The Wonderful Trinity in a Globalized World by Lars Wedin

DISKUSSION & DEBATT The Wonderful Trinity in a Globalized World by Lars Wedin

“if strategy is done badly, humans can ter part describes strategy as an art, some die in large numbers.”1 thing that is to be created. This dualism is Strategy is, as this quote shows, a serious very important: using strategic theory, the business. Yet, the word “strategy” is used strategist creates a strategy in order to solve in so many contexts that it risks losing its a certain strategic problem. Raymond Aron, meaning. In the Swedish 2004 “white pa and later Lucien Poirier, wrote about strat per” on the future of its defense forces the egy as a “praxéologie” – a science with a word is used 61 times – but not once either practical purpose.5 in the meaning of “grand strategy” or of This article concentrates on strategic “military strategy”. However, this is exactly theory. It discusses some important notions the meaning of strategy in this article. with particular relevance to small states and There are many definitions on strategy. to issues regarding symmetry-dissymmetry- The original term, in its modern sense, was asymmetry. It also puts special emphasis coined by Paul Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy in on uncertainty and surprise – two elements 1771: which tend to make strategic action very difficult. Warfare is the science of the general, which the Greeks call strategy, deep What is strategy? science, sublime, which includes ma ny other branches of science, but is There are many possible definitions on strat based on tactics ... In order to create egy depending from what angle one wants plans, the strategist combines time, to analyze the phenomenon. The most clas means and a number of interests.2 sic one is provided by Carl von Clausewitz: “the employment of the battle as the means Obviously, great captains formulated and towards the attainment of the Object of the adhered to strategic plans much earlier, War.”6 Generally, older definitions tend to but the term as such did not exist. Instead, emphasize strategy as a warfighting tool – one generally referred to the “art of war” the science of the general – while modern or, more specifically, to “grand tactics”3 or ones are broader in scope. “the sublime parts” of tactics.4 In a general sense, strategy is about the It is interesting to note that the first part achievement of political goals. This goes of the definition by Joly de Maizeroy high back to the fundamental understanding lights strategy as a “science”, while the lat that “War is a mere continuation of policy

1 NR 2 april/juni 2010 by other means”.7 This characterization by alectic of two opposing wills using force to Clausewitz, fittingly called the Formula by resolve their dispute.”13 Aron8, provides the basis for Western strate From these three definitions, one could gic thought: war should only be fought for draw a number of conclusions about strate political goals; war is an instrument for pol gy in a modern sense. The following is from icy and not vice versa. This insight, however, a strategic dictionary by François Géré:14 is older than Clausewitz. Already in a letter to Frederick II of Prussia in 1746, Mar • Strategy is about the transforma shal Maurice de Saxe wrote:”Your Majesty tion of a real situation in accor knows very well that the military part al dance with a political project; ways is subordinated to the politics.”9 • There is a conflict, but not neces After World War II, Sir Basil Liddell Hart sary a war, between projects ne saw the need for a definition of strategy go cessitating active strategic thin ing beyond the Clausewitzian definition, king and active strategic action; which only treats military aspects; the no • There is a dynamic interaction tion of Grand Strategy was born. This, he between the One and the Other argued, aims ”to co-ordinate and direct all and their projects; the resources of a nation, or a band of na • The probability of violence is more tions, towards the attainment of the politi than zero; cal object of the war – the goal defined by • Strategy is in the service of a poli fundamental policy”.10 Essentially, grand tical project. strategy, so defined, is not confined merely to actual war but includes aspects ”beyond In creating a strategy, the strategist must the war to subsequent peace”.11 find a balance between objectives on the As the definition of Liddell Hart is con one hand and ways-and-means on the oth nected with war, we also need a more gen er hand.15 The objective should lead, or at eral definition applicable also to situations least contribute, to the fulfillment of the po of non-war. Lucien Poirier has formulated litical project. In order to achieve the objec such a definition, which he later uses as a tive, there must be an action or a maneu basis for the development of a taxonomy of ver. In order to act, the strategist must figure strategic concepts: ”The science and art of out how that action could be undertaken – maneuvering forces in order to reach politi the ways – and the means required. If the cal objectives”.12 means needed for the preferred way are not These two definitions treat the purpose at hand, or cannot be created in time, the of strategy. They are, however, static – they strategist must find another way to achieve do not take into account the basic fact that the objective. If there is no set of ways-and- strategy is used in situations where two (or means available, the objective cannot be more) parties have conflicting objectives: achieved. If there is no achievable objective the political project of the One is met by a that leads to the political project, the proj counter-project of the Other. André Beaufre ect has to be abandoned. General Vincent offers such a definition that builds on the di Desportes has used the image of a three- alectics between the two opposing sides: “It legged stool, where the legs are objectives, [strategy] is therefore the art of the dialectic ways and means. The stool will be stand of force, or more precisely, the art of the di upright only if there is a balance between

2 DISKUSSION & DEBATT the three – in all other cases, the stool will son (decision, objective, organization of limp.16 means).22 Depending on the character of There are many other important notions a particular war, one or two are the most in strategy. Together they form what Colin dominant. In the same way, all three kinds S. Gray calls the grammar of strategy.17 We of “actors” are present but the balance be will look at some of them in the discussion tween them is a variable. that follows. Now, Clausewitz saw war as a mixture of these factors.23 The people – the Ger 24 man Volk includes people and nation – The Wonderful Trinity are most often ruled by passion while gov One of Clausewitz’s main theories is the ernments represent reason. As the General, “wonderful trinity”, which describes war or the commander to use a more general in two different perspectives: character word, will have to overcome contingencies of war and actors. Later, he adds a third of various forms, he will have to have a which contains the objectives of war. While free activity of the soul or a creative spirit. the first two ones are closely linked to each However, if we see these first two trin other, the third one is apparently more ities as parts of a Rubik’s Cube and ma loosely connected to the others. As we will nipulate it, there could also be other com see, it is useful to treat all three in a way in binations. Sometimes it is the government spired by the famous Rubik’s Cube.18 which stands for the creative spirit and This trinity has been much discussed sometimes it is the people that are charac and criticized, in particular with regard to terized by reason while the government is modern wars. The criticism, however, is of dominated by passion.25 For example, dur ten the consequence of a too rigid reading. ing the wars of the the French revolution Let us look at the three trinities (Table 1). passion and people played a dominant role In a war, all three “characters of war” while later, during the wars of the empire, are present: blind instinct or passion, prob reason and government – identical with the abilities and chance (unforeseen incidents, commander – were more dominant. surprises, hazard, and friction), and rea In the third trinity, Clausewitz lists the

Table 1

The character of the war19 The actors20 The objectives21 Violence, hatred and The people The will of the enemy animosity; blind instinct Probabilities and chance; free The General and his Army Military power activity of the soul (creativity) Subordinate nature of a The government Country political instrument; reason

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Body Physical element: military power (arms, organization, doctrines...) Mind Intellectual element: assigns the objective, structures political (power) relations ... Heart Spiritual element gives the basic underpinning or fundament of politics. Ideology

Table 2 three basic objectives for war: armed forc lonial wars, the wars of the French Revolu es, the will, and country. Traditionally, war tion and Empire against Great Britain, and has been fought over territory (country), the Finnish Winter War where the destruction of the military pow- The colonial wars were waged between er or the enemy’s forces has constituted the forces armed and organized according to means to that end. However, a complete vic Western strategic culture, which usually tory also requires that the will of the ene differed from that of their opponents – to my is broken. Quite obviously, it is possible day often referred to as “insurgents”27 – in to establish a link between this trinity and a considerable way. The latter could be of the first one: will and passion, enemy forces quite high standing but were, as a rule, less and commander, as well as between territo effective. These wars can be described as ry and government. Other combinations are asymmetrical as the opponents had inher also possible as we manipulate the Rubik’s ently different cultures and aims. Cube, now with all three factors. In such asymmetric wars, the balance be As this is not a article about Clausewitz tween the various parts of the trinity is quite but about strategy in general, it might be ac different between the One and the Other. ceptable to propose a variant of the trini Operation Allied Force against Serbia in ty inspired by the French philosopher Jean 1999 could illustrate this point. For NATO Guitton who in his turn based it on Blaise this was by definition a Crisis Management Pascal.26 (Table 2) Operation but for Milosevic it must have Now, as war is an endeavor between two been a war about vital interests: the status (or more) parties with conflicting goals, it is of Kosovo and, ultimately, his own power. quite possible that the setting of the cube for Table 3 depicts the trinities of the two op the One is quite different from the setting ponents. of the Other’s. This leads us to the issue of The wars between Great Britain and symmetry, dissymmetry, and asymmetry. France, on the other hand, were symmet ric as both the One and the Other wanted War is never symmetric to change the status quo to their own ad vantages. They were also fought between “Asymmetric wars” have become some Western states with, basically, the same level thing of a buzz-word and are often present of technology and culture. But their grand ed as something new. This is, however, far strategies were asymmetrical as Great Brit from the truth. Take three examples: the co ain relied on an essentially maritime strategy

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NATO Milosevic Government 16 (19) democratic states, no 1 dictator whose vital interest, vital interests are threatened.28 his power, is threatened Commander Complex organization An army completely in the governed by a council of hands of a dictator with a democratic st ates (NAC) with clear goal – keep Kosovo in a relatively vague objective. Serbian hands. People Diversity, clearly driven by In the hands of the dictator the ”CNN- e ffect”. and with strong sentimental l inks to Kosovo.

Table 3 against the continental strategy of France. Let us look at World War I. Here all bel The choice of strategy was, in principle, giv ligerents preferred offensive strategies. This en by the geostrategic situation of the two symmetric situation led to stalemate and a adversaries but also because of their differ war of attrition. In 1918, after the failed ent cultures – the British as an island coun German Michaeli-offensive, the situation try depending on maritime trade, while the became increasingly dissymmetric to the French power was based on agriculture and benefit of the Allies. stately organized manufacturing.29 With At sea, however, one could talk about time, the British maritime strategy helped asymmetry as the geostrategic situation giving the coalition armies a dissymmet differed so much between the Grand Fleet ric advantage over their French opponents. and the High Seas Fleet. The result was the That is, there was no fundamental differ asymmetric warfare where convoys of the ence between the armies of the two sides but Entente fought with German submarines. the coalition became successively stronger. “War among the people” or modern More usual than symmetric conflicts are Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN) dissymmetric ones. Here, the opponents ba are usually asymmetric in many ways. The sically share the same strategic culture but Western side uses organized military force their aims are different: ”one side wants which is technologically superior to its ad to win, the other not to lose.”30 This is the versary. The latter, consequently, tries to classic situation of a European small state find an asymmetric way of fighting to get in (potential) conflict with a more powerful an advantage. Terrorism, IEDs, and in neighbor. The Finnish Winter War is a good formation warfare are three typical tech example. niques. When we look at the level of military To conclude, symmetric situations imply strategy, symmetry is more frequent. How that the One and the Other have symmet ever, to win, it is normally necessary to find ric objectives, both want to win (or not to and explore an asymmetric advantage. In lose) and they basically wage war accord fact, it is hard to imagine a perfect symmet ing to the same principles. But to win, it is ric war – and if there was one, it would lead necessary to find an advantage. This could to mutual destruction or to a stalemate. As completely change the situation into an Desportes has written: “every victory, basi asymmetric one as happened in Japan af cally, is asymmetric.”31 ter the atomic bombs. At the very least, it

NR 2 april/juni 2010 is necessary to get a sufficient dissymmetric started to think about a new problem, asked advantage for the other to give up. themselves: ”De quoi s’agit-il?”(What’s it all Consequently, issues of symmetry, dis about?).34 Indeed, understanding the situa symmetry, and asymmetry must be treated tion, choosing the objective, and then find carefully. ing balancing ways-and-means are the key They tend to be more of buzzwords than issues in strategy. strategically meaningful. As war is an instrument of politics, it fol lows that the relationship between politics The objective and strategy is crucial. Strategy is “politics in action.” Without strategy, politics cannot From the trinity we have learned the three be transformed into action and political ob basic objectives: the military power that jectives cannot be met.35 must be reduced to impotence, the country For military strategy, the issue is to for that must be conquered and the will of the mulate an achievable objective that under enemy that must be subdued.32 pins the goal of the comprehensive strate Clausewitz makes an important dif gy in its mission to implement the political ference between two kinds of “real wars” project: fought for political purposes. The first kind is fought with the aim to overthrow the en The general military strategy is the emy, the winner dictates the peace. The sec science and art of maneuvering the ond one seeks a limited objective and, con forces of physical violence – the sequently, to a negotiated peace where the armed forces – in order to make result of the warfighting is an important, them contribute to the success of the but not the only, argument.33 comprehensive36 strategy charged to World War II is an example of the first fulfill the objectives of the general kind; a total war with an unlimited politi politics.37 cal project: the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan. When translated into This formula contains a very important as a strategic objective, this project meant to pect; namely the existence of two objectives tal victory for the allied forces, an occu on different levels. The political goal states pied country and a broken will. Hence, all the purpose (Zweck) or the long-term ob the three objectives mentioned above were jective while the military objective is more aimed for and ultimately achieved by the Al immediate (Ziel).38 The difference between lies. the two notions could also be described as But most wars are not of the first kind, success with the war and success in the war, but of the second. This is particularly true respectively.39 In fact, to make a success in for modern wars. This means that there is war lead to success with the war is one of no more a direct link between military suc the key issues in strategy. It often fails. Na cess and the achievement of the political ob poleon provides a good example. He could jective. As a consequence, strategy becomes never transform his long row of victories immensely more complicated. into a decisive strategic advantage leading As a professor at the French War Acade to peace. my, the future Marshal Ferdinand Foch used Frequently, the aim of the war changes to insist that his students, each time they over time because of the difficulty to predict

6 DISKUSSION & DEBATT the course of events during a war and how strategy was much too simplistic as it led to objectives change with time. One reason for a prolonged war of counter-insurrection. this is that “Once arms speak, the outcome The US hardly became more secure and is more important than the origin.”40 Op- world peace was not furthered. Six weeks eration Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was meant to of success with the war lead to six years of be a war of the first kind of war: it aimed struggling. The armed forces were not suffi at complete surrender (“We will accept no ciently destroyed, the country could not be outcome than...”).41 But, it ends (if it indeed completely occupied and the will was not has ended) by a negotiated end-state. conquered. OIF is also an example of not answering The issue of will links back to the first the question “De quoi s’agit-il?”. As Clause and the second trinity. A common way of witz has pointed out:”Theory, therefore, de attacking the will of the enemy is to weak mands that at the commencement of every en or dissolve the link between the people, war its character and main outline shall be the army, and the government. This could defined according to what the political con be done by substituting reason with blind ditions and relations lead us to anticipate as instinct, or more precisely despair. As an ex probable”42 The US “neocons” had a clear ample the bombing of the German popula idea of the war’s meaning and outcome, but tion had as one of its prime goals – the in this was not based on factual analysis but dustrial base was the other – to divorce the on ideology; “mind” was superseded by people from the government and the Nazi “heart” to use the trinity of Guitton. To use party. Will is also the main aim of terrorism: Clausewitz’s trinity: government was ruled to show the people that the government by passion instead of representing reason. and its security forces cannot protect it. The And it is somewhat difficult to say that the occupation of the country is then a conse commander was an example of “creative quence of terrorism that eventually leads to spirit”. surrender of the government and subdual of The political project was stated as:”It is the people.45 a fight for the security of our nation and the Another way to put this issue is to use peace of the world, and we will accept no the theory of legitimacy launched by Kale outcome but victory.”43 The comprehensive vi J. Holsti. He makes a difference between strategy’s objective was: “And our mission vertical legitimacy: “authority, consent, and is clear, to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass loyalty to the idea(s) of state and its institu destruction, to end Saddam Hussein’s sup tions”. Horizontal legitimacy, on the other port for terrorism, and to free the Iraqi peo hand, “deals with the definition and politi ple.”44 This led to a military strategy aimed cal role of community.”46 By attacking the at the destruction of Iraqi military power will of its adversary, the Allies aimed at followed by a short occupation of (parts weakening the vertical legitimacy of Nazi of) Iraq. It was supposed that the third ele government. ment in Clausewitz’s trinity, the will, would It is interesting to note that the fight for be no problem as the Iraqi people was sup vertical legitimacy – often referred to as posed to transform its country to a peace “winning hearts and minds” – in CMOs is ful democracy. Hence, this was a complete symmetrical: both “peacekeepers” and in Clausewitzian strategy. surgents want to achieve it while denying Now, seven years later, we know that this it to the opponent. The ways-and-means,

7 NR 2 april/juni 2010 however, are inherently asymmetric. peace in summer 1940. But an unpopu But when strengthening the vertical legit lar policy is fragile. This was shown when imacy of government becomes the principal the government in Madrid, after the 2004 issue, then the role of military strategy must bombings, was forced to take home its change. It is not enough to support directly troops from Iraq. Another example is the the comprehensive strategy; it must also sup “Highway of Death” at the end of oper port and coordinate with other strategies: ation Desert Storm. Here it was demon police, humanitarian aid, etc. The issue of strated that the public was not only sensi comprehensiveness cannot be confined, so tive about own losses but also about those to speak, to the top but must imbue all the of the enemy. various strategies needed. In fact, compre To this, one might add environmental as hensive strategies are very difficult both to pects. If one sees the environment as part develop and, in particular, to implement.47 of our “cultural property”, there is already Finally, it should be recognized that the guidance in international law regarding this strategist is limited in his choices of objec issue.50 However, so far relatively little in tives and ways-and-means by issues of law terest has been demonstrated in this regard. and legitimacy. He needs to ask himself This will probably change. It could be antic three questions. ipated that the ever more powerful environ The first one is whether the objective as mental lobbies will put restrictions on mili such is ethical – we are back to “de quoi tary activities including during operations. s’agit-il?”. Will the fulfillment of the ob This is probably particularly true for Scan jective lead to peace – preferably a better dinavian states like Sweden and Finland peace? These three questions above could also The next question is whether the ways- be based on the trinity of Guitton: do we and-means are ethical given the impor have enough “body” to do what we want, tance of the objective: “...at what point of does our “mind” find it reasonable, and is it destruction does a war cease to be a justi defendable according to our “heart”? fiable instrument?”48 This issue is particu However, even when the strategist is able larly pertinent in today’s Crisis Manage to discern a completely legal and legitimate ment Operations that are fought “among objective and ways-and-means to achieve it, the people”.49 Soldiers and sailors represent the result is often not as expected. Friction their countries and are part of their societ and surprise may make the best plan fail. ies. Hence, the societies that send them can not dissociate themselves from their actions. Surprise – things never This is one reason why the issue of “ways- and-means” – transformed into Rules of go as planned Engagement – is an inherently political re A basic problem is that power – defined as sponsibility. the capability of a political actor to force Finally, will the opinion support the ob another to accept its will – can only be mea jective given ways-and-means to reach it? A sured approximately. If it was possible to government may, to a certain extent, take make exact measurements, “wars would not part in operations without having the ap occur, since the results would be known in proval of a majority. If Churchill had bowed advance.”51 The reason is that war is a hu to public opinion, he would have asked for man endeavor: “The Art of War has to deal

8 DISKUSSION & DEBATT with living and with moral forces, the con and incapacity to see all possible future con sequence of which is that it can never attain sequences of the proposed strategies.58 the absolute and positive.”52 This is also the Friction is also, according to Clausewitz, meaning of the trinity; the characteristics of not just about lack of knowledge about the a war depend on the balance between blind terrain, the weather, and the whereabouts of instinct, contingencies, and reason. Obvi the enemy. Friction is also a result of the fact ously, when passion dominates reason, war that war is a dynamic duel between moral becomes increasingly irrational and distanc forces, as pointed out in Beaufre’s defini es itself from the Formula. Diabolization of tion. This duel, he continues, takes the form the enemy easily leads to such a situation. of a battle for freedom of action: “Each side When the enemy becomes the incarnation trying to preserve freedom of action for it of the Bad and of Satan, no compromise is self and denying it to the enemy”.59 possible.53 The issues of friction and hazard have Friction is one of Clausewitz’s best known been nicely summed up by Churchill: ”One ideas: “Everything is very simple in War, but should never, never, never believe that a war the simplest thing is difficult.” “Friction is”, will turn out to be easy... ”.60 he continues, “the only conception which in Surprise is a common strategy to create a general way corresponds to that which dis an asymmetrical advantage and to maxi tinguishes real War from War on paper.”54 mize the friction affecting the enemy. Sur Adherents of the school of Revolution prise could be defined as a ”physical and in Military Affairs (RMA) have sometimes psychological condition which results from proposed that modern information technol a sudden and unexpected occurrence.”61 ogy would abolish friction. Dominant Bat Already authors during classical antiq tlefield Awareness (DBA) would give a per uity like Polyen and Frontin discussed how fect view of the battlefield, which would lift to use surprise to get an asymmetric advan the Clausewitzian ”fog of war”. There have tage: stratagems.62 even been American (and Swedish) gener Clausewitz does not discuss surprise in als who believed that digitalization of the great depth. However, he gives the follow battlefield would lead to the insignificance ing definition, where he underlines the mor of Clausewitz.55 Recent history, however, al aspect of surprise: ”When it [surprise] is has amply shown that maybe friction has successful in a high degree, confusion and taken new forms; it is anyway still an im broken courage in the enemy’s ranks are the portant factor. Clausewitz will continue to consequences…” be studied when Admiral Owens is long He also underlines that surprise is easier since forgotten.56 to realize on the tactical level than on the One reason is that war is led and fought strategic level, the one that is of interest to by human beings and not machines or as us here.63 Desportes has put it: “A technology is just a One current definition of strategic sur technology; it cannot change the war which prise is: ”Strategic surprise may serve to primarily is dominated by human factors.”57 shatter an adversary, in a moral and psy Another is the fact that strategy cannot pro chological sense, thus ending a conflict, or vide a perfect answer. It is always limited to turn the moral balance of the war upside by three factors: imperfect information, im down, without necessarily achieving a tac possibility to envisage all possible solutions, tical victory (the Têt offensive in 1968).”64

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Another definition, less linked to war, is that fails may be very dangerous. As Clause ”strategic surprise is an occurrence, not witz wrote: ”If we surprise the adversary by anticipated, which is of great impact and a wrong measure, then instead of reaping shakes the foundation of a state.”65 good results, we may have to bear a sound One could imagine that there would be a blow in return;”69 symmetrical relationship between the offen If the offensive strategic “surprise“ is rel sive “surprise” and the defensive “be sur atively unusual, the defensive “be surprised” prised”. This is hardly the case. It is much is quite usual. This fact depends on a ten more usual that a government becomes sur dency of governments, commanders, and prised than that it succeeds in deliberately others to be surprised by events even if these surprising an adversary. were not meant to be surprising. The Fall There are two basic modes of strategy: of the Wall is an example: the East-German real and virtual. While the former aims at government did not at all envisage bringing the physical destruction of the forces of the it down. But down it fell and everybody be enemy, the latter is directed against his will. came surprised also by its strategic effects. A victory built on physical destruction will In the military strategic field, it is possible also have implications for the will of the to identify four types of surprise.70 To begin enemy. Conversely, an enemy whose will with, there is technological surprise which is weakened by our virtual strategy will be results from the use of a new weapon. The easier to defeat. effective use of submarines against merchant The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in ships during the Great War is one example. 1941 is a good example of a strategic sur It is also an example of a surprise that could prise carried out in a real mode, where the have been avoided – there were those who objective is to:” reduce or annihilate the ca anticipated their use in this regard but they pacity to react and the liberty of action of were dismissed as that view did not fit into the Other.”66 The Soviet ”Sputnik”, on the current thinking. Another example is the other hand, can be seen – besides the techni use of nuclear weapons against Japan. Here cal success as such – as a strategic surprise there was surprise on two strategic levels: in the virtual mode aiming at “reducing the a direct one causing the capitulation of Ja will of the adversary.”67 pan and an indirect one, not intended, with These two examples also highlight that more far-reaching consequences; namely the surprise is linked to risk. Both Japan and balance of terror. the Soviet Union had a strategic advantage Secondly, there is the geographic surprise. but it was of short duration. In both cases, The attack comes where the defendant did US reactions inversed the game. Edward N. not expect it. The classic example is the Ger Luttwak writes about the strategic paradox: man attack through the Ardennes in 1940; a bad road may be the best exactly because another is D-day in Normandy. the adversary does not envisage its use. As a The third variant regards time. A classic consequence, surprise has a price: the use of example is the Yom Kippur War, launched the bad road may lead to a slower build-up by a coalition of Arab countries during an of forces. However, it is supposed that this important Jewish holiday. price will be outbalanced by the psychologi Finally, there is the surprise caused by cal effects of surprise. 68 new doctrine – a new way to use force. The As a consequence, a tentative surprise maneuver war, to use contemporary phras

10 DISKUSSION & DEBATT ing, carried out by the armies of Napoleon phenomenon. In this case, the defender un is a striking example. The use of guerillas derstands more or less what is going to hap during the Vietnam War is another – in spite pen but does not dare to act; typically be of French experiences just a couple of years cause he is afraid of provoking the Other. before. Obviously, this is a fear that the Other is Michael Handel has offered an answer happy to add fuel to. A typical example is the to the question of why surprises happen in German occupation in 1936 of the demilita spite of the fact that, with hindsight, they rized zone along the Rhine. This area was of could have been avoided. According to his vital interest for France as a glacis against “theory of surprise”, it is quite usual that in Germany. In spite of that, the French did telligence officers have all the necessary in nothing. The public opinion was completely formation to understand what will happen. against any action that could lead towards However, the problem is often that they do war; the Ministry of War was afraid of pro not understand it or that they cannot dis voking the Germans and the army overesti cern the important signals in the noise. Oth mated the German capacity. In reality, the er factors are “inertia over openness”, and Germans had planned to abandon immedi “wishful thinking over realism.”71 ately in the case of French counter-moves. Another quite usual problem is ”mirror With the Rhine zone occupied, France had thinking”, when an actor assumes – con lost the liberty of action that might have sciously or subconsciously – that the oth saved Czecho-Slovakia in 1938. Fear of war er will think along the same lines as him and to provoke made the war inevitable.73 self. Also here Operation Iraqi Freedom is Self-deterrence is a notion with particular a good example. Apparently, the American relevance for small states living beside big administration thought that the liberated ones. Iraqis would by themselves become a peace Self-deterrence is closely linked to a syn ful, democratic society. The American doc drome called political hysteria. This oc trine had prescribed that its superior tech curs when a government or a people are nology would be able to finish the operation confronted with a problem that cannot be after a brief and relatively limited operation. solved without more or less complete re That worked out just as long as the adver thinking of status quo and basic values. In sary permitted the war to be fought along such a situation it is not unusual that the these lines. state or the people refuse to accept the prob A variant of the same problem are psy lem and hide behind selective realities, false chological and/or philosophic inhibitions. explanations and so on.74 For example, the At the time of the Japanese attack against assumed Soviet submarine intrusions in Pearl Harbor in 1941, the US forces had a Swedish waters during the Cold War did relatively low readiness. A basic reason was cause such a hysteria. that the Americans could not imagine that The ”ostrich-phenomenon” is yet anoth the Japanese would be able to plan and car er variant. It happens quite often that the ry out such an attack. Hence, the Japanese high command refuses to understand that trump was the American ignorance regard existent doctrines are obsolete, usually due ing Japanese military capabilities and an ar to technological advances. The glorifica rogance against anything Japanese. 72 tion of the offensive before the Great War “Self-deterrence” is another recurrent is a good example. The Boer War and the

11 NR 2 april/juni 2010 war between Russia and Japan had demon lia in 1648, where the nation-state was the strated that the new weapons – in particular basis for international security. A new cycle, the machine gun and the barbed-wire – had of which we know very little, will not begin made the defensive stronger than the offen until after 2020.77 sive. In spite of this, all belligerents entered Now, this article is about strategic theory. the war with offensive doctrines. Gray argues that “that enormous changes The French revolution, the Fall of the in the tactical and operational grammar of Wall, and the 11th of September are all strategy matter not at all for the nature and events that could be characterized as “rup function of war and strategy.”78 Castex, on tures”. A “rupture” is a major change in the other hand, wrote that “strategic pro the security field that provokes develop cedures are less subdued than tactical pro mentswhich are difficult to predict.75 The cedures by changes in armament....But, fi main event is rather brief but it has, in each nally, they change anyway, and this point case, been preceded by a development that should never be lost.”79 In fact, new devel was not understood. Afterwards, it has tak opments – the coming of the nuclear age, for en a long time before the situation again be example – often provoke a crisis in strategic came stable – but then the strategic chess thinking that forces us to read the present board had fundamentally changed. theory with new eyes. The strategic work In all these cases, the event might have place is always busy.80 been foreseen and surprise avoided; more With these ideas in mind, it should be easily in some cases than in others. But, it valuable to come back to the “wonderful is often first with hindsight that relevant trinity”. For convenience, it is reproduced factors can be identified. Investments in in in Table 4. telligence may reduce the risk of being sur Blind instinct, creativity, and reason. prised, but history seems to demonstrate These factors are at least as important as ever. that this will never be enough – states and We expect governments, especially Western their leaders will become surprised. As a ones, to be guided by reason (strategic anal consequence, strategic adaptability and flex ysis made by security councils and the like). ibility is of paramount importance. This is However, this is not always entirely true; the particularly true for a small state, which by decision by Bush to attack Iraq seems to be definition has less liberty of action and resil more based on ideology – blind instinct – ience than a big one. than reason. On the other hand, at least in the West, the information age should lead From Trinity to Globalization to a general public more governed by rea son than by blind instinct. The view of war There is abundant literature about the so- as primarily evil makes an important differ called new wars. Will the armed forces of ence between contemporary wars and those the West mainly fight among the people – of times gone by. It is, for example, difficult irregular wars – as argued by Sir Rupert to imagine the Great War being fought to Smith or will war among major states also day. “The real revolution in military affairs be a fact of the future as argued by Colin S. concerns primarily the social dimension of Gray?76 Jean Dufourcq and Ludovic Woets strategy, which is closely related to the de argue that we are now at the end of the cy mographic context and the evolution of the cle that started with the peace of Westpha mentalities in western states.”84

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The character of the war 81 The actors82 The objectives83 Violence, hatred and The people The will of the enemy animosity; blind instinct (passion) Probabilities and chance; free The General and his Army Military power activity of the soul (creativity) Subordinate nature of a The government Country political instrument; reason

Table 4

Chance, probability, hazard, and friction way of life and the search for economic gain. form the battlefield, now as before. Modern The first element is demonstrated in areas technology has reduced some of these effects where war has been endemic for a long time but also added others. Nevertheless, today’s like Congo or Colombia. Here soldiers have commanders have relatively small possibil no other prospects than fighting. This often ities to use their possible creative spirit as leads to a fusion between war and organized strategy is made in a political process. Oper crime. Furthermore, Private Military Enter ations are led by committees; be that in the prises (PME) play an ever more important EU or in NATO. The creative spirit today, role in Western warfare for logistics, as life- contrary to the time of Clausewitz, has rath guards, etc. A writer like Herrfried Münkler er its place on a tactical level. The “strategic sees the growing importance of private ac corporal” is an expression of this trend. tors driven by economic rather than politi In irregular wars like Afghanistan, the in cal objectives as one of the most important surgents (or terrorists or liberation fighters, new factors in warfare.86 depending on one’s outlook) show a mix The people, the General, and the gov- ture of passion, creative spirit, and reason. ernment. In modern states, it is debatable Their use of technology to find asymmetric if one could talk about Volk – people and advantages certainly shows creativity. Ter nation.87 All European states have a large rorist acts are planned with reason (even number of immigrants who do not neces if they are evil in our eyes) to get most ef sarily see themselves as part of their new fect. But as their struggle is a part of Jihad, nation. In virtually every Crisis Manage it is based on ideology, so passion seems to ment Operation, the adversary has relatives be the overall characteristic. On the other or supporters living in participating states. hand, this could also be seen as a political This fact gives important opportunities for choice, i.e. belonging to reason.85 Neverthe (dis-) information campaigns, and in the less, it is hard for a Westerner to understand worst case, for terrorist acts as in London the act of a suicide bomber as something in 2005. The global use of the Internet and else than an act of passion. new media like twitter and facebook makes Two relatively new elements are war as a it even more difficult for a modern govern

13 . NR 2 april/juni 2010 ment to create support for costly under any event in modern war has four distinct, takings in faraway countries. To put it in unique components: tactical, operational, another way, both vertical and horizontal strategic, and political. Sometimes even in legitimacy of governments are affected. The significant tactical events packed a huge po information age reduces the vertical legiti litical wallop. This is a key characteristic of macy both by giving opponents a stronger modern war.”91 say and by disseminating information, in The commander’s adversary may still be cluding on a scale hitherto unknown. At the a military commander but more often than same time, horizontal legitimacy is reduced not there is no clear commander, nor a gov by the increasingly diverse populations liv ernment on the other side. We could, fol ing in Western countries. lowing the analysis by Castex, call him the The Western commander is usually no “disturber”.92 The disturber usually consists longer subordinated to his own government of a number of groups with more or less dif but to an organization like the UN, the EU, ferent agendas. or NATO. This is in itself a source of friction Another element, which certainly was not or, as Churchill has said: ”There is only one there in Clausewitz‘s times, consists of the thing worse than fighting with allies, and various NGOs. They will normally make a that is fighting without them.”88 His com point of their independence from the mili mand is severely strained by political issues tary and its strategy while trying to make a that do not necessarily have anything to do strategic difference. Their numbers are stag with the war effort. In particular, his liberty gering; in Afghanistan there are more than of action is constrained by caveats; national 100 big and 1000 small NGOs.93 limitations regarding the use of their forces. The traditional paradigm is that war is This, however, is nothing new. The in fought between states. From the Social con structions received by the British Admiral tract by Rousseau, we are used to see war Sir John Norris for an expedition in the Bal as a relation between states, not between tic in 1716 in the context of the Great Nor man and man.94 As the war in Georgia dic War form a nice example of political has shown, war between states is still rel muddling: … “You should observe no mea evant. A conflict in the Nordic area should sures towards Sweden where the assistance almost certainly adhere to this paradigm. of [king George’s I] fleet shall be necessary But, when fighting the disturber, wars are to deprive them of any signal advantage, or fought between coalitions, albeit composed where your joining the Danes may procure by states, on the one hand, and individuals them some signal advantage. But without or more or less loose groupings on the other. one or the other of these two cases you are An interesting aspect is that the soldier, air not to give the Danes such a degree of assis man, or sailor always belongs to a state but tance as may be interpreted to amount to an is not operationally subordinated to his or open rupture with Sweden.”89 her government. This seems to be especially The issue is nicely summed up by Gen true for air operations in Afghanistan where eral Wesley Clark, SACEUR90 during the air operations are completely integrated un Kosovo War in 1999: “What we discov der an Air Component Commander.95 ered increasingly was that the political and The will of the enemy, military power, strategic levels impinged on the operational and country. In the fight against the dis and tactical levels. Or, to put it another way, turber, the strategic center of gravity is no

14 DISKUSSION & DEBATT more the destruction of the enemy’s forces96 consequence of these developments, defense but, as we have seen, the issue of vertical takes a much wider meaning than before. legitimacy: the accepted right to rule.97 To Defense is protecting shipping in the Indi neutralize the forces of the disturber is still an Ocean but it is also general protection important but a precondition, not a goal. It at home. Defense and general security, ex is (or should be) obvious that you do not ternal and internal, must be integrated in a win hearts and minds – strengthening your modern national strategy. legitimacy – by bombing but by providing However, “deterritorization” is a notion a hope for a better future. To this end, the that has its limits when it comes to defense country – or relevant parts thereof – needs of the survival of the state. The most vio to be secured or, in Clausewitz’s terms, “oc lent conflicts since 1990 have been fought cupied”. over territory: Palestine, Kosovo, Chechnya, The fight against the disturber has led etc.99 to a new interest in colonial strategies. The To conclude. The “wonderful trinity” “oil spot” method, developed and imple is still valid as such. However, its compo mented by Marshals Joseph Gallieni and nents have to some extent taken on new val Hubert Lyautey around 1900, is now the ues and some components need to be add basis for NATO’s strategy in Afghanistan. ed. Castex seems to be right when he wrote There is a need for caution, though. Gallieni that “It [the strategy] does not evolve much, and Lyautey wrote with the aim of colonisa but it evolves anyway.”100 Thus, the advice tion. The ideal soldier was to become a col of Clausewitz is more important than ever: onist and, as such, a basis for a militia able ”Theory, therefore, demands that at the to defend the new colony.98 Today’s forces, commencement of every war its character on the contrary, spend very little time in the and main outline shall be defined accord area, seldom learn the language of the peo ing to what the political conditions and re ple, and do only to a limited extent live with lations lead us to anticipate as probable”101 the people – all prerequisites for the original Not only theory, one might add but practice “oil spot” strategy. And, obviously, the aim and experiences. is not to colonize. Thus the Ziel is the same Finally a word of caution. This discussion as in Gallieni’s time but the Zweck is quite is about changes that are happening now. It another. The insurgents may perhaps be ex will first be with hindsight that we will be cused for not always understanding this dif able to see the big trends in the development ference. of the world. The strategist, however, can In a more general sense, “country” in the not wait. He will – like Robinson Crusoe word’s territorial sense is a much too limited – need to use the tools that are at hand to notion. solve today’s problems. To “country”, one needs to add “flows” of information, energy, people, and all oth Conclusion er commodities needed in a modern society. Thus, even a small country has vital inter What are the consequences for a small state ests far away from its territory. Conversely, – here Finland and Sweden – of these devel wars fought far away may have repercus opments? One is obvious and has already sions at home as witnessed by the terror been touched upon: globalization implies ist bombings of Madrid and London. As a that strategic interests of also a small state

15 NR 2 april/juni 2010 extend far outside its territory. It is thus im ing five strands: responsiveness, flexibility, possible to let the strategic action come to resilience, adaptability and acuity.104 a halt at the border. Isolation, as urged by Responsiveness: there must be forces that some Swedish officers, is not an option are ready to act – fully trained and equipped. if for no other reason than that it would One could of course imagine a mobiliza lead to the world being led by great powers tion force as a back-up reserve but the main without any possibilities of influence for force cannot be dependent on mobilization. the small ones. Such a policy would lead Flexibility: military forces cannot be to making the famous dialogue between trained for just one scenario – for instance the Athenians and the Melians during the peace keeping. They must be able to adapt Peloponnesian war, 431 – 404 B.C. relevant to sudden changes in the strategic and op again: “...right, as the world goes, is only in erational environment. question between equals of power, while the Resilience: military forces must be able strong do what they can and the weak suffer to overcome losses meaning a need for both what they must.”102 quality and numbers. But resilience must Secondly, it is not possible to make a be applied to the whole society – citizens choice between the ability to fight future will not accept that there is no protection wars as according to Smith or to Gray. at home while significant forces are fighting There must be capability to do both. The faraway wars.105 old French notion of “three circles”103 Adaptability: the military organization could constitute a valid basis. The first circle must be able to withstand strategic surpris would encompass the area of vital interests es. This is a question of mentality that must for the survival of the state: the Nordic area be underpinned by good education and including the Baltic and Barents Seas. In this training. It also requires knowledge of the area, the state must be able to act alone if world around us – even issues that for the necessary. The second would encompass the moment do not seem to be strategically im area of shared interests and solidarity: Eu portant. rope and its approaches. Here the state must Acuity or sharpness of understanding: act together with other European states and, this strand requires good research in the if possible, the US. The third circle, finally, strategic field and intellectual people - of is constituted by the rest of the world and ficers, civil servants, and politicians – that is defined by the necessity to safeguard the have such an education in the strategic field vital flows of energy, information and so on that they can understand the issues. but also to stop unwanted flows of traffick To come back to the trinity of Guit ing of various kinds. To this one must add, ton. A modern strategy needs a “body” the humanitarian imperative to reduce suf that is responsive, flexible, and resilient. fering. In this area, the small state can only The “mind” must be adaptive while acuity act within coalitions of different kinds and must mark the “heart”. has to, due to limited resources, make a stra tegic choice of where to act. The author is a Captain (Navy) and a fel Thirdly, there is a need for strategic agil low of the Royal Swedish Academy of War ity. This notion could be defined as compris Sciences.

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Notes

1. Gray, Colin S.: Modern Strategy, Oxford 19. Op. cit. note 6, p. 19. University Press, Oxford 1999, p. 306. 20. Ibid. 2. Coutau-Bégarie, Hervé: Traité de Stratégie, 21. Ibid, p. 20 Economica, Paris 1999, p. 59. All translations 22. Boëne, Bernard: “Inactualité de Clausewitz? from French or Swedish to English by the Origines, termes et critique du débat contem author. porain“, in Bardiès, Laure and Motte, Martin 3. de Guibert, Jacques: Essai général de tactique, (eds.): De la guerre? Clausewitz et la pensée Economica, Paris 2004 (1772), p. 141. stratégique contemporaine, Economica, Paris 4. de Saxe, Maurice: Mes rêveries, Economic 2008, p. 146. Paris 2002 (1756), p. 159. 23. Strachan, Hew:“Clausewitz en anglais : la 5. Poirier, Lucien: Stratégie théorique II, Eco césure de 1976“ in Bardiès, Laure and Motte, nomica, Paris 1987, p. 47. Martin (eds.): De la guerre? Clausewitz et la 6. von Clausewitz, Carl: On War, (translated pensée stratégique contemporaine, Economi by Colonel J.J. Graham) Barnes and Nobles ca, Paris 2008, p. 121. Books, New York 2004, p. 127. Italics in the 24. Ibid, p. 103. original. 25. Ibid, p. 121. 7. Ibid, p. 17 26. Malis, Christian: “Clausewitz et la stratégie 8. Aron, Raymond: Penser la guerre, Clause- nucléaire“, in Bardiès, Laure and Motte, witz. Part I, L’âge européen, Gallimard, Paris Martin (eds.): De la guerre? Clausewitz et la 1976, p. 169. It should be noted that the pensée stratégique contemporaine, Economi quote is the most usual but that the idea as ca, Paris 2008, pp. 274-275 such is treated more exhaustively in Book 6B, 27. Which is a curious way to describe a people which is also the basis for Aron when coining fighting for its freedom against invaders. “the Formula”. 28. One could, however, argue that the existence 9. Op. cit. note 4, Preface by Jean-Paul Charnay, of NATO had been in danger if one had not p. 35. acted against something that looked like 10. Hart, Liddell and Basil H.: Strategy. The genocide. Indirect Approach, Faber and Faber, London, 29. C.f. Mahan, Alfred Thayer: The Influence 1967, p. 335-336. It should be noted that of Sea Power upon History 1660 – 1783, he had a number of predecessors: Corbett, Sampson Low, Marston & Company, London Castex and Beaufre all endeavoured to en p. 29. large the original, military, notion of strategy. 30. Aron, Raymond: Peace and War. A Theory of 11. Ibid, p. 366. International Relations, Transaction Publish 12. Op. cit. note 5, p. 105. The word “forces“ ers, New Brunswick, 2003, p. 33. is used in a very general – mechanical – sense 31. Desportes,Vincent: La guerre probable, Eco and is not confined to “military forces”. nomica, Paris 2008, p. 38. 13. Beaufre, André: An introduction to strategy 32. Op. cit. note 6, p. 21. with particular reference to problems of 33. Op. cit. note 6, p. 8-9. defence, politics, economics and diplomacy Op. cit. note 8, pp. 121. in the nuclear age, Faber and Faber, London, 34. Foch, F.: Des principes de la guerre. Con- 1965, p. 22. férences faites en 1900 à l’École Supérieure 14. Géré, François: avec le concours de Wide de Guerre, Berger-Levrault Nancy Paris mann, Thierry; Blin, Arnaud; Pô, Jean- Strasbourg 1919, p. 120. Damien: Dictionnaire de la pensée straté- 35. Op. cit. note 12, p. 109. gique, Larousse, Paris 2000, p. 256. 36. Intégrale in the original text 15. Op. cit. note 5, p. 50-51. 37. Op. cit. note 12, p. 117. 16. Desportes, Vincent: Comprendre la guerre, 38. Ziel and Zweck are German words, not im Economica, Paris 2001, p. 102. mediately translatable to English. 17. See op. cit. note 1, p. 270. 39. Op. cit. note 8, pp. 92, 406. 18. The Rubik’s Cube is a 3-D mechanical puzzle 40. Op. cit. note 30, p. 87. invented in 1974 by Hungarian sculptor and 41. http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/ professor of architecture Rubik, Ernõ. news/releases/2003/03/20030322.html

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42. Op. cit. note 6, p. 648. 66. Op. cit. note 12, p. 127. 43. Op.cit. note 41. 67. Ibid. 44. Ibid. 68. Luttwak, Edward N.: Strategy: the logic of 45. Trinquier, Roger: La guerre moderne, Eco war and peace, Belknap Press of Harvard nomica, Paris 2008 (1961), p. 14. University Press, Cambridge, MA 2001, p. 46. Holsti,Kalevi J.: The State, War, and the State 21. of War, Cambridge University Press, Cam 69. Op. cit. note 6, p. 159. bridge 1996, p. 84. 70. Op. cit. note 2, p. 366-367. 47. C.f. Rathmell, Andrew: ”Adapting Govern 71. Stansfield, Gareth: “Israeli-Egyptian (in)secu ment for Stabilisation and Counterinsurgen rity: the Yom Kippur War“ in Smith, Steve; cy Operations” and Korski, Daniel: “British Hadfield, Amelia and Dunne, Tim (eds): For- Civil-Military Integration: The History and eign Policy. Theories, Actors, Cases, Oxford Next Steps”, The RUSI Journal, December University Press, Oxford 2008, p. 296. 2009, vol 156, No 6, p. 8-13 and 14-25. 72. Strange, Joe: Capital ”W” War. A Case for 48. Op. cit. note 30, p. 160 Strategic Principles of War (Because Wars Are 49. C.f. Smith, Rupert: The Utility of Force. The Conflicts of Societies, Not Tactical Exercisers Art of War in the Modern World, Allen Lane, Writ large), Marine Corps University, Quan Penguin books, London 2005. tico 2000, p. 161. 50. Hayward, Joel: ”Air Power and the Environ 73. Duroselle, Jean-Baptiste: France and the Nazi ment: The Ecological Implications of Modern Threat. The Collapse of French Diplomacy Air Warfare”, Air Power Review, Vol 12, no 1932-1939, Enigma Books, New York 2004, 3, Autumn 2009, p. 17. p. 123-136. 51. Op. cit. note 30, p. 53. 74. The expression political hysteria comes from 52. Op. cit. note 6, p. 15. Istvan Bobo, quoted in Terray, “Raymond 53. Terray, Emmanuel: “Raymond Aron critique Aron critique de Clausewitz“ p. 369-370. de Clausewitz: réflexions sur la guerre abso 75. Tunberger, Johan; Blomqvist, Jan; Andersson, lute”, in Bardiès, Laure and Motte, Martin Bengt och Granholm, Niklas: (eds.): De la guerre? Clausewitz et la pensée Strategi för det oväntade 2, Totalförsvarets stratégique contemporaine, Economica, Paris Forskningsinstitut, Stockholm 2004, p. 17. 2008, p. 366 76. Gray, Colin S.: Another Bloody Century. 54. Op. cit. note 6, p. 58-59. Future Warfare, Weidenfled & Nicholson, 55. Colson, Bruno: “La stratégie américaine de London 2005. sécurité et la critique de Clausewitz“, Straté- 77. Dufourcq, Jean and Woets, Ludovic: “Un gique, No 76, p. 162 nouvel âge historique: la fin du cycle de l’État 56. Admiral William Owens, Vice Chairman of Nation“, AGIR no 39, November 2009. Joint Chiefs of Staff during the President 78. Op. cit. note 1, p. 270. Clinton‘s first term, was one of the major 79. Castex, Raoul: Théories stratégiques, Tome I, proponents of RMA. Economica, Paris 1997 (1929), p. 19. 57. Op. cit. note 31, p. 173. 80. Poirier, Lucien: Le chantier stratégique, entre- 58. Op. cit. note 16, p. 215. tiens avec Gérard Chaliand, Hachette, Paris 59. Op. cit. note 13, p. 35. 1997, p. 41-43. 60. Churchill, Winston S.: Min ungdom: ett 81. Op cit. note 6, p. 19. kringflackande liv, P.A. Norstedts & Söners 82. Ibid. förlag, Stockholm 1931, p. 24. 83. Ibid p. 21. 61. Op. cit. note 14, p. 260. 84. Chaliand, Gérard: Le nouvel art de la guerre, 62. Polyaenus, author of Stratagems, lived in the l’Archipel, Paris 2008, p. 150. second century A.D. and Frontin, author of 85. Op. cit. note 22, p. 150 Strategemata, between 40 and 103 A.D. 86. Münkler, Herrfried: De nya krigen, Daidalos, 63. Op. cit. note 6, p. 156-157. Göteborg 2004, p. 52. 64. Chaliand, Gérard and Blin, Arnaud: Diction- 87. Cf. the French debate in 2010 on what consti naire de stratégie militaire des origines à nos tutes the national identity. jours. Perrin, Paris 1998, p. 649. 88. Winston Churchill quoted in Kiszely, John: 65. CHEM (Centre des hautes études militaires). Coalition Command in Contemporary “La surprise stratégique.“ Défense nationale Operations. Whitehall Report 1-08. RUSI et sécurité collective. Mars 2008, p. 41. London 2009, p. 1.

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89. Quoted in Aldridge, David Denis: Admiral Sir John Norris and the Britsh Naval Expedi- tions to the Baltic Sea 1715 – 1727. Nordic Academic Press, Lund 2009, p. 137. The author hints that Admiral Norris never did understand this instruction. 90. Supreme Allied Commander Europe 91. Clark,Wesley K.: Waging Modern War. Pub lic Affairs, New York 2001, p. 10. 92. Cf. Op. cit. note 79, Tome V, p. 104-127. 93. Kiszely, John: Coalition Command in Con- temporary Operations. Whitehall Report 1-08. RUSI London 2009, p. 13. 94. Op.cit. note 30, p. 112. 95. Interview at CESA (Centre d’études straté giques aérospatiales) Paris 2009. 96. Op. cit. note 6, pp. 526-527. 97. Op. cit. note 46, p. 84. 98. Cf. Gallieni, Joseph: “Rapport sur la Con quête de Madagascar“ in Gérard, Chaliand (ed.): Anthologie mondiale de la stratégie. Des origines au nucléaire, Robert Laffont, Paris 1990 and Lyautey, Hubert: “Rôle Co lonial de l’Armée“, Revue des Deux Mondes, 1900, p. 308-328. 99. Op. cit. note 22, p. 142 100. Quoted in Depeyre, Michel: Entre Vent et eau. Un siècle d’hésitations tactiques et stra- tégiques 1790-1890, Economica et Institut de Stratégie Comparée, Paris 2003, p. 136. 101. Op. cit. note 6, p. 648. 102. Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War, Everyman, London 1993, p. 290. 103. Coutau-Bégarie, Hervé: “La politique de défense de la France“, Stratégique no 53, 1992, p. 13. 104. Shields, Ian:”Air Power and Agility”, Air Power Review, Vol 12, no 3, Autumn 2009, p. 106 105. For a discussion of resilience, see Francart, Loup: ”Résilience: de quoi s’agit-il?”, Revue défense nationale, Février 2010 – no 727, p. 19-28.