january 2013 . Vol 6 . Issue 1

Contents Tunisia: Signs of Domestic

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Tunisia: Signs of Domestic Radicalization Post-Revolution Radicalization Post-Revolution By Anne Wolf By Anne Wolf

Reports 5 Jordan in the Balance: Evaluating Regime Stability By Sean L. Yom 7 Boko Haram’s International Connections By Jacob Zenn 13 Countering Islamist Radicalization in Germany By Dorle Hellmuth 17 Algerian Foreign Policy in the Context of the Arab Spring By Anouar Boukhars 22 A Profile of Lashkar-i-Jhangvi Leader Malik Ishaq By Daud Khattak

24 Recent Highlights in Terrorist Activity 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

Tunisian Salafists demanding the release of suspects arrested in connection with the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis. - AFP/Getty n a december 2012 interview, it is evident that Tunisia has a domestic Tunisian President Moncef radicalization problem. Tunisian Marzouki publicly admitted nationals were recently involved in a that his government has number of violent incidents in Tunisia Iunderestimated the danger posed by and other countries in the region, with Tunisia’s Salafi-jihadis.1 Since the some having received training abroad, ousting of former President Zine al- such as in the Libyan civil war.2 In late Abidine Ben Ali in 2011, Tunisia has December 2012, Tunisian authorities About the CTC Sentinel witnessed a resurgence of Salafism, even dismantled a terrorist cell linked to The Combating Terrorism Center is an including a violent Salafi-jihadi stream. al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) independent educational and research Although Tunisian authorities blame that was plotting acts of sabotage.3 institution based in the Department of Social the increase in the number of jihadists Sciences at the United States Military Academy, primarily on regional dynamics toward This article details recent violent West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses religious conservatism as well as the incidents in Tunisia and also examines the Center’s global network of scholars and former regime’s suppression of Islamists, the factors behind the radicalization of practitioners to understand and confront some Muslims in the country. contemporary threats posed by terrorism and other forms of political violence. 1 In an interview with The World Today, President Mar- zouki said in reference to the recent Salafist attack on the 2 “Tunisian Islamists Receiving Weapons from Libya,” al- U.S. Embassy in Tunis: “We [the government] didn’t rea- Monitor, February 15, 2012. The views expressed in this report are those of lise how dangerous and violent these Salafists could be.” 3 Thomas Joscelyn, “Tunisian Government Arrests al the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, For details, see Alan Philps, “Moncef Marzouki on Tuni- Qaeda Cell Tied to Ansar al Sharia,” The Long War Journal, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. sia and the Struggles of Drafting a New Constitution,” The December 22, 2012; Monia Ghanmi, “Tunisia Foils al-Qae- World Today 68:11 (2012). da Expansion Plan,” Magharebia, December 24, 2012.

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History of Religiously-Motivated Violence in movement to bring down the Ben Ali of its ambassador. One of the suspects, Tunisia regime by force. Trained by the Salafist Ali Harzi, was released due to lack of Throughout its more recent history, Group for Preaching and Combat evidence in January 2013, although Tunisia has witnessed sporadic (which became AQIM in 2007), the authorities “strongly suspected” his religiously-motivated attacks. On group quickly recruited more members, involvement. He is, however, still facing August 2, 1987, four bombs exploded numbering 40 at its height.11 Yet the charges for membership in a terrorist in four hotels in Sousse and Monastir, government subsequently crushed organization.15 injuring 13 people.4 An extremist the group in the town of Suleiman. cell called Islamic Jihad, which was Religiously-motivated attacks seemed Most recently, on December 21, Tunisian subsequently dissolved, claimed under control from that point forward. authorities uncovered a terrorist cell responsibility.5 On February 17, 1991, affiliated with AQIM, leading to the three Islamists attacked the office of the This changed with Tunisia’s revolution arrests of 16 people, including three government Constitutional Democratic in 2011, which saw a resurgence of Libyans, while an additional 18 other Rally (RCD) party in Bab Souika, religious ultraconservatism, including cell members are still being pursued. leaving one security guard dead.6 Salafi-jihadism. Since the revolution, The members of the group, known as The most prominent attack, however, ultraconservative Muslims have obtained the Militia of Uqba Ibn Nafaa in Tunisia, was on April 11, 2002, when a young arms and clashed with security forces reportedly received training and Tunisian linked to al-Qa`ida bombed throughout the country. In May 2012, weapons in Algeria and Libya.16 They the synagogue in Djerba in Tunisia’s sought to establish a Tunisian branch of south. The attack resulted in the deaths AQIM to overthrow the government by of 21 people, including 14 German “Since the revolution in force.17 tourists, five Tunisians, and two French 2011, ultraconservative citizens.7 Radicalization in Tunisia Muslims have obtained Certain territories in Tunisia have In 2003, as an immediate response to arms and clashed with traditionally been more rebellious the Djerba attack, Ben Ali implemented and religiously conservative than a comprehensive set of anti-terrorism security forces throughout others. Tunisia’s south and interior, laws.8 Religiously-motivated incidents the country.” in particular, have found it difficult to decreased in the subsequent years. Yet deal with the modernization policies in 2006, a small group of five Tunisians launched by the colonial and post- and one Mauritanian, known as the independence governments, whose Soldiers of Asad Bin al-Furhat9 (or the Salafi-jihadis and regular criminals leaders came from more privileged Suleiman Group), entered Tunisia from attacked a police station as well as areas.18 The secular nature of the Habib Algeria with six Kalashnikov rifles and bars selling alcohol in the governorate Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes were several grenades.10 The Suleiman Group of El Kef.12 In June, they firebombed particularly alienating for Tunisia’s aimed to establish a nationwide jihadist several offices of Tunisia’s biggest trade conservative Muslims. Both Bourguiba union, the Union Générale Tunisienne and Ben Ali originated from Tunisia’s du Travail (UGTT). That same month, coastal region, which enjoyed much 4 “7 Italians, 4 Britons Hurt in Tunisian Hotel Blasts,” an attack on an arts exhibition in La higher government spending for Associated Press, August 3, 1987. Marsa killed one, injured 65 policemen development than Tunisia’s interior 5 The members of Islamic Jihad were arrested and faced and led to the arrests of more than 160 and south, resulting in a wide regional the death penalty. See Alison Pargeter, “Radicalisation in people.13 In September, violent Salafist gap in prosperity and modernization.19 Tunisia,” in George Joffe ed., Islamist Radicalisation in mobs took to the streets to protest North Africa: Politics and Process (New York: Routledge, against an American film ridiculing the Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s policies to 2011), p. 79. Prophet Muhammad and stormed the limit the power of traditional religious 6 Michael Willis, Politics and Power in the Maghreb: Al- U.S. Embassy in Tunis and an American establishments also alienated many geria, Tunisia and Morocco from Independence to the Arab school—leaving three dead and causing conservative Muslims. For example, Spring (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2012), p. 168. the U.S. Embassy to recall its unessential shortly after his ascent to power, 7 “Al-Qaeda Claims Tunisia Attack,” BBC, June 23, staff from Tunis.14 2002; “Tunisian President in Djerba to Mark Decade Since Bloody Synagogue Attack,” al-Arabiya, January Moreover, two Tunisian Salafi-jihadis 15 Scott Shane and Tim Arango, “Turkey Detains 2 in 6, 2013. were arrested in October 2012 for their Connection With Killings in Libya,” New York Times, 8 While called “Anti-Terrorism Law on Support of In- alleged involvement in the attack on the October 5, 2012; “Tunisian Suspect in Attack on U.S. ternational Efforts against Terrorism and Money Laun- U.S. Embassy in Libya that led to the death Consulate in Libya Freed,” Associated Press, January 8, dering,” certain aspects of the legislation were violating 2013. Tunisia’s international obligations as they enabled arbi- 16 Joscelyn. trary arrests and the prosecutions of political prisoners. 11 Ibid. 17 Ibid. For details, see “Universal Periodic Review of Tunisia: 12 “Tunisia Salafis Riot to Protest an Arrest,” Associated 18 Alison Pargeter, “Localism and Radicalization in Human Rights Watch’s Submission to the Human Rights Press, May 26, 2012. North Africa: Local Factors and the Development of Council,” Human Rights Watch, April 7, 2008. 13 “Tunisian Salafis Riot over ‘Insulting’ Art,” Reuters, Political Islam in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya,” Interna- 9 Asad Bin al-Furhat was a Tunisian scholar and fighter June 13, 2012. tional Affairs 85:5 (2009): p. 1,039. who led a Muslim army against Sicily in 827. 14 “Tunisia Death Toll Rises to Four in U.S. Embassy At- 19 Alexis Arieff, “Political Transition in Tunisia,” Con- 10 Pargeter, “Radicalisation in Tunisia.” tack,” Reuters, September 15, 2012. gressional Research Service, June 18, 2012. 2 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1

Bourguiba dismantled the Great in the arbitrary imprisonment of While a minority within a minority Zaytouna Mosque and other Islamic hundreds of Islamists, some of whom movement—the number of Salafists institutions with their centuries-old were tortured, further deepened the is generally estimated at 10,000 in traditions of teaching and scholarship. resentment that many conservative a country of about 10.7 million27— His willingness to break with many Muslims held toward the regime.25 Tunisia’s Salafi-jihadis, who are of Tunisia’s Islamic traditions, such prepared to adopt violence to as the fast,20 led many conservative Resurgence of Salafism After the Revolution achieve their goals, have colored the Muslims to retreat further into religion. Yet it was only after the revolution perception of the movement as a whole. Consequently, Tunisia’s society became in 2011 that Tunisia began to suffer Increasingly mixing with jihadists are increasingly polarized between the from frequent small-scale religiously- regular criminals and economically secular elite and the more conservative motivated violence—this being despite the disenchanted people, both of whom broader public. This became particularly fact that the majority of ultraconservative share blame for the recent outbreak of obvious when urbanization exposed Muslims in Tunisia belong to the violent incidents in Tunisia.28 many conservative Muslims to the “scientific Salafists” who reject the use lifestyle of the country’s secularists in The recent resurgence of Salafism the big cities.21 is due to several factors. Most “The increased religious importantly, in 2011 many imprisoned The biggest opposition to the secular liberties in Tunisia’s young leading Salafist militants charged elite was the Islamist movement Jama`a under the former regime, such as Islamiyya (The Islamic Group), renamed democracy have also Sayf Allah bin Hussayn (also known as the Islamic Tendency Movement allowed ultraconservative as Abu Iyadh), were released from in 1981 and then Ennahda in 1989. prison.29 In addition, many exiled Although this Islamist movement was religious scholars from ultraconservative Muslims returned to only loosely connected to violence,22 abroad to come to the Tunisia following the revolution, such enduring regime suppression and as Shaykh Béchir Ben Hassan, a leader persecution contributed to the split of country to spread their within Tunisia’s Salafist landscape some of its members and the creation of beliefs.” who has been active in spreading more violent splinter groups.23 ultraconservative Islam ever since his return to Tunisia. The increased Regime suppression culminated in religious liberties in Tunisia’s 1991, when the Bab Souika affair of violence and focus on preaching a young democracy have also allowed provided the Ben Ali government “pure” version of Islam. Most of the ultraconservative religious scholars with a pretext to crack down on the scientific Salafists are apolitical, but from abroad to come to the country entire Islamist movement. The terms recently some have also decided to join to spread their beliefs. Moreover, “Islamists” and “terrorists” even the political game through the creation enduring economic hardship is an became interchangeable in many of the Salafist Reform Front Party, or important factor playing in the hands respects within regime circles.24 Jabhat al-Islah.26 The ultraconservative of the Salafists. In some regions, such Yet the crackdown on Tunisia’s Hizb-ut-Tahrir party—belonging to the as Tunisia’s southwest, unemployment predominantly moderate Islamists only international organization with the stands at almost 30% while youth benefited the emergence of more radical same name—was also recently licensed unemployment is even higher. This interpretations of Islam in Tunisia— in Tunisia. Similar to the scientific increases resentment toward the although this trend was also due to Salafists, Hizb-ut-Tahrir has endorsed government, which Salafists can regional dynamics toward religious non-violence, although some of its exploit.30 radicalism at the time. Ben Ali’s 2003 leaders have in the past expressed more anti-terrorism laws, which resulted violent rhetoric. Both ultraconservative 27 “Tunisia Detains 86 After Salafi Islamist Riots over groups advocate the establishment of a Art Exhibition,” al-Arabiya, June 12, 2012. 20 Bourguiba famously appeared on television during caliphate, but Jabhat al-Islah favors a 28 Anne Wolf and Raphael Lefevre, “The Demon or the Ramadan drinking a glass of orange juice and asking Tu- gradual national approach to achieve Demonized? Deconstructing ‘Salafism’ in Tunisia,” Open nisians to do the same. this goal, while Hizb-ut-Tahrir Democracy, June 5, 2012. 21 Pargeter, “Localism and Radicalization in North Afri- advocates an international Islamic 29 Abu Iyadh fought in Afghanistan against the United ca: Local Factors and the Development of Political Islam revolution. States before being arrested in Turkey in 2003, from in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya,” p. 1,041. where he was extradited to Tunisia. Having met Usama 22 The 1991 Bab Souika attack was executed by young bin Ladin in 2000 in Kandahar, Abu Iyadh has never members of the Ennahda movement, but attempts to denied his ties to al-Qa`ida, although he never belonged link senior members to the attack or other incidents have to the group. Currently, he is wanted by the Tunisian au- failed. thorities over the September 2012 U.S. Embassy attack in 23 For example, Islamic Jihad, which claimed responsi- Tunis. See Louisa Loveluck, “Planting the Seeds of Tuni- bility for the hotel bombings in 1987, is a breakaway fac- 25 “Universal Periodic Review of Tunisia: Human Rights sia’s Ansar al Sharia,” The Middle East Channel, Foreign tion from the Islamic Tendency Movement. Watch’s Submission to the Human Rights Council.” Policy, September 27, 2012. 24 These details came from the leaked U.S. Embassy ca- 26 For details, see Anne Wolf, “New Salafist Party: A 30 “Tunisia Races Economic, Social Challenges Amid bles published by Wikileaks. The cable in question was Threat to Tunisia’s Democratic Transition?” Middle East Historic Transformation,” International Monetary Fund, dated November 29, 2005. Online, August 3, 2012. September 5, 2012.

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There are a number of support facilities to 5,000 Salafists.35 Ansar al-Shari`a Yet Ennahda’s dialogue-seeking that facilitate the spread of Salafism has also organized numerous campaigns approach has led the regime in many in Tunisia. Mosques taken over by against blasphemy and encouraged cases to turn a blind eye to small- ultraconservatives remain important gender segregation.36 Significantly, the scale Salafist violence.41 Only the most establishments to increase their members of the AQIM cell dismantled important Salafist incidents have evoked influence, although the government in December 2012 were all active regime response: following the attack on members of Ansar al-Shari`a, although the La Marsa arts exhibition, Ennahda a direct organizational link between senior members stated that Ben Ali’s “Ennahda senior Ansar al-Shari`a and AQIM cannot yet anti-terrorism laws could be evoked to members have repeatedly be proven.37 deal with such attacks.42 Moreover, the attack on the U.S. Embassy in Tunis stressed that excluding In a climate of regional turmoil and resulted in the imprisonment of 144 Salafists from society the war in Syria, most of Tunisia’s people, including two senior members Salafi-jihadis are still looking to other of Ansar al-Shari`a.43 While in prison, will only foster further countries to wage jihad, with only small- Salafists engaged in a hunger strike radicalization.” scale organizational establishments that caused the deaths of two members, and incidents on Tunisian ground. including one leader.44 Recently, Syrian authorities revealed a list containing the identities of 108 Such developments only increased has recently managed to retake some foreign jihadist fighters—46 of whom the animosity between Ennahda and of them.31 According to Tunisian were Tunisians.38 This indicates that ultraconservative Muslims, who view government estimates, radical clerics Tunisia’s real challenge still lies Ennahda as an ally of the West and control from 100-500 mosques out of ahead—namely, when such fighters un-Islamic.45 Despite that, Tunisia’s 5,000 in the country.32 Some individual return home, trained and potentially Salafi-jihadis are likely to continue to imams have also encouraged violence armed—increasing the likelihood benefit from Ennahda’s “soft” approach while preaching, such as the imam of for the medium- and long-term that toward their movement. This is all the the prestigious Zaytouna Mosque who Tunisia could become a staging ground more important given that Ennahda is called for the deaths of the artists of the for jihadist action. Tunisia’s south and likely to remain one of the most—if not La Marsa arts exhibition before he was mountainous areas provide a particular the most—important player in Tunisian deposed by the government.33 fertile ground for the creation of violent politics for years to come. cells.39 The Tunisian branch of the jihadist Anne Wolf is a graduate of Cambridge platform Ansar al-Shari`a,34 founded by Conclusion University specializing in North African Abu Iyadh upon his release from prison, The future threat from Tunisia’s Salafi- affairs. She works in Tunisia as a is another important means to organize jihadis depends on the regime’s response journalist, researcher and political risk and direct the Salafist movement. In to religiously-motivated violence. Until analyst. May 2012, Ansar al-Shari`a staged a now, the Ennahda party has stressed mass rally in Kairouan attended by up the need to engage in dialogue with Tunisia’s ultraconservative Muslims, while arguing that any kind of violence 31 In November 2012, Religious Affairs Minister Nourre- will not be tolerated. Ennahda senior dine el-Khadmi stated that approximately 100 mosques members have repeatedly warned that are still controlled by the Salafists as compared to 500 excluding Salafists from society will 40 earlier in the year. For details, see Antoine Lambros- only foster further radicalization. chini, “Tunisia Salafist Chief Calls for Calm, Warns of Explosion,” Agence France-Presse, November 2, 2012. 35 For details, see Fabio Merone and Francesco Cava- 32 Ibid. torta, “The Emergence of Salafism in Tunisia,” Jadaliyya, 33 “Tunisian Artists Call for International Support,” Eu- August 17, 2012. romed Audiovisual, June 19, 2012. 36 Ibid. 41 For example, when a group of Salafists attacked pro- 34 While only loosely interlinked, the Ansar al-Shari`a 37 Joscelyn. testers who expressed solidarity for the owner of Nass- branches in Tunisia and Libya are considered primarily 38 “46 ‘terroristes’ tunisiens arrêtés en Syrie,” Business ma TV, Nabil Karoui, no action was taken against the responsible for the U.S. Embassy attacks in both coun- News, October 21, 2012. attackers. For details, see Roberta Lusardi, “Tunisia’s tries. Less well known is that besides such violent ac- 39 Tunisian authorities have found it difficult to control Islamists: Ennahda and the Salafis,” Middle East Policy tivities, both Ansar al-Shari`a branches are increasingly the large desert areas in the south and the mountainous Council, May 8, 2012. engaged in provisioning social services and organizing regions close to the border. Already the members of the 42 “Tunisia Rioters to be Charged Under Anti-Terror events, such as mass gatherings, campaigns against Suleiman Group used Tunisia’s mountains to establish Law,” al-Arabiya, June 12, 2012. blasphemy and lectures of ultraconservative scholars, camps and to hold weapons training. Most recently, some 43 “Tunisia Jails Salafist Leader in U.S. Embassy Attack although Tunisia’s branch is far more active and geo- suspects linked to the Militia of Uqba Ibn Nafaa managed for One Year,” Reuters, October 24, 2012. graphically spread than Libya’s. For more details, see to escape to Jebel Chambi, Tunisia’s highest mountain. 44 “Tunisia Govt Faces Dilemma over Islamist Hunger Aaron Zelin, “Maqdisi’s Disciples in Libya and Tunisia,” 40 For details, see Erik Churchill and Aaron Zelin, “A Strikes,” al-Arabiya, November 20, 2012. The Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, November 14, Balancing Act: Ennahda’s Struggle with Salafis,” Carn- 45 “Tunisia Jails Salafist Leader in U.S. Embassy Attack 2012. egie Endowment for International Peace, April 19, 2012. for One Year.”

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Jordan in the Balance: Among the first protesters were the habits, and resistance to reform.6 Such powerful Islamist movement headlined practices would have caused regime Evaluating Regime by the Muslim Brotherhood’s Islamic crackdowns in the martial law era, Stability Action Front party, the professional when Abdullah’s father, King Hussein, syndicates and labor unions, and ruled. Today, however, rumors about By Sean L. Yom liberal youth activists like the March royal corruption or jokes about the 24 Group, whose tech-savvy approach king’s poor Arabic are fodder in public protests regularly punctuate public compensated for their lack of civic discussion. Indeed, some protesters life in Jordan, but the national riots manpower.2 By the fall, however, new compare Abdullah with other deposed that exploded in November 2012 over opposition organizations from civil dictators, such as Hosni Mubarak of the rising cost of fuel seemed especially society had coalesced as well. Among Egypt and Mu`ammar Qadhafi of Libya, concerning. Coming after two years them were the National Reform Front, in a poignant reminder to the palace of continuous protests by opposition a coalition of disgruntled political that change must come now.7 groups demanding economic and elites and social entrepreneurs, and political reforms, telltale signs of more surprisingly tribal youth activists Second, although public protests have rebellion—burning tires on highways, in the rural northern and southern long been cherished by Jordan’s urban anti-regime chants in the streets, crowds governorates, who broke from the civil society, palace observers have been attacking police stations—suggested the traditionally loyal stance of their elders surprised at the spread of dissent into onset of revolution in the Hashemite to mount their own rallies for reform. rural East Bank tribal communities long kingdom. assumed to be bastions of monarchical These forces have mounted a significant loyalty. Bedouin and settled tribes Jordan plays a vital geopolitical role campaign of contentious politics— supported the Hashemite family when for the United States and its allies. It demonstrations, marches, occupations, they arrived in the 1920s.8 Yet mass is a peace partner to Israel, provides boycotts, and sit-ins—resulting in more Palestinian migration changed Jordan’s neighboring oil-rich Iraq and Saudi than 7,000 protest events during the demography due to the Arab-Israeli Arabia with a military buffer, and serves past two years.3 For a soft authoritarian wars of 1948 and 1967, rendering the as a natural barrier against Syrian and kingdom that ended martial law in 1989 East Bank tribes a minority. After Iranian interests. There is no question and prides itself on moderation and the 1970 Black September civil war, that regime collapse in Amman would tolerance, such persistent strife has anti-Palestinian bias saturated state unleash strategic volatility. Although been troubling. The U.S. government has institutions and the military.9 In this Jordan’s King Abdullah II has not followed these events with caution, and context, the fact that the youngest reacted masterfully to the past two years initiated significant overtures, such as generation of East Bank Jordanians has of opposition, his autocratic monarchy special visits by high-ranking officials marched to demand reforms reveals will most likely retain power. or more recently the deployment of that economic and political frustrations U.S. troops, to boost the regime’s have boiled over into the regime’s social This article provides context on Jordan’s confidence.4 bedrock.10 current troubles, outlines the factors that have made this crisis particularly Rebellious Signs Third, the reform concessions granted unstable, and finally establishes the Forecasters of revolution argue that by King Abdullah have not satisfied five reasons why the regime will likely today’s atmosphere of opposition breaks opposition constituencies. The palace survive. from conventional protests in Jordan in has executed several classic strategies several ways.5 First, the royal family no of shuffling and liberalization in hopes Background longer enjoys insulation from critique. of appeasing the public. For instance, it The “Jordanian Spring” began in late Despite the threat of arrest due to lèse frequently sacked its prime ministers in December 2010, when a confluence majesté laws and suffocating security of political factors—another hollow statutes, activists have criticized 6 Ethan Bronner, “Jordan Angered by Articles on the parliamentary election, another King Abdullah and Queen Rania for Discontent of Tribes,” New York Times, February 11, 2011. ineffectual prime minister—converged their perceived aloofness, spending 7 Labib Kamhawy, “Jordanians Without Freedom: Fare- upon a public already suffering from well to the Reform State,” al-Quds al-Arabi, August 26, declining employment opportunities 2012. and rising living costs. Drawing 2 Zaina Steityah, “Talk of Reform,” Jordan Business, Au- 8 For more on the colonial origins of tribal support for inspiration from demonstrators in gust 2011. the Hashemite monarchy, see Mary Wilson, King Abdul- Tunisia and Egypt, opposition forces 3 “We Have No Other Choice—Ensour,” Jordan Times, lah, Britain, and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge: Cam- quickly mobilized to launch protests November 15, 2012. bridge University Press, 1987). against a stale autocratic system they 4 Michael Gordon and Elisabeth Bumiller, “U.S. Military 9 The rise of anti-Palestinian nationalism in Jordanian saw as rife with corruption, closed to Is Sent to Jordan to Help with Crisis in Syria,” New York state institutions is charted well in Adnan Abu Odeh, public participation, and commanded Times, October 9, 2012. Jordanians, Palestinians, and the Hashemite Kingdom in the 1 by a recalcitrant kingship. 5 See, for instance, Taylor Luck, “Spiraling Social Vio- Middle East Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Insti- lence Pushing Country into ‘Danger Zone,’” Jordan Times, tute of Peace, 1999). 1 Marwan Muasher, “A Decade of Struggling Reform December 11, 2011; David Schenker, “As Jordan Stum- 10 Sean L. Yom and Wael al-Khatib, “Jordan’s New Poli- Efforts in Jordan: The Resilience of the Rentier System,” bles, the U.S. Response is Crucial,” The Washington In- tics of Tribal Dissent,” The Middle East Channel, Foreign Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2011. stitute for Near East Policy, September 19, 2012. Policy, August 7, 2012.

5 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1 response to popular frustration, with parliament motivates many protesters, monarchical loyalty—a holdover of five having held the premiership since and some analysts might be tempted to its imperial creation by the British, as 2010 alone, and also created new laws fear the worst if the Islamists and other well as early experiences defending the that nominally expanded the boundaries opposition forces follow through with crown during the turbulent era of Arab of political freedom, such as revising their promise to boycott the upcoming nationalism.17 While a robust coercive the constitution.11 Yet oppositionists elections, and then organize more street apparatus alone does not guarantee are seasoned enough to recognize protests to decry the legislative body regime survival, it can make the task that results. of opposition far more difficult, as in “Many public grievances Syria, where a raging civil war costing The boycott remains in full effect. When some 60,000 lives has yet to depose are grounded in economic the Electoral Commission presented the Bashar al-Assad.18 concerns that the cash- final list of the 820 publicly registered candidates running for parliament in Second, the actual number of protesters strapped government late December 2012, absent from it has not reached anywhere close cannot resolve, such as the were the names of Islamists and other to a critical mass. A few thousand familiar opposition faces.15 demonstrators in a capital of two million nearly 25% unemployment is not enough to create a revolution, rate, the removal of Resilience and Survival and most of the protests during the Yet for all these troubles, Jordan is past two years have attracted just a subsidies on fuel and little closer to revolution than prior few hundred participants—most being electricity, and stubborn to the Arab Spring. Five factors eager members of the organizing group, suggest that while social churn and not the average middle-class urban inequality between rich political burn may claim the next few citizen whose preferences have been and poor.” parliaments or appointed governments, the quintessential swing vote in more the authoritarian backbone of the revolutionary Arab countries. What kingdom—the Hashemite monarchy— will remain in power. such shallow reforms.12 Moreover, “Most protests have been many public grievances are grounded First, Jordan’s security forces are loud but not violent. Even in economic concerns that the cash- robustly capable of stamping out any strapped government cannot resolve, opposition that becomes extremely in the November riots, such as the nearly 25% unemployment militant or directly attacks regime only a handful of public rate, the removal of subsidies on fuel institutions. The Interior Ministry and electricity, and stubborn inequality controls not just the civil police, but institutions suffered direct between rich and poor.13 also the darak, or specialized riot police attack.” that have proven far more effective With parliamentary elections scheduled in containing crowds.16 Beyond them for January 23, 2013, these signs point is the army, under direct command to continued turbulence. After all, it of the kingship. Unlike Tunisia and made Egypt’s Tahrir Square bulge with was the November 2010 contest that Egypt, the Jordanian army has deployed opposition was not when longstanding helped spark the Jordanian Spring, violence on domestic soil to protect youth groups and other dissenting as electoral laws are engineered to the palace before; it emerged bloodied organizations mobilized diehard produce conservative and quarreling but victorious during the 1970 civil supporters; they had organized protests parliaments that pose little resistance war, and its tanks restored order when and demonstrations for years, with little to royal fiat.14 Distrust of the palace and more violent fuel price riots erupted effect. The tipping point came when in April 1989 and August 1996. There citizens with no preexisting affiliation 11 Naseem Tarawnah, “Why the Process Matters More,” are no signs the army will refuse to with any opposition group decided to Jordan Business, November 2011. deploy once again if protests rage out join them. 12 “Dallying with Reform in a Divided Jordan,” Interna- of control. The military is a highly tional Crisis Group, March 2012. professionalized force with a powerful Third, most protests have been loud but 13 Stephen Farrell, “Demonstrations Whisper of an Arab institutional culture of hierarchical not violent. Even in the November riots, Spring in Jordan,” New York Times, February 9, 2012. obedience, organizational unity, and only a handful of public institutions 14 Even though the parliament has little legislative abil- suffered direct attack. In more typical ity, electoral laws are still biased against opposition provide patronage in return for votes, and so they have episodes, ardent oppositionists march, forces in two ways. First, electoral districts are heavily more incentive once elected to fight over access to state demonstrate, and shout—but refrain gerrymandered, and mathematically favor rural districts resources rather than broader economic and political is- populated by nominally loyal tribal communities over sues. 17 Robert Satloff, Troubles on the East Bank: Challenges to historically contentious urban neighborhoods where 15 Adam Nickey, “Jordan Gears Up for Parliamentary the Domestic Stability of Jordan (Washington, D.C.: Center the Palestinian-dominated Islamist movement operates. Elections,” Jerusalem Post, December 29, 2012. for Strategic and International Studies, 1986). Second, citizens may cast just one vote in their district, 16 Sean L. Yom, “Jordan’s Stubborn Regime Hangs in 18 “UN Estimates More than 60,000 Have Been Killed even if there are multiple seats. In practice, this privileges the Balance,” The Middle East Channel, Foreign Policy, in Syrian Conflict, Calls Toll ‘Truly Shocking,’” Washing- wealthy, conservative, independent candidates who can March 31, 2011. ton Post, January 2, 2013.

6 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1 from throwing stones, assaulting police Fifth, oppositionists desire different officers, and escalating confrontations types of reform. The most common Boko Haram’s into direct violence. To date, only a demand articulated by opposition International Connections few citizens have been killed due to the groups—seen on placards, published protest wave since December 2010, an on websites, discussed in everyday By Jacob Zenn impressive figure spanning more than discourse—is to end the rampant 7,000 demonstrations, rallies, and corruption linking prominent officials, since carrying out its first attack marches.19 There are two reasons for including elites close to the palace, under Abubakar Shekau’s leadership this. The first is the worsening violence with questionable business investments in September 2010, Boko Haram in Syria. Wary of emulating the conflict and privatization deals.22 Beyond the has unleashed a wave of violence in there on domestic soil, and with many corruption issue, however, is a serious northern Nigeria, mostly targeted sharing close family ties across the divergence of political goals. Islamists against government personnel and border, many Jordanians self-moderate demand an immediate transition to security officers, Muslim politicians when confronting the police at protests, democracy through constitutional and traditional Muslim religious refusing to escalate confrontations into monarchism, whereas tribal activists leaders, and Christians.1 Although the violence.20 The second reason is that desire economic concessions in the insurgency began as a local movement inversely, the regime has deliberately form of jobs and development prior to in northeastern Nigeria’s Borno State, chosen to tolerate opposition activism any large-scale political change. Youth since August 2011 there have been rather than squash it outright, whereas activists desire more transparency and increasing signs of international the use of violence and repression accountability from the government, but collaboration between Boko Haram and has had the effect of radicalizing give few policy suggestions to sustain militants outside Nigerian territory, and hardening dissent in other Arab these generalities while also remaining such as in Borno State’s border region, contexts. wary of the Islamist agenda. northern Mali, the Sahel, Somalia and other countries in the Muslim world. Fourth, there is no coordinated Conclusion As a result of these international nationwide opposition movement. Even The fuel price riots that rocked connections, Boko Haram, which in fragmented Libya, disparate militias November should raise Western in 2009 was known as a “machete- and provincial councils managed to attention, but not because Jordan wielding mob,” has now matched— uneasily cooperate under the aegis of a teeters on the brink of collapse. and even exceeded—the capabilities transitional command during the civil The demonstrations expose two of some al-Qa`ida affiliates, while war against the Qadhafi regime. Yet paradoxical perspectives, namely the also incorporating al-Qa`ida ideology in Jordan, dividing lines have become continuing inability of an autocratic into the locally driven motives for the the regime’s blessing in disguise, as regime to satisfy the reform demands insurgency in northern Nigeria. longstanding mistrust over identity and from below, as well as the continuing religion continue to stymie opposition inability of social opposition to This article examines Boko Haram’s activists. For instance, Palestinian overcome internal differences and international connections and their leaders in the Muslim Brotherhood and confront the regime. The question is impact on the insurgency in northern youth activists from East Bank tribes thus not whether the monarchy will Nigeria. may both despise royal corruption, but maintain power, but rather how it will they will likely never march against the do so—through continued neglect and Boko Haram in Mali regime in any large-scale and unified increased repression, or through the In November 2012, the Movement for way.21 eventual implementation of economic Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)2 and political reform that can gradually and al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb satiate the many sectors of protest in (AQIM) captured Menaka in Mali’s the Hashemite kingdom. Gao region from the secular Tuareg- led militia, the National Movement for Dr. Sean L. Yom is Assistant Professor the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). An MNLA spokesman said that MUJAO, 19 “We Have No Other Choice—Ensour,” Jordan Times, of Political Science at Temple University, AQIM and Boko Haram prevented the November 15, 2012. and specializes in political development 20 In personal interviews conducted in 2011 and 2012, and regime stability in the Middle East. He opposition activists in both Amman and the tribal areas travels regularly to Jordan. 1 Boko Haram’s first attack with Abubakar Shekau as returned a common theme: when asked why they did not leader was on September 7, 2010, when approximately escalate their protests further to extract greater reforms, 50 fighters attacked Bauchi prison and freed more than the most common response was the fear of internal chaos 150 Boko Haram members after promising that they erupting as in neighboring Syria. would not spend Eid al-Fitr behind bars. An additional 21 Identity remains a controversial issue. Given that 500 prisoners were also freed, some of whom are be- Palestinians already constitute nearly two-thirds of the lieved to have then joined Boko Haram. See Sani Muhd populace, longstanding fears by tribal nationalists about Sani, “Attack On Bauchi Prison - Boko Haram Frees 721 Israeli plans to turn Jordan into a “substitute homeland” Inmates,” Leadership, September 8, 2010. for all Palestinians make many East Bankers wary of 22 Bassam al-Badarin, “Elite Digging into the Files of 2 MUJAO was formed as an offshoot of AQIM. MUJAO trusting their Palestinian peers, even when they have a Corruption, and the System Devours Itself,” al-Quds al- focuses on sub-Saharan Africa, but it is still led primarily common cause. Arabi, February 13, 2012. by Malian Arabs.

7 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1 local population from leaving the city Boko Haram militants train in camps in the video, Shekau appealed to al-Qa`ida so that they could be used as human northern Mali and most likely receive by paying homage to “martyred” leaders shields.3 Several sources corroborate financing and explosives from AQIM.8 such as Usama bin Ladin, Abu Yahya the spokesman’s claim that Boko Haram In addition, the U.S. ambassador to al-Libi and Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi. He fighters are present in Mali. Nigeria, Nigerian minister of foreign recited five of the ten suras in the Qur’an affairs, Nigerien foreign minister, that are most commonly quoted by al- First, news reports from Mali said that Malian foreign minister and Algerian 100 Boko Haram militants reinforced minister for Maghreb and African MUJAO’s positions in the battle for Gao affairs report that Boko Haram and “Niger’s vast desert and that Boko Haram helped MUJAO AQIM are coordinating operations in provides an ideal training raid the Algerian consulate in Gao northern Mali.9 and kidnap the vice-consul, who was ground and refuge for executed by MUJAO on September 2, A Boko Haram video released on Boko Haram, while the 2012, and that Boko Haram supported November 29, 2012, suggested that Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau Mandara Mountains along “Military officials from may be one of the Boko Haram militants the Nigeria-Cameroon in northern Mali. The video emerged Niger said that Boko only one month after a Nigerian media border, where state Haram militants are source reported that Nigerian President authority is weak and Goodluck Jonathan discussed Shekau transiting Niger en route to coordinating attacks in northern smuggling is pervasive, Mali on a daily basis.” Nigeria from northern Mali during the provides an ideal supply president’s October 17 visit to Niamey and October 19 visit to Bamako.10 In route, hideout and staging contrast to Shekau’s first five video ground.” MUJAO, AQIM and Ansar Eddine in statements of 2012, the November 29 their January 8, 2013, attack on Kona, video is the first to show Shekau not central Mopti region.4 Second, displaced seated in a room wearing traditional persons from Gao, including a former Islamic dress, but wearing green Qa`ida, and he called the United States, parliamentarian, said that Boko Haram camouflaged military fatigues and the United Kingdom, Nigeria and Israel is training at MUJAO-run camps.5 Third, training in a desert with heavily armed “crusaders” and warned them that military officials from Niger said that and veiled militants. He did not speak “jihad has begun.”12 Boko Haram militants are transiting in Hausa, the predominant language of Niger en route to Mali on a daily basis.6 northern Nigeria, but spoke entirely in Even if Shekau is not in Mali, it is Fourth, a MUJAO commander said in an Arabic, and he praised the “brothers and unlikely that he is still in Nigeria. In interview with a Beninese journalist for shaykhs in the Islamic Maghreb” and contrast to Mali’s and Niger’s vast Radio France Internationale that Boko “soldiers of the Islamic State of Mali.”11 desert regions, where AQIM has Haram members were arriving in Gao The video was also not disseminated via hosted training camps since the mid- en masse.7 Fifth, U.S. Africa Command YouTube like the previous five videos, 2000s that Boko Haram members have General Carter Ham, who in January but posted on a jihadist online forum. In attended, northeastern Nigeria’s desert 2012 said Boko Haram has links to AQIM is not known to have terrorist training and al-Shabab, said in November that 8 Ibid. camps and is not particularly remote 13 9 Joe Brock, “U.S. Still on High Alert for Nigeria Attacks,” or uninhabited. Shekau and the 3 Jemal Oumar, “Touareg Rebels Vow Terror Crack- Reuters, November 22, 2012; “Boko Haram: Why Nigeria, other militants would have also placed down,” Magharebia, November 22, 2012. ECOWAS Will Intervene in Mali - Minister,” The Nation, themselves at unprecedented risk to 4 “Dozens of Boko Haram Help Mali’s Rebel Seize Gao,” November 8, 2012; Laurent Prieur, “Boko Haram Got al train in broad daylight, as seen on the Vanguard, April 9, 2012; “Boko Haram en renfort des is- Qaeda Bomb Training, Niger Says,” Reuters, January 24, lamistes armés dans le nord du Mali,” Radio France In- 2012; Raby Ould Idoumo and Bakari Guèye “Faltering al- 12 Abubakar Shekau, “Glad Tidings, O Soldiers of Al- ternationale, April 10, 2012; “Malian Extremists Execute Qaeda Turns to Boko Haram,” Magharebia, January 27, lah,” November 29, 2012. Two days after appearing on Kidnapped Algerian Diplomat,” Agence France-Presse, 2012. The MNLA also claimed that “Islamist extremist popular jihadist websites, the video was posted to the September 2, 2012; “Africa Facing Sharp Rise in Islamic groups including Ansar Dine, Boko Haram and al Qaeda Ana al-Muslim Network website. The 39-minute video Extremism,” Agence France-Presse, July 6, 2012; Serge have seized control of Timbuktu along with the towns of featured Shekau reciting, among other common suras, at- Daniel, “Bilal Hicham, rebelle du nord du Mali,” Radio Gao and Kidal, and have killed top MNLA leaders there.” Tawbah, Ali Imran. al-Ma’ida, al-Anfal, and al-Haj. See France Internationale, August 4, 2012; “Niger Seeks Joint See “Mali Separatists Ready to Act over Destruction of “How Islamist Extremists Quote the Qur’an,” Arizona Southern Border Patrols to Bar Boko Haram,” Reuters, Tombs,” CNN, July 1, 2012. State University Center for Strategic Communication, October 7, 2012; “Top US Commander in Africa Cautions 10 “Uncovered: Boko Haram Base Traced to Mali - In- July 9, 2012. Against Intervention in Mali Despite al-Qaida Threat,” telligence Report Identifies Training, Operational Base,” 13 In September 2012, a long-time Boko Haram member Associated Press, December 3, 2012; “Mali Troops Fire The Sun, October 27, 2012. and employee in Nigeria’s immigration service confessed Shots at Islamist Fighters,” News24, January 8, 2013. 11 In addition to the November 29, 2012, video, Boko to having trained in assassinations and special opera- 5 Ibid. Haram released Abubakar Shekau’s video statements on tions with 15 other militants, some of whom were Nige- 6 Ibid. January 10, January 26, April 12, August 4 and Septem- rian security officers. See “Nigerian Officials Held for 7 Ibid. ber 30, 2012. ‘Boko Haram Links,’” al-Jazira, September 30, 2012.

8 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1 video, in Nigeria only days after Abuja and therefore attempting to steer Boko leaders are reportedly still hiding in announced a $320,000 reward for Haram’s ideology closer to al-Qa`ida. Diffa, Niger, and Boko Haram cells information leading to Shekau’s capture were uncovered in Zinder, Niger in and lesser rewards for 18 Boko Haram Borno’s Border Region September 2012 and Diffa in December Shura Committee members.14 While some Boko Haram members have 2011 and February 2012.19 Similarly, in come from the parts of Niger, Chad 2012, Boko Haram members have been Boko Haram militants could have joined and Cameroon that border Borno State reported in several primarily Baggara the insurgency in northern Mali in and where the three main languages of Arabic-speaking cities of Far North alliance with MUJAO and AQIM, and Borno—Hausa, Kanuri and Arabic—are Province, Cameroon, including Fotokol, Abubakar Shekau and his commanders spoken, few members are reported to Kousseri, Mora and the border town of may have found refuge in northern Mali have come from outside of those three Banki-Amchide, where on December or Niger to escape the Nigerian security countries or Nigeria.16 According to one 19, 2012, Cameroonian security forces forces crackdown on Boko Haram in of Boko Haram founder Muhammad arrested 31 suspected Boko Haram northeastern Nigeria. The crackdown Yusuf’s relatives, 40% of Boko Haram’s members, including two Nigeriens, and led to the capture or killing of more funding comes from outside of Nigeria, confirmed that a Boko Haram logistics than 10 commanders since September and as many as one-third of its members network facilitates “trans-border 2012, as well as Shekau’s spokesman, fled Nigeria following major clashes operations” and that Boko Haram one of his wives and his daughter.15 with the government in July 2009.17 uses the border area to “regroup after Shekau and other commanders are likely attacks in Nigeria, preparing for the coming into greater contact with AQIM The architect of those clashes was a next attacks.”20 Cameroon’s similar Nigerien, Abubakar Kilakam. While characteristics to Nigeria, such as a 14 It is certain that the video, which was released on No- Kilakam was arrested and deported relatively poor majority Muslim north, vember 29, 2012, was shot after November 25 since the to Niger, several other Nigerien Boko which has seen trade reduced because of prologue of the video offered “many glad tidings on…the Haram leaders are still in Nigeria, Boko Haram attacks on border markets storming of the prison in the Nigerian capital, Abuja and including Ali Jalingo, who masterminded and stricter border monitoring, and a freeing more than 150 mujahidin in response to Nigeria’s bombings in Borno State and escaped an wealthier majority Christian south, also tyrants dedicating a sum of money to anyone who gives attempt to capture him in Benue State make it an ideal recruiting ground for 18 21 information about the shaykh or one of the command- on January 7, 2013. Other Boko Haram the group. ers.” The “storming of the prison” refers to the Novem- ber 25 raid on the Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) 16 One of the lone reported cases of a non-Nigerian mili- In terms of geography, Niger’s vast in Abuja, which was claimed by the Boko Haram faction tant in Nigeria was a Mauritanian who used his shop in desert provides an ideal training ground Ansaru. The “giving information about the shaykh or Kano as a base for an AQIM cell that kidnapped a Ger- and refuge for Boko Haram, while the one of the commanders” refers to the Joint Task Force’s man engineer in January 2012, but there is no evidence Mandara Mountains along the Nigeria- November 24 declaration of “19 most wanted Boko that the kidnappers or the Mauritanian were members Cameroon border, where state authority Haram commanders.” See Yemi Akinsuyi, “Boko Haram of Boko Haram. See Habeeb I. Pindiga et al., “Kidnap of is weak and smuggling is pervasive, Attacks SARS Police HQ, Abuja,” ThisDayLive, Novem- German – Maurita­nian, Four Others Arrested in Kano,” provides an ideal supply route, hideout ber 26, 2012; “JTF Declares 19 Boko Haram Commanders Daily Trust, March 28, 2012. For more details on this inci- and staging ground. The recent upsurge Wanted,” Leadership, November 24, 2012. dent, see Jacob Zenn, “Boko Haram’s Dangerous Expan- in Boko Haram attacks in rural towns at 15 After a November 18, 2012, battle with Nigerian se- sion into Northwest Nigeria,” CTC Sentinel 5:10 (2012). the foothills of the Mandara Mountains curity forces, in which 35 Boko Haram members were On December 29, 2012, Radio Risala in Somalia reported in Adamawa State, where in 2004 killed and one of Shekau’s wives and two children were that “Al-Shabab fighters have entered [Nigeria] to assist Muhammad Yusuf’s followers had their “rescued,” Shekau was believed to have been shot and the Nigerian Islamist fighters,” but this report has not first major battles with the Nigerian died, which the November 29 video has now disproved, been corroborated elsewhere. See “Somalia’s Al-Shabab security forces, support the claims made or been placed “under deep cover abroad.” See “Boko Fighters said Pouring into Nigeria,” Radio Risala, De- by high-level Nigerian and Cameroonian Haram Looks to Mali,” Africa Confidential, November 30, cember 30, 2012. officials that Boko Haram is operating 22 2012. Shekau was also reported to have fled to northern 17 These militants fled after a four-day battle with Nige- from bases in Cameroon. Some of these Cameroon after Boko Haram’s January 20, 2012, attacks rian security forces in northeastern Nigeria in July 2009, in Kano, which killed 186 people. Other Boko Haram in which more than 20 security officers and as many reports and Nigerian analysts say that Ali Jalingo is Ni- commanders are also believed to have sought refuge in as 1,000 Boko Haram members were killed, including gerien. Nigeria placed a $60,000 reward for information Cameroon, including Kabiru Sokoto, who mastermind- founder Muhammad Yusuf. See “Suspects Charged in leading to Ali Jalingo’s capture in November 2012. ed the Christmas Day 2011 bombings in Madalla, Niger Nigeria Bombing,” al-Jazira, December 25, 2011. Some 19 “Niger Police Arrest 5 Suspected Boko Haram Mem- State, which killed more than 30 people. He escaped from of these fighters followed the sermons of Boko Haram bers,” Vanguard, September 27, 2012; “Diffa Traders Hit police custody with the help of Boko Haram supporters founder Muhammad Yusuf or viewed Boko Haram pro- by Border Closure,” IRIN, February 20, 2012. and government collaborators in January 2012, but was paganda CDs and DVDs, which were available in border 20 Eric Kouama, “The Unpredictable Terror of Boko recaptured on February 10 in Mutum Mbiyu, Taraba markets until the Nigerien and Cameroonian authorities Haram,” Radio Netherlands, March 21, 2012; Raoul Guiv- State, which is 300 miles from where Shekau was then enforced a ban on them in early 2012. See “Two Boko anda, “AMCHIDE: 31 membres de Boko Haram livrés au reported to be hiding in Ngaoundere, Cameroon, and Haram Suspects Arrested,” ThisDayLive, February 18, Nigeria,” Cameroon-info.net, December 27, 2012. 100 miles from the Nigeria-Cameroon border. See “Boko 2012. 21 “Boko Haram Threat Harms Cameroon-Nigeria Bor- Haram Escapee Kabiru Sokoto Re-Arrested in Taraba,” 18 “Terror Suspect Escapes Arrest in Benue,” Leadership, der Trade,” Cameroononline.org, December 27, 2012. Sahara Reporters, February 10, 2012; “Why We Did Not January 7, 2013. Jalingo is the capital of Taraba State in 22 Soloman Tembang Mforgham, “Boko Haram Infili- Kill Obasanjo” – Boko Haram Leader,” 247ureports.com, Nigeria. Although it is not uncommon in northern Nige- trates Cameroon,” Africanews, January 11, 2012; “Nigeri- January 23, 2012. ria to assume one’s geographic origin as a surname, news an Troops and Islamic Militants Trade Gunfire in Moun-

9 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1 attacks include: a December 13, 2012, border with Niger. As reports of Boko (umra) in August 2011.27 More recently, burning of a police station in Madagali, Haram in Niger and Cameroon have the leader of a Boko Haram cell that was five miles from the border; a December shown, the border region still serves responsible for the November 25, 2012, 28 night raid on a prison, customs office, similar purposes for Boko Haram as it attack on a church inside a military education administration complex did in 2003. barracks in Jaji, Kaduna, was in Saudi and Divisional Police Headquarters Arabia during the months prior to the in Maiha, three miles from the border, Boko Haram Diplomacy in Saudi Arabia and attack.28 which killed 21 people, and a separate Senegal attack on Fufore, five miles from the Boko Haram appears to have a Boko Haram may also have had “diplomatic” presence in Saudi dialogue with the Nigerian government Arabia, in addition to other militant in Senegal, where in August 2012 the “Boko Haram connections. In August 2012, a Boko imam of the Grand Mosque in Bignona, systematically destroyed Haram faction led by Abu Muhammed southern Senegal, claimed that Boko negotiated in Mecca with a Nigerian Haram was recruiting local youths.29 In hundreds of telecom government team led by National December 2012, Nigerian media reported towers, causing millions Security Adviser Sambo Dasuki that President Jonathan’s adviser and and advised by General Muhammed minister of Niger Delta affairs, Godsday of dollars of damages and Shuwa. President Jonathan has preventing the security rejected new talks with this faction, “Boko Haram’s target however, on the grounds that “there forces from tracking down can be no dialogue” with Boko selection has also its members.” Haram because it is “faceless.”24 Abu been influenced by its Muhammed’s proposed negotiating team included, among others, the interaction with militants Cameroonian Mamman Nur, who lost a abroad.” border; a December 31 attack on the power struggle with Shekau to lead what Divisional Police Headquarters in became the main Boko Haram faction Hong, 25 miles from the border; and a after Muhammad Yusuf’s death in July January 3, 2013, attack involving rocket- 2009.25 Therefore, Abu Muhammed’s Orubebe, held secret negotiations with propelled grenades fired at government claim to represent Shekau’s faction is Boko Haram commanders in Senegal buildings and a police station in Song, likely false, and Shekau’s spokesman arranged by the Malian and Senegalese 20 miles from the border.23 called Abu Muhammed a “fake” in secret services.30 Based on Orubebe’s August 2012.26 credentials as the “author” of the Boko Haram takes advantage of Niger, government’s arms-for-amnesty peace Chad and Cameroon for refuge, Boko Haram also has a deeper history program with Niger Delta militants in training, transit, attack planning and of involvement in Saudi Arabia: 2009, he may have discussed the release recruitment. Boko Haram does not, Muhammad Yusuf found refuge in Saudi of Boko Haram members from prison however, carry out attacks in those Arabia to escape a Nigerian security and “compensation” for the destruction countries, possibly to prevent those forces crackdown in 2004; Boko Haram governments from cracking down on has reportedly received funding with the 27 Monica Mark, “Boko Haram Vows to Fight Until the group and because Boko Haram’s help of AQIM from organizations in the Nigeria Establishes Sharia Law,” Guardian, January 27, grievances are rooted in Nigeria. The United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia; and 2012. Abu Qaqa said, “Al-Qaida are our elder brothers. porosity of the border region is one Boko Haram’s spokesman claimed that During the lesser Hajj [August 2011], our leader traveled reason why the first Boko Haram base Boko Haram leaders met with al-Qa`ida to Saudi Arabia and met al-Qaida there. We enjoy finan- called “Afghanistan” in 2003 was in Saudi Arabia during the lesser hajj cial and technical support from them.” In August 2011, situated only two miles from Nigeria’s Abu Qaqa reported that the spokesman before him, Abu Zaid, was “out of the country.” See Taiwo Adisa, “Boko tains,” Agence France-Presse, September 25, 2004. 24 “Nigeria Not Talking to Boko Haram Islamists, Presi- Haram’s Funding Traced to UK, S/Arabia - Sect Planned 23 “Yola Police Station Razed by Gunmen,” Nigeria dent Says,” Agence France-Presse, November 18, 2012. to Turn Nigeria into Afghanistan - Arrested Kingpin World News, December 13, 2012; “Police Confirm -At 25 Uduma Kalu, “How Nur, Shekau Run Boko Haram,” Opens Up,” Nigerian Tribune, February 13, 2012. This ar- tack on Station in Hong,” Leadership, December 31, 2012; Vanguard, September 3, 2011; Ibrahim Garba, “Nigerian ticle also said, “Sources confirmed that while the organi- “7 Die in Another Day of Boko Haram Terror,” Premium Government Enters Talks with Boko Haram,” Christian sation relied on donations by its members in its earlier Times, January 3, 2013; “Borno State Boils Again: 7 Peo- Science Monitor, August 21, 2012. The fact that Nur is days, its links with Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb ple Killed as JTF and Boko Haram Militants Clash,” Daily believed to have masterminded the UN Headquarters (AQIM) opened it to fundings from groups in Saudi Ara- Post, January 4, 2013. Boko Haram also attacked towns bombing lends credibility to the idea that the attack was bia and the UK.” along Borno’s border with Niger on December 1 and De- not carried out by Shekau’s faction, but may have been 28 “Army Raids Bomb Factory, Arrests 12 In Niger,” cember 6, 2012, with the latter attack forcing more than carried out by more internationally focused groups. Leadership, December 8, 2012. 1,000 refugees to flee from Borno to Diffa, Niger, after 26 “Statement By Boko Haram’s Spokesperson Debunk- 29 “Fansou Bodian imam ratib de Bignona: ‘La secte villagers were killed when they could not recite specific ing Reports Of Dialogue With The Nigerian Govern- Boko Haram est présente au Sénégal,’” SeneNews.com, verses of the Qur’an when ordered to by Boko Haram. ment,” Sahara Reporters, August 23, 2012; “Analyst says August 22, 2012. See “1000 Nigerians Flee after Boko Haram Killings,” Boko Haram’s Ceasefire Conditions are Impossible,” 30 “I Won’t Change My Stance on Amnesty - Orubebe,” PM News, December 6, 2012. Channels TV, November 2, 2012. Leadership, July 20, 2011.

10 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1 of mosques and Boko Haram members’ Headquarters in Abuja.33 After more include rocket-propelled grenades homes, which are demands shared by than 30 Boko Haram suicide attacks in (RPGs) with a 900 meter range for all Boko Haram factions.31 2012, it is now fathomable that Boko attacking hardened targets from long Haram could employ female suicide distances and improvised explosive Impact on Northern Nigeria bombers, a tactic which the Taliban devices (IEDs) for ambushing military Emulating the Taliban have employed in Afghanistan since and police convoys.37 There is also Boko Haram has long drawn inspiration June 2010.34 concern that Boko Haram could use from the Taliban and was called the “Nigerian Taliban” by outsiders from As a sign of Boko Haram’s desire to hold “As seen in Shekau’s 2003 until 2009. Some Boko Haram territory, the group has also planted members have reportedly trained in flags with its logo in its desired future November 29 video Afghanistan, and in northern Nigeria capital of Damatru, Yobe State, and statement, interaction with Boko Haram appears to have adopted mobilized 500 supporters in the streets tactics similar to the Taliban.32 For of Damatru in December 2011 as a show Islamist militias has likely example, in the second half of 2012, of force after the commissioner of police caused a shift in Shekau’s Boko Haram systematically destroyed said there were no Boko Haram members hundreds of telecom towers, causing in the state.35 messaging, which now millions of dollars of damages and resembles al-Qa`ida’s.” preventing the security forces from Weapons Procurement tracking down its members; used text Boko Haram has procured weapons messages to coerce government officials from abroad, which was described against obstructing Boko Haram as a “worrisome development” by Libyan-made man-portable air-defense operations and warned civilians against the Nigerian chief superintendent of systems (MANPADS) to shoot down cooperating with the government; police in August 2012.36 Such weapons commercial airlines flying into Niger, extorted “taxes” from merchants Chad and Nigeria—a tactic employed with the threat of death to the family 33 “Nigerian Islamists Vow ‘Fiercer’ Attacks,” Agence in 2002 by an al-Qa`ida-linked members of anyone who does not pay; France-Presse, June 15, 2011. Somali terrorist cell on a Mombasa- 38 and employed complex Haqqani-style 34 “Nigerian Police Step Up Security Around Telecom borne Israeli El Al airlines flight. attacks with multiple suicide bombers. Towers After Boko Haram Attacks,” International Busi- The threat of a Boko Haram attack on President Jonathan said suicide ness Times, September 7, 2012; David Cook, “Boko Haram: aviation prompted Nigeria to place bombings were “completely alien” to A Prognosis,” Rice University, December 16, 2011. Ac- all airports in the country on 24- Nigeria after Nigerian Umar Farouk cording to Cook, the significance of the advent of suicide hour security surveillance during Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate attacks as part of complex operations is not indigenous the Christmas holiday in December 39 explosives in his undergarments on a to Nigeria and appear to be based on the tactics of Af- 2012. The weapons in Boko Haram’s Detroit-bound airliner on behalf of al- ghan and Haqqani networks. Also see “Suicide Bombing “upgrade” often enter the country Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) Alien To Nigeria – Jonathan,” The Tide, January 9, 2010; through illegal or unmanned border in 2009. On June 16, 2011, however, “Boko Haram Capable of Using Female Suicide Bombers, crossings and sometimes with the 40 one day after Boko Haram warned Chemical Weapons - Counter Terrorism Expert,” African collaboration of immigration officials. that its members arrived from Somalia Spotlight, December 8, 2012. Boko Haram attacks on border posts, “where they received real training 35 “Nigerian Terrorists in Mass Importation of Rocket such as a 50-man attack at Gamboru- on warfare,” Boko Haram carried out Launchers…Plan to Ditch IEDs in Favor Of RPGs - Traf- Ngala on the Nigerian side of the border its first suicide car bombing at the ficking Carried Out Across Porous Borders,” Beegeagle’s with Cameroon on December 2, 2012, are Federal Police Headquarters in Abuja, Blog, August 5, 2012; Kingsley Omonobi, “Army Blocks often intended as a diversion to smuggle 41 and then in August 2011 the Somali- Move by Boko Haram to Hoist Flag in Damatru,” Van- weapons through other border areas. trained Mamman Nur masterminded guard, October 26, 2012; Osita Okolo, “Untold Secret of another suicide car bombing at the UN the Survival of Boko Haram Sect in Yobe,” Vanguard, 37 “Boko Haram Upgrading Weapons from IEDs to February 11, 2012. RPGs, Police Says,” Punch NG, July 15, 2012. 36 In September 2011, the chief of army staff said, “In- 38 David Ignatius, “Libyan Missiles on the Loose,” 31 Success Nwogu, “Sagay, NBA Back FG, Boko Haram volvement of foreigners in Boko Haram’s terrorist ac- Washington Post, May 8, 2012. Senegal Talks,” Punch NG, December 3, 2012; George tivities in Nigeria is certain. It is definite that the group 39 “Boko Haram: FG Tightens up Security in Airports,” Agba, “Of FG/Boko Haram-Dialogue and Double Stan- receives training and possibly funding from some foreign Daily Post, December 29, 2012. dard,” Leadership, December 7, 2012. elements…This is evident from the type of weapons we 40 Olawale Rasheed, “Arms Inflow from Northern Bor- 32 Before 2009, Muhammad Yusuf’s followers were of- have captured from them, from the type of communica- ders Intensifies: The Gaddafi Mercenaries Connection, ten called the “Nigerian Taliban,” but they had no formal tion equipment we have captured from them and from Boko Haram Members Relocate to Kano, Others,” Nigeri- connection to the Taliban in Afghanistan. They did, how- the expertise they have displayed in the preparation of an Tribune, October 3, 2011; “Army Arrests Immigration ever, admire the Taliban, Mullah Omar and Usama bin improvised explosive devices. These are pointers to the Officer, Others over Boko Haram Links,” ThisDayLive, Ladin. See “Boko Haram ‘Trained in Algeria, Afghani- fact that there is foreign involvement in the terrorism go- September 29, 2012; Lydia Beshel, “Challenges of Nige- stan,’” ThisDay, September 1, 2011; “Nigerian Trained in ing on in Nigeria.” See Yusuf Alli and Gbade Ogunwale, ria’s Porous Borders,” Reporters 365, August 9, 2012; Afghanistan,” BBC, September 2, 2009. The Nigerian “Boko Haram Gets Foreign Backing,” The Nation, Sep- “Boko Haram Upgrading Weapons from IEDs to RPGs, chief of defense staff also affirmed at a presentation at tember 28, 2011; Toyosi Ogunseye, “Terrorists in Mass Police Says,” Pilot Africa, August 4, 2012. King’s College, London, on November 21, 2012, that some Importation of Rocket Launchers,” Punch NG, August 5, 41 “Gunmen ‘Burn Churches, Border Posts in Borno Boko Haram members have trained in Afghanistan. 2012. State,’” Vanguard, December 2, 2012.

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Target Selection placed on the UK Proscribed Terror List Haram have also both threatened to Boko Haram’s target selection has also on November 23, 2012, for kidnapping attack the West when their capabilities been influenced by its interaction with and killing a British and Italian hostage enable them to do so.49 militants abroad. The Cameroonian in March 2012 while operating under the Mamman Nur, who is wanted by Interpol name “al-Qa`ida in the Lands Beyond Conclusion and the Federal Bureau of Investigation the Sahel.” On December 24, 2012, At a time when even al-Qa`ida is for masterminding the August 26, 2011, Ansaru also claimed the kidnapping of questioning its own brand, militant bombing of the UN Headquarters in a French engineer in Katsina 30 miles groups need not have formal affiliation Abuja, reportedly fled to Chad and from the Nigerien border and said it with al-Qa`ida to have an international then traveled to Somalia to receive would continue attacking the French agenda.50 Boko Haram’s connections explosives training from al-Shabab to militants in northern Mali, the before returning to Nigeria in the weeks “Boko Haram will be Sahel and elsewhere in the Muslim before the attack.42 The UN attack world enable it to receive and provide remains the only time Boko Haram has capable of surviving support to other Islamist militias. As targeted an international institution outside of its main base of a result, Boko Haram will be capable and was similar to al-Qa`ida’s attack of surviving outside of its main base of on the UN building in Baghdad in 2003 operations in Borno State if operations in Borno State if the Nigerian and AQIM’s attack on the UN building the Nigerian security forces security forces drive out key leaders in Algiers in 2007. from Nigeria such as Abubakar Shekau. drive out key leaders from Moreover, Boko Haram has been able to In 2012, the group also showed a new Nigeria such as Shekau.” draw on al-Qa`ida’s ideology and take focus on foreigners. A British and advantage of anti-government and anti- Italian hostage were killed in Sokoto Western sentiment in northern Nigeria in March; a German hostage was killed to justify its existence and recruit new in Kano in June; a French hostage was government and French citizens until members from Nigeria and Borno’s kidnapped in Katsina in December; and France ends its ban on the Islamic veil border region.51 a number of Chinese and Indians were and its “major role in the planned attack 43 killed in Borno in late 2012. on the Islamic state in northern Mali,” when it claimed responsibility for the kidnapping of which is virtually the same warning three European aid workers from a Saharawi refugee Transnational Ideology that MUJAO’s and AQIM’s leaders camp in Algeria in October 2011. It cited as inspiration 46 As seen in Shekau’s November 29 have issued to France. According to historical militant leaders in the region, including Usman video statement, interaction with the United Kingdom, Ansaru is “anti- dan Fodio and El Hajj Omar Tell. Islamist militias has likely caused a Western” and “broadly aligned” to al- 49 MUJAO military leader Oumar Ould Hamaha said in shift in Shekau’s messaging, which now Qa`ida, while in its own words Ansaru December 2012 that, “If they don’t come here, one day we resembles al-Qa`ida’s. The Boko Haram says it wants to restore the “dignity of will attack [the West]. If we cannot do this in our time, 44 47 faction Ansaru has also embraced an Usman dan Fodio.” Similarly, MUJAO our sons and the next generation will attack the West.” ideology similar to MUJAO as well as proclaimed at the time of its founding Similarly, in May 2010, one of Boko Haram’s members the primary tactic of MUJAO and AQIM: in December 2011 that it wants to said in an interview with Agence France-Presse, “We 45 kidnapping foreigners. Ansaru was spread jihad in West Africa and that its will carry out our operations anywhere in the world if members are “ideological descendants” we can have the chance. The United States is the number 48 42 Yusuf Alli, “FBI, INTERPOL Join Manhunt for Bomb of Usman dan Fodio. MUJAO and Boko one target for its oppression and aggression against Mus- Suspect Nur,” The Nation, September 21, 2011. lim nations, particularly in Iraq and Afghanistan and its 43 “Gunmen Kill Chinese Worker in Northern Nigeria,” several kidnapping operations in Niger. Al-Barnawy was blind support to Israel in its killings of our Palestinian Energy Daily, October 8, 2012. The article also noted that, one of three Boko Haram members that the United States brethren. We will launch fiercer attacks than Iraqi or “In July, suspected members of Boko Haram attacked a designated as a “foreign terrorist,” along with Abubakar Afghan mujahidin against our enemies throughout the factory in Maiduguri, killing two Indian nationals and Shekau and Adam Kambar, in July 2012. Kambar was world, particularly the United States, if the chance avails stealing about $600 in cash. Separately, the high-profile killed by Nigerian security forces in Kano in November itself…but for now our attention is focused on Nigeria, kidnappings and subsequent deaths of British, Italian 2012, while Shekau and al-Barnawy remain at large. which is our starting point.” See Sudarsan Raghavan and and German nationals earlier this year was blamed on 46 Ibrahim Shuaibu, “Islamic Group Claims Responsi- Edward Cody, “Mali Presents Risky Battleground for Islamist extremists.” bility for Kidnapping French Citizen,” ThisDay, Decem- Neighbouring Nations and Western Allies,” Independent, 44 Ansaru is the abbreviated name for Jama`at Ansar ber 24, 2012; Tiemoko Diallo, “Mali Islamists Tell France December 9, 2012; Aminu Abubakar, “Nigerian Islamic al-Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan, which means “Support- They Will Open Doors of Hell,” Reuters, October 13, Sect Threaten to Widen Attacks,” Agence France-Presse, ers of the Muslims in the Land of the Blacks.” Ansaru 2012. March 29, 2010. seeks a united front with Abubakar Shekau’s faction in 47 In the 19th century, Usman dan Fodio conquered 50 “According to newly released documents, Osama bin confronting mutual enemies, such as Christians and the Sokoto and most of northern Nigeria and influenced oth- Laden mulled renaming Al Qaeda amid worries that the Nigerian government, but views the killing of Muslims er jihads in the areas of West Africa where Boko Haram terrorist group had become a tarnished brand,” in Whit- by Shekau’s faction as “inexcusable.” is present today, such as northern Cameroon, northern ney Eulich, “Renaming Al Qaeda to Tanthim al-Jihadi 45 Ansaru broke from Boko Haram after the January 20, Nigeria, Niger, northern Mali and Senegal. See Philip D. litahrir al-aksa wa-tawhid al-Umma?” Christian Science 2012, attacks in Kano, which killed more than 150 inno- Curtin, “Jihad in West Africa: Early Phases and Inter- Monitor, May 3, 2012. cent civilians, mostly Muslims. One of Ansaru’s leaders Relations in Mauritania and Senegal,” Journal of African 51 Anti-American sentiment in northern Nigeria has is believed to be Khalid al-Barnawy, who trained with History 12:1 (1971): pp. 11-24. been bolstered by Islamist organizations, such as the AQIM in Algeria in the mid-2000s and participated in 48 MUJAO emerged for the first time in December 2011, Shi`a fundamentalist and pro-Iranian Islamic Move-

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As evidenced by the collapse of the counterradicalization, and identifies Malian state when Tuareg fighters Countering Islamist some of the problems with coordinating based in Libya returned to “Azawad” Radicalization in Germany counterradicalization programs at the after the fall of the Mu`ammar Qadhafi federal level. It also offers insight on regime, the transfer of Boko Haram By Dorle Hellmuth specific outreach and trust-building fighters from Nigeria to other countries initiatives between the German in the Sahel does not bode well for the in may 2012, German Salafists protested authorities and the Salafist community. region. It means Nigeria’s problem will in the streets of Bonn and Solingen. become another country’s problem, such The protests, which began after the The German Approach to Countering Salafi- as Mali, Cameroon or Niger, or smaller Pro Nordrhein-Westfalen (Pro-NRW) Jihadi Activities countries like Guinea, Burkina Faso citizens’ movement displayed pictures In contrast to the United Kingdom’s and Senegal. Like northern Nigeria, of the Prophet Muhammad, left 29 prior approach, representatives of these countries have majority Muslim police officers injured, and resulted in the German state generally refuse populations, artificial borders, ethnic the arrests of 108 Salafists.1 The clashes to work with Islamist groups. conflicts, insufficient educational and between police and Salafists were Counterradicalization initiatives in career opportunities for youths and unprecedented in Germany. Germany have been directed against fragile democratic institutions, and they all forms of radical Islamism, including have all witnessed Islamist militant Concern over violent Salafists in both political and violent Salafists. infiltration in their countries and their Germany has featured prominently in Politicians and security services countrymen traveling to northern Mali domestic intelligence assessments since emphasize the need to distinguish to join the Islamist militias in 2012. 2010.2 According to the Federal Bureau between political Salafists—the Although the ethnic groups in some of for the Protection of the Constitution majority of Salafist structures in these countries differ from northern (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, Germany that mostly reject violence— Nigeria, Boko Haram and Ansaru BfV), violent Salafists are increasingly and a small jihadist minority have the potential to inspire other seeking to launch terrorist attacks advocating violence in pursuit of “Boko Harams” in West Africa with in Germany, a country which after Salafist goals.4 Government officials their ideologies that fault the secular 9/11 mainly served as a logistics also warn that these boundaries can be government, democracy and the West hub for foreign battlefields. In light blurred as both violent and non-violent for their troubles and hark back to a of recent Salafist-inspired plots,3 Salafists share the same ideological time when Usman dan Fodio and the this article provides details on foundation. In other words, political Islamic caliphate brought “glory” and the country’s general approach to da`wa (missionary) activities used to “dignity” to the Muslims of the region. recruit followers and gain influence may 1 Florian Flade and Martin Lutz, “Das unheimliche Netz serve as a dangerous breeding ground 5 Jacob Zenn is an analyst of African and der Salafisten,” Die Welt, June 6, 2012; Charles Hawley, for violent Salafist radicalization. In Eurasian Affairs for The Jamestown “Salafists and Right-Wing Populists Battle in Bonn,” one example, the man who killed two Foundation and author of the Occasional Spiegel Online, July 5, 2012. The far-right Pro NRW party U.S. troops at Frankfurt airport in Report entitled “Northern Nigeria’s Boko is only active in North Rhine Westphalia and registered March 2011—the first deadly jihadist Haram: The Prize in al-Qaeda’s Africa 2,100 members in 2011. The Pro NRW had collected terrorist attack on German soil—had Strategy,” published by The Jamestown some 400 drawings as part of a cartoon contest designed established ties with radical Salafists Foundation in November 2012. In 2012, he to critique Islam and display the “winning” and most through Facebook contacts and online 6 conducted field research in Nigeria, Niger, provocative pictures in front of mosques and other Mus- media sharing sites like DawaFFM. Chad and Cameroon on the socioeconomic lim venues. The cartoon contest, scheduled ahead of state factors behind the Boko Haram insurgency. elections in North Rhine Westphalia in the hopes that it Yet in contrast to the United Kingdom, Mr. Zenn earned a J.D. from Georgetown would boost the Pro NRW’s votes, was initially canceled the Netherlands and Denmark, Law, where he was a Global Law Scholar, by state authorities but subsequently re-authorized by all of which initiated concerted and a graduate degree in International the courts. Major German Muslim organizations, such as counterradicalization programs in Affairs from the Johns Hopkins SAIS Center the Central Council of Muslims, condemned the subse- response to the terrorist attacks in Spain for Chinese-American Studies in Nanjing, quent violence. In October 2012, a district court in Bonn and the United Kingdom and the Prophet China. He has spoken at international found one of the Salafist protesters, a Turkish citizen Muhammad cartoon riots in 2004 and conferences on Boko Haram and is frequently born and raised in Germany, guilty of seriously injur- 2005, Germany got off to a later start interviewed by international media. ing two policemen, sentencing him to six years in prison. Due to the severity of his jail term, the man will likely be 4 The BfV estimates that Germany is home to some 3,800 deported to Turkey before the end of his sentence. See Salafists. About 150 of them are considered violent. Crit- “Salafist für Messerangriff auf Polizisten verurteilt,” ics note the numbers of Salafists residing in Germany Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, October 20, 2012. could be as high as 10,000. See “Koran Study,” Econo- 2 “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2011,” Bundesamt für Ver- mist, April 21, 2012. fassungsschutz, June 2012. The report distinguishes be- 5 See, for example, Hunert Gude, Souad Mekhennet, and tween Salafists, al-Qa`ida and franchises, and regional Christoph Scheuermann, “The Missionary Zeal of Ger- ment in Nigeria (IMN) led by Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, whose jihadist groups. many’s Salafists,”Spiegel Online, April 24, 2012. membership has increased with Iranian sponsorship in 3 For further information, see also Sajjan M. Gohel, “Ger- 6 Matthias Bartsch, Matthias Gebauer and Yassin Mush- recent years. See “Thousands Protest over Anti-Islam many Increasingly a Center for Terrorism in Europe,” arbash, “The Radical Islamist Roots of the Frankfurt At- Film in Kano Nigeria,” BBC, September 22, 2012. CTC Sentinel 4:8 (2011). tack,” Spiegel Online, March 3, 2011.

13 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1 and also still does not have a national offices—should be in charge of phone for Muslims to take a greater stance counterradicalization strategy.7 Apart help lines and awareness programs against violent Salafists.17 Federal and from an increasingly dynamic Salafist or whether programs to exit extremist state governments are also working scene, critics note that a national circles constitute a viable option. The together as part of a BMI-led working strategy is all the more necessary in state of Hamburg provides tangible group called the “prevention of Islamist view of Germany’s unique federal assistance in the form of apartment extremism and terrorism.”18 structure.8 Due to various restraints on rentals, vocational training, and job federal executive power,9 Germany’s 16 placement services to those who are Representing state and federal states, and their respective 16 interior looking to leave extremist circles. security services at the more tactical ministries and domestic intelligence In some states, awareness outreach level, the Joint Counterterrorism may only entail Muslim communities Center (Gemeinsames Terror- “Germany still does whereas in others they also include Abwehr Zentrum, GTAZ) added a new public schools, sports clubs, or state working group dealing exclusively not have a national agencies (such as immigration services with counterradicalization in strategy that addresses and prisons).11 Berlin’s intelligence December 2009. It is specifically service uses theological arguments to tasked with amassing federal and counterradicalization counter extremist interpretations of state counterradicalization initiatives, efforts.” the Qur’an, while other states will not sharing experiences and best practices, engage in any theological debates.12 In and developing new policies.19 Mostly Brandenburg, the intelligence service serving as an exchange forum, it is in 2010 began convening “regional the closest the law enforcement and services, have autonomy vis-à-vis security dialogues” to educate the domestic intelligence services of the the Federal Ministry of the Interior public on Islamist radicalization and federal government and the 16 states (Bundesministerium des Inneren, BMI). extremism.13 Other states got an early have come to coordinating their various In other words, counterradicalization start: “Contact scouts” of the Hamburg counterradicalization programs.20 programs are decided and implemented police started meeting with imams as by the individual states and therefore early as 2001 and have cultivated their Dialogue and Trust-Building Initiatives differ from state to state. While network since.14 German authorities have reached out to counterradicalization is considered Muslim organizations and communities a mostly local, grassroots effort in In view of this patchwork of state as part of various dialogue and trust- neighboring countries as well— initiatives, the interior ministries building initiatives. Some of these allowing programs to be tailored to of the 16 states have attempted to initiatives include: specific regional or local contexts and facilitate the nationwide coordination be administered by those who know of counterradicalization programs and The Prevention and Cooperation Clearing Point their communities best—Germany’s policies. Islamist extremism and, more To provide a comprehensive overview complex federal structure raises the recently, its Salafist tenets feature of past, ongoing, as well as future question in how far program outcomes prominently on the agenda of the so- local projects involving state and and experiences are communicated and called Interior Minister Conference, Muslim institutions across Germany, shared beyond regional jurisdictions, as which periodically brings together the the Prevention and Cooperation is also noted in a recent report by the interior ministers of all 16 states and Clearing Point (Clearingstelle German Islam Conference (Deutsche the federal government.15 Coordination, Präventionskooperation, CLS) was Islam Konferenz, DIK).10 however, remains politicized. For established in March 2008 at the example, the Chemnitz declaration Federal Office for Migration and Moreover, Germany’s 16 states have of 2009, stressing the need for exit Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und differed about the scope, objective, and programs, was only supported by the Flüchtlinge, BAMF). There are many timing of initiatives, such as whether conservative-governed states.16 At examples of cooperative or educational domestic intelligence services—as the most recent June 2012 meeting, projects.21 opposed to migration and refugee conservative interior ministers called

17 Thomas Steinmann, “Muslime sollen Salafisten iso- 7 On national counterradicalization strategies in other 11 Frank Pergande, “Reiseziel Pakistan,” Frankfurter lieren,” Financial Times Deutschland, June 1, 2012. European countries, see James Brandon and Lorenzo Vi- Allgemeine Zeitung, December 8, 2009. 18 “Zusammen in Deutschland,” Bundesministerium dino, “European Experiences in Counterradicalization,” 12 “Radikale Entlarven,” Tageszeitung, February 10, des Inneren, March 20, 2009. CTC Sentinel 5:6 (2012). 2011. 19 “Abwehr im Innern,” Spiegel, November 30, 2009. 8 See, for example, Uwe Schünemann, “Die dschihadis- 13 Astrid Geisler, “Wie Bin Laden nach Prenzlau kam,” 20 In November 2012, the BfV and the Federal Bureau of tische Herausforderung,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Tageszeitung, July 5, 2010. Criminal Investigation (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA) fur- August 18, 2010. 14 Peter Carstens, “Auf einen Tee mit dem Imam,” ther announced the creation of the Joint Counter Extrem- 9 To eradicate centralized Nazi structures for all time, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 25, 2011. ism and Terrorism Center (Gemeinsames Extremismus the Constitutional Council in 1948 combined executive 15 States take turns in presiding over the conference. und Terrorismusabwehrzentrum). The GETZ will focus power-sharing with the territorial fragmentation of pow- While the IMK-meetings are also attended by the federal on the analysis of and information-sharing on foreign, ers to the Länder. interior minister, he lacks veto power. left- and right-wing versions of extremism and terror- 10 “Präventionsarbeit mit Jugendlichen,” Deutsche Is- 16 Daniel Schultz, “Mit Broschüren gegen Terrorismus,” ism, as well as espionage and proliferation. lam Konferenz, April 19, 2012, p. 3. Tageszeitung, October 21, 2009. 21 For a list of 72 sample projects, see “Clearingstelle:

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Members of the police coach soccer individual consultations, exit program Muslim integration in Germany, clubs and offer bicycle training courses support may include filing paperwork the conference was first initiated in in Muslim and high-immigration with other bureaucracies, protecting 2006 and continued by the second neighborhoods. Law enforcement units against threats from relatives and Angela Merkel coalition government seek to improve their intercultural supporters of the jihadist scene, in 2009, albeit with a slightly communication skills in Berlin, schooling or vocational training different composition and more Stuttgart, and Essen. In Düsseldorf, placements, and housing and financial “actionable” agenda. For example, Muslim associations and police aid. It is not clear how many people, the second conference included more jointly developed a framework for if any, have taken advantage of the local representatives from cities “dialogue, peace and integration.” The program. Various states have voiced Recklinghausen police have identified considerable criticism over whether “German officials fear Muslim leaders who can assist them domestic intelligence services, whose in crisis situations. The CLS also mandates focus on intelligence that an additional 185 maintains a public database of some collection, should or can play a role extremists might either 300 contacts representing Muslim with regard to these exit programs.24 communities and the German state. have obtained or still seek Anyone with an idea for a new In light of these reservations, it is paramilitary training.” important to note that the BAMF began offering a second crisis hotline, called “The 16 states have Counseling Center Radicalization initiated deportations of (Beratungsstelle Radikalisierung), in and municipalities but excluded one January 2012.25 Similar to the HATIF of the four major German Muslim foreign Salafist extremists service run by the BfV, this help line organizations: the Central Council whenever possible.” encourages family members, friends, of Muslims in Germany. This group relatives, and teachers to come forward declined to participate, citing the lack of about friends or relatives who have clear conference objectives, insufficient recently become radicalized. Perhaps Muslim representation, as well as the project can access the database to not coincidentally, this was one of the sidelining of discussion topics such as contact relevant parties, and ask the first projects resulting from the new hostility toward Islam in Germany.27 CLS for support.22 A closer look at BMI-led Security Partnership Initiative the inventory of 300 names in the between state and Muslim institutions The Security Partnership Initiative database, however, shows that more created in June 2011. DIK’s agenda is broad and only deals than 70% represent state agencies, with radicalization prevention as one suggesting that the network—which The German Islam Conference of many topics. In addition, discussions is supposed to expand further—is in Since Germany’s 17 interior ministries center on instituting Islamic religion particular need of additional Muslim refuse to work with Islamist groups, classes in public schools, the education contacts.23 they have instead opted to create a and training of imams, German society permanent forum between moderate and values, and “Islamophobia.” Supporting Vulnerable Individuals: Nationwide Muslim institutions and the German To ensure a sufficient focus on Phone Hotlines state. The periodical meetings of the counterradicalization, the BMI created Since July 2010, the BfV has been DIK are attended by five Muslim the “Security Partnership Initiative – running the nationwide HATIF organizations, representatives from Together with Muslims for Security” phone hotline, designed to help federal, state, and local governments, (Initiative Sicherheitspartnerschaft individuals break with their violent and individuals.26 Designed to improve - Gemeinsam mit Muslimen für jihadist environment. HATIF is the Sicherheit) in June 2011, an alliance Arabic word for phone and the German between various federal and state 24 Markus Wehner, “Alle aussteigen, bitte!” Frankfurter acronym stands for “leaving terrorism security services and six Muslim Allgemeine Zeitung, July 25, 2010. and Islamist fanaticism.” Apart from organizations.28 In contrast to the 25 “Regierung startet Beratungsnetz,” Tageszeitung, Feb- DIK, it is not a permanent institution, ruary 2, 2012. and its membership can change Suche nach Projekten,” Bundesamt für Migration und 26 The Deutsche Islam Konferenz is located at www. depending on the nature of the project Flüchtlinge, available at www.bamf.de/DE/DasBAMF/ deutsche-islam-konferenz.de. The five organizations at hand. Its exclusive focus is to Clearingstelle/Projekte/projekte-node.html. include: Alevi Community in Germany, Islamic Commu- prevent Islamist violence with the help 22 For example, in 2011 the CLS was responsible for nity of the Bosnians in Germany, Association of Islamic coordinating 45 projects with a combined yearly budget Cultural Centers, Central Council of the Moroccans in of one million euros. See Martin Lutz, “Sicherheitspakt Germany, and the Turkish Islamic Union for Religious suchen, die Imame überall einzubeziehen,” Frankfurter mit Muslimen,” Die Welt, June 25, 2011. The CLS further Affairs. In addition, the secular association of Turk- Allgemeine Zeitung, July 2, 2011. helps educate security services, provides experts for dia- ish migrants, the Turkish Community of Germany, has 27 “Islamkonferenz mit neuen Mitgliedern,” Frankfurt- logue events, and distributes information. joined the conference. Similar arrangements also ex- er Allgemeine Zeitung, March 5, 2010; Olivia Schoeller, 23 “Clearingstelle: Suche nach Ansprechpartnern,” ist at the state level, as exemplified by the Berlin “Islam “Zentralrat boykottiert Islamkonferenz,” Berliner Zei- Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, available at Forum.” See “Islamismus: Prävention und Deradikal- tung, May 14, 2010. www.bamf.de/DE/DasBAMF/Clearingstelle/Anspre- isierung,” Senatsverwaltung für Inneres und Sport, Ber- 28 For details, see www.initiative-sicherheitspartner- chpartner/ansprechpartner-node.html. liner Verfassungsschutz, November 22, 2010; “Wir ver- schaft.de/SPS/DE/Startseite/startseite-node.html.

15 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1 of Muslim communities. Community Keeping a Close Watch: Raids, Bans, and and online videos, the raids led to the involvement is considered instrumental Deportations association’s voluntary dissolution as community members are often the The assumed connection between in August. Pierre Vogel, the most first to notice radicalization signs and political Salafist organizations and prominent preacher associated with this are also better equipped to counter Salafist-inspired radicalization has also organization, has since left for Egypt. these trends by means of their religious led to the closure of several community While these closures and bans enable and cultural expertise. The working centers and mosques since 2001. security services to target association group “trust” is afforded a key role as Moreover, in mid-June 2012, the first finances, they are also controversial part of the initiative. It is much smaller Salafist association, Millatu Ibrahim, because it becomes harder to gather in size, bringing together only a few was proscribed after authorities intelligence on extremist Salafists. select security services, in addition raided 80 Salafist meeting places in Critics also argue that this does not to the Central Council of Muslims seven different states simultaneously. address the root of the problem, as most in Germany and the Turkish Islamic According to the BMI, Millatu Ibrahim extremists do not even organize or might Union for Religious Affairs. While trust called on Muslims to actively fight simply decide to join foreign outlets. In building initiatives are generally drawn Germany’s constitutional order, praised addition, their videos are still available up behind closed doors, one of the on YouTube and similar websites.33 group’s best known projects involves “Even though Germany the recent creation of the Counseling In June, the BMI also initiated Center Radicalization at the BAMF. does not have a tradition of proscription proceedings for DawaFFM, issuing security strategies, an online sharing site for Salafist videos Security partnership membership, and literature—of both political and however, has declined significantly. a strategic framework violent nature—and networking.34 In Four of the six participating Muslim would not only be useful addition, the BMI is spearheading an associations quit the Security effort to prohibit The True Religion (Die Partnership Initiative in late August to boost coordination, Wahre Religion), an internet platform 2012 over a controversy involving but it would also help seeking to “expand da`wa activities in the “Missing” poster campaign.29 Germany” by means of information The posters, intended for Muslim ensure that the best media, workshops and seminars.35 neighborhoods in Berlin, Hamburg counterradicalization and Bonn, tell the fictional story of The 16 states have initiated deportations parents who have lost their children to practices can be identified, of foreign Salafist extremists whenever religious fanatics and terrorist groups. cultivated, and shared possible. They have also confiscated They are designed to encourage those passports, or required regular check- with similar experiences to call the across local and state ins with the police, to prevent German BAMF counterradicalization hotline. borders.” citizens suspected of violent Salafist Opposed to the campaign, Muslim tendencies from leaving for foreign organizations complained that their terrorist camps.36 According to the feedback and critiques were not heard BfV, at least 70 individuals “with a due to the unilateral agenda-setting and the violent May 2012 clashes in Solingen German connection”37 have trained in decision-making of Interior Ministry and Bonn in various online videos, and Islamist terrorist camps since the early officials. The latter responded that encouraged additional violent acts.31 In 1990s. German officials fear that an their feedback was not only invited response to the ban, Millatu Ibrahim additional 185 extremists might either but that the posters were approved leader Denis Cuspert declared Germany have obtained or still seek paramilitary by the six Muslim associations before a battle zone and called for jihad on training. going public.30 As of January 2013, the German soil.32 Security Partnership Initiative lists The Road Ahead the Alevi Community in Germany as Another Salafist association, the It is difficult to assess the effectiveness their only Muslim partner. Invitation to Paradise (Einladung zum of Germany’s various local, state, and Paradies e.V.), was subject to a 2010 federal counterradicalization measures BMI investigation that included raids at and initiatives because many of them various locations in Lower Saxony and have only been operational for a few North Rhine Westphalia. Considered an influential platform for spreading 33 Frank Jansen, “Krieg Im heiligen,” Der Tagesspiegel, Salafist ideology via seminars, July 1, 2012. 29 The four organizations include the Turkish Islamic preachers, literature, social media, 34 Flade et al., “Das Ende des Solinger Kalifats.” Union for Religious Affairs, the Association of Islamic 35 “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2011,” p. 219. Culture Centers, the Central Council of Muslims in Ger- 31 “Salafisten: Razzia und Vereinsverbot,” Bundesminis- 36 Wehner; Gude et al.; “Terrorverdächtiger reiste unge- many, and the Islamic Community of the Bosnians in terium des Inneren, June 14, 2012. hindert aus,” Der Tagesspiegel, September 14, 2011. Germany. See “Muslimische Verbände wenden sich von 32 Florian Flade, Kristian Frigelj, and Martin Lutz, 37 Individuals with a German connection are those who Friedrich ab,” Süddeutsche Zeitung, August, 31, 2012. “Das Ende des Solinger Kalifats,” Die Welt, June 15, 2012; have lived or are currently residing in Germany, German 30 “Bundesinnenminister hält an Initiative fest,” Initia- “Salafisten drohen mit Anschlägen,” N-TV.de, Septem- citizens with migratory backgrounds, and Muslim con- tive Sicherheitspartnerschaft, August 31, 2012. ber 3, 2012. verts. See “Verfassungsschutzbericht 2011,” p. 197.

16 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1 years. Yet Germany’s federal structure Algerian Foreign Policy in counter to the ideals and principles that surely complicates coordination it champions. Absolutist conceptions of of and information-sharing on the Context of the Arab sovereignty and inflexible opposition counterradicalization programs. It is Spring to interventionism even in cases of not clear in how far the GTAZ forum is severe humanitarian crises might lead sufficient in providing for a coordinated By Anouar Boukhars to a possible banalization of the guiding approach among security services. The principles of Algerian foreign policy. forum also does not account for non- the new geopolitical context in North Most importantly, Algeria might forgo GTAZ agencies/programs involved in Africa and the Sahel has created the opportunity to be a relevant actor counterradicalization efforts. These are difficult questions for the Algerian in managing the multiple crises in its supposed to be tracked by the BAMF- regime. The burst of democracy immediate neighborhood—such as led CLS, which is looking to better and revolutionary instability have the developing situation in Mali—and coordinate and network activities challenged the doctrines, principles shaping the ongoing debate about the involving state and non-state actors, and practices that drove the foreign international legal constraints on the including Muslim communities and policy choices of the government “responsibility to protect.” mosques. Nevertheless, it is also not since independence in 1962. As a clear how and why listed CLS projects result, Algeria’s old foreign policy How the country adjusts to these were or are successful, or in how far paradigm that stressed the sanctity changing realities will have regional Germany’s Muslims are represented of the sovereignty of states and non- implications. Algeria’s power attributes by the Muslim contacts in the CLS interference in their internal affairs place it in a unique position to influence database. has collided with the emerging events. The country boasts the largest pattern of international humanitarian defense budget on the African continent While the overall abundance of projects intervention. Many in the Arab ($10.3 billion in 2012), strong military is laudable, Germany still does not street, for example, saw the Algerian power projection capabilities (due have a national strategy that addresses government’s hostility toward foreign to its large fleet of aircraft) and counterradicalization efforts. Even intervention in Libya as a travesty. recognized counterterrorism expertise. though Germany does not have a Since the onset of the Arab revolts in It also serves as a founding member and tradition of issuing security strategies, early 2011, Algerian state action has leader in several regional and global a strategic framework would not only widely been viewed as driven by a counterterrorism forums. be useful to boost coordination, but it desire to forestall or contain democratic would also help ensure that the best contagion at its borders.1 The Doctrine That Lost its Way counterradicalization practices can be Since it gained independence in 1962, identified, cultivated, and shared across At first glance, fears of democratic Algeria promoted an international local and state borders. diffusion into Algerian territory seem architecture that defended the to have conditioned Algeria’s position sovereignty of states and the right to Dr. Dorle Hellmuth is Assistant Professor toward the Arab Spring. In reality, decolonization.2 It became a strong voice of Politics at The Catholic University of however, this is not the decisive factor of African and Arab revolutionaries America. At CUA, she teaches courses on in explaining Algerian foreign policy. and a leading proponent of the rights European Politics, Homeland Security, If one examines Algeria’s geostrategic of the developing world, rejecting the Counterterrorism, Transatlantic Security, considerations and foreign policy Cold War rigid bipolar structure and and Comparative Politics. She is a fellow outlook, then the regime’s calculus mobilizing support in multilateral at the American Institute for Contemporary begins to look less mischievous. forums for its agenda of self- German Studies (AICGS) at Johns Hopkins determination, inviolability of borders, University. Dr. Hellmuth also held an This article argues that the regime’s non-interference in domestic affairs and appointment as a research fellow at the attitude to the Arab uprisings sovereign equality.3 In a well-received National War College/National Defense was largely shaped by domestic speech before the UN General Assembly University for more than five years. considerations, security policy and in April 1974, Algerian guerrilla-turned- geostrategic imperatives. Algerian statesman Houari Boumedienne called leaders were concerned about the for the creation of a new world order potential disintegrative effects of the where the rights of the underprivileged breakdown phase of authoritarian are protected. The old order, he said, structures in neighboring countries on consecrated the impoverishment of the Algeria’s internal stability as well as Third World and perpetuated global on its status in the regional balance of inequalities. power. The article also aims to show how Algeria’s position reflects the growing disconnect between its long- standing strategic posture and a fast- 2 Amine Ait-Chalal, “L’Algérie depuis 1962: retour sur changing regional order that runs une histoire contrastée,” La Revue International et Straté- gique 2:46 (2002): pp. 61-72. 1 Claire Spencer, “Strategic Posture Review: Algeria,” 3 Nicole Grimaud, La politique extérieure de l’Algérie World Politics Review, July 25, 2012. (Paris: Karthala, 1984).

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Boumedienne’s ambitions to build war with your neighbor,” wrote Algerian near financial bankruptcy in 1994 and it international support for his vision scholar Akram Belkaid.6 The death of confronted a violent Islamist insurgency of a cooperative, equitable and just Boumedienne in 1978 did not end the from 1992-1999. world order soon hit a roadblock. The stand-off between North Africa’s major eruption of the Western Sahara conflict two rivals, but it reduced Algeria’s The primary objective of Algerian in late 1975 set Algeria against ambitions to build a single-voiced foreign policy in the 1990s was to Morocco, dividing the global south powerful bloc capable of fighting for the prevent the isolation of the country into supporters and detractors of creation of an international egalitarian and any outside interference in its own political and economic order. internal conflict.10 The military regime “For the Algerians, state sought international acquiescence for Under the presidency of Chadli its decision in January 1992 to abort the sovereignty remains the Bendjedid from 1979-1992, Algeria’s electoral process and rob the Islamic bedrock that provides foreign policy continued to be based Salvation Front (FIS) of victory in on the same ideological principles the second round of parliamentary order and stability to the of self-determination, freedom from elections. More importantly, it fought international system.” external control, and its own special to prevent the international community brand of socialism, but several from focusing on the excesses of the factors contributed to an attenuated struggle against armed Islamist groups. commitment to revolutionary idealism The foreign policy machinery was Algeria’s foreign policy.4 In Africa, the in its international relations. The geared toward convincing the West conflict exposed the continent’s deep end of the colonial era in Africa, the and the Arab world that there was only political, economic and ideological resistance of the industrialized West a military solution to Algeria’s civil cleavages between the moderate to the economic reforms defended by strife.11 countries aligned with Morocco and Algeria and the inherent instability the so-called progressives backing of its own economic model led to a The election of the former foreign Algeria. Morocco’s withdrawal from shift in the country’s foreign policy minister of Houari Boumedienne, the Organization of African States orientation.7 The economic and political Abdelaziz Bouteflika, to the presidency (OAU) in 1984 in response to constraints that Algeria began to face in in April 1999 reinvigorated Algerian the OAU admission of the Sahrawi the mid-1980s accelerated the country’s foreign policy. Bouteflika was Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) diminished global aspirations and determined to restore Algeria’s in 1982 intensified this divide and refocused its diplomacy on its immediate battered image. The gradual return of dampened any hope of African unity neighborhood.8 peace to the country and an improving and solidarity.5 By making the military economic outlook facilitated his task. and diplomatic support for the Polisario The collapse of the Soviet Union in Bouteflika then embarked on reclaiming rebels a central pillar of its foreign 1991 and the descent of Algeria into a Algeria’s leadership role on the African policy, Algeria’s grand strategic bloody civil war in 1992-1999 presented continent, evident by its involvement in preferences and initiatives to promote a series of new challenges for Algerian brokering a peace deal between Ethiopia them came to be seen through the prism foreign policy. The regime did not have and Eritrea in 2000, the creation of a of this conflict. It became “very hard to the money or the time to focus on world cabinet position dealing solely with defend the idea of a new international affairs.9 The country was faced with Africa,12 and the formation of the New order when you are engaged in a cold Partnership for Africa’s Development 6 President Bendjedid, for example, began the process (NEPAD) in 2001. The dramatic 4 For a short and excellent overview of the conflict, see of normalizing relations with France and the United changes in the international geopolitical Erik Jensen, Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate States, which he visited in 1983 and 1985 respectively. landscape caused by the 9/11 attacks on (Boulder and London: Lynne Riene, 2005). The reopening of borders with Morocco in 1983 and the the United States strengthened Algeria’s 5 Morocco bases its claim to the Western Sahara on resolution of territorial conflicts with Niger, Mali, and geopolitical ambitions. The perception several factors: 1) historical ties between Moroccan sov- Mauritania in 1981, and Tunisia in 1983, attested to this ereigns and the tribes of the Western Sahara, as clearly desire to establish constructive relations with its neigh- 10 Belkaid. stated by the International Court of Justice advisory bors, especially Morocco. See Akram Belkaid, “La diplo- 11 This strategy was quite successful. In the economic opinion on the legal status of the territory; 2) juridical and matie algérienne à la recherche de son âge d’or,” Politique and financial realm, Western governments, especially colonial records denoting Morocco’s sovereignty over the étrangère 2 (2009). France, and international financial institutions lined disputed territory before the Spanish conquest in 1884; 7 Saïd Haddad, “Entre volontarisme et alignement: up to support ailing state finances through financial aid 3) similarity in status of the Spanish Western Sahara and quelques réflexions autour de la politique africaine de and investments in the oil and gas sector. It is estimated nearby Moroccan southern provinces, also occupied by l’Algérie,” Dynamiques Internationales, October 7, 2012. that between late 1993 and early 1995, state coffers were Spain; 4) domestic public consensus on Morocco’s sov- 8 The creation of the Arab Maghreb Union (which in- propped up by at least $15 billion, thanks to debt resched- ereignty over the Western Sahara; 5) threat to Morocco’s cluded Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania and Morocco) uling and international loans. Politically, by the mid- internal stability and security that a weak, non-viable during the summit of Marrakech (February 15-17, 1989) 1990s Algeria was integrated into a number of multilat- independent Western Sahara state might pose. For an represented the culmination of this reorientation of Al- eral forums without having to demonstrate a minimum in-depth analysis of Morocco’s stance, see Abdeslam gerian foreign policy. See ibid. level of respect for human rights. See Cavatorta. Maghraoui, “Ambiguities of Sovereignty: Morocco, The 9 Francesco Cavatorta, “La reconfiguration des struc- 12 Since its creation in March 2001, Abdelkader Messa- Hague and the Western Sahara Dispute,” Mediterranean tures de pouvoir en Algérie: Entre le national et hel has occupied the position of delegate minister for Af- Politics, Spring 2003. l’international,” Revue Tiers Monde, April-June 2012. rican affairs, later expanded to include Maghrebi affairs.

18 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1 of Algeria by the international to drum up support for the Polisario including the Islamist militant group community changed dramatically. Long as the only legitimate interlocutor of Ansar Eddine.18 If diplomacy fails, perceived as a major producer of violent the Sahrawi tribes and delegitimize however, brandishing rhetoric of non- extremism and a human rights violator, Morocco internationally by holding it intervention becomes unsustainable, the country became a victim of Islamist solely responsible for the stalemate.16 especially if a well-planned and well- terrorism and a key actor in the global resourced African-led military effort fight against international terrorism. Algeria also continues to evince a to dislodge violent extremist groups The proliferation of violent extremist strong aversion to interference in the aligned with al-Qa`ida in the Islamic groups in Algeria’s southern hinterland internal affairs of sovereign states. Maghreb (AQIM) has the sanction of the boosted Bouteflika’s push to make The country adamantly refuses to UN Security Council and consent of the Algeria the linchpin in international acquiesce in the application of the authorities in Bamako. counterterrorism efforts in the trans- doctrine of humanitarian intervention Sahara region.13 even in the case of massive human The non-interference principle has rights violations.17 For the Algerians, deepened Algeria’s trust deficit in the The Foreign Policy Disconnect state sovereignty remains the bedrock region and worsened its public image. Bouteflika brought a dose of pragmatism that provides order and stability to Hewing to principled positions at a time to Algeria’s foreign policy, skillfully the international system. This puts the of unprecedented democratic upheavals engineering a strategic rapprochement Algerian paradigm of foreign policy at has earned Algeria the reputation of with the United States and expanding odds with the emerging international being a supporter of rogue regimes. defense and economic trade beyond human rights norm of the “responsibility According to Algerian former diplomat the country’s old partners. Algeria’s Abdelaziz Rahabi, the regime is participation in NATO’s Mediterranean “The crisis in Mali is a struggling to position itself in the new dialogue in 2000 marked an important architecture of international relations step in this regard. This signaled stark reminder that a shift because it has not yet taken stock that shift toward pragmatism, however, toward a more pragmatic the world is changing. This problem did not result in any major changes of adaptation does not apply to foreign to the country’s guiding ideological approach to the imperative policy alone, but it affects the way the imperatives. For example, Algeria’s of non-intervention is whole country is governed as well.19 perception of self-determination remains unchanged, as is demonstrated crucial for Algeria to be Domestic Considerations by its continuing refusal to compromise part of the solution.” Algeria’s opposition toward foreign on the Western Sahara dispute. Despite intervention stems largely from the indifference of the Algerian public principle. Yet in the case of Libya and to this conflict,14 the growing number Syria, it also reflects the Algerian of countries that have severed their to protect.” The multilateral humanitarian regime’s own nervousness about relations with the Polisario,15 and the intervention in Libya and greater Western the creation of another potentially support of most Arab states and the major engagement in Syria and Mali have dangerous precedent for Western world powers for a consensual political brought into focus the major challenges imposed regime change in the Arab solution, Algeria hopes for a referendum facing Algerian foreign policy. The world. Algerian leaders fear that the that leads to the independence of the non-interference policy has limited practice of humanitarian intervention Western Sahara similar to East Timor. the strategic options of Algeria to deal constitutes a slippery slope of more Algerian diplomacy is still driven by the with the tensions in its immediate foreign interference as the effects of same objectives that guided its approach neighborhood. democratic expectations and popular to the conflict since its eruption in protests in the Arab world continue late 1975: using every diplomatic tool The crisis in Mali is a stark reminder to unfold.20 This feeling of unease and that a shift toward a more pragmatic insecurity has only grown with the 13 It is important to note that it was Algeria’s successes approach to the imperative of non- momentous political changes that have in driving violent militant groups out of Algeria and into intervention is crucial for Algeria to be engulfed Tunisia and especially Egypt Sahel-Saharan areas that created a terrorist problem part of the solution. Algeria’s caution where Islamists outmaneuvered the old for fragile states like Mali. By 2003, several Algerian against rushed military intervention is guard generals. The Algerian regime Islamist militants put down their arms as part of two warranted as is its emphasis on dialogue saw in the fall of two neighboring amnesty initiatives launched by President Abdelaziz and negotiations with Tuareg rebels, Bouteflika, while the rest were successfully hunted down 18 Ansar Eddine is one of three groups that now control by Algerian security forces or forced to flee Algerian ter- 16 Ibid. northern Mali. The other two groups are the Movement ritory into northern Mali. 17 Even in the case of Kosovo, Algeria refused to sup- for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and al- 14 According to Algerian journalist Kamel Daoud, the port the NATO air campaign in 1999 to save Muslim Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Algerian public knows of the Western Sahara conflict Kosovars from ethnic massacres by Serbs. When faced 19 Quoted in Sonia Lyes, “Interview with Abdelaziz Ra- through the lens of regime-controlled television and print with respect for the principle of territorial integrity and habi, ‘On fait un mauvais à la diplomatie algérienne,’” media. Yet few Algerians understand why they support Muslim solidarity, Algeria chose the former. See Abde- Tout Sur l’Algerie, July 26, 2012; Abdelaziz Rahabi, “Quelle this “cause.” See Kamel Daoud, “Comment les Algériens nour Benantar, “La démocratisation des Etats arabes re- diplomatie pour l’Algérie?” El Watan, April 9, 2009. voient le reste du monde,” Slate Afrique, July 24, 2012. définira le dialogue de sécurité en Méditerranée,” Notes 20 Personal interview, Algerian journalist, Algiers, Al- 15 Belkaid. Internacionals 29 (2011). geria, June 18, 2012.

19 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1 secular dictatorships a grave prelude their social conditions during a difficult the doctrine of the “responsibility to to the Islamization of both societies, leadership transition.25 protect” against the depredations of undermining their own national security authoritarian regimes sets.28 Second, as well as that of their surroundings.21 Strategic Imperatives: The Case of Libya the regime was concerned about the For critics of Algeria, the country’s effects of regime change on the Western Many government officials have made obstructionism was especially Sahara conflict and the balance of power the case publicly that revolutionary alarming during the Libyan conflict in the region.29 Algeria sees France, change will destabilize the Middle East, where the regime refused to condemn which played a major role in the NATO spreading chaos and fueling the flames the Mu`ammar Qadhafi regime. The intervention, and its regional allies, of Islamist extremism.22 Some have Libyan opposition openly accused even portrayed the Arab uprisings as a the Algerian government of militarily scheme orchestrated by outside powers supporting the Libyan dictator.26 “Many government to reshape the political order of North Algeria’s position toward the conflict officials have made the case Africa.23 A common refrain heard in became more perplexing when it initially refused to recognize the Libyan publicly that revolutionary “The Algerian regime Transitional Council (NTC) after the change will destabilize the death of Qadhafi and the collapse of saw in the fall of two his regime. It took Algeria six days Middle East, spreading neighboring secular after the UN General Assembly voted chaos and fueling the overwhelmingly on September 16, 2011, dictatorships a grave to give Libya’s seat to the NTC to finally flames of Islamist prelude to the Islamization come to terms with the new reality.27 extremism.” This made the regime look increasingly of both societies, anachronistic, obstructionist, and undermining their own inimical to democratic change. This latter explanation of Algeria’s behavior namely Morocco, as the biggest hurdle national security as well as toward the Libyan conflict is, however, in its quest for regional dominance.30 that of their surroundings.” unsatisfying. There is no doubt that If Libya joins the pro-Morocco axis, it the fear of democratic diffusion helped would counterbalance Algeria’s power shape the Algerian regime’s negative and neutralize its ambitions to dominate attitude to the Arab Spring. Yet this is North Africa and the Sahel. Algeria is that Western powers and their not the only factor. Gulf allies, especially Qatar, are the main Most importantly, Algeria feared that driving force behind the revolutions. In the case of the Libyan conflict, the an external intervention in Libya In a speech he delivered on April 14, regime’s decision was mainly informed would reawaken the old ghosts of 2012, President Bouteflika warned that by strategic and security imperatives. ethno-tribal demands for sovereign democracy cannot be imposed from the First, it believed that the humanitarian identity, demands already boosted outside. “The Algerian people, like all calculus behind the intervention was by the Arab Spring promises of peoples who lived under domination, disingenuous and feared the dangerous self-determination.31 The Algerian learned that no foreign party, however precedent that the enforcement of government was convinced that the democratic and developed, will bring overthrow of the Libyan autocrat would them development and democracy,” 25 The uncertainty over the succession of Abdelaziz trigger a devastating chain of events, Bouteflika said. “What is happening Bouteflika, who is expected to retire when his third unleashing a wave of refugees, arms today under the guise of democracy term ends in 2014, is a cause of concern as it creates a proliferation, and most worryingly and respect for human rights remains political vacuum and amplifies popular disaffection. The the return of seasoned Tuareg fighters 32 subject to debate. Because democracy powerful security services are also expecting their own into their countries of origin. The like development can’t be given as a leadership transition. The DRS’ all-powerful and long- 24 gift or imported.” Keen observers serving chief, General Mohamed Mediene, is in his 70s, 28 This conclusion is based on the author’s personal in- of Algeria, however, believe that the and Army Chief of Staff Giad Salah is 80-years-old. The terviews in Algiers with a range of specialists. regime is playing the nationalist card to outcome of these transitions would have ramifications 29 Kamel Daoud, “Pourquoi l’Algérie ne veut pas inter- temper Algerians’ disgruntlement with for the pace of institutional change and the direction of venir au Sahel,” Slate Afrique, September 28, 2012. economic reforms. See Lamine Chikhi, “Algeria Awaits 30 Luis Simon, Alexander Mattelaer and Amelia Had- 21 Driss Cherif, “La politique étrangère algéri- Change After 50 Years Under Ruling Party,” Reuters, field, “A Coherent EU Strategy for the Sahel,” European enne à l’épreuve des révoltes arabes: entre consid- October 16, 2012. Parliament, May 2011; Salim Chena, “Portée et limites de érations internes et impératifs stratégiques,” Con- 26 “Our only response to Algeria is: stop supporting l’hégémonie algérienne dans l’aire sahélo-maghrébine,’” férence internationale, Rabat, Morocco, May 10, 2012. Kadhafi and stop helping him terrorise and kill innocent Hérodote 142:3 (2011): pp. 108-124. 22 Mélanie Matarese, “Face à l’ennemi, Alger mise sur civilians and our loved ones,” said Abdel Hafiz Ghoga, 31 Cherif. l’unité nationale,” El Watan, September 29, 2012. the then vice president of Libya’s National Transitional 32 The Malian Tuareg are Berber nomadic pastoralists 23 Ibid. Council. See “Libyan Rebels Warn Algeria: ‘Stop Back- who had long pushed for autonomy from a central gov- 24 Quoted in Samir Allam, “Bouteflika: La Democracie ing Kadhafi,’” Agence France-Presse, July 10, 2011. ernment they accuse of misrule and marginalization. ne s’octroie pas et s’importe pas comme une usine clés en 27 “Libyan Leader Begins State Visit to Algeria,” Agence Hundreds of Tuareg who served in Qadhafi’s pan-African mains,” Tout Sur L’Algerie, April 14, 2012. France-Presse, April 15, 2012. force, established in 1972, and who fought against Libyan

20 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1 second and third challenges were seen within Libya and halt their flow into military action on January 11, 2013, as the most explosive as they had the neighboring countries has aggravated against advancing Islamist militants potential to empower transnational the militarization of a region full of into the center of Mali is instructive terrorist and criminal groups, internal dissident movements and prone in this regard. The intervention of exacerbate secessionist tendencies and to intrastate conflict. foreign forces (French, Senegalese, reignite simmering insurgencies. The and Nigerian) is a Malian sovereign proliferation of micro-states in Algeria’s The problem for Algeria, however, is decision, as it was done in response to immediate neighborhood is detrimental that given its status as the region’s a plea by the government of Mali, said to the country’s interests and security.33 military power and self-proclaimed Amar Belani, the spokesman of Algeria’s Despite their expressions of attachment role as power-broker, its neighbors Ministry of Foreign Affairs.38 and the international community are looking to it to assume the role of To shed its reputation of perceived “Algerian foreign policy regional stabilizer.35 Inability or obstructionism and hostility to the seems torn between the unwillingness to effectively perform Arab Spring, Algerian leaders now such a role damages its credibility affirm their support for the legitimate country’s desire to be and reputation. Thus far, however, democratic aspirations of the Arab recognized as a regional Algerian foreign policy seems torn people.39 It is still too early to determine between the country’s desire to be whether these changes represent an leader on security, and recognized as a regional leader on evolution toward a more pragmatic its reluctance or inability security, and its reluctance or inability foreign policy approach. The only to use its significant capabilities to conclusion that is certain is that an to use its significant maintain stability in its backyard and absolutist policy of non-intervention capabilities to maintain help restore peace when conflict does will become unsustainable unless break out. adapted to a concept that advances stability in its backyard Algerian security policy and national and help restore peace Conclusion interests. Algerian foreign policy has faced when conflict does break formidable challenges since the Dr. Anouar Boukhars is a nonresident out.” outbreak of the Arab Spring. Its scholar in Carnegie’s Middle East uncompromising position against program. He is an assistant professor outside interference even in cases of of international relations at McDaniel humanitarian emergencies put the College in Westminster, Maryland and to Algeria, an independent Tuareg country out of step with Arab public the author of Politics in Morocco: state might be a powerful inspiration opinion. As a result, its image in the Executive Monarchy and Enlightened for the country’s own Tuaregs in the region suffered greatly, leading some in Authoritarianism (Routledge 2010). south.34 It might also spark a revival Algeria to call for an immediate course in Berber activism, even if Berber correction.36 In a context of geopolitical nationalism remains less threatening to fluidity and emergence of new ambitious the territorial integrity of the state. and competitive actors such as Qatar, Algerian leaders are worried that a hard- Subsequent events vindicated Algeria’s line policy of non-intervention risks assessment of the risks. The devastating marginalizing Algeria and excluding it shock of the Libyan war directly led to from international deliberations on how the explosion of festering historical best to manage the myriad instabilities grievances in northern Mali. Although on its borders and in the rest of the the disintegration of Mali is the product region. of local, national, and international factors that are inexorably intertwined, These concerns have recently it was the Libyan war that transformed contributed to a slight shift in Algeria’s the simmering insurgency in the north stance. The country still opposes any into a full-fledged armed rebellion. The outside interference in Syria, but failure of NATO to control the weapons it has softened its opposition to an international intervention in northern 37 revolutionaries, returned to their homes in northern Mali. Its response to the sudden French Mali after the eruption of the Libyan war. Some of these fighters are the offspring of Tuareg who had migrated to 35 Algeria has $200 billion in foreign currency reserves 38 “Intervention étrangère au Mali: ‘C’est une décision Libya during the 1984 drought or fled the Malian govern- and boasts the largest defense budget in the African con- souveraine’ des autorités maliennes, selon Alger,” El Wa- ment’s repression during the 1963 rebellion. tinent ($10.3 billion). For details, see Borzou Daragahi, tan, January 12, 2013. 33 Ibid. “Algeria: On a Military Spending Spree,” Financial Times, 39 “La politique étrangère algérienne à l’épreuve des ré- 34 In the last few years, the Algerian government has November 15, 2012. voltes arabes: entre considérations internes et impératifs launched an ambitious program of economic develop- 36 Lyes. stratégiques,” Conférence internationale, Rabat, Moroc- ment in southern Algeria. 37 Cherif. co, May 10, 2012.

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Similar to other children of his age, Ishaq.10 The organization was named A Profile of Lashkar-i- Ishaq quit school after the sixth grade, after slain SSP leader Maulana Jhangvi. Jhangvi Leader Malik Ishaq and joined his father’s cloth business. Despite their differences, the two Ishaq did not attend a madrasa (religious organizations remained linked. The By Daud Khattak seminary) for a formal religious formation of LJ was also meant to create education, but his close associates a military wing for the SSP along the in 2012, pakistan suffered a significant said he was influenced by the radical lines of their Shi`a rivals, who were increase in attacks against its minority cleric Maulana Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, using Sipah-i-Muhammad (SM) as Shi`a Muslim population. The incidents the founder of the anti-Shi`a SSP.6 The the armed wing of the Shi`a political occurred in Quetta in Baluchistan SSP, which was created in 1985, served party, Tehrik Nifaz-e-Fiqa Jafria Province, as well as in Kurram Agency the purpose of combating the growing of the Federally Administered Tribal influence of the Iranian Revolution on Areas, Gilgit-Baltistan, Karachi, both Sunni and Shi`a in Pakistan—often “Shortly after Ishaq’s Rawalpindi and other areas around through the use of violence.7 release from prison, the country. In most of the incidents, militants lined up civilians, checked After meeting Maulana Jhangvi in 1989, for example, there was their identities, and then executed Ishaq formally joined the SSP that same an unprecedented rise those suspected of being Shi`a. Other year and began anti-Shi`a activities. attacks involved improvised explosive Ishaq’s close aide said that he was in LJ attacks on Shi`a device (IED) or suicide bomb attacks regularly reading religious literature throughout Pakistan.” on Shi`a worship places, congregations and books authored by religious and mourning processions. The attacks scholars. He used to cite references continued into 2013. On January 10, from this literature during his talks for example, militants targeted Shi`a and discussions on matters relating to (TNFJ). After SSP chief Maulana Muslims at a snooker club in Quetta, Shi`a-Sunni differences.8 Azam Tariq was elected to Pakistan’s killing 86 people.1 National Assembly in 1990 and 1993 From the SSP to LJ and to the Punjab Assembly in 1997, The group Lashkar-i-Jhangvi (LJ) As the SSP evolved, it began to play a the SSP had to rely on LJ for attacks claimed responsibility for the majority more overt role in national politics and against Shi`a.11 This allowed the SSP of attacks. LJ is an anti-Shi`a sectarian eventually became a political party. to deny it had a role in violence.12 militant group that was formed in 1996 With the SSP’s growing interest in Nevertheless, Pakistan’s government by a group of men from the sectarian national politics, it was not able to eventually banned the SSP in 2002 for organization Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan engage in the same level of violence. its role in militancy. (SSP), the latter of which emerged in 1985 This angered some members of the following the Iranian Revolution and the group who wanted to escalate violent Initially, Riaz Basra, who also fought Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.2 activities against Shi`a in Pakistan. in Afghanistan alongside the Taliban These differences escalated after the and is alleged to have run a training Although LJ conceals its leadership assassination of SSP chief Maulana camp for LJ militants in Sarobi district structure, one of the top leaders in Jhangvi by suspected Shi`a insurgents of Kabul,13 was the leader of the newly- the group is Malik Ishaq.3 This article in 1990.9 formed group. Police killed Basra, profiles Malik Ishaq as well as his role however, in May 2002, and Akram in LJ. It also discusses the present These differences eventually led to Lahori became the new leader.14 Yet status of LJ and how the Pakistani state the creation of LJ in 1996. In that year, authorities soon apprehended Lahori as has failed to eliminate the group. a number of SSP members founded LJ, well, and he has been imprisoned since including Muhammad Ajmal (also known June 2002. Early History of Malik Ishaq as Akram Lahori), Riaz Basra and Malik Malik Ishaq was born in 1959 to a middle Since this time, the leadership structure class family in Rahim Yar Khan town in of LJ has not been clear. Yet it is widely 4 Pakistan’s Punjab Province. Although press Tribune, December 26, 2012. known that Ishaq, who was released southern Punjab suffers from widespread 6 Ibid. The journalist quoted Ishaq’s close aide, Attaul- from prison in July 2011 after being poverty, Ishaq’s family owned a cloth lah. jailed in 1997, now plays an important 5 15 shop as well as a small piece of land. 7 Arif Jamal, “A Profile of Pakistan’s Lashkar-i-Jhangvi,” role in the group. Shortly after Ishaq’s CTC Sentinel 2:9 (2009). The SSP would combat armed 1 Abdul Sattar, “Pakistani Shiites Protest After Bomb- Shi`a groups as well. For example, Sipah-i-Muhammad 10 Syed Shoaib Hasan, “Divided We Fall,” Dawn, No- ings Kill 120,” Associated Press, January 10, 2013. (SM) was an armed wing of the Shi`a group Tehrik Ni- vember 2, 2012. 2 Khalid Ahmad, “Who Killed General Zia?” Express Tri- faze Fiqa Jafria (TNFJ). See personal interview, Ayesha 11 Amir Rana, “Maulana Azam Tariq Profile,” Daily bune, December 7, 2012. Seddiq, author of The Military Inc., December 23, 2012. Times, October 7, 2003. 3 See, for example, “Pakistan Arrests Banned LeJ Leader 8 Personal interview, Rabia Mahmood, journalist, Ex- 12 Jamal, “A Profile of Pakistan’s Lashkar-i-Jhangvi.” Malik Ishaq,” Dawn, August 30, 2012. press Tribune, December 26, 2012. The journalist quoted 13 “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, 4 “Blood Flows Freely in Pakistan,” Ahlul Bayt News Ishaq’s close aide, Attaullah. undated. Agency, October 10, 2011. 9 “Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Terrorist Group of Paki- 14 Ibid. 5 Personal interview, Rabia Mahmood, journalist, Ex- stan,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, undated. 15 “The Release of Malik Ishaq,” Express Tribune, July 15,

22 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1 release from prison, for example, there carrying members of the Shi`a sect, leaders often face death threats.29 was an unprecedented rise in LJ attacks and killing all those identified as Indeed, many of the witnesses and on Shi`a throughout Pakistan. Shi`a.23 In September 2011, for example, their relatives in cases against Ishaq militants stopped a bus carrying Shi`a were found murdered.30 Ishaq’s reach Malik Ishaq’s Suspected Role in LJ pilgrims in Baluchistan Province, and extends far. The Punjab government, Ishaq has long been accused of playing proceeded to kill 26 passengers who a role in militancy. In 1997, Pakistani were identified as Shi`a pilgrims.24 LJ “There are increasing signs authorities arrested him on charges of claimed responsibility. Then, in August murder, death threats and intimidation. 2012, suspected LJ militants forced 25 that the TTP, LJ and al- Authorities allege that he masterminded Shi`a out of a bus in Gilgit-Baltistan Qa`ida have collaborated the notorious attack on the Sri Lankan and executed them.25 According to cricket team in Lahore in 2009 from police, the militants first checked each to target both the Pakistani his prison cell.16 In that attack, a group passenger’s identification papers, government as well of gunmen fired on the bus carrying killing those identified as Shi`a. These Sri Lankan cricketers, injuring six of are just two recent examples of a string as Shi`a in Pakistan. them.17 Six Pakistani policemen and of sectarian killings against Shi`a. Eventually Pakistan will two civilians were killed. According to multiple press reports, Ishaq himself For many analysts, it is not a coincidence be forced to address LJ’s admitted in October 1997 that he was that this rise in attacks came after Ishaq, escalating violence.” involved in the killings of 102 people.18 the founding member of LJ, achieved freedom.26 Despite the many charges and accusations, authorities released Ishaq Weak Government Response for example, is accused of providing from prison in July 2011 due to lack of Pakistan’s government has been financial support to Ishaq’s family evidence. As stated in the Express Tribune, criticized for its failure to punish during the years he was in jail, with the “Malik Ishaq’s counsel declared that militant leaders such as Malik Ishaq. apparent purpose to ensure peace in the his client had been imprisoned for over The government already has a history province.31 12 years and that the prosecution had of supporting anti-Shi`a outfits, or failed to produce any cogent evidence at least turning a blind eye to their Nevertheless, there are increasing which could implicate him in any of the activities. According to Arif Jamal, signs that the TTP, LJ and al-Qa`ida 44 cases of culpable homicide for which “For Pakistan, Malik Ishaq is a good have collaborated to target both the he was accused, out of which he had Taliban as his group does not carry out Pakistani government as well as Shi`a been acquitted in 34.”19 attacks on the Pakistani military and in Pakistan.32 Eventually Pakistan will is ready to carry forward the military’s be forced to address LJ’s escalating Upon his release, Ishaq’s first statement national and regional agenda.”27 This violence. to his Kalashnikov-wielding supporters is in contrast to militants from Tehrik- was that “we are ready to lay down lives i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), who target Conclusion for the honor of the companions of the Pakistani state interests. Many argue Pakistan’s government has a history Holy Prophet.”20 His statement was that Pakistan chooses to concentrate of collaborating with militant groups immediately interpreted as a threat to its resources on the various anti-state that share its interests. Besides the the Shi`a and a morale boost for his LJ groups, such as the TTP, rather than obvious case of Lashkar-i-Tayyiba and activists.21 Later in the year, Ishaq was create new enemies in LJ or, for example, the Kashmir conflict, Pakistan also present at anti-U.S. rallies and public Lashkar-i-Tayyiba.28 reportedly supported the SSP and LJ meetings of the Difa-e-Pakistan Council in the 1980s to weaken Shi`a Muslims (DPC).22 The courts have been criticized for who might sympathize with the Iranian inaction as well, although the judges, Revolution of 1979.33 Yet in most of Soon after his release, there was a lawyers and their families involved in these instances of state complicity with notable rise in attacks on Shi`a in the cases against prominent militant militant groups, Pakistan eventually several Pakistani cities attributed to lost control over the relationship. LJ. In these attacks, a new tactic was 23 “Pakistan Shias Killed in Gilgit Sectarian Attack,” employed: stopping passenger buses BBC, August 16, 2012. 24 Ibid.; Omer Farooq Khan, “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Claims 29 Ibid. 2011. Balochistan Attack,” Times of India, September 21, 2011. 30 Ibid. 16 “Pakistan Arrests Banned LeJ Leader Malik Ishaq.” 25 Ibid. 31 Ibid. 17 Jane Perlez, “For Pakistan, Attack Exposes Security 26 Arif Jamal, “A Dangerously Free Man,” Daily Jang, 32 Amir Rana, “Enemy of the State - Lashkar-e-Jhangvi Flaws,” New York Times, March 3, 2009. September 9, 2012. As stated by Jamal, “Soon after his and Militancy in Pakistan,” Jane’s Defence Security Report, 18 Harris bin Munawar, “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and the release on bail, Malik Ishaq started his campaign against August 5, 2009; “Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,” Mapping Militant ‘Lack of Evidence,’” Dawn, July 19, 2011. the Shias which resulted in more violence against them.” Organizations, Stanford University, August 3, 2012. 19 “The Release of Malik Ishaq.” 27 Ibid. 33 Ibid.; Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Mili- 20 Munawar. 28 Arif Jamal, “Meet ‘Good Taliban’ the Pakistani State tancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and 21 Ibid. Nurtured in the Last Three Decades,” The News Interna- the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies 22 Ibid. tional, September 18, 2012. 34:1 (2000): p. 157.

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A clear example is the case of Malik November 5, 2012 (GLOBAL): The Ishaq and LJ. When the number of LJ Recent Highlights in United Nations added the Haqqani armed activists was in the hundreds, the Terrorist Activity network to its Taliban sanctions threat was limited and the relationship list. The United States also recently could be controlled. Yet now that November 1, 2012 (UNITED STATES): designated the Haqqani network as a thousands of radicalized youth have A U.S. court sentenced Rezwan global terrorist group. – BBC, November 5 joined or support LJ, the relationship Ferdaus to 17 years in prison for is no longer manageable.34 The January plotting to use remote-controlled November 5, 2012 (SYRIA): A suicide 10 attack on Hazara Shi`a in Quetta model planes to bomb the Pentagon bomber killed a number of Syrian that killed 86 people underscores this and the U.S. Capitol building in soldiers at a checkpoint in Hama problem.35 Washington, D.C. Ferdaus is a U.S. Province. Syria’s state-run news citizen of Bangladeshi descent. – AP, agency said that the blast killed two Apart from the support of state November 2 people, while the opposition claimed intelligence agencies for the militant that the bomber killed 50 soldiers. outfits, the courts equally failed to November 2, 2012 (PAKISTAN): The bomber was a member of Jabhat award punishments to the militant Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) al-Nusra, a Salafi-jihadi group. – CNN, leaders. Malik Ishaq was charged in threatened Pakistan’s largest political November 5 nearly 200 criminal cases, but the party in Karachi, the Muttahida Qaumi frightened judges used to welcome him Movement (MQM). The TTP called November 5, 2012 (NIGERIA): honorably in court, and even offered the MQM the “apostate tyrants of Nigeria’s national security adviser him “tea and cookies.”36 Karachi.” The MQM has been publicly warned that there is “increasing critical of the Taliban, especially since cooperation between the Boko Haram As the U.S. withdrawal from the shooting of 15-year-old schoolgirl group in Nigeria and established Afghanistan draws nearer, and Malala Yousafzai by Taliban militants. terror groups operating in the Sahel.” the Taliban’s attacks on sensitive – Dawn, November 2 – AFP, November 5 Pakistani military installations continue to increase, the people’s trust November 3, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A November 6, 2012 (GLOBAL): Al- in the state and its security agencies is suicide bomber targeted the regional Qa`ida leader Ayman al-Zawahiri eroding, and the country’s dozens of head of a government-allied militia in released a new video telling Somalia’s militant outfits are bringing instability Buner District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa al-Shabab insurgents to fight back to dangerous new levels. Province, killing the leader as well as against the “crusader invaders.” five other people. – AP, November 3 Kenyan troops recently pushed al- Daud Khattak is Senior Editor with RFE/ Shabab out of its last major stronghold RL’s Mashaal Radio in Prague, Czech November 3, 2012 (BURKINA FASO): in Kismayo. Al-Zawahiri urged al- Republic. Besides working in Afghanistan Representatives of Ansar Eddine, an Shabab to “show them [foreign as Editor at Pajhwok Afghan News from Islamist militant group in control of troops] the fire of jihad and its heat. 2005-2008, he worked with Pakistani northern Mali, arrived in Burkina Faso Chase them with guerrilla warfare, English newspapers covering the situation for mediation talks with President ambushes, martyrdom [suicide in KP and FATA. In 2010, his paper Blaise Compaore. Ansar Eddine is one operations].” – Reuters, November 6 on the situation in Swat, “The Battle for of three Islamist groups that control Pakistan: Swat Valley,” was published by northern Mali; the other two are al- November 6, 2012 (IRAQ): A suicide the New America Foundation. Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb and bomber drove an explosives-laden the Movement for Unity and Jihad in vehicle into a group of Iraqi soldiers West Africa. – AP, November 3 outside an army base in Taji, 12 miles north of Baghdad, killing approximately November 3, 2012 (SOMALIA): Two 31 people. – Reuters, November 6 suicide bombers targeted the Village restaurant and café near Mogadishu’s November 7, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A Soobe intersection, killing at least one suicide bomber on foot targeted the person. The restaurant is frequented vehicle of a senior police investigator by government officials and members in Peshawar, killing him and his of the Somali diaspora. – GaroweOnline, colleagues. The explosion killed at November 3 least six people. – AFP, November 7

November 4, 2012 (KENYA): Suspected November 7, 2012 (YEMEN): Gunmen militants threw a grenade into a on a motorbike assassinated a church located in a police compound Yemeni intelligence officer in Sana`a. 34 Personal interview, Ayesha Seddiq, author of The in Garissa, killing one policeman. “Officials say at least 55 military, Military Inc., December 23, 2012. Garissa is close to Kenya’s border intelligence and police officers have 35 Sattar. with Somalia. – BBC, November 3 been killed in Yemen since mid- 36 “In Pakistan, a Militant Deal Sours,” Dawn, October 2011, with most of the assassinations 28, 2011. focusing on individuals working

24 january 2013 . Vol 6. Issue 1 in counterterrorism operations,” November 16, 2012 (UNITED STATES): November 21, 2012 (PAKISTAN): according to the Associated Press. Adis Medunjanin, a Bosnian-born U.S. A suicide bomber targeted a Shi`a Al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula citizen, was sentenced to life in prison Muslim procession and killed at least is suspected of being behind the for his role in plotting a suicide bomb 13 people in Rawalpindi. The attack assassination campaign. – AFP, attack on New York City subways in occurred only hours after two other November 7 2009. – Reuters, November 16 bomb blasts killed at least three people near a Shi`a gathering in Karachi. November 7, 2012 (SOMALIA): A car November 16, 2012 (UNITED STATES): – The News International, November 21; Reuters, bomb exploded outside Mogadishu’s The Federal Bureau of Investigation November 21 Federal Parliament building, killing added Radullan Sahiron, an Abu one officer. – GaroweOnline, November 7 Sayyaf Group leader, to its list of November 22, 2012 (PAKISTAN): The most wanted terrorists. The FBI also Pakistani Taliban promised to attack November 8, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A added Omar Hammami, an American India to avenge the death of Mohammed Pakistani Taliban suicide bomber member of Somalia’s al-Shabab, to the Ajmal Kasab, a Pakistani man who rammed an explosives-laden truck into list. – Philippine Star, November 16 was executed by India on November one of the entrances of the Pakistan 21 for his role in the November 2008 Rangers headquarters in Karachi’s November 16, 2012 (YEMEN): A Mumbai attacks. – CNN, November 22 North Nazimabad area, killing at least suicide bomber linked to al-Qa`ida three soldiers. – Dawn, November 8; BBC, in the Arabian Peninsula killed three November 23, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): November 8 people inside the headquarters of A suicide bomber in a vehicle government-allied militias in Abyan detonated explosives near a NATO-run November 8, 2012 (YEMEN): A Province. – Reuters, November 16 training base in the capital of Wardak suspected U.S. drone killed three Province, killing three people. – AFP, suspected members of al-Qa`ida in November 19, 2012 (UNITED STATES): November 23 the Arabian Peninsula near Sana`a. U.S. authorities charged four Los – al-Jazira, November 9 Angeles area men who were allegedly November 23, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): on their way to Afghanistan to train A suicide bomber detonated an November 12, 2012 (UNITED with the Taliban and al-Qa`ida. The explosives-laden vehicle near a joint KINGDOM): A UK court ruled that men were also allegedly plotting to kill Afghan-NATO border post in Torkham Abu Qatada, an alleged al-Qa`ida U.S. soldiers and bomb government in Nangarhar Province, injuring five operative, could not be deported installations. Authorities discovered Afghan security guards. – AFP, November from the United Kingdom to Jordan the men due to jihadist social media 23 to face terrorism charges. The judges postings. According to CNN, “The said that they were not convinced he three exposed their connection to November 24, 2012 (MOROCCO): would face a fair trial in Jordan. He each other and their radical leanings Authorities in Morocco announced was allowed to return to his home in explicitly on Facebook for over a that they broke up a cell training London. – CBS News, November 12 year. And one of them detailed his youths to fight in Mali. – Reuters, intentions to participate in jihad in November 24 November 14, 2012 (GLOBAL): U.S. an online chat with an FBI employee.” General Carter Ham, the head of U.S. – CNN, November 20 November 25, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A Africa Command, warned that al- bomb ripped through a Shi`a Muslim Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) November 19, 2012 (PAKISTAN): procession in Dera Ismail Khan, killing “will become stronger and they will A female suicide bomber wearing a at least six people. The Pakistani gain capability to export violence burqa targeted Qazi Husain Ahmad, Taliban claimed responsibility. – AP, throughout a broader region than the former chief of Jamaat-i-Islami November 25 Africa and certainly the high potential Pakistan, in Mohmand Agency of the to export violence into Europe and to Federally Administered Tribal Areas. November 25, 2012 (NIGERIA): Two the USA” if the group is not stopped. Qazi Ahmad escaped unharmed, suicide bombers attacked a church in – AFP, November 14 however. – AP, November 19 a barracks in Kaduna State, killing at least 11 people. Authorities suspect November 14, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): November 21, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): that the Boko Haram group was Taliban militants shot to death A suicide bomber killed two Afghan responsible. – Reuters, November 25 two Afghan men who worked as guards outside a NATO-run military interpreters for NATO troops in Logar compound in the main diplomatic November 26, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Province. – AFP, November 14 area of Kabul. Guards shot to death A bomb was discovered under the a second suicide bomber before he vehicle of well-known television November 14, 2012 (PAKISTAN): could detonate his explosives. – NBC anchor Hamid Mir. The Taliban Pakistan said that it released at News, November 21 claimed responsibility for the failed least seven senior Afghan Taliban assassination, saying that Mir was prisoners as part of peace negotiations “promoting secular forces.” – AP, in neighboring Afghanistan. – New York November 27 Times, November 14

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November 27, 2012 (IRAQ): Three December 2, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): December 6, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A separate bomb attacks in predominately Multiple Taliban suicide bombers suspected U.S. drone killed a senior Shi`a Muslim areas of Baghdad killed attacked a joint U.S.-Afghan airbase al-Qa`ida leader in North Waziristan at least 19 people. – BBC, November 27 in Jalalabad, killing four Afghan Agency of the Federally Administered soldiers and two civilians. According Tribal Areas. The leader was identified November 28, 2012 (YEMEN): Gunmen to Afghan authorities, nine suicide as Khaled bin Abdel Rahman al- assassinated a Saudi diplomat and attackers were involved. NATO said Hussainan (also known as Abu Zaid his bodyguard in Sana`a. Authorities that the militants failed to penetrate al-Kuwaiti). – Voice of America, December 8; suspect that al-Qa`ida in the Arabian the airbase. According to the BBC, AP, December 9 Peninsula was responsible, although “Afghan officials said the first four the group later denied involvement. attackers had arrived in explosive- December 9, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): The gunmen were wearing army laden cars and targeted different Afghan and coalition forces rescued uniforms. – Voice of America, November 28; entrances to the airfield early on Dr. Dilip Joseph, an American Yemen Post, December 2 Sunday. Others who had followed on physician who was kidnapped by foot battled security guards.” – BBC, the Taliban, in eastern Afghanistan. November 29, 2012 (PAKISTAN): December 2 During the raid, at least six people A suicide bomber attempted to were killed, including a member of a assassinate Mullah Nazir, a prominent December 2, 2012 (NIGERIA): U.S. Navy SEAL team. – New York Times, pro-government, anti-U.S. Taliban Suspected Boko Haram group members December 9 commander. Mullah Nazir was injured killed 10 Christians in Chibok, Borno in the attack, which occurred in South State. – al-Jazira, December 3 December 9, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A Waziristan Agency of the Federally suspected U.S. drone killed a senior Administered Tribal Areas. – Dawn, December 3, 2012 (GLOBAL): U.S. al-Qa`ida commander and three November 29 General Carter Ham, the head of U.S. others in North Waziristan Agency Africa Command, said that there are of the Federally Administered Tribal November 29, 2012 (NIGERIA): Boko “clear indications of collaboration Areas. The commander was identified Haram leader Abubakar Shekau amongst” al-Qa`ida in the Islamic as Mohammad Ahmed Almansoor. released a new video, expressing Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram. He – Reuters, December 9 solidarity with global jihadists. He said that the United States has seen saluted fighters from the “Islamic state evidence that Nigeria’s Boko Haram December 10, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): in Mali,” as well as those in Somalia, “is receiving financial support, some Gunmen shot to death a female official Libya, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, training, probably some explosives in charge of the women’s affairs Yemen, and Palestine. – AFP, November from al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, department for eastern Laghman 29 in a relationship that goes both ways.” Province. According to the Associated – Bloomberg, December 3 Press, the woman, Najia Sediqi, had November 30, 2012 (YEMEN): Yemen’s taken the job after her predecessor Interior Ministry announced the December 4, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A was killed in a bomb attack in July arrest of Suleiman Hassan Mohammed suicide bomber in an explosives-laden 2012. – AP, December 10 Murshed Awad (also known as Abu vehicle attacked a checkpoint outside Osama al-Abi) in Zinjibar, Abyan a police station in Bannu District December 10, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): Province. He was described as an al- of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, A roadside bomb killed the police Qa`ida leader and one of the country’s wounding six people. – AFP, December 4 chief for Nimroz Province as he was most wanted fugitives. – AP, December 1 traveling home from neighboring December 5, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Two Herat Province. – AP, December 10 December 1, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A suicide bombers in an explosives- suicide bomber in a vehicle detonated laden vehicle attacked the Zarai Noor December 10, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Four explosives near a police headquarters Camp in Wana, South Waziristan Taliban suicide bombers attacked in Uruzgan Province, killing two Agency, killing at least three Pakistani a police station in Bannu District children and a civilian. – RFE/RL, soldiers. – CNN, December 5; Voice of America, of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, December 1 December 5 killing at least eight police and civilians. – Reuters, December 10 December 1, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A December 6, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): A suspected U.S. drone killed a Yemeni suicide bomber attempted to assassinate December 10, 2012 (SYRIA): The al-Qa`ida-linked fighter in South Afghan Intelligence Chief Asadullah U.S. State Department designated Waziristan Agency of the Federally Khalid in Kabul. Khalid survived Jabhat al-Nusra, a Salafi-jihadi rebel Administered Tribal Areas. The man the attack, but sustained injuries to group in Syria, as a foreign terrorist was identified as Abdul Rehman al- his abdomen and chest. Authorities organization linked to al-Qa`ida in Zaman Yemeni. – Dawn, December 1 said that the bomber posed as a Iraq (AQI). The State Department Taliban peace messenger, detonating essentially identified the group as a his explosives vest near Khalid. wing of AQI. – CNN, December 11; Christian The Afghan Taliban quickly took Science Monitor, December 10 responsibility. – Bloomberg, December 6

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December 11, 2012 (UNITED STATES): “superficial allegations, frivolous December 22, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A A U.S. court sentenced Shaker Masri to ramblings and whimsical desires suicide bomber killed a Pakistani almost 10 years in prison for plotting of those who wish to enhance their politician at a rally for the Awami to attend a militant training camp in image at the price of jihad and the National Party in Peshawar. The Somalia with the hopes of becoming a mujahideen.” Earlier in 2012, al- politician, Bashir Balour, was a suicide bomber for al-Qa`ida and al- Amriki had criticized al-Shabab in a provincial cabinet minister. The blast Shabab. Masri, a Chicago man, was number of video statements. – CNN, killed at least seven other people. – al- born in Alabama. – AP, December 11 December 17 Jazira, December 22

December 12, 2012 (IRAQ): A suspected December 20, 2012 (MALI): The UN December 23, 2012 (IRAQ): Iraqi al-Qa`ida detainee attempted to blow Security Council authorized military authorities arrested 66 members of himself up inside a prison cell in action to retake northern Mali from the the Islamic State of Iraq in Karbala Baghdad. The explosion wounded control of al-Qa`ida-linked militants. Province. An Iraqi security source the man, along with six others. Iraqi The resolution, however, demanded said that the men were planning authorities were trying to determine that the plan must entail both military attacks against Shi`a Muslims. – UPI, how the detainee acquired an and political solutions to help reunify December 24 explosives belt. – AP, December 12 the country. – AP, December 20 December 24, 2012 (YEMEN): A December 13, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): December 20, 2012 (NIGERIA): A suspected U.S. drone killed two al- A suicide bomber in a vehicle attacked group of approximately 30 militants Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula a NATO base in Kandahar, killing a kidnapped a French engineer in militants in Ra`da, Bayda Province. U.S. soldier and two civilians. The Katsina State. French President Three other militants were critically Taliban claimed responsibility. – AFP, Francois Hollande suggested that the injured. – AP, December 24 December 13 militants probably belonged to al- Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb or an December 26, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): December 14, 2012 (YEMEN): Yemeni allied group. – BBC, December 21 A suicide bomber in a vehicle airstrikes killed two militants in detonated explosives outside Camp Abyan Province. – AAP, December 15 December 21, 2012 (YEMEN): Chapman, a major U.S. military base Gunmen kidnapped two Finns and in Khost Province. An Afghan guard December 15, 2012 (PAKISTAN): one Austrian in Sana`a. According and two Afghan civilians were killed. Militants attacked a military base to Agence France-Presse, “The three The Taliban claimed responsibility. attached to Bacha Khan International are an Austrian man and a Finnish – AP, December 26 Airport in Peshawar, killing at least man, both students of Arabic, and a three civilians. The militants fired Finnish woman who arrived recently December 28, 2012 (PAKISTAN): rocket-propelled grenades and automatic in Yemen.” Authorities suspect that Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) weapons at the airport. Tehrik-i- the gunmen belonged to al-Qa`ida in chief Hakimullah Mehsud said that Taliban Pakistan claimed responsibility. the Arabian Peninsula. – AFP, December his militia is willing to negotiate with – Washington Post, December 15 22 authorities, but they will not disarm. “We believe in dialogue but it should December 16, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): December 21, 2012 (PAKISTAN): An not be frivolous,” he said. “Asking France announced that officials from explosion killed Taliban commander us to lay down arms is a joke.” In the the Afghan government, the Taliban Maulvi Abbas in South Waziristan video, Hakimullah Mehsud is seen movement and other factions would soon Agency of the Federally Administered sitting next to his deputy, Wali-ur- meet near Paris to discuss the future Tribal Areas. Two other people were Rehman. – Reuters, December 28 of Afghanistan. – Reuters, December 16 killed as well, including one of the commander’s sons. There was no claim December 28, 2012 (YEMEN): A December 17, 2012 (AFGHANISTAN): of responsibility. – RFE/RL, December 21 suspected U.S. drone killed two A suicide bomber attacked a U.S. suspected militants belonging to al- contracting company’s compound in December 21, 2012 (PAKISTAN): Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula in Kabul, killing two Afghan civilians. Gunmen stopped a bus in Baluchistan Hadramawt Province. – Reuters, December The Taliban claimed responsibility. Province, checked the identification 28 – Reuters, December 17 of the passengers, and then executed three men. Two other male passengers, December 29, 2012 (YEMEN): Al- December 17, 2012 (SOMALIA): Al- who were kidnapped by the militants, Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula Shabab released a new statement were later found dead. – RFE/RL, (AQAP) placed bounties worth tens saying that American al-Shabab December 21 of thousands of dollars to anyone who member Abu Mansur al-Amriki had kills the U.S. ambassador to Yemen or been kicked out of the group. The al- December 21, 2012 (TUNISIA): an American soldier in the country. Shabab statement called al-Amriki’s Authorities in Tunisia announced AQAP said the offer was valid for six past videos “childish petulance.” that they arrested 16 members of an months. – New York Times, December 30 Al-Shabab also said that the group’s al-Qa`ida-linked cell in the country. goals would not be tarnished by the – Bloomberg, December 22

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December 30, 2012 (PAKISTAN): CTC Sentinel Staff Authorities found the bodies of 21 tribal policemen who were Editor-in-Chief previously kidnapped by the Taliban Erich Marquardt near Peshawar. The men, who were Senior Editor, CTC discovered tied up and blindfolded, had all been executed. – Guardian, Editorial Board December 30 COL Michael J. Meese, Ph.D. Department Head December 30, 2012 (PAKISTAN): A Department of Social Sciences (West Point) suicide bomber in an explosives-laden vehicle rammed into a bus carrying COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. Shi`a Muslim pilgrims in Baluchistan Deputy Department Head Province, killing 19 people. – Guardian, Department of Social Sciences (West Point) December 30

MAJ Bryan Price, Ph.D. Director, CTC

Contact Combating Terrorism Center U.S. Military Academy 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall West Point, NY 10996 Phone: (845) 667-6383 Email: [email protected] Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/

* For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383

support The Combating Terrorism Center would like to express its gratitude to its financial supporters, for without their support and shared vision of the Center products like the CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how to support the Combating Terrorism Center, please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association of Graduates at 845-446-1561.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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