The Construction of Palestinian Identity: Hamas and Islamic Fundamentalism
Institute of Islamic Studies Mcgill University, Montreal
April 2002
A thesis submitted ta the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of Master of Arts
© Joyce Hamade 2002 Nationallibrary Bibliothèque nationale 1+1 of Canada du Canada Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bibliographie Services services bibliographiques 395 Wellington Street 395, rue Wellington Ottawa ON K1A ON4 Ottawa ON K1 A ON4 canada Canada Your file Votre ré18_
Our file Notre rélé_
The author has granted a non L'auteur a accordé une licence non exclusive licence a110wing the exclusive permettant à la National Libraty ofCanada to Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou copies ofthis thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette thèse sous paper or electronic formats. la forme de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur format électronique.
The author retains ownership ofthe L'auteur conserve la propriété du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse. thesis nor substantial extracts frOID it Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son penmsslOn. autorisation.
0-612-79473-3
Cana Introduction 1 CHAPTERONE Four Stages in the Construction ofPalestinian National 4 Identity Ottoman rule to WWI 5 WWIto 1948 11 1948 to 1987 20 Post-Intifijr;la 23 CHAPTER TWO Theories ofNationalism 25 The Construction ofPalestinian Identity: The Role of Secular Nationalism 34 CHAPTER THREE Islamic Fundamentalism: Theoretical Approaches 43 Fundamentalism in Palestine: lfarakat al-Muqiiwama al-Isliimiyya Clfamas) 49 The Historical Antecedents oflfamas 52 The Charter: Ideological Goals Versus Political 57 Pragmatism The Marriage ofPalestinian Nationalism and Islam 59 lfamas-PLO Relations 70 Paiestinian Identity: the RaIe ofIsiamic 82 Fundamentalism CONCLUSION 93 BIBLIOGRAPHY 101 INTRODUCTION The rapid economic, social and scientific changes that characterize modemity had a profound effect on the Middle East. Industrialization led to mass urban societies that replaced localized forms ofcommunity. Modem equality and individualism caused a shift away from high centres ofgovemment such as monarchs or caliphs. This was accompanied by a shift in allegiances away from family, clan and religion to the impersonal state. The modem revolution resulted in two interrelated developments-nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism. The demise ofNasser and Pan-Arabism paved the way for Palestinian nationalism. Since the 1960's the Palestinian Liberation Organization or PLO has led the Palestinian nationalist struggle. However, the revolutionary project ofthe PLO and other secular movements failed to secure a state for Palestinians. The rapid progress ofmodemity brought upon a growing sense ofalienation and economic strife in the Middle East. This coupled with the failures of 1967 and 1973 created a social and political vacuum that religiously based political movements moved to fill. Although the cultural and political origins ofIslamic fundamentalism can be traced to the late nineteenth centUlY, it became widespread as a political phenomenon in the Arab world in the late 1970's and in Palestine in the 1980's. 2 My thesis focuses on modern Palestine and the role of nationalism and fundamentalism in the construction ofPalestinian national identity. lfamas provides a case study ofIslamic fundamentalism in Palestine. The movement developed during the late 198ü's as a reaction to the failures ofthe secular project. lfamas is a reflection ofa region-wide phenomenon. It is not solely a reaction to modernity. Rather, lfamas is the result ofspecifie condition that led to the politicization ofIslam after the Intifiùja. Today the nationalist PLO and lfamas struggle to define Palestinian identity and to shape the emerging Palestinian state. Palestinian national identity like that ofother modern nations has been constructed. Nation-building or identity construction in Palestine can be divided into four historical stages. Each stage is characterized by overlapping and competing identities: Ottoman, Arab, religious, local and kinship. These identities are not mutually exclusive and often a combination ofidentities became prominent historically depending on the internaI and external forces pressuring society. Nationalism and fundamentalism developed in the later stages ofPalestinian identity construction, 1948 to the present. Each plays a significant role in the construction ofPalestinian identity. Fundamentalism utilizes religion as a cultural system. Islam is viewed as a means ofcreating or preserving identity. As a fundamentalist movement, lfamas promotes narrow identities based 3 on religion and kinship, what it views as the pillars ofPalestinian society. In contrast, the PLO (re) defines Palestinian national identity along more secular lines. Although not devoid ofreligious overtones, the PLO promotes broader more impersonal identities linked to the Palestinian state and citizenship. Nationalist elites endeavor to construct "authentic" identity as a means ofsecuring a Palestinian state, fundamentalist as a strategy for preserving a way of life threatened by the encroachment ofsecularism. 4 CHAPTERONE Four Stages in the Construction ofPalestinian National Identity National identity is created and not an essential given. The construction ofa separate Palestinian identity occurred in four historieal stages. In each stage the project ofidentity creation was eHte driven. Notables, intellectuals and urban eHtes began a process ofidentity-creation in the last decades ofOttoman rule. These elites manipulated symbols and re-narrated the past in an effort to construct Palestinian national identity. They fostered a shared consciousness based on a common history, language and a common threat, Zionism. This national consciousness emerged in the absence ofa nation-state and was disseminated to peasants and the lower classes, through the press and education. The first stage in the construction ofa separate Palestinian identity encompasses the last decade ofOttoman rule to World War 1. This era was characterized by overlapping and competing identities: Ottoman, Arab, religious, local and family. The second stage (post WWI to 1948) expanded the sense ofPalestinian identity and united the population against a common threat, Zionism. During the third stage (1948 to 1987) Palestinian identity is defined by the common fate ofdispossession and exile. It is during this period that secular nationalism develops fully. Finally, during the post- Intifiiqa 5 stage (1987 to the present) identity is in flux. Established identities are contested by developing religio-political movements such as lfamas. Ottoman Rule to WWI During the first stage (late 1800's to WWI) Palestinian identity was shared by a narrowly defined group ofurban educated elites. These elites formed a group larger than the old traditional notables, however they were still a restricted strata ofsociety. They inc1uded the new middle c1asses-teachers, c1erks, government officiaIs and businessmen who increased rapidly in the last decades ofOttoman rule. l These elites and the rural, illiterate majority ofthe population were characterized by a multi-focused set ofidentities. Palestinian identity competed and overlapped with Ottomanism , Arabism, religious, local and family loyalties.2 The first stage in the construction ofPalestinian identity is a time ofgreat change in the Arab world. Until the First World War the urban educated elites primarily subscribed to Ottomanism. They were integrated into the Ottoman system ofgovernment and they were loyal to the Caliph. During this period a ulliversal process was unfolding in the Middle East involving an increasing identification 1 Rashid Khalidi, Palesfjnian Identity: Tbe Construcfjon ofModern national Consciousness, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, 193. 6 with the new states created by the post-World War 1partitions.3 Ideas ofidentity were shifting away from Ottomanism. Zionism also played a role in shaping Palestinian identity. It was the primary "other" faced by the Palestinians for much ofthis century.4 This has led sorne to overestimate the significance of Zionism to the development ofPalestinian identity: "Had it not been for the pressure exerted on the Arabs ofPalestine by the Zionist movement, the very concept ofa Palestinian people would not have developed".5 Hence, Palestine and Palestinian identity is made illegitimate. This line ofargumentation is parochial and ignores the historical developments taking place in the Arab world during the early twentieth century. While Zionism helped shape the specifie form ofPalestinian national identification, it cannot be viewed as the sole reason for the development ofPalestinian identity. The question ofPalestinian identity must be situated within the larger context ofArab history. Although the threat ofZionism encouraged Palestinian nationalism, 2 Ibid. Khalidi examines the lives and writings of two representatives ofJerusalem in the Ottoman Parliament (1876-78 and 1908-1913). These writings exemplify the shifting identities ofPalestinians before World War I. See 63-88. 3 Ibid. 4 Khalidi, 20. 5 Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Midgal, Palestinians: tile Making ofa People, Toronto: The Free Press, 1993, xvii. 7 it was "ushered into its own independent existence mainly as a result ofthe chaos and disarray ofthe larger Arab nationalist movement.6 The fragmentation ofthis movement in Amir Faysal's state in Syria (1918-1920) led to a subsequent disillusionment with Arab nationalism after 1920. This fracture tipped the scale in favour of the Palestinian urban notables. The failure ofAmir Faysal's Arab nationalism ushered the way for the development oflocal Palestinian autonomy. Local newspapers were central to the development ofan autonomous Palestinian nationalism. Palestinian urban elites utilized Arabie language newspapers as a tool for uniting Palestinian society. They worked tirelessly to elucidate the history and objectives ofZionism. Influential newspapers such as al-kanniland Filastin dedicated numerous articles to the devastating consequences Palestine would face as a result ofZionist activity. Established in 1908 Al-Kannilwas published in Haifa by Najib Nassar. It was by far the most outspoken newspaper in its opposition to Zionism. Filastin was established in 1911 and published in Jaffa by 'Isa and Yusuf al- 'Isa. Filastin soon became the rival of al-Kannilinside and outside Palestine and was the most important paper ofthe two during the mandate period. Both focused 6 Muhammad Y. Muslih, The Oâgins o[Palestùlian Nationalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, x. 8 on the question ofZionism as a common threat to Palestinians and Arabs alike. Newspapers functioned as pioneers ofPalestinian and pan- Arab opposition to Zionism. The Arab critique ofZionism in the press can be distilled to a few major themes. First, was the opposition to the laxity ofOttoman central authorities in restraining Zionist colonialism. The Ottomans controlled the granting ofvisas and the system ofland purchasing. Other themes included: "the opposition to unrestricted Zionist immigration and land-purchase, the resentment ofthe self-imposed segregation ofthe immigrants and their failure to become loyal citizens ofthe country they settled."7 Through an examination ofthe Arabic press during this period it is conclusive that by 1914 most editors and writers were fully aware ofthe ultimate ends ofZionism. They identified the Zionist dream ofestablishing ofa Jewish state in Palestine, and its concomitant the dispossession ofthe Arab population. li The opposition to Zionism was a source of unity for Palestinians. Although Zionism was the subject ofextensive journalistic comment and public controversy in Palestine and the Arab regions ofthe Ottoman Empire, the urban elites did not calI for 7 Ibid., 142. g Ibid. 9 armed resistance against the colonizers.9 They failed to critique the Ottoman government who ultimately controlled visas and land sales and purchases in Palestine. Further, the Palestinian elites did not criticize the Ottoman's new European-derived property relations that made land sales to the Zionist possible. In short, during this early period, there was no demand for the social transformation needed to successfully deal with Zionism. The literate upper classes in Palestine (with sorne exception) failed in terms ofleadership. They proved unwilling to follow the lead ofthe fellahin or peasants in their resistance to Zionism. 10 Theorists ofnationalism tend to focus solely on the role of intellectuals and often ignore the role ofthe subaltern. The non-elites or subaltem elements ofPalestinian society were the first to come into direct contact with Zionism. In the Palestinian case the fellahin were faced directly with increased Zionist expansion. The implementation ofthe Ottoman Land Code of 1858 in Palestine caused communal rights oftenure to be ignored. Many peasants with long-standing traditional rights failed to register their land for fear of taxation and conscription by the Ottomans. 11 Instead village leaders, and urban members ofthe upper classes, manipulated the legal process and registered large areas of land as their personal property. <) Khalidi, 93. Khalidi points out that the question ofZionism was part ofthe 1911 Ottoman parliamentary debates. He dispels the myth that Arab opposition to Zionism began only during the Mandate period. 10 The consolidation ofland ownership through Ottoman registration led to devastating ends. Prosperous merchants from Beirut, Haifa, Jaffa and Gaza purchased large tracts offertile land in Palestine. These new owners did not work the land. Rather, they viewed land as nothing more than a commercial investment. 12 These wealthy merchants were largely responsible for the sale and transfer oflands to Zionist settlers. The Paiestinian peasants found themselves dispossessed oflands they once "owned," and working as labourers on lands now owned by Jews. 13 This dispossession and accompanying resistance to Zionism led to a degree ofpoliticization among the rural population of Palestine. Palestinian opposition to Zionism in the last decades of Ottoman rule developed along tl1fee lines, Ottoman loyalism, Paiestinian patriotism, and Arab nationalism. 14 Ottoman loyalty was upheld by the oider notable elites. Notable or ayan is used in the political sense to mean intermediaries between government and people. The aristocratie families, the Husseini's, Nashashibi's, Khalidi's, were recruited as high-Ievel bureaucrats by the Ottomans. The notables rejected Zionism because they did not want to be separated from the Ottoman state. 10 Ibid., 140-42. Il Khalidi, 95. 12 Khalidi argues that during the 1920's more than 60 per cent of the land purchased by Jews was bought from Arab absentee landlords residing outside ofPalestine, 113. 13 Land sales were not made to individual Jewish settlers, rather the Jewish National Fund purchased Palestinian land as a trust for the Jewish people until time immemorial. 11 Palestinian patriotism rejected Zionism as a threat to Palestinians. Until the downfall ofthe Ottoman Empire in 1918, Palestinian patriotism ran parallel with Ottoman loyalties. 15 In contrast, Arab nationalism was espoused by younger urban elites and was intertwined with Palestinian patriotism until1920. The adherents ofArab nationalism rejected Zionism because it would take Palestine out ofArab hands and thwart the goal ofArab unity. They believed Arab unity would protect them against Zionism: "Thus Palestinian patriotism was the common characteristic ofthe two main Palestinian groups...Zionism was the context in which this patriotism grew.,,16 Zionism provided Palestinians with the focus for their national struggle. Through the press they engendered an Arab reaction to Zionism. Between 1908 and 1914 newspapers in Palestine and in the Arab world (Beirut, Cairo and Damascus) influenced attitudes toward Zionism and shaped ideas ofidentity. 17 WWI to 1948 The second stage in the construction ofPalestinian national identity includes the period from the outset ofWorld War One to 1948. During this period, the political and national identification of most politically conscious, literate, and urban Palestinians underwent 14 Muslih. 216. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 12 a sequence ofmajor transformations resulting in a strong and growing national identification with Palestine. IX The first ofthese changes was the collapse ofthe Ottoman state. This left a vacuum in political consciousness that would be filled by Arabism: "Arabism had the same central goal ofOttomanism, that is it aimed at defending the civilization ofIslam and the Arabs from Western threats and ambitions.,,19 The idea ofSouthern Syria also emerged as a post-war focus ofidentity. Palestinian elites who saw their country as southern Syria were largely committed to Arabism. The first modern Arab state under Amir Faysal was viewed with pride as a representation of Arab triumph over colonialism. Palestinians hoped the new state would protect them against the emerging Zionist threat. Hence, the fragmentation ofFaysal's government in Damascus caused major disillusionment among Palestinians. This fracture was a major factor in the development ofa separate Palestinian nationalism. During the early Mandate Period (1917-1923) the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate over Palestine contributed to a transformation ofPalestinian identity. The struggles with British and Zionist colonialism fostered feelings ofsolidarity based on a common fate/threat. Coupled with the collapse ofthe Ottoman state 17 Khalidi examines newspapers in this manner in order to eliminate the oversimplif1ed view prevalent in Israeli and much western scholarship that Palestinian identity was primarily a response to Zionism. IX Khalidi, 149. By the end ofWWI Ottomanism and religion were diminished in importance. 13 this new solidarity led to a shift from Ottoman!Arab to Palestinian!Arab identity. Arab nationalism was an ideology influenced by the western concept ofthe territorial and political nation. It emerged as a reaction to pan-Turanianism or the Ottoman beliefin Turkish superiority. At the heart ofArab nationalism is the beliefin the cultural, ethnie and political unity ofArabs. However, advocates of local independence viewed their struggle as compatible with Arab natlOna· 1°lsm.20 For example, Palestinian notables viewed Syrian-Palestinian unity as an expanded opportunity for political posts that would work to their advantage. The young urban partisans ofunity imagined a sense ofideologically compatibility with Syrians and Iraqis whom they anticipated would pre-empt the Damascene elites?1 Other complex factors motivated leaders ofthe Palestinian Arab nationalist movement: fear ofZionism, patriotic sentiment, and the ideological strength ofthe Arab nationalists in Syria. 22 A united Syria was viewed as an expression ofself-assertive patriotic sentiment and Amir Fay~al represented revoIt against 19 Muslih, 2. 20 The ideo1ogy ofloca1 nationalism was not encouraged and terms such as a1-wataniyya al-Fi1astiniyya were not uti1ized, see Muslih, 5. 21 Yehosuah Porath, The Emergence ofthe Pa1estinian-Arab National Movement: 1918-1929, London: FrankCass, 1974,83. 22 Muslih, 185. 14 colonialism on behalfofthe Arabs.23 United the Arabs could guard against Zionism and European expansion. Palestinian Arab nationalist promoted the idea ofPan-Syrian unity to advance the Palestinian cause. Through pamphlets they promoted the religious significance ofPalestine, to arouse Syrian!Fay~al's support. Palestinians, like 'Isa al-'Isa the editor of Filas.tfn, ,were influential in Faysal's government. They utilized - - organizations such as al-Fatat, al-Nadi al-'Arabi, and the al-Istiqlal party to influence the outcome ofpolitical debate on Palestine. Through these organizations the Palestinian Arab Nationalist won majority support in favor ofpan-Syrian unity at the First Palestinian Arab Congress in 1919.24 However, by the Third Palestinian Arab Congress fragmentation ofFay~al's government split the Arab nationalist movement along provinciallines. By the Third Congress, there was no reference to pan-Syrian unity in the resolutions and the Congress' objectives were distinctly .. 25 Pa 1estIman. A narrow, territorially defined concept of an independent Palestinian state emerged from the Third Palestinian Arab Congress. By the 1920's the regional division between Syria and Palestine was 23 Ibid. 186-17. 24 Ibid., 193-210. The Second Palestinian Arab Congress was to be held in May 1920 to protest the British Mandate and the Balfour Declaration. For fear ofdisturbances this did not occur. The Third Palestinian Arab Congress convened in Haifa in December 1920. It was designated third despite the fact that the second congress was never convened. 25 Ibid., 209. 15 complete, and the ideal ofArab nationalism was replaced with the reality oflocal nationalism.26 The focus shifted to Zionism's political counterpart, " 'Palestinianism': the beliefthat the Arab population originating in the area ofthe Palestine mandate is distinct from otherArab groups, with a right to its own nation-state in that territory."27 The 1929 Rebellion and the 1936-1939 Revoit were the most significant events in the second stage ofthe construction of Palestinian identity. Arab fears ofJewish infringement on their territory came to climax in 1929. A dispute emerged over the Maghrebi quarter ofJerusalem and the Western Wall. Jews view the Western Wall as the last remuant ofthe outer wall ofHerod's Temple, built on the site of Solomon's Temple.2R For Muslims, the wall is the outer perimeter ofthe Haram al-Sharif, the third holiest site in Islam, the temple mount that housed the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome ofthe Rock. 29 Zionist leaders wanted to buy the wall from the Muslim waqf that held it tear down the Maghrebi region and open the area for Jewish worshipers?O In August of 1929, Jews and Arabs attacked each other killing and wounding over 200 people. The Zionist 26 Ibid., 210. 27 Kimmerling and Midgal, xviii. nd 28 Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 2 ed. New York: St. Martins Press, 1992, 87. 29 Ibid. 30 After the 1967 War the demolishing of the Maghrebi region was accomplished by Israel. 16 Revisionist Party and the Mufti ofJerusalem have both been blamed for the violence: "What seems clear is that the struggle for control of the Western Wall evolved from a purely religious matter oflong standing into a political confrontation in which both the hopes and the fears ofthe respective populations were fused. "31 The 1929 violence between the Jewish and Arab communities was only surpassed by the 1936 Revoit. During the 1936-1939 RevoIt Palestinians from the upper and middle classes both urban and rural were mobilized against British and Zionist colonialism. 32 Palestine was transformed socially from a self sufficient and homogenous peasant society to a society incorporated into world markets and politics.33 This transformation created division within Palestine as pertinent links between Palestinian notables and British rulers were severed. A new leadership emerged divided intointernalleaders that represented the specifie regions ofthe country, and those outside that claimed to speak for the national movement. This division would characterize Palestinian leaders in the subsequent stages ofPalestinian national development. However, the national movement was unanimously united in its opposition to Zionism. 31 Smith, 89. The al Husseini family control1ed the post ofmufti from the mid-nineteenth century. Their prominence led the British to recognize the then Mufti ofJerusalem, Haj Amin al Husseini, as the leading Arab representative during the Mandate fol1owing World War 1. See Smith, 32. 32 Although the 1936 Revoit is referred to as the Arab Revoit, this is in fact a Palestinian revoit against the British and to sorne extent against Zionism in Palestine. So as not to be confused with the 1917 Arab Revoit the 1936 RevoIt will hereafter be referred to as the Revoit. 17 In 1936 a series ofgeneral strikes, political demonstrations and clashes with police marked the beginning ofanti-mandate activism. These protesters sought to rid the country ofimperial rule. British support ofZionist was no longer viewed as delusion to be corrected: "Rather, Zionism was part and parcel ofWestern imperialism in the Middle East.,,34 However, until1936 the Mufti of Jerusalem publicly urged the Arabs to target Jews and not the British. This coupled with internaI conflict among the notable families shows their distance from the immediate situation of peasant dispossession and general anti-imperial wil1. 35 During the first halfofthe 1930's radicalized urban political activist, reacting to the factional fighting among the notables, led a surge ofanti-A 'yan opposition. This period in the Palestinian nationalist movement was also marked by religious tensions among Muslims and Christians. These tensions were grounded in Husseini's power base in the Supreme Muslim Council and the use ofmosques as a base for popular mobilization. The over-representation ofChristian Arabs in the bureaucracy and the presence offoreign missions in Palestine further exacerbated tension. 36 Sorne militants promoted an exclusivist 33 Ibid., 97. 34 Ibid., 99. A portion of the old ayan, the notable tàmilies ofthe Husseini and Nashashibi clans, initially moved to temper militants in the anti- imperial Istiqlal Party. 35 Pretentiously the ayan continued to use "feudal" titles such as pasha, bey, and effendi. See Kimmerling and Midgal, l02. 36 Ibid. 18 Islamic component ofidentity. They sought a prominent role for Islam in the emerging national identity and in politics. However, a secular independent Arab state remained the goal ofnotables, urban elites and most rural leaders. The tensions ofthe 1930's took place against the backdrop of increasing Jewish immigration, growing social dislocation and Arab urbanization. Rural resistance ranging from civil disobedience (withholding taxes) to violence (guerrilla organized peasants) played a critical role in the 1936 RevoIt. Jewish settlements and British installations were attacked by bands ofpeasants. During this period, the image ofthe dispossessed Arab farmer became a poignant symbol ofPalestinian identity. In the name ofthese dispossessed peasants, sheikh 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam organized armed resistance against imperial rule. His death by British forces in 1935 gained symbolic significance during the Revolt. In the 1960's armed movements would link al-Qassam's "heroism" to that ofthe first fellahin. 37 The peasant headdress-the kiifiya-was appropriated by these later movements. They became symbolic ofthe continuity with the first armed opponents of Zionism. The Revolt resulted in cultural and socio-political transformation in Palestine. In a "muted cultural revolution," Arabs 37 Khalidi, 106. 19 were asked to discard the fez or tarbush, a symbol ofmiddle and upper c1ass urbanization, for the kiiflya. 38 Rural leaders and the Mufti commanded the veiling ofwomen both Christian and Muslim.39 Both the kiifiya and the veil became symbolic ofprotest against urban assimilation and the dominance ofurban elite culture.40 In reaction, the British destroyed the national institutions ofthe notables. Palestinian urban elites could no longer play an effective leadership role in the Revolt.41 Power shifted from notable controlled Jerusalem to Ramallah, Nablus, Hebron and Bethlehem, towns controlled by rural rebels. The revolt's strikes and boycotts affected the urban economy and initiated a process ofreverse migration, from cities to villages. This shift was marked by c1ass struggle as the uprising was directed at the notables as weIl as the British and Jews: "popular culture romanticized the lower c1asses, especially the peasantry, interpreting the revolt as a struggle against the collusion ofoppressive forces, the Zionist, the British, and the ayan.,,42 The reality was a breakdown of order. Religious c1eavages, local disputes and kinship tensions, long 3X Kimmerling and Migdal, 112. 39 Ibid. This is ironie sinee traditionally the veiling ofwomen was an urban Muslim rather than village eustom. 411 Both the kaffiyya and the veil beeome part ofthe proeess by whieh Palestinian identity is eonsolidated during the Intifàda. 41 Kimmerling and Migdal, 107. 42 Ibid., 113. 20 43 characteristic ofPalestinian society, once again surfaced. A growing violence between urban and rural Palestinians also emerged. Wealthy notables and merchants were forced into "taxation" to sustain the revoIt. When they resisted paying they were beaten or murdered, or deemed "collaborators" or "traitors."44 The revolution deteriorated and the urban leadership ofthe national movement was deported, killed or self-exiled.45 The Revoit left the Palestinian national movement fractured and directionless. It was however, a distinct watershed that crystallized Palestinian national identity: "It offered new heroes and martyrs-most prominently Sheikh Qassam-and a popular culture to eulogize them; it constituted an unequivocal declaration that, whatever their social status, Palestinians unaIterably opposed the Zionist program.,,46 The Revoit had devastating results for Palestinian society and economy. Nevertheless, it reflected the local language ofPalestinian nationalism and helped to create a nation.47 1948 to 1987 The third stage in the development ofPalestinian national identity encompasses the period from the formation ofthe state of 43 Druze and Christian communities were the targets ofrural bands, the latter were also singled out as wealthy merchants and often because of the uprising's strong Islamic component. See Kimmerling and Midgdal, 116. 44 Ibid. 45 Nearly the same number of Arabs died as Jews. This created fear and led many wealthy Palestinians into exile in Beirut were they remained until the 1980's. 46 Kimmerling and Migdal, 123. 47 Ibid. 21 Israel in 1948 to the outbreak ofthe Intifieja in 1987. This period is characterized by dispersal and dispossession. The 1948 Nakba or catastrophe overshadowed pre-war divisions. Both urban and rural Palestinians found themselves in refugee camps, united by the experience ofexile: "1948 proved both a great leveler, and a source of a universally shared experience.,,48 The experience ofexile created a form of cultural umest captured in narrative, songs and poetry. The new folk culture conveyed: the praise and memory ofa lost paradise, lamented the present hardships, and dreamed of a triumphant return. How can l see my land, my rights usurped And remain here, a wanderer, with my shame? Shall l live here and die in a foreign land? No! l will return to my beloved land. l will return, and there Will l close the book ofmy life.49 These literary themes are reminiscent ofother unfulfilled national identities-the Kurds, Armenians and Jews before 1948.50 With the demise ofthe politicalleadership literary motifs maintained and rebuilt Palestinian national identity. This was accomplished through education. The education system facilitated the spread ofnationalist concepts in Palestine. In the towns in 1945-46, 85% ofboys and 4X Khalidi, 194. 49 Fadwa Tuqan, "Visions ofthe Return: The Palestinian Arab Refugees in Arab Poetry and Art," Middle East Journal, 17 (1963): 517. Tuqan's poetry is representative ofthe dispersal and alienation of Palestinian refugees. 50 Khalidi, 194. 22 65% ofgirls were enrolled in schools. The United Nations Relief Works Agency (UNRWA) was established in 1949 as a response to the refugee crisis. This agency became responsible for the education ofrefugees, and fuHliteracy was achieved within a generation.51 During the Mandate period Palestinian nationalism originated among the notables and urban elites and spread down to the peasants and lower classes. After 1948 this process was reversed. Former fèllahin and workers, especially the children educated in the refugee camps, defined a new Palestinian consciousness. Arabs in Israel as weIl as communities within Gaza and the West Bank defined Palestinian national identity. These refugees shaped Palestinian national aspirations into a search for a homeland, rather than merely a return to Palestine.52 They defined ghurba not as exile from Palestine, but as displacement from original homes, villages and lands. The refugee camps became societies onto themselves and UNRWA reinforced refugee isolation. This agency became a paternalistic force that provided material necessities, educated children and provided employment for refugees. UNRWA promoted Palestinians into staffpositions and its teachers became the basis of a new Palestinian leadership. With aH its successes UNRWA 51 Ibid., 194. 52 Kimmerling and Migdal, 187. 23 continued to represent the impermanence ofthe Palestinian refugees, and it engendered a sense ofdependence. Post- Intifiùja The final stage in the construction ofPalestinian national identity was inaugurated by violent struggle. The Inti1Jiefa (1987- 1996) a grassroots popular uprising in the occupied territories signaled a new area. Palestinian identity could no longer be characterized by quite perseverance in the face ofdispossession and occupation: "A corrosive counter-narrative" emerged based on the disillusionment with the PLO leadership, especially for Palestinians III.t h e D·laspora.53 By the late 1980's the Palestinian leadership now in Tunis was viewed as ineffectual. The Palestinians within the territories regained political control. The center ofgravity ofPalestinian politics shifted away from the Diaspora back inside Palestine. The PLO continued to play a role in the construction ofPalestinian national identity. However, the secular nationalist were faced with opposition from newly emerging religio-political organization such as lfamas. During the Inti1Jiefa-stage fundamentalist movements promoted a Palestinian religious identity to the exclusion ofother 53 Khalidi, 200. 24 identities. Fundamentalist elites argued that secular nationalism failed to deliver economically, politically and socially. They called for a retum to Islam and to "authentic" Islamic values as the remedy. The commitment to an Islamic state in Palestine places fundamentalist movements in direct conflict with the PLO. The following chapter deals with theoretical approaches to nationalism and examines the third stage in the construction ofPalestinian identity more closely. The focus is on Palestinian secular nationalism and the role ofthe PLO in the construction of Palestinian identity. 25 CHAPTER TWO Theories ofNationalism Defining concepts such as nation and nationalism is often problematic. Ethnic as opposed to political components ofthe definition ofnation are most contested.54 Nationalism is equally elusive. Sorne equate nationalism with 'national sentiment,' others with nationalist ideology or language. Most recent scholars theorizing nationalism fall into one oftwo main categories: modemists and "ethnicists". Modemists argue elites and intellectuals construct the nation by utilizing state institutions as a means to engender a national identity. Ethnicists focus on the cultural aspects ofthe nation, the pre-modem and perpetuaI nature ofthe nation especially as an expression of "authentic" identities. In contrast, modemists focus on the political aspects ofthe nation. Modemist and Ethnicist Both modemist (Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson) and Ethnicist (Anthony Smith, and John Armstrong) describe nationalism as a product ofobjective socioeconomic conditions. Modemists and ethnicists adhere to the realist perspective. They 54 John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith eds., Nationalism, New York: Oxford University Press, 4. 26 define nationalism as a tangible reality embedded in concrete historical circumstances (ancient for ethnicist and recent for modernist). Modernist theorists such as Ernest Gellner define nationalism as an inherently modern phenomenon. It is not the identification with a nation that is modern rather it is the political expression of this identification that is a distinctive feature ofthe modern world. In the modern age, culture and state power are related in a new way so as to engender nationalism.55. Like Max Weber, Gellner defines the nation in terms ofa shared culture. Culture both persists and changes. Although cultures are continuously transmitted over time, they are not static, and what is presented as "continuous" and "immemorial" tradition is often consciously invented.56 Gellner argues, "The attribution ofan immemorial antiquity to nations is an illusion.,,57 Nations are mythic entities created and invented by nationalist intelligentsia. Intellectuals and political elites transmit shared culture through state institutions. In this way Gellner places nationalism in the political sphere: "Nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds 55Ibid.,93. 56 EricHobsbawm and T. Ranger, The Invention ofTradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 57 Ernest Gellner, Nationalism, London: Weidenfe1d & Nico1son, 1997,93. 27 that the political and the national unit should be congruent."S8 This approach privileges the political role ofintellectuals: Gellner divides history into an agrarian age (Agraria) and a modem age (Industria): "homogeneity ofculture is an unlikely determinant ofpolitical boundaries in the agrarian world, and a very probable one in the modem industriallscientific world".S9 In the transition from Agraria to Industria, localized forms ofcommunity (tribe, village) are replaced by mass urban society. This urban culture is characterized by conflict over limited resources by differently socialized ethnie groups. Nationalism is rooted in these inevitable conflicts.60 Benedict Anderson also represents the tradition ofmodemist theorist ofnationalism.61 Like Gellner, Anderson views nationalism as modem. Nations are "imagined communities." The possibility of imaginingthe nation only arose in the modem age when three ancient, fundamental cultural conception lost prominence. The first was the rejection ofthe idea that a script-language (Latin, Arabie) offered access to ontological truth, and hence, was a part ofthat truth. The second was movement away from the hierarchical ordering ofsociety and the decline ofsocietal organization under 5X Ernest Gellner, Nations mJd Nationalislll, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983,1. 59 Gellner, Nationalism, 95. 611 Gellner, Nations andNationalislll. 61 Anderson theorizes nationalism in much the same way as Ernest Renan did in 1882. Renan identified the subjective nature ofthe nation as a "moral consciousness." See "Qu'est-ce qu'une nation?" a lecture 28 high centres such as monarchs who governed by divine rule. The third cultural conception to lose prominence in the modern age deals with temporality and the conflation ofcosmology and history.62 These ideas rooted humankind and provided certainties. In the industrial age these three cultural conceptions fall under the impact ofrapid economic, social and scientific change. Further, the modern equality and individualism ofthe Enlightenment abolished the heterogeneity ofhierarchical belonging.63 There is a shift away from narrow identities (local, family and religious) to wider impersonal identities ofthe state. The modern age is accompanied by the development ofprint-capitalism and the use ofnew vernacular languages that "unify the fields of exchange and communication.,,64 The new way ofcommunicating (a result ofthe development ofprint capitalism) facilitated the growth and dissemination ofa new image ofthe nation. This image is rooted in a remembered past central to the subjective idea ofthe nation.65 Gellner and Anderson view the 'origins' ofnations and nationalism as a sign ofthe 'modernity' ofsociety. Both recognize delivered at the Sorbonne, Il March 1882. A translation ofErnest Renan's "What is a nation'?" appears in Romi K. Bhabha, Nation andNalTation ed., New York: Routledge, 1990, 8-21. 62 The decline ofthese three idea1s is summarized in Benedict Anderson, hnagined Coml11unities: Reflections on tfle Origins andSpread oi'Nationalism, London: Verso, 1991,36-46. 63 Ronald Beiner ed., TiJeorizing Nationalism, New York: State University ofNew York Press, 1999,225. 64 Rutchinson and Smith, Nationalism, 94. 65 The subjective idea of the nation owes much to Renan's thesis. The focus on communication and dissemination ofideas is rooted in Karl Deutsche's Nationalism andSocial CommU11ication, 1953. 29 nationalism thrust for a correspondence ofethnic/cultural identity and political identity. However, unlike Gellner, Anderson does not view nationalism as an ideology in the sense ofLiberalism or Marxism. It is more strongly affiliated with religious imaginings: "nationalism has to be understood, by aligning it not with self- consciously held political ideologies, but with large cultural systems that preceded it, out ofwhich-as well as against which-it came into being.66 For Anderson, the nation is: "the representation of social lifè rather than the discipline ofsocial politj'.67 In addition to the emergence ofnationalism from a system of cultural signification, Anderson is critical ofGellner's characterization ofnationalism as fabricated. Gellner argues that 'Nationalism is not the awakening ofnations to se1f-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist. ,6R In this sense invention becomes fabrication rather than imagining or creation. Unlike modernist, ethnicist theorist (Anthony D. Smith and John Armstrongt9 view nationalism as a permanent feature ofhumankind and as primarily though not exclusive1y an expressions ofidentity.7o Although not purely a thesis ofprimordially, Armstrong and Smith both focus on the cultural component ofthe nation. 66 Anderson, 12. 67 Bhabha, 2. Bhabha represents the semiotic or postmodernist theories of nationalism. 68 Anderson, 69 John Armstrong, Nations Befàre NationaJism, Chapel Hill, University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1982. Anthony D. Smith, T1Je Et1Jnie Origins ofNations, London: Basil Blackwell, 1986. 70 Classical examples include theorist such as Fichte and Herder. 30 Although the nation is a relatively modern phenomenon, its origins can be traced to pre-modern ethnie communities, ethnies. Ethnicists agree with modernists that nationalist create nations however, they argue that this creation does not occur exnihilo. Nations are shaped out ofpre-existing cultural resources-myths, memories, symbols and traditions. For ethnicists nationalist elites utilize pre-existing cultural resources to re-interpret sacred text in order to "reconstruct" the nation. This is in contrast to modernist for whom the nation is created/reshaped out ofnew modern processes related to high culture, modern technology, bureaucracy, capitalism, secular education and nationality. For ethnicist modern nations have a sociologically dominant ethnie community or an "ethnie core". State-formation takes place around this community and ultimately the nation is formed. In sorne cases two or more dominant ethnie communities are in dispute. Often a monarch or an aristocracy builds the state on upper-class culture with myths ofcommon decent, a vernacular language, territorial homeland and shared history. This ethnie community or ethnie spreads the culture and language downwards to the middle and lower classes. Often the monarchy or aristocracy no longer exists and the ethnie categories are subject populations. However, the educated upper classes preserve memories ofindigenous heroes, 31 kingdoms, poets ofa 'golden age', sacred territories and myths of origin and divine election.71 By the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries under the influence ofRomanticism and western scholarship there is a process ofretrieval that takes place. The search for an "authentic" past takes the shape ofterritorial civicnationalism or a more ethnictype of nationalism. For Smith, territorial, civic nations tend to develop from aristocratic ethniesthrough a process of 'bureaucratie incorporation.' The lower classes are absorbed into the ethnie culture ofupper classes. In contrast, ethnie nations develop from 'vertical' ethnies through a process ofcultural mobilization on the part ofintellectuals.72 Like smith, Hutchinson divides nationalism into cultural and political types. Like the classical polis, the ideal ofpolitical nationalism is a civic politY ofeducated citizens united by common laws. They reject the traditional allegiances for a rationalist conception ofthe nation that transcends cultural difference. However, they must work within a territory or homeland to secure a state: "To mobilize a political constituency on behalfofthis goal, political nationalist may be driven to adopt ethnic-historical 71 Beiner, 33. 72 For a differentiation of 'eivie' from 'ethnie' nations see Anthony D. Smith, "The Origins ofNations," Ethnic andRacial Studies, 12 (July 1989): 340. 32 identities and in the process may become ethnicized and 're- traditionalized' .73 The goal-securing a state-is modem. Cultural nationalist view the state as accidentaI, because the essence ofthe nation is distinctive civilization, the product ofa specifie history, culture and geography.74 Nations are viewed as organic beings or personalities infused with a creative force that endows aIl things with individuality. They are primordial expressions ofthis spirit. 75 Hutchinson's political nationalism is comparable with Smith's 'civic' nation. Politicallcivic nations uproot traditional order and replace it with modem legal-rational society. Hutchison's concept ofcultural nationalism is reminiscent ofSmith's 'ethnie' nation, both are elite driven movements ofmoral regeneration. Both cultural and ethnie nations replace the state as agent ofpopular mobilization and seek to reconstruct a communal past and unite the traditional with the modem.76 According to Hutchison, political nationalism appears first in the West. In CentrallEastem Europe and Asia, society was primarily agrarian and a secular middle class did not exist. This society was characterized by social and political backwardness that facilitated the dominancy ofa "reactionary aristocracy.,,77 Modemist claim there often exists no correlation between ethnie and political 73 Hutchinson and Smith ,124. 74 Ibid. 75 This creative force is the spirit Herder speaks of. 33 boundaries and that cultural nationalist create them through a visionary nation. This imaginednation is based on ancient historical memories and unique cultural attributes. In opposition to this modernist interpretation, Hutchinson, is sympathetic to cultural nationalist. He views the reassertion of traditional values by educated elites in the 'East' as a defensive response. The return to the foundational past is not a regression but rather a means to advance into a new stage ofsocial development; "Cultural nationalist should be seen, therefore, as moral innovators who seek by 'reviving' an ethnie historicist vision ofthe nation to redirect traditionalist and modernist away from conflict and instead to unite them in the task ofconstructing an integrated distinctive and autonomous community, capable ofcompeting in the modern world.,,7R Methodologically modernist and ethnicist do not differ. They can both be characterized as "realist." This perspective holds that nationalism is produced by and anchored in objective socioeconomic conditions and material interest.79 Nationalism is a tangible reality embedded in concrete historical circumstances (ancient for ethnicist and recent for modernist). These theoretical approaches 76 Smith, "The Origins ofnations," 341. 77 Hutchinson and Smith, 127-28. 7X Hutchinson and Smith, 129. 79 Jankowski and Gershoni" Retlzinking Nationalism in tfle Arab Middle East, 6. 34 are a tool for examining the historical circumstance of the Palestinian case. The Construction ofPalestinian Identity: The Role ofSecular Nationalism Although nationalism is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning ofthe nineteenth century, nations and nationalism have survived and penetrated into all societies. The political dimensions ofmodernity provide the conditions for the rise ofnations and nationalism. Similar to Gellner, this paper contends that in the Palestinian case nationalist elites played a role in the construction of Palestinian identity. They shaped this identity through various institutions such as the press, schools, religious establishments, political groups, foreign missions,dubs, charities and organs ofthe Ottoman state. Both Anderson and Gellner draw attention to the non- political changes ofmodernity: printing, literacy, urbanization and changing social roles. These are significant in the Palestinian case. Print-capitalism and the modern press were utilized by elites to engender nationalism. In the first decade ofthe twentieth century Palestinian newspapers, al-KaJmiland Filastin, reacting to British colonialism and Zionism engendered a sense ofidentity among Palestinians. This was aided by the institutions ofeducation that 35 development in conjunction with the "industrialization" of Palestinian society. The modem press facilitated a shift in identity among Palestinians. Narrow identities offamily and village gave way to broader identities ofmass urban society. Ethnie bonds and the centrality ofreinterpreted traditions also play a significant role in the construction ofthe modem Palestinian nation. Palestinian notables played a role in the dissemination ofhigh culture and fostered the construction of modem Palestinian consciousness. The Palestinian ethnieresiding in cuiturally transmitted myths and symbols, especially the myth of common descent, constructed a sense ofPalestinian identity and nationalism. For nationalists the nation includes a population occupying a historicalland, a common culture, economy, legal rights and duties for members as weIl as shared myths and memories. The Construction ofidentity is the vehicle by which the nation emerges in the modem era. Palestinian nationalist elites re narrated the past and utilized symbols such as dispossession and exile to construct "authentic" Palestinian identity. They often portrayed military defeat as triumph or heroic perseverance, ~'iUmud in an effort to consolidate a sense ofcommon struggle. This began during the Mandate Period and reached its peak in the 1960's with the emergence ofthe PLO. 36 The first decade after 1948 was characterized by disorientation, an absence ofmeaningful politicalleadership and petty communal feuding. Grassroots organizations, charitable, professional and cultural in nature, continued to function quietly.RO Organizations like the Haifa Cultural Associations and the Jaffa Muslim Sports Club kept alive the memory ofPalestine. The shared experiences ofdispossession, suffering and refugee camps preserved and reshaped a sense ofsolidarity. After the Palestinian dispossession, more than halfofthe pre- war population was now in the West Bank. These refugees came under the control ofJordan. The Hashemite regime declared itself the only legitimate heir ofArab Palestine.RI The Jordanian state executed a process ofJordanization ofPalestinians. Two-thirds of aU Palestinians became Jordanian citizens. The state established a comprehensive educational system for the East and West Banks in order to promote a Jordanian social whole. R2 Palestinians were encouraged to settle on the East Bank and welfare and development agencies were created to aid refugees. The Jordanian state also acted to suppress the voicing of a national Palestinian identity.R3 This policy ofJordanization was problematic at the outset. The Palestinians (an educated and urbane community) out numbered HO Ibid., 195. HI This po1icy was maintained until 1988. H2 Kimmerling and Midga1, 191. 37 the Jordanians two to one at the time of annexation. They quickly overwhelmed the original Jordanian population in many domains. The Bedouin core ofJordanian society was left in control ofkey political ministries and the army. The Gaza strip came under Egyptian control after 1948. This was a much harsher c1imate for Palestinian refugees. Gaza suffered a loss ofits agricultural zones (citrus and grain lands), and was characterized by poverty and social misery.84 The Egyptians denied Gazans opportunities granted to Palestinians by the Jordanians. They were denied opportunities for institution building and political participation (including citizenship). Gaza was poor and constituted mainly ofilliterate unskilled refugees and agricultural workers. It did not become a center ofnew Palestinian institution building. Rather, Gazan society developed and maintained memories and culture from pre-war Palestine: "Gaza became the quintessential representation of a new culture-what we might call camp society.,,85 Old institutions offamily and clan remained important for Gazans during this time ofstrife. These institutions helped recreate Palestinian identity. After the 1967 Gaza and the West Bank became the Occupied Territories. The 83 King Abdallah was negotiating with Israel when he was assassinated in 1951 by a Palestinian. 84 Kimmerling and Migdal, 199. 85 Ibid., 198-99. 38 separate and isolated Palestinian culture that developed in Gaza and the West Bank came together in the territories. The period after 1948 was marked by inter-Arab rivalries. In 1956-57 Egypt and Iraq clashed over the Baghdad Pact. In 1961 Syria seceded from the union with Egypt. The war in Yemen further divided the Arabs into camps.86 In 1964 Nasser called a meeting of Arab leaders in response to Israeli implementation ofa plan to divert the waters ofthe Jordan River for its own use. 87 It was at this meeting that a "Palestinian entity" was created. A few months later, a Palestine Council of422 Palestinians representing various sectors ofthe population would proclaim a draft constitution oftwenty-nine articles that included a resolutions for: a) the creation ofthe Palestine Liberation Organization or PLO, b) election ofA1].mad al-Shukayri, the Palestinian representative at the Arab League, as chairman ofthe Executive Committee, c) the transformation ofthe council into the First National Congress ofthe PLO, d) the adoption of a national Covenant for the organization, and e) the selection by the chairman of an executive committee of fifteen Palestinian representatives.88 H6 For a full account ofthese rivalries see Malcom H. Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal AbdelNasser and His RivaIs, New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. H7 Jamal R. Nassar, The Palestine Liberation Organization: From ArmedStruggle t the Declaration al' Independence, New York: Praeger, 1991, 19. HH Ibid., 20. 39 After the 1967 war the PLO under the control ofFateJ;. came to dominate Palestinian politicS.89 The PLO dominated by FateJ;. established itself as the official leadership ofthe Palestinians and Palestinian nationalism. The PLO generation ofleaders had access to university education in the Arab world and sorne in North America and Europe. The new professionals and intel1ectuals derived their powers not from the traditional villages but from the tools ofmodern education. After the 1967 war, the newly educated constructed three heroic images that would shape Palestinian national identity for the next three decades: the freedom fighter, the survivor and the martyr. The fidi'Îwas the modern holy warrior who sacrifices himselfin the battle against Zionism.9o This image idealized the peasant in spite of the fact that the new leadership, the PLO was mainly urban. The second was the survivor, the fèl1iJ;. or peasant who demonstrated steadfastness, enduring humiliations and dispossession.91 The last was "the child ofthe stone," the shahidor martyr who offered his life for the national cause.92 These youth were reminiscent ofthe shabib ofthe RevoIt. During the 1960's and 70's (the era ofworldwide nationalliberation movements) the symbol ofthe fidi'j dominated. X9 ln 1959 Yasser 'Arafat and a group ofhis university colleagues established Fa/ell the Palestinian National Liberation Movement. 911 The fèdaywas portrayed wearing the kiifiya, the headdress of the feflalün, and carrying a Kalishnokov. This image drew on memories of the rebels in the Palestinian RevoIt. 91 Ibid., 212. 92 Ibid. 40 In the 1980's and 90's the image ofthe martyr became more prominent. The PLO developed a national mythology ofheroism and sacrifice. The 1968 battle of a1-Karamah is an example ofthis national mythology. This battle is the "foundation myth" ofthe modern Palestinian commando movement. 93 The mythology built around this incident is characteristic ofthe myth making that enters into the process ofcreating national identity. The PLO often narrated failure (military defeat) as triumph. The battle of a1- Karamah is an example ofthis mythologization. The battle took place in the abandoned city of al-Karamah on the East side ofthe Jordan River. Israeli troops attacked Palestinian military bases and met with unexpected resistance. The Israelis suffered much heavier casualties than expected and were forced to leave behind sorne damaged vehicles.94 This was not an Arab military victory but the Palestinians fought and were left in control ofthe land at the end ofthe battle. Viewed in the immediate aftermath ofthe 1967 defeat, al-Karamah became a symbol exploited by Palestinian nationalist. A failure narrated as heroic triumph.95 93 Khalidi, 196. The name ofthe town aJ-KaramaiJ means dignity. 94 Ibid., 197. 95 The portraya1 of failure as defeat became part ofPLO mythologizing. Other examp1es include the narration ofthe debacle in Jordan in September of 1970. PLO defeat cu1minated in Black September and expulsion from Jordan. The 1975-76 attacks on Pa1estinian camps in Lebanon, and the 1982 defeats both a result ofPLO invo1vement in the Lebanese Civil War. These and numerous other events have been re narrated as victory rather than defeat. 41 The "narrative offailure as triumph" re-shaped events like the martyrdom ofsheikh 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam, the Palestinian RevoIt, and the Arab-Israeli War. The violence and losses suffered by Palestinians during the course ofthe revolt as weIl as the disorganization, confusion and leaderless chaos ofthe Arab-Israeli War were turned into triumph. Defeat was shifted into the heroism ofthe Palestinian peasant, urban fighters and charismatic leaders of the war. The selective retrieval ofhistory is typical of aIl nationalist movements. As Ernest Renan argues, nations must choose to remember and to forget their past. The re-narration ofhistory must be viewed along side the fact that the PLO was not a government. They operated without the benefit of a nation-state and hence, they did not possess the means to propagate an official version ofhistory to the entire Palestinian population. They lacked an education system, control over channels ofthe media, museums, archaeological exhibits, national parks and cultural manifestations to reinforce their version ofhistory.96 However, the PLO was able to reach sorne ofthe Palestinian population through newspapers and periodicals, its publishing houses and research institutes, and especially its radio station $awt Filas/in, the Voice ofPalestine.97 The Palestinian experience of 96 Kimmerling and Midgal, 199. 97 Ibid., 199-200. 42 dispossession, dispersal and exile was disseminated through these media in a hid to construct a sense ofnational solidarity. The IOle ofnationalist elites in identity-creation can he compared to that ofIslamic fundamentalist. The following chapter examines the theoretical approaches to Islamic fundamentalism and the IOle offundamentalist movements in the construction of Palestinian identity. The central focus is the history, organizational structure and ideology oflfamas, a movement ofIslamic fundamentalism in Palestine. 43 CHAPTER THREE Islamic Fundamentalism Theoretical Approaches In the late twentieth century the resurgence ofreligion in the Middle East is a reaction to the failures ofmodernization. More accurate1y, the formation offundamentalist movements can be attributed to the inability ofreligious and politicalleaders to deal with the negative consequences ofthe modern age. 9R The Islamic Resistance Movement (lfarakat al-Muqiiwama al-Isliimiyya)99 exemplifies Islamic fundamentalism in Palestine. My thesis utilizes fundamentalism to denote, the affirmation ofreligious authority as holistic and absolute, expressed through the collective demand that scriptural dictates be recognized and legally enforced.\OO lfamas affirms the authority ofIslam and promotes an Islamic state in Palestine. Fundamentalism as a global concept is characterized by an anti- modern reaction against secularism. Fundamentalists are modems not modemist.\O\ They do not resist industrialization or scientific progress rather, it is modernism they appose. Modernism is characterized by relativism, consumerism, and the search for individual autonomy. Its foundations were established in the 9K James Piscatori, "Accounting for Islamic Fundamentalisms," in Accoun{jng for FundalllentaJjsllls: The Dynalllk Character o[Movelllents, Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby eds. (Chicago: The University ofChicago Press, 1994),361. 99 HereatTer referred to as Hamas. 100 Bruce Lawrence, Defènders o[God: The FundamentaJjst Revoit Agajnst tile Modern Age, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, Publishing, 1989),27. lOI Ibid., 1. 44 Enlightenment, and its vision and values are driven by secular rationalism. Modemity is used to describe the physical process of modemization such as urbanization, industrialization, and capitalism. In this context, fundamentalists do not deride the consequences ofmodemism (modemization), but castigate the values on which this process rests. Although dogmatically opposed to the values of individualism and relativism, fundamentalists tacitly accept greater urbanization and modemization. This, modemization, however, must occur within a cultural paradigm that affirms the importance of religion. Fundamentalists see modemization coupled with 'westemization' as anathema to their cultural integrity and survival. Committed to a religious and cultural structure, wholly different than the one offered by the West, fundamentalists use anti-westem rhetoric to promulgate an urbanized, sophisticated modemization buttressed by a commitment to religious scripture. Hence, fundamentalism is a modem ideology first and a religious disposition second. J02 The prelude to understanding fundamentalism as an ideological reaction to modemism lies in the examination ofreligion in its pre-modem scope: "A drastic change has been transforming the entire world during the Technical Age. Its manifestations are physical and material, but its undercurrents are spiritual and psychological. J03 History can be divided into the Agrarianate Age (pre_19th century), the Technical Age (beginning in the 19th century 102 Ibid., 97. 103 Ibid., 24. 45 and extending to the early 20th century), and the High Tech Era (since 1950's). 104 The relationship between ideology and religion is different in each division ofhistory. In the Agraianate Age religion was superior to ideology, in the Technical Age ideology and religion were separate yet in latent conflict. In the High Tech Era (post-1950's) ideology superseded religion. The conflict is no longer dormant. Modemism (relativism, consumerism, individual autonomy) emerges as the dominant ideological strand ofmodemity in the High Tech Era. Two opposite templates ofthe world are bom, modemism and the reaction against it fundamentalism. 105 Fundamentalism is a religious ideology with five discemible characteristics: (l) fundamentalist advocate a pure minority viewpoint even when they gain the majority as in Iran; (2) they are oppositional and reactionary; (3) fundamentalists are secondary-level male elites that interpret scripture; (4) they generate their own technical vocabulary; (5) fundamentalism is characterized by historical antecedents, but no ideological precursors. I06 It is possible to utilize these criteria to determine the nature ofparticular religious political movements. The revival ofIslamic ideas in the 20th century contains two distinct components, Islamic fundamentalism and Islamic revival. 104 Ibid., 97-99. lOS Accompanying the shift from the Agrarianate Age to the High Tech Era is a shift in European thought. Exponents ofthe Enlightenment like Emmanuel Kant enlarged the role ofpractical reason and detined categorical or moral imperatives as equivalent to belief in God. Other Enlightenment thinkers would demote religious authority in the Post-Kantian Period: Hegel, Feurbach, Comte and later Nietzsche and Marx. !06 Lawrence, 100-101. According to Lawrence, antecedents such as the Wahhabi revoit for Sunni Muslims, do exist but as a religious ideology fundamentalism is recent. 46 Islamic fundamentalism is synonymous with political Islam and is characterized by extremism and isolation. Resurgence is mainstream and pervasive, a broad intellectual, cultural, social and political movement in the modem Islamic world. 107 The resurgence is a collected effort on the part ofMuslims to modernize without westernizing, to industrialize without adopting Western values. The political manifestation ofthe Islamic resurgence is comparable to the protestant Reformation: "both are reactions to the stagnation and corruption ofexisting institution; both advocate a return to purer and more demanding form oftheir religion; preach work, order and discipline; and appeal to emerging, dynamic, middle-c1ass people. JOX There exist no scholarly consensus on what defines fundamentalism. A broad range oftheories can be utilized to define the historical context, meaning and relevance ofIslamic fundamentalism. The evolutionary theory focuses on the development offundamentalism as a reaction to Western hegemony. This theory defines fundamentalism as a stage in Islam's development, and a reaction to the modernization ofthe last two hundred years. Scholars such as Bruce Lawrence, John Obert Voll, Mohammed Ayoob and Fazlur Rahman view the development of fundamentalism as a modem reaction against Western domination. The second theoretical approach focuses on religion as a cultural system and presents fundamentalism as a means ofcreating identity. Fundamentalism is a strategy or set ofstrategies: "which \07 Samuel Huntington, The Clash ofCiviJjzations and the Remaking ofWorld Order(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 110. IOX Ibid., Ill. 47 beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their cultural identity as a people or group. Feeling this identity to be at risk, fundamentalist fortify it by selective retrieval ofdoctrines, beliefs, and practices from a sacred past.,,109 Hence, fundamentalism according to the afore mentioned concepts requires: (a) an external force, power or entity able to (b) generate a specific identity. Both theoretical approaches are encompassed in the theory of essentialism (negatively described as cultural determinism). Essentialists focus on Islam as a cohesive whole with basic and permanent values. According to essentialism, the thinking of fundamentalist is characterized by the standard Islamic world-view and the corresponding self-image ofIslam. 110 Scholars that adhere to this theory (implicitly and explicitly) characterize Islam as an unchanging monolith, with an essential "essence" that can be observed and studied. According to essentialist, the fundamentalist reaction to modernity and the need for identity creation are based on traditional Islamic values and precepts: "The fundamental reason for the resurgence appears to be the feeling among many ordinary Muslims, that they were in danger of losing their identity, because of its 109 Martin E Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Accounting for Fundamentalism, 1. Marty and Appleby are the editors of a massive tlve volume work know as the Fundamentalism Project based at the University ofChicago. 110 See Montgomery W. Watt, Islamic Fundamentalism andModernity, New York: Routedge, 1988. 52 leadership's authority was undermined and diminished. Finally, the political circumstances of foreign military occupation and the threat of annexation triggered the Intifada and the development ofHamas: "Political violence has been a product ofunusual circumstances and external influences.,,120 Prior to these circumstances, political Islam in Palestine was primarily a movement ofsocial transformation. Palestinian fundamentalists react to the economic and social hardships ofthe Israeli Occupation and increasingly to the inability ofthe secular nationalist PLO/PA to find lasting political solutions for Palestinians. Thus Islam provides the vehicle for confronting Israel and Western hegemony. The resurgence ofreligion and the return to prominence oftraditional identities (rooted in blood ties, family, clan and tribe) are not solelya reaction to modernity. In the face ofmilitary occupation by Israelis the reaction to modernity is exasperated. The Historical Antecedents oflfamas Founded by I:Iasan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood is the historical and ideological predecessor ofIslamism in Palestine. The Palestinian question has been central to the movement since its inception. This centrality resulted in both 119 Israel mistakenly characterized the Mujama as a social welfare organization and unlike the PLO un interested in politics. In 1978 Israel's civil administration encouraged Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the head of the Mujama and later the spiritual leader of Hamas, to register as a charitable society. 53 ideological and sorne military support and culminate in the fonnation ofa Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood organization. The new movement was characterized by religiously motivated social welfare activism. The religious motives ofthe movement are related to the concepts ofIslamic ummiior community and the notion ofjihiid121 The Muslim Brothers divided politicalloyalty into loyalty to country, loyalty to Arabism and loyalty to Islam. Arab unity was a prerequisite for the revival ofthe past (glorious age ofIslam) and for Islamic unity. The unity ofthe Islamic ummiirequires the revival of the caliphate. According to al-Banna, this would be achieved graduaI, "moving from national unity, to Arab unity and then to Islamic unity.,,122 This religious notion ofIslamic fratemity is rooted in the Qur'an and replaces nationalism with a greater bond ofunity built on Islam. The Muslim Brethren viewed Palestine as part ofthe Islamic nation or ummiiand its significance was couched in religion. Jerusalem was the place ofthe Prophet Muhammad's night joumey and the first qiblah or direction ofprayer. For religious reasons Palestine was the property of aU Muslims and not just 120 Ibid., 6. 121 Abd al-Fattah Muhammad el-Awaisi, The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question 1928-1947, (New York: Tauris Acedemic Studies, 1998), 2. 122 Ibid., 4. 48 erosion by Western intellectual attitudes". 11 1 Hence, fundamentalist believe, a return to "true Islam," the Islam ofthe earliest period, will insulate them from the onslaught ofsecularism. Islam is seen as the solution for all social and economic problems. In short, essentialism emphasizes specifie historical and cultural traditions presented through the lens ofIslam (fundamentalist). My thesis accepts the essentialist theory tempered with a qualification. The emphasis on tradition by essentialism to the exclusion of other factors leads to an incomplete and unsatisfactory understanding offundamentalism. Edward Said argues: "Islam has been fundamentally misrepresented in the West-the real issue is whether indeed there can be a true representation ofanything, or whether any and all representation, because they arerepresentations, are embedded first in the language and then in the culture, institution, and political ambience ofthe representer.,,112 This is a critique ofthe methodological failures ofOrientalism. However, it can be incorporated to facilitate a valuable polemical challenge to essentialism. What emerges, is an understanding ofa changing fundamentalism constructed by and in response to specifie political and culture exigencies. This is not to imply that definitive representations can't be formed and presented. It only alerts the 111 Ibid., 61. 49 astute observer to the fact that these representations are not always fixed in a single historical context. The case oflfamas demonstrates that a fundamentalist movement (colored by traditional Islamic world view) can explicitly affirm traditional values (essentialism) while, implicitly asserting a Palestinian identity enshrined in the modem notion ofthe nation state. Fundamentalism in Palestine: lfarakat al-Muqiiwama al-Isliimiyya (lfamas) As a political phenomenon in the Arab world, Islamic fundamentalism became widespread in the 1970's. The emergence of an Islamic republic in Iran facilitated a global Islamic awakening. The Israeli occupation delayed the development offundamentalism in Palestine until the late 1980's: "Islamism has now become a major political force in the West Bank and Gaza Strip at the expense ofthe PLO.,,113 Support for Islamism was achieved through a radical reorientation ofthe main Islamic organization in Palestine, the Muslim Brotherhood. Resurgence theories offundamentalism suggest that fundamentalism took root in Palestine for many ofthe same reasons it has developed in the Arab world in general. According to these 112 Edward Said, Orientalism, New York: Vintage Books, 1994, 272. 113 Jean-Francois Legrain, "Ramas: Legitimate Reir ofPalestinian Nationalism?" in John Esposito, Political Islam, Revolution, Radicalism or Reform, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997, 159. 50 theorist fundamentalism is a reaction to modernity.114 A leading resurgence scholar summarizes the approach ofthese theorists in his dual characterization offundamentalism as both political and cultural. l15 PoliticaIly, Islamic fundamentalism is a reaction to a structural crisis. Economic factors such as the need for jobs, housing and education, class malaise, individual alienation state tyranny and political alienation due to the lack ofliberalization among Arab governments are aIl significant determinants ofpopular support for Islamist movements. Islamic fundamentalism is an attack on the nation-state and an effort to provide an alternative to this failed secular institution. 116 CulturaIly, political Islam emerged as a response to a crisis of meaning(the result ofcultural contradictions produced by modernity). According to Bassam Tibi, "The salient feature of political Islam is its defensive-cultural character." The defensive culture ofIslam is a result ofIslam's clash with 'cultural modemity.' This clash revolves around the modem concept ofknowledge 114 See the work of Bruce Lawrence, James Piscatori, Robert übert Voll, John Esposito, Mohammed Ayoob, Fazlur Rahman and others. See especially, Martin E Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.) Aeeounting for Fundamentalism. This part of a massive five volume research project based at the University of Chicago. 115 Basam Tibi, Confliet and War in the Middle East: From lnte rstate War to New Security, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999),227. 116 Bassam, Tibi, The Challenge ofFundamentalism: Political Islam and the New World Disorder, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998). 51 providing the basis for modern science and technology, and the idea ofsecular governance versus the "rule ofGod."ll7 Although modernist theories ofnationalism can be applied successfully to the Palestinian case, related theories that attempt to explain the 'resurgence' ofIslamic fundamentalism do not fully explain the rise Palestinian religio-political organization such as Hamas. The decline ofArab secularism in the Nasser era did not lead to Islamic fundamentalism in Palestine: "In the case ofPalestine, however, the opposite was true: the period after 1967 saw political Islam eclipsed by an increasingly flourishing secular nationalism."IIK These movements must inevitably be viewed with reference to the unique political circumstances from which they emerged. First, Israel supported Islamist such as the Mujama or Islamic Congress as a way to destroy the secular nationalist struggle for statehood.1l9 Israeli funding ofIslamists was intended as a policy of divide-and-rule in the Occupied Territories. However, it is partly responsible for the rise ofIslamic fundamentalism in Palestine. Second, the Palestinian nationalist movement went into decline after the 1982 Israeli invasion ofLebanon that resulted in forced exile and the massacres at Sabra and Shatilla. Dislocated in Tunis the PLO 117 Ibid" 224-230. 118 Beverley Milton-Edwards, fslamic Politics in Palestine, New York: Tauris Academie Studies, 1996.5. 54 Palestinians. 123 Modem fundamentalist inherited the idea of Palestine as an Islamic waqfor trust for aIl Muslims. The strategy ofthe Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine is divided into two phases. In the first phase there is a caU to transform society, in the second the focus is on the calI for jihador holy struggle against Israel. Al-Banna defined holy struggle as a religious obligation of aIl Muslims and thus, it is part ofthe oath ofaIlegiance ofthe Muslim Brotherhood. As a community Muslims are to defend themselves from aggression, secure freedom ofbelief, protect the message ofIslam and relieve the oppressed and support them against their oppressors. 124 The doctrinaire perspectives on the religious precepts of umniâ and jihaddrive the Muslim Brotherhood's commitment to the Palestinian cause. To a lesser extent, the Muslim Brothers had national and political concems that focused on the military and economic security of Egypt. They feared a Zionist state because they viewed it as an outpost ofWestern imperialism and as a barrier obstructing contact with Asia and Africa. Zionism was also viewed as a social threat, a potential source ofapostasy and permissiveness. 125 The Muslim Brotherhood met in Haifa in 1946 and 1947 and committed itselfto the defense ofPalestine and to cooperation with 123 Ibid., IO. 124 EI-Awaisi arrives at these conclusion after analyzing the writing ofHasan al-Banna and the Muslim Brothers. 55 the nationalist forces. The movement flourished as general respect and appreciation for its support grew. In 1947, the Brotherhood became active in public mobilization campaigns in preparation for Jihad and in disseminating anti-Zionist propaganda. 126 The Brotherhood disseminated its message through the mosques. In the 1948, the movement put aside ideology and joined forces with national organizations even participating in the war. After the 1948 war the movement was divided. The Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank was incorporated into the Brotherhood in Jordan and the Brethren in Gaza carne under Egyptian control. The movement in the West Bank adopted a political approach that focused on education, and charity. The Brothers in Jordan were conservative and quietist, more concerned with social issue and the building ofan Islamic society. Its counterpart in Gaza took on revolutionary and military traits. The Brotherhood in the Gaza Strip was involved politically and militarily until1954 when Nasser banned the organization. This led to the establishment ofthe National Liberation Movement, Fatei} in 1958- 59. Palestinian Islamists distanced themselves from the secular nationalism of Fate{J.. They refrained from engaging in the liberation 125 EI-Awaisi, 18. 126 Khaled Hroub, Hamas: Politicai Tbougbt andPractice, (Washington D.C: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1998),17. 56 struggle during the 1960's and 70's when FateiJ came to dominate the PLO. 127 The Brotherhood continued to play a passive role focusing on social rather than political issues. They built mosques, and social institution, Islamic student societies, clubs and charitable organizations. In the late 1980's the Muslim Brotherhood underwent an ideological transformation and became the Movement ofIslamic Resistance, lfamas. This shift coincided with the outbreak ofthe Intifiiç/a and was accompanied by a marked change in the political practice ofthe movement. Led by Shaykh A1}mad Yasin, the Brotherhood embraced the principle ofarmed resistance and combined it with the social change thesis. m Patriotism (watanlyah) was united with religion (da 'wa). After the signing ofthe Peace Accords in 1993 lfamas became the main opposition to the terms of selfrule. As such, lfamas views itself as the legitimate alternative to Palestinian secular nationalism. In the West Bank and Gaza lfamasis the most popular Islamist movement. Polls conducted by the Center for Palestinian Research and Studies, an independent think tank in Nablus, consistently place lfamas as the main Islamist rival to the FateiJ controlled PA. In a January 1999 poll ofelections for the PNA President, 47% of 127 The Brotherhood justifies its non-engagement in the liberation struggle on the bases of arguments that it was engaged in a social struggle to change society and prepare a generation for struggle. 12X Hroub,35. 57 supporters chose'Arafat followed by 12% support for Al]mad Yasin (the spiritual leader ofI1amas). FateJ;. consistently receives the largest faction ofthe vote nearly 50% followed by lfamas at about 15%. lfamas may not be an epi-phenomenon or the result ofshort lived frustration but it is also not the legitimate alternative to nationalism. 129 Although the movement is the largest Islamic opposition to the PLOIPA it has not been able to capture support from more than a minority ofPalestinians. The lfamas Charter: Ideological Goals Versus Political Pragmatism In November 1988 the Palestinian National Council (PNC) of the PLO adopted a Declaration ofIndependence. This Declaration accepts UN Resolution 181 and UN Security Council Resolution 242. Resolution 181 calls for the division ofPalestine into two states, one lewish and one Arab, and 242 establishes the right of aIl states to live in peace and security within secure boundaries. 130 In August of 1988 lfarakat al-Muqiiwama al-Isliimiyya or the Islamic Resistance Movement emerged as a reaction to the Palestinian Declaration ofIndependence. 131 129 Legrain, 159. 1311 Menachem Klein, "Competing Brothers: The Web ofHamas-PLü Relations" in Re/igious Radica/ism in tile Greater Middle East, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar (eds.), (Portland: Frank Cass, 1997), Ill. 131 Because the Declaration ofIndependence implicitly recognizes the state ofIsrael it is rejected by lfamas. The Arabic acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement is lfamaswhich means zeal. 58 The 1988 charter identifies the movement and establishes its ide010gica1 and politica1 goals: Allah is its Goal. The Messenger is its Leader. The Qur'an is its Constitution. Jihad is its methodology, and Death for the sake ofAllah is its most coveted desire. 132 Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the ultimate goal ofI1amas is the establishment of an Islamic state. This can only be achieved through the liberation of al1Palestine (Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea) from the "Zionist enemy.,tl33 Accordingly, the Charter establishes the land ofPalestine: "upon all Muslim generations till the day ofResurrection" as an Islamic waqfor religious trust. 134 The Palestinian cause is transformed into a religious cause, and Jihadfor the liberation ofPalestine is made obligatory for every Muslim. 135 lfamas also professes a social agenda. The movement calls for fundamental changes in the education system: "to liberate it from the effects ofthe Ideological Invasion brought about at the hands of the Orientalists and Missionaries... "136 The role ofwomen is described as "no less than the role ofthe man, for she is the factory ofmen." 137 lfamas'anachronistic system views woman's biology as destiny. The 131 Article 8. "The Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement ofPalestine" translated by Muhammad Maqdsi, fOl/maI olPakstine Stl/dies, 22, no. 4 (summer 1993), 122-134. 133 Article Il, 125. 134 Article 10, 125. 135 Article 15, 126. 136 Article 15, 127. 137 Article 17, 127. 59 role ofMuslim women is in the home. They are to raising children of ethical character in accordance with Islam and to prepare children for the religious obligations ofjihad The Charter characterizes Jews as an oppressive enemy that robs Muslims oftheir lands and property, imprisons youth, make orphans ofchildren, and issue tyrannicallaws. 138 According to the Charter, the Jews collectively own wealth and control the international press through the support ofpowerful enemies ofIslam. Zionist are responsible for crimes from the Communist Revolution to the First World War and the destruction ofthe Islamic Caliphate. As a religio-political movement lfamas is faced with conflicting ideological issues. The Marriage ofPalestinian Nationalism and Islam The movement utilizes religious language in its charter and quotes the Qur'an and iJadith (the prophet's sayings) leaving little room for political flexibility. It denies the possibility ofany and aH peace initiatives. As religious trust Palestine can never be divided. Renouncing any part ofPalestine or recognizing the state ofIsrael is kufi- according to lfamas. 139 However, although committed to an undivided Palestine, lfamas does not renounce the PLO (which has l3X Article 22, 129. 139 Ibid. Kufùroften trans1ated as heresy, is a much more serious sin ofnon-be1ief deeming the sinner an infidel. 60 accepted a two state solution). Rather, the PLO is referred to in the charter as father, brother, relative, or friend: "Our nation is one, plight is one, destiny is one, and our enemy is the same..."140 Ideologically, the secular nationalism ofthe PLO is in total contradiction to lfamas'religious ideology. However, like its predecessor lfamas has been forced to alter its parochial beliefs. The Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood was constrained to adopt an Islamic endorsement ofviolence that is jihiïdagainst Israel. 141 Similarly, lfamashas also been forced to alter its ideology to suit the political realities ofPalestine. The movement recognizes the nationalist character ofthe Palestinian struggle. Therefore, the charter makes concession to the PLO making nationalism (al- wa,taniyah) a component ofthe faith. 142 In addition to its tacit support ofthe PLO, lfamas supports two conflicting obligations, an undivided Palestinian state and an Islamic community or ummii. Like its predecessor, the Muslim Brotherhood, lfamas simultaneously supports a universalist vision of Islamic fraternity and a particularist vision ofPalestinian nationalism. Although lfamas daims to represent "true" Islam its ideology is not an unchanging body ofdoctrine. Rather, it is something that evolves and changes based on pragmatic realities. 1411 Article 27,131. 141 Piscatori, 366. 142 Piscatori, 366. 61 lfamas'written manifesto is not the only tool for understanding the movement. Although the Charter establishes the ideological foundations oflfamas the movement's practice often strays from its doctrinaire goals. As a fundamentalist movement lfamas is influenced by an Islamic heritage, but as a national liberation movement it is implicated in secular, western, national ideas: "Since its inception, lfamas has 'Palestinianized' the universal claim ofIslam and given the movement a national-religious political profile.,,143 The national struggle ofthe PLO has been Islamized by lfamas: "So effective has Barnas becorne in setting the agenda ofthe Intifiùja that the PLO has been moved to invoke an Islamic discourse in its own pronouncements." 144 In this way, lfamas has Palestinianized Islam as opposed to Islamizing Palestine. The Palestinianization ofIslam occurred on three ideological levels. lfamas differentiates its political conditions from those in other Arab countries because Palestine is ruled by an internaI (secular) enemy. Second, Palestinian land especially Jerusalem is portrayed as the center ofnational-religious identity. Finally, the jihadofthe Intifiiqa led by lfamas is equated with the struggle against the enemies ofIslam.145 However, the movements' sacred obligations to an undivided Palestine clash with its obligation to Palestinian unity and Islamic fraternity. These contradictions are manifested in threc modes ofpolitical action on the part of lfamas: competition with the PLO, prevention ofcivil war with the PLO, and 143 Klein, 113. 144 Piscatori, 364. 145 Klein, 113. 62 communication to reach equal status with the PLO. 146 lfamashas adhered to these simultaneously creating antagonism. In 1990, lfamas groups in the West Bank clashed violently with Fatei}. the PLO's largest faction. The fighting came to an end one year later when lfamas and the PLO signed the 'Alliance of Honor'. The PLO offered lfamaspolitical representation and a chance to participate in its institutions. PLO leader Yasser 'Arafat, offered lfamas seats in the 20th session ofthe Palestinian National Council. 147 lfamas agreed to participate on the condition that the PLO rescind its recognition ofIsrael and its readiness to make peace. The PLO rejected these conditions and the political clashes continued. 148 In December of 1992, the 'Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigade (lfamas' military wing) launched guerrilla actions in the West Bank and Gaza that claimed the lives ofsix Israeli soldiers in six days. As a result the Israeli government expelled 415 alleged lfamas fundamentalist to South Lebanon and, unleashed the worst period ofIsraeli repression in the Territories since 1967. 149 This is the historical background of the negotiations between the PLO and Israel. These negotiations led to the Declaration ofPrinciples on Interim Self-Government Arrangements (DOP), signed in Washington in 1993. 146 Klein, 115. 147 Ibid., 112. 14X Ramas' leadership is characterized by pragmatic leaders in Palestine and "hard-Hne" leaders in Jordan. Muhammad Nazal and Ibrahim Gawshah deported by Israel in 1989 direct the Hamasbranch in Jordan. 149 Graham Usher, "What Kind ofNation? The Rise ofRamas in the Occupied Territories," in Politkal L According to the DOP Israel agreed to partially withdraw from Gaza and the West Bank town ofJericho as a prelude to a comprehensive peace. lfamas terrorist actions seemed to succeed. They forced the Israeli government to unprecedented limits and insured a space for lfamas in the struggle for a Palestinian state. As a modern political movement that challenges Israel and the PLO, lfamas is critical ofthe DOP as a political and ideological surrender. 150 In 1993 as a reaction to the DOP, lfamasjoined forces with the Popular and Democratic Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP and DFLP) and eight ex-PLO groupS.151 The new commitment became 'The Palestinian Forces Alliance'. The Alliance sought to build a politicaJ alternative to the PLO leadership by Ulliting ten ideologically diverse groups. 152 This union accepted the PLO Covenant (1968) and the Program of Stages (1974) as the basis for its ideology.153 This is another example oflfamas'ideological compromise. The 1974 Program of Stages contradicts the lfamas Charter and the notion ofthe indivisibility ofPalestine. The Program ofStages: "accepts the adoption ofpolitical means and divides the liberation ofPalestine into two successive stages.,,154 In order to dominate the Palestinian Forces Alliance lfamasrelied on pragmatism rather than ideology. It compromised its ideals for political gain. 1511 An Interview with Edward Said, "Symbols Versus Substance: A Year After The Declaration of Principles," Journal olPalestine Studies, 24, no. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 60-72. 151 Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic lùndamentalism in the West Bankand Gaza" Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994, 119. 152 The Alliance represents secular-Marxist views, ultra-nationalist and Muslim radicals. 153 Klein, 120. 154 Ibid. 64 Since the early 1990's, lfamas leadership outside Palestine has mobilized the movement in a less ideological direction. lfamas' doctrinal discourse (the rigid language ofthe Charter) has diminished in intensity. The struggle against Zionism has taken precedence over questions ofideology. This moderation is refiected in lfamas' practice. The organization has established contacts with Western states and international bodies especially in humanitarian matters. Further, a more nuanced understanding ofJudaism, that separates the political movement ofZionism from the Jewish religion as a whole, has emerged. 155 As lfamas is drawn into the political sphere it behaves according to the rational actor model: "political relations normally are governed by shifting pragmatic interests rather than by enduring abstract theoretical positions based on principle.,,156 By placing interests above principles lfamas is acting out ofpreservation. Its ideology will continue to evolve and change. The shift to pragmatic politics is evident in the way lfamas has approached the interim solution (Oslo). lfamas views the struggle with Israel as a long-term historic struggle. Victory requires the supremacy ofIslam in the form ofan Islamic state. However, the final victory ofthe Islamic ummiiover Zionism and Western ideals is viewed in future terms. Accordingly, the temporaJyvietories ofZionism are not final because the historie conditions required for victory in a final sense have not yet been realized. When the Arab and Islamic renaissance takes place and the 155 Hroub, 50. 156 Ibid., 57. 65 will ofthe ummiiis united, victory (the liberation ofall Palestine) will be attained. These views form the basis oflfamas'position on a Palestinian state in part ofhistorie Palestine, alongside a sovereign Israeli state. lfamas differentiates a historie solution from an interim solution. The historie solution to the Palestinian problem is described as a long-term solution. The objectives ofa long-term solution are to win baek aIl ofhistorie Palestine. The short-or medium-term solution is called the interim solution. This inc1udes a commitment on the part ofPalestinians to willingly accept a Palestinian or Arab or Islamic sovereignty over only part ofthe historie territory ofPalestine alongside a sovereign Israeli state. This would be achieved through war or through peaceful means and is usually coupled with the idea of an armistice. 157 lfamas did not abandon the historie solution however, it became less prominent in the post-Oslo period. Political realities forced the movement to choose between dealing with the developments ofthe peace-process or rejecting them outright. Aware that the Palestinian "dream" ofliberating aIl ofhistorie Palestine could not be achieved immediately lfamas followed a realistic approach. It made its acceptance of an interim solution contingent on a number ofconditions outlined in the five pillars or guidelines ofits Political Bureau. lfamas bases its acceptance ofan interim solution on the unconditional withdrawal ofZionist occupation forces from the West 157 Ibid., 69. 66 Bank and Gaza, including Jerusalem, the dismantling ofsettlements and the evacuation ofsettlers from those areas, and the holding of free general elections for a legislative body among the Palestinian people inside and outside Palestine. 158 Acceptance is also based on the condition that there is to be no recognition ofIsrael. The eventual goal is an Islamic state in which Jews could live as citizens, not a sovereign Jewish entity.159 lfamas also bases its support on the consistency ofthe interim solution with shari 'ah. The interim solution is consistent with the Islamic concept ofhudnah or armistice. Hudnah is not a peace treaty. According to Islamic law an armistice is an agreement limited for up to ten years. Hudnah does not require: "acceptance of the usurpation ofour rights by the enemy."160 Hence, an interim solution is not a permanent solution rather it is an agreement for a short period oftime until political circumstances in Palestine change. Acceptance ofan interim solution is contingent on the acceptance that armed resistance, the most prominent example being the Intifiiqa, is the only way to achieve progress beyond the interim solution. These guidelines are summarized in a statement by the Political Bureau oflfamasdated April 1994. 161 For the first time in the history ofthe movement an agenda in the form ofa comprehensive solution was proposed. However, the statement by the Political Bureau like the ideology of Ifamas is rife with ideological contradictions. It is difficult to reconcile the 158 Ibid., 76. 159 Ibid., 72. 160 Ibid., 75. 161 Usher, 302-06. 67 acceptance in principle ofan Interim solution with the continued beliefin Palestine as an indivisible religious trust for aU Muslim generations. lfamas argues that it is willing to accept an Interim solution, that is declare a willingness to accept a Palestinian, Arab or Islamic sovereignty over part ofthe historie territory ofPalestine alongside a sovereign Israeli state. However, one ofthe conditions ofaccepting an Interim solution is the non-recognition ofIsrael. lfamas is simultaneously committed to a historie solution that caUs for an Islamic state (to be established at a latter date) that does not include a sovereign Jewish entity and an Interim solution that recognizes a two state solution. The proposaI from the Political Bureau caused sorne to believe that lfamas had moved beyond its initial rejection ofOslo to a more pragmatic position that recognizes the political realities of self-rule. 162 However, the commitment to a historie solution is unwavering: " the movement still believes that the Palestinian people have a right to Palestine from the Mediterranean to the Jordan; that jihad is the path to liberation; and that negotiating with the enemy is totaUy unacceptable.,,163 lfamas did not abandon its position on the historie solution. Rather the movement adopted a wavering position in favour ofan Interim solution in tandem with its core position calling for the liberation of aB Palestine. What Ffamas has gained from these contradictory statements is political space to discuss the details ofthe settlement plan. However, it consistently argues that 162 Graham Usher, "Ramas seeks a place at the Table," MMdle East International, (May, 13, 1994), 17. 16.' Rroub, 70. 68 engaging in discussion is not to be viewed as acceptance ofthe plans themselves. For the present, lfamas is focused on ending the occupation rather than the liberation of aIl Palestine. The political realities of Israeli military occupation made it necessary to focus on daily survival. As a pragmatic exchange with the PLO lfamas demanded cultural control in Palestine. It is concemed that school curricula and personal status legislation be based on shari'ah. However, the movement is not only interested in the social culture ofself-rule: "what I1amas wants is what mainstream political Islam in the occupied territories has always wanted-less the soil ofPalestine than the souls ofits people."I64 Through the souls ofPalestinians lfamashopes to gain the soil ofPalestine. Socio-cultural control ofPalestine is not as an end in itself. Winning the souls ofPalestinians is a prelude to winning the soil of Palestine. Underlying lfamas'political pragmatism is a belief in the inevitability of an Islamic renaissance, the formation of an Islamic brotherhood and hence, an Islamic solution for Palestine. The acceptance (direct or indirect) ofself-rule is not a deviation from lfamas'historic position ofa solution in stages. lfamasviews Oslo as part of a preliminary stage and does not believe that any movement can relinquish the rights ofPalestinians to aIl Palestine. The movement's spiritual leader Shaykh A1)mad Yasin established lfamas as a division ofthe Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood was originally a socio-cultural movement whose lM Ibid., 19. 69 primary goal was the founding ofthe Islamic personality 165 The concept ofterritory as a component ofidentity was seen as foreign to the construction ofthe Islamic personality. Territorial nationalism was viewed by the Muslim Brothers as idolatry: "The land... is either a land ofatheism or ofIslam; there is no such thing as Arab, Palestinian, or Jewish land... Land cannot be considered holy, because holiness is only characteristic ofAllah, so how can we sanctify and even worship a very small geographical area [Palestine] rather than Allah, as the so-called nationalist dO?,,166 Ideologically, Palestinian Islamic nationalism is at odds with prevailing Islamists ideology.167 Initially, Israel misinterpreted the intentions oflfamas and equated Islamist social program with political inactivity. The Israeli army virtually ignored the movement (even after lfamas published its political manifesto). In fact, Israel originally supported the movement as a useful tool for combating Palestinian nationalism (PLO). It is only after lfamastook responsibility for killing two Israeli soldiers in 1989 that the movement was declared illegal by Israel. In departing from the Brotherhood's ideological stances on territorial nationalism lfamas creates a new tradition. This invented tradition is here after considered an integral part ofPalestinian national identity.16x lfamas conflates religion and territory. Islam 165 Graham Usher, "What Kind ofNation'!" 340. 166 Ibid., 351. Usher quotes the West Bank Muslim Brother Sabri Abu Diad early in the 1980's. 167 The work of Sayyid Qutb illustrates this. In Milestones he argues thal the land of Islam is not a piece of land by the homeland ofIslam (dar al-Islam). 16K Eric Hobsbawm, The Invention of'Tradition, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. The question ofidentity is especially relevant for a generation that came of age and was politically forged by the Intifiiçla. 70 aIlows for the creation ofan identity and territory facilitates the substantive recognition ofthis identity. Thus, like the state ofIsrael, which garners its legitimacy through international recognition ofits territorial sovereignty, lfamas aims for a similar recognition. The organization has Islamized the struggle for Palestinian statehood, manipulating the interim solution into its version of Islamic law. In the interest ofgaining "a place at the negotiating table," lfamas has avoided direct confrontation with the PLO and moderated its tone toward the PA security forces. 169 This has not stopped the PA from arresting and imprisoning lfamas militants. lfamas-PLO/PA Relations The PLO has always been dominated by Fatal;, which is led by Yassir 'Arafat. So that PLO/ lfamasrelations are in fact lfamas' relations with Fatel;,. Both organizations have been in constant competition for membership especially in professional associations and universities. In January of 1994, elections ofthe Gaza Engineers' Association (929 registered), the lfamas/Islamic Jihad bloc received 46.7% ofthe vote, with Fatel;, receiving 43.95%.170 Support for Islamic groups spread to aIl professional fields, doctors, lawyers and teachers unions: "In most ofthe professional and university election held between 1989 and 1994, lfamas and Fateh 169Usher, 18. 170 The Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS) in Nablus publishes monthly opinion polis and election results. 71 obtained almost the same results, ie around 40% each.,,171 However, the national support remains at 40% support for Fatel; and only 12- 17% for lfamas. 172 The competition and tensions characteristic oflfamas-Fatel; relation date back to the 1950's when Fatel; split from the Muslim Brotherhood. Ideologically, the PLO is committed to a two state solution and a democratic secular state in Palestine. This places it in direct opposition to lfamas. Although the lfamas charter mentions the PLO as brothers in the same struggle, there is no clear recognition ofthe PLO as the sole legitimate representatives ofthe Palestinian people. The Introductory Memorandum oflfamas stresses that the organization has no objection to integration with the PLO as long as the PLO remains committed to the liberation of Palestine and to non recognition ofIsrael. 173 lfamaswas critical ofthe Madrid and Oslo peace-process and the Cairo agreements. During the Madrid Conference lfamas attacked the PLO delegation because it "lacked legitimacy.,,174 They refused to recognize the resolutions ofthe Palestinian National Council meeting in Aigeria that endorsed participation in Madrid. In 1993 a meeting in Sudan between the PLO and lfamas failed. 171 Legrain, 166. 172 See the CPRS at [email protected]. m Introductory Memorandum (1993) appears in the appendix of Hamas: Political Thought and Practice by Khaled Hroub. 174 Ibid., 90. 72 Between the Madrid Conference in 1991 and the Oslo Agreement in 1993 lfamas grew increasingly critical ofthe PLO. In lfamas'view the PLO abandoned the Palestinian people and negotiated their rights away.175 The lfamas Charter provides two conditions for its participation with the PLO: the abandonment ofsecularism and the end ofa political agenda that caUs for a peaceful settlement with Israel. The possibility ofjoining the PLO arose in 1990. In a Memorandum presented to the Palestinian National Councillfamas asked the PLO to consider four conditions: the PNC's adherence to the principle ofliberating aU Palestine, the refusaI to recognize the Zionist entity; the endorsement ofthe military option and the granting ofa number ofseats in the PNC to lfamas. 176 The PLO refused. Despite continued tensions lfamas did not attempt to take over the PLO or to present itself as the legitimate alternative to the organization. Rather, lfamas refrained from adopting a clear position. This provided the organization with political flexibility that would be absent had it joined the PLO. A wavering position also translated into freedom for lfamas. They were not constrained to establish a clear political strategy or to strive for regional or international 175 ]famas special statement issued after the announcement ofthe Oslo Agreement (1993) entitled "Comprehensive national reform is the solution." Ibid" 91. 176 Ibid., 95. 73 legitimacy. The fact that lfamas did not attempt to replace the PLO meant that the two organization could cooperate on issues of common interest such as the exile ofIslamists leaders to south Lebanon. l77 The middle option left lfamas able to criticize the "power usurping" leadership ofthe PLO while cooperating with the nationalist. 178 Since the PLO took control ofthe self-mIe areas in mid-1994 lfamas has refrained from criticizing them and tumed its attention to the PLO controlled Palestinian Authority or PA. The Oslo Agreement provided for the establishment ofa Palestinian Authority. From the beginning lfamas was critical ofthe PA. They released numerous accusatory and hostile statements however these were never translated into violence. Initially, lfamasrefrained from confrontation with the newly burgeoning PA. They welcomed the Palestinian police ofthe new authority even meeting with 'Arafat at the Islamic University in Gaza. But the honeymoon period did not last and the PA and lfamas clashed to the point ofcivil war. I1amas' relations with the PLO were strained during the Intjfjjqa. In 1994, the PA undertook an arrest campaign, the closure ofI1amas institutions and the humiliation ofI1amas leaders by PA security forces. The PLO undertook a three-prong approach in its confrontation with I1amas. First, the PLO attempted to co-opt the 177 Ibid.. 102. 74 opposition by offering them representation in PA institutions. Second, the PLO attempted to split the movement by encouraging sorne ofits members to form an independent Islamic political party. FinalIy, the PLO attacked I-Jamas' traditional centres ofinfluence, the mosques, charitable societies and institutions ofcivil society. Sermons were censored and religious endowments awqiifcame under direct PA control. In response, lfamas did not participate in the 1996 elections but it did not calI for a boycott ofthe elections either. Further, the movement refrained from any military activity during the election despite the fact that the head ofits military arm Yahya 'Ayyash was assassinated two weeks prior. After the elections lfamasretaliated with a number oforganized suicide bombings in Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and 'Asqalan. The PA responded arresting lfamas members and jailing important leaders. They also c10sed the organization's charitable institutions restricted lfamas activities in the West Bank and Gaza. In March of 1996, the Palestinian police raided al-Najah University in Nablus and arrested the lfamas dominated student union board. 179 In addition to attacks on lfamas'traditional centres of influence, the mosques, charitable societies, the PLO attempted to co-opt·the opposition. It offered lfamas four positions in the 178 Ibid., 89. 75 leadership ofthe PA which lfamas refused. 180 Further, the PLO attempted to split the movement by encouraging sorne ofits members to form an independent Islamic political party. This did not succeed. lfamaswanted to avoid civil war. Consequently, the PA was confident that lfamaswould not directly confront the PLO. This was in fact the true. lfamas did not retaliate for the "Black Friday" incident in which fourteen ofits supporters were shot to death by the Palestinian police. They did not retaliate for the assassination of lfamas military leaders, nor did it retaliate for the arrest and interrogation ofnumerous ofits other members, or the raids on its mosques, agencies and the Islamic University. 181 lfamas'political relations with the PLO/PA continue to be characterized by tension. Predictions about future relations can be discemed by examining the theoretical approaches to pluralism presented in the lfamas charter. Section four ofthe charter examines the issue of political pluralism. There is a declaration ofrespect for other Islamic movements and for the PLO who is recognized as brother organization: "We have but one homeland, one affliction, one shared destiny, and one shared enemy.,,182 The Introductory Memorandum includes a section on "The Positions and Policies ofthe Movement in 179 Ibid., 106-07. 180 Ibid., 107. 181 Ibid., 108. 76 the Palestinian Sphere" in which lfamas preaches tolerance: "regardless ofthe extent ofdifferences in viewpoints and perspectives (ijtihiidiit) in the national effort, it is impermissible under any circumstances to use violence." In its relations with the PLO and the other Palestinian resistance groups lfamas has kept its promise. Shaykh Yasin has expressed a preference for a multiparty democratic state. When asked ifhe would support the election of communists, Yasin responded: "Ifthe Palestinian people were to express their rejection of an Islamic state, l would respect their will and honor their wishes.,,183 lfamas uses its participation in student and trade union elections as evidence ofits commitment to pluralism. In the 1970's and 80's, Islamic student groups played a integral role in the foundation oflfamas and the outbreak ofthe Intifii4a. lfamas points to participation in those student elections as a principle aspect ofpolitical practice inside the Occupied Territories. lfamas leadership adhered to its expressed commitment to avoid violence and political assassinations. During the elections for the Chamber ofCommerce and Industry in 1992 FateiJ was accused ofvote rigging. The lfamasbloc withdrew rather than cause the failure ofthe elections. In 1992 during elections for student council 182 JfamasCharter, Article 27. 77 at al-Najah University (which lfamaswas projected to win) armed Fate1}. Black Panthers stormed the campus causing the Israeli authorities to interfere. Fate1}. triumphed and in the process agreed with Israel to the deportation offour Palestinians. lfamas again avoided violence against the PLO. Despite these harassments lfamas remained calm creating "norms for democratic practice in Palestinian politics".\84 In theory, lfamas'leadership accepts political pluralism. They consistently profess tolerance despite differences in belief: "No faction has the right to encroach on, obstruct, nullify, or abrogate the political activities of another faction...No faction has the right to claim that it represents the majority or that other factions are in the minority in the absence offree, honest and unbiased elections..."\85 This is a tactical position taken out ofpragmatism rather than a genuine commitment to pluralism. lfamasitselfhas emphasized the need for unity in the face ofoccupation. The avoidance ofviolence against the PAis a pragmatic position that temporarily recognizes the overarching Israeli challenge and the need for unity in confronting Zionism. lfamashas skillfully placed pragmatism above ideology. This is true ofthe alliance lfamas formed with the united opposition often 183 Hroub, p. 211. 184 Ibid., 212. 185 Ifamasdeclaration dated November 6,1991. Ibid., 214. 78 organizations committed to the Palestinian resistance. The Palestinian national resistance organizations or fà$ii'il includes the Democratic and Popular Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine and numerous other pro and anti-'Arafat factions. Pragmatically, lfamaswas able to overcome the ideology ofthe Leftist and secular groups in the fàsa 'il in hopes ofbuilding on a common political position-resistance to the peace-process. When the alliance proved unbeneficiallfamasretreated. Similarly, lfamas acted pragmatically when it withdrew demands for Israeli withdrawal and UN participation before national elections could be held. A 1992 statement on self-rule and elections demanded "No to Elections Associated with Self-Rule."186 However, in practice lfamas viewed elections as a source ofrepresentational legitimacy. This had to be balanced with the movements' boycott of the Madrid-Oslo process. Participation in election was not only a way to demonstrate the activity ofIslamism in Palestine it could be translated as de facto acceptance ofthe peace negotiations. lfamas'official position was not to participate in the Madrid-Oslo framework through elections. It based this on the nature ofthe elections. lfamas argued that these elections were inseparable from a settlement that differed little from Camp David. Further, the elections were for an administrative and executive body tied to self- 186 Ibid., 222. 79 rule not representatives for a legislative body representing the Palestinian people. 187 This is an example where lfamas placed ideology above pragmatism since it is argued that the fa$a'il could of utilized elections to form a united list ofcandidates to capture the majority and abrogate the Oslo Agreement. 188 The elections of 1996 had a voter tum out of 86 percent. Such a high ratio can be translated as support for the Oslo peace process and a weakened support oflfamas. This is especially true since 'Arafat won a high ratio ofthe vote for president. The Center for Palestine Research and Studies place support for lfamas between 1993 and 1997 at slightly over 18 percent and support for Fatel; at just over 40 percent. 189 However, polIs and opinion surveys are never recognized as impartial by all sides. lfamas views the CPRS as biased. It accuses the pollsters of supporting Fatel;. lfamas argues that the polIs are often conducted on Fridays during noon prayers when its supporters are at mosque. They allege that pollsters have avoided universities, professional associations of lawyers, doctors and engineers, mosques, and other places ofsupport for lfamas. Further, they argue that the intimidation by Israeli and Palestinian security forces make it difficult for respondents to dec1are support oflfamas. 187 Ibid. 221-22. 188 The independent Islamists won 8 out of 88 seats despite the fact that lfamas and Islamic Jihad were uninvolved. 80 lfamas did not participate in the 1996 e1ections and hence there are no clear numbers ofsupport nationally for the movement. It is difficult to ascertain whether high voter turnout was re1ated to support for the peace-process or simp1y a thirst for freedom and independence. 190 Based on an assessment ofprofessiona1, student and chambers ofcommerce elections, lfamas estimates its support to be at 40 and 50 percent. 191 However, these cannot be translated to the general Palestinian population who are less educated and less politicized than professional association members and college students. l92 Further, the e1ectoral platforms ofthese associations and unions are not pure1y political. They have administrative, financial and ethical concerns that give advantage to Islamic blocs because of their religious faith and Islamic discipline. 193 Another reason the claim to 40-50 percent support for lfamas may be exaggerated is the centrality ofthe PA in the West Bank and Gaza. The presence ofthe PA impacts Palestinian public opinion. Israel, the neighbouring Arab states and the international community has legitimized the PA through the peace-process and this affects public opinion. The media in Israel and in Palestine has turned the peace-proccss into a fact oflife. Further, the PA has a virtual IW See the CPRS at [email protected].. 190 Ibid., 230. 191 Khaled Hroub of the Institute for Palestine Studies has written the most comprehensive work on lfamas to date. He estimates support for lfamas in Palestine to hover around 30percent. 192 Ibid., 231. 193 Ibid. 81 monopoly over television and controls aH but a few pro-lfamasradio stations limited in broadcast range and efficacy.194 The most influential newspapers support the PA. The threat from both the PA and Israel insures that few publications loyal to the opposition thrive. The PA has not abrogated its support for the interim solution. This process requires time to work and resolve difficulties and the Palestinian population seems to be willing to invest the time. This translates into voting for candidates who are working within the framework ofself-rule, the PLO/PA. As ofyet, lfamas has been unsuccessful in its political goal. It has not managed to capture support from more than a minority ofPalestinians. Yet Islamism has had a profound effect on Palestinian identity. lfamas embodies Islamic anti-Israeli resistance. It has attempted to reconcile Islamism with nationalism as an indispensable condition ofthe movements' success in assuming the heritage ofthe former nationalist leader, the PLO. The foHowing section deals with the role ofIslamic fundamentalism in the development ofPalestinian identity. Fundamentalism is characterized by a reaction to modemity. Fundamentalist elites perceive their identity to be threatened by the secular identity that engenders modemity. A complex understanding offundamentalism requires an 194 Ibid., 232. 82 acknowledgment that both traditional values and shifting identities constitute the fundamentalist agenda. lfamasuses Islam to define the struggle for Palestinian identity and statehood. In addition the emphasis on territorial sovereignty imports into the fundamentalist ethic a commitment to the modem concepts ofthe nation-state. Hamas operates on two levels. Extemally, it must confront the Israeli presence. Intemally, it struggles to capture the state from the secular nationalist PLO. Palestinian Identity the Role ofIslamic Fundamentalism The resurgence ofreligion and the retum to prominence of traditional identities (rooted in blood ties, family, clan and tribe) are a reaction to modemity. Urbanization, industrial development and the values that underpin modemity are a direct threat to religious identities. lfamas developed as a reaction to the failures of modemization. More accurately, it is a reaction to the inability of religious and politicalleaders to deal with the negative consequences ofthe modem age. In the High Tech Era (post-195ü's) ideology superseded religion. Modemism (relativism, consumerism, individual autonomy) emerged as the dominant ideological strand ofmodemity. The secular ethos ofmodemity is in conflict with the religious identity engendered by lfamas. ln the face ofIsraeli military occupation the failures ofmodemity are more pronounced. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is an ethnie conflict: "Both among lsraelis and Palestinians interpretations ofhistorical events 83 have become potent ethnie symbols. History and tradition have been invented, interpreted and reinterpreted, purified and essentialised."195 Images ofthe "enemy" constitute an effort on the part ofthe powers (Israel/Palestine) to produce national consensus. Like Israel/Zionism, lfamas transforms the nationalist ideology and imbues it with a religious tone. lfamas interprets Jewish identity as inimical to Islamic identity. As a result, the territorial integrity of Palestine and Islam are conflated to confront the Israeli state and the Jewish religion. In this way, the identities ofboth Israeli and Palestinian have developed in opposition to each other. The individual ethnic differences and identity divides are downplayed in an effort to forge national consensus. In the case ofIsrael, diverse ethnic and religious identities (Ashkenazim, Mizrahim, Sephardim, secular and religious Jews and so on) are overlooked. The Israeli state ideologically manipulates the historical events (Holocaust) and other pogrom-symbols to bridge this sectarian divide. 196 Palestinian identity has also been forged in the context ofsymbol manipulation. The symbol ofthe Palestinian peasant has in the face ofthe occupation been manipulated by the urban middle-c1ass as a national unifying symbol. 197 The peasant is presented in essentialised form as a symbol ofancient collective Palestinian attachment to the soil and the homeland. 19x In this manner both Tsraeli and Palestinian identities are constructed. 195 Dag Jorund Lonning, Bridge Over Troubled Water: Inter-Ethnie Dialogue in Israel-Palestine, Bergens, Norway: Norse Publication, 1995,45. 196 Ibid., 56. 197 Ibid., 71. 198 Gustav Thaiss, "The Conceptualization of social Change Through Metaphor," Journal ofAsian and Afriean Studies, 8, 1978, 1-2. 84 The anthropology ofreligion identifies the cultural dimension ofreligious analysis. Ideological manifestations ofreligion (fundamentalism) are explained in reference to culture. According to Clifford Geertz, culture denotes: "an historically transmitted pattern ofmeaning embodied in symbols, a system ofinherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means ofwhich men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life.,,199 Symbolism forms the positive content ofcultural activity. As a cultural system religion utilizes symbols to facilitate the creation ofidentity. According to Geertz, religion is: (1) a system ofsymbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive and long lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order ofexistence and (4) c10thing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the modes and motivations seem uniquely realistic.200 Palestinian fundamentalists manipulate the metaphorical transmission ofthis system ofsymbols. Religious concepts such as jihiidor waqf, dar alharh and dar alIslam are transmitted from a religious semantic field to the secular field ofpolitics.201 During the Intifiieja-the fourth stage in the construction of Palestinian identity-conflict emerged based on how Palestinian identity would be defined. lfamas transformed the nationalist ideology and imbued it with a religious tone. National symbols such 199 Clifford Geertz, "Religion as a Cultural System," in Religion and Ideology" Robert Bocock and Kenneth Thompson ed.(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1985), pp.66. 200 Ibid., 67. 201 Lonning, 72. 85 as the idealized peasant were less relevant in post- Intifjitfa Palestine. The image ofthe fellal1 steadfastly dealing with dispossession and humiliation gave way to the more activist image ofthe fida'i, or martyr willing to die for Islam and Palestine. However, Islamists cannot daim a monopoly on the notion of jihador martyrdom. Secular nationalist utilized the terms although not in the manner articulated by Sayyid Qutb and other Islamists. The fida'i, fighters ofthe secular nationalist were modern revolutionaries in a nationalliberation struggle: "they were portrayed as educated, urban, worldly and sophisticated, not as traditional, conservative or rural figures.,,202 The sacrifice they made as martyrs (shahid) was as fallen fighters struggling to liberate Palestine, not as mujahidin fighters ofthe jihadfor God. 203 These fighters were the vanguards inspired by the guerrilla movements ofVietnam, China and Latin America. The symbolism is in sharp contrast to the religious martyrs ofHamas. lfamasviews its struggle with Israel in a larger context as a struggle with the forces ofEuropean colonialism. This is a religious struggle that takes on civilizational terms. It is a comprehensive jihadon social, and military fronts: "the conflict in its general context is one between the entire Islamic ummawith its Islamic cultural program and the forces ofworld imperialism with its agenda ofWesternization.,,204 Zionism is representative ofthe wider agenda ofwestern imperialism. 202 Milton-Edwards, 91. 203 Ibid., 95. 2114 Hroub, 46. 86 In addition to the external dynamic with Israel, there is an internaI struggle to define Palestinian identity. The most important dimension ofthis struggle concerns the theoretical complexities challenging the Islamic movement in general. These include the dialectic ofreligion, politics, and social change, and the extent to which the behaviour ofthe movement should be determined by political considerations or by religious values and principles. lfamas has successfully blurred the religious and the political. Its social action and its political practices are intertwined. The movement has not followed the path offormation and development typical ofpolitical parties. IdeologicaIly, lfamasviews itselfas "the radical and cultural alternative" to the Israeli and Western orders. Accordingly, lfamas elites are waiting for the PLO to exhaust aIl means and resources and collapse, taking with it the Palestinian secular experience. Like its ideological predecessor the Muslim Brotherhood, lfamas is opposed to secular Arab nationalism. In accordance with other Islamists, lfamas'leadership believes that without Islam, nationalism has no content: "Islam gave it [secular nationalism] its civilizational dimension" .205 Without Islam secular nationalism is 205 Mahmud Zahar, "Hamas: Waiting for Secular Nationalism to Self-Destruct," JoumalofPale...tine Studies, 24, no. 3 (Spring, 1995), 81-88. Converse1y, another leading Pa1estinian Islamist, claims lfamas does not want to destroy the PLO but reform it ti-om within. See Graham Usher, "The Is1amist Movement and the Pa1estinian Autharity," an interview with Bassam Jarrar in, Political Islam: Essays tram Middle East Report, Joel Beinin and Joe Stark (eds.), Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press, 1997, pp. 335-338. Bassam Jarrar is 1eading Is1amist thinker in the occupied territories and teacher ofIs1amic studies at UNRWA's Teacher Training Center in Ramallah (West Bank). He was one of the 415 alleged Ramas members to be deported by Israel in 1992. 87 simply the dream ofChristian Arabs educated in Western universities. In practice, the Muslim Brotherhood subordinated the Palestinian national issue to the goal ofIslamizing society. It is only after the Intifaeja and the establishment oflfamas that the former takes precedence over the latter. Hamas'interest in the Palestinian question represent a qualitative shift from the position ofthe Brotherhood towards the Palestinian national problem. lfamas' goals continue to be political rather than solely Islamist or social. Shaykh Hamad Bitawi, a prominent pro-lfamasreligious representative was nominated by 'Arafat as head ofthe religious courts in the West Bank. These courts operate under the PA'S awqaf ministry and as such incorporate lfamas into PA institutions. The incorporation oflfamas into the institutions ofthe PAis a recognition ofIslamist political culture in the occupied territories. The Palestinian national struggle has to contend with the Islamist influence in legal spheres and on the socio-cultural fronts via the schools and mosques. It is also evidence that lfamas seeks political and not just socio-cultural power in Palestine. There is an organic connection between lfamas' social and political views. The involvement oflfamas in the social dimension ofthe Palestine problem stems from the ideology ofthe Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood emphasized social development as a necessary stage in the path ofpolitical change. lfamas is involved extensively in the infrastructure ofcharitable social services established for the poor: "Subsequently, these social services became one ofthe most important sources ofinfluence that Hamashad with 88 the broad strata ofthe public."206 The Jfamas charter sets out the two main components ofits social action theory. The liberation of Palestine must be waged by a "fortified society" and the fortification ofsociety can only be achieved through religion?07 Society according to the charter must be fortified in order to undertake the struggle against Israeli occupation. The role ofwomen is important to the fortification ofsociety. As "the factory ofmen," Muslim women must work in the home raising children ofethical character in accordance with Islam and preparing them for the religious obligations ofjihad".20R Through social solidarity Zionism "the enemy" can be defeated. Society must be built on solid ideological bases before the enemy can be confronted and Palestine liberated: "The two processes are coherent and complementary. The first process fortifies society through education, and the second challenges the occupation with a fortified society.,,209 The theory translates into practice for charitable institutions, mosques, schools, alms tax cornrnittees, medical clinics, relief 2I societies, orphanages, nurseries and cultural and sports clubs. O The focus is on these activities both before and after the Intifiù;Ia. These organizations were in constant contact with the needs and concerns ofthe working class and the poor. They helped influence political choices and religious conduct and beliefs. In contrast to PLO 206 Hroub, 234. 207 See the l~amas Charter, Articles 17, and 18. 20X Ibid. 209 Hroub, 235. 210 Funding for these institutions and societies came from private donations inside the Occupied Territories and from Arab oil-producing states in the Gulf. 89 nepotism, incompetence and corruption these institutions produced an Islamic ethic ofhonesty and integrity. lfamaswas also interested in the education ofPalestinian children who often suffered from strikes and school closures. Theoretically, lfamaswas interested in liberating the education system "from the effects ofthe Ideological Invasion brought about at the hands ofthe Orientalists and Missionaries... ,,211 Practically, it established temporary public education in mosques where school curricula was taught in the evenings. lfamas utilized religious education to fortify society in an effort to create social solidarity and prepare Palestinians to resist the occupation. Through the education system it instilled religious values ofmartyrdom and sacrifice blurring the religious, social and politica1.212 Boycotting Israeli goods was conflated with issues such violation ofthe holiness ofRamaqan. Enlistment in the IntifÉùja was made a symbol ofreligious commitment. In short, lfamas combined social discourse and national resistance and made each an integral part ofthe other. Mosques and Islamic institutions played a vital role in these activities. lfamas was able to remove mosques and Islamic societies from under the control ofthe Israeli authority, the Jordanian religious endowments and even the PA,213 This contributed to the development of an autonomous Palestinian civil society. However, in 1996 in response to lfamas'disruption ofthe peace-process 211 Article 15, 127. 212 Hroub, 238. m Ibid., 240. 90 through suicide attacks, the PA took control ofmosques controlled by the movement. These were brought under the control ofthe PA awqafministry. The following year the PA closed over 20 charitable institutions belonging to lfamas crippling the infrastructure of Islamic social movements in the West Bank and Gaza. lfamas developed its thought and practice regarding social issues during the Intifiieja. After the peace agreements brought an end to the resistance and the PA was established, the solidarity ofPalestinian society was undermined,z14 The external threat ofIsrael was replaced with an internaI governmental authority that was in conflict with Islamists. According to Palestinian, Israeli and international human rights organizations such as Amnesty International, the PA is responsible for repressive tactics and social policies. Giacaman and Jorund's 1998 book AfterOslo outlines the dismantling ofthe institutions ofPalestinian civil society.215 Although an analysis of PA activities is beyond the scope my paper, the dismantling of Palestinian civil society as outlined in After Oslo has direct repercussions for lfamas. "The Autonomous structures in civil society have been seized, the atmosphere has been militarized, and there is rapid movement toward a traditional kind ofpolice state, where the state exercises it hegemony over civil society."Z16 For example, prior to Oslo Palestinian charitable nongovemmental organizations paid the primary cost ofhealth care. After Oslo, the 214 Ibid., 241. 215 George Giacaman and Dag Jorund, eds., After Oslo, London: Pluto Press, 1998. 216 Hroub, 241. 91 PA has crippled these institutions with legal regulations, monitoring offunds and genera1 interference in their internaI affairs. The PA has set out to destroy opposition to the peace process. It has involved its security forces in supervision ofIs1amists institutions causing a tense atmosphere offear. The international community has virtually ignored PA violations as a way ofgiving precedence to the peace process in the Middle East. As a newly formed government, the PAis in a precarious position to prove its legitimacy. It must prove to Israel and the international community that it is able to suppress or destroy opposition to the peace process and it is willing to accomplish this even at the expense ofPalestinian civil society. Since its inception during the Inti/iil/a, lfamas has professed a beliefin the military option. According to its charter, armed struggle is central to the liberation ofPalestine.217 The military operations and suicide bombings ofits military wing (the 'Izz al- Din al-Qassam Brigades) are a source ofmass appeal and politicallegitimacy.218 Its military operations after Oslo added to the strained re1ationship with the PA. lfamas had confined its military actions to Palestine attacking only military targets until the 1994 Hebron massacre.219 After the massacre, a lfamas communiqué offered Israel an armistice in which civilians would he removed from the struggle. The movement views settlers in the West Bank and Gaza (most ofwhom 217 liamas Charter, Article 12 and 15. 218 Hroub, 242. 219 In 1994, twenty Palestinians were shat by a Jewish settler during Ramadan prayers at the Abraham Masque in Hebran. 92 are armed) as legitimate military targets. Israel did not respond to the communiqué. lfamas continues to justify its attacks on Israeli civilians as part ofa long-term plan to liberate aH ofhistorical Palestine. According to the movement, these attacks are to be viewed as a way ofexhausting, embarrassing and weakening the state ofIsrael: "Hamas'goal is to transform Israel from a land that attracts world Jews to a land that repels them by making its residents insecure.,,220 Because the Israeli foe is militarily formidable the use of unconventional means (attacking civilians) is justified by lfamas. It is important to note that lfamas has inherited the military strategy and ideology ofthe PLO during the 1970's and 80's. 220 Hroub, 247. 93 CONCLUSION Palestinian national identity like that ofother modem nations has been constructed. This speaks to the evolving nature ofnational identity in general and specifically in Palestine. The multiple foci of identity (Arab, religious, kinship) are characteristic ofPalestinian history. Shifts in the focus ofPalestinian identity can be traced to historical developments in the Middle East. Sometimes the Ottoman identity prevailed, at other times the Arab or Muslim identity came to the forefront. The construction ofidentity is the means by which the nation is created. Nations have ethnie cores that invent and re-create themselves through the use ofsymbolism. In the modem era, these identities were disseminated through print-capitalism-education, newspapers, publications and institutes. The politicization ofthese ethnie cores (nationalism) creates the modem nation-state. Similar to other national identities, Palestinian identity was constructed and reconfigured by elites. The Palestinian nation is an "imagined community" that constitutes a shared consciousness. The press united a group, who did not know one another face to face but shared a joint sense of grievance, into a "community" ofPalestinians. This community 94 constructed its identity (Palestinian-ness) through symbols and the interpretation ofhistoric events. Both nationalist and fundamentalist construct identity. The making ofPalestinian identity can be divided into four historical stages. During each stage nationalist or fundamentalist elites utilized different symbols in an effort to foster unity under the banner ofsameness. The symbol ofthe felliiJ; or peasant was idealized and used by both fundamentalist and nationalist in their attempts to forge a sense ofPalestinian consciousness. The Palestinian peasant was steadfast dealing with dispossession and humiliation. This image became less relevant in post-Intifiieja Palestine when the more activist image ofthe fidii'i or freedom fighter, and the siJaiJid or martyr willing to give his life for the nation dominated. This shift coincides with the outbreak ofactivist opposition to Israel, the Intifiieja. During the Intifiieja, religio-political organizations gained prominence. Fundamentalist movements such as lfamas promoted a Palestinian religious identity to the exclusion ofother identities. This must be viewed within the context ofIsraeli identity creation. The focus on Palestinian religious identity emerged in opposition to an Israeli identity constructed around Judaism. Like Palestinians, Israelis constructed this identity through the manipulation of 95 symbols. Although this construction pre-dates the, Intjfjù!a the occupation served as an immediate reminder ofJewish control. Islam provided the vehicle for confronting Israel and Western hegemony. The resurgence ofreligion and the return to prominence oftraditional identities (rooted in blood ties, family, clan and tribe) are a reaction to modernity. Urbanization, industrial development and the values that underpin modemity are a direct threat to religious identities. In the face ofmilitary occupation by Israelis the reaction to modemity is exasperated. The Palestinian case is congruent with theoretical approaches to nationalism. The Palestinian nation like other nations utilizes symbols and culture to invent and re-create itself. The politicization ofthis process (nationalism) creates the modern nation-state. Similar to other national identities, Palestinian identity was constructed and reconfigured by elites. In Gellner's view nations are invented: "nationalism, which sometimes takes preexisting cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them, and often obliterates preexisting cultures: that is a reality."221 Palestinian nationalism whether promoted by secularist or fundamentalists is constructed. Both secular and fundamentalist nationalism ignore the ancient history ofPalestine. There is no mention ofCanaanites, 221 Gellner, Nations andNationalism, 49. 96 Philistines or early Christianity. The nationalists foeus on the mythology offreedom fighters recently created by the PLO. The fundamentalists utilize the past glories ofIslam as way to foster identity. Bath invent, obliterate and reereate myth and culture so as to foster a common Palestinian identity deserving ofa separate nationination-state. The Palestinian nation was constructed in four historical stages characterized by overlapping and competing identities Ottoman, Arab, religious, local and kinship. These identities were not mutuaHy exclusive, one or the other became prominent depending on the internaI balance ofpower and the nature ofexternal forces pressuring society.z22 As an "imagined community" the Palestinian nation constitutes a shared consciousness. The shared consciousness ofPalestinians is facilitated through print-capitalism and the spread ofeducation. Zionism was a force that solidified the Palestinian nation. Together Palestinians of aH classes and religions faced the same threat, suffered the same exile and dispossession. Certain symbols (religious and secular) captured the meaning ofhistorie events. The use ofthese images and myths help create a sense ofidentity- Palestinian-ness. 222 Kimmerling and Migdal, 278. 97 The Palestinian case is not congruent with theoretical approaches to fundamentalism. The decline ofArab secularism and modernism in the post-1967 period did not lead to the rise of fundamentalism in Palestine. In fact, "political Islam was eclipsed by an increasingly flourshing secular nationalism."223 Contemporary political Islam in Palestine is not solely a product ofmodern acculturation. The resurgence ofIslam in Palestine occurred under specifie conditions. Fundamentalism in Palestine is shaped by numerous specifie events and peculiarities: British colonization, Zionist immigration, the refugee experience, the heritage of Jordanian and Egyptian rule, the Israeli Occupation and the nationalist experience. Fundamentalism in Palestine developed after the PLO defeat in Lebanon in 1982. These groups were encouraged by Israel as part ofits policy ofdivide and rule aimed at eradicating the secular nationalist PLO.224 Islamic fundamentalists in Palestine were reacting to the secularization ofPalestinian society. Often their ideology was less political and more religio-cultural calling for a return to Islamic dress and tradition. However, this is as much the result of a crisis of identity and as it is a product ofdirect Israeli policies ofencouragement. Perhaps most importantly, the outbreak ofthe Intifiiçla accounts for the change in the nature ofPalestinian m Milton-Edwards, 5. 98 Islamists. The Israeli Occupation is the central factor that accounts for the shift in the nature ofIslamic organizations in Palestine from religio-cultural movements ofsocial transformation to politically violent anti-occupation force. 225 Recently, fundamentalism in Palestine has played an increasing role in identity creation. Fundamentalism as addressed in this paper is characterized by its reaction to modernity. A complex understanding offundamentalism requires an acknowledgment that both traditional values and shifting identities constitute the fundamentalist agenda. lfamas utilizes Islam to define the struggle for Palestinian identity and statehood. In addition the emphasis on territorial sovereignty imports into the fundamentalist ethic a commitment to the modem concepts ofthe nation-state. lfamas operates on two levels. Externally, it must confront the Israeli presence. Internally, it struggles to capture the state from the secular nationalist PLO. lfamasmade the transition from a socio-cultural organ ofthe Muslim Brotherhood to the a political, armed resistance organization. This transition is characterized by ideological inconsistency. As an organization born during the Intifijeja the movement was initially limited in ideological and practical scope. 224 Ibid., 8. 99 Unlike the PLO it did not benefit from a continuity ofleadership and institutional structures. The inconsistency is a result ofthe gray areas created by a movement that is caught between principles and self-interest. Further, lfamas is unable to act solely for political reasons, it is confined by a religious framework that is the source ofideological inconsistency. Initially, lfamaswould not participate in any PLO organization unless the PLO abandoned secularism and its political agenda for a peaceful settlement with Israel. Its political thought has deve10ped and it now focuses solely on the rejection ofthe PLO's political agenda: "Hamas tacitly acknowledged (although it never said as much verbally or in writing) that it had transcended its insistence that the PLO abandon secularism in order to be consistent with its own declared commitment to democracy and pluralism." 226 The focus now is sole1y on the political agenda. lfamaspossesses sufficient support within the territories (15- 30%) to continue operating despite the fact that its socio-cultural and economic activities have been greatly curtailed by the PA. The legitimacy lfamasenjoys is a result ofits new-found attachment to the Palestinian national cause. The movement has tapped into the discontent sorne Palestinians fee! with the peace process. lfamas 225 Milton-Edwards outlines political Islam's strategy of social transformation in Palestine from 1920-1995. She argues that over this 75 year period Islamic groups have engaged in the peaceful transformation of society. Political violence is the product of unusual circumstances and external influences. 100 support stems from grassroots ofPalestinians who arc discontent with the PLO's abandonment ofthe principle ofindependent statehood in historie Palestine and of armed struggle. Essentially, lfamas'political program is that ofthe old PLO, the liberation ofPalestine from river to sea. Its success and legitimacy is a result ofits nationalist activity and not its religious message.227 Its armed operations (a mixture ofreligion and nationalism) are the most significant ofthe movement's activities.22X Recent developments in Palestine have shown the inadequacy ofthe Oslo agreement. Ifthe Palestinian Authority continues to be characterized by autocratie and inadequate leadership this may create a political and ideological vacuum for relgio-political movements to fill. We may be witnessing the beginnings ofthis in the recent Iiamasification ofPalestinian society. 226 Ibid., 95. 227 Musa K. Budeiri, "The Nationalist Dimension of Islamic Movements," Journal alPalestine Studies, 24:3 (Spring 1995), 93. 228 Hroub, 258. 101 Bibliography Abu-Amr, Ziad. "Hamas: A Historica1 and Politica1 Background," Journal ofPalestine Studies, XXII, 4 (summer 1993), 5-19. ____"Report from Palestine," Journal ofPalestine Studies, 24: 2 (Winter 1995), 40-47. Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Refiections on the Origins and Spread ofNationalism, London: Verso, 1991. Armstrong, John. Nations Before Nationalism, Chape1 Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 1982. Ashrawi, Hanan Mikhail. "The Contemporary Pa1estinian Poetry of Occupation," JournalofPalestinian Studies, 7 (1978): 77-111. Ayoob, Mohammed ed. The Politics ofIslamic Reassertion, London: Groom and He1m, 1981. Beiner, Ronald ed. Theorizing Nationalism, New York: State University ofNew York Press, 1999. Budeiri, Musa K. "The Nationalist Dimension of Islamic Movements," Journal ofPalestine Studies, 24:3 (Spring 1995), 90 115. Choueiri, YoussefM. Islamic Fundamentalism, London: Pinter Publishers Itd., 1990 Deutsche, Karl. Nationalism andSocial Communication, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,1953. EI-Awaisi, Abd al-Fattah Muhammad. The Muslim Brothers and the Palestine Question 1928-1947, New York: Tauris Academie Studies, 1998. Esposito, John ed. Political Islam, Revolution, Radicalism or Reform? Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997. 102 ____ Islam andPolitics(3rd ed.) New York: Syracuse University Press, 1984. Gellner, Ernest. Nations and Nationalism, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983. ____ Nationalism, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1997. Giacaman, George and Dag Jorund, eds. AfterOslo. London: P1uto Press, 1998. .Hall, John A. The State ofthe Nation: Emest GeJlner and the Theory ofNationalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Hobsbawm, Eric and T. Ranger eds. The Invention ofTradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983. Hroub, Khaled. Hamas Political Thought andPractice, Washington D.C. : Institute for Palestine Studies, 2000. Huntington, Samuel. The Clash ofCivilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. Hutchinson, John and Anthony D. Smith eds. Nationalism, New York: Oxford University Press,1994. Jankowski, James and Israel Gershoni. Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Khalidi, Rashid. Palestinian Identity: The Construction ofModem National Consciousness, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. Kimmerling, Baruch and Joel S. Midgal. Palestinians: the Making of a People, Toronto: The Free Press, 1993. Klein, Menachem. "Competing Brothers: The Web ofHamas-PLO Relations" in Religious Radicalism in the GœaterMiddle East, Bruce Maddy-Weitzman and Efraim Inbar eds. Portland: Frank Cass, 1997. Legrain, Jean-Francois. "Hamas: Legitimate Heir ofPalestinian Nationalism?" in John Esposito, PoliticalIslam, Revolution, Radicalism orRefonn. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997. 103 Lonning, Dag Jorund. Bridge Over Troubled WateJ:' Inter-Ethnie Dialogue in Israel-Palestine. Bergens, Norway: Norse Publication, 1995. Lewis, Bernard. The Multiple Identities ofthe Middle East, New York: Pantheon Books, 1998. Marty, Martin E. and R. Scott Appleby eds. Accounting for Fundamentalism, Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1994. Milton-Edwards, Beverley. Islamie Polities in Palestine. New York: Tauris Academie Studies, 1996. Muslih, Muhammad Y. The Origins ofPalestinian Nationalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. Nassar, Jamal R. The Palestine Liberation Organization: From AnnedStruggle to the Declaration ofIndependence. New York: Praeger, 1991. Piscatori, James. "Accounting for Islamic Fundamentalisms," in Accounting for Fundamentalisms: The Dynamie Character of Movements, Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby eds. Chicago: The University ofChicago Press, 1994. Porath, Yehosuah. The Emergence ofthe Palestinian-Arab National Movement: 1918-1929, London: FrankCass, 1974. Roy, Sara M. "Gaza: New Dynamics ofCivic Disintegration," Joumal ofPalestine Studies, XXII, 4 (Summer 1993),20-31. Smith, Anthony D. The Ethnie Oligins ofNations, London: Basil Blackwell, 1986. ____ "The Origins ofNations," Ethnie andRacial Studies, 12 (July 1989): 340. Smith, Charles D. Palestine and the Arab-Lçraeli ConDiet, 2nd ed. New York: St. Martins Press, 1992. Thaiss, Gustav. "The Conceptualization ofsocial Change Through Metaphor," Joumal ofAsian andA/Hcan Studies, 8,1978, 1-9. 104 Tibi, Basam. ConDiet and War in the Middle East: From Interstate WartoNewSecurity. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999. _____ The Challenge ofFundamentalism: PoliticalIslam and the New World Disorder. Berkeley: University ofCalifomia Press, 1998. Usher, Graham, "What Kind ofNation? The Rise ofRamas in the Occupied Territiories," in Beinin, Joel and Joe Stork eds. Politieal Islam: Essays From Middle East Report. Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press, 1997,339-35. ____ Ramas Seeks a Place at the Table," Middle East Intemational, (May 13, 1994), 17-25. Watt, Montgomery W. Islamie Fundamentalism andModemit~ New York: Routledge, 1988. Zahhar, Mahmud. "Ramas: Waiting for Secular Nationalism to Self Destruct," Joumal ofPalestine Studies, XXIV, 3 (Spring, 1995),81 88. "The Charter ofthe Islamic Resistance Movement ofPalestine" translated by Muhammad Maqdsi, JoumalofPalestine Studies, 22, no. 4 (summer 1993), 122-134. An Interview with Edward Said, "Symbols Versus Substance: A Year After The Declaration ofPrinciples," Joumal ofPalestine Studies, 24, no. 2 (Winter 1995), pp. 60-72.