Goulding 30 June 1998 Transcript
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ST/DPIST/OPI ORAL HISTORY (02) G696 Yale-UN Oral History Sir Marrack GouldinGouldingg James S. Sutterlin, IntervieweInterviewerr June 30, 19919988 Oxford, EnglanEnglandd I f Yale-UN Oral History ProjecProjectt Marrack GouldinGouldingg James S. Sutterlin, IntervieweInterviewerr I June 30, 19919988 Oxford, EnglanEnglandd I Index: UN Peacekeeping Operations 1982 Agreement 8, 11 I Cambodia Operation 34,38-48,50,60,71 Cease-fire negotiations 59-63,65-71,73-74 Central American Peace Process 51 Cold War 5, 76 Commission for Refugees 34 -' Conflict with Angola 2,8-9, 13-14 Congo Operation 22, 40 Contras 53,55-56 - Department of Administration and Management 5-7 _r Department of Disarmament Affairs 50 Depat1ment of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 1,32,48,52,58,65, 76 Depm1ment ofPolitical Affairs 48 ,\ Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 72 El Salvador Operation 54,58,64,66-70,72-73 Elections 18,27,38-39,56-57 Esquipulas 11II Agreement 51 Esquipulas Process 52, 55 European Community 2 'I Frente Farabundo Ma11iMat1i para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) 59,60-62,66-67,70-71,59,60-62,66-67, 70-71, 74 , Human rights 23,38-39,54,59 Human Rights Commission 46 International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV) 54-56 , Civil Police (CIVPOL) 24-25 International Labor Organization (ILO) 68 Iran-Iraq negotiations 10, 12 , Khmer Rouge 36-37,42-46 Koevoet 26-28 Monroe Doctrine 56 Namibia Operation 1-7, 12-27,33, 37-39,45,49, 76 , Namibia Operation in relation to Cambodia Oper.Opel'. 25,29 Nicaragua Operation 51-61 Nongovernmental Programs (NGO) 75-76 , Organization in AfricanAfi'ican Unity (OAU)(OAD) 19-20,22 Paris Peace Conference 43 Peacemonger 9 , Permanent Five 6,33 San Juan Agreement 59 Sandinistas 52,52,5656 , Somalia Crisis 76 South African Involvement in Namibia Operation 14, 18-19,20,18-] 9, 20,23-24,26-2823-24, 26-28 , South West Africa People's Association (SWAPO) 8-9,11-14, 16,27-28 , SouthSouth WestWest AfricanAfrican PolicePolice (SW(SWAPOL)APOL) 25-26 SpecialSpecial RepresentativeRepresentative byby thethe Secretary General (SRSG) 19,21 DepartmentDepartment ofofNon-AlignedNon-Aligned Movement 20 SupremeSupreme NationalNational CouncilCouncil 44 UNUN AdvanceAdvance MissionMission inin CambodiaCambodia (UNAMIC)(UNAMIC) 35 UNUN DevelopmentDevelopment ProgramProgram (UNDP)(UNDP) 10,69 UNUN Iran-IraqIran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) 12 UNUN MissionMission toto Verify thethe Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) 52-53, 57 UNUN ObserverObserver Group inin Central American (ONUCA) 52-53,55-58, 74 SpecialSpecial PoliticalPolitical Affairs (SPA)(SPA) 1,3-4,6,12,16,24,32-33,52,57-58,65 UNUN ObserverObserver Missions inin el Salvador (ONUSAL) 59,69,74 UNUN SecuritySecurity Council 5-6,40-41,51 UNUN TransitionTransition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 4-5,8, 13, 17-19,21 UNUN TransitionalTransitional Authority inin Cambodia (UNTAC) 34-35,37-38,41,43,47 UnitedUnited StatesStates Congress 41,59 Yale-UNYale-UN OralOral HistoryHistory SirSir MarrackMarrack GouldingGoulding JamesJames S.S. Sutterlin,Sutterlin, InterviewerInterviewer JuneJune 30,30, 19981998 Oxford,Oxford, EnglandEngland James S. Sutterlin: ThisThis isis anan interviewinterview withwith SirSir MarrackMarrack Goulding,Goulding, inin Oxford,Oxford, England, on JuneJune 30,30, 1998.1998. TheThe interviewerinterviewer isis Sutterlin.Sutterlin. First ofof all,all, II wouldwould likelike toto thankthank you,you, SirSir MarrackMarrack Goulding,Goulding, forfor agreeingagreeing toto participate inin thisthis Yale Oral HistoryHistory projproj ect.ect. AsAs isis usualusual inin suchsuch cases,cases, II wouldwould likelike toto askask you toto identifyidentify whatwhat youryour positionposition waswas whenwhen youyou becamebecame associatedassociated withwith thethe UnitedUnited Nations effort, firstfirst ofof allall inin Namibia.Namibia. AtAt thatthat time,time, ofofcourse, course, thethe NamibiaNamibia operationoperation went back aa longlong timetime inin UNUN history.history. ButBut whatwhat II wouldwould likelike toto getget onon thethe recordrecord asas wewe begin, isis when you came intointo thethe picturepicture soso toto speakspeak andand whatwhat youyou werewere doingdoing there.there. Marrack Goulding: II had joinedjoined thethe UnitedUnited NationsNations SecretariatSecretariat onon thethe firstfirst ofofJanuary January 1986, succeedingsucceeding BrianBrian UrquhartUrquhart asas Under-Secretary-GeneralUnder-Secretary-General forfor SpecialSpecial PoliticalPolitical Affairs, inin which capacity II waswas inin charge ofof thethe peacekeepingpeacekeeping operationsoperations ofofthethe UnitedUnited Nations, and some aspects ofof thethe peacemakingpeacemaking effortsefforts ofofthe the UnitedUnited Nations,Nations, especiallyespecially asas regardsregards thethe Middle East and Cyprus.Cyprus. II remainedremained inin thatthat positionposition untiluntil MarchMarch ofof 1993.1993. InIn thisthis conversation II will referrefer toto whatwhat isis nownow calledcalled thethe DepartmentDepartment ofofPeacekeeping Peacekeeping Operations asas SPA,SPA, which waswas thethe officeoffice ofof SpecialSpecial PoliticalPolitical Affairs,Affairs, asas youyou remember,remember, Jim. I thinkthink that'sthat's more accurate thanthan DPKO. SoSo II waswas inin chargecharge ofofpeacekeeping, peacekeeping, andand my responsibility kicked inin whenwhen itit hadhad been establishedestablished thatthat therethere waswas aa needneed forfor aa peacekeeping operation, or whenwhen itit waswas clearclear therethere waswas goinggoing toto bebe aa needneed forfor aa 2 peacekeeping operation, as will be clear from what I have toto say both about Namibia andand about Cambodia. One of the problems was the transition from thethe peacemaking effort, from negotiation of the peace settlement into implementation that involvedinvolved thethe peacekeeping operation. It didn't work terribly well in either Namibia or Cambodia, butbut it worked much better in Central America. This was because thethe Under-Secretary General responsible for peacekeeping was brought at a very early stage intointo thethe negotiation and participation in the negotiation; and was directly responsible forfor thethe negotiation of the military aspects. JS: In Central America. MG: The peace settlement in El Salvador, whereas in Namibia, thethe key rolerole inin thethe negotiation had been played by the Americans, by Chet Crocker. The Contact Group hadhad ceased to be an effective negotiation mechanism after the Americans adopted linkage,linkage, andand the other four members of the contact group were unhappy about that.that. And soso thethe Americans went on alone. I had been very much involved inin thisthis inin my previous capacity as the British Ambassador to Angola, because at that time thethe Americans had no representation at all in Angola, and the British Ambassador was, with thethe agreement ofof Washington, one of the channels through which communications would pass toto thethe Angolan government. That, in parenthesis, involved some difficulties because thethe European Community, as it then was, didn't approve of linkage, didn't approve of what the Americans were doing. So it had to be kept a top, top secret, thatthat thethe British Ambassador was involved in this exercise. And one spent every Sunday on thethe beach, 33 withwith thethe cherschers colleguescollegues pressingpressing forfor information.information. "Somebody"Somebody mustmust bebe involved,involved, somebodysomebody mustmust bebe handlinghandling thisthis visit,"visit," '"'" theythey said,said, "Who"Who couldcould itit be,be, Mig,Mig, anyany ideaidea whowho itit couldcould be?"be?" ...... andand II alwaysalways hadhad toto playplay thethe dummydummy andand say,say, "I"I don'tdon't know."know." SoSo II hadhad beenbeen familiarfamiliar withwith thethe negotiationsnegotiations atat thatthat stage,stage, thenthen whenwhen IIjoined joined thethe UN,UN, II waswas nono longerlonger involved,involved, becausebecause thethe AmericansAmericans werewere talkingtalking toto MarttiMartti Ahtisaari,Ahtisaari, whowho hadhad beenbeen designateddesignated asas thethe firstfirst SpecialSpecial RepresentativeRepresentative ofof thethe Secretary-General,Secretary-General, andand theythey werewere notnot talkingtalking toto thethe OfficeOffice ofof SpecialSpecial PoliticalPolitical Affairs,Affairs, oror notnot much.much. AndAnd atat thatthat time,time, I'mI'm nownow talkingtalking aboutabout '87-'88,'87-'88, MarttiMartti andand CedricCedric Thornberry,Thornberry, whowho waswas hishis right-handright-hand man,man, aa veryvery efficientefficient right-handright-hand manman inin thesethese matters,matters, werewere notnot terriblyterribly keenkeen aboutabout thethe ideaidea ofof implementationimplementation beingbeing thethe responsibilityresponsibility ofof thethe OfficeOffice ofof SpecialSpecial PoliticalPolitical Affairs.Affairs. InIn particular,particular, theythey werewere notnot keenkeen aboutabout anyany ideaidea thatthat MarttiMartti wouldwould reportreport toto thethe SecretarySecretary GeneralGeneral throughthrough thethe Under-Secretary-GeneralUnder-Secretary-General forfor SpecialSpecial PoliticalPolitical Affairs.Affairs. AsAs youyou know,know, Jim,Jim, inin thethe fivefive traditionaltraditional peacekeepingpeacekeeping operationsoperations thatthat existedexisted atat thatthat time,time, thethe headhead ofof thethe operationoperation waswas aa militarymilitary officerofficer reportingreporting toto thethe Secretary-GeneralSecretary-General throughthrough