University of Bradford Ethesis
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Distorted Security Discourses. The ROK’s Securitisation of the Korean Nuclear Crisis, 2003–2013 Item Type Thesis Authors Yoon, Seongwon Rights <a rel="license" href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ by-nc-nd/3.0/"><img alt="Creative Commons License" style="border-width:0" src="http://i.creativecommons.org/l/by- nc-nd/3.0/88x31.png" /></a><br />The University of Bradford theses are licenced under a <a rel="license" href="http:// creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/">Creative Commons Licence</a>. Download date 30/09/2021 17:27:55 Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10454/15865 University of Bradford eThesis This thesis is hosted in Bradford Scholars – The University of Bradford Open Access repository. Visit the repository for full metadata or to contact the repository team © University of Bradford. This work is licenced for reuse under a Creative Commons Licence. Distorted Security Discourses The ROK’s Securitisation of the Korean Nuclear Crisis, 2003–2013 Seongwon YOON Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Faculty of Social Sciences University of Bradford 2016 Abstract Seongwon Yoon Distorted Security Discourses The ROK’s Securitisation of the Korean Nuclear Crisis, 2003–2013 Keywords: securitisation, security discourse, discursive chasms, North Korea’s nuclear threat, South Korea, Roh Moo-Hyun, Lee Myung-Bak South Korea’s security discourse on the nuclear threat posed by North Korea has been dichotomised by its position within the political spectrum between the progressives and conservatives. By drawing upon Securitisation Theory (ST), this study challenges the current security discourse in South Korea, which has divided and misled the public as well as securitising actors. This study examines the security discourses of the Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008) and Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) administrations, since they represent the archetypes of the progressives and conservatives respectively. The results of the analysis suggest that the current security discourses that have been prevalent in South Korea do not correspond with reality and, subsequently, the discourses were not able to deal with real challenges that the nuclear threat posed. This research also explains the root cause of the distorted security discourses by applying a ‘discursive chasm’ as a preliminary concept, which indicates a discursive structure that fundamentally impedes the performance of securitising actors’ articulation, and that distorts the discursive formation (securitisation processes). The chasms consist of three elusive discourses: first, a discourse on threats that cannot simply be said to be either imminent or not imminent (nuclear weapons as materiality and discourse); second, a discourse on the other that cannot easily be defined (the difficulty of representation of North Korea); and third, a discourse on measures that cannot easily be realised (intangible extraordinary measures). i Acknowledgements The work on this thesis started in 2009 when I was accredited to the Ministry of Unification and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of South Korea. I wrote articles in relation to North Korea’s nuclear issues almost every day for over three years and, in general, the articles were based upon daily briefings, formal interviews, informal meetings with government officials, and so forth. It was invaluable in that not only could I access policymakers in a relatively easy fashion on a daily basis, but I could witness how the government’s wording was made and how influential its message was when the public received it. In that sense, this thesis has been a journey to reconstruct a security discourse of South Korea from fragmentary messages and wordings. It has also been an academically joyous journey in that although the initial motivation of this research emanated from the issues of the Korean peninsula and East Asia, it has benefited from modern Western ideas and thoughts relevant to security studies. This journey could not have been possible without the cordiality of many people. Firstly, Prof. Christoph Bluth and Prof. Owen Greene, my supervisors, deserve a great deal of thanks for providing me with guidance and support. Besides my supervisors, this page would be incomplete without a mention of my thesis committee: Dr John Nilsson-Wright, Dr Simon Whitby and Dr Bryan McIntosh. I also would like to express my sincere gratitude to my interviewees. Had they not openly shared their experiences and insights, there would not be a thesis. However, since many of the interviews were carried out on condition of anonymity, I will refrain from mentioning their names. Special thanks goes to the British International Studies Association, which assisted me with the final write up cost. My sincere thanks also goes to the Daily NK, which is one of the most important online newspapers focusing on North Korea, as it provided me with an opportunity to join their team while I was in South Korea for my field research. I want to thank Prof. Kang Sung-Hack at the Korea University, Dr Cheong Seong- Chang at the Sejong Institute and Dr Neil Winn at the University of Leeds, all of whom gave me the chance to explore my further academic journey in the UK. Special thanks too to my parents, sister and to my wife, Sang Hee, for providing me with tireless support and prayers. ii Table of Contents Abstract .............................................................................................................. i Acknowledgements .......................................................................................... ii Table of Contents ............................................................................................. iii List of Figures .................................................................................................. vi List of Tables ................................................................................................... vii Abbreviations ................................................................................................. viii PART I. Conceptualising Security Discourse ................................................. 1 1. Introduction ................................................................................................... 2 1.1 Does today’s discourse reflect reality? ............................................................................... 2 1.1.1 Today’s security discourse .......................................................................................... 2 1.1.2 The purpose and scope of the thesis .......................................................................... 5 1.2 Conceptual framework: securitisation ................................................................................. 7 1.2.1 Why Securitisation Theory and what is it? .................................................................. 7 1.2.2 How does Securitisation Theory work in the ROK context? ..................................... 10 1.3 The research questions and hypotheses .......................................................................... 12 2. Theoretical Concerns: Theories Revisited ............................................... 18 2.1 Historical and conceptual contexts ................................................................................... 19 2.1.1 A brief history ............................................................................................................ 22 2.1.2 Theoretical intricacies: origin, process and solution ................................................. 27 2.2 Theoretical contexts: IR trend and the Korean peninsula ................................................ 31 2.2.1 Realism: a self-contradiction? ................................................................................... 34 2.2.2 Liberalism and Constructivism: more realistic than Realism? ................................... 39 2.2.3 Towards an eclectic paradigm?................................................................................. 48 2.3 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 49 3. Methodological Concerns: Conceptualising Security Discourse ........... 51 3.1 Conceptualising discourse ................................................................................................ 51 3.1.1 Characteristics of discourse ...................................................................................... 51 3.1.2 Methodology for discursive turn ................................................................................ 53 3.2 Conceptualising security discourse .................................................................................. 55 3.2.1 Securitisation Theory and its critics ........................................................................... 56 3.2.2 Securitisation Theory and the ROK: analytical mechanisms .................................... 63 iii 3.3 Compiling methods ........................................................................................................... 71 3.3.1 Methodology for security discourse ........................................................................... 71 3.3.2 Methods for security discourse: corpus-assisted DA ................................................ 72 3.3.3 Methods for security discourse: interpretive/intertextual DA ..................................... 77 3.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 83 PART II. Evaluating