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Boko Haram and the Kidnapping of the Chibok Schoolgirls

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Boko Haram and the Kidnapping of the Chibok Schoolgirls MAY 2014 . VOL 7 . ISSUE 5 Contents Boko Haram and the FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Boko Haram and the Kidnapping of Kidnapping of the Chibok the Chibok Schoolgirls By Jacob Zenn Schoolgirls REPORTS By Jacob Zenn 8 The ISIL’s Stand in the Ramadi-Falluja Corridor By Michael Knights 12 Kidnappings and Murders Targeting Foreigners in Libya By Alison Pargeter 17 The British Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria By Raffaello Pantucci 21 A Profile of Ahrar-ul-Hind and Ansar-ul-Mujahidin in Pakistan By Zia Ur Rehman 24 Al-Hijra: Al-Shabab’s Affiliate in Kenya By Fredrick Nzes 26 Recent Highlights in Political Violence 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts A woman chants slogans during a rally calling for the release of the missing Chibok schoolgirls in Lagos, Nigeria. - Pius Utomi Ekpei/Getty n april 14, 2014, Boko Haram Despite an outcry from the militants kidnapped more international community, social than 250 schoolgirls media and civil society, this operation from Chibok in Nigeria’s was consistent with Boko Haram’s Onortheastern Borno State. Soon after the previous militant activities in the kidnapping, reports surfaced that Boko Nigeria-Cameroon-Chad-Niger border Haram may have transferred many of the region and its founder Muhammad girls from Nigeria to Cameroon, Chad Yusuf’s non-recognition of colonial-era About the CTC Sentinel and as far as Central African Republic’s political boundaries that “cut off Niger The Combating Terrorism Center is an Birao region near Sudan.1 In a video and Chad and amalgamated [Borno] independent educational and research released on May 5, 2014, Boko Haram with infidels.”3 As Shekau, who is institution based in the Department of Social leader Abubakar Shekau announced he Yusuf’s former deputy, said in his May 5 Sciences at the United States Military Academy, would “sell” the schoolgirls as “slaves statement, “we don’t know Cameroon or West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses in the market,” and on May 12 proposed Chad…I don’t have a country. Islamiyya the Center’s global network of scholars and that “if you want us to release your girls is what I have.”4 practitioners to understand and confront that we kidnapped, you must release our contemporary threats posed by terrorism and brethren that are held in Borno, Yobe, other forms of political violence. Kano, Kaduna, Enugu and Lagos states, Chibok Girls into Slavery – Boko Haram,” Vanguard, May as well as Abuja.”2 6, 2014; “Chibok Girls: Boko Haram Proposes Prisoner Exchange,” Punch, May 12, 2014. The views expressed in this report are those of 3 Shaykh Muhammad Yusuf, Tarihin Musulmai (History of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 1 “Abducted Chibok Girls Seen in Central Africa,” Punch, Muslims), video from pre-July 2009, accessed May 2014. the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. May 11, 2014. 4 Omonobi, “#BringBackOurGirls: We’ll Sell Chibok 2 Kingsley Omonobi, “#BringBackOurGirls: We’ll Sell Girls into Slavery – Boko Haram.” 1 MAY 2014 . VOL 7. ISSUE 5 This article analyzes Boko Haram’s After suffering losses, the Nigerian These members were aided by their pre- area of operations along the Borno- Taliban focused on preaching Salafist existing connections to al-Qa`ida and Cameroon border with a focus on ideology based on the “pure teachings” its affiliates, and Boko Haram’s regional kidnappings, as they have become of the Taliban and Usama bin Ladin network of sub-leaders.12 In July 2010, Boko Haram’s primary method of self- and providing community services.9 after AQIM’s leader promised “men, sustainable funding and are a tactic Yusuf and other leaders, however, weapons, and ammunition” for the first introduced in northern Nigeria also dispatched members to the Sahel, “mujahidin in Nigeria,” Shekau gave an by Nigerian al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan to interview to a blindfolded journalist in Maghreb (AQIM) militants who formed receive funds to build madrasas and a hideout near Maiduguri, Borno State, the faction Ansaru5 in 2012.6 The mosques and acquire militant training saying that he “assumed leadership” of article reviews Boko Haram’s militant and advice from al-Qa`ida, especially Boko Haram13 and declared to America networks in Nigeria and abroad from after Bin Ladin declared Nigeria “ready that “jihad has begun.”14 2003 to 2012, traces Boko Haram’s for liberation” in 2003.10 retreat to southern Borno and northern From 2010 to 2012, Shekau led Boko Cameroon after Nigerian President When security forces killed Boko Haram Haram in northeastern Nigeria, while Goodluck Jonathan declared a state founder Yusuf and 800 followers in militants who trained with and received of emergency in 2013, and discusses July 2009, more than 100 Boko Haram funding from AQIM and al-Shabab how several factions may have come members fled to the border region, returned to Nigeria and established cells together to carry out the kidnapping the Sahel, and Somalia, while Shekau, in northwestern Nigerian states under in Chibok in April 2014. Finally, the according to one member, “hid in the article suggests that “Shekau” may have 11 desert between Chad and Sudan.” 3, 2011; personal interview, Idayat Hassan, Centre for become a nom de guerre representing Democracy and Development West Africa (CDD), May all Boko Haram leaders, including the oon,” Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 2014; “Nigerian Taliban Reportedly Reforming to Strike real Shekau, in a confederation. This February 21, 2014; Aminu Abubakar, “Nigerian Troops Again a Year After Uprising,” Agence France-Presse, confederation pools resources together and Islamic Militants Trade Gunfire in Mountains,” July 16, 2010. from all factions for major attacks, such Agence France-Presse, September 25, 2004. 12 These sub-leaders included Mamman Nur, third-in- as the one in Chibok, but disagrees over 9 Emanuel Goujon and Aminu Abubakar, “Nigeria’s command, from Cameroon (although some reports sug- two main issues: terms for a cease-fire ‘Taliban’ Plot Comeback from Hide-outs,” Agence gest he is from Chadian parents); attack planner Abu with the Nigerian government and the France-Presse, January 11, 2006. Mahjin from Chad; chief logistician Abubakar Kilakam killing of Muslim civilians.7 10 A Nigerian convert to Islam told the BBC in 2009 from Niger; and Saudi-connected financier Muhiddin that he “met Yusuf two weeks after finding the sect in Abdullahi from Sudan. According to Vanguard, “As far Boko Haram’s Area of Operations Maiduguri and was asked by [Yusuf] to go to Afghani- back as 2010, the Algerian government had said avail- The first confrontations between Boko stan,” where he “spent three months and was trained as able intelligence reports confirmed that extremist Ni- Haram (then called the “Nigerian a bomb specialist” and was “supposed to train five people gerian Islamic group, Boko Haram, has linked up with Taliban”) and Nigerian security forces on his return, but when he did not receive his money he AQIM...[Boko Haram] sent out some six members to took place in 2003 at Boko Haram’s escaped.” See also “Chapter 2 -- Country Reports: Africa Algeria to learn how to make Improvised Explosive De- “Afghanistan” compound located two Overview,” U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2008, vices. Indeed, the students, in the light of Boko Haram’s miles from Niger and less than 100 miles which implicates Yusuf and other “Nigerian Taliban” bombing raids, appeared to have learnt well.” See Jacob from Yusuf’s and Shekau’s hometowns leaders in illegally receiving foreign currency, includ- Zenn, “Northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram: The Prize in al- in Yobe, and in 2004 near Gwoza ing funds from “an al-Qa`ida affiliate in Sudan” as well Qaeda’s Africa Strategy,” The Jamestown Foundation, in the Mandara Mountains along as from “two al-Qa`ida operatives in Pakistan,” sending November 2012; “Al-Qaeda Takes Over Boko Haram,” Nigeria’s border with Cameroon.8 “Nigerian Taliban” members to train with AQIM in the Vanguard, March 9, 2014. Sahel and “passing coded messages from Pakistan to Ni- 13 Shekau announced that he formed Jama`at Ahl al- 5 Ansaru is the abbreviated name for Jama`at Ansar al- gerian Taliban members on how to carry out terrorist ac- Sunna li al-Da`wa wa al-Jihad (People Committed to Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan, which in Arabic means Sup- tivities against American interests in Nigeria.” See “Boko the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad), porters of Muslims in the Land of Black Africans. Haram Looks to Mali,” Africa Confidential, November 30, although it was commonly known as “Boko Haram,” 6 “Security Officials and Christians Are Enemies of Is- 2012; “Boko Haram Scare For Nigeria’s Police Boss,” PM which means “Western education is sinful” in the Hausa lam and Muslims, We Will Target and Kill Them – Says News Nigeria, July 23, 2011; Ikechukwu Nnochiri, “Dan- language in Nigeria. Spokesman of Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladi Su- ger Alert: Al-Qaeda Boss in West Africa Lives in Kano,” 14 On October 2, 2010, AQIM’s media wing, al-Andalus, dan, Abu Ja’afar,” Desert Herald, June 5, 2012; “Algerian Odili.net, April 8, 2012; “Nigerian ‘Trained in Afghani- also published a statement by Abubakar Shekau to the Journalist on ‘Real’ Identity of AQLIM Leader, AQLIM stan,’” BBC, September 2, 2009. Shumukh al-Islam jihadist web forum, which marked Future in Nigeria,” Agence France-Presse, October 27, 11 An International Crisis Group report said that “in the first time that AQIM ever disseminated any official 2010. 2010-2012, Boko Haram was reported to have trained message from another militant leader or group.
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