (now owned by CSX) south of Benning Yard evolved into the Shepherds Branch that delivered coal to the furnaces of Saint Elizabeth’s Hospital Complex

16 the end of the branch, opened in 1938 and received its chemicals from this line. During WW II, a bridge, complete with movable span, connected Shepherds Landing with Alexandria. After World War II the bridge was dismantled and freight traffic levels decreased. Planes no longer flew from the military airfields and St. Elizabeth’s Hospital stopped using coal. Only the Blue Plains sewage plant still needed rail traffic until service to Blue Plains ended in 2001.

While the CSX tracks are unused,40 the CSX right-of way exists. NCPC proposed this as an alignment to separate freight from commuter and passenger rail,41 and the Committee of 100 explained at pages 27-29 of our September 25 DEIS Comments why the right-of-way should be evaluated as an alternate freight route to separate freight from passenger and commuter rail operations in the Virginia Avenue Tunnel EIS proceeding.42

The Shepherds Branch is a Reasonable Alternative

The rerouting options that involve a new Potomac River crossing discussed in the FEIS are the three alternative alignments that were proposed by the National Capital Planning Commission in their 2007 study, the Railroad Realignment Feasibility Study.43

Concept 8, Deep Bore Tunnel. A new tunnel would be bored under the Potomac River and under the existing CSX tracks in DC, at a depth of 80 feet for a distance of nine miles. It would require the acquisition of 14 to 16 acres of land for the portals.44

Concept 9, Indian Head Alignment. A new Potomac River crossing is proposed by means of a 2.5 mile–long bridge, requiring construction of new a new, two-track railroad and adding a second track to a substantial section of the Indian Head Branch.

sewage treatment chemicals to Blue Plains, and tank cars of aviation fuel to the Bolling Air Force Base.(id.)

40 The tracks are in disrepair and attempting to reconstruct surface tracks may not be practicable, given subsequent redevelopment. A viable possibility would be to lower the tracks and deck over them, like the SW tracks along a part of Maryland Avenue or perhaps a Virginia Avenue type of shallow tunnel in order to coexist with the development that has occurred in this area. The possibility of using a tunnel boring machine for all or part of this work needs to be evaluated.

41 NCPC proposed a rail tunnel under the Potomac River between Virginia and Anacostia in their 1997 plan Extending the Legacy: Planning America’s Capital for the 21st Century.

42 http://www.virginiaavenuetunnel.com/project-resources/

43 FEIS, pages 3-55 through

44 DEIS, pages 3-17, 3-18 and 3-27

17 and the Pope’s Creek Branch. A total of 31 miles of new rail line would be required.45

Concept 10, Dahlgren Alignment. A new Potomac River Crossing by means of a two-mile-long railroad drawbridge. A new two-track railroad would be required on the Virginia side and the Maryland side to connect with existing CSX tracks, requiring a total of 38 miles of new rail lines.46

The three above alternative alignments provide useful information by which to evaluate the Shepherds Branch alternative. A tunnel would be a possible option to cross the Potomac River to connect to the Shepherds Branch. Locating the tunnel below the bed of the Potomac River, which at this point is about 30 feet deep, would require greatly reduced approach slopes, a shorter total length and much less expense than the 80 foot deep, nine mile long tunnel that the DEIS considered as Concept 8. A bridge would also be a viable option, because we know that a bridge existed at this location during WW II, and the length would be much shorter than the two and two-and-a-half mile bridges that would be required for Concept s 9 and 10. The Shepherds Branch tracks would have to be converted to double-tracks and probably depressed (similar to the below-grade configuration of the Maryland Avenue tracks and the CSX tracks north of Benning Yard) to accommodate roads and other development that has occurred. But that would mean rebuilding 6 miles of rail tracks, compared to 31 miles of new rail lines for Concept 9 and 38 miles of new rail lines for Concept 10.

The FEIS Did Not Evaluate the Shepherds Branch Alternative

The FEIS summarily dismissed the Shepherds Branch alternative with the explanation (Appendix L, Comment 20-11, page L-108):

This proposal is not a reasonable alternative because it presents a number of infirmities including the rerouting of a major railroad from an existing longstanding right-of-way through a new structure over the Potomac River and then using another for other purposes. Section 3.2 of the DEIS identified all the alternatives considered, including concepts that would temporarily or permanently reroute the mainline freight rail network outside of the District, and provided the reasons why none of the reroute concepts were selected for further consideration.

In addition to objecting to the use of the Shepherds Branch right-of-way for the reason stated above, the FEIS also claimed that the right-of-way was “of critical importance to the DC government for other purpose.”47 That other purpose would be the possible use of the

45 DEIS, pages 3-20 and 3-27

46 DEIS, pages 3-22 and 3-27

47 FEIS Appendix L, Comment 20-43, page L-13.

18 right-of-way for the DC streetcar system, as DDOT proposed as Alternative 9 for the Anacostia Extension of the Streetcar system.48

But that routing of the streetcar makes no sense. The Blue Plains Line bypasses the heart of the Anacostia community entirely. The southern part, which represents about half of the 6- mile length, is located inside the Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling (JBAB) military base, and north of the military base the line is immediately adjacent to Interstate 295. It is located between I-295 and some commercial and light manufacturing properties. There are no plans in the Comprehensive Plan for development along the CSX right-of-way. The west side of the CSX right-of-way is I-295, with no space for development. The use of this right-of-way as a potential streetcar route would ignore the heart of the community entirely and thus would not serve the residential communities and would provide either no access or, where access is available, a quarter miles walk to business and community amenities along to Martin Luther King Jr. Ave.

48 Anacostia Streetcar Extension Environmental Assessment and Section 106 and 4(f) Evaluations, Draft January 2014.

19

Shepherds Branch Is Being Reserved by CSX as the Primary Rerouting Alternative As early as 2010, DC was interested in acquiring the Shepherds Branch right-of- way. Article VII of the August 23, 2010 Memorandum of Agreement between and the District of Columbia (contained in Appendix A of the FEIS) provides that CSX and DDOT “shall negotiate in good faith the terms and conditions for DDOT’s use of the CSX’s Shepherd’s Branch property.” That agreement eventually took the from of an option for DDOT to acquire the Shepherds Branch right of way, but only after CSX obtained “the necessary permits and approvals to construct” the expanded Virginia Avenue Tunnel in the Virginia Avenue right-of-way (Section II.B.7 of the December 2012 Amendment No.1 to the Term Sheet Agreement, contained at page 56 of Appendix A). In other words, CSX would continue to retain the Shepherd’s Branch right-of-way until they had all the

20 necessary approvals to enlarge and reconstruct the tunnel under Virginia Avenue. Obviously, CSX recognized the importance of having a reserve routing option in the event they did not get approval to enlarge the Virginia Avenue Tunnel.

If the Shepherds Branch route had that value to CSX, then it needs to be evaluated as a rerouting option in this NEPA proceeding. While it is unused and would have to be rebuilt, and roads have been built over the right-of-way, that situation exists with the CSX tracks in SW and the CSX tracks north of Benning Yard, and development has been accommodated by depressing the tracks. It would require a new Potomac River crossing, but since the Long Bridge is the only rail crossing south of Harpers Ferry (63 miles to the north), an additional rail crossing would be in the interest of rail operations in general.

Further, the on-going Long Bridge study is considering rebuilding the Long Bridge by adding two more rail tracks, streetcar tracks, bicycle and pedestrian lanes, and possibly automobile lanes to the extent that a second span may be appropriate. Isn’t this the opportunity to relocate that second span such that freight and passenger/commuter rail operations can be separated so all three forms of rail can expand and grow to better serve the public?

In summary, building a second bridge would:

1. Provide a continuous double–tracked railway to accommodate double stacked container trains;

2. Accommodate expansion of freight, passenger, and commuter rail services;

3. Separate passenger and commuter rail infrastructure from freight infrastructure, allowing each system to be optimized for its specific use;

4. Address the safety and security concerns associated with high-volume freight operations near population centers and national landmarks;

5. Locate freight away from the Capitol and Monumental Core to provide dilution of the emissions that CSX diesel locomotives would continue to produce, to the benefit of vulnerable marble and sandstone national landmarks;

6. Minimize the amount of new and rebuilt tracks; and

7. Utilize existing tracks and rights of way to the extent possible.

21 Conclusion

The Committee of 100 recommends that the Record of Decision address the deficiencies described in these comments and that the Federal Highway Administration and the District Department of Transportation adopt the No-Build Option until such time as the DC Rail Plan can be completed and the ability to separate freight from commuter and passenger rail can be fully evaluated, as well as options to accomplish that separation, including the Shepherds Branch rerouting option. During that time the Virginia Avenue would remain in use by CSX and if CSX does expand their operations to the point that additional capacity is required, then CSX can make use of its proven ability to enter into trackage arrangement with Norfolk Southern.

Respectfully submitted,

Monte Edwards, Vice Chair The Committee of 100 on the Federal City

Attachment A: June 26, 2014 Committee of 100 letter to Mayor Vincent Gray Attachment B: January 7, 2014 Committee of 100 letter to Ms. Lezlie Rupert Attachment C: February 27, 2014 Committee of 100 Supplemental Comments Requesting Revised DEIS

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