• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text

UC Berkeley UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Urban-bias and the Roots of Political Instability: The case for the strategic importance of the rural periphery in sub-Saharan Africa Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/3q6104zr Author Rabinowitz, Beth Sharon Publication Date 2013 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California Urban-bias and the Roots of Political Instablity: The case for the strategic importance of the rural periphery in sub-Saharan Africa By Beth Sharon Rabinowitz A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science in the Graduate Division of the University of California, Berkeley Committee in Charge: Professor Steven K. Vogel, Chair Professor Michael Watts Professor Robert Price Professor Catherine Boone Fall 2013 COPYRIGHT Abstract Urban-bias and the Roots of Political Instablity: The case for the strategic importance of the rural periphery in sub-Saharan Africa By Beth Sharon Rabinowitz Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science University of California, Berkeley Professor Steven K. Vogel, Chair Urban-bias and the Roots of Political Instability: the case for the strategic importance of the rural periphery in sub-Saharan Africa seeks to unravel a conundrum in African politics. Since the 1980s, we have witnessed two contradictory trends: on the one hand, coups, which have become rare events world-wide, have continued to proliferate in the region; concurrently, several African countries – such as Ghana, Uganda, Burkina Faso and Benin – have managed to escape from seemingly insurmountable coup-traps. What explains this divergence? To address these contradictory trends, I focus initially on Ghana and Cote d‟Ivoire, neighboring states, with comparable populations, topographies, and economies that have experienced contrasting trajectories. While Ghana suffered five consecutive coups from the 1966 to 1981, Cote d‟Ivoire was an oasis of stability and prosperity. However, by the end of the 20th century, Ghana had emerged as one of the few stable two-party democracies on the continent, as Cote d‟Ivoire slid into civil war. Why was Cote d‟Ivoire so much more stable and prosperous than Ghana in the „60s and „70s? And what explains their dramatic reversal of fortunes? I answer these puzzles by examining the political strategies of regimes in both countries, with a particular focus on rural alliances. I find that the leaders who followed a rural political strategy were better able to preserve stability, while those who followed an urban political strategy were more likely to suffer coups. In contrast to the prevalent urban-bias thesis, I contend that traditional elites and producers in rural areas – not the organized urban sectors – are most critical to political stability. To show the wider applicability of my thesis, I extend my argument beyond these two countries. In a systematic review of fifty-eight regimes over eighteen sub-Saharan countries, I demonstrate that the rural/urban dichotomy is pervasive and predictive of the success/failure of regimes. Using formal modeling, I show a strong and robust correlation between supporting rural areas and the likelihood of being ousted in a coup as well as longevity in power 1 DEDICATION This dissertation is dedicated to my mother, Dr. Barbara Cowen, without whose continual support and love it would not have been realized. i TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction Chapter One: Urban Bias and the Roots of Political Instability: Theory and Method Part I. Reversal of Fortune: Ghana and Côte d‟Ivoire Compared Chapter Two: Kwame Nkrumah: An Urban Strategy Unravels Chapter Three: Felix Houphouët-Boigny: A Rural Strategy Builds a Nation Chapter Four: John Jerry Rawlings: How Ending Urban-Bias Revived the State Chapter Five: Henri Konan Bédié: Ivoirité and the Loss of the Rural Periphery Part II. Testing the Model: The Quantitative Study Chapter Six: Successful and Unsuccessful Regimes in Historical Perspective Chapter Seven: Why Rural Strategies? Conclusion Bibliography APPENDICES: Appendix I: List of Regimes by Rural Political Score Appendix 1I: Key to Coding of Rural Scores Appendix III: Regimes Coded ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS So many people have helped this dissertation come to fruition. First and foremost, my committee, Steven K. Vogel, Robert Price, Michael Watts and Catherine Boone, who stayed with me throughout. I want to especially thank Catherine Boone, not only for taking on this project, despite its being outside of her own department, but also for being such an indispensible guide and role model. Cathy‟s willingness to read every article and draft and her trenchant feedback helped ensure that my work was rigorous and careful. I also want to thank Steve Vogel who believed in my from the first and was willing to take on this project though it was far from his own area of expertise. His sage advice, insightful critics of my writing and general support made the completion of this dissertation possible. There were also a countless people who offered me feedback or help along the way, including Beverly Crawford, Robin Turner, Lauren MacClean, Laura Stoker, Sean Gailmard, Michael Cohen, Claude Salem, Martha Saavedra, Jordanna Malton, Nicolas van de Walle, Ralph Austin, Carl Levan, and Rachel Beatty Riedl. I want to further thank the people in Ghana and Abidjan, who offered me hospitality and help ‒ even when they stridently disagreed with the claims of my project. Those to whom I am particularly indebted are, in Ghana: Elvis Kosi, Esther Ewool, Hayford Kofi, Honorable Alidu Addrisu, Isaac Epaaennir, Desmond Neketia and Josiah Okyere; and in Côte d‟Ivoire: Claude Médard Gombleu Kouadi, Aboudoulaye Touré, Lanciné Gon Coulibaly, Tiho Tagouelbe, Bazin Yao, Joachim Boguhe and above all the Elleingand family, Eric, Grace, Edgar and Noa, who offered me a home away from home. Lastly, I want to thank Roman and my mother whose willingness to bear with me during trying times and help me through difficult obstacles kept me going. iii INTRODUCTION In the 1970s, Côte d‟Ivoire and Ghana, neighboring states with similar populations, economies and geographies, represented opposite poles among the newly independent nations of sub-Saharan Africa. Côte d‟Ivoire‟s rapid development was singular ‒ so singular that it was dubbed the „Ivorian miracle‟. In contrast, Ghana, once the most prosperous territory in Colonial West Africa, had become one of the poorest nations in the region and was spiraling into a seemingly unending succession of coups. However, fast-forward three more decades and the two countries had exchanged places. By the turn of the 21st century the Ivorian miracle had come to a violent and unexpected end, the country suffering its first coup after forty years of political stability. Ghana, on the other hand, had become the poster-child for democratic governance in sub-Saharan Africa. Why did these two countries reverse their fates? The reversal of fortunes of these two countries is, in fact, emblematic of wider trends on the continent. Therefore, a study of the Côte d‟Ivoire‟s slide from stability to instability and Ghana‟s successful climb out of instability can help shed light on how states more broadly achieve political stability in Africa. Speaking in the broadest terms, Africanists have developed fruitful schemas for analyzing the failures of post-independence Africa, but have been less successful in critically assessing its successes. For example, great strides have been made in explaining how dysfunctional governance systems are perpetuated in sub-Saharan Africa. Bates (2008) examines how inherited colonial institutions have enabled African leaders‟ to create „control regimes‟ that undermine the productive capacity of the state, enabling leaders to privilege the few at the expense of the many. Leonard and Strauss (2003) analyze how the region‟s high dependence upon geographically circumscribed resources („enclave economies‟) and/or international aid undermines governments‟ responsiveness and states‟ productivity. A variant of this line of reasoning is provided by Riddell who argues that it is not the ease of receiving aid but rather the inadequate and irrational distribution of aid on the part of international donors that has undermined the ability of governments to develop their own capacity and stabilize their economies. Perhaps, the most prevalent generalization made about African politics is that the region suffers from patrimonial systems of rule which legitimize the use of public resources for patronage, undermining the institutional order and economic development (Jackson & Rosberg 1984, 1985; Bayart 1989; Chabal & Daloz 1999; van de Walle 2001). The problem is that none of these analyses help us understand why some states (such as Ghana), though they share all of these afflictions, have been able stabilize after prolonged periods of political volatility, while others, like Côte d‟Ivoire, spiral out of control despite having been stable for decades. Yet these types of dramatic changes occur frequently. Mali alone is emblematic of the dissonant trends on the continent. From 1960 to 1991, Mali experienced two coups and was subject to military rule. In 1991, its military rule finally ended as Mali‟s first democratically elected President took office. But in 2012, Mali‟s thirty-year democracy was violently ended with a military coup. Ever since, Mali has been on a path towards increasing political instability. Unfortunately, the dominant paradigms in African politics are too static to explain such transformations. What is missing, therefore, is a more nuanced account of the incentive structures that might lead a head of state to develop better or worse state-building strategies. Today, however, we have a unique opportunity. Since the 1980s, there have been a handful of states that have rebuilt out of the ashes of failed regimes: Uganda, Ghana, Benin and - 1 - Burkina Faso. Moreover, they have done so in a similar way. All of these countries have extricated themselves from what is termed a „coup-trap‟.

Load more

  240

Copy Link