Boko Haram and the Kidnapping of the Chibok Schoolgirls

may 2014 . Vol 7 . Issue 5

Contents Boko Haram and the

FEATURE ARTICLE 1 Boko Haram and the Kidnapping of Kidnapping of the Chibok the Chibok Schoolgirls By Jacob Zenn Schoolgirls Reports By Jacob Zenn 8 The ISIL’s Stand in the Ramadi-Falluja Corridor By Michael Knights 12 Kidnappings and Murders Targeting Foreigners in Libya By Alison Pargeter 17 The British Foreign Fighter Contingent in Syria By Raffaello Pantucci 21 A Profile of Ahrar-ul-Hind and Ansar-ul-Mujahidin in Pakistan By Zia Ur Rehman 24 Al-Hijra: Al-Shabab’s Affiliate in Kenya By Fredrick Nzes

26 Recent Highlights in Political Violence 28 CTC Sentinel Staff & Contacts

A woman chants slogans during a rally calling for the release of the missing Chibok schoolgirls in Lagos, Nigeria. - Pius Utomi Ekpei/Getty n april 14, 2014, Boko Haram Despite an outcry from the militants kidnapped more international community, social than 250 schoolgirls media and civil society, this operation from Chibok in Nigeria’s was consistent with Boko Haram’s Onortheastern Borno State. Soon after the previous militant activities in the kidnapping, reports surfaced that Boko Nigeria-Cameroon-Chad-Niger border Haram may have transferred many of the region and its founder Muhammad girls from Nigeria to Cameroon, Chad Yusuf’s non-recognition of colonial-era About the CTC Sentinel and as far as Central African Republic’s political boundaries that “cut off Niger The Combating Terrorism Center is an Birao region near Sudan.1 In a video and Chad and amalgamated [Borno] independent educational and research released on May 5, 2014, Boko Haram with infidels.”3 As Shekau, who is institution based in the Department of Social leader Abubakar Shekau announced he Yusuf’s former deputy, said in his May 5 Sciences at the United States Military Academy, would “sell” the schoolgirls as “slaves statement, “we don’t know Cameroon or West Point. The CTC Sentinel harnesses in the market,” and on May 12 proposed Chad…I don’t have a country. Islamiyya the Center’s global network of scholars and that “if you want us to release your girls is what I have.”4 practitioners to understand and confront that we kidnapped, you must release our contemporary threats posed by terrorism and brethren that are held in Borno, Yobe, other forms of political violence. Kano, Kaduna, Enugu and Lagos states, Chibok Girls into Slavery – Boko Haram,” Vanguard, May as well as Abuja.”2 6, 2014; “Chibok Girls: Boko Haram Proposes Prisoner Exchange,” Punch, May 12, 2014. The views expressed in this report are those of 3 Shaykh Muhammad Yusuf, Tarihin Musulmai (History of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, 1 “Abducted Chibok Girls Seen in Central Africa,” Punch, Muslims), video from pre-July 2009, accessed May 2014. the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government. May 11, 2014. 4 Omonobi, “#BringBackOurGirls: We’ll Sell Chibok 2 Kingsley Omonobi, “#BringBackOurGirls: We’ll Sell Girls into Slavery – Boko Haram.”

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This article analyzes Boko Haram’s After suffering losses, the Nigerian These members were aided by their pre- area of operations along the Borno- Taliban focused on preaching Salafist existing connections to al-Qa`ida and Cameroon border with a focus on ideology based on the “pure teachings” its affiliates, and Boko Haram’s regional kidnappings, as they have become of the Taliban and Usama bin Ladin network of sub-leaders.12 In July 2010, Boko Haram’s primary method of self- and providing community services.9 after AQIM’s leader promised “men, sustainable funding and are a tactic Yusuf and other leaders, however, weapons, and ammunition” for the first introduced in northern Nigeria also dispatched members to the Sahel, “mujahidin in Nigeria,” Shekau gave an by Nigerian al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan to interview to a blindfolded journalist in Maghreb (AQIM) militants who formed receive funds to build madrasas and a hideout near Maiduguri, Borno State, the faction Ansaru5 in 2012.6 The mosques and acquire militant training saying that he “assumed leadership” of article reviews Boko Haram’s militant and advice from al-Qa`ida, especially Boko Haram13 and declared to America networks in Nigeria and abroad from after Bin Ladin declared Nigeria “ready that “jihad has begun.”14 2003 to 2012, traces Boko Haram’s for liberation” in 2003.10 retreat to southern Borno and northern From 2010 to 2012, Shekau led Boko Cameroon after Nigerian President When security forces killed Boko Haram Haram in northeastern Nigeria, while Goodluck Jonathan declared a state founder Yusuf and 800 followers in militants who trained with and received of emergency in 2013, and discusses July 2009, more than 100 Boko Haram funding from AQIM and al-Shabab how several factions may have come members fled to the border region, returned to Nigeria and established cells together to carry out the kidnapping the Sahel, and Somalia, while Shekau, in northwestern Nigerian states under in Chibok in April 2014. Finally, the according to one member, “hid in the article suggests that “Shekau” may have 11 desert between Chad and Sudan.” 3, 2011; personal interview, Idayat Hassan, Centre for become a nom de guerre representing Democracy and Development West Africa (CDD), May all Boko Haram leaders, including the oon,” Integrated Regional Information Networks (IRIN), 2014; “Nigerian Taliban Reportedly Reforming to Strike real Shekau, in a confederation. This February 21, 2014; Aminu Abubakar, “Nigerian Troops Again a Year After Uprising,” Agence France-Presse, confederation pools resources together and Islamic Militants Trade Gunfire in Mountains,” July 16, 2010. from all factions for major attacks, such Agence France-Presse, September 25, 2004. 12 These sub-leaders included Mamman Nur, third-in- as the one in Chibok, but disagrees over 9 Emanuel Goujon and Aminu Abubakar, “Nigeria’s command, from Cameroon (although some reports sug- two main issues: terms for a cease-fire ‘Taliban’ Plot Comeback from Hide-outs,” Agence gest he is from Chadian parents); attack planner Abu with the Nigerian government and the France-Presse, January 11, 2006. Mahjin from Chad; chief logistician Abubakar Kilakam killing of Muslim civilians.7 10 A Nigerian convert to Islam told the BBC in 2009 from Niger; and Saudi-connected financier Muhiddin that he “met Yusuf two weeks after finding the sect in Abdullahi from Sudan. According to Vanguard, “As far Boko Haram’s Area of Operations Maiduguri and was asked by [Yusuf] to go to Afghani- back as 2010, the Algerian government had said avail- The first confrontations between Boko stan,” where he “spent three months and was trained as able intelligence reports confirmed that extremist- Ni Haram (then called the “Nigerian a bomb specialist” and was “supposed to train five people gerian Islamic group, Boko Haram, has linked up with Taliban”) and Nigerian security forces on his return, but when he did not receive his money he AQIM...[Boko Haram] sent out some six members to took place in 2003 at Boko Haram’s escaped.” See also “Chapter 2 -- Country Reports: Africa Algeria to learn how to make Improvised Explosive De- “Afghanistan” compound located two Overview,” U.S. Department of State, April 30, 2008, vices. Indeed, the students, in the light of Boko Haram’s miles from Niger and less than 100 miles which implicates Yusuf and other “Nigerian Taliban” bombing raids, appeared to have learnt well.” See Jacob from Yusuf’s and Shekau’s hometowns leaders in illegally receiving foreign currency, includ- Zenn, “Northern Nigeria’s Boko Haram: The Prize in al- in Yobe, and in 2004 near Gwoza ing funds from “an al-Qa`ida affiliate in Sudan” as well Qaeda’s Africa Strategy,” The Jamestown Foundation, in the Mandara Mountains along as from “two al-Qa`ida operatives in Pakistan,” sending November 2012; “Al-Qaeda Takes Over Boko Haram,” Nigeria’s border with Cameroon.8 “Nigerian Taliban” members to train with AQIM in the Vanguard, March 9, 2014. Sahel and “passing coded messages from Pakistan to Ni- 13 Shekau announced that he formed Jama`at Ahl al- 5 Ansaru is the abbreviated name for Jama`at Ansar al- gerian Taliban members on how to carry out terrorist ac- Sunna li al-Da`wa wa al-Jihad (People Committed to Muslimin fi Bilad al-Sudan, which in Arabic means Sup- tivities against American interests in Nigeria.” See “Boko the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad), porters of Muslims in the Land of Black Africans. Haram Looks to Mali,” Africa Confidential, November 30, although it was commonly known as “Boko Haram,” 6 “Security Officials and Christians Are Enemies of Is- 2012; “Boko Haram Scare For Nigeria’s Police Boss,” PM which means “Western education is sinful” in the Hausa lam and Muslims, We Will Target and Kill Them – Says News Nigeria, July 23, 2011; Ikechukwu Nnochiri, “Dan- language in Nigeria. Spokesman of Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina fi Biladi Su- ger Alert: Al-Qaeda Boss in West Africa Lives in Kano,” 14 On October 2, 2010, AQIM’s media wing, al-Andalus, dan, Abu Ja’afar,” Desert Herald, June 5, 2012; “Algerian Odili.net, April 8, 2012; “Nigerian ‘Trained in Afghani- also published a statement by Abubakar Shekau to the Journalist on ‘Real’ Identity of AQLIM Leader, AQLIM stan,’” BBC, September 2, 2009. Shumukh al-Islam jihadist web forum, which marked Future in Nigeria,” Agence France-Presse, October 27, 11 An International Crisis Group report said that “in the first time that AQIM ever disseminated any official 2010. 2010-2012, Boko Haram was reported to have trained message from another militant leader or group. Although 7 Shekau believes a cease-fire can only be negotiated in Somalia’s Lower Shabelle and Lower Juba regions, al-Qa`ida core and Usama bin Ladin did not “recognize” once Boko Haram has created an Islamic state or Nigeria acquiring IED and suicide attack skills. Members en African affiliates like Boko Haram, in 2010 AQIM, al- adopts a Boko Haram-approved version of Shari`a, while route to Somalia allegedly entered Kenya posing as Mus- Qa`ida in Iraq, and al-Shabab issued condolences to the other factions appear to be willing to accept a cease-fire lim preachers and social workers.” Mamman Nur also “mujahidin” and “monotheists” in Nigeria. The October in return for compensation for Boko Haram members reportedly “returned from Somalia” before he master- 2010 statement from Shekau (which, perhaps, was writ- killed in the July 2009 clashes and the reconstruction of minded the UN Headquarters attack in August 2011. See ten by al-Qa`ida) sent Shekau’s “glad tidings” to various mosques, as well as punishment of the government offi- “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram In- al-Qa`ida leaders and affiliates.” See “Periodical Review cials who took part in the crackdown on Boko Haram. surgency,” International Crisis Group, April 2014; “How July 2010 – No. 2,” International Institute for Counterter- 8 “Arms Smuggling to Boko Haram Threatens Camer- Nur, Shekau Run Boko Haram,” Vanguard, September rorism, August 2010.

2 may 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 5 the leadership of longtime Nigerian to the Nigerian security forces, which using the pseudonym “Muhammed AQIM militant Khalid al-Barnawi.15 contributed to Ansaru’s gradual demise Marwan”),21 who accepted a second-in- These northwestern cells, in contrast to and necessitated al-Barnawi to reconcile command role to Shekau. Nur’s faction Shekau’s faction in Borno, specialized with Shekau in late 2012.18 attacked “un-Islamic” places such as in sophisticated bombings that bore beer halls, international targets like the “hallmark of al-Qa`ida.”16 Boko Retreat to Gwoza the UN Headquarters, organized a plot Haram claimed all attacks until March After the elimination of Ansaru as a on the U.S. ambassador in Abuja, and 2012, when al-Barnawi led a cell that competitor, Shekau appointed new bombed motor parks in Kano and Abuja kidnapped and killed an Italian and a leaders to replace Ansaru’s commanders, to send “messages” to the Nigerian British engineer in Sokoto and claimed including ones close to al-Barnawi.19 government and traditional Muslim it under “al-Qa`ida in the Lands Beyond After the deaths or arrests of these leaders to release Boko Haram prisoners the Sahel.” In January 2012, al-Barnawi commanders as well as Shekau’s own and to offer compensation for victims of had formed a new militant group called commanders in Yobe and Adamawa, the July 2009 clashes.22 Ansaru, which attacked Nigerian however, Boko Haram became primarily soldiers and prisons in Abuja and Kogi a Borno-based movement, with 75% 21 While it is widely believed that “Muhammed Marwan” and carried out three kidnappings in of its attacks in Borno during the first is a pseudonym, there is also speculation that Marwan 17 Nigeria. Due to a dispute over funding three months of 2013 (compared to 35% may refer to a former Boko Haram “spiritual adviser” 20 from AQIM, ideology and Shekau’s in 2012). Only Kano remained under named Abdullahi Damasak. This author, however, be- “ruthless” leadership style, Shekau’s the influence of Mamman Nur (likely lieves that Marwan is likely a pseudonym for Mamman faction reportedly leaked information Nur for the following reasons: the name Muhammed about some “traitorous” Ansaru cells 18 Ansaru and Boko Haram had a dispute over shar- Marwan may be in reference to Mamman (another spell- ing funds from AQIM and the issue of Muslim civilian ing for Muhammed) and Marwa, Nur’s hometown in 15 Other leaders included Adam Kambar in Kano, Ka- deaths, but, according to the International Crisis Group, Cameroon; Marwan’s claim to have released the seven- biru Sokoto in Sokoto, and Abu Muhammed in Kaduna. “after they reconciled, Barnawi allegedly entered into a member French family kidnapped in northern Camer- See Jide Ajani, “UN House Blast: Mastermind, Nur, De- deal by which Shekau, who had the men, would provide oon in April 2013, which is in Nur’s current area of oper- clared Wanted,” Vanguard, September 1, 2011; “Nigerian security cover, while Barnawi, who had the skills, would ations and an operation Nur’s faction likely carried out in Islamists Vow ‘Fiercer’ Attacks,” Agence France-Presse, kidnap Westerners. Part of the ransom money would coordination with al-Barnawi’s faction; Marwan’s claim June 15, 2011; “Madalla Bombing: Kabiru Sokoto Says fund Boko Haram operations.” Nonetheless, leaks led to to have carried out a motor park bombing in Kano, which ‘No Case to Answer,’” Pilot Africa, May 17, 2013; “Boko the arrests or deaths of several Ansaru commanders as resembles the motor park bombings in Abuja in April Haram Gets N40Million Donation From Algeria,” Saha- well as Abu Qaqa, who defected from Boko Haram be- and May 2014, whose connection to al-Shabab and Suda- ra Reporters, May 13, 2012; “North Africa Qaeda Offers cause of Shekau’s unfair treatment of non-Kanuris like nese Boko Haram networks suggest Nur may have been to Help Nigerian Muslims,” Reuters, February 1, 2010. Qaqa, who is an Ebira from Kogi. The reconciliation was involved since Nur was trained by al-Shabab and Nur 16 Shekau’s faction focused on carrying out assassina- confirmed in November 2012, when Shekau released a masterminded the two other major bombings in Abuja of tions, church and school arson attacks, prison breaks statement in which he issued “glad tidings” to the “Islam- the UN Headquarters and Federal Police Headquarters and mass assaults on government buildings that left ic State of Mali” and other al-Qa`ida leaders and affiliates. in 2011; Marwan’s claim to be “second-in-command” many Muslim civilians dead. The northwestern cells See “Horror in Sokoto – Al-Qaeda-Funded Group Killed to Shekau, which is consistent with Nur’s natural rank carried out bombings, including: in Jos on Christmas Hostages”; Alli, “Kabiru Sokoto Names Boko Haram’s in Boko Haram after Yusuf’s death. Nur, like Marwan, Day in 2010; at the Federal Police Headquarters and UN Leaders”; “Power Tussle in Boko Haram Led to Sect was also opposed to Shekau’s obstinate stance on nego- Headquarters (the first suicide bombings in Nigeria’s Leader’s Arrest,” Leadership, March 26, 2012; “Dozens tiations and was in favor of negotiations with the gov- history) and Madalla church in Abuja in 2011; and 10 of Boko Haram Help Mali’s Rebel Seize Gao,” Vanguard, ernment over the release of Boko Haram prisoners and church bombings in Kaduna in 2012, including on Eas- April 9, 2012; “Mali – Mokhtar Belmokhtar, un des chefs compensation for the July 2009 clashes. Like Marwan, ter. The Madalla church is in Niger State, but not far from d’Aqmi, est à Gao,” Lepoint.fr, July 4, 2012; “Exclusive: Nur was also likely based in Kano because Kano was the Abuja. In Shekau’s third video message on April 12, 2012, The Last Days of Shekau, Boko Haram Leader,” Van- hub of international funding to Boko Haram; Nur’s con- he said that “some Muslims are using the Boko Haram guard, August 25, 2013; “Boko Haram Leaders Flee Hot nections to al-Shabab and AQIM and involvement in the name to make money,” but indicated that he would not Mali to Nigeria,” The Nation, January 31, 2013; “Curbing UN Headquarters attack, which was planned from Kano, take action against such individuals because they would Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency.” suggest that Kano is where Nur would have received face “ultimate punishment in the afterlife.” It is possible 19 Perhaps as part of their reconciliation, Shekau ap- such funds. Marwan’s absence from making public state- that Shekau knew of Ansaru’s formation but decided to pointed al-Barnawi’s trainee, “Assalafi,” in Sokoto, and ments from his base in Kano since August 2013 may also let Ansaru exist and later use the name “Boko Haram” his own commanders, such as Muhammed Zangina, in be attributed to the fact that Nur has been reported by in videos and possibly even imposters of Shekau without Kaduna. By 2013, however, the security forces arrested Cameroonian sources to be operating in northern Cam- retribution, although it is likely Shekau’s faction leaked “Assalafi” and Zangina, while Shekau’s sub-command- eroon in early 2014. Moreover, Boko Haram commander information about certain Ansaru cells to the Nigerian ers in northeastern Nigeria, such as Abubakar Yola in Kabiru Sokoto said in February 2012 after his arrest that security forces. Adamawa and Mommudu Bama in Yobe, were killed. Abdullahi Damasak had already been arrested. See “An- 17 Ansaru may have eliminated “al-Qa`ida” from its See “Another Boko Haram Commander Killed in Shoo- other Boko Haram Figure Speaks, Ruling Out Dialogue name to avoid international scrutiny and, per AQIM’s tout,” PM News Nigeria, September 25, 2012; Michael With Nigeria Gov’t,” Sahara Reporters, January 29, 2013; advice, to distance itself from Boko Haram’s killing of Olugbode, “JTF Kills Top Boko Haram Commander in David Martosko, “Hillary Clinton’s State Department Muslim civilians. See “Barnawi, Kambar: Qaeda-linked Combined Operation,” This Day, April 28, 2013; “Nige- Refused to Classify Boko Haram as a ‘Terror Group’ Militants with Boko Haram Ties,” Agence France- rian Troops ‘Kill Boko Haram Commander Momodu Even After it Threatened to ‘Murder the U.S. Ambassa- Presse, June 21, 2012; Yusuf Alli, “Kabiru Sokoto Names Bama,’” BBC, August 14, 2013; “Boko Haram Looks to dor’ to Nigeria,” Daily Mail, May 15, 2014; Alli, “Kabiru Boko Haram’s Leaders,” The Nation, February 14, 2012; Mali.” Sokoto Names Boko Haram’s Leaders.” Jide Ajani, “Horror in Sokoto – Al-Qaeda-Funded Group 20 These percentages are based on the author’s personal 22 Nur’s “messages” likely included the motor park Killed Hostages,” Vanguard, March 11, 2012. statistics. bombing in Kano (which was claimed by “Muhammed

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The French-led military intervention In response to these attacks, President received and prisoners exchanged in northern Mali in January 2013 Jonathan ordered a state of emergency as a result of these kidnappings in may have indirectly revitalized Boko in Borno, Yobe and Adamawa on May Cameroon as well as the kidnappings Haram.23 From March to May 2013, 14, 2013, which coincided with the of 12 women in Bama in May 2013—who former Ansaru, Boko Haram and other creation of the civilian Joint Task were exchanged for the release of 90 militants who fought with or learned Force (JTF) to track down Boko Haram Boko Haram members, their wives and from militants in Mali launched attacks militants.26 Boko Haram’s foot soldiers children, and possibly ransom money— along northeastern Borno’s border with abandoned Maiduguri and retreated likely incentivized Boko Haram to carry Niger and Cameroon. They attacked a from the deserts and swamplands of out more kidnappings, such as the one military barracks in Monguno, a prison northeastern Borno and Lake Chad to in Chibok, to pressure the Nigerian and in Bama and destroyed three towns: mountainous rural areas near Gwoza in Cameroonian governments to cede to Baga, Marte, and Maiha.24 For the first southern Borno, which is 15 miles from Boko Haram’s demands for the exchange time in Nigeria, militants mounted Chibok, where the 250 schoolgirls would of more ransom money and prisoners.29 weapons on 4x4 vehicles, kidnapped later be kidnapped. Gwoza is also where To protect its operational space in government officials and their relatives “university-educated Nigerian Taliban” northern Cameroon, Boko Haram to exchange for ransoms of $10,000 members carried out abductions of issued a series of warnings to Cameroon to $300,000, and supported a more Christian women in 2004 until they in fliers signed in Shekau’s name saying ethnically and religiously inclusive were expelled by Nigerian troops and that vigilantes (keskes) would be targeted ideology like Ansaru’s and AQIM’s— “vigilantes,” the latter of which were a and “Cameroonians, we have not but unlike Shekau’s—that called on predecessor to the civilian JTF.27 attacked you; do not attack us.”30 The “Muslim youths” to fight not “in the name of any sect, clan, or country,” but Context of the Chibok Kidnapping edly $12.5 million from the Cameroonian government). 25 for Islam. In 2013 and early 2014, Boko Haram’s A third kidnapping took place in April 2014, when mili- newly formed “special kidnapping tants kidnapped two Italian priests and a Canadian nun Marwan”) in March 2013 and likely also the two bomb- squad,” which may be part of al-Barnawi’s in Tchéré, Cameroon—near Nur’s reported hometown of ings in a motor park outside of Abuja in the month before faction, kidnapped several foreigners in Marwa—and brought them toward the Nigerian border Nigeria hosted the World Economic Forum on May 7, northern Cameroon and brought them (their location remains unknown). A fourth kidnap- 2014. to Borno, while Nur’s faction utilized ping of 10 Chinese engineers in Waza, Cameroon, took 23 An intelligence report by Nigeria’s State Security Ser- Nur’s “guerrilla expertise” in the border place on May 17, 2014, and, like the Tchéré kidnapping, vice (SSS) “revealed that some 200 persons suspected to region and contacts with Kanuri tribal they were probably taken to Borno. Although the third be of Nigerian origin successfully completed their train- elders in Cameroon to facilitate hostage kidnapping remains unclaimed, suspicions fell on Boko 28 ing at a camp in Mali.” They reportedly fled Mali before negotiations. The total ransom money Haram, while the first one of the French family was first a French airstrike in January 2013. Security experts told claimed by Boko Haram, but in a statement that, like this author that the mounting of weapons on 4x4 vehi- racks”; “Twenty Islamists Killed in Northeast Nigeria: AQIM and previous Ansaru statements, was in Arabic cles in Borno after the French-led military intervention Military,” Agence France-Presse, March 3, 2013; “New and criticized France for the intervention in Mali. The in Mali was likely a tactic learned from Mali. See “French Boko Haram Sect Emerges, Shows Off Large Cache Of second kidnapping of the French priest was claimed Foreign Minister Says Documents Show Nigeria’s Boko Arms And Ammunitions,” Information Nigeria, May 2, by Boko Haram in “coordination” with Ansaru. See Haram Trained in North Mali,” Fox News, November 14, 2013. “Senior Officials in Cameroon Suspected of Complicity 2013; “B’Haram’s Anti-Aircraft Training Camp Uncov- 26 “Nigerian Islamists Retreat, Apparently to Fight An- With Nigerian Islamic Sect,” Cameroon-Info.net, April ered in Niger,” Punch, February 19, 2014; “Over 200 Ni- other Day,” Reuters, June 7, 2013. 11, 2014; “Abducted Chinese Likely in Nigeria – Camer- gerians Train as Terrorists in Mali, Says Report,” Nigeria 27 In December 2013, 80% of Boko Haram attacks were oon,” Vanguard, May 17, 2014; Guibai Guitama, “Cam- Political Economist, May 9, 2014. in areas of Borno south of Maiduguri—the most limited eroun – Libération du père Georges Vandenbeusch: Le 24 “Boko Haram Claims Responsibility For Attacks area of operations in its history. Gwoza is also about one négociateur désigné de Boko Haram réclame son argent,” in Baga, Bama; Promises More On The Way,” Sahara mile from Cameroon and six miles from Nigeria’s Sambi- L’Oeil du Sahel, January 6, 2014; Ola Audu, “Boko Haram Reporters, May 13, 2013; “Boko Haram Latest Threats: sa Forest. Its population is approximately 50% Christian, Threatens JTF Spokesperson, Demands Prisoners Ex- Maiduguri JTF Spokesperson, Sagir Musa Responds,” 40% Muslim and 10% animist. See “Nigerian Christians change for French Nationals,” Premium Times, March 18, Sahara Reporters, May 20, 2013; “Boko Haram Mili- Brace for More ‘Taleban’ Attack,” Nigeria/Africa Mas- 2013; “Nigeria’s Boko Haram ‘Got $3m Ransom’ to Free tants Shows Off Weapons ‘Captured’ From an Army terweb News Report, March 1, 2005; “Army ‘Corners’ Hostages,” BBC, April 26, 2013; “Taking the Hostage Barracks,” Sahara TV, April 29, 2013; Ndahi Marama, Boko Haram Leader, Shekau, in Borno Hills - Punch Road,” Africa Confidential, March 15, 2013; “Curbing Vio- “Kidnapped Monguno Regains Freedom After Payment Newspaper,” Sahara Reporters, July 26, 2013. lence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency.” of Ransom,” Vanguard, May 7, 2013. 28 The first such kidnapping was in February 2013, when 29 One estimate suggested that Boko Haram received up 25 According to Boko Haram spokesman Abu Qaqa af- militants kidnapped a seven-member French family in to $70 million in total from al-Qa`ida funding streams. In ter his arrest in 2012, Boko Haram members who refused Waza, Cameroon, who were released in Gwoza in April addition, an anonymous expert suggested to the author to go on suicide missions faced the “death penalty.” He 2013 for $3.14 million from the Cameroonian government that some of the money paid to AQIM for four French- also said that Shekau’s tendency to select non-Kanuris and in exchange for 19 prisoners in Cameroonian and Ni- men in northern Mali “ended up in Boko Haram’s pock- for such missions alienated members from other ethnic gerian prisons. A Nigerian journalist told the author that ets.” See Jide Ajani, “Funding of Terror Network: ‘Boko groups. Some members also preferred Mamman Nur as this ransom money “did not go to Shekau.” The second Haram Got Over N11bn to Kill and Maim,’” Vanguard, leader over Shekau because Shekau’s focus was domes- kidnapping was in November 2013, when militants kid- May 4, 2014; Chris Okocha et al., “Women, Children De- tic, while Nur’s was more transnational. See Yusuf Alli, napped a French priest in Nguechewe, Cameroon, and tainees to be Released First, Says FG,” This Day, May 23, “How Bombers are Chosen, by Boko Haram Suspect,” released him weeks later on “compassionate grounds,” 2013; Senator Iroegbu, “JTF: ‘We’ve Rescued 9 Hostages The Nation, February 9, 2012; “Boko Haram Militants but also in return for a weapons smuggler in a Camer- Held by Boko Haram,’” This Day, May 25, 2013. Shows Off Weapons ‘Captured’ From an Army Ba- oonian prison and an undisclosed sum of money (report- 30 The fliers were released between December 2013 and

4 may 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 5 fliers coincided with religious leaders kidnapping in Chibok in coordination Nigeria and Cameroon.36 “Muhammed from Borno recruiting youths among with Boko Haram’s factional leaders, Marwan”—who is likely Mamman Nur— Cameroon’s Kanuri population using including Aminu “Tashen-Ilmi,”33 Nur, claimed responsibility for releasing a persuasion and financial inducements, al-Barnawi and Shekau.34 Tashen- seven-member French family kidnapped increased arms trafficking to Boko Ilmi was a member of the “Nigerian in northern Cameroon in April 2013 for Haram along Cameroon’s border with Taliban” when that group carried out $3.14 million and says he is in control similar small-scale kidnappings and of Boko Haram’s “arms and finances.”37 could have leveraged contacts for the These arms and finances are likely “There are likely several Chibok operation with his former co- derived from kidnappings with al- Boko Haram factions, disciples, Shekau and Nur, the latter of Barnawi’s faction, weapons deals along whom was then operating in northern the Chadian-Cameroonian border, and but they come together Cameroon.35 Similarly, Nur’s faction contacts between Nur’s faction and in a confederation for has possibly coordinated kidnappings AQIM, al-Shabab and sponsors in Sudan with al-Barnawi in Cameroon and and possibly the Persian Gulf region.38 major attacks, such as the Borno since February 2013, and the Locally rooted factional leaders, such kidnapping in Chibok, and latter’s faction may have carried out as Ngalyike and Tashen-Ilmi, who the kidnapping and cross-border may have been involved in the Chibok also coordinate their public transfer of some girls, “marketed” the kidnapping and are likely in Borno or relations strategy.” attack with Shekau’s “fear-mongering” along the border with Cameroon, can video on May 5 and proof-of-life video self-finance their factions through on May 12, and then transferred some looting villages as “spoils of war.”39 girls deeper into the Sahel or Central Chad, militants in Borno retreating Africa. As for Shekau, he was reportedly to northern Cameroon and Chad after injured in northern Mali in 2012, attacks, and the assassination of Factions and Faux Shekaus returned to Borno after the French-led informants in Cameroon.31 It was in Al-Barnawi may be outside of Nigeria, military intervention, and recovered the context of these kidnap-for-ransom possibly in Niger, where some Ansaru from wounds in Amchide, Cameroon, in operations and a rear base in northern militants retreated after the French August 2013, where, according to some Cameroon that the Chibok kidnapping intervention in northern Mali, but his reports, he died—but Shekau emerged occurred on April 14, 2014. faction operates regionally, including in 36 Evidence of Ansaru’s operations in Niger include the Local Boko Haram unit leaders statement of an Ansaru member, Abu Ali al-Nigeria, in in Gwoza, such as Ibrahim Tada Haram plan its sporadic, but large-scale attacks in Mai- the video that Mokhtar Belmokhtar’s faction and the 32 Ngalyike, may have carried out the duguri, such as on Maiduguri Air Base in December 2013 Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and Giwa Barracks in March 2014. It is also possible that released after they jointly carried out suicide attacks on February 2014 in northern Cameroon. See “Boko Haram Tashen-Ilmi, Shekau and Maiduguri-based operational a French uranium mine in Arlit, Niger, and on the mili- Met en Garde le Cameroun,” Le Septentrion, February leaders in coordination with militants in the Mandara tary barracks in Agadez, Niger, in retaliation for Abu 2014. Mountains like Ngalyike are responsible for carrying out Zeid’s death and Niger’s support of France’s “war on 31 Farouk Chotia, “Will Nigeria’s Abducted Schoolgirls massacres of villages in southern Borno, targets which Shari`a” in Mali in 2013. Ansaru may also have taken Ever be Found?” BBC, May 12, 2014; “Are Nigeria’s are rejected by other Boko Haram factions, including part in the June 1, 2013, attack on a prison in Niamey, Neighbors Safe Havens for Boko Haram?” Voice of Amer- Mamman Nur’s and the shura that broke from Shekau Niger’s capital, that freed 22 prisoners, including a long- ica, March 25, 2014; David Wemai, “Cameroun - Goulfey: in July 2013. See Joe Brock, “Insight: Boko Haram, Tak- time AQIM member, and may have intended to free Une impressionnante cache d’armes découverte,” L’Oeil ing to Hills, Seize Slave ‘Brides,’” Reuters, November several detained Boko Haram or Ansaru members. See du Sahel, March 27, 2014; “288 Rifles, 35 Rockets Seized 17, 2013; Kingsley Omonobi et al., “Chibok: American “Le Mujao revendique le double attentat et promet qu’il y From Terrorists in Cameroon,” Vanguard, April 1, 2014; Marines Locate Abducted Girls in Sambisa Forest, Van- en aura d’autres,” Radio France Internationale, May 24, “Cameroun: Boko Haram recrute des jeunes à la fron- guard, May 10, 2014. 2013; “Niger: Boko Haram Prisoners Tried to Escape,” tière avec le Nigeria,” Jeune Africa, April 3, 2014; “Arms 33 Tashen-Ilmi is from a town near Gwoza and was a for- Associated Press, June 2, 2013; Ola Audu, “How Boko Smuggling to Boko Haram Threatens Cameroon”; Moki mer “Nigerian Taliban” member involved in the clashes Haram Turned to Kidnapping to Raise Funds in Borno,” Edwin Kindzeka, “Boko Haram Attacks Near Border in 2003 and 2004. He also was a University of Maidug- Premium Times, May 20, 2014. Spark Fear in Cameroon,” Voice of America, January 17, uri dropout who, like Shekau, previously believed Yusuf 37 For an explanation of some reasons why Niger’s Diffa 2014; Stephanie Gosk, “Nigerian Neighbor Cameroon was too “soft” and that “Bin Ladin does the work of God.” has not seen the same level of Boko Haram-related secu- Faces ‘Phantom Enemy’ Boko Haram,” NBC News, May See “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram rity threats as compared to Cameroon, see Jacob Zenn, 20, 2014. Insurgency”; Emmanuel Goujon & Aminu Abubakar, “Niger’s Security Strategy in Boko Haram’s Badlands,” 32 In late 2013, Ngalyike, who was a militant known for “Nigeria’s ‘Taliban’ Plot Comeback from Hide-outs,” The Soufan Group, February 12, 2014; “We are Ready “using traditional charms that make him disappear,” be- Agence France-Presse, January 11, 2006. to Accept Amnesty – Boko Haram Leaders,” Codewit gan attacking security forces and civilian JTF members 34 Another reported factional leader is “Abu Sumayya,” World News, April 21, 2013. and seizing teenage girls who, like the Chibok school- although in an interview he referred to Shekau as the 38 Regis Soubrouillard, “Interview with Alain Chouet, girls, were forced to wear veils and cook for Ngalyike’s leader of Boko Haram. See “Interview with One Mujahid Former Director of Intelligence at the French General Di- foot-soldiers. The name “Tada Ngalyike” suggests that from Jama`at Ahl al-Sunna li al-Da`wa wa al-Jihad in rectorate of External Security,” Marianne, May 20, 2014. he is Dghwede from near Gwoza. Ngalyike’s unit hid Nigeria,” As-Sawarim Media Foundation, May 26, 2014. 39 Chesa Chesa, “Boko Haram Kills Over 100, Abducts in the mountains outside of Gwoza, and also received 35 “Suspected Boko Haram Militants Attack in Camer- Eight More Girls in Borno,” Daily Independent, May 6, “guests” from Maiduguri, which may have helped Boko oon,” Channel 4 News, May 17, 2014. 2014.

5 may 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 5 in a credible September 2013 video.40 In new shura’s cease-fire and that “Shekau 2013 and reiterated that peace would August 2013, Shekau may nonetheless lost leadership” of Boko Haram, despite only come when Shari`a is adopted in have been deposed in a “coup” by some followers remaining loyal to Nigeria.45 members of his shura, after which Shekau.42 Shekau’s appointed spokesman, Abu The possibility of multiple factions Zamira, announced that “commanders Even despite this alleged coup in August using Shekau as their “spokesman” as far afield as Niger, Chad, Sudan and 2013, it is likely that Nur’s faction and or at least Shekau’s name with look- Cameroon” agreed to a cease-fire with other militants operating in the Borno- alikes in videos suggests that Shekau’s the Nigerian government and a hiatus Cameroon border region still used “stamp-of-approval” is relevant for in suicide bombings.41 In late 2013, Shekau’s name as a nom de guerre to claim showing unity or enhancing credibility. “Muhammed Marwan”—likely Nur— attacks or featured imposters of Shekau Moreover, the stage-managed settings also announced that he supported the in Boko Haram video statements.43 of Boko Haram’s videos of Shekau, Thus far, only one self-proclaimed including scripts and props such as a 40 In the video, Shekau taunted President Jonathan, pro-negotiation factional leader, Abu mishwak (a teeth-cleaning twig) and the Margaret Thatcher, President Obama, Benjamin Netan- Mohammed Abdulaziz, publicly stated same carpet and armored personnel yahu and President Hollande saying they “should bury in March 2013 that an “imposter” carrier in several videos, suggest that their heads in shame” before he “announces to the world appeared in a Boko Haram video of all factions now operate under one that I am alive today with Allah’s authority alone…I with- Shekau, while in March 2014 Nigerian “Boko Haram” umbrella and coordinate drew myself from public view and remained silent. You media also began speculating about the a sophisticated external propaganda 44 can assume that this is a fake image of mine (laughing)… “changing faces of Shekau.” Shekau’s campaign, with Ansaru either dormant Can you believe telling the world I was injured in a battle faction, however, dismissed Abdulaziz or using the name “Boko Haram” to in Sambisa Forest and taken to Amchide for treatment as a “fake” in 2012 and again in March claim its operations. Nonetheless, and died (laughing).” Moreover, Shekau’s detained fam- in addition to his “spokesman” role, ily members have never claimed he was dead, nor have 42 “Leader of Boko Haram Faction in Official Talks With Shekau likely also retains an operational detained Boko Haram militants. There have also been the Nigerian Gov’t Claims Responsibility For Deadly role in ordering—and often claiming— no “martyrdom” videos of Shekau, and the U.S. foreign Kano Bombings, Says Abubakar Shekau Still Alive,” Sa- his followers’ massacres of university terrorist designation of Shekau in 2012 (as well as al-Bar- hara Reporters, August 4, 2013. students, such as in Yobe in September nawi and Adam Kambar) and recent statements by U.S. 43 There is precedent for using nom de guerres in Boko 2013, or of villages in Borno and large- officials suggest that the U.S. government believes Shek- Haram, such as when Abu Qaqa was arrested in 2012, scale attacks on military bases in au is alive. See “Boko Haram National Leader, Abuba- but for the next half-year Boko Haram insisted he was Maiduguri. kar Shekau, Narrowly Escapes Arrest,” Premium Times, not the real “Abu Qaqa,” despite the ensuing hiatus in April 6, 2012; Aminu Abubakar, “Boko Haram Leader Boko Haram statements and Boko Haram’s killing of Conclusion (Shekau) Escapes Arrest In Kano – Wife Arrested,” Ni- Qaqa’s father in retribution for Qaqa’s revelations about There are likely several Boko Haram gerian Tribune, March 5, 2012; “Dozens of Boko Haram Boko Haram. Moreover, Nur, al-Barnawi, Abu Zamira factions, but they come together in a Help Mali’s Rebel Seize Gao”; Jacob Zenn, “Nigerians in and Tashen-Ilmi—as well as all former Ansaru shura confederation for major attacks, such Gao: Was Boko Haram Really Active in Northern Mali?” members—cover their faces with veils or do not appear as the kidnapping in Chibok, and African Arguments, January 20, 2014; “JTF Claims Boko publicly or in videos, which would make them more also coordinate their public relations Haram Leader, Abubakar Shekau, May Have Died Of likely to allow faux Shekaus and the real Shekau to re- strategy. If their demands are met in the Gunshot Wounds,” Premium Times, August 19, 2013; main the official “face” of Boko Haram while they operate Chibok kidnapping, all factions could Hamza Idris, “Boko Haram’s Shekau Likely Dead, JTF behind-the-scenes. Other reasons for the use of multiple see the release of dozens of prisoners Says,” Daily Trust, August 20, 2013. Shekaus include that Shekau was debilitated or away and ransom payments for all leaders in 41 Based on Yusuf’s and Shekau’s video from before July in Mali or another country for a period of time, which exchange for the return of some or all of 2009, it is likely that Shekau’s position is that negotia- necessitated substitutes, or that after the U.S. “foreign tions can only take place with the Nigerian government terrorist” designation of Shekau in 2012 he went under- 45 Complicating the issue of the alleged “imposter” that once an Islamic state is established. See “Shekau Shot, ground and used multiple images as a form of deception. Abdulaziz claimed appeared as “Shekau” in the March Deposed - Boko Haram Spiritual Leader,” Vanguard, See “Boko Haram Announces Peace Discussions”; Adam 1, 2013, video is the fact that this video came out in one August 2, 2013; “Boko Haram Announces Peace Dis- Nossiter, “Jihadist’s Face Taunts Nigeria From Shad- public version with Shekau speaking in Hausa, while cussions,” Nigeria Village Square, July 20, 2013; “Nur ows,” New York Times, May 20, 2014. a second version that was never released publicly but Killed OBJ’s Host Fugu - Security Sources,” Vanguard, 44 Abu Mohammed Abdulaziz claimed that Nur was obtained by the author featured Shekau speaking in a September 19, 2011; “Muhammad Marwana ya Kalub- on his negotiation team in 2012, but distanced himself language other than Hausa or Arabic, which may mean alanci Abubakar Shekau” (Muhammad Marwana Chal- from the kidnapping of the French family from northern that two versions of the video were produced, with the lenges Abubakar Shekau), Voice of America (Hausa), Cameroon in 2013, which Nur’s faction may have carried internal version also containing “highlight clips” of other July 20, 2013; “Gwamnatin Najeriya da Boko Haram out with al-Barnawi’s faction. “Muhammed Marwan”— Boko Haram commanders, including one called “Abu sun yi Ikirarin cim ma Yarjejeniyar Tsagaita Wuta” who is likely Nur—also refuted a January 2013 cease-fire Fatima,” who was associated with Ansaru in 2012. See (The Nigerian Government and Boko Haram Say They announced by Abdulaziz. This suggests that Abdulaziz “Statement by Boko Haram’s Spokesperson Debunking Have Agreed to a Ceasefire), Radio France Internationale may at one point have been in Nur’s faction. A Nigerian Reports of Dialogue with the Nigerian Government,” Sa- (Hausa), July 8, 2013; “Da Alamu Akwai Baraka Taska- politics blog, Beegeagle’s Blog, began holding discussion hara Reporters, August 23, 2012; Haruna Umar, “Boko nin Shekau da Marwana” (Apparently, There is a Rift Be- on whether there were imposters of Shekau as early as Haram Leader Denies Peace Talks with Nigeria,” Associ- tween Shekau and Marwana), Voice of America (Hausa), August 20, 2013. See Ndahi Marama, “Boko Haram ated Press, March 3, 2013; Chuks Okocha, “We Are Not July 15, 2013; “Kwamandojin Boko Haram sun bar Shek- Agrees to a Cease Fire,” Vanguard, January 28, 2013; Ghosts, Boko Haram Tells Jonathan,” This Day, March au Cikin Rana” (Boko Haram Commanders Abandon “The Changing Faces of Shekau,” PM News Nigeria, 14, 2013; “Another Islamic Sect Emerges to Counter Boko Shekau), Voice of America (Hausa), July 22, 2013. March 25, 2014. Haram?” Desert Herald, June 2, 2012.

6 may 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 5 the schoolgirls. Since it is now clear that and weapons to revive Ansaru, but Fourth, Boko Haram may prepare for multiple leaders command Boko Haram these operations may be carried out retaliatory attacks on Western targets fighters, it is likely that Boko Haram under a new group name if schisms with in southern Nigeria or abroad and take could evolve in several new ways.46 Shekau’s faction widen or if the Chibok advantage of its networks in Sudan and negotiations expose factional fault- possibly the United Kingdom if a regional First, if Boko Haram maintains its lines.50 or international coalition collaborates safe havens in Borno and northern with Nigeria to launch a “total war” on Cameroon, it may become a resource for Third, Boko Haram’s ideology will Boko Haram or rescue the schoolgirls violent members of other predominantly become less Nigeria-centric and from Chibok.52 Moreover, launching a Muslim ethnic groups in Nigeria—such more trans-regional to attract a new series of attacks throughout Nigeria as Fulanis in Zamfara or Kogi—and Sahelo-Saharan recruiting pool, but its would force Nigeria’s military to “divert nearby countries—such as Central ideology may still resonate most deeply its attention” from Borno and weaken a African Republic—to train for attacks on with Kanuris of the Nigeria-Cameroon- renewed offensive against Boko Haram rival Christian ethnic groups with whom Chad-Niger border region.51 along the Nigeria-Cameroon border.53 they have land or other disputes.47

tures of Séléka militants inscribing “Bocouharame [Boko is facilitated by Kanuris’ sense of grievance for their lost Second, Boko Haram will likely expand Haram]” on their uniforms shows that Boko Haram has empire and inspired by the ideal that an Islamic state is its focus outside of northern Nigeria, influence among some of its fighters. As of May 9, 2014, possible—as represented by Iran’s “Islamic Revolution” especially if leaders like al-Barnawi it was reported that “almost 50 girls who speak only in 1979. See personal interview, Idayat Hassan, Centre and Nur are operating in Niger and English but not any of the Central African languages, for Democracy and Development West Africa (CDD), 48 Cameroon, potentially training Séléka or those of Sudan or yet still those of Chad, were tempo- May 2014. 49 militants, and acquiring new funding rarily carried on board a truck confined in Birao,” pos- 52 Evidence of this includes: Shekau’s threats on the re- sibly referring to the girls from Chibok. See “Kidnapped fineries in the Niger Delta in his past three videos; Boko 46 “Muhammed Marwan” (who is likely Mamman Nur), Nigerian High School Girls Spotted in Northern CAR,” Haram’s possible coordination with Séléka in transfer- Abu Zamira and other factional leaders have stated that Kangbi Ndara, May 9, 2014; Hanna McNeish, “Lawless ring the kidnapped girls to Central African Republic; Shekau was deposed, lost leadership of Boko Haram, or CAR Attracting Terrorists’ Attention,” Voice of Ameri- Shekau’s calls in 2013 for “brethren” from “Iraq, Paki- that Shekau now controlled a reduced following within ca, November 22, 2013; Michelle Shephard, “Will Central stan, Afghanistan and Syria” to join Boko Haram; Boko Boko Haram. Nur’s and al-Barnawi’s factions have African Republic Become a Battleground for Religious Haram’s attacks on bridges connecting Nigeria to Camer- also likely coordinated and introduced attacks beyond Radicals?” Toronto Star, March 27, 2014; Moki Edwin oon and on prisons where Boko Haram members are held Shekau’s known capabilities and area of influence, such Kindzeka, “Cameroon Blames Séléka Rebels for Hostage in Cameroon and first reported “ambush” on Nigerien as kidnappings in Cameroon. Notably, the first video Taking,” Voice of America, May 15, 2014; “Abducted troops in Diffa, Niger, in May 2014; the two bombings claim of a kidnapping in Cameroon of the seven-member Chibok Girls Seen in Central Africa,” Punch, March 11, in a motor park outside of Abuja in April and May 2014 French family was the first time suspicions emerged that 2014; “Central African Republic: Violence Leaves ‘30 in coordination with networks in Sudan and possibly a faux Shekau was used in the split-screen video with the Dead,’” BBC, April 9, 2014; Adam Nossiter, “New Threat the United Kingdom; and the kidnapping of 10 Chinese family, possibly because Nur’s faction carried out the at- in Nigeria as Militants Split Off,” New York Times, April workers in Cameroon on May 17, 2014, one week after tack and claimed it in Shekau’s name with imposters and 23, 2013; Krista Larson, “In Central African Republic, China agreed to support Nigeria to combat Boko Haram. possibly to disguise that the $3.14 ransom really went Diamonds Are Seleka Rebels’ Best Friend,” Associated Boko Haram’s connections to the United Kingdom can be to Nur and al-Barnawi—and not Shekau. Moreover, Press, May 6, 2013. seen in at least three incidents: Kabiru Sokoto, the plot- Shekau never had full control over cells in Kano or north- 50 Nonetheless, all factions will likely for the short- ter of several bombings of churches in the Middle Belt western Nigeria, with some commanders such as Kabiru term continue to eschew bureaucratic and administra- with AQIM funding, was arrested in 2012 with a ticket in Sokoto denying he was in Shekau’s faction, and Shekau tive structures and the unpopular forms of Shari`a that hand for London; al-Muntada Trust in the United King- was not known to have strong ties to Sudan, but the mo- AQIM and al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula estab- dom reportedly funded Islamic charities in Sudan in the tor park bombings in Abuja in April and May 2014 were lished in northern Mali and Zinjibar, Yemen, in 2012 2000s, which also funded Boko Haram; and the master- masterminded by individuals tied to Sudan, suggesting and 2010, respectively, and the knowledge of which has mind of a motor park bombing in Abuja in April 2014 that leaders other than Shekau are coordinating major likely been passed on to Boko Haram. was a UK citizen of Nigerian descent, who was arrested attacks. 51 This was exemplified by Shekau’s scripted May 5, in Sudan. See John Irish and Elizabeth Pineau, “West Af- 47 Boko Haram also reportedly recruits among Hausas, 2014, video statement, in which he stated “we are to- rica Leaders Vow to Wage ‘Total War’ on Boko Haram,” Fulania, Kanuris, Tuareg and Toubous in Niger. See Fri- gether with Usman dan Fodio” as well as his recalling Reuters, May 17, 2014; “Cameroon: Boko Haram Said At- day Olokor, “Fulani Herdsmen are Terrorists, Says ex- past instances of Muslim-Christian violence, which are tack Barracks, Free Two Detained ‘High Profile’ Fighters Zamfara Gov,” Punch, March 31, 2014; Ike Abonyi, “Boko two cornerstones of Ansaru’s former statements and that in North,” Sahara Reporters, May 5, 2014; Adolarc La- Haram: SSS Bursts New Cell in Kogi,” This Day, Novem- are unheard of in Boko Haram statements since Yusuf’s missa, “Nigerian Islamic Sect Intends to Attack Maroua ber 21, 2013; “Bomb Blasts Rock Jos Market,” Vanguard, death and may appeal to all West Africans, including Central Prison,” Le Jour, May 9, 2014; “Niger Arrests 14 May 20, 2014. militants in Central African Republic. Recent surveys Suspected Boko Haram After Troop Ambush,” Reuters, 48 Séléka is a predominantly Muslim rebel coalition in of armed militants operating alongside Boko Haram in May 6, 2014; Yusuf Alli, “Untold Story of Kabiru Soko- Central African Republic, which includes Sudanese and Borno and northern Cameroon reveal that the militants’ to,” The Nation, January 22, 2012; Jamie Doward, “Peer Chadian fighters. It was formerly led by Michel Djotodia, goal is to “knock out” Nigeria and then “create a Sahelo- Raises Fears Over UK Charity’s Alleged Links to Boko who overthrew President François Bozizé on March 24, Saharan Islamic Empire that mirrors the boundaries of Haram,” Guardian, September 9, 2012. 2013. the pre-colonial Kanem-Borno empire, which extended 53 When Suleiman Muhammed, an ethnic Yoruba Boko 49 Séléka began carrying out kidnappings in Cameroon in from Borno through Cameroon, Chad and Niger to Haram commander in Kano, was arrested in 2012, he May 2014. Multiple sources suggested there is some level southern Libya and Sudan.” To such militants, the battle said Boko Haram “decided to shift to the South in order of Boko Haram presence in Central African Republic and with France in northern Mali in 2013 was a “prep” for the to divert the attention of security agencies, which are on likely mutual networks in Sudan and Chad, while pic- real battle, which is to take place in Nigeria and which the trail of its members in the North.” See “Captive Eth-

7 may 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 5

Finally, even if a cease-fire is reached concerning, the extent of the movement’s with some factions, and Boko Haram The ISIL’s Stand in the real control of the area is debatable. is limited to Borno or sporadic attacks Ramadi-Falluja Corridor Furthermore, the ISIL may have in Kano, Abuja, and Jos, it will still overreached by committing itself to the have the potential to cause instability By Michael Knights defense of terrain, particularly in urban in Nigeria, including army mutinies areas so close to the Iraqi government’s and defections, violence during the since december 30, 2013, the Islamic State logistical bases around Baghdad. If upcoming February 2015 election in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has sought current trends continue, the ISIL’s season, or a “war” between Christians to carve out an area of control in the gambit in the Ramadi-Falluja corridor and Muslims if it launches a renewed Iraqi cities of Ramadi and Falluja, as could bring a strategic reversal for the series of attacks on churches in the well as in the Euphrates River delta movement within the Iraqi theater. Middle Belt or extends its operations between these urban areas. These to majority Christian areas of southern locations are replete with symbolic Opening Moves Nigeria.54 As such, Boko Haram can and strategic significance for the ISIL. Throughout 2013, the Iraqi government still punch above its weight in Nigeria The movement’s forerunner, al-Qa`ida had chafed at the existence of two with attacks that have far-reaching in Iraq (AQI),1 fought in the iconic “Arab Spring”-style Sunni Arab ripple effects on political stability, as twin battles for Falluja in March and protest sites in Ramadi and Falluja.3 seen by the ongoing fallout from the November 2004, an event that fanned On December 28, 2013, the influential Chibok attack. the flames of Iraq’s Sunni insurgency Iraqi cleric `Abd al-Malik al-Sa`di for years afterwards. In late 2006, issued a statement from Jordan calling Jacob Zenn is an analyst of African and Anbar tribes turned decisively against on Sunnis to defend the protest camp, Eurasian Affairs for The Jamestown AQI and its affiliates in the provincial which government forces were massing Foundation and a consultant on countering capital of Ramadi, beginning the against.4 Armed tribal forces were fully violent extremism, international law of movement’s near-fatal deterioration.2 mobilized by December 30, when Iraqi freedom of association, and socio-cultural These cities and their outlying rural forces suspended local cellphone and analysis for geospatial visualization. satellites continue to be key terrain: the internet communications and began to Mr. Zenn speaks French and Arabic and Ramadi-Falluja corridor is just 22 miles bulldoze the Ramadi and Falluja protest carried out field research in the northern from the capital’s international airport sites. Al-Sa`di called on security force Nigeria-Cameroon-Chad-Niger border and sits astride the country’s main members to defect and for all Sunnis region three times between 2012 and 2014. trucking highways to Jordan and Syria. to rise up.5 Tribal forces in northern He is currently researching Boko Haram’s Iraqi security forces have been excluded Ramadi repelled Iraqi Army 1st division connections to Central Asian militants in from Falluja—a city with a population troops from the sit-in square. Tribal a Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) of more than 300,000 on Baghdad’s fighters also routed newly-arrived monograph. Mr. Zenn holds a Juris Doctor doorstep—for nearly five months. Emergency Response Brigade forces degree from Georgetown University Law from various police stations in Ramadi Center and a certificate in international This article recounts how the ISIL city.6 The arrival of these predominately studies from the Johns Hopkins-SAIS spread into Ramadi and Falluja, Shi`a forces from the southern city of campus in Nanjing, China. why it has failed to secure control of Kut stoked tensions and contributed to Ramadi, and the conditions that have the tribal backlash.7 To restore calm, led to its present control of Falluja.

It finds that while the ISIL’s activities 3 The Ramadi “sit-in” site is called the “Pride & Dignity in the Ramadi-Falluja corridor are Square” and is located north of Ramadi city at a major in- tersection on Highway 11. The Falluja site is immediately 1 There has never been an organization with the name east of Falluja city on Highway 11. “al-Qa`ida in Iraq.” This name, however, has referred to 4 On the same night, Iraqi special forces tried to enforce the fighters in al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, Tanzim al-Qa`ida an arrest warrant in Ramadi on `Ali al-`Alwani, the fi Bilad al-Rafidayn, Majlis Shura al-Mujahidin, Hilf al- brother of well-known Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) parlia- Muttaybin, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) and now finally mentarian Ahmad al-`Alwani. When tribal bodyguards the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). During sought to resist, a firefight resulted in the death of `Ali the first Falluja battle, these fighters fought under the al-`Alwani and his sister, as well as the arrest of MP Ah- nic Yoruba Boko Haram Kingpin Says ‘We Planned To name al-Tawhid wa-al-Jihad, under the command of mad al-`Alwani. For a full account of the events leading Invade Lagos, Onitsha, Ibadan, Enugu and Warri Too’; Abu Mus`ab al-Zarqawi. Al-Zarqawi then declared his up to and following December 28, 2013, see “Maliki Tar- Says ‘Terrorists Feeling The Impact Of The Security bay`a (oath) to Usama bin Ladin, and Bin Ladin accepted gets Ramadi Protest Site,” Inside Iraqi Politics, January 8, Crackdown,’” Beegeagle’s Blog, May 17, 2012. it in October 2004. At that point, the organization’s name 2014, pp. 2-8. 54 Nigeria’s Middle Belt, which includes Kaduna, Jos was changed to Tanzim al-Qa`ida fi Bilad al-Rafidayn. 5 Ibid., pp. 5-7. (Plateau State), and Abuja, is a region of central Nigeria This article refers to all these fighters as AQI. 6 Personal interview, Iraqi National Intelligence Service populated by diverse ethnic groups. It is where majority 2 For a good collection of first-hand Iraqi accounts of the official, May 9, 2014. Muslim northern Nigeria and majority Christian south- tribal “awakening” in Anbar, see Gary Montgomery and 7 Personal interview, Jaber al-Jaberi, Iraqi MP and Fal- ern Nigeria meet and clash, particularly over land use Timothy McWilliams eds., Al-AnbarAwakening Volume luja negotiator, Baghdad, March 11, 2014. The use of and during election seasons. Also see Ibanga Isine, “Boko II: Iraqi Perspectives, From Insurgency to Counterinsurgency southern Shi`a SWAT teams in northern Sunni areas Haram Wants War Between Christians, Muslims in Ni- in Iraq, 2004-2009 (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Uni- is a common cause of localized tensions. On April 23, geria – Jonathan,” Premium Times, May 5, 2014. versity, 2009). 2013, southern SWAT teams killed more than 50 protes-

8 may 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 5 the Ramadi-based Anbar provincial The ISIL in Ramadi and al-Hawz.17 This effort was launched council negotiated a withdrawal of Iraqi In Ramadi, the provincial government from al-Humayra and Albu Jabr, a belt Army and Emergency Response Brigade and key tribal groupings were loosely of rural suburbs south of the train line forces from Ramadi on December aligned with the government against the that marks Ramadi city’s southern 31.8 Entering Ramadi from multiple ISIL until the government arrest and edge. The area is physically linked to directions on January 1, 2014, ISIL military operations of December 28- similar ISIL “support zones” south fighters opportunistically exploited the 30, 2013. Almost immediately after the of Falluja and stretching down to the breakdown of government control to late December clashes, the government Jurf as-Sakhar area in northern Babil ransack police stations in the city.9 and most of Ramadi’s tribes once again Province. The ISIL has been strident made common cause against the ISIL, in its defense of its southern launch- The dynamic was markedly different seemingly in reaction to the ISIL’s in Falluja where (even before the alarming expansion into Ramadi city crisis) Iraqi Army forces were neighborhoods.14 The ISIL’s northern “The ISIL may have normally only located on the outer effort failed in January 2014. The ISIL overreached by committing edges of the city. From the night of fighters from the Western Euphrates December 30, armed locals also came River Valley towns and the Western itself to the defense of to the streets, massing at the main Desert reinforced the ISIL in the terrain, particularly in Falluja protest site (on the highway rural areas north of Ramadi such as east of the urban center), appearing to Albu Sha`ban and `Ali Jassim, and urban areas so close to answer earlier calls by `Abd al-Malik to the `Alwan and Albu Fahad tribal the Iraqi government’s al-Sa`di and Grand Mufti Sheikh Rafi` areas to the northeast of Ramadi.15 By al-Rifa`i to block the road to prevent the end of January, locally-recruited logistical bases around reinforcements from reaching Ramadi police paramilitaries, tribal fighters Baghdad.” and western Anbar.10 Local residents and the military pacified the urban also fortified the entry checkpoints to areas of Ramadi north of the Euphrates the city to exclude Iraqi government collectively known as Albu Faraj or forces from entering Falluja.11 After Jazira.16 pads. In al-Humayra, for example, an some days of inconclusive skirmishing Iraqi Army probe was decimated on around the edges of Falluja city, Iraqi The situation in southern Ramadi April 20, 2014, by wire-guided anti- government forces settled down for a evolved very differently, with the ISIL tank missiles, with the loss of an entire prolonged siege. Inside the city, ISIL mounting a costly multi-month effort to mixed platoon of T-62 tanks and MTLB convoys paraded in Falluja’s streets, dominate the southern neighborhoods armored vehicles.18 ISIL forces have ransacking local police stations and of al-Mal`ab, Fursan, Hayy al-Dhubat used titanium-coated, armor-piercing using megaphones to call on residents to ammunition in Dragonov-model repent and pledge allegiance.12 The ISIL rifles to shoot out the engine blocks unilaterally declared Falluja an Islamic 14 This is hardly surprising: key Ramadi tribal leaders on large numbers of Iraqi Hummers state at Friday prayers on January 3, such as Shaykh Ahmad al-Rishawi (Ahmad Abu Risha) in an apparent effort to reduce Iraqi 13 19 2014. risked everything to defeat the terrorist movement in Ra- Security Force (ISF) mobility. When madi in 2006-2007. The return of the ISIL to Ramadi’s security forces began searches for tors at the Hawija protest site near Kirkuk. On March streets is inimical to almost all of Ramadi’s shaykhs. Key ISIL workshops in late March 2014, a 23, 2014, Shi`a SWAT killed a further 27 civilians at provincial leaders including Governor Ahmad Khalaf car bomb damaged the bridge linking Buhriz, Diyala Province. See Wladimir van Wilgenburg, al-Dhiyabi and Provincial Council Chairman Sabah al- Ramadi city to the al-Ta’mim suburb, “Implications of the Hawija ‘Massacre’ and Kirkuk Pro- Halbusi worked to rapidly soothe tensions between the the historic site for ISIL bombmaking 20 test Movement,” Today’s Zaman, May 12, 2013. Also see Iraqi government and most of the local tribes, excepting workshops in Ramadi. Ghaith `Abdul-Ahad, “Iraq Election Holds Little Hope of elements of Ahmad al-`Alwan’s clan and Shaykh `Ali Change for Town Scarred by Decade of War,” Guardian, Hatem Sulayman’s Military Command of Anbar Tribal 17 A useful Radio Free Iraq tracker for Ramadi incidents April 29, 2014. Revolutionaries—both marginal military forces. See can be found at www.anbardaily.blogspot.com. 8 Personal interview, Iraqi National Intelligence Service “Falluja’s Faustian Bargain,” p. 13, fn 29; “Anbar: Secu- 18 Personal interview, Omar Nidawi, Iraq analyst, official, May 9, 2014. rity Forces Fight Insurgency to a Standstill,” Inside Iraqi Washington, D.C., May 21, 2014. See the useful stream 9 “Anbar: The Road to Catastrophe,” Inside Iraqi Politics, Politics, April 19, 2014, pp. 7-8. of Tweeted imagery and updates from @MemlikPasha, January 8, 2014, p. 6. 15 Personal interview, Aymenn al-Tamimi, May 12, “#ISIS ambushed a large ISF armored column in the 10 “Baghdad Adrift as Deadlock Continues,” Inside Iraqi 2014. al-Humayra area in the southeastern outskirts of Ar Politics, March 6, 2014, p. 3. 16 Jazira, a block of neighborhoods north of the Euphra- Ramadi,” April 21, 2014, available at www.twicsy.com/ 11 The International Crisis Group’s well-sourced ac- tes and south of Highway 11, is not to be confused with the i/7pun9e#1pISW1ZCp6MaRPzW.99. count described non-ISIL groups of armed residents desert area of the same name abutting Syria. The wester- 19 Personal interview, U.S. government official, May 20, taking control of the entry checkpoints. See “Falluja’s ly Jazira and easterly Aetha areas make up the Albu Faraj 2014. Faustian Bargain,” International Crisis Group, April 28, area of Ramadi, which includes Ramadi’s protest site on 20 Personal interview, Iraqi National Security Advi- 2014, p. 13, fn 32. Highway 11. During 2013, this area usually suffered 3-4 sory official, May 6, 2014. AQI historically hid car bomb 12 Ahmed Ali, “Iraq Update #42: Al-Qaeda in Iraq Pa- attacks per month according to The Washington Insti- workshops in the mechanics areas of al-Ta’mim, an in- trols in Fallujah,” Institute for the Study of War, January tute’s Iraq violence database. With the exception of a dustrial and worker suburb on the west side of the canal, 5, 2014. spike of 24 attacks in January 2014, the average returned southwest of the city. The ISIL appears to use the same 13 Ibid. to four attacks per month in February-April 2014. area for car bomb fabrication today. Before the current

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The determination of the ISIL’s efforts still able to penetrate the city’s such as al-N`imiya and `Amiriy were to destabilize southern Ramadi are southern flank and repeatedly draw the important AQI support zones in 2006 quite exceptional, even by the violent government into destructive clearance until the local Albu `Issa tribes sought standards of today’s Iraq. Prior to the operations. This is arguably a limited U.S. support to break al-Qa`ida’s late summer of 2013, the ISIL conducted payoff for a significant investment of stranglehold.32 Since then, the ISIL around eight to ten attacks per month ISIL effort and presumably considerable has gradually clawed its way back into in Ramadi’s urban center south of losses as well. If the ISIL downgrades these areas. An ISIL suicide bomber the Euphrates.21 This increased to an its effort or loses its southern Ramadi killed the key anti-ISIL tribal leader, average of 20 attacks per month from support zone, the government and Shaykh `Aifan al-`Issawi, in January September-December 2013, reflecting its tribal allies may be able to claim a 2013.33 The consolidation in 2013 of the an intensification of attacks on police partial victory. ISIL’s “Wilayat al-Janub” in the Jurf as- forces and tribal leaders.22 From Sakhar area of northern Babil has placed January-April 2014, the average number The ISIL’s Stand in Falluja another contiguous support zone to the of monthly attacks surged to 44 in the The background to the ISIL’s creeping southeast.34 By October 19, 2013, the southern Ramadi neighborhoods.23 takeover of Falluja is rooted in the city’s ISIL was confident enough to hold a 50 The destructiveness of the attacks also isolated status within Anbar Province. vehicle rally in daylight in the southern increased, causing significant material Falluja is an insular town renowned Falluja mechanics area of al-Shuhada’, damage and major outflows of internally for its rebelliousness and links to a historical car bomb manufacturing displaced persons. In 2013, there was an Salafism.28 The tribal uprising that hub.35 An ISIL sniper killed Falluja’s average of one attempted mass casualty gathered momentum in Ramadi never mayor, `Adnan Hussein al-Dulaymi, in attack in Ramadi per month: in the achieved the same result in Falluja, and al-Shuhada’ on November 13, 2013.36 first four months of 2014, the monthly al-Qa`ida affiliates have enjoyed far average increased to 9.25.24 In April greater ongoing freedom of movement One of the most interesting aspects of 2014, the ISIL launched 13 attempted in Falluja, including at the city’s the Falluja stand-off in 2014 has been suicide vest attacks and six attempted protest camps.29 Throughout 2013, the the state of relations between the ISIL suicide car bombings in southern ISIL sought to expand its profile inside and other insurgent factions within Ramadi.25 Falluja city. Militant attacks claimed the city.37 On the surface, the groups by the ISIL in Falluja city rose from have cooperated, with non-ISIL forces The ISIL has invested significant an average of 16 per month in the first manning many of the city’s perimeter numbers of suicide militants to keep quarter of 2013 to 31 in the last quarter defenses and with the ISIL providing the fight active in Ramadi,26 despite of that year, with an apex of 39 incidents military support and advice. The the low probability that the ISIL will in December 2013.30 The ISIL’s preferred relationship, however, is more complex: eventually control the city. Ramadi city tactics in Falluja throughout the year Fallujans never rejected al-Qa`ida and was the heart of the tribal “awakening” were drive-by shootings, under-vehicle its spin-offs to the extent that Ramadi’s in Iraq and the ISIL appears determined bombings and car bombings of houses tribes did. Even so, memories of the to keep fighting in this area. It has belonging to local leaders and police succeeded, in so far as ongoing violence forces. The ISIL also targeted electrical 32 For a detailed account of this period and these ge- is a distraction to the government generator operators, shopkeepers and ographies, see Bill Ardolino, Fallujah Awakens: Marines, and prolongs the sense that the city is clerics in a slow-building campaign of Sheikhs, and the Battle Against al Qaeda (Annapolis: Naval 31 contested. Yet Ramadi is essentially fundraising and influence-building. Institute Press, 2013). Also see Montgomery and McWil- under government control, albeit with liams eds., pp. 84-105. 27 a significant “commuter insurgency” Throughout 2013, the ISIL also 33 Bill Ardolino, “Al Qaeda Claims Assassination of MP strengthened its hold on the southern Aifan Sadoun,” The Long War Journal, January 20, 2013. crisis, Iraqi security forces discovered a car bomb factory neighborhoods and southern rural 34 Personal interview, Aymenn al-Tamimi, May 12, in al-Ta’mim on September 1, 2013, that contained three outskirts of Falluja city. The Euphrates 2014. tons of ammonium nitrate, 50 kilograms of C4 and large River communities south of Falluja 35 Personal interview, Iraqi National Security Advisory stores of specialized equipment to make car bombs. official, May 6, 2014. 21 These figures are derived from The Washington Insti- by U.S. forces in Iraq, the concept is explained further in 36 “Fallujah Mayor Assassinated While Anbar Council tute’s Iraq violence dataset. David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Tries To Replace Provincial Police Chief,” Musings on 22 Ibid. Wars in the Midst of a Big One (Oxford: Oxford University Iraq blog, November 14, 2013. 23 Ibid. Press, 2009), p. 142. 37 This relationship is explored in some depth through- 24 Ibid. 28 For discussions of Falluja’s reputation for rebellion out “Falluja’s Faustian Bargain.” Among a dizzying 25 Ibid. The ISIL used such weapons to try to penetrate and piety, see John R. Ballard, Fighting for Fallujah: A New array of resurrected nationalist and Salafist insurgent the Anbar Operations Center and the compound of Dawn for Iraq (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing factions in Falluja’s military council, the key non-ISIL Shaykh Ahmed Abu Risha. In another case, a captured Group, 2006), pp. 2-5. Also see “Falluja: Embattled City group appears to be Hamas al-Iraq. All others appear Iraqi Army Hummer was used to conceal a car bomb. of Mosques and Minarets,” BBC, January 9, 2014. to have limited military clout in Falluja. Further insight 26 Of 34 attempted suicide attacks in eastern Anbar in 29 Marisa Sullivan, Stephen Wicken, and Sam Wyer, into the tactical formation of non-ISIL company-sized January-April 2014, 25 were in Ramadi city, according to “Iraq Update 2013 #4, Fallujah Protests Turn Violent,” militias within Falluja is given in Matt Bradley and Ali The Washington Institute’s Iraq violence dataset. Institute for the Study of War, January 25, 2013. Nabhan, “Iraqi Officer Takes Dark Turn to al Qaeda: 27 The “commuter insurgency” refers to an urban fight 30 All insights in this paragraph are drawn from The Alliance Against Maliki Government Develops After in which insurgents travel in each day, like suburban Washington Institute’s Iraq violence dataset. Armed Militants Overtook Fallujah,” Wall Street Journal, commuters, from support zones on the outskirts. Coined 31 Ibid. March 19, 2014.

10 may 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 5 destruction that al-Qa`ida brought upon a new mayor and police chief for Falluja government.50 The tone of the council’s the city in 2004 are still fresh. There is on January 12:42 throughout the latter complaints indicates that the ISIL is also considerable bitterness between half of January, the ISIL detained and increasingly in charge within Falluja.51 former AQI fighters and Fallujans harassed the new mayor, damaged the who cooperated with the government, mayor’s office with multiple improvised The federal government was initially notably tribal groups like the Albu explosive devices (IEDs), and bombed willing to contain the ISIL within `Issa and the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) the new police chief’s home.43 Falluja rather than risk a political and with its militant wing in Falluja, Hamas military setback during the electoral al-Iraq.38 Initially, the ISIL struck a Although the ISIL agreed not to hold and government formation processes. rallies or try to govern the city when This option has been undermined by the “If the government can it joined the Falluja Military Council44 porous cordon around Falluja city and on February 8, 2014, the movement by the ISIL’s determination to launch pacify Ramadi and Falluja, has consistently overstepped the strategic high-impact attacks toward particularly with local reported restrictions placed upon it by Baghdad. other Fallujan rebels.45 For example, tribes in the lead, then on March 20, the ISIL held a major One theme touted by the ISIL has been a the ISIL could experience rally in Falluja’s government center renewed battle of Baghdad, a city where that included ISIL flags carried on the Sunni minority and its militias were a very public strategic captured police vehicles and Iraqi Army roundly defeated and purged in many setback.” Hummers.46 In the April 24-30 period, areas by Shi`a militias in 2006-2007. the ISIL undertook house demolitions On January 19, 2014, ISIL amir Abu Bakr against the Falluja homes of three al-Baghdadi urged fighters to “creep Anbar provincial council members and toward Baghdad,”52 a call that was later conciliatory note, promising not to one member of parliament.47 National echoed on April 12 in a communiqué attack the locally-recruited police elections proved impossible to hold to slip “as soft as fog” into Baghdad.53 forces and merely chiding Fallujans for in Falluja on April 30.48 The ISIL has With surprising mobility, the ISIL backing the government against AQI also sought to take over distribution appears to have moved forces from from 2007 onwards.39 Very quickly, of critical supplies including food and its Ramadi-Falluja corridor and the however, the ISIL escalated its contest cooking gas bottles.49 At the start of May, shores of Lake Tharthar to Baghdad’s with the IIP and Hamas al-Iraq. In the Falluja Military Council publicly outskirts via Saqlawiya, Karma and early January 2014, most of the Falluja complained that the ISIL was disarming Abu Ghurayb.54 On March 31, the ISIL police force ceased wearing uniforms rival militias inside Falluja rather than held a large parade in an outer suburb and police stations associated with focusing fully on the defense of the city of Abu Ghurayb comprising between former Hamas al-Iraq members were against the common enemy, the Iraqi 70-100 vehicles, including Iraqi Army abandoned to ISIL looting.40 From Hummers and even an M113 tracked 55 January 3 onwards, ISIL patrols cruised 42 The Ramadi-based provincial council sought to ap- armored personnel carrier. On April Falluja city in captured police vehicles point Mohammed `Allawi al-`Issawi, a cousin of Ahmed 9, the U.S. government warned about a using megaphones to call policemen to Abu Risha, as the new police chief for Falluja. See “Fal- threat to Baghdad International Airport, 41 56 repent. The ISIL reacted aggressively luja’s Faustian Bargain,” p. 13. adjacent to Abu Ghurayb. when the Iraqi government and Ramadi 43 “Falluja Mayor Assassinated,” Musings on Iraq blog, shaykhs negotiated the appointment of November 14, 2013. 44 “Anbar: Disunity Undermines Fight Against Insur- 50 The Falluja Military Council accused the ISIL of “at- 38 One example of the blood feud between the ISIL and gency,” Inside Iraqi Politics, February 18, 2014, p. 4. Inside tacking the Council and factions stationed on the front- local shaykhs was the aforementioned revenge assas- Iraqi Politics lists the factions as “ISIS and eight other lines including the kidnapping of a large number of sination of Shaykh `Aifan al-`Issawi, which came over groups: al-Jaysh al-Islami, Jaysh Muhammad Brigades, them and confiscation of their weapons.” See “‘Fallujah, seven years after he turned on AQI. In January 2014, Jaysh al-Murabitin, Asad-Allah al-Ghalib Brigades, The Military Council’ calls ‘Daash’ to Stop his Actions,” Shaykh Abu Mohammed al-Adnani, the ISIL’s spokes- Hamas al-Iraq, Faylaq Omar, Falluja Revolutionaries, Shafaaq News, May 2, 2014. man, claimed that the ISIL would “award whoever takes and Sons of Fallujah. The council, which meets twice a 51 The author would like to thank the Institute for the the head of the traitor, Ahmed Abu Risha.” See Ahmed week, has 15 members, some of whom are dignitaries or Study of War team led by Ahmed Ali for its provision of Ali, “Iraq Update #5: ‘The Time to Harvest is Coming’ – religious scholars rather than militia leaders.” data on ISIL-military council disputes in late April and ISIS Statement,” Institute for the Study of War, January 45 According to “Falluja’s Faustian Bargain,” p. 15, the early May 2014. 8, 2014. ISIL was “forbidden from imposing their views and pro- 52 “ISIL Chief Urges Fighters to ‘Creep Toward Bagh- 39 Since the start of 2014, the ISIL has pushed the mes- moting the imposition of Sharia (Islamic law), from tar- dad,’” Daily Star, January 19, 2014. sage in Falluja that “we warned you when you joined the geting state officials or former sahwa members as well as 53 See tweeted data on this issue from journalist @Dan- Sahwa and it turned out just as we predicted. So join us in their properties, and from raising al-Qaeda flags.” ieleRaineri at http://pic.twitter.com/JqJcdrtS4U. making a Sunni region.” See personal interview, Jaber al- 46 All insights in this paragraph are drawn from The 54 Personal interview, Aymenn al-Tamimi, May 12, Jaberi, Iraqi MP and Falluja negotiator, Baghdad, March Washington Institute’s Iraq violence dataset. 2014. 11, 2014. 47 “Security In Iraq 2 Weeks Before National Elections,” 55 Bill Roggio, “ISIS Parades on Outskirts of Baghdad,” 40 Ahmed Ali, “Iraq Update #42: Al-Qaeda in Iraq Pa- Musings on Iraq blog, April 17, 2014. The Long War Journal, April 1, 2014. trols in Fallujah,” Institute for the Study of War, January 48 Ibid. 56 “Emergency Message for the U.S. Community in Iraq: 5, 2014. 49 Personal interview, Aymenn al-Tamimi, May 12, Heightened Risk of Violence on and Around 9 April,” 41 Ibid. 2014. U.S. Embassy Baghdad, April 8, 2014.

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Using a different approach, the ISIL in 2004 and crushing defeat in 2006- Kidnappings and Murders also manipulated its on-off control of 2007.60 the regulating dams downstream of Targeting Foreigners in Falluja to flood the Euphrates delta from This intoxicating vision comes with a Libya April 6 onwards, causing extensive warning: the ISIL has now committed displacement of rural residents and itself to a battle for terrain, and the By Alison Pargeter threatening to flood metropolitan fight is taking place at a point where Baghdad.57 These gambits, alongside the Iraqi military can easily concentrate kidnappings and murders have become the well-publicized execution of Iraqi and supply its forces and where common in post-Qadhafi Libya. Eastern special forces, appear to have been local allies may be willing to enable Libya has suffered the worst, with an designed to lure the Iraqi military the government’s offensive. At the ongoing assassination campaign that into a hasty assault on Falluja, a present time, there are reportedly 13 has killed scores of security personnel potential spark for a wider Sunni Arab Iraqi military brigades with extensive and members of the judiciary in uprising against the government.58 artillery and air support deployed in drive-by shootings and bomb attacks, With Iraqi forces tightening the siege the Ramadi-Falluja corridor.61 Baghdad especially in the towns of Benghazi and clearing Falluja’s rural outskirts International Airport provides a secure and Derna. The country has also on all sides during May 2014, the ISIL resupply route for the significant U.S. witnessed hundreds of kidnappings may have succeeded in speeding up the military aid being provided to Iraq’s and abductions since the fall of the government’s plans for Falluja. forces. The ISIL may have placed itself former regime. An armed group even on an anvil. If the hammer falls and the seized and detained former Libyan Conclusion government mismanages its offensive, Prime Minister Ali Zidan in October The ISIL, and its predecessor the ISI, causing significant civilian casualties 2013.1 These murders and kidnappings has been remarkably successful in or failing to evict the ISIL, the militant have become part and parcel of the chaos recovering its position in Iraq since group will score an important victory. that has enveloped the country since the 2011,59 yet the movement’s Iraqi Yet the ISIL now faces the same strategic fall of the former regime in 2011. successes cannot yet compare to its puzzle as forerunners such as AQI: it development of a secure capital city in needs to either control territory or it Alongside these attacks, however, al-Raqqa, Syria. Iraq is still a financial may begin to fade away in the face of there has been a growing number of powerhouse for the ISIL, particularly local pushback. If the government can kidnappings and murders of foreigners. its third-largest city, Mosul, but the pacify Ramadi and Falluja, particularly These incidents do not appear to be ISIL’s political center of gravity is with local tribes in the lead, then the connected. No single group has claimed undoubtedly in Syria. The ISIL’s ISIL could experience a very public responsibility for either the killings or ambitions in the Ramadi-Falluja strategic setback. For the ISIL project abductions, and the motives appear to corridor represent a potential shift in Iraq, the Ramadi-Falluja conflict be as varied as the incidents themselves. in this dynamic, with the movement could be a fulcrum point. While some of the attacks are clearly seeking to establish long-term control politically or ideologically driven, over liberated zones at the heart of Dr. Michael Knights is the Lafer Fellow others seem simply to be opportunistic Iraq. If successful, the development at The Washington Institute for Near attempts by criminal groups seeking of a defensible ISIL caliphate just East Policy. He has worked in all of Iraq’s financial gain. Due to its ongoing outside Baghdad would be a historic provinces, including periods embedded weakness and the collapse of the central achievement on par with anything the with the Iraqi security forces. He recently authorities that accompanied the fall of movement has achieved in Syria. Such provided Congressional testimony on the former regime, the Libyan state is success would be doubly sweet, taking the resurgence of Al-Qa`ida in Iraq still beholden to the array of militias, place on iconic terrain where the ISIL’s in December 2013 and has written on revolutionary brigades, and armed predecessors experienced great success militancy in Iraq for the CTC Sentinel groups that control the ground. As a since 2008. result, the state has been unable to 57 “Iraq Insurgents Turn Seized Dam into Weapon,” counter the entrenchment of militant Daily Star, April 12, 2014. Islamist groups, especially in the east. 58 On January 20, 2014, the ISIL video-recorded the ex- As Culture Minister Habib al-Ameen ecutions of four captured Iraqi SWAT soldiers near Ra- 60 ISIL spokesman Abu Muhammad al-`Adnani argued in early March 2014, extremists madi. See “Execution of SWAT Forces Furthers Crimes made a statement on Falluja in April 2014 in which he are getting the upper hand in Benghazi, Against Humanity,” Human Rights Watch, February 5, claimed: “We have returned to the cities, and controlled which is now comprised of “armed 2014. In 2004, the first assault on Falluja was prompted the ground, and we will be killed a thousand times before cantons,” each controlled by certain 2 by the ambush, slaying and public dismemberment of we think of going back. In the cities and provinces that currents or groups. Blackwater private security guards in the city. The ISIL are under our control, on top of them Falluja…there will may have been seeking an echo of this scenario, which be no place in it for the secularists. For Falluja is Falluja ended with a propaganda victory for AQI when the hasty of the Mujahidin and Anbar is Anbar of the Mujahidin.” offensive was suspended. See Memlik Pasha, “ISIS Insurgents Have Almost Sur- 59 For an early review of the ISI’s recovery in Iraq from rounded Baghdad,” Vice, April 29, 2014. 1 “Libyan PM Ali Zeidan Detained by Militia,” BBC, Oc- 2011 onwards, see Michael Knights, “Back with a Ven- 61 See DJ Elliot, “Iraq Order of Battle,” Montrose Toast tober 10, 2013. geance: Al-Qaeda in Iraq Rebounds,” IHS Defense, Secu- blog, available at www.home.comcast.net/~djyae/site/?/ 2 “Mesoul Libi Rafia Yatarif Lil Mara Oula Biwujoud Al- rity & Risk Consulting, February 24, 2012. page/Iraq_Order_of_Battle. Takfireen fi Benghazi,” al-Quds al-Arabi, March 2, 2014.

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This article examines some of the out the kidnapping on their behalf.6 however. The diplomats’ abductors, kidnappings and murders of foreigners The veracity of these reports is not who appeared to be from the same that have occurred in Libya during clear. Al-Itan’s abductors demanded group that kidnapped Ben Sheikh, recent months. It finds that although Dersi’s release and appealed to Jordan later demanded the release of two not part of an organized or unified to stop torturing Islamist prisoners in Libyan prisoners who were sentenced strategy, these incidents represent Jordanian prisons and to free a number to 20 years in prison in Tunisia for a new trend that is indicative of the of detainees.7 taking part in a May 2011 gun battle generalized chaos that has gripped the between militants and security forces country since the revolution, as well as The abductors’ actions paid off. After a that killed two Tunisian soldiers further evidence of the entrenchment of period of intense negotiations between at Rouhia.14 Then, on April 21, a militant Islamist groups. Amman and Tripoli, Dersi was handed poorly produced video appeared on over to Libya on May 13 in return for social media sites showing a sobbing Kidnapping of Foreigners: Political Motives al-Itan’s release on the same day. Dersi Ben Sheikh appealing to Tunisian Assailants have kidnapped a number was supposed to receive a reduction in President Moncef Marzouki to talk to of foreigners in Libya in recent his sentence and be allowed to serve the his captors to secure his release.15 months. Notably, they have kidnapped remainder of his prison time in Libya.8 diplomatic personnel who have clearly Once back on Libyan soil, however, The video was made by Shabab al- been seized with the aim of achieving Dersi was allowed to go free. It seems Tawhid Lil A’alam (the Young specific political goals, namely the as though his kidnappers struck a hard Monotheists’ Media), which, according release of Libyans detained abroad. bargain: Dersi was met at Tripoli airport to Tunisian jihadist sources, is one of by his brother, who accompanied him the media arms of Ansar al-Shari`a in On April 15, 2014, masked gunmen home to Benghazi, telling the media the Tunisia.16 At the end of the video, text kidnapped the Jordanian ambassador, following day: “My brother is free and he appeared on the screen threatening, “As Fawaz al-Itan, from the center of Tripoli resides in the family home in Benghazi you imprison ours, we imprison yours. as he was on his way to work. Not long and he is not in a Libyan prison.”9 As you kill ours, we kill yours.”17 after he was seized, his abductors, whose identities are still unknown, demanded In a similar vein, two Tunisian The kidnappings seem to have been that Jordanian authorities release diplomats were kidnapped around the some sort of collaboration between Libyan militant Mohamed Said Dersi, same time by a group with specific Libyan and Tunisian militants. A known as al-Nass, who was sentenced political motivations. On March 21, Tunisian jihadist who resides in Libya to life imprisonment in Jordan in 2007 secretary of the Tunisian embassy, told the media that the abductions were for plotting to blow up a Jordanian Mohamed Ben Sheikh, was abducted a joint operation undertaken by Libyan airport.3 Dersi, who is from the Islamist from his car in the Ain Zara area of jihadist elements who are part of Ansar stronghold of al-Laithi in Benghazi, is the capital, forced into his abductors’ al-Shari`a and Tunisian elements that a former member of the Libyan Islamic vehicle and driven away.10 A few belong to the same organization in Fighting Group (LIFG) and was arrested weeks later on April 17, Laroussi Tunisia but who have been residing in April 2006 in Jordan along with Gantassi, an adviser at the Tunisian in Libya since August 2013.18 Little is two Iraqis.4 The Jordanian authorities embassy, was seized from Tripoli’s al- known about the extent of collaboration accused him of being part of al-Qa`ida. Kadasia Square.11 According to reports between Ansar al-Shari`a in Libya and in the Tunisian media, Gantassi may Tunisia. Tunisian militants, however, According to Libyan sources quoted in not have been the intended target of have certainly joined Ansar al-Shari`a an article by Libyan journalist Omar al- the abduction.12 These reports claim run training camps that are preparing Keddie and published on the Bawabat that he had intervened to save two volunteers to fight in Syria.19 al-Wasat website, Dersi’s family Tunisian engineers who had been 13 and tribe had been pushing Amman detained at a security checkpoint. 14 “Al-Kadha Al-Tunisi Yestima Lilibeen Itha Ikhtitaf 5 to grant him clemency. Frustrated This has not been confirmed, Tuniseen Fi Tarablus,” Elaph, April 23, 2014. at their lack of progress, the family 15 “Libyan Jihadist Group Parades Sobbing Hostage,” al- allegedly turned to revolutionary 6 Ibid. Arabiya, April 21, 2014. elements in the capital who carried 7 “Menji Hamadi: Al-diplmasi Tunisi Laroussi Gantassi 16 “Amaliat Ikhtitaf Al-Diplomasi Tunisi Nafedhaha Maktouf Min Jama`a Tutaleb Beitlaq Serah Libyeen Min Muntamoun Li Ansar Al-Sharia Fi Tunis,” al-Jarida, Sijoun Tunis,” al-Sada Press, undated. April 22, 2014. This group should not be confused with 3 “Jordanian Ambassador’s Kidnappers Seek Libyan 8 “Libya: Al-Urdon Sertusalim Sajeenan Islamiyan Mu- the Libyan Shabab al-Tawhid group, which is a separate Militant’s Release,” Asharq al-Awsat, April 16, 2014. kabel Al-Ifrage An-Safiriha Al-Mukhtataf,”Libya al-Mo- entity, and which did not post the video on its Facebook 4 “Al-Urdon Sefruj An Al-Dersi Muqabel Safirahu Bi stakbal, April 29, 2014. page. Libya,” al-Jazira, April 22, 2014. 9 “Libya Focus,” Menas Associates, May 2014. 17 “Tunisian Diplomat, in Video Message, Urges Gov- 5 “Omar Al-Keddie: Awaqib Ikhtitaf Al-Safir Al-Urdani 10 “Tunisia Diplomat Kidnapped in Libya,” Press TV ernment to Negotiate with Libyan Kidnappers,” Reuters, Ala Libya,” Bawabat al-Wasat, April 17, 2014. Bawabat [Tehran], March 23, 2014. April 21, 2014. al-Wasat is a relatively new venture established and 11 “Khass: Al-Tafaseel Al-Kamela Li Amaliyat Ikhtitaf 18 “Khass: Majmua Jihadiya Tunisia-Libeeya Takif headed by former head of media in the executive office Al-Diplmasi Laroussi Gantassi Bi Libya,” Elhasade, April Wara Ikhtitaf Al-Diplomsi Al-Tunisi,” Afrigate News, of the Transitional National Council (NTC), Mahmoud 26, 2014. April 21, 2014. Shamam. It is based in Cairo and is generally considered 12 Ibid. 19 Aaron Zelin, “New Evidence on Ansar al-Sharia in to be liberal in orientation. 13 Ibid. Libya Training Camps,” al-Wasat blog, August 8, 2013.

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Why these elements chose only to accused of kidnapping Prime Minister Other Kidnapping Motives demand the release of Libyan militants Ali Zidan and which answers directly to Other foreigners have also been rather than both Libyan and Tunisian the General National Congress (GNC). targeted in kidnap operations during militants is not clear. The LROC is deemed to be particularly recent months, although in these cases close to GNC head Nouri Abu Sahmaine, the perpetrators remain unknown The abductions, however, sparked a rush who in the summer of 2013 appointed and the motivations are far less clear. of negotiations that included mediation Shaban to head up the LROC and tasked Although it is impossible to be certain, from former LIFG amir and head of the it with securing Tripoli.25 Although these appear to be largely opportunistic al-Watan party, Abdelhakim Belhadj. the LROC denied any involvement attempts with the primary aim of On April 26, Bensheikh’s sister, Samira in the kidnapping of the Egyptian securing financial gain. Bensheikh, divulged that she had diplomats, it was not shy in making it received a call from one of the leaders of clear that it would not tolerate Shaban’s This would certainly seem to be the case the al-Watan party, Jamal Sadawi, who imprisonment. Adel Ghariani of the with the kidnappings of three Italians resides in Tunisia and who reassured LROC threatened that the Egyptians in the east of the country. On March 22, her that Belhadj was making every would face a “strong response” if Shaban Italian construction company employee effort to secure her brother’s release.20 was not released.26 Gianluca Salviato was seized near The abductors, however, reportedly Tobruk.30 Salviato’s car was discovered refused to continue negotiations with It is still not entirely clear why the with the keys still in the ignition after other involved parties until Belhadj was Egyptian authorities detained Shaban. he failed to show up for work on the site removed from the talks.21 On January 26, al-Sharq al-Awsat quoted of a new sewer project in the al-Hadaek Egyptian security sources who claimed area of the town.31 Since Salviatio’s The identities of the other parties are that Shaban had been in contact with kidnapping, there has been no ransom not clear. On April 28, Acting Libyan members of the Egyptian Muslim demand, or at least not one that has Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni Brotherhood and that he intended been made public, and no news of his told the media that his government was to carry out “acts of terror” on the whereabouts. communicating with the kidnappers of third anniversary of the Egyptian both the Tunisians and the Jordanian revolution.27 The Egyptian Interior Salviato’s kidnapping came just ambassador al-Itan, asserting, “We Ministry, however, maintained that the weeks after the release of two Italians, do not want to use force against the commander had been arrested because Francesco Scalise and Luciano Gallo. kidnappers, we want to reach peaceful his residency had expired.28 The two contractors, who worked for solutions.”22 As a result, it appears an engineering firm, were kidnapped in likely that those holding the Tunisians Despite denials of a “deal,” both Shaban January in the village of Martouba on hostage will achieve their demands. and the Egyptian diplomats were the road between Derna and Tobruk.32 released at the end of January following Little is known about their abduction This is not the first time in post-Qadhafi negotiations between the Libyan and and the circumstances surrounding Libya that abducting foreign diplomatic Egyptian governments.29 No one was their release. The fact that they were personnel resulted in the realization of arrested or held accountable for the freed, however, suggests that they a specific political demand. In January incident, sending out a clear signal that may have been taken by a criminal 2014, five Egyptian diplomats were one’s political goals could be achieved gang seeking financial gain, rather kidnapped from their Tripoli homes. by seizing foreign diplomatic personnel. than by a group with more ideological Their abductors demanded that Egypt Indeed, Libya has developed a culture motives. The same appears to be true free revolutionary commander Hadia of impunity in which such crimes go of Salviato’s kidnapping. An Italian Shaban (also known as Abu Obeida unpunished. Even those who kidnapped Foreign Ministry spokesman stated Zawi), who had been arrested in former Prime Minister Zidan have not following his abduction that they Alexandria in January.23 Shaban, a been held accountable. believed Salviato had been seized by hard line Salafist, spent 10 years in a “criminal organization intending to Yemen from 1993 where he was known seek a ransom, rather than an Islamist for his militant preaching.24 He is the group.”33 commander of the Libyan Revolutionary Operations Chamber (LROC), the body On January 20, South Korean Han

25 “Ghorfat Amaliat Thuwar Libya Wa Lajnat Mukafat Seok-Woo, who headed the Libya 20 “Belhaj Utamin Shakiqa Al-Diplomasi Al-Tunisi Al- Al-Jarima...Qiyanat Ghamdht Fi Dawla Al-Libyeea,” office of the Korean Trade-Investment Muqtataf,” Bawabat al-Wasat, April 26, 2014. Asharq al-Awsat, October 11, 2013. Promotion Agency (KOTRA), was 21 Alikhbaria, April 26, 2014. 26 “Libya Politics and Security,” Menas Associates, Jan- abducted in Tripoli on his way home 22 “Kidnapped Diplomats in Good Health Says Al-Thin- uary 27, 2014. ni,” Libya Herald, April 28, 2014. 27 “Masader Amnia: Al-Ishtiba Bintima Qa’id Thuwar 30 “Gianluca Salviato rapito in Libia: ‘Un mese senza no- 23 The abductors appeared on the al-Arabiya channel on Libya Lil Qa’ida Wa Tawasal Ma Al-Ikhwan Fil Qahira,” tizie,’” La Nouva Di Venezia e Mestre, April 19, 2014. January 25, 2014, demanding Hadia be released within Asharq al-Awsat, January 26, 2014. 31 Ibid. 24 hours. See “Libya Says Five Kidnapped Egyptian Dip- 28 “Libyan Militiaman Released in Egypt after Diplo- 32 “Paura in Cirenaica rapiti due operai italiani,” L’Unita. lomats Freed,” Reuters, January 26, 2014. mats Freed,” Reuters, January 27, 2014. January 19, 2014. 24 “Libya: Militias, Politicians Meld in Explosive Mix,” 29 “Kidnapped Egyptian Diplomats in Libya Freed,” al- 33 “Italy Says its Citizen Kidnapped in Libya, Needs Associated Press, October 22, 2013. Jazira, January 27, 2014. Medical Help,” Reuters, March 23, 2014.

14 may 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 5 from work. He was dragged from his untouched, suggests that their deaths also tweeted mocking comments about car by four gunmen who forced him were more ideologically motivated and Islamist militants.44 Neither Smith’s in their vehicle before driving away, probably represented an opportunistic tweets nor his sense of Christian leaving his Iraqi driver behind.34 attack by someone with an antipathy mission justify or explain his murder, towards Westerners. but they suggest why he might have Libyan security forces freed Seok- been a particular target for Islamist Woo three days later and arrested his The killing in December 2013 of militants. abductors. According to a spokesman American school teacher Ronnie Smith, from Libya’s Foreign Ministry, the South who was shot dead while jogging near Ideological motivations may also Korean was freed by security forces his Benghazi home, may also have been explain the executions of seven with the cooperation of citizens in the ideologically motivated. According to Egyptian Coptic Christians at the end neighborhood where he was detained. an Interior Ministry statement, four of February. According to neighbors, The spokesman stated, “The people who unidentified assailants in a black Jeep gunmen forced their way into the kidnapped him were not ideologically opened fire on Smith, a chemistry men’s apartment building in the or politically motivated. Some of teacher at the Benghazi International Garoutha suburb of Benghazi and the kidnappers were arrested.”35 School, killing him immediately.38 demanded to know which residents Therefore, his abduction appears No one claimed responsibility for his were Christian. The Christians in the to have been another opportunistic murder. Although there is no evidence of building were then rounded up and kidnapping by a group trying to any direct causal link, it is notable that abducted at gunpoint. The Egyptian take advantage of the pervading Smith was murdered just days after human rights group Nations Without lawlessness, possibly for financial al-Qa`ida operative Adam Gadahn Borders has recounted how the gunmen gain. called on Libyans to take revenge for also spraypainted a message on the the apprehension of Abu Anas al-Libi building and other buildings in the Murders of Foreigners by U.S. forces in October.39 area offering 10,000 Libyan dinars Foreigners have also been targeted in ($8,160) for anyone who hands a fatal attacks during recent months, Furthermore, Smith was a devout Christian over.45 The corpses of the mostly in the troubled east. On March Christian and appears to have been in abductees were found on a beach 2, 2014, French engineer Patrice Real Libya partly on a personal proselytizing approximately 19 miles west of was shot dead in his car by unidentified mission.40 As his widow explained in an Benghazi.46 According to Ibrahim gunmen in the Ras Obraida area of interview following his killing, “What Sharaa of the Benghazi Joint Security Benghazi.36 Real had been working I want people to know about him…he Chamber, several of the men were found on a project to upgrade and expand wanted to shine the light and the love with their hands bound and with a single the Benghazi Medical Center. Little of Jesus to the Libyan people…he really gunshot wound to the head.47 Shortly is known about the circumstances did.”41 Meanwhile a statement posted afterwards, on March 2, an Egyptian Copt surrounding his death or who was on the website of the Austin Stone was shot as he was unloading fruit and behind it. Community Church where Smith was vegetables from a car onto his market a pastor declared, “Ronnie’s greatest stall in Benghazi’s Majouri area.48 The same is true of the killing of British desire was for peace and prosperity in oil worker Mark de Salis and his New Libya and for the people of Libya to These are not the first attacks against Zealand companion, Lynn Howie, on have the joy of knowing God through Egyptian Christians in Libya. There have January 1, 2014. They were shot dead as Christ.”42 Given the sensitivities around been numerous incidents, including they picnicked on a beach near Mellitah proselytizing in Libya and the fact that attacks on Christian churches, as well in the west of the country. Both were dozens of Egyptian Christians were as the detention of scores of Copts shot in the head in what was clearly an rounded up in Benghazi and tortured on charges of proselytizing by armed execution-style attack.37 A photograph in 2013 by Islamist militants after being Islamist groups.49 posted on the internet showed what is accused of proselytizing, anyone openly purported to be the couple lying face promoting Christianity would have about Libyans. 43 down in the sand next to their belongings been extremely vulnerable. Smith 44 In October 2013, he wrote, “Libya Islamists are threat- with what appear to be gunshot wounds ening kidnappings. As if they can fit kidnapping into a to the head. This style of killing, along 38 “American Teacher Slain in Libya,” CNN, December 2hr work day that already includes a nap. Losers.” See with the fact that according to the Libyan 6, 2014. “American Teacher Ronnie Smith Shot Dead While Jog- Defense Ministry the couple’s car, 39 “Al-Qaida: US Committed ‘Crime of Piracy’ by Kid- ging in Benghazi,” Guardian, December 5, 2013. passports and belongings were all left napping Abu Anas al-Liby,” Guardian, December 1, 45 “Islamist Militia Group in Libya Suspected in Killing 2013. of Seven Coptic Christians,” Morning Star News, Febru- 34 “Kidnapped South Korean Trade Official Freed in 40 “Widow of American Teacher Forgives Attackers ary 25, 2014. Libya,” al-Arabiya, January 23, 2014. who Killed her Husband in Libya,” CNN, December 21, 46 “Libya Politics and Security,” Menas Associates, 35 “Abducted South Korean Trade Official Freed in Lib- 2013. March 3, 2014. ya – Government,” Reuters, January 22, 2014. 41 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 36 “French National Shot Dead in Benghazi,” Libya Her- 42 “Grieving the Loss of Our Brother in Christ,” The 48 “Another Egyptian Targeted in Benghazi,” Libya Her- ald, March 2, 2014. Austin Stone Community Church, undated. ald, March 2, 2014. 37 “Nusha Ala Shatta Al-Bahr Al-Libi Intaht Bi Rasassa 43 Some Libyans, meanwhile, complained about Smith’s 49 See “Egyptian Copts in Libya Allegedly Detained, Fee Al-Ras,” al-Arabiya, January 5, 2014. alleged posting of a series of tweets that were derogatory Tortured Following ‘Missionising’ Claims,” al-Ahram,

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Other Copts or foreign Christians have For example, despite accusations of Conclusion also been killed. In September 2013, involvement in the kidnapping of the The array of militant groups has become two Egyptian Christians were stopped Egyptian diplomats and Ali Zidan, ever more entrenched and more difficult on a rural road in the militant Islamist the LROC is still entrusted with to challenge in post-Qadhafi Libya, stronghold of Derna. The men, Waleed protecting Tripoli under the orders of as evidenced by the military parade Saad Shaker and Nash’at Shenouda Ishaq, Abu Sahmaine who, as part of his role that was staged by a newly announced were robbed, tied up and then shot dead as head of the GNC, is also supreme group in Derna on April 4, 2014. This after they refused to convert to Islam.50 commander of the armed forces. evidently well-armed and well-equipped Thus, in many cases, even when the group—the Shura Council of the Youth Meanwhile, in March 2014, Iraqi state knows who is behind a crime, of Islam in Derna—announced that it Christian Adison Karkha, a medical it is unable to act. As culture minister was planning to set up special camps school professor, was killed on his way and government spokesman Habib al- and forums to explain the “pure faith” to work in Qadhafi’s hometown of Sirte, Ameen lamented recently, “There are to the people and to open a number of another town that is fast becoming takfiri groups in Benghazi and Derna and recruitment centers in the town.58 a center for Islamist militancy.51 His they are responsible for the repeated death came a few months after the assassinations. Everyone knows these It is the entrenchment of these groups killing of Iraqi academic Hamid Khalf, groups and everyone knows their and the state’s failure to respond that who was abducted on his way to work members and where they are located. prompted retired Libyan army general and later killed in Derna, in November But no one can confront them or stop Khalifa Hafter to intervene and launch 2013.52 Khalf, who had been living in them.”54 his own assault against militant groups Iraq since 1998, was a Shi`a Muslim. in Benghazi. On May 16, Hafter—backed It is believed he may have been killed The problem is compounded by the fact by the Libyan National Army—staged in retaliation for the execution in Iraq that some of these militias and groups a number of attacks in a handful of of Libyan citizen Adel al-Zawi who had have support right at the heart of the Islamist-dominated neighborhoods in been convicted of terrorism charges.53 political establishment. As al-Ameen Benghazi. This move prompted other explained, there are “political parties forces to rally in support of Hafter’s Weak State inside the congress who are supporting cause, and a number of militias in While it is difficult to pull these these [takfiri] groups and who cover Tripoli attacked the Libyan parliament, incidents together into a single for them and provide them with all while Libyan National Army spokesman narrative and in most cases to say with facilities.”55 Although such assertions Mohamed al-Hegazi told Libya’s al- any certainty who was behind them, are difficult to prove, it is clear that the Ahrar television that the parliament “is the pattern of the killings and at least ideological outlook of some congress what supports these extremist Islamist some of the kidnappings suggests that members is not especially far removed entities. The aim was to arrest these they were the work of Islamist militants from that of some of the militant Islamist bodies who wear the cloak of and groups. The one aspect these groups. Indeed, Ali Zidan accused two politics.”59 incidents have in common, however, is hard line Islamist congress members that as with the kidnappings, no one has from Zawia—Mohamed al-Ghaylani and Hafter’s actions have plunged Libya been brought to justice. This is partly Mustafa Treiki—of being involved in even deeper into crisis. The country a result of the weakness of the Libyan his own abduction.56 is highly polarized with talk of civil state. The central authorities, which are war. With the Libyan state proving losing legitimacy by the day, still have In addition, reports have emerged itself incapable of offering any real no real control on the ground, having that Islamist militants are infiltrating protection at this time, further killings been unable to build a national army official security bodies. In March and kidnappings of both foreigners and or police force. There is still resistance 2014, the former spokesman of the Libyans are inevitable. among the armed groups on the ground Benghazi Security Directorate, Tariq to building such a force, which is al-Kharass, stated, “the state security Alison Pargeter is a Senior Research strongly associated in their minds with body is penetrated by the extremists Fellow at the Royal United Services the forces of the former regime. and if someone writes a report about Institute and a Senior Associate at Menas these extremists, the report is leaked Associates Consulting Firm. She specializes As a result, the state still has to rely and whoever wrote it will be killed in security issues in North Africa and in on the various brigades and militias instantly.”57 political Islamist movements in the region. to assist whenever there is a crisis. Her books include: Libya: The Rise and Fall of Qadhafi (2012), The Muslim February 28, 2013. 54 “Mesoul Libi Rafia Yatarif Lil Mara Oula Biwujoud Brotherhood: The Burden of Tradition 50 “Islamist Militia Group in Libya Suspected in Killing Al-Takfireen fi Benghazi,” al-Quds al-Arabi, March 2, (2010), and The New Frontiers of Jihad: of Seven Coptic Christians.” 2014. Radical Islam in Europe (2008). 51 “Report: Christian Iraqi Killed in Libya,” Associated 55 Ibid. Press, March 18, 2014. 56 “Ghorfat Amaliyat Thuwar Libya Militia Mutheera Li 52 “Libyan Jihadists Kill Shi’ite in Revenge for Prisoner Jedel,” al-Arabiya, January 30, 2014. 58 “Tanzeem Jihadi Fi Libya Yalin Adawatahu Lil Kuwat Executions by Iraq,” SITE Intelligence Group, January 57 “Mesoul Amni Sabak Yakshif Al-Tajawasat fi Mudi- Nidamia,” Libya News Network, April 6, 2014. 15, 2014. riyat Al-Am Bi Benghazi,” Bawabat al-Wasat, March 18, 59 “Rogue Libyan General Launches Anti-Islamist Raid 53 Ibid. 2014. on Parliament,” The National, May 18, 2014.

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British fighters in Syria is an imprecise each of Algerian, Azerbaijani, Pakistani The British Foreign Fighter science, with French President Francois and Turkish ethnicity. Ultimately, Contingent in Syria Hollande saying in January 2014 that charges were only brought against some 700 Britons were fighting in the Algerian and Turkish individuals, By Raffaello Pantucci Syria, a figure downplayed by the who were both charged with “making British government who stood by 350 record of information of a kind likely in mid-april 2014, the British government fighters.5 The International Center to be useful to a person committing released its latest annual report on for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) or preparing an act of terrorism or CONTEST, the British counterterrorism estimated in December 2013 that there possessing a document or record strategy. Focusing on the persistent were somewhere between 43-366 British containing information of that kind.”11 threat from international terrorism fighters who had traveled to Syria.6 A The Turkish individual was also accused faced by the United Kingdom, the more recent figure was offered by Helen of “preparing a terrorist act,” while the document highlighted how the British Ball, the senior national coordinator for Algerian was accused of “possession government is “concerned about the counterterrorism in the Metropolitan with a false document.”12 It is believed threat to the UK from Syria based Police, who admitted that as many as the other two were released. groups and the threat from foreign 700 Britons might be fighting in Syria.7 fighters returning to this country.”1 There has been a tight hold on further Officials spoke of 33-50% of security This article offers a brief background information allowed in the public service casework having a Syria on the alleged Mumbai-style plot domain, although the understanding component to it.2 that was disrupted in October 2013, is that the men were believed to be and then looks more specifically at planning a “Mumbai-style” shooting The threat of returning fighters from the community of British fighters in spree attack and the plot was one which Syria is one that British security Syria. It finds that while most British had connections to Syria.13 One report officials already believe they have foreign fighters in Syria may not suggested the men may have met in seen and disrupted, specifically in pose a domestic threat to the United Syria.14 Information around the case the form of a “Mumbai-style” plot Kingdom, it appears likely that some has been limited with the names of targeting the United Kingdom in might, especially in light of the recent the charged men kept out of the public October 2013 that reportedly had Mumbai-style plot that reportedly had domain. The case is due to go to trial links to Syria.3 On the ground in Syria, connections to the Syrian battlefield. later in the year. British fighters continue to die and broadcast their activities through a Mumbai-Style Plot British Fighters Increasingly Bold in Syria variety of social media platforms, while On the evening of October 14, 2013, Syria continues to have connections publicly denying the accusation of police staged a dramatic series of arrests to Britain’s longstanding Islamist wanting to launch attacks in the United across London.8 Four men, all allegedly community, and the police have moved Kingdom.4 The community of Britons long-term investigative suspects, were to clamp down heavily on the foreign in Syria, however, reveals a group with picked up in the sweep after authorities fighter phenomenon at home. In the strong links to criminal networks in the believed the group might have had first three months of 2014, authorities United Kingdom, as well as a growing access to firearms.9 Two individuals made more than 40 arrests connected willingness to publicize violent activity were arrested in a “hard stop” involving to Syria-related activity.15 At the that might constitute war crimes. shotgun rounds used to blow out the same time, the groups in Syria have wheels of the car they were driving, a become more bold, with British fighters Taken alongside the fact that Britons third at his home in Peckham and a final communicating with the media to appear to be fighting with a multiplicity suspect outside an Iranian restaurant in discuss their intentions and even going of groups (many British fighters who Westbourne Grove.10 so far as to establish their own media announce their affiliation claim to outlet and group in December 2013 be members of the Islamic State in The identities of the four men were not known as Rayat al-Tawhid. Iraq and the Levant, although others confirmed beyond their ethnicities and appear in images fighting alongside ages: all were British nationals, but one 11 “Two Men Charged with Terrorism Offences,” Press groups connected to Jabhat al-Nusra Association, October 20, 2013. or even other smaller units), it seems 5 Tom Whitehead, “700 Britons Fighting in Syria Terror 12 Ibid. that the threat to the United Kingdom Groups, Warns Hollande,” Telegraph, January 31, 2014. 13 Gardham, “Police Foil ‘Mumbai-Style’ Terrorist Plot is growing. The actual number of 6 “Up to 11,000 Foreign Fighters in Syria; Steep Rise in London, Say Security Sources”; Justin Davenport, Among Western Europeans,” The International Centre “Islamist Terror Suspects Could Have Met During Syria 1 “CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Coun- for the Study of Radicalisation, December 17, 2013. Conflict,” Evening Standard, October 15, 2013; Amanda tering Terrorism, Annual Report,” UK Home Office, 7 Tom Whitehead, “Up to 700 Britons Feared to be in Williams, “Hundreds of British Jihadis Returning From April 9, 2014. Syria,” Telegraph, April 24, 2014. Fight in Syria Spark Terror Alert After Police and MI5 2 Ibid. 8 Sean O’Neill and David Brown, “Syria Link to Terror Thwart Mumbai-Style Attack on London,” Mail Online, 3 Duncan Gardham, “Police Foil ‘Mumbai-Style’ Ter- Arrests in London Raids,” Times, October 15, 2014. February 16, 2014. rorist Plot in London, Say Security Sources,” Guardian, 9 Justin Davenport, “Police Foil ‘Major Islamist Terror 14 Ibid. October 14, 2013. Plot’ After Armed Raids Across London,” Evening Stan- 15 Tom Whitehead, “Syria-Related Arrests Soar as Po- 4 “British Fighters in Syria ‘Not Planning UK Attacks,’” dard, October 14, 2013. lice Urge Mothers and Wives to Stop Would-be Jihadis,” ITV News, April 8, 2014. 10 Ibid. Telegraph, April 24, 2014.

17 may 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 5

The Rayat al-Tawhid branding has they might plan to eventually return Syria.23 A prominent figure who shows become an increasingly prominent to the United Kingdom. This latter up repeatedly in Kataib al-Muhajirin feature of reporting in the United prospect is of great concern to British videos, al-Mazwagi (also known as Abu Kingdom around Syria, with the group authorities, given their brutalization Fidaa) fought previously in Libya and publishing a series of videos and and apparent ability to manufacture appeared to have enjoyed being filmed pictures through YouTube, Instagram explosives (a skillset suggested in fighting in Syria.24 Subsequent to his and Twitter accounts that offer images in which they show homemade death, for example, a mini-film emerged insights into personal experiences bombs). showing his activities on the battlefield, on the battlefield. The videos have joking around with fellow foreign glorified the fighting, calling on Kataib al-Muhajirin/Kataib al-Kawthar fighters and marrying a Swedish woman people to leave “the gangster life This is not the first time that Britons who had come to the front.25 In the Abu behind and join the life of jihad.”16 have emerged in such a public way on Kamal video, Abu Fidaa is referred to Other more recent videos have shown the Syrian battlefield. In early 2013, a the background of their lives near the group called Kataib al-Kawthar began “In the first three months battlefield, characterizing it as “Five to produce tweets under the handle Star Jihad”—a likely ironic reference @KAlKawthar and established a of 2014, authorities made to earlier images that emerged off the Facebook page that on March 31, 2013, more than 40 arrests battlefield in which Britons described released a video entitled Commander Abu the luxurious lives they were leading Musab’s Weekly Address, purporting to be connected to Syria-related with sweets from home and abandoned “the first weekly address of Abu Musab, activity.” mansions with swimming pools in a western Mujaahid commander who which to live.17 Rayat al-Tawhid videos is currently leading his forces against reflect a harder life on the battlefield, the oppressive regime of al-Assad.”20 illustrating the basic living conditions, Delivered in fluent, but accented, alongside suspected British national while also using the videos to solicit English, the blurb promised regular Abu Qudamah as carrying their fallen funding from the United Kingdom.18 The weekly updates, although it is not clear Swedish comrade’s body back to an group has also posted images of members if any more statements emerged. At ambulance.26 Abu Qudamah seems to be involved in the apparent execution of an around the same time as the video’s the battlefield name of another British individual identified as a rapist, and in publication, Kataib al-Kawthar released man from London who was later killed another image one of them is seen with a hagiographical video of Abu Kamal and who features prominently in images a bag of heads that are apparently from al-Swedee in both English and Arabic, released by Kataib al-Muhajirin. a group of regime soldiers.19 with the English language delivered in native sounding English.21 Abu Kamal Abu Qudamah and Ibrahim al-Mazwagi It is not clear who is behind Rayat was identified as a Finnish-born Swede feature in a number of images together, al-Tawhid, although their activities with a convert Finnish mother and as well as with other individuals. and publicity are reminiscent of Swedish father.22 Al-Mazwagi is later photographed longstanding British extremist groups. alongside Omar al-Shishani, while They speak with British accents, and The video about Abu Kamal appeared Abu Qudamah is instead featured in their references to gang culture suggest to be produced by a parallel or sister a montage set of images published on at least a working knowledge of that group to Kataib al-Kawthar called Facebook by a now closed account in life. What is somewhat disturbing about Kataib al-Muhajirin, a grouping which a group of individuals were the group is their ease with the extreme composed of foreign fighters in Syria heralded as “Green Birds.”27 What violence and brutality of the battlefield apparently led by the Georgian Omar is particularly striking about this in Syria, including involvement in al-Shishani. The divisions between the collection of images is that alongside battlefield executions, beheadings and group are unclear, with Abu Musab Abu Qudamah, the montages feature possibly torture. The men all seem being referred to in a video released Mohammed el-Araj, Bilal al-Berjawi eager to maintain their anonymity and by Kataib al-Muhajirin as one of Omar and Mohammed Sakr. Al-Berjawi only appear in videos with their faces al-Shishani’s commanders. The Abu and Sakr were two Britons who came covered, which suggests that they want Musab in the second video speaks only from west London and were killed in to protect their families back home from in Arabic, although prominent in the Somalia fighting alongside al-Shabab.28 the attention of the authorities, or that video are also Sayfullah al-Shishani and Ibrahim al-Mazwagi, a Libyan-Brit who 23 Richard Kerbaj and Malik al-Abdeh, “Dead at 21: Brit- 16 Steve Swann, “British Man Recruits for Syria Jihad,” was the first confirmed Briton killed in ain’s Veteran Jihadist,” Sunday Times, March 3, 2013. BBC, December 20, 2013. 24 Ibid. 17 Aris Roussinos, “Jihad Selfies: These British Extrem- 20 Commander Abu Musab’s Weekly Address, Kataib al- 25 Inigo Gilmore, “Britons Fighting with Syria’s Jihadi ists in Syria Love Social Media,” Vice, December 5, 2013. Kawthar, March 30, 2013, available at www.youtube. ‘Band of Brothers,’” Channel 4 News, June 14, 2013. 18 Know Your Role, Rayat al-Tawhid, April 25, 2014, com/watch?v=3wE0VWLgQnA. 26 Shaheed Abu Kamal English Version. available on Instagram. 21 Shaheed Abu Kamal English Version, Kataib al Muha- 27 Roussinos. 19 The image of the severed heads was posted on Ins- jirin, March 13, 2013, available at www.youtube.com/ 28 For a more complete story about al-Berjawi’s and tagram. The execution video was made public through watch?v=vn_8Ul4K_Gc. Sakr’s adventures in Somalia, see Raffaello Pantucci, the reporting of Tom Rayner, “British Fighters Filmed in 22 Per Gudmundson, “The Swedish Foreign Fighter “Bilal al-Berjawi and the Shifting Fortunes of Foreign Syria ‘War Crime,’” Sky News, May 2, 2014. Contingent in Syria,” CTC Sentinel 6:9 (2013). Fighters in Somalia,” CTC Sentinel 6:9 (2013).

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Mohammed el-Araj, on the other hand, bomber, Abdul Waheed Majid, killed In other moments, the younger Bary was a Briton of Palestinian descent from himself.34 A long-term activist himself, referred to his missing father, pushed Ladbroke Grove in west London who was Abdul Waheed Majid had featured back against those who defamed the killed in Syria in August 2013.29 El-Araj on the periphery of serious terrorist ISIL, and repeatedly denied accusations was an engineering student who was investigations in the United Kingdom that he was in some way connected to arrested in January 2009 at a protest for some time, including the large 2004 prominent British extremist preacher outside the Israeli Embassy.30 Also plot called Crevice that intended to Anjem Choudary. Mentioned in an arrested at the protest were Mohammed target a shopping mall outside London early profile that exposed him publicly Sakr and Walla Rehman, although with a large fertilizer-based explosive as fighting in Syria,41 Bary seemed both received far lighter punishments device.35 offended by the prospect, stating at than el-Araj—Sakr and Rehman were one point “why linking me to anjem charged with affray under the public Historical and Criminal Networks choudary again though, I dont know order act, while el-Araj was charged The war in Syria also has connections the man and we aint on the same wave with handling stolen goods. Rehman’s to longstanding members of the jihadist lol hes on that microphone jihad.”42 significance within this context comes community in the United Kingdom. In another post, he reported how he from the fact that he was identified as British foreign fighter Abdel Majed and a fellow Briton were “kidnapped/ being involved in the same network as Abdel Bary, for example, is the son of tortured by FSA/IF scum they stole al-Berjawi and Sakr in East Africa.31 Adel Abdel Bary, who was extradited our ak’s and a 7mm, my vehicle & our to the United States in 2012 after phones and cash.”43 Highlighting the It is of course impossible to know spending years in British custody.36 He circles in which he operated back in the the extent or importance of these stands accused of being the leader of United Kingdom, in mid-March 2014 he connections, although it is notable Egyptian Islamic Jihad’s cell in London declared that “my lil brother ahmed got that the men all come from a relatively in the 1990s and of providing support sentenced to life…26 years minimum…. similar part of London. It is possible that to Usama bin Ladin by helping to run a love lil bro see you in the afterlife the young men all knew each other and media outpost for al-Qa`ida.37 He is also inshallah #kasper.”44 He appears to be the grouping behind them is one that accused of involvement in the 1998 East referring to Ahmed Kasper Mikhaimar, has previously helped fighters reach Africa U.S. Embassy bombings.38 The a convicted burglar who in January 2014 Somalia and is now directing people younger Bary, a former grime music was sentenced to 26 years incarceration toward Syria.32 What is certainly rapper from west London, seems to for the murder of a teenager on London’s concerning about this grouping is that have had a radical damascene moment streets.45 it has clearly pledged allegiance and in mid-2013, and in July declared on fought alongside Omar al-Shishani, his Facebook page that “the unknown This link to serious criminality can a man who was the leader of foreign mixtape with my bro tabanacle will be be found elsewhere among Britain’s fighters in Syria and has now moved the last music I’m ever releasing. I have community of fighters in Syria. Choukri over to be a sub-commander to Abu left everything for the sake of Allah.”39 Ellekhlifi, a Briton of Moroccan descent Bakr al-Baghdadi, the head of the In October 2013, he used his Twitter feed from Paddington west London who Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant to ask “for everyone that still asks me used the name Abu Hujama, was killed (ISIL)—one of the most violent groups about where my videos have gone, like in August 2013 alongside his brother- in Syria. The other Chechen visible in I said a while back I quit music & I took in-arms Mohammed el-Araj.46 Prior the aforementioned video featuring all the vids I can down….& if you own to coming to Syria, Ellekhlifi had been Omar and Abu Musab, Sayfullah al- a channel that has any of my music up arrested with Mohammed Elyasse Shishani, appears to have broken away can you take it down also, appreciated. Taleouine and Mohammed Ibrahim from Omar to set up a more independent Bless.”40 in August 2012 after a series of brutal faction fighting alongside Jabhat al- robberies in London’s affluent Belgravia Nusra.33 He was killed in early February district where masked men on bicycles 2014 in an attack on Aleppo prison attacked people walking the streets, where the first recorded British suicide 34 “UK ‘Suicide Bomber’ Abdul Waheed Majid Video threatening them with a taser while they 47 Posted Online,” BBC, February 14, 2014. stole their possessions. In two cases, 29 Shiv Malik and Haroon Siddique, “Briton Killed 35 Raffaello Pantucci, “Syria’s First British Suicide Fighting in Syria Civil War,” Guardian, November 20, Bomber: The UK Jihadist Backdrop,” Royal United Ser- 41 Greenwood. 2013. vices Institute, February 14, 2014. 42 Twitter feed @ItsLJinny, March 9, 2014. 30 Ibid. 36 Chris Greenwood, “Fighting Jihad in Syria, The Brit- 43 “The Scum Stole our Cash,” Daily Mail, March 9, 31 J1 v. The Secretary of State for the Home Department, ish ‘Grime’ Rapper from £1m Home in Maida Vale, West 2014. Royal Courts of Justice, 2013. London, Who is the Son of a Suspected Al Qaeda Master- 44 Twitter feed @ItsLJinny, March 13, 2014. 32 It is possible that there is a similar structure at play in mind,” Daily Mail, December 31, 2013. 45 William Turvill, “Five Thugs who Killed a Schoolboy Belgium in a case currently working its way through the 37 “Fact Sheet on Extradition of 5 Terrorism Suspects Stabbing Him with Swords and Meat Cleavers in one of system in which fighters were being sent to both Soma- to US: Information on Charges,” U.S. Embassy London, Britain’s Wealthiest Postcodes are Jailed for 131 Years,” lia and Syria. See “L’epouse de Rachid Benomari lui en- October 5, 2012. Daily Mail, January 31, 2014. voyait de l’argent en Somalie,” La Libre, March 10, 2014. 38 Ibid. 46 Amie Keeley, “Four Britons ‘Killed Fighting in Syrian 33 “An In-Depth Look At Chechen Fighters in Syria – 39 This post, dated July 1, 2013, is available at www.face- Civil War With Al Qaeda Rebels,’” Mail Online, Novem- Part I: Sayfullah Al-Shishani and His Circle,” Middle book.com/LyricistJinn/posts/634492946562118. ber 20, 2013. East Media Research Institute, December 6, 2013. 40 Twitter feed @ItsLJinny, October 9, 2013. 47 Duncan Gardham, ‘The Al Qaeda Fanatic from Brit-

19 may 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 5 they used the taser on their victims.48 The final connection to longstanding called Anil Khalil Raoufi.64 Both Raoufi The men were released on bail, and it members of the UK jihadist scene is and Iftekar Jaman have since been killed appears that at this point Ellekhlifi fled the case of Moazzam Begg, the former fighting.65 the country and traveled to Syria where Guantanamo Bay detainee and founder he joined the fighting.49 Taleouine was of the Azzam Publications bookshop in Others from the Portsmouth cluster re-arrested on January 10, 2013, when Birmingham.58 UK authorities arrested who are still fighting in Syria include counterterrorism officers undertook Begg on February 25, 2014, and former private schoolboy and fitness an “intelligence-led operation” into charged him with providing terrorist fanatic Muhammad Hassan.66 Hassan, “alleged facilitation of travel overseas training as well as funding terrorism another participant in the Portsmouth for terrorism.”50 Searching Taleouine’s overseas.59 Arrested alongside him da`wa group, is a regular on social media property, police discovered a converted were Gerrie and Mouloud Tahari, a and promotes the ISIL’s cause.67 In mid- 9mm MAC-10 submachine gun, and he mother and son who are also charged November 2013, another Portsmouth ultimately pleaded guilty to firearms with supporting terrorism overseas.60 man, Muhammad Hamidur Rahman, offenses and robbery charges.51 Taleouine Begg’s arrest elicited substantial a manager at a local retail clothing was sentenced to 10 years in jail.52 public outcry and his trial later in store, told his family he was heading the year is likely to prove a major to Syria as part of an aid convoy only Abdel Majed Abdel Bary also provides spectacle as he fights against perceived to reemerge weeks later as a fighter a connection to another relation of a persecution. alongside the ISIL.68 Both men are prominent British individual previously believed to still be fighting in Syria. accused of involvement with radical Portsmouth’s Bangladeshi Bad Boys circles. On April 18, 2014, Bary tweeted Another cluster of Britons drawn to In contrast, Mashudur Choudhury, who “Subhanallah just seen the brother less Syria can be found in Portsmouth where recently became the first Briton to be than 2 weeks ago, may Allah accept his a group that seems to in part echo a convicted of terrorism charges related shahada, Abdullah Deghayas, martyr local da`wa (propagation) community to the conflict in Syria,69 was arrested inshallah.”53 This was a reference to has gone to fight in Syria alongside upon his return to the United Kingdom Abdullah Deghayes, an 18-year-old the ISIL. The Portsmouth Da`wa Team on October 26, 2013.70 He had left for Briton of Libyan descent who was continues to carry out its peaceful Syria on October 8 with four other killed fighting in Kassab, Latakia.54 The activities in the city center, and there Portsmouth men on a commercial nephew of former Guantanamo detainee has been no evidence presented that it flight to Turkey (including Muhammad Omar Deghayes, Abdullah is the middle is connected to terrorism. A number of Hamidur Rahman and Muhammad child of three brothers who have former members, however, have gone to Hassan) after long conversations left their homes in Brighton to fight fight in Syria. Most prominently, Iftekar via various social media and online alongside a Libyan unit in Syria called Jaman, a former call center employee communication methods, including al-Battar.55 His older brother Amer was and son of fast food restaurant owners, Skype, with Iftekar Jaman.71 In one of shot in the stomach during the same became something of a celebrity jihadist these messages, Choudhury suggested clash, while his younger brother Jaffer through his online media profile.61 In that the group he was traveling with is the youngest publicly confirmed November 2013, he achieved particular should call themselves the “Britani Briton fighting in Syria at 16 years of notoriety when he was interviewed by brigade Bangladeshi bad boys,” which age.56 Their father has since pleaded for the BBC’s flagship Newsnight program.62 elicited a “lol sounds long” from his two remaining sons to return home, He was also responsible for helping to Jaman.72 Choudhury was also revealed although it seems uncertain whether facilitate travel to Syria for two other to have argued about his activity with this will be possible.57 Britons who used the pseudonyms Abu his wife who saw him as a fantasist Qaqa and Abu Layth al-Khorasani.63 ain who Funded Jihad Trip to Syria by Mugging London- Abu Layth was later revealed to be a 64 Yakub Qureshi, “Anil Khalil Raoufi, 20, Killed Fight- ers with a Taser,” Mail on Sunday, November 30, 2013. Manchester-born student at Liverpool ing in Syria Thought War was ‘Like Star Wars,’” Man- 48 Ibid. University and part-time amateur boxer chester Evening News, February 13, 2014. 49 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 50 Metropolitan Police statement, undated, available at 66 Dipesh Gadher, David Leppard, Hala Jaber, Toby www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.53847542619990 58 “UK Ex-Guantanamo Detainee Moazzam Begg Re- Harnden and Laura Molyneaux, “‘We Need to Start Tak- 1.1073741856.423306314383480&type=3. manded in Custody,” BBC, March 1, 2014. ing Heads Off’: The YouTube Jihadists who Pose a Risk 51 Ibid. 59 Ibid. to Britain,” Sunday Times, January 12, 2014. 52 Ibid. 60 “Mouloud Tahari: Briton, 20, Charged over Funding 67 Dipesh Gadher and Laura Molyneaux, “Portsmouth’s 53 Twitter feed @ItsLJinny, April 18, 2014. Syria Terrorism,” Independent, March 4, 2014. Primark Jihadist Surfaces in Syria,” Sunday Times, De- 54 “Father Scared for Sons in Syria,” Press Association, 61 Edward Malnick and Richard Spencer, “British ‘Ce- cember 1, 2013. April 21, 2014. lebrity Jihadi’ and Chef Dies in Syria,” Telegraph, Decem- 68 Ibid. 55 Conal Urquhart and Shiv Malik, “Teenager From ber 17, 2013. 69 Dominic Casciani, “Mashudur Choudhury: Serial Liar Brighton Killed Within Weeks of Joining Syrian Con- 62 Richard Watson, “Briton ‘Doing his Duty’ by Fighting and Jihadist,” BBC, May 20, 2014. flict,”Guardian , April 18, 2014. with Group Linked to al Qaeda in Syria,” BBC, Novem- 70 Tom Whitehead, “Man Travelled to Syrian Terror 56 Urquhart and Malik. ber 21, 2013. Training Camp After Angry Wife Said ‘Go Die on Battle- 57 Shiv Malik, “Father of UK Teenager Killed in Syria 63 Tam Hussein, “Social Media Jihadi: The Inside Story field,’ Court Told,”Telegraph , May 7, 2014. Implores his Other Sons to Return,” Guardian, April 20, of a Briton who Died Fighting for ISIS,” Huffington Post, 71 Ibid. 2014. February 6, 2014. 72 Ibid.

20 may 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 5 and who finally told him in a July text A Profile of Ahrar-ul-Hind the truce with the government and to message to “go die in battlefield. Go refrain from all “jihadist” activities die, I really mean it just go. I’ll be and Ansar-ul-Mujahidin in during this period.5 In response, the relieved. At last. At last.”73 Pakistan Pakistani government also announced a cease-fire.6 Conclusion By Zia Ur Rehman The flow of foreign fighters to Syria On March 3, however, an attack at from the United Kingdom continues, on march 1, 2014, Tehrik-i-Taliban the Islamabad district court killed 11 although the scale is difficult to Pakistan (TTP) and the Pakistani people, including a session judge.7 determine. The trends are worrisome, government agreed to a month-long Ahrar-ul-Hind, a little-known militant with the preponderance of longstanding temporary cease-fire to negotiate group, claimed responsibility.8 The networks of individuals involved in a peace deal. A few days after the group’s spokesman, Asad Mansoor, radical activity, the continued featuring announcement, two little-known told reporters that they are not bound of British nationals fighting alongside militant groups—Ahrar-ul-Hind and to follow a cease-fire of any kind with the ISIL, and the fact that a number Ansar-ul-Mujahidin—carried out two the Pakistani government. “We were a of these nationals are connected to terrorist attacks in the Pakistani capital part of TTP earlier but now we operate serious criminal networks in the United of Islamabad and Hangu District of independently,” the spokesman said.9 Kingdom. These factors highlight a Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, killing trend that is likely to develop into dozens of people.1 Although the cease- Then, on March 5, a roadside bomb future threats. The twin incidents of the fire ended in April due to disagreements struck a paramilitary Frontier Corps murder of Lee Rigby in Woolwich by between the Pakistani government and (FC) personnel convey in Hangu District longstanding activist Michael Adebolajo the TTP, the attacks by Ahrar-ul-Hind of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, and the suicide bombing in Aleppo by and Ansar-ul-Mujahidin appeared to killing six FC personnel.10 Another Abdul Waheed Majid, a man with almost reveal that there are factions within the militant group, Ansar-ul-Mujahidin, two decades of radical activity, serve to TTP that strictly oppose any negotiation claimed responsibility.11 Abu Bassir, highlight the persistent and long-term with the government.2 the organization’s spokesperson, said threat that such radicalized individuals that the attack was in reaction to the can pose. This article provides a brief background killing of Taliban fighters in drone on the attacks during the recent peace attacks in Pakistan’s tribal areas.12 He Thus far, only one domestic terrorist talks, profiles Ahrar-ul-Hind and also added that his group is not part of plot in the United Kingdom has been Ansar-ul-Mujahidin, and assesses the TTP and therefore is not bound by reported as having a connection to the overall implications of potential the cease-fire.13 Syria, but there is an expectation that splintering within the TTP. more will emerge.74 While most fighters Following the attacks, media and who return from Syria may not pose a Violation of the Peace Talks civil society groups made growing threat, it is likely that some will. British Although some analysts expected a demands for a full-scale military fighters state that they have no intention Pakistani military operation against operation against the TTP. The of carrying out attacks in the United TTP strongholds following a bloody TTP leadership, however, publicly Kingdom, but the indicators from across start to 2014, Pakistani Prime Minister expressed frustration that some Europe (including the recently foiled Nawaz Sharif instead announced on militant groups had not abided by the Mumbai-style plot) suggest that future January 29 that his government would cease-fire.14 In a March 3 statement, domestic threats connected to the war pursue peace talks with the TTP.3 TTP spokesperson Shahidullah in Syria are likely to emerge.75 Sharif named a four-member committee Shahid denied any involvement in the to facilitate the talks. In turn, the TTP Islamabad court attack, saying that the Raffaello Pantucci is a Senior Research also nominated a committee for dialogue TTP was struggling to enforce Shari`a Fellow at the Royal United Services with the government.4 Institute for Defence and Security Studies 5 “Pakistani Taliban Announce Month-Long Ceasefire,” (RUSI) and is grateful for the support After several meetings between the Dawn, March 2, 2014. of the Airey Neave Trust in his work on committees from both sides, the TTP 6 Muhammad Anees, “Government Announces Cease- foreign fighters. announced a month-long cease-fire on fire Following TTP,” The News Tribe, March 2, 2014. March 1 and directed all groups working 7 “Judge, 10 Others Killed in Islamabad Blasts, Firing,” under the umbrella of the TTP to honor Dawn, March 3, 2014. 8 Ibid. 1 Malik Asad and Muawar Azeem, “Judge, 10 Others 9 Azad Syed, “Hello, We Are Ahrarul Hind, We Attacked Slain in Islamabad Court Attack,” Dawn, March 4, 2014; Islamabad,” The News International, March 4, 2014. Ahmed Naveed Zafar, “Four FC Personnel Martyred in 10 “Bomb Kills Six Near Hangu,” Newsweek Pakistan, Hangu Bomb Attack,” Pakistan Tribune, March 5, 2014. March 5, 2014. 73 Ibid. 2 Zahir Shah Sherazi, “TTP Decided Not to Extend 11 Ibid. 74 O’Neill and Brown. Ceasefire,”Dawn , April 16, 2014. 12 Ibid. 75 Raffaello Pantucci, “Thick as Thieves: European 3 “PM Sharif Announces Another Push for Taliban Peace 13 Ibid. Criminals Take to Syria’s Battlefield,” Royal United Ser- Talks,” Dawn, January 29, 2014. 14 Hasan Abdullah, “TTP Frustrated at ‘Defiance’ Over vices Institute, March 31, 2014. 4 Ibid. Ceasefire,”Dawn , March 6, 2014.

21 may 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 5 in Pakistan and that they considered a A Profile of Ahrar-ul-Hind engaged in the recent peace talks with violation of the cease-fire “un-Islamic.”15 Ahrar-ul-Hind first entered the the government.31 He said that anyone belonging to the spotlight on February 9, 2014, when Taliban would be questioned if found Asad Mansoor, the group’s spokesman, Some reports suggest that Qasmi is guilty of any violent incident during the issued a statement to media outlets now based in Mohmand Agency, a cease-fire.16 declaring that the group would not tribal region situated on the Pakistan- accept any peace agreement short of Afghanistan border area.32 A Taliban Sources said that the TTP leadership the complete enforcement of Shari`a in commander in the tribal areas said formed a special cell to identify the Pakistan.21 On February 14, the group that Ahrar-ul-Hind had also contacted militants associated with Ahrar-ul-Hind released another statement rebuking militants loyal to a faction formerly and Ansar-ul-Mujahidin.17 Professor those who support peace talks before headed by Badar Mansoor, al-Qa`ida’s Ibrahim, a member of the Taliban’s the implementation of Shari`a.22 chief in Pakistan who was killed in a negotiation committee, confirmed that drone strike in February 2012, to join Mansoor claimed that Ahrar-ul-Hind their group.33 is headed by Maulana Umar Qasmi.23 A “Although few details have Newsweek Pakistan report suggested that According to a commander of a Taliban emerged about Ahrar-ul- Qasmi, from Jhang district of Punjab group, the group derived its name of Province, was associated with Sipah- “Ahrar” because the Ahraris were Hind, one militant source i-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), a banned against the formation of Pakistan, said that many of its sectarian militant group.24 Qasmi was and they believed that the entire also reportedly enrolled at Usman-o- subcontinent was their homeland.34 members are from Punjab Ali seminary, run by Maulana Masood Explaining Ahrar-ul-Hind’s objectives, Province.” Azhar, the head of the banned Jaysh- the commander said that the group plans i-Muhammad group, in Bahawalpur.25 to expand the fight to “the remaining Apart from the TTP and Jaysh-i- part of the subcontinent, India and Muhammad, Ahrar-ul-Hind reportedly Occupied Kashmir.”35 the TTP leadership was chasing down has ties with the Islamic Movement of the little-known groups—especially Uzbekistan, Harkat-ul-Mujahidin and Ansar-ul-Mujahidin Ahrar-ul-Hind.18 Maulana Yousaf Jundullah.26 The North Waziristan-based Ansar- Shah, another member of the Taliban’s ul-Mujahidin has existed since at least negotiation committee, said that the Although few details have emerged March 2013. Reports citing government TTP leaders would first try to persuade about Ahrar-ul-Hind, one militant officials and intelligence information the splinter groups to abide by the source said that many of its members suggest that Mufti Shafique, a leader of cease-fire. If the groups refused, said are from Punjab Province.27 Several the TTP Gandapur group,36 has ties to Shah, then the TTP would take strict eyewitnesses to the Islamabad court Ansar-ul-Mujahidin,37 and that Uzbek action against them.19 attack in Islamabad reported hearing fighters are also part of the group.38 the militants speaking Punjabi to one It is not clear what became of these another.28 This suggests that the group The group claimed credit for a double threats, although by April the cease- may have splintered from TTP Punjab,29 suicide bombing on a Shi`a mosque in fire was no longer in effect after the TTP which is headed by Asmatullah Parachinar town of Kurram Agency accused the Pakistani government of Muawiya.30 Muawiya has been openly on July 26, 2013, which killed at least killing 50 TTP activists.20 Nevertheless, 57 people.39 Ansar-ul-Mujahidin also the formation of Ahrar-ul-Hind and 21 Ismail Khan, “Spoilers in the Game,” Dawn, March 4, claimed responsibility for three suicide Ansar-ul-Mujahidin has important 2014. attacks on different military checkpoints 40 implications for future peace deals 22 Ibid. in North Waziristan Agency in 2013. between the TTP and the Pakistani 23 Khaled Ahmed, “The Coming Apocalypse,” Newsweek government. Pakistan, April 1, 2014. 31 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 32 Ahmed. 25 Ibid. 33 Tarakzai. 26 Asim Qadeem Rana, “TTP, Ahrar-ul-Hind Ate and 34 Rana. Slept Together,” The Nation, March 6, 2014. 35 Ibid. 27 Sajid Tarakzai, “Shadowy Militant Splinter Group 36 The TTP Gandapur group is associated with the cen- Threaten Pakistan Peace Talks,” Agence France-Presse, tral TTP and they operate in Kolachi and other neighbor- 15 Tahir Khan, “Clear Their Name: TTP Denies Hand in March 9, 2014. ing areas of Dera Ismail Khan District of Khyber Pakh- Capital Assault,” Express Tribune, March 4, 2014. 28 Ibid. tunkhwa Province. 16 Ibid. 29 TTP Punjab, also called the Punjabi Taliban, is a loose 37 Muhammad Irfan Mughal, “Shadowy Groups Claim 17 “TTP Investigating About Ahrarul Hind: Ibrahim,” conglomeration of members of different banned militant Killing KP Minister,” Dawn, October 20, 2013. Pakistan Today, March 16, 2014. groups of Punjabi origin who have developed connec- 38 Amir Mir, “Ansarul Mujahideen is Part and Parcel of 18 Ibid. tions to the TTP and al-Qa`ida. TTP,” The News International, March 6, 2014. 19 “Taliban nay Ahrarul Hind Jaisi Tanzeemo ka koj 30 Fasihur Rehman Khan, “Qaeda Now Relying on Pun- 39 Zahir Shah Sherazi, “Anti-Drone Militant Group lagaliya,” Daily Nai Baat, March 10, 2014. jabi Taliban Instead of Pashtuns,” The Nation, February Claims Parachinar Twin Blasts,” Dawn, July 27, 2013. 20 Sherazi, “TTP Decided Not to Extend Ceasefire.” 24, 2014. 40 Ibid.

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Ansar-ul-Mujahidin claimed the refrain themselves from the anti-polio used the peace talks and the cease-fire October 16, 2013, killing of Khyber campaign,” said Abu Bassir at that to regroup for future attacks against the Pakhtunkhwa law minister Israr time, threatening that “at the moment, Pakistani government.49 Moreover, on Gandapur, along with nine other their focus is toward Nawaz Sharif’s May 28, 2014, the TTP Waliur Rehman people, in Dera Ismail Khan, in government, but they will turn their faction, led by Khan Said (also known retaliation for the death of two of guns on Khan and Haq if they do not as Sajna), announced its separation their men during an attack on Dera relent.”45 On November 9, 2013, the from the TTP, alleging that the current Ismail Khan jail on July 29, 2013.41 group also directed a message to Prime Maulana Fazlullah-led TTP is bombing Taliban militants freed 248 militants Minister Nawaz Sharif and his brother public places using fake names to avoid from the jail, including 48 high profile and Chief Minister of Punjab Province responsibility.50 militants from the TTP and Lashkar-i- Shahbaz Sharif, threatening to kill Jhangvi.42 The TTP previously claimed them with suicide bombers as revenge Conclusion for the November 1 death of TTP chief Even if Ahrar-ul-Hind and Ansar- “The large number of Hakimullah Mehsud in a drone strike.46 ul-Mujahidin operate outside the influence of the TTP leadership, they distinct and competing Implications could have support from al-Qa`ida and armed actors suggests Attacks carried out by Ahrar-ul-Hind other anti-state elements, especially and Ansar-ul-Mujahidin have two foreign militant outfits.51 Returning that putting an end to possible implications. normalcy to the Pakistani tribal violent insurgency through areas is not in the interests of foreign First, some analysts believe that the militant groups due to their ongoing dialogue will remain a Pakistani government’s effort to achieve operations in neighboring Afghanistan. distant possibility even if a peace deal with the TTP has exposed Experts believe that foreign militant a split in the group, suggesting that groups, especially al-Qa`ida and Uzbek the government and the it has lost influence over its various militants, are worried that a peace deal TTP agree on a peace deal.” factions. The TTP, for example, is not might close their safe heavens in North a monolith; it is composed of many Waziristan.52 different groups. According to one general estimate, 54 militant groups While such splits among militant responsibility for that same jailbreak. operate in the tribal areas and settled groups may be a reason for the Pakistani Security officials initially said that districts, with 43 of them operating government to rejoice when combating they were trying to determine whether in North Waziristan alone.47 When them militarily, the large number of Ansar-ul-Mujahidin is part of the TTP, the government entered into peace distinct and competing armed actors or if the claim was a TTP tactic to avoid negotiations with the TTP, according suggests that putting an end to violent responsibility.43 to this theory, some militant groups insurgency through dialogue will began carrying out attacks on their remain a distant possibility even if the Ansar-ul-Mujahidin had also claimed own for reasons varying from tribal government and the TTP agree on a responsibility for the October 11, 2013, affiliation, sectarian views, or ties with future peace deal.53 suicide attack on a security convoy in foreign militants such as al-Qa`ida.48 the Wana area of South Waziristan Therefore, the splintering of the TTP Zia Ur Rehman is a journalist and that killed two security officials, saying means that even a successful peace deal researcher who covers militancy and that the attack was a response to the with the group will not end militancy in security issues in Pakistan. He has written September 6 drone attack in North the tribal regions. for the Friday Times, New York Times, Waziristan Agency that killed the Dawn, The Jamestown Foundation and Haqqani network’s key leader, Mullah Second, other analysts and police The News. He is also author of the book Sangin Zadran.44 officials allege that the TTP leadership Karachi in Turmoil. purposely allowed various “so-called” In December 2013, Ansar-ul-Mujahidin splinter groups to continue with their also warned Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf subversive activities to place pressure party chief Imran Khan and Jamiat- on Pakistan while the main TTP i-Ulama-i-Islam (Sami faction) factions publicly engaged in the cease- chief Maulana Sami-ul-Haq against fire. According to this theory, the TTP championing the polio vaccination campaign. “Khan and Haq should 45 Nazar ul Islam, “Militants Warn Khan, Haq Against Police Campaign,” Newsweek Pakistan, December 19, 49 Tarakzai. 41 “Pakistan Jailbreak: Taliban Free 248 in Dera Ismail 2013. 50 These details are based on an official press release sent Khan,” BBC, July 30, 2013. 46 Mir. to this author from Azam Tariq, the spokesman of the 42 Ibid. 47 Khan, “Spoilers in the Game.” TTP Waliur Rehman faction, on May 28, 2014. 43 Mughal. 48 Daud Khattak, ‘Taliban Turf Wars Block Peace,” 51 Zahra-Malik. 44 Zulfiqar Ali, “Act of Revenge: Ansarul Mujahideen Foreign Policy, March 5, 2014; Mehreen Zahra-Malik, 52 Personal interview, Raees Ahmed, Karachi-based se- Claims Responsibility of Wana Blast,” Express Tribune, “Violent Splinter Groups Mars Peace Deal with Pakistan curity analyst, May 23, 2014. October 13, 2013. Taliban,” Reuters, March 7, 2014. 53 Khattak.

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which killed 10 people in Nairobi on that residents call “Little Mogadishu” Al-Hijra: Al-Shabab’s May 16, 2014.8 because of its large population of Affiliate in Kenya Kenyan Somalis and refugees who have A Profile of Al-Hijra fled the war in Somalia. By Fredrick Nzes Al-Hijra is a covert group of primarily Kenyan Somali and non-Somali Muslim The MYC, however, reportedly in september 2013, militants linked to followers of al-Shabab in East Africa. developed links to al-Shabab, and was al-Shabab carried out a deadly attack It is reportedly led by Shaykh Ahmad accused of recruiting Kenyan youth to at the upscale Westgate shopping Iman Ali, who left Kenya to join al- fight for the terrorist group in Somalia.15 mall in Nairobi’s Westlands area. Shabab in Somalia in 2009.9 Al-Hijra’s The MYC thrived by generating funds, The assault killed 67 people and geographic center of support is on the as well as recruiting and training refocused international attention on the Muslim Swahili coast of Kenya and networks for al-Shabab in Kenyan towns organization.1 The operation appeared Tanzania, although its base is in the to embolden al-Shabab, which until Majengo area of Nairobi.10 “In October 2013, UN that point had been on the defensive in Somalia.2 As the attack on the Al-Hijra’s predecessor, the MYC, and European officials Westgate mall unfolded, al-Shabab was formed at the Pumwani Riyadha expressed concern that al- claimed responsibility through Twitter Mosque, one of the oldest Islamic posts, stating that they sent men armed institutions in Nairobi, as a community- Shabab and al-Hijra were with AK-47s into the shopping mall based organization in 2008.11 The planning future attacks to retaliate against Kenya’s invasion MYC’s primary objective was to offer of Somalia in 2011.3 As they had done counseling, as well as to work for employing the Westgate previously, al-Shabab followed these positive social and economic change tactical model.” tweets with warnings that Kenya’s for the Muslim youth in the Majengo failure to withdraw its forces from slums who felt discriminated against as Somalia would have dire consequences.4 Muslim minorities in Kenya.12 The MYC Evidence quickly emerged that al- was funded by the Pumwani Riyadha such as Nairobi, Garissa, Mombasa and Shabab affiliates in Kenya assisted the Mosque Committee (PRMC) through Eldoret.16 Some of the recruits had their militants in executing the Westgate money generated from, among other travel facilitated to Somalia, where they shopping mall attack.5 sources, large sections of land in the would fight for al-Shabab.17 Majengo slums and by rent payments This article profiles al-Hijra, formerly from second-hand clothing stalls in the The MYC’s founder, Shaykh Ahmad known as the Muslim Youth Center nearby Gikomba market—land which Iman Ali, was reportedly born in 1973 or (MYC), which is considered a key al- the PRMC owns.13 The PRMC is also said 1974 in Kenya.18 He studied engineering Shabab affiliate in Kenya and East to control large storage facilities where in Nairobi, where he graduated in 1997 Africa.6 It traces al-Hijra’s evolution traders keep their goods and pay rents.14 or 1998 (although other reports claim he from the MYC to a group with a The slum and the Gikomba market graduated in 2001).19 After graduation, substantial underground network in border Eastleigh, a district in Nairobi he worked for Shell and Exxon Mobil oil Kenya, capable of posing a major threat companies as an engineer.20 As a youth 7 to domestic security. Understanding al- 8 Jason Straziuso, “Bombings Kill 10, Wound 70 in Ke- leader at the Pumwani Riyadha Mosque, Shabab’s network in Kenya is especially nyan Market,” ABC News, May 16, 2014. Iman Ali oversaw the construction important in the wake of continued 9 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eri- of a new mosque building. In 2007, attacks targeting Kenya, the latest of trea Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 2002 he masterminded the ouster of the (2011),” United Nations, 2012. executive committee of the Pumwani 1 “It’s Not Over, Somali Terrorists Say After Mall Attack 10 “Security Agencies Worry About New Terrorist Riyadha Mosque, leading to the removal That Killed 67,” CNN, October 2, 2013. Threats in Kenya.” of five officials over alleged corruption 21 2 Nevertheless, months before the assault, a string of 11 For more details, see the mosque’s website at www. and mismanagement. Al-Shabab’s grenade and small improvised explosive device attacks Pumwanimasjid.kbo.co.ke. Also see “Al-Shabaab Names occurred in Nairobi, Mombasa, Garissa Wajir and Man- Kenyan Leader,” Somalia Report, January 10, 2012; “Was 15 “Masterminds Target Youth to Execute Terror At- dera, killing and injuring Kenyan civilians, police, and Sheikh Rogo Shot by Americans Agents?” The Star [Nai- tacks,” Daily Nation, March 3, 2014. military officers. See “African Politics: Diverse Threat,” robi], January 10, 2012. 16 “UN Report Links Nairobi to Somali Militants, Wante- Economist, October 15, 2013; “At Least 10 Killed in Gre- 12 “MYC Behind Extensive Funding, Recruiting and dinAfrica.com, August 1, 2011. nade Attack in Northern Kenya,” Africa Review, June 23, Training of Mujahedeen in Kenya,” Middle East Media 17 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eri- 2013. Research Institute, August 2012. trea Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 2002 3 “Somali Terror Group Al-Shabaab Claims Responsi- 13 “Muslim Kenyans Fund and Recruit Al-Shabaab, UN (2011)”; “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and bility for Kenya Mall Attack,” NBC, September 21, 2013. Report,” Reuters, July 29, 2011. Gikomba market, which Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2060 4 Ibid. is located next to the slum, hosts the largest second-hand (2012),” United Nations, 2013. 5 “Trial of Westgate Attack Suspects Begin,” Daily Na- clothing market in East Africa. Also see personal inter- 18 “Are These the Faces Behind Westgate Mall Attack,” tion, January 15, 2014. views, individuals in Majengo, Nairobi, Kenya, October Daily Nation, September 29, 2013; Gisesa. 6 “Security Agencies Worry About New Terrorist 2013. 19 Gisesa. Threats in Kenya,” Sunday Nation, October 12, 2013. 14 Nyambega Gisesa, “A Portrait of a Jihadist Born and 20 Ibid. 7 Ibid. Bred in Nairobi,” Daily Nation, January 30, 2012. 21 “Kenya: Sheikh Ali - The Making of a Terrorist Com-

24 may 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 5 leadership allegedly took note of his and PRMC in Majengo in Nairobi.32 came days after he reiterated his fundamentalism and secretly appointed According to the United Nations, the support for al-Shabab and defended him as the de facto leader of its cell in MYC chose to change their name to the Westgate terrorist attack.38 “I Nairobi.22 In 2009, reports emerged that avoid the scrutiny of the authorities, support the Westgate attackers,” the MYC was recruiting youth for al- which had taken action against MYC- Makaburi told the BBC. “We as Shabab from within the mosque. Iman affiliated names and bank accounts.33 the Muslims cannot sit back and do Ali left for Somalia in 2009, where he nothing about it while our brothers became leader of the al-Shabab cell in The MYC’s official name change was not and sisters get slaughtered worldwide, Kenya.23 His role was to plan terrorist immediately noticeable on their social the Westgate attack was well deserved.”39 operations with militants in Kenya.24 media outlets. Twitter and Tumblr Makaburi, who faced three charges Members of the mosque then suspected accounts linked to the MYC continued related to terrorism in December 2010, that the committee had previously to release statements under its old allegedly aided al-Hijra militants in channeled funds to al-Shabab when names.34 The “MYC Press” Twitter procuring weapons for an attack on a under Iman Ali’s leadership.25 account still continues to operate, church under the orders of Iman Ali in posting discussions on jihad and other March 2014.40 Iman Ali’s MYC, however, had long matters affecting Muslims. There was aspired to carry out attacks in Kenya.26 much activity on the Tumblr account Both the United States and United That aspiration gained momentum in from January to September 2013, but Nations had designated Makaburi as October 2011, when Kenyan troops the last press release was issued in a terrorist.41 The United Nations had entered Somalia to pursue al-Shabab September 2013. previously described him as a leading militants.27 On January 10, 2012, facilitator and recruiter of young nearly three months after Kenyan A letter from the members of the UN Kenyan Muslims for violent militant troops deployed to Somalia, al-Shabab Monitoring Group on Somalia and activities in Somalia.42 announced a merger with the Kenya- Eritrea said in 2012 that al-Hijra based MYC.28 It also designated continued to operate in Kenya with Prior to Makaburi’s death, unknown the MYC’s Iman Ali as al-Shabab’s relative freedom, sending funds militants killed another key Islamist representative for Kenyan affairs.29 and recruits to Somalia in support ideologue, Shaykh Aboud Rogo In a statement, the MYC welcomed of al-Shabab, while simultaneously Mohammed, in Mombasa on August the development, stating there was no developing plans to conduct terrorist 27, 2012.43 Rogo was considered doubt that Iman Ali’s elevation as the attacks inside Kenya, deploying several an ideological leader for al-Hijra’s supreme amir of Kenya was recognition operational cells for this purpose.35 predecessor organization, the MYC.44 from the “Somali brothers who fought Rogo’s successor, Shaykh Ibrahim tirelessly against the kuffar on the Pressure on Al-Hijra Ismail, was also assassinated in a drive- importance of the Kenya mujahidin in Nevertheless, al-Hijra’s activities, by shooting in October 2013.45 Somalia.”30 as well as those of the PRMC, have been disrupted by international and The following month, in February 2012, regional security services.36 Moreover, the MYC renamed itself al-Hijra, with a number of unexplained killings have 31 Iman Ali as its leader. The proposal to targeted clerics considered supportive Death on Radicalism in Kenya as yet Unclear,” Sabahi, change the name was floated at a secret of al-Shabab and Islamist militants in April 8, 2014; Benard Sanga and Stanley Mwahanga, strategy meeting between the MYC Kenya. “Radical Cleric Sheikh Abubakar Shariff alias Makaburi Shot Dead,” Standard, April 2, 2014. mander,” Daily Nation, January 22, 2012. On April 1, 2014, gunmen killed 38 Ibid. 22 Gisesa. Abubakar Shariff Ahmad (also known 39 “Sharif Makaburi Applauds Westgate Attackers Says 23 “Kenyan Picked to Head Local Al-Qaeda Wing,” Cap- as “Makaburi”), an extremist cleric who It Was Well Deserved,” Nairobi Exposed blog, October ital FM, January 17, 2012. supported al-Shabab and may have 8, 2013. 24 Ibid. been a member of al-Hijra, under 40 “Mombasa Court Awards Damages to Makaburi 25 Gisesa. controversial circumstances in the Over Unlawful Police Raid,” Sabahi, March 28, 2014; 37 26 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eri- coastal city of Mombasa. His death Benard Sanga, “Did Nairobi Based Al Shabaab Group trea Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 2002 Order Attack on Likoni Church?” Standard, March 30, (2011)”; “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and 32 Ibid. 2014; Sanga and Mwahanga. Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2060 33 Ibid. 41 “UN Warned of Al-Shabaab Ally’s New and More (2012).” 34 These accounts are located at www.twitter.com/ Complex Operations in Kenya,” The Long War Journal, 27 Ibid. MYC_Press and www.themovingcaravan.tumblr.com. September 23, 2013. 28 “We are Now Part of Al-Qaeda East Africa,” The Long 35 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eri- 42 “Police Patrol Kenyan Port After Muslim Cleric’s War Journal, February 10, 2012. trea Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 2002 Murder,” Agence France-Presse, April 2, 2014. 29 “Al-Shabaab Names Kenyan Leader,” Somalia Report, (2011).” 43 “Al-Shabaab Supporter Aboud Mohammed Rogo January 10, 2012. 36 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Killed in Kenya,” BBC, August 27, 2014. 30 “Kenyan Picked to Head Local Al-Qaeda Wing.” Eritrea Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2060 44 Christopher Anzalone, “Kenya’s Muslim Youth Cen- 31 “Report of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eri- (2012).” ter and Al-Shabab’s East African Recruitment,” CTC Sen- trea Pursuant to the Security Council Resolution 2002 37 “Radical Preacher Makaburi Shot Dead,” The Star, tinel 5:10 (2012). (2011).” April 2, 2014; Bosire Boniface, “Impact of Makaburi 45 Boniface.

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Conclusion April 6, 2014 (PAKISTAN): Clashes Despite these setbacks, al-Hijra Recent Highlights in between two Pakistani Taliban factions appears determined to restore its Political Violence left at least 20 people dead along the efforts in Kenya. Based on the number border between North and South of recent attacks in Kenya, the group April 1, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber Waziristan. – The Nation, April 8 has possibly been reinvigorated by targeted a military convoy in Tikrit, fighters returning from Somalia and killing five Iraqi soldiers. – AP, April 1 April 6, 2014 (EGYPT): Egyptian state local recruits from East Africa. This media announced that authorities network poses a serious threat to April 2, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A would charge Muhammad al-Zawahiri, Kenya’s domestic security, given that suicide bomber wearing a military al-Qa`ida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri’s its members operate clandestinely. uniform attacked the Interior Ministry brother, with setting up an “al-Qa`ida- Moreover, in October 2013, UN and compound in Kabul, killing six police linked terrorist group” that plotted European officials expressed concern officers. – Time Magazine, April 2 attacks against security personnel, that al-Shabab and al-Hijra were government installations, and planning future attacks employing the April 2, 2014 (EGYPT): Two bombs members of Egypt’s Christian minority. Westgate tactical model.46 exploded next to a police vehicle Muhammad al-Zawahiri has been in near Cairo University. A third bomb Egyptian custody since August 2013. As stated by prominent Somalia analyst exploded more than two hours later – Gulf News, April 6 Matt Bryden in October 2013, “Al- in the same location while a forensics Hijra has been under surveillance for a team was investigating the initial April 6, 2014 (BAHRAIN): A homemade number of years and the Kenyan state bombings. A senior police officer was bomb exploded in a car in an area where has accumulated enough intelligence killed. A little known-group called many foreigners live in Manama, but on its ideological leaders to disrupt Ajnad Misr (Soldiers of Egypt) claimed there were no reports of casualties. the movement. For some reasons, there responsibility. – Washington Post, April 2 – Reuters, April 7 is reluctance to provide classified intelligence to the law enforcement April 2, 2014 (YEMEN): Al-Qa`ida in April 7, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A agencies for effective prosecutions. And the Arabian Peninsula militants killed suicide bomber in a minivan attacked this ought to change.”47 In the wake of eight people in a rocket and car bomb a NATO convoy in Kandahar Province, the Westgate attack and the continued attack on an army headquarters in although no one was seriously wounded. violence affecting Kenya, the Kenyan Aden. – AFP, April 2 – AP, April 7 government is now clearly aware of the threat posed by al-Shabab and its April 2, 2014 (KENYA): Unidentified April 7, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A East African-based affiliates such as militants assassinated Abubakar roadside bomb killed at least 15 people al-Hijra. Al-Shabab has managed to Shariff Ahmed (known as Makaburi), in Kandahar Province. – AP, April 7 establish a dangerous network in Kenya, an extremist cleric supportive of al- and the Kenyan government will have to Shabab, in Mombasa. – Mail Online, April April 7, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber concentrate resources on dismantling 2 in a vehicle attacked a police checkpoint that network domestically. near Samarra, killing five people. – AP, April 4, 2014 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida April 7 Fredrick Nzes is a journalist based in chief Ayman al-Zawahiri released a Nairobi. He writes frequently about new audio message calling on Islamist April 7, 2014 (SOMALIA): Two United politics, religion and terrorism. militants in Syria to end their infighting. Nations personnel were shot to death He said that “sedition” is to blame for as they disembarked a plane at Galkayo the killing of Abu Khalid al-Suri, al- Airport. The gunman was wearing a Zawahiri’s representative in Syria who police uniform. – BBC, April 7 was assassinated in a suicide attack in February 2014. Al-Qa`ida’s affiliate in April 8, 2014 (LIBYA): The bullet- Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, blamed al-Suri’s riddled body of Ali bin Taher, identified death on the Islamic State in Iraq and as the leader of the Islamic State Army, the Levant. – Voice of America, April 5 was found on a farm near Derna. Libyan authorities said that Taher’s group is April 4, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): suspected of involvement in a number of A policeman fired on two veteran assassinations of policemen and judges. foreign journalists in Afghanistan’s – AP, April 8 Khost Province. Associated Press photographer Anja Niedringhaus was April 9, 2014 (PAKISTAN): A bomb killed, while journalist Kathy Gannon killed at least 21 people at a fruit and was critically wounded. – Radio Australia, vegetable market on the outskirts of April 5 Islamabad. Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan 46 “Security Agencies Worry About New Terrorist denied responsibility. – Wall Street Journal, Threats in Kenya.” April 9 47 Ibid.

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April 10, 2014 (GREECE): A car bomb April 18, 2014 (GLOBAL): A spokesman struggling to contain a surge in bomb exploded outside a Bank of Greece for the Islamic State in Iraq and the and gun attacks that the authorities building in Athens, although there were Levant (ISIL), Abu Muhammad al- blame on the Somali Islamist militants no injuries. – al-Jazira, April 10 Adnani, accused al-Qa`ida’s leaders of [al-Shabab] who killed at least 67 deviating from “the correct path” and people when they laid siege to Nairobi’s April 11, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): A betraying the jihadist cause. He further Westgate shopping mall in September.” suicide bomber killed a pro-government said that “al-Qa`ida today is no longer – Reuters, April 23 tribal elder in Jani Khil district of Paktia a base of jihad.” The ISIL, previously Province. – AP, April 11 known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), April 24, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber was recently disowned by al-Qa`ida in an explosives-laden vehicle attacked April 12, 2014 (IRAQ): A car bomb chief Ayman al-Zawahiri. – Daily Star, a police checkpoint at the entrance to exploded in Ba`quba, killing three April 18 Hilla, 60 miles south of Baghdad, killing people. – CNN, April 12 at least 11 people. – AP, April 24 April 19, 2014 (YEMEN): A U.S. drone April 13, 2014 (IRAQ): A car bomb strike killed at least nine suspected April 25, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): exploded near a joint Iraqi army and members of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian The Afghan Taliban’s top military police patrol in a busy commercial area Peninsula in Bayda Province. Three commander, Mullah Abdul Qayam of Mosul, killing at least 10 people. – al- civilians also reportedly died in the Zakir, resigned due to health reasons. Jazira, April 13 strike. – AP, April 19 Some analysts viewed his resignation as a sign of major splits among the Taliban April 14, 2014 (NIGERIA): Boko Haram April 20, 2014 (YEMEN): Airstrikes leadership. – Daily Beast, April 25 militants kidnapped more than 200 killed approximately 25 suspected schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno State. members of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian April 25, 2014 (IRAQ): A car bomb – Daily Trust, April 16 Peninsula in a rugged mountainous exploded at an election rally for a Shi`a region in southern Yemen. – Voice of political party in Baghdad. After the April 14, 2014 (NIGERIA): A bomb America, April 20 explosion, a suicide bomber attacked killed at least 75 people at a crowded bus the site. The bombs killed at least 31 station on the outskirts of Abuja, the April 20, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber people. – AFP, April 25; CNN, April 25 Nigerian capital. Boko Haram claimed detonated explosives at the entrance to responsibility. – Business Recorder, April 19; Kadhim University in Baghdad, killing April 26, 2014 (GLOBAL): Al-Qa`ida BBC, April 19 five people. Police reportedly shot to chief Ayman al-Zawahiri released a new death three other gunmen who were audio statement calling on his followers April 15, 2014 (YEMEN): Suspected part of the attack. – RFE/RL, April 20 to kidnap Westerners, particularly al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula Americans, so that they could be used as militants assassinated the governor of April 21, 2014 (SOMALIA): A bomb tore bargaining chips to free jailed jihadists. Bayda Province as he was heading to through the car of a Somali lawmaker – Reuters, April 26 work. – al-Arabiya, April 15 in Mogadishu. The lawmaker, Isaak Mohammad Rinoco, was killed by the April 27, 2014 (SYRIA): Iraqi army April 16, 2014 (AFGHANISTAN): bomb, which was reportedly planted by helicopters attacked a jihadist convoy Taliban militants kidnapped a group of Islamist militants. – Reuters, April 21 in Syria close to the Iraqi border, killing Afghan policemen who were traveling at least eight people. The attack marked in civilian clothes in Wardak Province. April 23, 2014 (NETHERLANDS): The the first claimed airstrike inside Syria The militants later claimed that they Netherlands warned that militants by Iraq since the start of the uprising killed seven of them. – New York Times, returning to Europe from the Syrian against the Bashar al-Assad regime in April 16 battlefield pose a security threat. March 2011. – al-Jazira, April 27; Guardian, According to the Dutch intelligence April 27 April 16, 2014 (PAKISTAN): Tehrik-i- agency, “at the end of 2013, dozens of Taliban Pakistan said they were ending Dutch jihadists have become habituated April 28, 2014 (IRAQ): A suicide bomber a six-week-old cease-fire with the to extreme violence and have become detonated explosives in a Kurdish town Pakistani government. – New York Times, radicalized in their intolerant and in Diyala Province, killing 25 people. April 16 violent ideological orientation.” The The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant agency also said that approximately 100 claimed responsibility. – AP, April 28 April 16, 2014 (YEMEN): A new Dutch citizens had traveled to Syria to jihadist video appeared on Islamist join the Islamic State in Iraq and the April 29, 2014 (UNITED STATES): websites, showing a large gathering Levant and Jabhat al-Nusra. Twenty A Nigerian citizen pleaded guilty to of al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula of those fighters have returned to the providing material support to al- (AQAP) militants in Yemen. The video Netherlands. – Reuters, April 23 Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula shows AQAP leader Nasir al-Wahayshi (AQAP). Lawal Olaniyi Babafemi greeting more than 100 followers and April 23, 2014 (KENYA): A car bomb allegedly traveled from Nigeria to saying “we must eliminate the cross… exploded outside a police station in Yemen twice to meet with AQAP the bearer of the cross is America.” Nairobi, killing four people. According leaders, and he reportedly worked – CNN, April 16 to Reuters, “Kenya’s security forces are on AQAP’s Inspire magazine. He was

27 may 2014 . Vol 7. Issue 5

extradited to the United States from CTC Sentinel Staff Nigeria. – News 24, April 30

Editor-in-Chief April 29, 2014 (LIBYA): A suicide Erich Marquardt bomber detonated an explosives-laden Senior Editor, CTC minibus outside a Libyan army camp in Benghazi, killing two people. – Reuters, Editorial Board April 29 COL Cindy R. Jebb, Ph.D. Department Head April 29, 2014 (SYRIA): The Islamic Department of Social Sciences (West Point) State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) reportedly crucified two men in al- COL Suzanne Nielsen, Ph.D. Raqqa, displaying their bodies in public. Deputy Department Head – Daily Beast, April 30; Fox News, April 29 Department of Social Sciences (West Point) April 29-30, 2014 (PHILIPPINES): MAJ Bryan Price, Ph.D. Clashes between Philippine troops and Director, CTC the Abu Sayyaf Group in the southern Philippines left 14 militants and one soldier dead. – AP, April 29

April 30, 2014 (GLOBAL): The U.S. State Department released its annual report on terrorism. As stated by Voice of America, the report says that “losses in Contact al-Qa`ida’s core leadership in Pakistan Combating Terrorism Center and Afghanistan have ‘accelerated’ the U.S. Military Academy network’s decentralization. It says that 607 Cullum Road, Lincoln Hall has resulted in ‘more operationally West Point, NY 10996 autonomous’ and ‘more aggressive’ Phone: (845) 667-6383 affiliates, notably in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Email: [email protected] northwest Africa and Somalia.” – Voice Web: www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/ of America, April 30

* For Press Inquiries: (845) 667-6383 April 30, 2014 (SPAIN): Spanish authorities, with the help of French police, arrested Abdelmalek Tanem in the southern city of Almeria. Tanem, who is French-Algerian, is suspected of fighting for al-Qa`ida-linked militant support groups in Syria. He is also accused The Combating Terrorism Center would of helping other Europeans cross the like to express its gratitude to its financial Turkey-Syria border to fight with the supporters, for without their support and Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant and shared vision of the Center products like the Jabhat al-Nusra. – AFP, April 30 CTC Sentinel could not be produced. If you are interested in learning more about how April 30, 2014 (NORTH AFRICA): to support the Combating Terrorism Center, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, a former leader please visit http://www.ctc.usma.edu or call in al-Qa`ida in the Islamic Maghreb, Kristin Sorenson at West Point’s Association pledged allegiance to al-Qa`ida chief of Graduates at 845-446-1561. Ayman al-Zawahiri. – AFP, April 30

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and not of the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of the Army, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.

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