MIDDLE EAST PROGRAMME BRIEFING PAPER MEP BP 07/03 JULY 2007 Open for Business: Syria’s Quest for a Political Deal Rime Allaf, Chatham House Photo: © Brian McMorrow Summary • The Syrian regime no longer feels weak and as its prospects of survival improve, its self-confidence is increasingly apparent. • The tactics of Syria’s opponents have mostly been counterproductive, giving the Syrian regime increased leverage. Attempted isolation has not weakened the regime and external pressure has strengthened its domestic position. Meanwhile, its regional position has been bolstered by policy failures in Iraq and Lebanon. • The Syrian leadership is now betting on certain favourable developments which will continue to boost its confidence, both in the region and vis-à-vis Western policy. • It is futile to conduct policy towards Syria on the basis of antipathy towards the regime. Syria’s national interests must be recognized for there to be progress. • Syria will not ‘capitulate’ to US demands merely to become another ‘moderate ally’. The Syrian regime is not looking for popularity, but for recognition. It seeks BRIEFING PAPER a business deal rather than a love affair. 2 Open for Business: Syria’s Quest for a Political Deal Introduction been criticism on the Palestinian front, and there was a sudden about-turn on Lebanon in 2004. These There is no international consensus on the role Syria grievances include claims that Syria: plays in the Middle East. Critics accuse it of having a destabilizing influence on its neighbours, creating • is allowing insurgents to cross into Iraq; problems in order to then become an essential part of • is harbouring members of Saddam Hussein’s the solution. Allies and partners recognize a need for regime; its involvement in regional affairs and believe it is not • supports ‘terrorism’ by hosting radical Palestinian as malevolent as is sometimes claimed. groups in Damascus; The dichotomy extends to the nature of the Syrian • continues to influence events in Lebanon through regime, and the power it allegedly holds. Some view it a network of agents and active backing of as having been weakened by events in the last few Hizbullah; years, desperately hitting out to avoid isolation or, • is not serious about peace with Israel and is only even worse, its own demise; certain events are hence looking for engagement to escape isolation. explained as desperate measures by a cornered regime. Others consider that none of the attempts to For some time, Syria’s critics attempted to deal with sideline the regime have been successful, and that it these grievances through non-engagement and remains very firmly anchored to power. attempted isolation. But four years into the Reflecting these differing assessments is a lack of occupation of Iraq, and two years after the consensus on how to deal with Syria. The Bush withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon, there are administration’s chosen policy, isolation, has not been signs that the critics are reconsidering their positions adopted by most others – especially the European and attempting a different policy, one which Union, which has opted for a more pragmatic necessarily begins with some engagement. The Syrian approach. Although many EU countries decreased their regime has not been subtle about having survived the contacts with Syria following the assassination of antagonistic approach, and Syrian media brashly former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in celebrate the government’s steadfastness in the face February 2005, normality seems to be returning to of threats to national security and sovereignty. The Syria’s bilateral relations with most of these countries. culmination of this ‘victory of endurance’ was recently There is also a question of what to demand from seen during the Arab summit in Riyadh in March 2007, Syria. As the urgency of most conflicts in the region when King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, having until then rises, different parties with different priorities are openly shown his displeasure with Syria’s attitude, pushing their interests. While the US seeks a gave Syrian President Bashar Assad a warm welcome. pacification of Iraq first and foremost, France is more Although Saudi Arabia was probably not indicating its interested in calming the situation in Lebanon, and the approval of Syria’s actions, it was at least recognizing European Union remains concerned by events in the that it could exert greater influence by being on occupied Palestinian territory. speaking terms. Two months later, US Secretary of The Syrian regime certainly has a hand in a State Condoleezza Rice held a meeting with Syrian number of events around the region, but not in all. It Foreign Minister Walid Muallem, breaking the ice after certainly has influence on a number of parties, but a long chill.1 only in a limited way. It certainly did feel weak and More than other parties in the region, Syria feels it isolated, but it does not any more. has been proved right about regional issues, This paper examines the succession of events regardless of its own involvement (alleged or proven) surrounding Syria since UNSC Resolution 1559 was in them. This partly explains why the Syrian regime is adopted in September 2004, and explores the effects gaining confidence, especially when this is framed of various policies, both actual and potential, on the within the context of unexpected, and unintended, regime and its reactions to them. gifts from Israel, the US and the UK, and even the anti-Syrian Lebanese movement. From Damascus, the Contention and unintended view is that each official Syrian warning has not only consequences materialized but has consequentially brought an extra benefit as well. Syrian warnings of Iraq’s The US, the UK and some continental European disintegration are proving realistic and Anglo- countries have made a number of complaints about American ideas of democratization are being Syrian behaviour during the last few years; most of forgotten. Syria’s warning that Israel threatens these have revolved around Iraq, but there has also Lebanon’s sovereignty materialized with the Israeli Open for Business: Syria’s Quest for a Political Deal 3 assault of July 2006; the unforeseen capacity of to vote, if only to maintain control of foreign policy Hizbullah to withstand the attack and claim a victory influence. over Israel was an unexpected bonus. The subsequent The Syrian regime did not adequately read US freeze on the internal Lebanese front, mired by political developments from 2000, understanding obvious outside interference (including by Syria) has neither the Bush team nor the neoconservative ideas, boosted the position of Syria’s allies. Syrian warnings and there have been a number of contradictions in its that the Palestinian solution has to be inclusive of all stated positions. The Syrians spontaneously offered groups have been borne out by the breakdown of intelligence to the US after 9/11 and participated in its security in Gaza. ‘extraordinary rendition programme’,2 but were On all these fronts, there is a crisis that needs to surprised that this did not translate into public be resolved. And on all these fronts, Syria can be part American support. The regime failed to see this as a of the problem as well as being one of the keys to the warning sign of the Bush administration’s generally solution. antagonistic disposition. Syria’s seat on the UN Security Council for 2002–03 put it in the delicate Regional interests position of being the voice of the Arab and Asian countries opposed to the invasion of Iraq. And yet The last few years have seen a deterioration in Syria’s Syria voted in favour of UNSC Resolution 1441 in relations with most significant Western powers, and November 2002, ensuring unanimity for America’s last even with key Arab players. Relations went from warning to Iraq. However, at the same time Syria relatively good to bad with France, from bad to worse continued to criticize the plans to attack Iraq, and the with the US, and from excellent to frosty with Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs even publicly wished for Arabia. In contrast, important regional alliances with the defeat of the US-led coalition during the invasion.3 non-Arab states remained untouched by regional Syria’s inconsistency on Iraq continued as it missed upheavals, evolving regardless of the country’s the vote on UNSC Resolution 1483 of May 2003 which relationship with the US: the relationship with Turkey recognized the US and Britain as occupying powers. (a strong US ally and NATO member) continued to Syria blamed the time difference between New York strengthen, as did the relationship with Iran. and Damascus, claiming later it would have voted in favour.4 Syria then supported UNSC Resolution 1511 of Ruining a perfectly bad relationship with the October 2003 (paving the way for the new Iraqi US constitution), days after Israel had bombed targets in For decades, US–Syrian relations were mostly Syria for the first time in 30 years – an action influenced by Israel. While there has never been any supported by President Bush, who declared that Israel doubt where US loyalty belongs, relations with Syria ‘must not feel constrained’ in defending itself.5 fluctuated but never reached breaking point. Even the The US continued to accuse Syria of helping or carte blanche on Lebanon given to Syria in 1990 allowing insurgents to cross the Syrian–Iraqi border, of (following the decision by Syrian President Hafez providing night-vision goggles to anti-American Assad to support the liberation of Kuwait) had been forces, and of harbouring members of Saddam approved by Israel. Now it is Iraq in particular which Hussein’s regime. Secretary of State Colin Powell, in has become the focal point, and which has defined the his last visit to Damascus in May 2003, issued a list of relationship since the invasion in 2003.