Hrltaln's Secret War The Indonesian Confrontation 1962-66 CONTENTS
THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND 3 • The Brunei remit. December 1962
CONFRONTATION 6 • The phases of0pcr.ltions - the baulclicld - the troops • General Walker's operational principles WILL FOWLER hn wortled • 'I leans and mil1d~' - 22 SAS -the Border ScOUlS In Jourmllllam and publishing • Summary of Commonwealth forces .Ince H112, reportIng for Europe.n, American, Aalan 'nd ArabIc magazlnea from INDONESIAN CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS, Europe, the USA, the Middle E..t, Chi", .nd SE Alia. 1963-64 11 Amongst hIs more than 30 • Longj THE PLATES 43 INDEX 48 Men-at-Arms· 431 Britain's Secret War The Indonesian Confrontation 1962-66 Will Fowler· Illustrated by Kevin Lyles Se"es ed, tar Milrt,n W,ndrow Fm published '" a-l ernUl '" 2006 by Osl:ny NlIlsIlIr>g. Artist's Note MkIIand House. West Wwy. Solley. O~!ord 0:<2 OPI-l. UK «3 p,n, Avenue S AI lights ...-. Apart fftIm any ,air -r.g lor UW IUJIOU 01 prlvale .1\.o:jy. KIIVIO Lyles. 10 COw Roast, Tring. He<1s HP23 5Rf. UK .-aroI'l. CtIIicISIIl Of" _. lIS ptm'IItIelll¥ldef lIle CopyrIght. 0Mlgna WKl PIl""la Act, 19f1ll. no par1 011" publicIIlon may lie teprOOuCed••_In The Publishers r&glllilhat they can ante< into no corrospondenc:e • ~ S'f$IIIm, or uanamttled In any torm or by IIlV "-'S.~. upon !1Iia manEll". 1IIctncaI. chImicaI, rTIlIChatucaI. opI.o:e1. pIloIOCXlP)'ing. AlCOI'Iling or <>IheIwlH• ...lhout uw prior writI"" penTI&SSIor> oIlhe copynght _. EnQo.>nes __ lie .odrIIsed 10 lIle PublIshIra. ISBN I II4«J3 048 X ISBN 13 918 1 84ro3 048 2 Editor· Mart... Wondrow P~ llyoul. by AllIn Hemp TVPMI '" New BaskerVllltl and Htilvetlca Mapa by John RictWdI Indu by GIyn Sutcille OrIgIneted by PPS~.~.. UK Ponlld In 0- I/II'OIJ9Il WOOd PI1nt ltd. 060708091010987654321 FOfl A CATALOGUE OF ALl900KS PUBUSHED BY OSPAEY MIlITARY AND AVIATION PUAS€ CONTACl' Nonh AmerIcI: Osprey Olrect C/o RlW>dom HovsI Di.trlbution CIr1t... 400 H"'n ROad. Wntmln.t.... MO 21167, USA Emsd. lnlOOOopNydl....,t.com All ollleor SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY Ulaxl THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND OPPOSITE Two of the e ••entlal HE WHOLE OF SmITH-EAsr ASIA saw dramalic changes between Ult' factol'll In the British victory mid 1950$ and lhe early \9605. Se\'erdl fonner Dutch, French and In the Confrontation: Gurkha British colonies in the region had become independent nations, hlfantry, and a Fl••t AIr Arm T sOllie of them after bloody guerrilla campaigns, and were now asserting Wessell helicopter, which hal JUlt dropped them on the their newfound national idemil)'_ United Slates agencies had been tleliplld built out,ide a hilltop involved in South Vietnam - fonned)' part of French Indochina- since fort In Bomeo. The foreground 1954, and since 1961 US Army advisors had been assisting its aoldle. carrie. an LMG fleld governmelll. By the end of 1964 there would be 23.000 US personnel in modified with. forward plltol Viemam, and the following March the first major ground units would gnp. (Royal Navy} arrive, beginning a commitment \\'hieh would last seven grim years. The former Bdush colony off\.'!alara had been granted independence within the Commonwealth in August 1957. after the suppression of a nine-year communist guclTilla campaign (the ·E.mergency·) almost entirely limited to the large Chinese minority population. This had involved some 100,000 British and Gurkha troops with Australian, New Zealand and Malay support; but the new government w:a.~ both stable and well inclined towards the West..' Indonesia had achieved independence from the Netherlands in December 1949, but these hundreds of islands - stretching some 3.000 miles from ,,'est LO east - were only partially controlled by the Djakarta government; their population ofsome 85 million, divided into 17 major ethnic b"'Oups. was riven by unrest. Ne\'ertheless, in 1962 the president. Achmad Sukarno, an aggressive nationalist with pretensions to wider leadership among the 'non-aligned' nations, had a grandiose dream of forging a new Pacific union called 'Maphilindo', to bring togt.'lher MalaYA, the Philippines and Indonesia as a regional power bloc. This dream had been born in r.'!arch 1945 when Snkamo bad been a member of a body set up by theJapanese mililall' adminiSffiltion of the occupied Netherlands East Indies, The greater, southern pan of the hllge jungle island of Borneo (to the Indonesians, K..'1limanLan) lay within Indonesia: and iniliallv Sukarno \\'ished to extend his control o\'er lhe neighbollring British colonies and protectorates in nonh-western I~orneo - SarJ.\\'ilk, Sabah and the Sultanate of Brullei, knowll collecti\'ely as the North Borneo Territories - which were also approaching negotiated independence. In May 1961 the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rahman. proposed that r-,'Iala)'a. the island Slate of Singapore and the North Borneo Temtodes should fonn a fedemtion named Malaysia. Although at first sceptical, the British go\'ernmenl So.'1W the advantages that this plan offered, and the scheme would be acceptable to the United Nations. 11le 1 See M«>-al·Arml132, ThaMaiayan ~ 1948-60 3 ~~-- I..., :_,'...-, ·, ,'",~~ SO TH-EAST ASIA : TIlAlL.AND ~'11>', •, ?--I•... ' \ : ':VIETN"M ,I .:. S (I /I I h • IA' , ... China LAY J Ewm1lNEA • ,,,,,,,.'AUT: DON E 5 A • •· ~.~~""''';;;:;.~~. • ~._----~-.,:,,_--_.'~-- TunJ...u was well qualified to lead t\.lala)'sia; an aristocratic Brilish educated la\\'}'cr, he had established his crcdclllials both with ~lalayans as an am.i-eolonialist. and \'o'il.h the British as a staunch allli-communisl. In Indonesia, SUKarno sal. lhis move as a rebuff to his plans for Maphilindo. A flambol"31l1 oralor and 'headline addict', he taned including in his public rants a slogan that "ould become hi catchphrase: 'Cmyong MalaJ'sia' - 'Smash Mala\'sia', AfLcr many di.scussions the Federation of ~Iala,:.ia was finallv proclaimed on 16 September 1963 (though without the Sultanate of Bnll1ci. ",!lich preferred sovereign independence), TIle Indonesian Foreign Ministcr, Dr Subandrio, tJlen began making public references to a poliC) of Confl'omation or KOIifrrmtasl towards Malaysia, accusing the ncv.' StalC of being 'accomplices of nco-colonialist and nco imperialist forces pursuing a policy hostile towards Indonesia', In lhe words ofGen Sir William Jackson, 'He did nOl ~pell OUl \\hat was meant b~ -confronL.,tion~, but it was assumed to be a blending of political. economic and milira.n presstlresjust short ofwar: The Brunei revolt, December 1982 The first sholS of the ConfronL."ltion pre-dated the fonnation of Malavsia, On 8 December 1962 a rebellion mmembers ofthe Kedayan uibe broke alii in tllC oil-rich Sulmnate of Brunei. The rebels adopted the title ~ortll Kalimantan National Ann\' (Tnltara Naswnm Kallman/an l}tara - TNKU): lhc\' were led by YaMin AfTendi. The TNKU had alX>1ll 4,000 followers in Brunei and Sarawak, but onl)'some 150 ofLhcm were well anncd and about 2,000 had shOlgum, The rebellion would be • supprcssed quickly by men from four ballalion-sized British infantry units: 1st llatmlion, 2nd Gurkha Rifles (I/2nd GR), 42 C.ommando Royal Marines (42 Cdo RM). 1st GrecnJackets (I GJ). and the Queen's ~11 I lighlanders (QOI-I), AI 8nlllci to""'n. and at Limbang across the border in Sarawak. the TN'KU had taken hosmges. and there were indications that these "-Quid be executeGurkhas to Bnll1ei town Bakanu, s.r.w.. Noottl ~ and L'lbuan island, "hieh \\ere quiekJr secured. On 10 December a Territories., Oec:ember IH2: Blackbunl Beverley piloted b)- f Lt Fenn earning 90 men of the Rifleman TetTY F~ of ht Queen' OWII Highlanders landed CONFRONTATION General Sir \\'illiamJackson described the three-and·a·half)'earconnict as a six-round COntest. of which the Tunku and his BriLish supporters \\'on the firsL fi\'e rounds conclushely on points, He identified Round One as Suk."lmo's aHempt to stop the creation of Mala) ia; Round Two 6 \\'as the breakingoftrade and diplomatic links, and the first cross-border raids bv TNKU 'volunleers': Round Three brought Indoncsian polilical pressure through the United Nations, a peace conferencc in S...ngkok in Febnmrv 196-1 during a short cease·fire, and the simultaneous deplonuem of regular Indonesian forces: Round Four sa\\ operations 1)\ Indonesian n·gulars in Borneo and on the Mala\ General Walker'. operational principles TIle British and later Federation and Common \\callh forces who deplored to Bomeo from 1963 were \\ell sen'ed b\ the Director of Operntions, MajCen Walter Walker, GOC 17th Gurkha Di\ision and a veLCran ofthejungles of BUlllla and Malara, who arri\'ed in theatre in December 1962, Walker's initial responsibility W,Li to quash lhe Brunei rebellion: but hejudged lhal there was a g,'ealer threat from Indonesia. and requested thaI at the close of lhal opel'alion force levels in the 7 ·,. NORTH BORNEO BORDER AREA 1962-66 ,-_..:"..._"'"....._"'."...... :D_ '; , 1---...... _~----I '; 0 • --- TlIroughcKlt Borneo the Inland area should not be reduced. Walker's as.'iCSSlllent "''as correct. and le..,.l" w.. cn.rKteft~edby operations would soon have to be undertaken first 10 cOlltain CI'"OSS Iteep ridges mlng to 8,000tt border raids b} IBTs - "ndoncsia-b..'lSCd BordcrTerrorists' - and later [0 mountain.; thick rIIln I_I, deslro) their ""ill to laullch them. In his first oper-Ilions directh'c Walker _It Into ~'lNtu.1 gloom bV the tOOft high lungle canopy; f••I laid dO\m the six principles which would guide the proseclltion of the flowing Itreaml, and C08ltal campaign: mangrove Iwamp•. Therll WI,. (I) Joim operations between the police and the Ihree armed services very few motor1lble road., end (2) Time!) and accurate illlclligence informaLioll the climate ranged 'rom ,tlning humidity to chltl night, on which (3) Speed, mobilil) and nexibility toldI.... needed lleepll'lil bagl. (-I) Security of bases Dally downpourII of IrQPlcll ,.In (5) Domination ofthejulIg'le added to the mlnrl•• of troop. (6) Winning and keeping the confidence of the indigenous people. In the field, and r••trlcted both The Police Special Branch, working with the Ann)'. was able to supply movement on the ground ,nd night. by h.llcopt..... inronnalion aboutlocaltelTorisl leaders and their likely hiding places in Sarawak and Sabah. Thanks tu Ihis intelligence, Yassin AfTendi, the lasl of the surviving TNKU leaders, who had sel up a base in s"",unp5 on the bank of the Brunei river ncar Kampong Scrdang, wa,~ eliminated, Men of the 2/ith Gurkha Rines sl\'ept through his camp at dawn on 18 May 1963, and Yassin AJTendi was fawlly wounded when his party rnn into a cUl-oJT group positioned outside the camp. 'Hearts and minds' - 22 SAS Among the units under his command Cell Walker had A Sqn, 22nd Special Air Sen.ice Regiment. His original plan for their employment ""'as as a mobile ·fire brigade· ""hich could parachule into Ihejungle to recapllIre an) border ,'mages seized by the Indonesians. The 8 commanding oOicer of 22 5.\5. LICoI John Woodehousc. feil that this \\'ould resull in hea\)' casualties and was a poor use of skilled men. Woodehouse had joined the British Anm as a prh.uc in 1941: he. \Iichael Cahert and Dare Newell were the lhret" men \\ho had lransfonned the Malamn ScOULS into 22 SAS in lhe earh 1950s, Woodehouse. \,;th a fund of practical experience 10 dr.m upon. proposed lO Walker that the SAS should operate in small pmrols along the jungle border as 'eyes and cars'. while gailling the confidence ofthe local tribal groups - thus achieving both il.ellls (2) and (6) on Walker's lisl of plinciples, l1u~ SAS patrols \,'ere deplo)'ed aboul e\'c'1 60 miles along the 'Heert, eltd mlltd" In • tnHI border, and immcdiately beg'drl a 'hearts and minds' progr.unme among village, 11165: e m.dal Ol"derty from the 0-.. ~ ~hlnlts. lhe tribal \;lIages of the Dvaks, Kclabits and Punans, For the Quant. c...... e _ .. cut loe-.lI popliialion lhere \\ere real benefi ..... from the relationship. since hand before d,...mg It. The the antibiotics c.l.rried b\ the SAS medics could sometimes cure phr-... 'hNrU lind rnincb' "-d O\emighl simple medical conditions from which lhe patients had ft...t be4n uNd by FM Sir Gerald endured months ofdistress, Apart from rOlll.ine medical assistance, the Temp'-r In h4e: e.m~lgn ..I~t Communl,t T.non,t, fC"r.lln resourceful SAS teams made themselves popular in many other wa)'s Maley•• 19S2-ae, when troop' (one enterprising sergeanl named 'Crps)" Smith buill a miniature under hll commend hed won the hy'dro-cleClric plant in a Slream al Talibakus, Sabah, and pro\~ded lhe loyel , ..lltene. 01 Jungl. tnb.. onlv electric lighting for 370 miles). BerwcenJanuatv and April 1963. A .. Intelligene....thenlt"I .Itd Sqn operated \\;th onh iO men in thealre. but bv breaking lheir fom guld.... The conc INDONESIAN CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS, 1963-64 II The first clash Cline on 12 April 1963, .... hen IBT~ attacked 1I police stillion at Tebedll in SOlllh-wCSI Sarawak: although the raidcl'S were repulsed by Insp Cbimlxlll's mcn, the lnTs looted the local ba/. Track 6, March 1964 With the breakdown of the Bangkok l 2 For _ K_, t.- WO!'I!l_1I-. RovaI ~ "'''"'''-''''' m ...... !JfM MId. ~ mIlllII~, ~ 14 rmm • c:.p; • wtvIe rim, ...... t • ,.,.,.. IIeld ~ a bIlIck cotlfa c:"'*! to Ilrike, /IboI.-. 'SARAWolJ(' , in of a Sleady build·up of Indonesian ~larine commandos and ofparaU'oopers in camps in =a•• Kalimaman, on the SumaL.r.l coaSt opposite !.he "laI3\"11 mainland. and on the Riau Islands sOUlh of Singapore. Faced b} this thl'cat, Ceo Walker n~cei\'ed 51 Bde of the Su,Hcgic Resen'e. with iLS I-IQ and one Gurkha and two British battalions. Walker was no\\, able to rOtate and redeploy b the frig-IIC t-1MS ;\Ja.\~ the fishing boaL~ were caplllred. 1\1th large stocks of ammunition and explosives, but the launch escaped. The Indonesians also attempted Iandin&1'S 011 the coastJine south-cast of Jallore. Ben\'ccli 7 ~o\'embt:r 1964 and 25 March 1965 the\ made Ii\c landin~; the !i1'SltWO. in ~O\emberand December. \,'ere quickh mopped up. On l.he night of 25/26 Febm;uT. 44 Indon~ian police and \'Olul1leers came ashore and ambushed men of the Singapore Regt, killing cighland wOllnding fi\c. ill the end of March, hOWl....'eT. Ihe seetlnt) forces had accounted for all 44 infilmuors. Two more iltlempted landings were quickh foiled, as well as several minor inou"Sions. On 31 ~Iarch 1965 the taLiI! number of auempu.~d landings stood at 4), \\ith 142 Indonesians killed and 309 captured. On 30 ~la\. in a fmal gesture. 25 Indonesian regular soldiers landl-'tt at Tal~ong Pen·Celih in c-dStem Johore and occupied a position l5ePtemb...- 1064: the "!don••n a.ndlnes on the M• ...,..., buill 1>\ theJapaneo;e in World War 11 ..\ d;n later the\ surrendered, after m.1.w.ncl led to • "'"'htllned strikes 1>\ rockel-filing lll1nter5. .18t. of 8lert ..the_ thf'MtIIned to H(;,818t1o to 8ft Australian and New Zealand commitment, 1965-66 entirely _ ...... An R.u: The landings on the ~Iala\ I'eninsula had ....ider repercussions than Whlrtwlnd MAR 10 circles F_t IKout e...- of C Sq.n, Sukarno had alllicipated. The Australian go\ernmelll had been Roy.t lristl H .... assi~lance, 0_" reluctalll 10 prmide milimr\ because it shared a long border Th8 ..-glt'\8nt Mel th ubA: ....ith Indonesia on Ihe huge island of New Guinea; Ihe westel1l half ...."aS aquHron••Kh of th troops, Indonesian 'WCSI Irian', and the caslern halfAustalian-protected Papua ..ch troop eq..n~ with New Guinea. 111e" had troop<; based in Malara as part of 28th two S8llOdln -wn... he8't)' Commonwcalth Inf Bdc oflhe Far East Strall~gic Resen'e; btll these were .rmCHlred .:. with 711mm gUn$ .nd 2.J: .3Oln MO., .nd two MG illlended ollh 10 protCCt Malara againsl external attack. .nned F.,.,.t Mk II teOIlt c~ During the cordon-and·se:lrch operalions following Indonesian r:.lids • "1)8..1. '....u" troop' rode on tbe mainland men of3 RAR and I RNZR were employed, since these In S8r.c.n .rmCHlred ~nel wel"e cleOId\' external allacks. The AlIsll',llian and ~e....' Zealand c.rri..... go\'emmcnu, now agrcl'd that troops should be commiucd 10 Borneo, Th. RAF Ol)8r.tlKl Whirlwind. 0' No' 103, 110.230 Sqn' In and in March 1965,3 RAR an'i\'cd in Sarawa\.::, where it served unlil det8chment, b.Nd .t '1.rlCHl' the end of.July. During this lime the Australians mounted exlcllshe loe.tlon,. Other Common""••lth opcratioll~ on both sides of Ihe border, and had fOLlI" major contactS h.lIcopt.r ....t. w.... th. UH· with the Indonesians. In Mayan ambw;h commanded b)' Lt Patric\.:: 1B 'Hu.»," of No 15 Sqn RMF, Beale caughl foul' Indonesian boalS. Two wcre destroyed; the third was .nd the AJou.tte Ill' of No 15 Sqn RMAF, (IWM R 2(1872) visible 10 only one soldier, PLC Jackson, hut he engaged il with his rifle and killed all fhe OCcllpant'\.Jack....an hurled grenades althe fourth bom, and to gel:t bener shot ill it he climbed a tree. When LI Beale ordered the .....ithdn.lwal, thc plat.oon had killed at least 15 Indonesians. On 12 Jul), 1965 an ambush commanded bv 2/Lt B\'crs caught 25 IndOllcsiall'\ in the ~illillg ground; when it was spnlng 17 enemy were killed, but the mni\'ol" count.cl·-:.tttacked, and in the subsequcnt ten minute firefiglll two AliSlralian.) \,ere wounded. Calling down ..rtillel"' fire. Byers was Ihen able to withdraw his phlloon. In 1966, 3 RAR \\ere replaced b\ "I RAR, whose lour in Saraw,t\.:: belween April and AugUSl W;L'o quieler. but who also operalcd on both sides of the border. 17 In addition to 3 and 4 RA.R, and \W'O squadrons of the Australian SASR (see heIO\,). Australia deplo\'cd se,-cral anillcn" baueries and troops of Ropl Austrl.llian Engineers. In all, 23 Atbtralians were killed during the Confrontalion and eight wounded. THE CONFRONTATION IN THE AIR The fil'St helicoplers 10 arrive in Bomc..'O were Bristol Bch-ederes of ~o.66 Sq RAF. as well as \'anaus detachments ofWestland Whirh..;nds. The FAA contributed four squadrons £h'ing Ihe Westland Wessex and \\11irh..;nd. and the .\rm.. Air Corps (MC) five Scout and five Sioux flight.-.. Though highel' figures have been quoted, Cen Jackson states that there \\'ere never more Ihan 70 helicopters available in theatre at am one time. Shcil-5mall andJames suggest that 'had six Men from 11t0th Q~ RIftes helicopters been a\'3ilable per battalion, Confrontation might ,..-ell ha\e ~te white rec:ognltlon Ugn finished a "ear earlier'. The jungle "orkhorses were unquestionabh on NO - bring in one of the the \\'es.<;ex and the Scout. The Wessex IlAS ~Ik I could earn up to 1HI1ndone.lan paratroop.", dropped naar Labl., Malaya, on 16 troops, with a range of645 miles: the SculllAH Mk I could caIT)' four the night 01 1I2nd 5eptembet' troops plus the pilot and co-pilor; it had a rJ,nge of312 miles. 1t&4. H.llJtI)e.... to wear plain Though all lhe RAF. AAC and FA.\ fixed- and rotan-\\;ng cre"~ were 01"'- drab; other ~ra WON critkal for the supph;ng orromard troops and inserting and extracting tM camouftage uniform Mown them from ulejungle. the na\,,-I ainnen of8·15 ~.\S made a panicularf" In Plate A2. Thl. Gur1tha significant contribution. Bel\\cen December 1962, \,hen th~ fir.>1 \,ent ba't.llon lI«ounl.cl for &t ot the ,..1<1.... (M'l H.E,Shleld.l ashore, and earl> 1965 ule squadron completed 10,000 hours' fh'ing, c 2 Para at Piaman Mapu. April 1965 The most ambitious attack on a comp..,nr base c..une near the end oftlle Confonlation, at Plaman ~lapu in lhe FiBt Dhision on 2; April 1965, The position \'t,ts held b) B Col I-IQ, 2nd Bn The Parachute Regiment, plus a weak pl:uoon of soldiers fresh from the depot: the bulk of the com pan, '\~.lS out on pmrol. The p..,ratroop battalion had deplmed to Borneo onh' in MardI. In the position \\ere lhree officers including Capt Webb, thc artillen forward obser"ation officer (FOO>; Compam Sergeant Major Williams, and cools, mortar cre\\'S and radio operators - a to..,\ slrength of 34 men, At O·t-t5hrs, during the usual nighttime downpour, the position came under mortar and rockel-launcher fire, The auackers \\'ere from a toughJa\'anese unil oflhe Indonesian regular am1\': lhe 3rd Bn, Para-Commando Regt (RPKAD), commanded b\ LlCoI $.,ro Edllie \\ldabo\'to. The R])KAD had seen a good deal of action in lhe 1950s and earh 196Ih, including SC\'eral combaljumps: lhe' el~o,ed elite s..,tus as trusted Ktlarcls of tlle regime, and had good equipmelll from" mixlllI'c ofsources both Smiel and Westem. The Pard-Commandos CUI the perimeter wire with Bang-dlore torpedoes, and launched tlln~e assaults. The first gained a lodgement in the position, capturing an 81mm monar pil. CS~1 \\llli"ms and Capl Thompson, Ihc :Icting platoon commander, rallied lhe Pams, but Thompson was wounded b) mortar fire, With tlle siLUation delerior,ning, WillialllS recalled thinking, 'This is it - lhis is the end of Ihe stOl1' :1Il}'\I,ly, "0 ,'II gi\'c 'em a bit ofrapid fire'. He discarded his rifle and gl,lbbed a CP~IG, dipped twO more bellS to that all'ead), in thc gUll, and slood firing from thc hip, as epl Baughan led a counter-auack, Se"eral of the Indonesians charged straight at Williams, lhe nearcst being killed ani)' IWO yards aII'll)' frOIll him, When lhe second assault came in, with supporting fire and Bang-alore tOrpedoes, 10511l1ll howitzers were able to fire on the enemy axis of au.ack, IllSide lite position, CSM Williams brought another GPr-,'IC up, and Sgt McDonald fired t,hc 81 mill monar \'enicalJ)', w>ing onl)' lhe primary charge, so that the bombs fell onlr 30 preis a\'t~dy. This broke up the second aSS:llllt, The third attackjusl before dawn, ataoout 05.45, \'t SAS tactics - 'shoot and scoot' Though S,\S palrols would ambush the enem} both in ~lala\'sia and later across the border, this was not their primal) fUllction, Colonel \\'oodehollse laid down that the stllndard operating procedure for a contact would be 'shoot and scoot' - open fire to deter a follow-up, bLll break orr the contact as quid.h as possible. Relie\ing A Sqn. 22 SAS in Ma\ 1963, 0 Sqn emlxlrked on deep operalions along the estuaries in Sarnwak's lo\\-I\'ing western frontier region. Tracks o\'er the high ground opposite LongJa\\oai in lhe ll1ird Dh·ision. the \~d.llc} south of I>ensiangan in soluhern Sabah, and the coastal eSluaries or Sabah were also identified as likel}' infiltration routes. During their first month D Sqn penetr.lIed a pre\'iollsl} unexplored area on the 5.'lbah border knO\\11 as The Gap: this patrol, commanded b, G.1pt 'And\' Dennison, included the experienced Sgt Eddie 'Geordie' lillico, Lillico would later suni\e an ambush in Februal) 1965 \\ilh se\'ere leg wounds, and would cI In 1964 Harold \\ilson won the General Election and Brirain had a Labour go\'cnuncnt. lll(~ $ecrcl....I)' of State for Defence was Dennis Ilealc), who in World War II had served in the Royal Engineers. rising to the r~lnk of m;\jor and seeing action in [laly. The goycmmcllt \lias commiucd to supporting the nc....' Commonwealth nauons; the threal from Indonesia \\";IS c\ident, and the go\'cmmem"dS prepared to lake lough dcci~ions. Ileak'y and Wilson pro\ed shrC\'l'd political alli~ for Mala\ ia and for Cell Waller. \\110 was able lO comincc (hem ofthe need for lOp secn~t crOSSoborder raids against Indonesian ~taging C"dmps. These oper.uiolls \\'cre codcnamed 'Claret', and were imcnded 'to pn..--empl any likel) build-up 01' attack. LO harass b} ambush and palrols the IndorH.'sial1s, and 10 induce Ihem to mo\'e their camps... away from the bonier'. Indon("~ia and the Fedemrion of Mal.l\'sia, lel alone lhe L'niled Kingdom. wcre nOt officialh at W;lr, so it \\"as a risk\ political mO\"l~, One Brili.. h officer ..er\'ing wilh ~1.t1aysi;m Rangers rec-Alled the grim preamble to the orders group prior 10 a Claret operation: 'This opcr.uiol1 is deniable and will be denied'. Once lhe soldiers had crossed me ill-dcfincd jungle border into Indonesia lhe) were on lheir 0\\11. \\'hen il \I~IS nece~s:u) 10 repon the resull ofa Clarel raid 10 lhe media, il 1...1S described as 'a ~Llcccssful action in the border area'. Tht.' SAS had in faci been crossing the K.alirnantan border since December 1963; bUI now anacls would be undertaken al plaloon or e\en compan} 'itrenglh m rCKular Brilish infantn b."lllitiions, working on imelligcllce galhered m SAS patrols - \\110 also mOllilled small scale ambusht.~. A special \\-.1.1' room \\.LS SCI lip lO handle lhe clandestine Oper-dtiOns, which wcre condliCled under SInn guidelines 1m0"11 as TIle Golden Rules: (I) All 1 2 .. 1: Prlvate, A Coy, lsi Sn 0tMfit.. Own Highlanders; Brunei, December 1962 2: Manne, 42 Cdo RM; Brunei, winter 1962/63 3: Rllleman, lit Bn Green JlK:kets; N.Bomeo, w1nt.... 1962163 B 1: NCO, 3nl Bn ~ AustIaIM Regt; Sar8wak, J ...... 11165 2: GuMdsman, I.t Bn Scots au.ds; boat p;1ItroI, $ab8ft, 19&1 3; Radio ~Ol', 1.1 Bn ~ Ulst. RiflB; Sarawak, Jvty 111&1 c 1: Trooper, 0 Sqn, 2200 SAS Regt, , 963 2: Dog hilndlM, 2nd Bn Green Jackel., 19615 3: Puoan trKker, 1963 2 D 1: lance-Nalk R1lmbahadur 11mbu (VCI, C Coy, 2nd en, 10th Gurltha Rilles; , Gunong Tepol, 21 No....mber li165 2: RillemIln, lat an, 10th Gurkha Rilles; labia, 5ej)tember 1964 3: Lt, 2nd Bn, 1nd Gurkh. Rl''''; lumbls, June li165 E 1: W02, Royal Army Pay eorp. 2; 5er(Jeant, Royal Army Medical Corps 3: Vlca·Admlral, AN 4: Captain, Queen.. Royal Irish HI,r$$3r$ • ·1 3 1: Petty Officer, RN landing party, 11&4 2: Sgt hellcopt. pilot, 65e Sqn Me 3: UCpl, lS AIr Despatch R-vt. RASe; Kuching, 11164 G 1: CSM, 8 Coy, 2nd 8n Tn. PlIrKtlula Regt; Plaman Mapu, 21 AprIllM15 2: lban Bordat' ScoYI, 2nd 6n 101t0 0urkh8 Rifles, 1965 H wiLh neutralizing an Indonesian observation post on Sebatik Island on· S."1bah·s east coasl, which was dose 10 an Indonesian base on Nanukan Island. In an earlier century the Dutch and British colonial carto graphers had dhided Sebmik. an island measuring about 25 by 12 milt.-s, almost exactly in half: the southel"ll portion "~dS now Indonesian all(ltlle nonhern ','IS pari of S."1bah. The SBS had recollllOilred the or earlier in 1964: and on 8 December the mOtor cmiser Bch SaWYi!r carried a group of Rm.1I Marines under command of an SBS officer, Lt RA.~I.Secger, 10 a poim ofT tile coast. Here the~ launched three Gemini inflatablcs: one carried a support pam "'ith a GPMG to a position on the bonier, La deter any Indont.osian pUl"Suit after the atl.lck. The other two boats, with 15 men aboard, paddled the 6 miles to a small beach. Seeger had di,ided the 15 men into a Gr~IG crew under Sgt Cosdev. a close Riflemen of 2nd O....n Jacket. SAS CLARET OPERATIONS about to set out on II flye-day [n the winter of 1964-65, A & B Sqns. 22 SAS conducted:1 number of patrol on the Jungle border cross-border oper.tt.ions; palrols from B Sqn wen~ concentrated on the between Scorewak an.d Plich range of hills in western Sarawak. il1lcrcepting agents :llI.empting Kall....ntan. The patrol eommandet- mak.. a ".t-mlnute to cont.act CCO cells in Lundu. E.'1.rl) in 1965. D Sqn under ~I:y Roger eheek of arm. and equipment; \\'oodh,iss replaced A Sqn again, and the Claret operatiom continued. one. out on P11lrol ttIM only In Apdl a four-man patrolled b\ Capl Robin Lens ncar 8db..'1.ng Raba in contKt wi1h thot'r be.. will be Kalimant.."1l1 monitored Indonesian traffic on the Sentimo rher. and on by radio, and _ ...... 11 Item the morning of the 28th the\ spnll1g an ambush against twO longboats. 01 equipmotnt .." behind could a~ mean that UNo mluJon will not In four minutes, at ranges close as 8ft, tJ1C' liUed five Indonesian be accomplilltloed. They wear ...... soldiers: one CSCdped. Pm equipment with poncho roll" In Ma\ 1965, ~taj Woodiwiss briefed Sgl Don 'Lofn" Large - fomlerly .trapped to In. luIy~k, and of t.he CloLlcest.er!>hirl' Reg:t, and a leteran of lhe Korean War - 10 lead the p.trol commander hat • a patrol across the border 10 lhe Koemb:' ,'i\'er near Poed. On 10 ~lay 'GOlioek' machete a' hi. hlp. Apart lrom 1 .. 2 OJ end 2 Para, they encollntered an Indonesian platOon, but carefully skirted their EnllUah and Irlah line batU,lIon" po~i,-ion. When they had localed a position for an OP on t.hc edge ofa Which deployed to the Far n,bl>cr plantation they \\~Ilched the ril'er traffic. The following day a 45ft ea.t varlov. dates w . 8' lUXllr} motor yacht appeared. 'At the stern "'as the red and "hit.e flag... foll_ (1,t 8"a in each c ): Royal LeicHten, Royal Ulster onh those boats with soldiers on board had f10"'1 it. so far, Amidships Rin.., Queen" Ow" 8una, a... citnop' shaded its occup.3nts.so that Large could not. make them OUL Dum.m Ught lnt.nt,." Roya' On a shon mast.,. flew another banner. this one ha\;ng a str.lI1ge de\;ce Werwlckstlire Fufilwn., Royal that slrongl, suggested 10 his practi.sed e,e the son which \e.... senior Ham9Shi and King's Own officers displa~ to boo<;ttheir<'gos and inspire awe. ~We'lI have this one~. yortuhl Ught 1"'Mlt)!. "<1.5 (IWM FEW 65132/34) Large whispered.' It then thai he saw a )oung girl among the pa.'>SCngers. Wondering if this meam thai t.he boat. carried a ci,;lian official. the}' let il pass; and 12 vea!"i 1:II.er, Cen Moerdani of the Indonesian Parachlllc Regt had an opportunity t.o tJl:tnk two fonner members of the palrol for tJleir chi,,;:,lr}'. Llrge had been right: the flag 34 had been the guidon of the tJ1Cli Col Mocrdani. It took another day before another target presented itself; then, in dn\;ng rain, the patrol opened fire OIL 45 preis' range on a 40ft launch \\;th t"'o soldiers al the stem and a deck cargo under tarp,;HIlins, Hil b\ more than 60 rounds, the boat tool.. on a list and slaned to burn, and Ihe smell of burning fuel borne on the wind follo\\,('(1 Ihe po-llrol as the)' withdrew, In late May 1965, D Sqn was replaced b) A Sqn, commanded by ~Iaj Peter de la Billiere. That August, working c1osel) \\;Ih the Gurkhas. the squadron launched a .'tenes of cross-border raids, MallY \,'ere fruitless; during an operalion in September, 12 four-man palrol.. conducted a \~dn three-week search for a reponed CCO camp on the headwaters of Ihe Sempa)'ang and Bcmban rivers on Sarawak's western bordcr, III December 1965 the ne'" Director of Operations. :\l;~Gcn George Lea, cleared 6, 7 & 8 Tps of B Sqn for an extenshe spread ofambushes on the Bemban-to-Sawah track, The Indonesians had beell alened hi two locals, but when they attempted to roll up one ambush in a sen~ of ( fire-and-manocll\Te moves. file "'ere caught in the blast of a OanJlore: '111e result was shocking... hats, limbs, bodies ne'\ and then la\ grotesquel)' still". TIle remaining two Clanllores pointing down the track "ere fired blind and produced screams and groans. e\;dentJ> from a fullO\\-llp force which must have been halted in its tracks, for it ne\-er appeared.' Among the ambushers on this occasion was TprJohn White, whose brother l.\ilI) had been killed in an ambush while ~r...illg with A Sqn in Augusl 196·\. John While had been so impressed when he A haurd of long IUl'IlIle patrola altended his brOlher's memorial service at Hereford lhal he had Iha rubber aole 01 tha lungle \'olllll1eered for lhe Regiment. boot haa parted from tha can",.. An interesting de\'e1opmenl from this period was the formation, at upper, TheM light boots w.,.. comfortable but not robust the close of the campaign in 1966, of G (for Guards) Sqn, 22 SAS, enough lor '"" eondltlons, and The S Australian SAS From February to Jul) 1965. I Sqn, Au... lralian Special Air Senice Regimelll served in Brunei. and 2 Sqn from February to July 1966 in Sarawak; Ihey sutTered three killed in action, Urigadier Ilarry TlllO, commander' urthe Cenlral Ilngade where they operated, noted Ihat lhe Australians 'appeared to be eXlremeiv keen and tough and arc 10 operale on the same lines as the Ikiti!.h $AS'. No,l S Men of 1,t $(:ot, Q_rdI New Zealand SAS in • Mk 4 oUuult Boat on • In Febmar} 1965.40 men of the Ne..... Zealand SAS comm;mdetl b\ Maj .,.t.rc:ou.... In S.tJ.h's Ent WJD.Mcldnnll arrhed in Borneo to take over some of Ule work. 11le B~; • lighf mKhlne gun Is Kiwis spelll a month tmining at Tlllong in Brunei; skills learned and mounted In the bow, The Jungle improved included 'hot COlllacl' drills il1\'ohi.ng fast, dose range riv.n weN neee,..r1ty lIHd by both ,id..., ~Jor tnnSfXl(t shooting. as well as navig-dtion and suni\'al. TIley ulcn moved to .rterlel, .net ~ny CI.nf Kuching ill westcrn Sal'll ...... lk. \\'here they were au.a.chcd to 22 SAS. In oper.llon, InvolwKl obItmIiMJon AU&'\Ist 1965,2 Detachment NZSAS, 'mder r-,'l.y R.S.Bciu;ng. arrived in .net .mbuan.. 0' lnet_lan Singapore and. after training at TUlong, moved to Kuching to replace river tnlffic. (1 sa via JoIvI NoniII I Oct on 6 October. [n the First and Second Division areas the NZSAS took their turn a' monilOring river lmllic inside Indonesia. W.D.Baker lOok pan in one patrol which found a good observation and ambush position. with a clear field of fire and good routes in and out. The day passed quietly. until they saw a longboat \\i.tl1 outboard motor stntggling upstream hea\i.ly laden with stOres, and crewed by alen, armed Indonesian soldiers. It ....-as photographed b) the patrol commander, \\ ho debriefed his men aboul what had the}' seen; they had recogni1ed Armalites. and were comi.nced that the boat \\...IS on a supply nm to an Indonesian camp upstream. They decided to ambush it on its return. and aboLlllwo hour'S later the sound of an outoo..lrd malar alcrrcd Ulel1l. 37 Whell the boat entered the 'K point ofthe ambush -the point \.. here the coxsw'lin would be unable to turn it - the troopers opened fire, and Ihe ambU5h was o\er in seconds: four Indonesians were killed and IWO \\Ollllded. In Juh 1966. 4 Det ;,\,ZSAS under Maj D.W.S.~lolonC\ arrinxl in Iheatre. TIlcir tour included a conl3ct \\ith Indonesian troops as laIc as :, Augu.)l: the ~ZSAS pavol, led by the appo"iteh named Lt 'Alb\' N"'i, followed the Indonesians, \\'ho \\'cre north ofthe border. On 12 August, whilc the) were still in lhc jungle, the Federation of Malaysia and Indonesia signed a peace agreemcnt. THE LAST YEAR Duling 1965 there were confused politic'll signals from Dj:tl..::tna, and it was thcrefore felt to be politically expediem 10 reduce the cross-border pressure. The British soldiers nicknamed these periods 'Be kind to Indos', and in realil\ the~ allo",·ed the Indonesians 10 regroup for what would be thc final spasms of the campaign. On the Mala\osian side of the border, following the action al the 2 I)ara fon al Plaman Maptl in Apnl, the PardS had furllier COnL"lCl'o ",ith the Indonesians 011 Ij ~Ia) 1965 ncar the v'illage of ~Iongkus. ~len of 10 Pill outflanked an ambush where about 100 Indonesians were covering a lrdck junclion: for the loss of one man lhe Par-IS killed five and drovc ofT the enemy force. In a follOW-lip after dark an Iban tracker Iitcrally used his hands to feel OUl the route, until by 02,00 they were so close thai they could smcll the enem)'. but b\ dawn the Indollc..ians had slipped aW"'"n': anillcl' (irc ...... 110 called down on their likely mUlCS. On 22 Maya helicoptcr assault put seven platoons of 2 Para into an area between Mongkus and Mujal 10 cmel" the likelv rollle of 50 Indotl(-siilIlS. Before the Paras roped dOMl the area had been prepared b\ anillen fire and anned hdicopters. It fell 10 a section commander, Gpl Tindale of JO PUl, 10 make COnl3CL lie heard mm'ement, sel his section up in a snap ambush, and ....·hen al>out 40 Indonesians broke cover on a lidge he waited until tht.1' were only 20ft awav before he gav'e the order to fire, The 1\\'0 Bren guns and the section's SLRs killed 14 encmy, and when lile Indonesians began 10 mortar 1l1e position and roll 11 lip from the flank Tindalc withdrew his little forct: withoul sllfTcring any caSllalties, Gunong Tepol: Rambahadur Llmbu, YC On 21 November 1965, on the Indonesi;m side ofthe borderwest ofUau in 1l1C exu'cme west of Sarawak's First Divi... ion, L/~aik (l, Cpl) Ramb.lhadllr limbu of the 2 10th Gurkha Rines \\on the onl) "klona eros... of Ihe campaign. The action .... ____upbt' ...... ,""'._PIn '. (j) 40 from his FOO. The !irst !k1.lvo almost landed on the Gurkhas, with a chunk of melal slicing into a tree only a few feet from Maunsell's head. The gunners correct.ed their fir·e. and t.he neXI salvo crashed into lhe "crub among the Indonesians. ~Iaunscll had ncutr.l.lized the position. ,md his COlllIKtll) had killed al leasl 24 of the enemy. so he now g.l\'e the order 10 withdraw to lheir rendeZ\·Olls. Once the Gurkhas were clear - laking \\ith them their three dead. one seriousl) and one lightl) wounded - Mallnscll called dO\\ll a ban-age of 5.5in alld J05mm fire on the \'3cated posiLion, The action had lasted abolll 90 minutes. Captain M:llIl1scll and Lt R.1.IUit Rai each received the MiliL'ln Cross. and L/Cpl R..'lmbahadur Limbll was awarded the \'jctolia Cross, IIi.s citiltion SL1.tcd tlmt he had displaved 'heroism. sc1f sacrifice and a de\'otion to dllt\ and to his men of the veIl highest order. His actions 011 this da) reached a zenith of determined. prcmedilated \'31011r \\hich mllSt count among the mOSt notilble on record', lronicall). because Claret operntions \\'ere secret. the localion of the Gunong Tepoi action had to be concealed; it was described as being in the Ball district inside Sarw'\ilk. To the lIninfonned this made the Indonesians appear much more aggressh"e and effecli\e than the\ reall\ were. apparent!, capable of penetrating across the border in strength and building a compam posilion in dIe jungle; in rcalit), the) had been pushed onto the defensh'e In the CI Getting out Ibmbahoadur UmIK.t, VC, 2110th III late 1965 it 1\'3S clear to the Indonesian armed forces that the)' \\'ere Ou~ RIfII. (... PYII £1)., losing the Confrontation, and - like the Argentine defeal in the photOO"'pMd ..,..- I' • H.vlkillr (-V-Inl). HI w..,1 on to No Falklands campaign in 1982 - this triggered dissension al home. eommlulonfil, .nd 10 serve (KIt President Suk:trno had nirted with the CCO, and the domestic I long Ind dl.tlngu~ 1:11..... Indonesian Communisl Pan) (PKI) also e1uo)'ed his patronage, \\hich I' I Ou,.h. ottlelr. aroused suspicion among Lile strongl)' anli-comlllllllist milital}. On AllhCKlgh • 1111')' flw po.thumou, I Octo~r 1965 Llle PKI launched a coup, killing six gcnerals; among 'Wlrd. WI" midi durinll "Ier 20th eentul')' I:IImp.llln., LlmlK.t t.hose who escaped werc Ccn $uhano, a future leader of Indonesia. and wu thl only 8rill,h soldier Cen Nasulioll, all inlillCTllial fonner defence minister. The Ann)' then who .urvlll~ 10 be dtK:Gr.ted led an anti-cortltl1unist purge 0\'1"1' sevcral mont.hs during which morc with Ihl Vletorll Cro•• between than 250,000 PKI members were massacred. On 21 F'ebrual1' 1966, 1985,.1Id the IW.rd to Pte Johnson 8eh.rry 0' hi Bn Sukamo allempted 10 reduce lhe aUlhorit)' of his generals, bIll on Prine... of W.le." Roy•• Regl \\~IS II March he forccd 10 sign an order handing all executive power lor gelllniry In t...q In M.y Ind to Cen Suharto. Thc Ann)' then moved swifu)' to bring an end to Junl 2004, (Ourilh. WIlf... Confrontation, \\hich was reckoned 10 be consuming about 60 per cent TN.') of all govenunent expenditure, At the eml of 1965 the number of Ilritish u'oops in Borneo had been reduced frOIll a campaign peak of 17,000 to 14,000. B) .\Iarch 1966 the Confrontalion had elTectively ended; a prmisional agreemelll signed in Bangkok on I June \\'as ratilied in Djakarta on II Augusl 1966. 11l(' Indonesians senl a miliL'U) mission to the Mala\'Sian capiml. Kuala Lumpur. headed b) Col Moerdani -the paratroop officen\ho had been sp.'lred b\ SAS Sgt 'Loft,' L'lrge during a Claret operation. The Confrontat.ion had COSI the Commonwealth milita'l and ci\ilian scnices 150 dead. 234 1\"Ollnded and 'I captured; ofthis tOlal the British 41 suffered 19 killed and 44 wounded, and the Gurkhas. wbo bad borne the brunt of the Claret raids, '10 killed and 83 wounded. The Indonesians suffered 590 dead, 222 wounded and 771 captured. TIle British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, Defence Minister Dennis I-lealey and Cens Walter Walker and George Lea had ensured that this undeclared war remained a 'low illlensit) opclOltion' -the Indonesians AI Gunong T.pollhe FOO, 1I FOil were kept under pressure, but never publicly provoked or humiliated in RA, wa. abl. to can down a wa) that might ha\'e escalated or prolonged the war. artill.ry "~ fl"Oll'l tJ.... 1n.1de S.n1w.k to CO\l., the wtthdnIW.1 •• • of Capt M._II" G...... ",.•. In Vietnam the US forces were facing a far stronger and more '"'- _~ two 105mm pack committed enem) and. in their rear areas, highly organized guerrillas. howftll... at C Coy. main tJ... On a heavily populated battlefield their massive firepower caused c:IImp at $erikln, a~ a ·/fmll.. to the _.t, and • single S.atn heav} ci\;lian casualties, ,,;th inC\;table consequences. The British and ~lahw5ia wen~ IJIIn at Peli"", about twice a. Commonwealth troops deplo'ed to spared a comparable fa' ~h·_.t. This photo shoWs ordeal. Infant!"} warfare deep in the Borneo jungle was terriblv _ of the tullsn-dnlQned punishing: the death of close comrades is as shocking" painful for 010 M Mse t DSmm pack soldiers whether the total casualtie amoullI to a few hundred or tens howitz of F Tp, 178 Sty RA of thousands, and as dC\'aSt.."lting for their families al home.~ IlowC\"er, .t , ...n prac:t~ In a f_ani position In Sanwak dl.lrlng the Confrontation ""as veT) largel) a soldiers' war, and rel;ttionships 1""; note the white sq-..o with the local populations were usualh easy-going. For man} British, reeognitlon eigne on the front Australian and Ne\\ Zealand \eterans there were some happier and back 01 the crew" j ...ngle memories of the Confront.."ltion: the, recall the beer, the girls and h.ta. Royal Artlllef'y e+ementa deployed d...rtng tlte campaign the songs. _ all or MNne b.tterietl of The beer was Carlsberg from Denmark. locally produced Anchor. the follO¥ring ,..1_... 4, e, or Tiger - an excellent lager brewed in Singapore. TIle girls were 40 • 4S Light; 2llI • ,S pan of the exotic Oriental nightlife et'U0)cd by soldiers who had been Commando L.l9h1; 12, 18 • 22 amassing pay while sel"\;ng on the border. For some young soldiers, Light AI, Defenc.; 20 Medl...m; 1M L.oc:atlng; pi.... L.oc:allng Tp, however, encounters \\'ith the seductive channs of the hoilau of Bugis 3 RHA, .nd Air OP Tp, 4' Field Street. Singapore, taughl them that \\hile extemal appearances could Ragim.nt. (IWM FES 84/243131 be delightful, closer acquaintance re\'ealed some startling surprises. The songs were tile pop hilS of the earl) I960s, among them a number by the British group The Animals which \\'as sling by the soldiers with ironic gusto: 'IWVf golfO gtl mil of this fllar/', if it'~ th,. I{I.~I thing Wi' roer do... ' Within a couple of years. about 1.000 miles to lhe north across the Somh China Sea, US se....;cemen would be singing the same chonlS with similar enthusiasm as the sign-off Ilumber to USO shows in the jungles ofVietnam. 3 ~...-..c.-"'0I0I< qI 42 COo AM, 1<-.:1110" .. 1M c:orAct. _.~frwldqlIM_q1 _ _ .. IIft.~briOIqI~_ 42 • .,.... carrying 1M chilli ..__ THE PLATES AddilJonai material by Nick van dar 8l~ A1: TNKU officer, North Borneo, December 1962 The Tenun NasionaJ Kalimantan Utara produced a hon"le made oolorm WIth rudimentary 1OSignla. ThIs figure is based on a khaki stwt '" the RM Museum; a second IS green, beanog onty the chest patch, "TNKU' shoulder titles, and broad dark green outer loops on the shoulder strapS. A blue example captured by 1 GJ, said to be that of the 'Blue Platoon' based at Lawas in 5arawak. bears plam white shoulder strap loops but alr the other iOSlgnla ~Iustrated here. including the right sleeve patch; this shows a yellow sun above three slars between the horns of a black buffalo head, on a white background. Despite the obvious effort to establish the TNKU on 'regular' lines With ranks and insignia. some members wore civilian shorts Of' saroogs and '!lIp-flop' sandals, and there was no specific headdress. Many carried the 12·bore shotguns which were widely used for hunting. bul with single-slug cartridges for combat. A2: Sergeant, Indonesian Air Force paratroops (PGT), 1964 Indooesls's original airbome unit - tracing thelr hneage to a SaladIn. of the Queen's Royallrtsh Hu...,.. pause while on handful 01 anti·Dutch guerrillas who jumped inlo Kalimantan patrol durtng the Brunei revolt, December 11M2; the ome.... in October 1949 - the PBsukan Gerak TJfJPlJf or Fast Mobile at left _a,.. the regiment" green and gold 'tent hat' Force saw action in the 1950s-60s against antl-goverrrnent I... Plat' F41. The QRlH took ov... ln OCtober 11M2 .. rebels, belore being commlUed to both airborne and the divisional rec:or>nal...~ regiment 01 17tt1 Our1l.ha Inf seaborne insertions dUl10Q the Conlrontation I'l 1964. By the DIv; In September the following rear they handecI_ to next year the PGT had ltvee battalions, headquartered at "th Ropt ,..,. R., whose higher fonnaUon _ then Bandung; the force was latef redesignated KOPASGAT, and OeaIgnated 17th Brtttsh 0iYlskHl. (1WM FESle2J2e2l72) finafty PASHKAS - M Fon::e SpeaaJ Fon:es - I'l 1983. Photos taken dunng the 19605 show ItlIS on&-Pl8C8 camouflage encountered (see under Plate H 1). In order to 'ncrease the overall based on the US Ml942 jungle SUIt WIth 1000extemal renable qUlCk·reactJon elements available 10 the O)akarta pockets. The squashed-1ooIung field cap I'l drab hermgbone goverrment. in 1961 lour pICked units from the Ihr8e infantry twiI seems to have been convnon (the orange beret of regments based in Java had been QlYerI airborne tTainIng. KOPASGAT was not yet used). The tnSIgnIa worn here on including 328 & 330 Para-Aalder 80s. fTOm the KoJang Aegt barracks dress were not displayed In the field: the AK Force of the Sitiwongl 0MsI0n. Special Fon:es left shoulder patch (inset A'll, the PGT title in black on yellow on the right breast, and yellow metal Air Bl: PrIvate, A Company, 1st Battalion Queen's Force parachute wings on the lelt. Rank was Dutch style, Own Highlanders; Seria airfield, BruneI, worn on should6f' strap slides. In the field, webbing December 1962 equipment was of US M1956 pattern. and the standard Men of A Coy deplaned from two TWin Pioneer Blrcraft to personal weapon was the 7.62mm NATO FN-FAl rille. seize sana airfield after Just one hour's traIning in rapid A3: NCO, 328 Para-Raider Battalion, Indonesian disembarkation at Labuan. This private wears a Mk III helmet Army; Kllng-Kang Mountains, March 1984 with scrim camouflage; for jungle patrols the Jocks would On 7 March 1964 a company of this unit was Intercepted by wear jungle hats With a blue rectangular patch beanng the 2110th GR on Track 6 in the Kllng-Kang range. and much white St Andrew's cross at front and back. His 'olive green' equIpment and intelligence material was captured. including (OG) shirt displays shoulder strap slides WIth embroidered photos upon whtch this figure is based. The fl8kl cap and black titles '001 HIGHlANDERS', and on both sleeves the UflIIOl'TT1 are in the same eamoulIage pattern as that worn by formabon sign of 99 Gurkha Inf Bde - white crossed kukns A2., but the SOlt is two-p.ece and lacks the large thigh on a brown rectangle. Issue OG trousers, WIth • map pocket pockets. Webblng compnses a US M1956 pIStol belt and on !he outslde of the left thigh, are confined I'l btancoed 37 suspenders, WIth double clip pouches for hts M1 carbne Pattern anklets. O\Ief polished ammunItiOn boots. His newly and holstered Colt M1911A1 -the lattef being the orty sign If'ItlOduced 58 Pin CEFO (Combat Equipment FIQhtlng ~ of his NCO status. The US M3 'grease gun' SMG was also comprises belt, yoke (suspenders), two 'Bfen' pouches and earned by this unit. There wen:'! sevn versions of the Ratder a water bottle camet; a Wortd War II YI'ltage 171'l CoIins right sleeve patch: the example shown (inset A5t Is believed machete in a IIghI brown leather scabbard IS sUlg behn:I to be contemporary. twa hlp. HIs weapon is the 7.62mm semt-automatIC l1Al These Amry awbome .nfantry urms should not be confused Sl.R (self loading nfle) which had just become standard I'l WIth the Para-eommanoo Aegt (RPKAOI, which was also the BntJsh Army: weighmg 9'hlb, It had a detachable 43 2Q-round magazine. British infantry rifle training reqUired fOf the integral aluminium mug, whICh could be heated for a (and stiM does) accurate shootIng at 300 yards. ('o\flth thanks quick 'brew' rather lhan bothering with messtms. The to LtCol Charles McHardy fOf his assrstance.) AustTalian machete, IOtnxtuced in 1944, resembled the US B2: Marine, 42 Commando, Royal Marines; type. The 'Iarge pack' is that used by lhe BntlSh Army Sll"lCe Brunei, winter 1962/63 1908. The 9mm Owen SMG, modified in the 19505 WIth Btl Nos.40 and 42 Commandos served throughout the added sbdll'lg plate over the rear of the teCeMll", was by now Confrontabon. l Company, 42 Cdo RM recovered the more often blackened !han camoufIage-painted: the box hostageS at Umbang: the company was com-nanded by magazJ08 hekl 33 rounds. and rate of lira was a rnpd capt John Jeremy Moate, who had already won his first Me 700rpm. He I5IakJog from Its M7 'bandoleer' a US Ml8A1 II'l the Malayan Emergency, and who would become more Claymore command-detonated dir8ctlonaf BtlIi-PfWSOMeI WIdely known Ifl 1982 as commander of Bnttsh land fon;es m.ne; this prqected 900 ball beanngs 0Vf!Jt an arc of 60'", W1ttl Ifl the Falklands campargn. lethal effect out to 250 yards. ThIs Manne on a local patrol has folded hiS green C2: Guardsman, 1st Battalion ScotI Guards; Commando beret forward IIltO a cap shape to sI'veId hIS boat patrol, Sabah, 1964 eyes He wears the OG shIrt and 'trousers drill green' with a ThIs rlQURt is a composite of two membeB of suctl a patrol. pair of the newly issued catf-1engtt1 green canvas jungle He wears a bulky, awkwarn kapok life jacket, and 44 PIn bell boots, with charcoal-coloured rubber soles and rein order, over hiS OG shirt and trousers. He has cut down the forcement. With light 58 PIn patrol order he wears an old 37 brim of his Jungle hat: and, unusually, he wears 37 PIn PIn mapcase. the flap lifted to show the acetate wil'ldow anklets over his jungle boots, presumably 10 prevent covenng the map folded to the area of an operation. The undergrowth snagging the laces - lhey would not be 9mm L2A3 Sterling sub-machine gun was a practical effective protection against leeches. His weapon Is the US weapon for close range contacts in wooded terraIn, M79 40mm grenade launcher, called the 'elephant gun' by weighing under 61b empty and having a 550l'pm rate of fire. Bfltlsh troops. This fired HE. smoke and illumination rounds; B3: Rifleman, 1st Battalion Green Jackets; Mirl, against area targets HE was effective 10 350 yards and for North Borneo, winter 1962/63 point targets to 150 yards. ThIS was the correct designation at this date, when - since C3: Radio operator, 1st Battalion Royal Ulster 1958 - the fOl'Tll8l" Oxfordshire & Bucklnghamshinl Ughl Rifles; Sarawak, July 1964 Infantry (43rd & 52nd) formed the senlOf battalion of the This radioman operatlOQ the standard A41 VHF platoon set Green Jackets Brigade, alongside lhe former King's Royal may be on hrs first JUIlOIe operaliOl'l; he has made the Rifle Corps (60th) and the Alfie Brigade (95th). On 1 January mIStake of SlOpping off his stwt. The 'floppy' Jungle hat bears 1966 these .....Its would be amalgamated 10 10flTI a 'large his battalion's black band WIth a green shamrock Sl9" at the regltl"l8l"lt' as lSI, 2nd & 3rd Bns The Royal Green Jackets. In front, suctl SlgllS - usually SImple bands Of shapes Ifl solid 1962/63 1st Bn was commanded by UCol 'Todd' Sweeney. light colours - were used by many unrts for instant who had led a platoon on D-Day when 0 Coy, 2nd Bn Ox & recognItlOfl during fleeting jungle contacts. HiS 1r'COSefS, Bucks U seIZed the River Orne bndges on the left ftank of lungle boots and partial 44 PIn belt Older would be the Normandy beachhead. conventional, but as a radio operatOf he camel a SlerIing This nfleman, about 10 board a hellcopler fOf Btl operatJon, SMG Instead 01 a rifle. The A41 set, welghlng 48Ib WIth ItS wears standard OG shirt and IrOUSer'S WIth Jungle boots, and spare battery and full ancilaries, IS camecI on the multi his brigade's nfIe-green beret wrth SIlver badge. He has the purpose alumInium tubular 'general service canier', ighter full rl8ld krt fOf an extended operation: 58 PIn webbing, with than lhat designed specrl'1Cal1y fOf use With the A41 III a gro!Msheet in a poncho roll and a skatn of heavy COfCl Europe. He is USIng a plastic SJiOex SIgnal encryption wallet attached benealh Ihe 'kydney pouches', a machete on his With a clear front. ThIs system used vanable grids of alpha hlp, and over all a 44 PIn haversack with a 'pick, Jightweight' numeric codes, written in pencil on celluloid slops, to in the shov~ retaining straps. This pack was shorter and encrypt important messages such as map refereoces. omer3 easier to wear with the crowded 58 PIn rear belt order than and Intelligence reports. the field pack of that set, which was almost Invariably left on unit transport or In barracks. 01: Trooper, 0 Squadron, 22nd Special Air Service Regiment; Sarawak, 1963 C1: NCO, 3rd Battalion Royal Australian When the Brunei revolt broke out in December t 962 the Regiment; Sarawak, June 1965 Mure role of the SAS was under debate - was il to be The uniform of the Australian Infantryman was the 'jungle dedicated to NATO in Europe, or 10 prepare fOf global greens' Introduced for aU arms io 1958: the ju"9le hat was of miSSIOnS? The outbreak of the revolt saw 0 Sqn deployed the Bntlsh pattem. If lhey were ever dISplayed on lanyards. rapidly, and during the Confrontation thefe was always at 3 RAR's identifying coIoU" was rifle-green, and 4 RAR's least one BntlSh, Austraban Of New Zealand SAS squadron scar1et. CharactenstlC8lly Australian ilems are the high, two in Borneo. ThIS troopef is depIcled al a Ilm8 when they wtlAl buckle IeggU"IQS of blackened webbing: the 'boots AB' of providing a 'tnpwwe' and ptJfSI.Jrig a 'hearts and minds' 'NorId WfM UVIntage, though now blackened: and the long programme 10 the villages along the Indonesian bofder. It net veil of ovaJ-weave mesh. The webbing is basically Bntish was to be another year before the SAS began to develop 37 Pm, modified fOf jungle use Iale 10 Wand War II, although thetr dress and equipment by ImprovisatJOO and some 44 PIn Items were also made available. The 37 Pm 8CqU1S1tlOl'l5, and apart from the eut-down )uOQIe hat this shoulder bnIces were WIdened to spread wetght. The basic trooper wears arnost entlreIy standard clottwng and webbing 44 pouctIes are W'OlTl, WIth Bnttsh 44 Pm water bottles, popular order. One difference is the belt fashloned from an 81( resupply stowage strap with a roller buckle: another is the backpack habitually carried - the 1944 Bergen rucksack. The LMG is the 7.62mm L4A5, rebarrelled from the old .3031n 8fen, and stili known by that name to most soldiers. Its 500rpm rate of fire was unimpressive, but it was lighter and shorter than the GPMG, and its 3O-round magazine aVOIded the problem 01 linked ammunitIOn fouling in dIrt or vegetabon. We have chosen to show one modlfl8d With a forward pIStol gnp - apparently from an Owen gun - by a unit armourer (although the source photo Il'l fact shows 1tlts canied by a Gur1 ~IIIUln '" bold .d~, ". ,ll.... .-~".~". ..m'd.' boo 119l>5-6'l1 11_15 S....w-.k i, 111. 17. 19, ~,. 3-l. 'I.'i In,I<>n-nl." CommllnlS' 1'••" {PI'll II ",,-, {'>pr< ..l I,. <,.,,,,,,rl ~lll, I'. U \tId.....!. e,,,, Ilol~n ~~ Indo"....an for"..... i. 11 CJ4," Oprn'~>I" ~ ~ The 'Confrontation' between Malaysia and Indonesia in Borneo - the war against Indonesian raids across a 900-mile border - eventually involved nearly 20,000 British and Commonwealth troops, with air and naval support; and yet, by mutual consent, astonishingly little was reported at the time. This 'secret war' saw the perfection of SAS jungle tactics; and audadous secret missions deep inside enemy territory, including the award to a Gurkha soldier of the British Army's only 'living VC' for 40 years. This book wiU reveal the experiences of the soldiers who survived and succeeded amidst some of the Unnvalled detail Photographs world's worst jungle terrain. ISBN 1-84603-048-X OSPREY PUBLISHING 9Il~IIU~111 www.ospreypublishing.comMalayan Emergency of the 19505, When tllese ol1icers and men deployed commllndlng ttt Q~n" Own to lhe Far Easl they came as formed batl