ST/DPIST/OPI ORAL HISTORY (02) G696
Yale-UN Oral History
Sir Marrack GouldinGouldingg James S. Sutterlin, IntervieweInterviewerr June 30, 19919988 Oxford, EnglanEnglandd I
f Yale-UN Oral History ProjecProjectt Marrack GouldinGouldingg James S. Sutterlin, IntervieweInterviewerr I June 30, 19919988 Oxford, EnglanEnglandd I Index: UN Peacekeeping Operations
1982 Agreement 8, 11 I Cambodia Operation 34,38-48,50,60,71 Cease-fire negotiations 59-63,65-71,73-74 Central American Peace Process 51 Cold War 5, 76 Commission for Refugees 34 -' Conflict with Angola 2,8-9, 13-14 Congo Operation 22, 40 Contras 53,55-56 - Department of Administration and Management 5-7 _r Department of Disarmament Affairs 50 Depat1ment of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) 1,32,48,52,58,65, 76 Depm1ment ofPolitical Affairs 48 ,\ Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 72 El Salvador Operation 54,58,64,66-70,72-73 Elections 18,27,38-39,56-57 Esquipulas 11II Agreement 51 Esquipulas Process 52, 55 European Community 2 'I Frente Farabundo Ma11iMat1i para la Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) 59,60-62,66-67,70-71,59,60-62,66-67, 70-71, 74 , Human rights 23,38-39,54,59 Human Rights Commission 46 International Commission for Support and Verification (CIAV) 54-56 , Civil Police (CIVPOL) 24-25 International Labor Organization (ILO) 68 Iran-Iraq negotiations 10, 12 , Khmer Rouge 36-37,42-46 Koevoet 26-28 Monroe Doctrine 56 Namibia Operation 1-7, 12-27,33, 37-39,45,49, 76 , Namibia Operation in relation to Cambodia Oper.Opel'. 25,29 Nicaragua Operation 51-61 Nongovernmental Programs (NGO) 75-76 , Organization in AfricanAfi'ican Unity (OAU)(OAD) 19-20,22 Paris Peace Conference 43 Peacemonger 9 , Permanent Five 6,33 San Juan Agreement 59 Sandinistas 52,52,5656 , Somalia Crisis 76 South African Involvement in Namibia Operation 14, 18-19,20,18-] 9, 20,23-24,26-2823-24, 26-28 , South West Africa People's Association (SWAPO) 8-9,11-14, 16,27-28 , SouthSouth WestWest AfricanAfrican PolicePolice (SW(SWAPOL)APOL) 25-26 SpecialSpecial RepresentativeRepresentative byby thethe Secretary General (SRSG) 19,21 DepartmentDepartment ofofNon-AlignedNon-Aligned Movement 20 SupremeSupreme NationalNational CouncilCouncil 44 UNUN AdvanceAdvance MissionMission inin CambodiaCambodia (UNAMIC)(UNAMIC) 35 UNUN DevelopmentDevelopment ProgramProgram (UNDP)(UNDP) 10,69 UNUN Iran-IraqIran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) 12 UNUN MissionMission toto Verify thethe Electoral Process in Nicaragua (ONUVEN) 52-53, 57 UNUN ObserverObserver Group inin Central American (ONUCA) 52-53,55-58, 74 SpecialSpecial PoliticalPolitical Affairs (SPA)(SPA) 1,3-4,6,12,16,24,32-33,52,57-58,65 UNUN ObserverObserver Missions inin el Salvador (ONUSAL) 59,69,74 UNUN SecuritySecurity Council 5-6,40-41,51 UNUN TransitionTransition Assistance Group (UNTAG) 4-5,8, 13, 17-19,21 UNUN TransitionalTransitional Authority inin Cambodia (UNTAC) 34-35,37-38,41,43,47 UnitedUnited StatesStates Congress 41,59 Yale-UNYale-UN OralOral HistoryHistory
SirSir MarrackMarrack GouldingGoulding JamesJames S.S. Sutterlin,Sutterlin, InterviewerInterviewer JuneJune 30,30, 19981998 Oxford,Oxford, EnglandEngland
James S. Sutterlin: ThisThis isis anan interviewinterview withwith SirSir MarrackMarrack Goulding,Goulding, inin Oxford,Oxford,
England, on JuneJune 30,30, 1998.1998. TheThe interviewerinterviewer isis Sutterlin.Sutterlin.
First ofof all,all, II wouldwould likelike toto thankthank you,you, SirSir MarrackMarrack Goulding,Goulding, forfor agreeingagreeing toto
participate inin thisthis Yale Oral HistoryHistory projproj ect.ect. AsAs isis usualusual inin suchsuch cases,cases, II wouldwould likelike toto askask you toto identifyidentify whatwhat youryour positionposition waswas whenwhen youyou becamebecame associatedassociated withwith thethe UnitedUnited
Nations effort, firstfirst ofof allall inin Namibia.Namibia. AtAt thatthat time,time, ofofcourse, course, thethe NamibiaNamibia operationoperation
went back aa longlong timetime inin UNUN history.history. ButBut whatwhat II wouldwould likelike toto getget onon thethe recordrecord asas wewe
begin, isis when you came intointo thethe picturepicture soso toto speakspeak andand whatwhat youyou werewere doingdoing there.there.
Marrack Goulding: II had joinedjoined thethe UnitedUnited NationsNations SecretariatSecretariat onon thethe firstfirst ofofJanuary January
1986, succeedingsucceeding BrianBrian UrquhartUrquhart asas Under-Secretary-GeneralUnder-Secretary-General forfor SpecialSpecial PoliticalPolitical
Affairs, inin which capacity II waswas inin charge ofof thethe peacekeepingpeacekeeping operationsoperations ofofthethe UnitedUnited
Nations, and some aspects ofof thethe peacemakingpeacemaking effortsefforts ofofthe the UnitedUnited Nations,Nations, especiallyespecially asas
regardsregards thethe Middle East and Cyprus.Cyprus. II remainedremained inin thatthat positionposition untiluntil MarchMarch ofof 1993.1993. InIn
thisthis conversation II will referrefer toto whatwhat isis nownow calledcalled thethe DepartmentDepartment ofofPeacekeeping Peacekeeping
Operations asas SPA,SPA, which waswas thethe officeoffice ofof SpecialSpecial PoliticalPolitical Affairs,Affairs, asas youyou remember,remember,
Jim. I thinkthink that'sthat's more accurate thanthan DPKO. SoSo II waswas inin chargecharge ofofpeacekeeping, peacekeeping, andand
my responsibility kicked inin whenwhen itit hadhad been establishedestablished thatthat therethere waswas aa needneed forfor aa
peacekeeping operation, or whenwhen itit waswas clearclear therethere waswas goinggoing toto bebe aa needneed forfor aa 2 peacekeeping operation, as will be clear from what I have toto say both about Namibia andand about Cambodia. One of the problems was the transition from thethe peacemaking effort, from negotiation of the peace settlement into implementation that involvedinvolved thethe peacekeeping operation. It didn't work terribly well in either Namibia or Cambodia, butbut it worked much better in Central America. This was because thethe Under-Secretary
General responsible for peacekeeping was brought at a very early stage intointo thethe negotiation and participation in the negotiation; and was directly responsible forfor thethe negotiation of the military aspects.
JS: In Central America.
MG: The peace settlement in El Salvador, whereas in Namibia, thethe key rolerole inin thethe
negotiation had been played by the Americans, by Chet Crocker. The Contact Group hadhad
ceased to be an effective negotiation mechanism after the Americans adopted linkage,linkage, andand
the other four members of the contact group were unhappy about that.that. And soso thethe
Americans went on alone. I had been very much involved inin thisthis inin my previous capacity
as the British Ambassador to Angola, because at that time thethe Americans had no
representation at all in Angola, and the British Ambassador was, with thethe agreement ofof
Washington, one of the channels through which communications would pass toto thethe
Angolan government. That, in parenthesis, involved some difficulties because thethe
European Community, as it then was, didn't approve of linkage, didn't approve of what
the Americans were doing. So it had to be kept a top, top secret, thatthat thethe British
Ambassador was involved in this exercise. And one spent every Sunday on thethe beach, 33 withwith thethe cherschers colleguescollegues pressingpressing forfor information.information. "Somebody"Somebody mustmust bebe involved,involved, somebodysomebody mustmust bebe handlinghandling thisthis visit,"visit," '"'" theythey said,said, "Who"Who couldcould itit be,be, Mig,Mig, anyany ideaidea whowho itit couldcould be?"be?" ...... andand II alwaysalways hadhad toto playplay thethe dummydummy andand say,say, "I"I don'tdon't know."know."
SoSo II hadhad beenbeen familiarfamiliar withwith thethe negotiationsnegotiations atat thatthat stage,stage, thenthen whenwhen IIjoined joined thethe UN,UN, II waswas nono longerlonger involved,involved, becausebecause thethe AmericansAmericans werewere talkingtalking toto MarttiMartti Ahtisaari,Ahtisaari, whowho hadhad beenbeen designateddesignated asas thethe firstfirst SpecialSpecial RepresentativeRepresentative ofof thethe Secretary-General,Secretary-General, andand theythey werewere notnot talkingtalking toto thethe OfficeOffice ofof SpecialSpecial PoliticalPolitical Affairs,Affairs, oror notnot much.much. AndAnd atat thatthat time,time,
I'mI'm nownow talkingtalking aboutabout '87-'88,'87-'88, MarttiMartti andand CedricCedric Thornberry,Thornberry, whowho waswas hishis right-handright-hand man,man, aa veryvery efficientefficient right-handright-hand manman inin thesethese matters,matters, werewere notnot terriblyterribly keenkeen aboutabout thethe ideaidea ofof implementationimplementation beingbeing thethe responsibilityresponsibility ofof thethe OfficeOffice ofof SpecialSpecial PoliticalPolitical Affairs.Affairs.
InIn particular,particular, theythey werewere notnot keenkeen aboutabout anyany ideaidea thatthat MarttiMartti wouldwould reportreport toto thethe SecretarySecretary
GeneralGeneral throughthrough thethe Under-Secretary-GeneralUnder-Secretary-General forfor SpecialSpecial PoliticalPolitical Affairs.Affairs. AsAs youyou know,know,
Jim,Jim, inin thethe fivefive traditionaltraditional peacekeepingpeacekeeping operationsoperations thatthat existedexisted atat thatthat time,time, thethe headhead ofof thethe operationoperation waswas aa militarymilitary officerofficer reportingreporting toto thethe Secretary-GeneralSecretary-General throughthrough thethe UnderUnder
Secretary-GeneralSecretary-General inin NewNew York.York. MarttiMartti didn'tdidn't wantwant toto fitfit intointo thatthat mold.mold. ThereThere waswas nevernever hostilityhostility betweenbetween MarttiMartti andand meme onon this.this. ThereThere waswas aa littlelittle bitbit ofof tensiontension withwith
Cedric,Cedric, rightright atat thethe beginning,beginning, inin thethe lastlast weeksweeks beforebefore thethe operationoperation waswas toto bebe implemented.implemented. TheThe wayway itit workedworked out,out, andand we'llwe'll comecome backback toto thisthis inin laterlater questions,questions, waswas thatthat thethe demandsdemands ofof business,business, andand thethe factfact thatthat (I'm(I'm bangingbanging mymy ownown drumdrum here)here) wewe ranran
quitequite anan efficientefficient operationoperation atat SPA,SPA, meantmeant thatthat MarttiMartti waswas onon thethe telephonetelephone toto meme allall thethe
time.time. HeHe couldn'tcouldn't getget toto PerezPerez dede CuellarCu611ar onon thethe phonephone allall thethe time,time, soso thethe workwork tendedtended toto
comecome throughthrough me.me. DeDe facto,facto, aa relationshiprelationship developeddeveloped inin whichwhich afterafter thethe meetingsmeetings ofof thethe 4
Namibia Task Force, it was I who would draft the instructions and send themthem inin mymy namename to Martti. This never created any problem at all between us; we had a very honest relationship once he was there on the ground; it worked very well-one of thethe bestbest operations we've ever had.
JS: Yes, I think that's the general consensus, but what you say isis particularly interesting because one ofthe reasons that is usually given for thethe great success inin
Namibia was the extensive planning that took place in advance, thethe planning forfor
UNTAG. And to what extent was SPA involved in that?
MG: To a very little extent. Except that General Timothy Dibuama, who was thethe military advisor (at that time I think to the Secretary-General; or maybe he was stillstill military advisor to the Under-Secretaries-General for Special Political Affairs), waswas thethe person who advised Martti and Cedric about the military aspects. And he was closeclose toto
Prem Chand.
[Interruption]
MG: Timothy Dibuama was the person who was the main source of military adviceadvice toto
Martti and Cedric. He had been working on the Namibia file for a longlong time.time. HeHe gotgot onon well with Prem Chand, who a long time previously had been designated as thethe ForceForce
Commander for the eventual UNTAG. He kept me informed of what was going onon inin general terms, but it wasn't until the last few weeks that thethe civilian part of SPA waswas
brought into the planning. 55
JS: I see, because therethere was some controversy inin thethe SecuritySecurity CouncilCouncil asas toto thethe budget.
MG:MO: Well, let me move back a bit, Jim. TheThe operationoperation hadhad beenbeen onon thethe booksbooks forfor aa long time, been in prospect for a longlong time.time. QuiteQuite aa lotlot ofof workwork hadhad beenbeen donedone beforebefore II arrived, including by Brian, I think,think, inin thethe early'early' 80s,80s, aboutabout thethe operationoperation andand thethe peoplepeople in FOD, or whatever itit was called then,then, perhaps itit waswas calledcalled somethingsomething different,different, wasn'twasn't it? Anyway, the function became FOD and nownow FALD,FALD, theythey hadhad beenbeen out,out, andand donedone allall their quantity surveying.
JS: The Field Office, you mean.
MG: Field Office, that'sthat's right. They had donedone theirtheir work,work, soso aa greatgreat dealdeal ofof informationinformation was available, indeed planning documents werewere availableavailable inin the,the, whateverwhatever itit waswas calledcalled then, the Department of Administration and Management.Management. CedricCedric hadhad veryvery muchmuch gotgot onon top of those, and Martti at thatthat timetime was Under-Secretary-GeneralUnder-Secretary-General ofof AdministrationAdministration andand
Management. The other thingthing which he andand CedricCedric hadhad donedone veryvery wellwell waswas toto identifyidentify
staff members who could fill civilian posts inin UNTAGUNTAG whenwhen itit waswas fielded.fielded. ItIt waswas aa greatgreat
achievement; I do have a great admiration forfor them.them. TheyThey didn'tdidn't justjust gogo aroundaround thethe usualusual
political bits ofthe Secretariat; theythey went intointo thethe economiceconomic andand socialsocial sectionssections andand gotgot
some extremely good people. So itit was veryvery wellwell plannedplanned inin thatthat respect.respect. ThenThen suddenlysuddenly
the negotiation accelerated: end of thethe Cold War,War, SovietsSoviets startedstarted helping,helping, andand soso on.on. TheThe
planning accelerated, and we inin SPA were broughtbrought in.in. ItIt turnedturned outout atat thatthat stagestage thatthat thethe 6 size of the operation, especially on the military side, was more thanthan thethe major powers feltfelt willing to finance, and the usual paring down exercise took place.
At one time we also discussed a proposal by a commercial firm-a sort of "Brown andand
Root-type firm"-tofirm "_to do the whole ofthe logistic side as a commercial contract. ButBut therethere was a general feeling that that was not an avenue to go down. I personally thinkthink wewe should have explored it a bit more. It was understandable thatthat thethe people who had beenbeen working in Administration and Management on planning thisthis operation forfor a longlong timetime felt they had a vested interest and wanted to do it themselves. I thinkthink it'sit's arguable, eveneven though this operation did cornecome out under-budget, that it would have been quite interesting to have contracted out the logistics, as was done subsequently, toto a limitedlimited extent, in other operations.
But there was a crisis about the budget, because the major powers wanted toto reducereduce it,it, and as a result the budget was, as you say in your question, adopted only on thethe firstfirst ofof
March, one month before the operation. And 11 days, no, 12 days, 13 days after thethe
Security Council resolution. That's fantastically quick by modern standards. The average now is six months between a Security Council decision and thethe adoption ofof thethe budget. Again that says a lot for the preparation that had been done inin Administration and Management, that the budget could be adopted so quickly. It had toto massaged aa bitbit when the Permanent Five insisted on reduction in the military, and therethere were delays. ButBut
I don't think myself that the budgetary issue was a major cause of delay inin thethe deployment of force. It was simply the problem of getting thethe troopstroops out therethere inin time.time. 7
[Note by M.G. on 2 June 2000: having since read inin papers and my own diariesdiaries forfor thisthis time, I now believe the budgetary argument was a major cause of delay.]
JS: Could you elaborate a little bit on that, because thisthis isis often cited, thethe budgetbudget isis often cited, including by the former Secretary-General, as one of thethe reasonsreasons whywhy thethe
troops were not there.
MO:MG: I think, I can't remember, or maybe I didn't even know, because II wasn'twasn't terriblyterribly
involved in the deployment stages of this operation. But II thinkthink thethe problem maymay havehave
been that yes, the troop contributing countries had been identified,identified, and knewknew whatwhat theythey
were expected to provide. I can remember going toto Finland inin about' 87,87, andand beingbeing
shown all the kits sitting in the store ready to go. The budgetary delay mademade itit difficultdifficult
for Administration and Management to charter thethe ships needed, and thethe heavyheavy aircraft,aircraft,
because they couldn't enter into financial commitments without thethe budgetary provisionprovision
being there. I don't know the detail of this, James, I'm afraid.
JS: And you were not involved in the decisions, out of necessity, toto orderorder somesome ofof thethe
equipment from South Africa?
MG: No. 8
JS: Then let's go on to your visit to the region in March, to be particular, to Angola, where you had conversations. How would you describe the impressions that you gained
at that time in talking to Nujoma?
MG: Well, my impression was that we had a problem with Nujoma. And your book, or
Javier's book, accurately reflects what he said to me in the conversation which we had on
the 25 thth of March, was it? The 26thth of March.
JS: That's just about right.
MG: Having read my diary of that time this morning, I have to say I'm surprised at how
relaxed they were, or I seem to have been, about the evidence that Nujoma rejected the
1982 agreement. I suspect that this was because I had seen the previous evening, the
evening ofthe 25 thth ofMarch...what were these dates? Anyway,AnywaY,justjust before I saw Sam, I
saw dos Santos. I1 prepared carefully, I'm reading from my diary, "IItl prepared carefully for
the meeting. It went better than I1 expected. Dos Santos tried to escape thethe subj ect of
SWAPO bases, but eventually said that Angola would honor thethe commitments itit had
accepted in 1982, that an UNTAG military delegation could return toto Luanda early next
week, and that by then the necessary Angolan liaisonliaison officers would have been
nominated,lInominated,lt The next day began with a sparky meeting with Sam Nujoma. He launched
straight into our working paper on Angolan monitoring of SWSWAPOAPO bases. He said thisthis
was totallytotally unacceptable, and itit goes on as inin your book. I thinkthink thatthat I must have been
lulled intointo a false...... or intointo under-rating thethe seriousness ofwhat Nujoma had said-by thethe • 9 belief that dos Santos was going to get him intointo line.line. If!If! cancan saysay inin self-defense,self-defense, we'dwe'd
• seen a lot ofdos Santos getting Nujoma intointo lineline inin thethe precedingpreceding monthsmonths asas thosethose • negotiations were brought to conclusion. Dos Santos had alwaysalways wantedwanted toto getget SWAPOSWAPO out of Angola. The change in the Soviet position-the willingness ofof thethe SovietsSoviets toto workwork
• with Crocker-ledCracker-led him to see a possibility of doing that.that. AndAnd ofof coursecourse hehe hadhad alreadyalready • conceded the point about the withdrawal of Cuban troops.troops. II mademade aa mistake.mistake. Now the only thing I question inin your book isis where JavierJavier sayssays hehe didn'tdidn't getget thethe
• thth III letter, or the report, until the 28 .. I'm not sure quite how thatthat happened.happened. TheThemeetingmeeting rdrd with Nujoma had been on the 23 ,, that's right. As farfar as II cancan telltell fromfrom thethe diary,diary, II diddid aa
III long cable drafting session on the evening of thethe day I'dI'd seenseen Nujoma.Nujoma. I'dI'd seenseen dosdos
nd rdrd .. Santos on the 22 ; I saw Nujoma on thethe 23 ;; and thatthat evening II hadhad aa longlong cablecable writingwriting session. And then I had two days, a weekend, toto spend inin ZimbabweZimbabwe beforebefore goinggoing backback toto
Itf"" ," the Middle East. And I can't believe I would have spent thatthat weekendweekend goinggoing downdown toto It Greater Zimbabwe without having sent thethe report toto JavierJavier aboutabout thethe importantimportant conversations. At that time I thought thatthat dos Santos was moremore importantimportant thanthan NujomaNujoma
It1 thth was. So I don't know how Javier didn't see thethe reportreport until thethe 2828 ,, whetherwhether itit gotgot lostlostinin It1 the machine in New York, or... [Note by M.G. on 2 JuneJune 2000:2000: II havehave nownow donedone somesome It1 research on this which will, I hope, be published inin my bookbook Peacemonger,Peacemonger, aa copycopy ofof thisthis ~ draft will be sent separately to J.S.] ~ JS: Well that is really something thatthat requires clarification becausebecause therethere isis thatthat timetime ~ lapse which again, some people have suggested, was one ofof thethe reasonsreasons thethe UnitedUnited Nations was not adequately prepared. • 10 I
MO:MG: I also did a letter, a cable writing session, the diary tells me, on the evening of thethe
thth • 28 • But by that time, I was in Tehran. I was writing about the difficult negotiations II 11 had with the revolutionary guards in Tehran about the plotting ofthe no-man's landland 11 between Iran and Iraq.
III JS: Where would the cable most likely have gone out? Angola, or from ...... ? III IJI MO:MG: It would have gone out from Zimbabwe, I would guess. ..11' JS: Zimbabwe? MO:MG: I was being looked after by UNDP in Harare. Of course they wouldn't have had .. code cables. I suppose it is conceivable I kept the cable with me until I got to code .. facilities in Tehran. It would be interesting to know the date on that cable ......
III J8: Right, because that is one ofthe mysteries ofthis particular operation. At leastleast .. thatthat clarifies that you wrote the cablecable..
.. MO:MG: I certainly wrote the cable and as is clear from Javier's book, I clearly gave a fullfull ~ account ofthe conversation with Nujoma, didn't hide the obstreperousness ofNujoma. ,.~ I'd be interested to know what the cable said about the previous meeting with dos Santos on the previous evening, when he was categorical: they were going to do what theythey said ~ ,.~ 11 1111
11 they would do, which was to monitor the SWAPOSWAPO bases in Angola. That was in the 1982 11 document.
11 Can I say in parenthesis, and thisthis isis not to be a self-excuse, that that episode is one 11 illustration of thethe great problems you can get into if you start amending an agreement that'sthat's already been adopted, without making sure that all the parties to that agreement are
11 equally aware of thethe amendment and have an equal perception ofwhat they think it 11 impliesimplies for them.them. If I may make a criticism of JJavier,avier, I think that he had a slight tendency not toto be as open as possible. The classic case was the Western Sahara, where the
11 Moroccans and thethe Polisario were allowed toto have very different views of what they'd IJI agreed toto and what was going toto happen. I thinkthink myself, painful though it can be sometimes and time-consumingtime-consuming thoughthough itit can be-it may delay thingsthings as much as two
IJI years-you've got toto get thethe twotwo sides 'round'round thethe table,table, and say: "This isis thethe amendment III we've agreed to,to, and thisthis isis what we, thethe UN, thinkthink ofthis,this, and are you sure, both sure III thatthat you accept that?1Ithat?1I That didn't happen inin thethe case of thethe 1982 agreement. .. JS: I'dI'd likelike toto go further intointo thethe Western Sahara part, because some studies have .. come out recently which have been very critical of Perez de Cu611arCuellar inin thatthat connectionconnection.. .. MG: Rightly so,so, inin my judgment.judgment. ~ JS:JS: That isis covered inin his book at somesome length,length, it'sit's certainly not his view, but thatthat he
~ was overly under thethe influence,influence, somesome might say,say, of thethe King of Morocco. - - 12
MO:MG: II thinkthink he was overly trustfultrustful ofIssa Diallo. He delegated a great deal ofthat negotiation toto IssaIssa Diallo.
JS:JS: That's true.true.
MO:MG: EverybodyEverybody gets accused of being unduly influencedinfluenced by thethe Moroccans. That's thethe absolutelyabsolutely standardstandard...... perez de Cuellar, Boutros-Ohali,Boutros-Ghali, Ooulding,Goulding, everyone, all "have beenbeen paidpaid byby thethe Moroccans."Moroccans." That's not true.true. Moroccans can be very generous inin theirtheir hospitality;hospitality; oneone hashas toto bebe carefulcareful notnot toto be sortsort of misled intointo that.that. But II don't believe anyoneanyone waswas over-influencedover-influenced byby thethe KingKing ofof Morocco.Morocco. II do thinkthink thatthat JavierJavier allowed himselfhimself toto bebe deludeddeluded byby IssaIssa intointo thinkingthinking therethere waswas moremore common ground between thethe partiesparties thanthan therethere was.was.
JS:JS: Well,Well, toto gogo backback toto Namibia,Namibia, whatwhat waswas thethe reactionreaction inin thethe Secretariat,Secretariat, andand particularlyparticularly SPA,SPA, whenwhen thethe incursionsincursions byby SWAPOSWAPO diddid taketake place,place, andand thethe UNUN waswas notnot
quitequite prepared?prepared?
MO:MG: WellWell I'mI'm notnot inin aa positionposition toto answeranswer that,that, James,James, becausebecause II hadhad beenbeen sentsent downdown toto
AngolaAngola toto talktalk toto NujomaNujoma andand dosdos SantosSantos aboutabout thisthis problem,problem, aboutabout thethe SWAPOSWAPO bases,bases, inin
thethe lastlast weekweek ofofMarch. March. II wentwent toto themthem butbut foundfound theythey weren'tweren't there;there; they'dthey'd gonegone toto
ZimbabweZimbabwe forfor thisthis Front-LineFront-Line StatesStates meeting.meeting. II followedfollowed themthem there,there, toto Harare,Harare, andand II sawsaw
themthem bothboth there.there. II thenthen wentwent offoffto to Iran-IraqIran-Iraq toto visitvisit UNIIMOO.UNIIMOG. II waswas justjust comingcoming outout 1313 afterafter thatthat visit,visit, whenwhen thisthis horrorhorror happenedhappened onon thethe firstfirst ofofApril. April. II camecame outout fromfrom Baghdad,Baghdad, andand thenthen II camecame toto Amman,Amman, andand thenthen II gotgot thethe messagemessage fromfrom NaNa JahJah toto gogo toto LuandaLuanda asas quicklyquickly asas possible,possible, whichwhich II did.did. ItIt waswas aa hellhell ofofaajourneyjourney fromfrom AmmanAmman toto CairoCairo toto
Addis,Addis, toto Kigali,Kigali, toto Bujumbura,Bujumbura, toto Luanda.Luanda. ThenThen II spentspent almostalmost aa wholewhole monthmonth inin
Angola.Angola. II didn'tdidn't getget backback toto NewNew YorkYork untiluntil aboutabout thethe secondsecond oror thirdthird ofof May.May. SoSo II can'tcan't telltell you what thethe reactionreaction at headquartersheadquarters was toto thethe reportsreports fromfrom Ahtisaari,Ahtisaari, nornor waswas II present during PdC's telephonetelephone conversation with Pik [Botha].[Botha]. II was inin Luanda, inin
Angola, for most of April. Initially inin Luanda, then inin Lubango, tryingtrying toto get all
concerned, which included Nujoma, who was down in the south by about the tenth of
April, and the Chief of Staff of the Angolan army, to get the SWAPO fighters back under
some kind ofmonitoring. It was only when that had been done, and the diplomatic
process in South Africa, with the Americans and the Russians and the Cubans and so on,
had come to a successful conclusion that I was released and went down to South Africa.
Or rather, I went down to Namibia to see how UNTAG was getting on. Then I spent a
day in Praetoria and then came back to New York.
1S: Did you find thatthat thethe SWAPO camps were ever effectively monitored by thethe
Angolans?Angolans?
MG:MO: ItIt waswas veryvery difficultdifficult toto getget accessaccess toto them.them. II think.think. thatthat theythey werewere effectivelyeffectively
monitoredmonitored afterafter thethe ladslads hadhad beenbeen gotgot backback fromfrom Namibia-theNamibia-the survivors.survivors. II don'tdon't believebelieve
therethere waswas anyany AngolanAngolan intentintent toto monitormonitor themthem beforehand.beforehand. II don'tdon't thinkthink thatthat thatthat waswas
withwith malicemalice aforethought;aforethought; itit waswas obviouslyobviously notnot inin Angola'sAngola's interestinterest thatthat thethe NamibianNamibian 14 operation should fail. I think it was partly a mistaken belief, which I shared, that theythey had got Nujoma under control; partly, an assessment that it really couldn't be in Nujoma's interest to do this; and partly Angolan inefficiency. They just didn't get their officers intointo the camps in time. Some ofthose areas, in the South, had become kind of "no-go" areas.
SWAPOSWAPO had been there such a long time, and they were so security-conscious. They didn't want anyone to see the preparations they were making very cautiously when thethe war was still going on. And so the Angolans didn't have a sort of database, as it were, for immediately switching on a system of monitoring. But I think that the debacle at thethe beginning ofApril it was very threatening to the Angolans. The Cuban withdrawal was underway. Ifthe whole Namibia thing broke down, they would be naked in front ofthethe
South African forces. So they did get SWAPOSWAPO under control.
JS: Did you reach any conclusions yourself as to why SWAPO undertook these incursions?
MO:MG: No, I couldn't understand it, and I still can't understand it. I talked a lot toto thethe
NarnibianNamibian I knew best (because I saw a lot of him when I was Ambassador in Angola),
Hidipo Hamutsuya, who was the Secretary of Information. He was very evasive and
embarrassed about this. Theo-Ben Gurirab later on was equally evasive and embarrassed.
I think it was foolishness, straightforward foolishness on Sam's part. I quite respect Sam,
I think he's done extraordinarily well as President of Namibia. I think he's shown
statesmanship, he's shown a capacity to listen to good advice and act on it. I think thatthat
was reciprocated by a lot of statesmanship on the South Africans' side. The way both of III 1155
I them encouraged the whites to stay in Namibia; the way both of them were patient about I Walvis Bay and didn't allow it to become an issue between the newly independent Namibia and South Africa: that was real statesmanship. Namibia has benefited very I much from it. So I've become an admirer of Sam. I wasn't much of an admirer when we 11 were neighbors in Rwanda. He used to come down because he liked my then-wife's cucumber sandwiches and strawberry cake and tea, but he was always strident) he had an • infantile anti-imperialist attitude. But I got to know him pretty well during those three or •~ four weeks in southern Angola. He was then a terribly troubled man) because of the ".-" .. ,., casualties he had suffered and the rap he was getting, including from his old friends the • Russians, for doing something so foolish. Of course he was very unpopular with the IJ Angolans, and he was a sobered man. But I just can't understand why he made the IJ mistake in the first place. , JS:J8: Now were you back in New York at the time the task force was formed? iJ MG: The task force was formed as a response to the crisis in April. And I got back and
iJ. , /· found that it was at times an almost hysterical body. The hysteria was led by Viru III [Dayal]. Aby Farah was there but didn't join in. James [Jonah], I think, was there, and hewas a bit hysterical too.
",.cb' 11k.'! ' , J8: Yes he was a member. • 16 MG: It took quite an effort. When I came back, I was very unpopular. It was fact thatthat
• a) I had failed to give adequate warning that this was going to happen; b) I had been tootoo • ready to agree with Ahtisaari about the inescapability of letting the South African troopstroops • go out and deal with this incursion. It was felt I'd taken an anti-SWAPO position. Snide III references were made to the fact that Mrs. Thatcher was in Windhoek on the first of April or the second of April, I think. And I found that the task force had become a kind of oldold-
IJ fashioned Non-Aligned Movement body. Carl Fleischhaurer was the voice of common
sense there, but he was also the lawyer. It was quite a political job to persuade these /7' JJ~"., JJ people of some ofthe realities on the ground and to persuade them that we were beyond the stage where we were going to strike anti-South African poses. It was a real operation,
IJ, a settlement plan was being implemented. It wasn't the South Africans who had broken
the rules from Day One; it was SWAPO. This was something that we couldn't turn a
.IJI""".:,...... blind eye to. We obviously didn't want to-or I didn't want to-accuse anybody,
IJI-.J\"}/-,..:> because I wanted to get the thing back on track. I think that we succeeded in the end. IJI Timothy Dibuama was very helpful in this. Brave, sometimes. We did succeed in getting
IJI some common sense into the task force. And then the task force began working. Again itit IJI will sound as though I am beating my own drum, but the reason why, one of the reasons why it began to work, was realistic common sense. Second was that once I got back, SPA
IJl was providing a very good service as the secretariat, as it were, ofthe task force. The
cables came first to us, we made sure they were distributed; we prepared drafts inin timetime forfor
the daily meeting of the task force. We took action on the decisions taken. The meetings
finished at 6:00 or 7:00, so we in SPA stayed very late sending off the mass of cables of • 17 instructions overnight to Ahtisaari. So things began to work very welL I would say that • by, certainly by the time Javier [Perez de Cuellar] went out there in July, by sort ofthe • middle of June, things were working pretty well, and the ship had regained its stability.
• JS: Now that's from the point ofview ofNew York, so to speak. I recall myselfthat • in this rapid formation of the task force, there was a sense that UNTAG, and in particular 11 Martti Ahtisaari, was out of control, and that there had to be more control exercised from 11 New York. Did you sense that?
11 MG: Very much so. I was regarded as the enemy by the task force, because I had been ..r hob-nobbing with Ahtisaari the previous week. And had gone with him to either Pretoria or Cape Town. They thought that was a terrible thing, I shouldn't have done that, I was • told. Viru [Dayal] said, "You should not have gone to Cape Town." I think I didn't get their permission to go. The easiest way was to get out was to get into South Africa and •.. fly out from there. III JS: Now you mentioned earlier Cedric Thornberry. I believe ifI'm not mistaken, he III was one ofthe sources of distrust, so to speak, on the part of the people in New York.
Ill...~?, .. MG: Correct. Cedric had many enemies for all sorts of reasons, and there was a
distinct anti-Cedric focus sometimes in the task force. I 18]8
I JS:JS: WhichWhichperhaps perhaps addedadded toto thethe distrustdistrust thatthat thethe tasktask forceforce hadhad ofofwhat what waswas goinggoing onon I inUNTAG.in UNTAG.
11 MO:MG: II thinkthink that'sthat's right,right, butbut II repeat,repeat, Jim,Jim, thatthat II wouldwould guessguess thatthat byby thethe middle of June 11 (I(I wouldwould havehave toto consultconsult mymy diariesdiaries moremore carefully),carefully), wewe werewere backback on course and yes, therethere werewere differencesdifferences ofof opinion,opinion, butbut therethere wasn'twasn't by thenthen thethe assumption that Ahtisaari
11 andand ThornberryThornberry mustmust bebe gettinggetting tootoo much involvedinvolved with the South Africans. And I would IJI saysay thatthat thethe problemsproblems thenthen were not actually relations between UNTAG and New York, butbut thethe problem was within UNTAO,UNTAG, it was a Prem Chand problem. That was quite a
11 severe problem, and it was never really resolved. [Note by M.G.: having now consulted 11 my diaries, I see that this was an over-rosy recollection. The tensions continued atat leastleast , until the elections in November.] , JS: You're talking now about thethe appointment ofofthethe DeputyDeputy toto Ahtisaari.Ahtisaari.
• MG:MO: That's right.right. PremPrem waswas perceivedperceived asas beingbeing farfar tootoo closeclose toto thethe SouthSouth Africans.Africans. • AndAnd PremPrem waswas perceivedperceivedasasbeingbeingsomeonesomeonewhowhowaswasoutsideoutsideAhtisaariAhtisaari's'scontrol.control. •, JS:JS: WhenWhen youyou saysay perceived,perceived, nownow where,where, inin NewNew York?York? , MG:MG: InIn NewNew York,York, yes.yes. PremPrem had,had, II thinkthink forfor genuinegenuine logisticlogistic reasons,reasons, insistedinsisted onon havinghaving hishis headquarters,headquarters, hishis ownown office,office, notnot inin Martti'sMartti's office,office, butbut downdown byby thethe otherother sideside , ofof town,town, byby thethe headquartersheadquarters ofof thethe militarymilitary component.component. AndAnd thatthat createdcreated a a geographicalgeographical , , 1919 divide, and a certain policy divide. Prem was aa veryvery sensitivesensitive person.person. HeHe didn'tdidn't likelike
Cedric much. He didn't really accept, II thinkthink itit isis fairfair toto say,say, thatthat therethere waswas aa civiliancivilian command in this field operation. He'd been Force CommanderCommander inin Cyprus,Cyprus, wherewhere yes,yes, there had been a civilian official, but Prem was very muchmuch thethe bossboss inin Cyprus.Cyprus. II thinkthink hehe always thought he would be very much thethe boss inin Namibia.Namibia. HeHe hadhad establishedestablished closeclose personal relations with some of thethe South African generals,generals, andand theythey likedliked him.him. WhenWhen hehe found that he was being reined inin politically by Martti,Martti, hehe didn'tdidn't likelike itit veryvery much.much.
JS: Well I think the real crisis came when itit waswas decideddecided thatthat therethere hadhad toto bebe anan
African deputy. At that point, he wrote a private letterletter submittingsubmitting hishis resignationresignation toto thethe
Secretary-General.
MG: I don't think I knew that.that.
JS: Well it was never released. Handwritten.
MG: This was something thatthat we feltfelt we hadhad toto do,do, itit waswas almostalmost thethe priceprice thatthat thethe
OAD was demanding, iftheythey were going toto reestablishreestablish confidenceconfidence inin UNTAG.UNTAG. AnAn
African deputy SRSG and an African deputy forceforce commander.commander. OpandeOpande turnedturned outout toto bebe
very good. He was a well-chosen officer, he got onon veryvery wellwell withwith Prem,Prem, alsoalso hadhad aa bitbit ofof
military tradition, and very correct as a soldier.soldier. 2200
JS: Going back to that subject, of course there was extensive criticism among GAUGAD members of Ahtisaari. How influential did you find these criticisms of thethe GAD members within the task force?
MG: Very strong. As I say, the task force when I got back seemed likelike a department ofof the Non-Aligned Movement, and so in that context, criticisms by thethe GAU,GAD, thethe regionalregional organization concerned, had a big impact.
JS: There's one question I wanted to be rather specific on. It was often said, actually erroneously, that Martti Ahtisaari took the decision to agree toto thethe release of thethe South
African soldiers from cantonment on his own. I don't know where you were at thisthis particular point.
MG: I was in the air, it was a long journey.
JS: But in fact, there is in the record a clear indication that Ahtisaari did consult thethe
Secretary-General, and the Secretary-General reluctantly had agreed. Can you elaborate on that at all?
MG: I've always believed that to be the case. I think itit was unfortunate thatthat Mrs.
Thatcher was around at that time. Because this enabled people toto say, "It's justjust AhtisaariAhtisaari being manipulated by Mrs. Thatcher. But I know Ahtisaari pretty well, and toto me it'sit's 2121 inconceivableinconceivable thatthat hehe wouldwould taketake aa positionposition ofof thatthat kindkind withoutwithout consultingconsulting thethe SecretarySecretary-
General.General. He'sHe's aa veryvery politicallypolitically sensitivesensitive andand correctcorrect person,person, Martti.Martti.
JS:JS: WellWell it'sit's clearlyclearly inin thethe recordrecord thatthat hehe diddid consult.consult. ButBut II waswas justjust wondering,wondering, becausebecause thethe oppositeopposite impressionimpression doesdoes exist,exist, andand II wonderedwondered whetherwhether youyou hadhad any,any, couldcould elucidate why thisthis opposite impression,impression, and perhaps Mrs. Thatcher's presence was one reason.reason.
MG: I suspect that the atmosphere that prevailed inin thethe task force at that time, and as I say, still prevailed when I got back at the beginning of May, was an atmosphere in which people were inclined to forget that Martti had consulted the 8-G. There was a tendency to blame everything on UNTAG headquarters.
JS: That's another element, and that's why this question is here, about the conversation with Botha that the Secretary-General had, because the question did come up in that conversation, also. But you were not there, so you can't...
MG: No, I'm afraid I can't comment on that.
JS: In fact, nobody else was present at that particular point. I want to go now to a more positive aspect, thethe Namibian......
MG: Was itit Legwaila oror Opande thatthat causedcaused Prem ChChandand toto threatenthreaten toto resign?resign? 2222
JS: Well Prem Chand did not know who the deputy was going to be.
MG: But it was the deputy SRSG that he objected to, not the deputy force commander?
JS: That's right. Because he had assumed that he was filling that role.
MG: Now I do remember that. Now I can remember. I got a magnificent letter from him, that he didn't write about resignation, but I remember him being very upset by it.it, yes.
JS: Because once a deputy would be appointed, then he would of course loselose thatthat role.
MG: ...ofbeing in charge in Ahtisaari's absence. Absolutely, that'sthat's right.
JS: That's right.
MG: And there was some documentary thing,thing, wasn't therethere somesome reportreport way back at thethe planning stage that said thatthat thethe force commander would be deputy toto thethe Special
Representative? I thinkthink thatthat actually we were changing thethe written rules.rules.
JS: That I don't know, thatthat II don't know.know. ButBut of course asas wewe havehave alreadyalready said,said, therethere was great pressure fromfrom thethe GAD toto put inin an African. ButBut PremPrem ChandChand diddid staystay on,on, atat I 2233 11 least. But I want to go to the positive side, and get your assessment onon that,that, because onon the whole, the Namibia operation, I think, isis viewed as an enormous success,success, oneone oftheofthe
11 greatest successes. What, from your perspective, what were thethe elementselements thatthat reallyreally lentlent ,~ the success to the operation? MG: It had been long and thoroughly planned. The settlement waswas aa goodgood settlement,settlement, aa
11 well-negotiated settlement, with one exception of thisthis codicil, inin 1982,1982, whichwhich ledled toto
trouble. Thirdly, I would say that the leadership was very professional, thatthat MarttiMartti andand Cedric formedfonned a very professional, and imaginative,imaginative, leadership.leadership. ThereThere hadn'thadn't beenbeen aa UNUN peacekeeping operation of this kind before. I've already spokenspoken aboutabout theirtheir readinessreadiness toto ,• bring in outsiders, people outside the politico-military part of thethe Secretariat.Secretariat. TheyThey werewere very conscious ofpublic relations, and organized thatthat extremely well.well. TheyThey werewere goodgood onon • the police side. We hadn't had police on thisthis scale-not sincesince thethe Congo,Congo, anyway.anyway. AndAnd , the fact that the police commissioner was from thethe IrishIrish Republic helped,helped, andand CedricCedric tooktook , a great interest in the police, because he had a human rightsrights background. AndAnd finally,finally, II have to say that the South Africans were easy people toto workwork with;with; perhapsperhaps notnot easy,easy, butbut
reliable people to work with. That was not thethe perceptionperception inin thethe tasktask force.force. ThereThere itit waswas ,,:/ , thought that the South Africans were cheating allall thethe time.time. VeryVery oftenoften II hadhad toto bebe thethe lone voice in the task force, "They are not cheating. You'reYou're assumingassuming they'rethey're cheating."cheating." , Ahtisaari's not reporting they'rethey're cheating. And ifif youyou looklook atat thethe texts,texts, they'rethey're notnot f cheating. And Carl would often support me onon thatthat point.point. .... ,~ The South African officials on thethe ground, especiallyespecially thethe military,military, hatedhated thethe ordersorders I~: they were getting, but theythey were very correct, andand ratherrather strictstrict inin discipline,discipline, soso theythey L~ 2244 carried out the orders-with ill grace, it is true, but in the end they did what they were told to do. That meant that you could rely upon them. It wouldn't be pleasant, but you could rely upon them to do what they were told to do. That's very often not the case in these situations, where officials will find ways of twisting or ignoring their orders. But in
Namibia it was the case and as a result, we came out, as I say, ahead of schedule and below budget.
JS: Now there are two, three questions that arise from that. One pertains precisely to police, to CIVPOL. As you say, it seems to have been a success in Namibia, whereas elsewhere it's been problematic. And I wondered how were the CIVPOL personnel selected? Did SPA, was it involved in this or not?
MG: No, this is done in Administration and Management. And as I recall, Cedric, I think, got the commissioner to come to New York and help with the recruitment. As in the case of military personnel, we asked governments to send contingents of police
officers, and the quality they sent varied very much. It varied very much because the
structures and chains of command and procedures of police forces vary much more from
country to country than in the case of military forces. And so getting homogeneity was
quite difficult.
JS: Well)Well, the interesting point here isis that in the case ofNamibia itit seemed toto have
worked, whereas inin talking toto Mr...... 2525
END OF TAPE 1, SIDE 1
BEGINNING OF TAPE 1, SIDE 2
JS: ...that CIVPOL seems to have been a weak element in Cambodia, and a strong element in Namibia. How would you account for that?
MG: In Namibia, you had a very efficient structured, disciplined police force for the
UN-CIVPOL people to work with. You didn't have that in Cambodia.
JS: You're referring to SWAPOL now.
MG:MO: Yes. SWAPOL were professional policemen; they did horrendous things but they were professional policemen. And other professional policemen found they could work with them. I come back to the point, Jim, that in the end they did what they were told, even though they didn't like it.
JS: Now, in Namibia also, there was almost a tripartite structure, where you had political officers in the field, you had the peacekeeping military contingent, and you had the CIVPOL. They worked apparently well together. What do you have to say about that,that, because it'sit's a rather unusual structure.
MG: I would say that good leadership from the center, spreading this ethos of cooperation, good selection of thethe district chiefs, or whatever they were called (I come I 2266 I back to Martti and Cedric's skill inin thethe selection ofthethe people) andand thirdly,thirdly, IIwouldwould saysay that after the initial disaster was overcome, itit was a tremendouslytremendously positivepositive atmosphereatmosphere
I there. People really felt that they were pioneers, thingsthings werewere goinggoing well,well, theythey lovedloved thethe
country. It was very exciting, and itit was very happy. There waswas nobodynobody whQwhQ feltfelt thatthat
- they were being sidelined, that they didn't have enough toto do,do, exceptexcept forfor PremPrem Chand.Chand. AA - very happy mission. [Note by M.G.,M.O., 2 June 2000: another over-rosyover-rosy recollection.]recollection.]
11,0' 11 JS: Now you mentioned SWAPOL. There were somesome problemsproblems with,with, II don'tdon't knowknow how to pronounce it, Koevoet, were you involvedinvolved inin tryingtrying toto bringbring thatthat underunder controlcontrol atat
11 all? 11 MG:MO: Yes, very much so, it was discussed a lotlot inin thethe tasktask force.force. RepresentationsRepresentations werewere • made to the South Africans. And reading my diary, quite earlyearly on,on, itit said,said, theythey hadhad beenbeen disbanded. l J"~..
' .. JS: That's right.
" MG: They went on covertly for a while.
JS: In the north, apparently.
MG: Yes. 2277
JS: ... and the Secretary-General, Perez de Cuellar,Cuetlar, took it up repeatedly) I think, with
the South Africans.
MG: Including when he went out in July, as I recall.
JS: Right. And that brings me to another question. There was a remarkable, when itit
actually came to the elections, the political parties, the various political parties, worked
rather harmoniously together. The Secretary-General, when he went out there as you said
in July, held a meeting with the various leaders of the different political parties. The first
time this perhaps had been done. Did you, from your perspective) I guess at that point inin
New York, did you find that the Secretary-General did have an impact in that visit toto
Namibia, which followed a short stay in South Africa, I believe?
MG: Preceded it, I believe.
JS: Or preceded, yes.
MG: I was with him on that.
JS: You were with him on that trip, and you were actually present when he met with
the leaders?
MG: Correct. 2288
JS: What was your impression?
MG: That the DTA, that's what it was called, Dirk Mudge's outfit was prettypretty
withdrawn, and suspicious. Suspicious that thethe UN was pro-SWAPO, workingworking withwith
SWAPO. But all the others were tremendously excited, thethe Secretaty-GeneralSecretal)'-General ofof thethe
United Nations there, they're having a meeting with him, thisthis place a sortsort ofof shutteredshuttered
colony where the South Africans had kept this kind of political activity underunder control,control,
having the Secretaty-General of the United Nations tellingtelling themthem how shouldshould behave,behave, howhow
they should hold an election, it was very exciting.
JS: And they did, there was a degree of sophistication as toto what thethe Secretaty-Secretal)'-
General represented then, and what the United Nations represented,represented, You foundfound that.that.
MG: Yes. There was certainly a great awareness of what thethe United NationsNations
represented. And as I say, it was all so optimistic and positive, ItIt was aa marvelousmarvelous placeplace
to be in Namibia during that operation. The refugees were coming back, nobody'snobody's killingkilling
anybody, there was some trouble with Koevost, but not thatthat bad, There waswas aa greatgreat sensesense ~ of purpose. The UN was very, very popular. It wasn't like lala pesta blanca inin EIEl r Salvador. ~ ~
IFP;!;;',
>1ifii!;,:'~i . I 2299
I JS:JS: ThatThat wouldwould bebe youryour overalloverall assessmentassessment ofof thethe operationoperation there,there, inin Namibia,Namibia, aa veryvery
positivepositive thing.thing. Was therethere somethingsomething inin thethe NamibiaNamibia operationoperation toto be learnedlearned thatthat was - usefuluseful inin subsequentsubsequent operations? - MG:MO: This waswas missed. We werewere a littlelittle bitbit inebriatedinebriated by thethe successsuccess of Namibia. We -~ didn'tdidn't analyze carefully enough why itit had been successful.successful. We justjust said,said, "Well thethe UN isis good atat thesethese things."things." WeWe didn'tdidn't realizerealize howhow much thethe successsuccess depended onon thatthat longlong 11 periodperiod of planning. We didn't realizerealize how much itit depended on therethere being a good agreement, understood by both sides. When you thinkthink thatthat Western Sahara came along
11 what, almost immediatelyimmediately afterwards, thatthat shows thatthat we hadn't learnedlearned thethe lesson.lesson. 11 , JS: And most notably, Cambodia.
MG:MO: Cambodia is different. Cambodia was different. Cambodia was different because , what went wrong there was that a major party withdrew from the agreement halfway through. I have a lot to say about Cambodia, but we'll come back to that.
JS: We'll get to that.
MG:MO: We didn't learn the lessons about the importance of public relations. And that's
partly a budgetary weakness. It's easier to put a battalion of infantry in, than putting an
information officer in, because the information officer has to be on a post, and the post
has to be created, and the post can't be created until the budget's been approved, and so 11 3030
11 on and so on. I believe, with hindsight, that one of the greatest mistakes was not to have, ~ in all these operations, not to have the information office there at the very beginning, because you can't rely on the parties to convey accurately to the people what the U1\J's
come there to do. You've got to do it yourself. They will only start telling the truth about
- the UN when both parties have become sure that this is in their interests, as it were. So - those were the main lessons that we failed to realize. And I suppose you could also say, 11 Jim, that we failed to learn the lesson of the disaster that can befall you if you don't have 11 your military strength on the ground before the operation.
11 JS: You mention public relations, or public information. Communication, I judge, , was easier because of a general familiarity with English. Would you say that was one of the reasons, or one of the things that separated Namibia, in a way, in its success from , some other operations that were less successful? , MG: No, I think what separated it was a clear information policy from the very beginning, information policy which had been defined by Martti and Cedric, especially
Cedric, without much consultation with other departments including DPI. Before the
operation started, they got some very good advice about how you implement an
informationinformation policy inin a place likelike Namibia. They had t-shirts, pencils and balloons, and
thatthat stuff, not justjust the printed word, not just the television program.
JS: Now thethe finalfinal question here goes back to the Secretary-General. He was more
willing perhaps toto deal withwith thethe South Africans than some other members of the I 3311 I Secretariat. What was your overall impression of thethe Secretary-General's rolerole inin thethe I success of the achievement of independence for Namibia. I, MG: I would say the Secretary-General kept his head on thethe firstfirst of April.April. ThatThat waswas hishis
greatest achievement. You know him, Jim, far better thanthan II do. He's notnot aa sortsort ofofhandshands-
- on manager. He's not an executive chairman. At thosethose tasktask forceforce meetings hehe waswas oftenoften - silent almost throughout-listening very carefully toto what was being said,said, butbut notnot 11 intervening. Very often it was a tussle between Carl and me on thethe one hand,hand, andand VimVim 11 and James Jonah on the other, with Aby being rather silent. But II thinkthink whenwhen thethe momentmoment ofcrisis came, the defining moment, as Alvaro would say, Perez de CuellarCueIlar keptkept hishis headhead
11 and took a painful decision which he knew was going toto get him intointo troubletrouble withwith thethe 11 non-aligned world, and again, with some of his own staff. But his nerve didn'tdidn't crackcrack there. I imagine he was getting calls from Mother Thatcher, and probably fromfrom
,v , Washington, too, at that time. , JS: It happened too rapidly, I think.
, MG: I thought Thatcher called him from down there.there. , JS: She may have, but there's no record if she did. But that'sthat's not totallytotally unusualunusual,, •, because there are some other calls that she made toto him thatthat are not inin thethe recordrecord.. ,
,i7/~" 3322
MG: So that is his greatest achievement-that he kept us all in line. I think that the task force would have been more difficult had he not been there. In a way, he imposed certain restraints on our behavior.
JS: Is there any other comment, general or specific, that you'd like to put on the record with regard to Namibia before we move on to a different tape?
MG: I don't think so, no.
JS: Thank you.
END OF TAPE 1, Side 2
BEGINNING OF TAPE 2, Side 1
JS: We would now like to move to Cambodia, and again, ifI could start to ask you about SPA's, actually earlier than DPKO, SPA's involvement in the initial planning, the drafting that went on into the Paris peace agreement?
MG: It's rather like in Namibia. We were almost not involved at all, except that
Timothy Dibuama as military advisor was made available as an asset to Rafi Ahmed.
JS: And he worked very closely, I believe, as part of the team, right? 33
I MG: That's right. But kept me informed of what was going on.
• JS: So that from your perspective, then, Rafi Ahmed was relatively independent in hihiss • contacts with all the conference participants, including the P-5? Because he had repeatedrepeated meeting with the P-5.P-5. • MG: Absolutely.Absolutely.
11 JS: But SPA was not involved.
MG: Again we became involved when implementation was very close. I tried to get .. close toto Rafi about this,this, but it was very similar to what I said about Martti and Cedric. At thethe beginning theythey didn't want to get into a position in which they were going to be in
some way subordinated toto SPA. And Rafi, as you know, can be a rather touchy person.
JS: Yes.
MG: We were brought in,in, as I say, I remember beginning toto take part in the meetings of
thethe P-5, inin thethe pre-implementation phase.
JS:JS: Let's move on then,then, toto thethe actual operation inin Cambodia, which was thethe largestlargest
peacekeeping operation sincesince thethe Congo. How did thatthat work inin termsterms ofthethe Special
Representative'sRepresentative's chain of command toto New York? I 34
I MG: It was very different. It was very different partly for personality reasons, but also I I think that the larger time difference was a factor. With Martti, I'd be on the telephone to him several times each day. And there was a very full exchange of opinion, and a - confidence between us. With Akashi, we hardly ever spoke on the telephone. And Akashi was not good at responding to cables, whereas with Martti, in addition to our - telephone conversations, there was a regular exchange of cables. This is mainly, and the - same occurred in Yugoslavia, Yasushi's management style. He likes to have a rather small, rather junior, but very bright private office. And he keeps headquarters at a certain - distance. He also, and this was a real problem in Cambodia, kept at a certain distance the 11 directors ofthe various component parts of UNTAC, and didn't give them a great deal of 11 access to his own thinking, nor to the cable traffic with New York, such as it was. I used to get, when I went out there, and when people came through NewNew York,
11 very strong complaints from the rather senior UNTAC staff members, the representative ,.~ of the Commissioner for Refugees, and so on, complaints about the fact that they were ~ simply not being taken into the Special Representative's confidence. With Boutros' agreement, I actually made an effort to try and persuade Yasushi to change. Boutros said,
~ "You won't succeed. But if you think this is worth trying, you can try." I didn't succeed. ~ Attitudes in headquarters were made worse by the fact that Yasushi, and I think this is in a way perhaps to his credit, liked spending a lot oftime with the media. He talked a lot to
~ the media, especially of course the Japanese media, but also others. And there was a , feeling that if you had a television camera then you had much better access to him than if ,..~ you were director of a component part of his operation. From our point of view in New , York that was a major problem. So there was much less dialog, much less openness
r--.'.: 35 between him and New York, and between him and his senior staff, than there was with
Martti.
JS: What about the military commandeers? Did theythey ever reportreport directly toto you?you?
MG: They complained directly to me. And they reported toto Dibuama, military toto
military. But it wasn't Dibuama very long, soon itit was Baril. But UNTAC waswas
centralized, Sanderson would not make a recommendation about policy, unless AkashiAkashi
endorsed it. Often he didn't act on their recommendations, often hehe didn'tdidn't agreeagree withwith
them. Some of these things would just sit on his desk.
J8:1S: But there was no effort on their part toto go around Akashi toto headquarters?
MO:MG: Not that I recall, except that when one went therethere theythey would complain.complain. AndAnd
when they came through New York, theythey would complain. Right,Right, Sanderson,Sanderson, asas farfar asas II
know, never sent a message toto thethe Secretary-General saying,saying, "It's"It's notnot working."working."
1S:JS: Well, the previous French commander had moremore difficultiesdifficulties withwith Akashi.Akashi.
MG:MO: He was the Frenchman inin charge ofUNAMIC,ofUNAMIC, wasn'twasn't he?he?
JS: Right. 3636
MG: He was difficult number. I can't remember his name.
JS: I haven't got the name here either, unfortunately, but...
MG: ...... but thatthat was a transienttransient phase.
JS:JS: Well, no. Subsequently therethere was a French commander, actually, who felt that a farfar more aggressive attitude should be takentaken towardtoward thethe Khmer Rouge.
MG: But he was deputy forceforce commander.
JS:JS: He was thethe deputy. And eventually left.left.
MG:MG: That'sThat's right,right, I'mI'm beginningbeginning toto rememberremember that.that. Sanderson was very cautious. I thinkthink militarilymilitarily hehe waswas right.right. HeHe was a good General, Sanderson, perhaps ratherrather conventional,conventional, he'she's notnot oneone toto getget intointo fights,fights, unless he's suresure he's going toto win them,them, unlessunless he'she's suresure he'she's gotgot thethe militarymilitary capacitycapacity toto do.do. And he didn't have thethe military capacitycapacity toto fightfight andand beatbeat thethe KhmerKhmer Rouge.Rouge. InIn thatthat sortsort ofofterrain, terrain, thosethose sortsort of guerrilla movementsmovements werewere extremelyextremely difficultdifficult toto beat.beat.
JS:JS: BecauseBecause thatthat ofofcourse course bringsbrings upup thethe nextnext question.question. WhatWhat waswas thethe reactionreaction inin NewNew
YorkYork toto thethe decisiondecision notnot toto trytry toto gogo intointo KhmerKhmer RougeRouge territory?territory? 3737
MG:MG: WellWell thethe decisiondecision inin NewNew York,York, oror thethe viewview inin NewNew York,York, waswas thatthat itit waswas evidentevident thatthat thethe KhmerKhmer RougeRouge werewere notnot goinggoing toto allowallow eithereither AkashiAkashi oror UNTUNTACAC militarymilitary personnelpersonnel intointo theirtheir mainmain headquartersheadquarters inin Pailin;Pailin; andand thatthat AkashiAkashi thereforetherefore mademade aa mistakemistake inin drivingdriving downdown thethe roadroad withwith allall thethe presspress menmen behindbehind himhim andand beingbeing stoppedstopped atat thethe barrierbarrier andand forcedforced toto withdrawwithdraw inin ignominy.ignominy.
JS:JS: TheThe bamboobamboo pole,pole, soso toto speak.speak.
MG: That'sThat's right.right. AndAnd thethe feelingfeeling waswas thatthat itit wouldwould havehave beenbeen muchmuch betterbetter ifif hehe hadhad not put himself into a position where hehe and thethe UNUN werewere boundbound toto bebe humiliated.humiliated. ThereThere was no way in which the Khmer Rouge was going toto be intimidatedintimidated byby thethe televisiontelevision cameras to lift the bamboo pole.
JS: As I mentioned earlier in connection with Namibia, Mr. Akashi felt thatthat the
CIVPOL operation was one of the weakest operations in Cambodia. Why was this, as seen from New York again? And then you made your visits to Cambodia, so you saw it onon thethe spot.spot.
MG:MG: ItIt waswas because,because, I'veI've saidsaid before,before, theythey didn'tdidn't have a properly organized, professionalprofessional policepolice forceforce toto dealdeal withwith inin anyany ofof thethe areas.areas. Secondly,Secondly, therethere was a tremendoustremendous languagelanguage problem,problem, whichwhich therethere wasn'twasn't inin Namibia,Namibia, wellwell therethere waswas some,some, but itit waswas nothingnothing likelike thethe languagelanguage problemproblem inin Cambodia.Cambodia. AndAnd thirdly,thirdly, II think,think, II can'tcan't I 3388
I remember who thethe police commander was inin Cambodia, he was thatthat Dutch man, wasn't 11 he?
JS: I think so. 11 MG:MO: He wasn't as sensitive and intelligent a commander as thethe Irishman who
11 commanded inin Namibia.
JS: Now as you know, thethe Cambodian operation has been subjected toto various typestypes
of criticism. One of themthem was that insufficient attention was paid toto human rights, thatthat
thethe ballot box was more important than human rights. Did thisthis influenceinfluence thinkingthinking inin New
York?
MG:MO: ItIt was one of thethe main issues of contention within UNTAC. And Denis
McNamara, who was the Director of thethe human rights component, who isis a good friend
and a good man, isis a bit of a passionate advocate.
JS: Yes, I've interviewed him.
MG:MO: And he, more than any of them,them, more even thanthan Sergio de Mello, felt he couldn't
get through toto Akashi. And he stated inin writing, and inin meetings thatthat I attended with
Akashi, that until human rights improved,improved, he could not say thatthat conditions existed for
holding free and fair elections inin Cambodia. Whereas Akashi's policy was toto press ahead 3399 with elections, and not worry too much about the finer rules and the finer principles. If we could get an election that was reasonably free and fair, he felt that was better than having no election at all. I personally think he was right on that. I sympathized with
Denis, because from the point of view of a human rights professional, it was pretty unsatisfactory what was going on, and we appeared to be condoning the situation. And with respect to human rights, it was pretty imperfect. So yes may be the ballot boxes mattered more than human rights, were given higher priority than human rights. I would say the best can't be the enemy of the good in these circumstances.
JS: Right. Now the Namibia operation took place when Perez de CmmarCm\llar was
Secretary-General, Cambodia when Boutros-Ghali was Secretary-General. Did you detect a difference in the leadership of the whole organization, so to speak, as reflected in the operation in the field, depending on the two secretaries-general?
MG:MO: Boutros was a much more hands-on leader, as I said just now. He took a closer
interest in the detail. He was forever on the telephone, much more so than Javier. He
regarded Sihanouk as being a close personal friend because the Egyptians were close to
the North Koreans and Sihanouk was close to Kim IIIl Sung, so he knew Sihanouk quite
well. But as far as the operation was concerned, he was very reluctant to criticize his
representatives in the field. He might criticize them in private, but he would certainly not
criticize them in public. Even small groups of senior staff, he was a bit reluctant to voice
criticisms about them. I had great trouble in persuading him that Akashi wasn't actually I 4400
say, "You I doing a terribly good job, and we ought toto do something about it. He would say, "You can try, but you won't succeed." I can
was very I The main problem was this ban on travel by Under-Secretaries-General. He was very determined in this position: "I'm not going to have the U-S-Gs going on promenades."promenades," I him And we all tried, I tried, Kofi tried later on, Akashi tried, Eliasson tried to persuade him by fax that you can't run these large, complicated operations halfway across the world by fax ground, - and telephone. You've got to go and see what's going on, what it's like on the ground, I think. - how people are interacting with each other. And I only got to Cambodia twice, I think. air Which is absurd, the largest peacekeeping operation since the Congo. And when air
- travel is so easy. But he said "No you can't, you're supposed to be here, you run your , travel is so easy. t' department, you stay here." One of his greatest weaknesses, in my opinion.
JS: And thatthat applied toto participation inin thethe Security Council also, which was ••••."1.. , problematic.
Council. , MG: II feltfelt quitequite relievedrelieved at not having toto spend all thosethose hours inin thethe Security Council. wanted to ~ ChinmayaChinmaya GharekhanGharekhan diddid aa goodgood job,job, was a veryvery effective buffer. And ifif we wanted to , makemake pointspoints toto thethe SecuritySecurity Council,Council, wewe did itit by calling up thethe Ambassadors. JS:JS: YouYou didn'tdidn't findfind aa problemproblem there.there.
,W,! ., 41
MG: No, I welcomed it. Some people felt they were being denied access to the
Security Council. I was thrilled by it, to get out of it.
JS: General Sanderson was the force commander. You've already mentioned, I think, that you found him to be effective. Was this the general impression? He had a major command there.
MG: He had a major command, he commanded it well, he commanded the respect of his subordinates. He inadvisably brought his wife to Phnom Penh, which was supposed to be a non-accompanied station, and that sort of thing could spread some discontent in the ranks. I admired John Sanderson. He's not somebody who is going to excite you. I wouldn't terribly want to be led into battle by John Sanderson, I think, but in a peacetime operation of this kind he's a safe pair of hands.
JS: And he went back to a major position.
UNTAC had one great success, and that was in financing, unlike most other UN operations. Again, what do you attribute that to? Why was it easier to get a great deal more money for UNTAC than any other operation?
MG: The salving of the U.S.D.S. conscience. I think that there was greater support in the
U.S.D.S. Congress for an expensive peacekeeping operation, and readiness to appropriate
money for it, because Cambodia was not one ofthe happiest subjects in American history. I 4422
I There was a feeling there that all that bombing and bringing Cambodia into the war had I led to terrible horrors for the country and the people. - JS: And the U.S. paid fully.
MG: As far as I know, yes. -~ ~ JS: And Japan? ~ MG: Japan also, for its own regional reasons, was keen to playaplay a part, and they held a 11 conference in Tokyo where $800,000,000 dollars was raised for reconstruction.
,; JS: Right. So, I have the same questions of course in regard to Cambodia. Are there r~ lessons that should have been learned from there, perhaps one of them pertaining to , finance?
, MG: Is that the end, is that the last question?
,1;- , JS: Not quite the end, no. !~'" , MG: Because I was wondering, I wanted to talk about the big issue, which is the whole , question of the Khmer Rouge, and the handling of the Khmer Rouge. ,
,~:\(' I 4343 I JS:JS: Of course, right.
I MO:MG: There are twotwo points 1want to make. First, was it right to press ahead regardless, I when the Khmer Rouge withdrew from the military aspects ofthe agreement? I thought I at the time that it was, that for us to say, "they are no longer cooperating," and put down our tools and go home would have been a mistake. Better to have a partly implemented - agreement than no implementation at all. Looking back, 1think that we didn't give thought to another option, which was to reconvene the peace conference, thethe Paris - conference. Suspend things, but stay on the ground, and go back to the parties toto thethe ~ Paris conference, who under the peace treaty were required to make an effort ifif thingsthings tI went wrong. Say "we've got a problem, and we'd like to meet in Paris toto talktalk about itit,, find a solution, take some political decisions." As 1recall, Jim, we did thinkthink about thatthat,,
, but the feeling was that that would inevitably cause delay, thatthat UNTAC was anan expensivexpensivee , operation, stories were beginning to get around about how badly thethe Bulgarian trooptroopss were behaving, and how Cambodian society was being corrupted by thethe operation. AnAndd •i¥ we decided to not to pursue it. It is interesting to think of what would have happenedhappened iiff , we had gone down that road. That's the first point II wanted toto makemake.. , The second point is that there was a lot of criticism inin New YorkYork aboutabout thethe wayway AkashAkashii
~ handled the Khmer Rouge, partly 1think because ofthe humiliation at the bamboo pole. r handled the Khmer Rouge, partly 1think because of the humiliation at the bamboo pole. , Akashi had become very combative and aggressive towardstowards thethe KhmerKhmer RougeRouge.. Sanderson was also combative and aggressive forfor differentdifferent reasons,reasons, forfor militarymilitary reasonsreasons-
~ for the KR soldiers not doing what theythey were supposedsupposed toto do.do. AndAnd thethe dialog,dialog, insofarinsofar aass ~ ~ "ti;'" 4444 there was one, broke down very easily. We all felt that Akashi could have been much more sophisticated in the way he handled the KhmerKJuner Rouge.
JS: Who were still at that point in the Supreme Council.
MG: They were still in the Supreme Council, we felt that he ought to have avoided these confrontations arising. He should have avoided the confrontation at the bamboo pole by simply not going there. He should have avoided the breakdown in relations which occurred when they started getting difficult over the military thing. And he should have established a dialog with, what was he called, the civilian who was there on the
Supreme National Council, anyway...
JS: I get them mixed up, but I think it was Ieng Sary, but I'm not sure.
MG: No, it wasn't Ieng Sary it was .... Anyway, it doesn't matter. We felt that he should have got a dialog going, a quiet dialog. And he didn't. What I'm about to tell you is not generally known; you may know, but I don't think so. We got Rafi Ahmed engaged and asked him to try and open up a back channel to the Khmer Rouge. Rafi tried, and spoke to the man whose name I can't remember two or three times, but didn't really get anywhere. Then I had a rather strained dinner in Bangkok with Raft and
Yasushi, in which the script was that we would talk about the Khmer Rouge and Rafi would talk a bit about how he'd handled the Khmer Rouge during the negotiations, and try and convey, not too directly, to Akashi the message that maybe you can get I 4545
I somewheresomewhere byby beingbeing aa littlelittle lessless toughtough withwiththem. them. ButBut AkashiAkashi waswas notnot toto bebe changed.changed. YouYou knowknowhe hewas was veryvery setset ininhis his ways.ways. SoSo thatthatis is thethe secondsecond pointpoint IIwanted wanted toto makemake
I beforebefore wewe getgetto to thethe finalfinal question.question. I TheThe thirdthird pointpoint II wantwant toto make,make, whichwhich II willwill introduceintroduce now,now, isis thatthat moremore thanthan anywhereanywhere - I'veI've seen,seen, thethe presencepresence ofofthat that peacekeepingpeacekeeping operationoperation hadhad aa reallyreally corruptingcorrupting affectaffect onon thethe locallocal community.community. ItIt wasn'twasn't onlyonly thethe prostitutionprostitution andand soso on.on. ItIt waswas thethe injectioninjection ofofall all
- thisthis moneymoney intointo aa very,very, veryvery poor,poor, war-tornwar-torn society.society. ItIt waswas thethe injectioninjection ofofall all thesethese - vehicles,vehicles, allall thesethese materialmaterial goods.goods. ItIt was thethe astonishing contrastcontrast betweenbetween thethe standardstandard ofof it livingliving of thethe UN people and thethe locals.locals. And itit wasn't likelike thatthat inin Namibia. Namibia by
Cambodian standards was comparatively prosperous. We didn't have so many people. , There wasn't so much ostentatious living. They were excellent troops we had in Namibia, whereas the Bulgarians obviously did tremendous damage to the standing of the , Organization in Cambodia. , So lessonslessons to be learned:learned: One lessonlesson toto be learnedlearned fromfrom Cambodia isis you've got toto have
your contingencycontingency plans.plans. ItIt waswas notnot unforeseeableunforeseeable thatthat thethe KhmerKhmer RougeRouge wouldwould denydeny us ,'(p; , accessaccess toto theirtheir territory.territory. ItIt wasn'twasn't unforeseeableunforeseeable theythey wouldwould withdrawwithdraw fromfrom thethe militarymilitary arrangements.arrangements. ItIt wasn'twasn't unforeseeableunforeseeable thatthat HunHun SenSen wouldwould refuserefuse toto disassemble,disassemble,
~ dismantle,dismantle, hishis administration,administration, asas hehe waswas supposedsupposed toto do.do. WeWe didn'tdidn't realizerealize thatthat hehe wouldwould , maintainmaintain aa partyparty structurestructure inin parallelparallel withwith thethe ministerialministerial structure,structure, thethe governmentgovernment structure,structure, asas isis standardstandard inin communistcommunist countries.countries. AllAll ourour planningplanning waswas basedbased onon gettinggetting
~ somesome kindkind ofofsupervisionsupervision ofofthethe governmentalgovernmental structure,structure, wewe nevernever thoughtthought aboutabout thethe partyparty ~
P'!if'. _ ~ I 46
I structure, which remained a completely closed book to us throughout. That's where the I decisions were taken. So it was a case where a) there wasn't enough contingency planning and b) there wasn't enough care and analysis in thinking at the planning stage of
~ the main operation. That's one lesson. ~ A second lesson, which we learned in many other cases, isis thatthat it'sit's not enough justjust toto
~ negotiate a peace treaty, go in with a peacekeeping operation toto implementimplement thethe peace ~ treaty, and then withdraw your involvement. We should have devoted more timetime and ~ money to the transition from the peacekeeping toto post-peacekeeping, toto thethe economic and social phase ofpeace building. We didn't do much inin thethe way ofpeace building. The p Human Rights Commission stayed; a certain amount of reconstructionreconstruction went on. II didn'tdidn't , think at the time, but II now thinkthink thatthat we should have kept a much more senior kindkind ofof pro-consul there,there, after thethe military withdrew. Somebody who would havehave enjoyedenjoyed thethe
, confidence of Sihanouk, and would have been a sort of senior politicalpolitical advisoradvisor toto , Sihanouk. Again, you have thethe problems of language,language, because HunHun SenSen hasn'thasn't gotgot anyany languagelanguage except Khmer, and Russian possibly. SomeoneSomeone whowho wouldwould have beenbeen there,there, notnot
, tootoo visible, likelike an Oriental Counselor inin aa BritishBritish legationlegation ofofthethe lastlast century.century. SomeoneSomeone , who wouldn't be very visible, but would be trustedtrusted byby allall thethe parties,parties, wouldwould gogo around,around, would help build bridges between them,them, dodo aa bitbit ofof peace-makingpeace-making betweenbetween them.them. TheThe
, sort of thing the French have been quite good at, sometimes, in Africa. So those are the sort ofthing the French have been quite good at, sometimes, in Africa. So those are the ~r main lessons,lessons, thethe failurefailure toto followfollow throughthrough properly,properly, thethe failurefailure toto planplan forfor badbad ~ contingencies. ,i·, ~ ~/;; r 4477 r JS: What about thethe decentralization?decentralization? ThisThis waswas thethe most decentralizeddecentralized operation,operation, II r think.think. r MG: Was it?it? I JS:J8: Well, according toto Akashi. I I MG: Well I would say the very reverse. I would say that it was the most centralized. l JS: Well what I mean is, in terms of the field and New York. J J MG: DhOh I'm sorry, I thought you meant in the field.
JS:J8: No, I don't mean in the field, not UNTAC. ~ MG: No, no, he was more autonomous. He was allowed to be more autonomous, and
~ that was in my view, unwise for reasons I've already said to you. Whether, if he had been ~ as much, I wouldn't say under our control, but getting as much guidance from us as Ahtisaari-and Ahtisaari accepted that, although initially he didn't, and he said he -1,,- enj oyedDyed it and it worked well; and he felt secure getting all, having all that exchange with ,~ New York. JS: Who exactly was in charge in New York of the Cambodian operation? ..r p 48
MO:MG: I was.
JS: It came under DPKO.
MO:MG: Yes. When Boutros established his Department of Political Affairs inin February ofof
1992, then Petrovsky wanted to have a finger in the pie. But it wasn't difficult toto keep
Petrovsky out of what I regarded then as my pie. I believed then thatthat you can't say thethe political aspects ofpeacekeeping belong to DPA, and the operational aspects toto DPKO.
It's all one ball of wax. And I was not going to have Petrovsky kneading my wax.
JS: Akashi has referred to occasional instructions that came out from DPKO which hehe felt did not reflect a real knowledge of the situation.
MO:MG: To which we would say that if there was a lack of understanding of thethe situation, the reason was that he wasn't reporting. But again, Jim, I think thatthat thethe time difference.. .ifBoutros had allowed me to go every two months to Cambodia, as II went every two months to Namibia, it would have been different. Not thatthat Goulding isis a great man, but simply there would have been more exchange, better understanding.
JS: Well did you have the sense that Akashi actually accepted that DPKO was reallyreally in charge? 49
MG: No. He thought he was in charge, he was even perfunctory in his reporting to the
Secretary-General.
JS: Okay. Because there is one other question in that connection. He places great
importance on his contacts with the Ambassadors in Phnom Penh, which he used as a kind of "friends," you might say, and their indirect influence on the decisions of the
Security Council, which-and I think this is justified-were much more sensible in the
case of Cambodia than subsequently in the case of Bosnia. Did you, from New York, see this beneficial effect of the close contact with the crucial Ambassadors in Phnom Penh?
MG:MO: It was absolutely essential. Akashi is not the only one who did that. Martti kept
very close relations with the representatives of the major powers in Namibia. All Special
Representatives are instructed to do that. And what made our life difficult was that
sometimes the representatives ofthe countries concerned in New York would come to us
with facts and of which we were not aware, because Akashi wasn't reporting them. And
so there was a real disconnect there, which I think affected the quality of the operation in
the long run. Because there wasn't what there had been in Namibia, it wasn't so much
control, it was exchange of ideas and information. It was dialog, which I think improved
Martti's capacity to run the operation. Certainly it improved our capacity to send him
instructions that made some sense. 5050
JS:JS: That'sThat's anan interestinginteresting point,point, becausebecause clearlyclearly ififtherethere isis thisthis kindkind ofofcloseclose relationshiprelationship withwith Ambassadors,Ambassadors, it'sit's gotgot toto bebe reflectedreflected byby aa similarsimilar relationshiprelationship withwith headquarters.headquarters.
MG:MG: OfOfcourse, course, that'sthat's right.right.
JS:JS: AndAnd perhapsperhaps thatthat waswas notnot thethe case then,then, as you saw it,it, at least in Cambodia.
MG:MG: ItIt isis personality. Martti is a much easier person to dialog with than Yasushi.
Yasushi was very able in some ways, but he's not somebody with whom you'd sit down,
drink a bottle of wine and have a good thorough discussion of things.
JS: The final question in this connectioncOlmection again pertains to Akashi. Were youyou familiarfamiliar
with the background of Boutros-Ghali's choice of Akashi?
MG: Yes.
JS:JS: CouldCould youyou describedescribe it?it?
MG:MG: I'mI'm justjust tryingtrying toto rememberremember whatwhat thethe political.political. '"'" HeHe wantedwanted toto abolishabolish thethe
DepartmentDepartment ofof DisarmamentDisarmament Affairs.Affairs. HeHe hadhad toto havehave aa JapaneseJapanese Under-SecretaryUnder-Secretary
General,General, whowho he'dhe'd beenbeen toldtold waswas goinggoing toto bebe Akashi.Akashi. SoSo hehe hadhad toto findfind somethingsomething forfor
Akashi.Akashi. 51
JS: Enough said. Thank you very much.
END OF TAPE 2, Side 1
BEGINNING OF TAPE 3
JS: Turning now to Central America, I'd likelike toto start if! could by asking you a fewfew questions about the UN role in Nicaragua. When, and toto what extent did you perceive thethe operation foreseen in Nicaragua as something new and different fromfrom previous peacekeeping operations?
MG: Can I justjust step back a littlelittle bit, Jim,Jim, and setset thisthis all inin context? II thinkthink thatthat thethe
Central American Peace Process was one ofthethe jewelsjewels inin Javier'sJavier's crown.crown. II thinkthink itit waswas aa tremendoustremendous success of his Secretary-Generalship. It startedstarted withwith EsquipulasEsquipulas II.n. HeHe andand
Alvaro saw thatthat thethe factfact thatthat thethe Presidents oftheofthe fivefive CentralCentral American statesstates hadhad reaffinnedreaffirmed thethe commitment toto get all thesethese individualindividual insurgenciesinsurgencies underunder control,control, andand were interestedinterested inin thethe help oftheofthe UNUN inin doingdoing so,so, gavegave them them [the[the S-GS-G andand AlvaroAlvaro dede
Soto] thethe opportunity toto putput theirtheir feetfeet inin thethe door.door. TheThe footfoot waswas putput inin thethe doordoor byby meansmeans of thatthat Security CouncilCouncil resolutionresolution whosewhose numbernumber I'veI've forgotten,forgotten, which,which, youyou willwill remember,remember, calledcalled uponupon thethe Secretary-GeneralSecretary-General toto continuecontinue hishis goodgood officesoffices missionmission withwith thethe fivefive states.states. ThatThat waswas thethe frameworkframework withinwithin whichwhich wewe thenthen diddid quitequite aa lotlot ofof things.things.
OneOne ofofthethe things,things, ofofcourse,course, waswas monitoringmonitoring thethe electionelection inin Nicaragua.Nicaragua. II thinkthink wewe allall I 5522
realized immediately that this was something new for thethe United Nations. WeWe hadhad donedone
• election, plebiscite and referendum monitoring in the past, but always in a decolonization election, plebiscite and referendum monitoring in the past, but always in a decolonization • context. I don't think that there was a previous occasion where we were monitoringmonitoring anan • election in an independent state at the request ofthatthat state. That requestrequestitselfitselfemergedemerged inin I} the Esquipulas process. It wasn't seen as a peacekeeping thingthing at all, atat thethe beginning,beginning, and I was not initially involved. In fact, it was a condition of thethe Sandinistas thatthat therethere
IJ should be no military involved. ONUVEN, as it was called, was a civilian operationoperation ledled 11 by Richardson in a rather titular way, with Iqbal Riza inin charge on thethe ground.ground. ButBut veryvery shortly thereafter, there was the decision to establish ONUCA, which waswas aa militarymilitary
11 observer group whose purpose was to verify that thethe five states complied withwith theirtheir IJ commitments in Esquipulas Dos not to permit trans-border arms shipmentsshipments andand armedarmed groups based on their territory. The two operations got a littlelittle bit intertwined,intertwined, becausebecause • Iqbal had his civilian operation, and we were setting up small military observerobserver teamsteams inin IllF · Nicaragua, as in the other four countries. So the Nicaragua operationoperation waswas notnot initiallyinitially at seen as an expanded form of peacekeeping; itit was seenseen asas anan electoralelectoral operation,operation, thethe application to an independent state of something we'd donedone inin dependentdependent territoriesterritories asas
f they progressed toward independence. f , JS: Can Ijust interrupt a minute toto ask, thisthis aspect ofof thethe ONUVEN,ONUVEN, diddid thatthat fallfall under what was by now DPKO?
MO:MG: No, it was still SPA. , 53
JS: It was still SPA?
MG:MO: No, it didn't. It fell under FOD, the field office.
JS: Field service.
MG:MO: Field service, because they had to provide the logistic arrangements for
ONUVEN, Iqbal's group. But it didn't come under SPA. And I was told, fairly clearly, that it was not a peacekeeping operation. It was run, I think, out of the S-G's office, wasn't it?
JS: I believe so, but it's not entirely clear from the record.
MG:MO: I think it was; certainly Iqbal was not reporting to me. I think he was probably reporting to Alvaro in the S-G'sS-O's office.
JS : Yes, and certainly Richardson was.
MG:MO: But I became involved in Nicaragua after the election, when the Contras were demobilized, and there you did need a peacekeeping operation, especially to take delivery of the weapons that they handed in and to destroy those weapons. This couldn't be done without a UJ\J military presence. It's a matter ofprinciple, ifyou're taking weapons off them, you've got to have the capacity to guard those weapons before they're destroyed. 5544
So we brought in, you'll remember, a Venezuelan infantryinfantry battalion,battalion, whichwhich waswas temporarily attached to ONUCA to do thatthat function.function. ThatThat workedworked veryvery well,well, thatthat waswas aa successful operation. I'm sure that some ofofthe the weapons werewere notnot handedhanded over,over, andand asas wewe know, a lot of ex-Contras are now bandits. But nevertheless, wewe regardedregarded itit asas aa success.success.
JS: I was going to ask, in thatthat cOlUlection, about thethe relationshiprelationship withwith thethe OAS,OAS, whichwhich was involved in these operations, at leastleast supposedly. WhatWhat waswas youryour experienceexperience inin thatthat relationship?
MO:MG: My direct experience was really nil, because II don'tdon't recallrecall anyany discussiondiscussion withwith
Baena Soares about the peacekeeping. But II do rememberremember somesome sortsort ofof uneasinessuneasiness onon thethe
part of the OAS,GAS, which had seen, this whole peace process, andand thethe involvementinvolvement ofof
international organizations in the peace process, as being somethingsomething wherewhere thethe GASOAS
would be in the lead and the UN would be therethere because itit waswas thethe UNUN butbut essentiallyessentially inin
an GAS show. Iqbal,Iqbal, however, had made quite clear inin NicaraguaNicaragua thatthat asas farfar asas hehe waswas
concerned this was a UN show. As a result he had difficult relationsrelations withwith thethe Argentine,Argentine,
Murray, who was in charge of the GAS operation inin Nicaragua.Nicaragua. ThereThere waswas very very obviousobvious
rivalry between the two, and the OASGAS were at thatthat timetime ratherrather betterbetter equippedequipped thanthan thethe
UN, and that led to jealousy as well as rivalry. It was quitequite tense;tense; BaenaBaena SoaresSoares didn'tdidn't
like it, and complained to Javier as I recall. This may allall bebe inin thethe book,book, II don'tdon't know.know.
By the time we got to the operation in EIEl Salvador, II thinkthink thethe GASGAS hadhad acceptedaccepted thatthat ifif itit
was a peacekeeping operation, as that was, or a human rightsrights operationoperation itit waswas goinggoing toto bebe 55 a UN operation and therethere wasn't going toto be much rolerole forfor thethe OAS. So ClAY never reallyreally worked, inin my view.
JS:JS: Could you elaborate on thatthat a bit? ClAY was supposedsupposed toto be responsibleresponsible forfor thethe
demobilization......
MG: ItIt was supposedsupposed toto be responsibleresponsible forfor thethe followfollow up of all thethe Esquipulas stuff,stuff,
wasn't it?it?
JS:JS: And thethe reintegrationreintegration of thethe Contras. Did thisthis even theoreticallytheoretically come within thethe
frameworkframework of peacekeeping?
MG: II would now saysay yes. II would saysay thatthat thethe demobilization of troopstroops and theirtheir
reintroductionreintroduction toto civilian lifelife isis a peacekeeping function.function. ItIt involvesinvolves military because of
thethe disarmament bit, which can't very easily be done by civilians. II can't remember,remember, Jim,Jim,
whether CIAV were on our backs and wanted toto be involvedinvolved inin thethe demobilization ofthethe
Contras. II don't recallrecall any CIAV presence when thosethose demobilizations tooktook place and we
destroyed thethe weapons.
JS:JS: II thinkthink thethe twotwo were separate,separate, thethe disarmament was clearly a functionfunction of...
MG: The UN...... I'.,.'.' R 5566
JS: Actually ofofONUCA.ONUCA.
MG: ONUCA, that's right.
JS: Whereas ClAYCIAV had the responsibility of reintegration, resettlement,resettlement, andand soso on.on.
MG: Yes, I think you're right. We gave thethe Contras theirtheir documentationdocumentation thatthat they'dthey'd
surrendered their weapons, and so on, and I thinkthink wewe gavegave themthem somesome sortsort ofof basicbasic
civilian clothes, didn't we?
JS: Yes, and you did give themthem a document. II don'tdon't wantwant toto answeranswer thesethese questions,questions,
but I interviewed a couple of Contras actually inin Nicaragua,Nicaragua, andand theythey werewere veryvery proudproud ofof
the documentation that they received both fromfrom ONUCAONUCA andand fromfrom CIACIAV.V.
MG: I see. Anyway, my general perception, Jim,Jim, waswas thatthat itit wasn'twasn't aa greatgreat success,success, thethe
relationship between the OAS and thethe UN.
JS: I think that certainly isis true.true. II wantedwanted toto askask inin thisthis connectionconnection whetherwhether youyou again,again,
or the UN in itsits peacekeeping role,role, hadhad anyany contactcontact withwith thethe NicaraguanNicaraguan military,military, eithereither
directly with Mrs. Chamorra after herher governmentgovernment waswas established,established, oror withwith GeneralGeneral
Ortega, who stayed as Minister of Defense,Defense, II think.think. I 5757 i MG:MG: II hadhad firstfirst hadhad mymy contactscontacts withwith GeneralGeneral OrtegaOrtega andand thethe chiefchiefof of staff,staff, whowho waswas aa
~ veryvery suavesuave General,General, whosewhose namename I'veI've forgotten.forgotten. AA realreal sortsort ofofmiddle middle classclass general,general, I unlikeunlike thethe Ortegas.Ortegas. BeforeBefore thethe election,election, whenwhen ONUCAONUCA waswas beingbeing established,established, thethe peoplepeople i wewe werewere dealingdealing with,with, thethe peoplepeople whosewhose goodgood behaviorbehavior wewe werewere toto verify,verify, waswas thethe r Sandinista army. They were very cooperative and helpful. After the election, the :1 Sandinista army. They were very cooperative and helpful. After the election, the transitiontransition waswas quitequite difficult,difficult, asas you'llyou'll remember;remember; IqbalIqbal stayedstayed onon asas thethe DirectorDirector ofof
I ONUVEN,ONUVEN, andand playedplayed aa veryvery importantimportant mediationmediation rolerole betweenbetween thethe victorvictor andand thethe i vanquishedvanquished inin thethe elections.elections. ButBut thatthat againagain waswas notnot consideredconsidered peacekeeping,peacekeeping, itit didn'tdidn't I comecome underunder SPA.SPA. II thinkthink wewe gotgot thethe cablescables becausebecause wewe hadhad ONUCAONUCA there.there.
~ JS:JS: AndAnd werewere youyou awareaware ofofany any problemsproblems thatthat resultedresulted fromfrom differingdiffering attitudesattitudes onon thethe ,~ partpart ofofthethe forceforce commandercommander oror variousvarious battalionsbattalions towardtoward thethe differentdifferent elements?elements? ,- MG:MG: TheThe mainmain concernconcern aboutabout thethe chiefchief militarymilitary observer,observer, asas hehe waswas called,called, waswas hishis ~ desiredesire toto reestablishreestablish thethe SpanishSpanish empireempire inin CentralCentral America.America. ItIt waswas aa veryvery HispanoHispano centriccentric operationoperation there,there, andand II hadhad toto speakspeak toto himhim fromfrom timetime toto timetime andand saysay thatthat hehe mustmust
~ rememberremember thatthat therethere werewere otherother nationalitiesnationalities representedrepresented inin hishis operation,operation, includingincluding somesome ~ non-Spanishnon-Spanish speakingspeaking ones-theones-the Swedes,Swedes, oror thethe othersothers whowho couldcould operateoperate inin Spanish.Spanish. ~ ButBut hehe was,was, II can'tcan't rememberremember hishis namename now,now, aa veryvery enthusiasticenthusiastic officer,officer, butbut aa veryvery nationalisticnationalistic officer.officer. AndAnd thatthat diddid causecause somesome problems.problems. ",- I.;" "'h -it, 11 g.:-" )lY 5588
JS: Now ONUCA was supposed to control the cross-border movement ofof personnelpersonnel and of arms. They never did at all catch a single one. Was thisthis a matter ofof concernconcern inin
SPA, or were you aware of it? Was this a problem thatthat you had toto deal with?with?
MG: It was a problem in that it sometimes became difficult toto justifyjustify toto thethe mediamedia andand the skeptics in missions what ONUCA was for. And ONUCA waswas notnot therethere inin realityreality toto
intercept trans-border arms. It was there toto ease inin thethe thinthin endend ofof thethe wedgewedge ofofaa UNUN
military presence in Central America. And so we didn't inin thethe realreal worldworld worryworry aboutabout thethe
fact that they weren't catching anybody.
JS: And you found this to be true,true, thatthat is,is, thatthat thethe presencepresence ofONUCAofONUCA servedserved thatthat
purpose of familiarizing people with blue helmets, soso toto speak,speak, soso thatthat laterlater inin ElEl SalvadorSalvador
this facilitated cooperation.
MG: This was Javier's and Alvaro's judgment,judgment, II think.think. WithWith thethe weakeningweakening andand
probable collapse ofthe Soviet regimeregime inin Russia,Russia, therethere werewere goinggoing toto bebe opportunitiesopportunities forfor
resolving these conflicts because theythey would nono longerlonger bebe proxyproxy ThirdThird WorldWorld conflictsconflicts
between East and West. We thought,thought, and againagain itit waswas right,right, thatthat thethe AmericansAmericans wouldwould bebe
prepared to allow an internationalinternational organization, whichwhich waswas thenthen inin quitequite goodgood standingstanding inin
Washington, to playaplay a part inin mediatingmediating thethe endend ofof thesethese conflicts.conflicts. AndAnd clearlyclearly thethe UNUN
was better qualified toto do thisthis thanthan thethe United States.States. SoSo thethe MonroeMonroe doctrinedoctrine waswas
suspended in that context. GettingGetting militarymilitary observersobservers therethere inin uniformuniform waswas aa goodgood wayway
into that. That was basically ourour thinking.thinking. 59
JS: And as the head of SPA or DPKO initially, did you become involved in thethe
distrust that became apparent in Washington toward these operations eventually? Not inin
Nicaragua, but in El Salvador.
MO:MG: Yes, very much so, because I already had, what was he called, it began with aaB, B, the Assistant Secretary for ...
JS: I was thinking of Aronson.
MO:MG: That's right, Bernie Aronson. James Baker actually hit me once, in Lisbon,
because he said, "Mig, you've got to get on to the cease-fire, for Christ's sake negotiate a
cease-fire." I said, "Secretary, you know as well as I do that the cease-fire is going toto
come at the very end, because it is the only card that the FMLN have to play. We've got to get all the other bits in place before they will agree to a cease-fire." (He said), "You
think that? You UN people..." and he thumped me on my left arm! I actually had a
bruise. Berniewas very difficult at times, but he came around in the end. They were
under pressure from Congress and so on. It was a political game that was being played.
What I should have said, actually, is, if you want to hear about my personal involvement,
right at the beginning of this process, I was asked to come ano brief representatives of thethe
five countries who came to a meeting with Javier in New York, and Alvaro was there,there,
and I was asked to go, and in my Portuguese, briefed them about' 101 UN Peacekeeping, '' which I did in several sessions. It was all part of softening them up to the idea of thethe UN I 6060
I perhapsperhapshaving havinga arole roleto toplay playin inthe thefuture. future. ThenThenof ofcourse courseAlvaro Alvarogot gotstarted, started,and andthere there i waswasthe theSan SanJuan Juanagreement agreementon onhuman humanrights rightswhich whichled ledto tothe theestablishment establishmentof of ONUSAL,ONUSAL,and andIqbal Iqbalwas wasput putin incharge chargeof ofthat.that. ONUSALONUSALthen thenbecame becamea a peacekeepingpeacekeeping i operation.operation. ItsItsmandate mandaterelated relatedto to humanhumanrights rights atat thatthat stage,stage, butbutclearly clearly ititwas was intendedintended byby i allallthat thatit it shouldshouldbe bethe the germgerm ofofthe the eventualeventual operationoperationto to implementimplement aa peacepeace agreement.agreement. FairlyFairly soonsoon afterafterthat thatthe the negotiationsnegotiations onon thethe cease-firecease-fire started.started. AlvaroAlvaro waswas excellentexcellent andand
I broughtbrought meme fullyfully intointo thethe negotiation.negotiation. II actuallyactually tooktook overover thethe negotiationnegotiation ofofthe the militarymilitary I aspects,aspects, whichwhich werewere thethe cease-firecease-fire andand wherewhere theythey werewere goinggoing toto bebe grouped,grouped, and all thethe I restrest ofofthe the demobilization.demobilization. ItIt waswas aa veryvery goodgood workingworking relationshiprelationship thatthat Alvaro and I had. Excellent.Excellent. HeHe keptkept meme fullyfully informedinformed about what he was doing on the civilian table, and
I hehe entrusted thethe military "table" to me. I ; JS;J8; Which was primarily a negotiation ofthe cease-fire, right?
~ MG: ItIt was a negotiation ofofthethe cease-firecease-fire andand thethe cantonmentcantonment ofofbothboth sides'sides' troopstroops ; thethe armyarmy andand thethe FMLNFMLN troops.troops. TheyThey started,started, bothboth ofof them,them, withwith totallytotally unrealisticunrealistic demands.demands. II hadhad toto pointpoint outout thatthat ifbothifboth demandsdemands werewere metmet therethere werewere goinggoing toto bebe somesome I 400400 differentdifferent locations,locations, whichwhich waswas aboutabout twentytwenty timestimes whatwhat therethere werewere inin thethe wholewhole ofof I Cambodia.Cambodia. TheyThey agreedagreed inin thethe end.end. ThenThen ofof coursecourse therethere waswas questionquestion ofofwhatwhat waswas toto bebe donedone withwith thethe arms;arms; therethere waswas thethe questionquestion ofof collectingcollecting anyany armsarms cachescaches whichwhich theythey
I declareddeclared toto us.us. AsAs youyou knowknow theythey didn'tdidn't declaredeclare somesome ofof thethe armsarms cachescaches toto us;us; wewe hadhad toto I embarrassembarrass themthem laterlater on.on. AllAll that,that, andand thenthen thethe placesplaces wherewhere theythey wouldwould staystay whilewhile theythey werewere trainedtrained forfor re-entryre-entry intointo civiliancivilian life.life. SoSo I Ididdid allall that.that. WhatWhat I Ididn'tdidn't dodo waswas thethe I I 61 downsizing ofthe army, which Alvaro did, it was a highly political part of it,it, nornor thethe purging of the army.
JS: Nor the purging of the army.
MO:MG: No, Alvaro did that.
JS: And that would have been only ofthe government army, so toto speak,speak, butbut therethere was none in the case of the FMLN.
MO:MG: No.
JS: What was your experience in these negotiations inin termsterms of thethe twotwo sides?sides?
MO:MG: The FMLN were extremely distrustful. But that'sthat's not surprising, thesethese insurgentinsurgent movements always are. The army were extremely conscious ofthethe army asas "the"the institution." This created a very broad gap that had toto be bridged. II judgedjudged thatthat itit hadhad toto be bridged by bringing them together. It wasn't the sort of gap thatthat you were effectivelyeffectively going to bridge by shuttling and coming up with propositions, et cetera. You hadhad toto bringbring them together so that they could both see they'd got toto change theirtheir culture, changechange theirtheir ethos. It was very time-consuming. We had some pendulum periods when wewe diddid shuttleshuttle from one to the other, but then we had long, joint meetings, which sometimessometimes becamebecame very acrimonious and had to be suspended. But it worked over a period of months.months. II willwill 6622 always remember the thrill of pleasure when I walked along a corridor in that ghastly hotel in Mexico City and found) half concealed behind a tree in a pot, Villalobos ofthe
FMLN and Vargas of the government delegation, talking to each other) and I thought,
"we're now on the home track." They'd been there together and gotten to see that they had to adjust their concepts. Alvaro did one very good thing, among many very good things; he persuaded the FMLN to bring the field commanders in, to actually be present at these negotiations and join the negotiating commission; then they could see what was
going on, they'd see how the negotiations, see then they weren't being sold down the river.
IS: In the cease-fire negotiations, then, you had direct access to the field commanders.
MG:MO: That's right. And not only in cease-fire, they were brought in to be at least
observers, and at time participants, in all the negotiations. So we had a series offield
commanders who came in, because there was round after round after round ofthese
negotiations. Alvaro spotted that this process was becoming slightly incestuous between
the whatever it's called, the peace commission on the government side, and the
negotiating committee on the FMLN side. The rank and file ought to see what was going
on.
The only hiccup in my relations with Alvaro in what was nearly two years of fairly
tense negotiation, was that.. ..
JS: Yes? 6633
MG: You know about this?
JS: No.
MO:MG: That we had been negotiating up to the last minute on thethe military aspects.aspects. AndAnd II and my team was waiting down in the other end of the 38 thth floor forfor thisthis signaturesignature ceremony, which depended on some last minute things......
JS: This is the midnight ceremony?
MO:MG: Midnight ceremony, at midnight on the 31 st of December. We waited inin vainvain andand we were never called, and we heard everybody leaving. I was very piqued aboutabout that.that.
JS: So that's why you are not in that picture.
MO:MG: That's why I'm not in the picture. The friends ofthe Secretary-General, theythey werewere all there, and so on, but nobody from the military table, who had negotiated, waswas there,there, soso
I was upset by that. But otherwise it was a very good, harmonious working relationship.relationship.
JS: Incidentally, you mentioned Villalobos. He was here at Oxford.
MO:MG: He still is. At this College. 64
JS: Is he, because I've been trying to find him?
MG:MO: Just got his MSC here.
JS: Oh really? And he's still around?
MG:MO: Still around, and he's staying on for another three years doing research into civil
conflict.
JS: So he'll be reachable through here, then?
MG:MO: Reachable through here, yes.
~ JS: That's good to know, because he was identified in the book by Perez de Cuellar as ~ the most interesting ofthe... ~ ~. MG:MO: He's gone astray now, though.
&;.'Il)\':~ l; JS: Yes, I know, because when we were in El Salvador his former colleagues did not ~ , speak well of him.
MG:MO: No. And before we go, I'll get my secretary to give you his coordinates. 6565
JS:JS: I'dI'd likelike that.that.
WhatWhat kindkind of,of, youyou hadhad veryvery goodgood relationsrelations withwith dede SotoSoto inin termsterms ofofthethe negotiations.negotiations. WasWas therethere anyany kindkind ofof aa liaisonliaison mechanismmechanism inin thethe Secretariat,Secretariat, though,though, toto keepkeep DPKODPKO oror itsits predecessorpredecessor inin touchtouch withwith thethe negotiations?negotiations? OrOr waswas thisthis aa personal,personal, youryour personalpersonal participationparticipation inin thesethese negotiations?negotiations?
MG: My personal participation, but itit wasn't justjust me, itit was a team.team. We had a teamteam inin
SPA, which consisted of myself, Michele Pelletier, a couple of military officers, a reallyreally
very bright Spanish half-colonel. We were thethe UN part ofthethe military table,table, soso we were
part, II feelfeel likelike itit was, and Alvaro was at thethe top,top, was thethe head of thethe whole enterprise.
And thenthen on thisthis side therethere was a military, on thatthat side there was a civilian, and I was
head of thethe military bit, although senior toto Alvaro, but seniority didn't matter.
JS: Right. And he was Special Representative.
MG: Personal Envoy, then it was. Where there was some tension, was between Alvaro
and IqbalIqbal Riza. IqbalIqbal felt that he was there on the ground, the war still continuing, he was
not kept informed. I used to urge Alvaro to keep him better informed. But Alvaro never
liked Iqbal very much. He didn't want the information to get out too far. He thought that
if he were to tell Iqbal, Iqbal would tell his people, his senior staff, and it would get back
to governments, and so on. The relationship with the friends of the Secretary-General had
to be managed very carefully. It had to be made clear to them that they were not there to 6666
~i taketake initiatives.initiatives. They were toto do certain tasks when the Secretary-General asked them to
do thosethose tasks.tasks. Some of themthem saw that more clearly than others and there was one point
when thethe President of Venezuela very nearly screwed the whole thing up. Carlos Andres ~I Perez.Perez.
JS:JS: HeHe triedtried toto taketake over thethe negotiations.
MO:MG: That'sThat's right.right. II looklook backback onon it,it, Jim, as one of thethe happiest aspects of my life in the
UnitedUnited Nations,Nations, thatthat negotiation.negotiation.
JS:JS: ButBut justjust toto continuecontinue onon thethe FriendsFriends questionquestion aa moment.moment. Mexico was very
importantimportant providingproviding aa locus,locus, butbut alsoalso inin otherother ways.ways. HowHow important,important, leavingleaving aside
Venezuela,Venezuela, diddid youyou findfind thisthis institutioninstitution oftheofthe FriendsFriends inin thisthis particularparticular casecase inin bringing
aboutabout thethe ultimateultimate agreement?agreement?
MO:MG: II won'twon't saysay thatthat wewe couldn'tcouldn't havehave donedone itit withoutwithout them.them. ButBut doingdoing itit waswas greatlygreatly
helpedhelped byby theirtheir existence.existence. See,See, theythey couldcould bebe usedused soso flexibly,flexibly, Jim.Jim. InIn factfact theythey becamebecame
fivefive plusplus oneone whenwhen thethe AmericansAmericans camecarne in.in. SoSo youyou couldcould selectselect fromfrom thatthat groupgroup ofof sixsix
statesstates anyany individual,individual, anyany combinationcombination thatthat youyou thoughtthought wouldwould bebe ableable toto deliverdeliver thethe baitbait
whereverwherever youyou wantedwanted thethe baitbait delivered.delivered. SoSo wewe wouldwould givegive taskstasks toto thethe Mexicans,Mexicans, we'dwe'd
givegive taskstasks toto thethe Americans.Americans. TheThe MexicansMexicans toto pushpush thethe FMLNFMLN aa littlelittle wayway towardstowards thethe
middle,middle, andand thethe AmericansAmericans toto pushpush thethe governmentgovernment towardstowards thethe middle.middle. TheThe onlyonly
problemproblem came,came, asas II say,say, whenwhen thethe FriendsFriends startedstarted thinkingthinking theythey wouldwould dodo itit themselves,themselves, 67
and start having conversations that we didn't know about until we heard about them
through the Salvadorian parties.
JS: Now there's one point regarding the military struggle, which is a complete
dichotomy between former FMLN people and former government people. And that is
what was the significance, or let's put it this way: When did the FMLN really decide to
negotiate seriously? Was it because they did not succeed with their offensive that took iri' III them into the capital, or not? if Iltl MG:MO: Villalobos says that they never expected that offensive to succeed. They did
expect it to give the government a nasty shock, and make it possible for others to say to
the government that there wasn't a military solution to this conflict. He says that well
before then they had recognized that the situation was changing, the world situation was
changing, which made it necessary for them to negotiate, to get as much in retum for
giving up the armed struggle as they could get. The longer they waited, they felt, the less
they would get, because the Americans would see that they were becoming less of a threat
with the change of regime in Russia, and what that implied for Cuba and Cuba's ability to
!!! support them. The change of govenU11ent in Nicaragua was another factor. So they made illl'Ll 1 •.~ that big push in November of '89, realizing that their time was running out. That may be
ex post facto clever thinking. He says it's not. I'm prepared to leave that as their
calculation. Does that make sense to you? 6688
JS: Yes. The former President Cristiani sayssays exactlyexactly thethe opposite.opposite. Namely,Namely, thatthat theythey
had no intention of negotiating the agreement untiluntil theythey recognizedrecognized essentiallyessentially thethe defeat defeat
ofthat maj or...
MG: I don't believe that for a moment.
JS: Anyhow, that's why I asked, because it'sit's aa completecomplete differencedifference inin thethe storystory youyou
hear from the two sides. And I believe thethe general UNUN belief,belief, inin termsterms ofof AlvaroAlvaro dede SotoSoto
and the former Secretary-General, is what you havehave justjust said.said.
I want to go on to your later role, surprising rolerole inin thethe agriculturalagricultural reform.reform. ButBut
before that, I'd wanted to ask you if there'sthere's any otherother aspectaspect ofofthisthis reallyreally extraordinaryextraordinary
operation in El Salvador that you would want toto commentcomment onon fromfrom youryour personalpersonal experience.
MG: There's one big aspect, which Alvaro and GracianaGraciana [del[del Castillo]Castillo] havehave writtenwritten about a lot, and you know that. Itls very relevantrelevant toto thethe lessonslessons learnedlearned byby thethe UN.UN.
Again, it sounds as though I am beating my own drum,drum, butbut ifif youyou looklook atat thethe negotiationnegotiation with Guatemala, and the way we handled that,that, you'llyou'll seesee thatthat wewe learnedlearned thethe lessons.lessons. WeWe brought the Banle and the Fund and thethe military generalsgenerals intointo thethe negotiationsnegotiations fromfrom thethe very beginning of those three years of negotiation. WeWe diddid itit byby regularlyregularly briefingbriefing themthem atat consultative board meetings. We did itit also, as farfar asas thethe agenciesagencies areare concerned,concerned, byby bringing them into the negotiations in thethe sense ofof askingasking themthem forfor expertsexperts whowho joinedjoined thethe negotiating team. The indigenous rights agreement ofof Guatemala,Guatemala, whichwhich isis probablyprobably thethe 6969
most revolutionaryrevolutionary of thatthat package of agreements, was negotiated with great help from
thethe inputinput of a British official at thethe ILO,ILO, who turned out toto know quite a lot about
minority andand indigenousindigenous rights.rights. Fortunately he was a Spanish-speaking Brit, so it worked
extremelyextremely well. We succeededsucceeded inin giving thethe agencies a sense of some ownership of the
agreementagreement thatthat was being negotiated, which made themthem readierreadier toto cooperate with the UN
properproper whenwhen itit camecame toto implementation.implementation. That's different fromfrom what we did inin El Salvador
whenwhen ONUSALONUSAL camecame inin bright-eyed and bushy-tailed and started setting up itsits own
structuresstructures toto dodo things,things, likelike thethe encampmentencampment andand thethe sustenancesustenance and retrainingretraining of thethe ex-ex
combatants,combatants, thingsthings thatthat wouldwould havehave been done much betterbetter by UNOP, forfor instance,instance, who
hadhad beenbeen onon thethe groundground therethere forfor decades,decades, knewknew everybody,everybody, knew how toto get thingsthings done
inin ElEl Salvador.Salvador. TheThe factfact thatthat wewe camecame inin andand thoughtthought we would do itit ourselves inin our
ownown way,way, a)a) waswas inefficient,inefficient, andand b)b) causedcaused badbad bloodblood withwith thethe restrest of thethe United Nations
, community.community. WeWe avoidedavoided doingdoing thatthat againagain inin GuatemalaGuatemala byby bringingbringing thethe agenciesagencies inin fromfrom
~I thethe veryvery beginningbeginning andand givinggiving themthem aa partpart toto playplay inin thethe negotiations.negotiations. SoSo I'mI'm ratherrather proud
ofofthat that asas aa lessonlesson learned,learned, andand aa lessonlesson quicklyquickly appliedapplied inin thethe neighneighboringboring country.country. II
thinkthink that'sthat's thethe mainmain pointpoint II wantedwanted toto make.make.
AnotherAnother thingthing I'llI'll telltell youyou aboutabout ElEI SalvadorSalvador isis whatwhat II callcall thethe WhiteWhite CarCar
Syndrome.Syndrome. InIn aa smallsmall countrycountry likelike that,that, somewhatsomewhat uneasyuneasy aboutabout thethe UNUN gettinggetting involvedinvolved
andand mediatingmediating itsits internalinternal conflict,conflict, havinghaving suchsuch aa conspicuousconspicuous presencepresence isis politicallypolitically
damaging.damaging. II rememberremember goinggoing therethere andand seeingseeing thisthis arrayarray ofofabout about thirtythirty whitewhite JeepsJeeps
markedmarked "UN""UN" linedlined upup atat thethe backback ofofthe the beachbeach onon aa Sunday.Sunday. ThatThat doesdoes looklook aa bitbit likelike anan
occupyingoccupying army.army. InIn thethe reportreport whichwhich II preparedprepared forfor KofiKofi beforebefore II leftleft onon howhow toto dodo thingsthings
betterbetter inin peacepeace andand security,security, II saidsaid oneone thingthing youyou shouldshould dodo isis decidedecide notnot toto havehave whitewhite 7700 cars everywhere. Have a mixture of colors. There are many cars thatthat don't do anythinganything but drive around in the town; they donlt go out on patrol inin thethe bush. The could bebe painted like ordinary cars to avoid being so conspicuous.
JS: Let me ask you two other questions.
MG: Can I say one other thing about El Salvador? The follow up. The agreement inin EIEl
Salvador was negotiated in a way that made it possible for us toto monitor pretty closelyclosely how well the two sides were complying with it because we had toto make regularregular reportsreports toto the Security Council. Boutros got quite uneasy, and even angry sometimes with AlvaroAlvaro and me, because he said we were constantly snapping at thethe heels of President CristianiCristiani and his successor President Calderon. They were heads of state, he said; we ought toto show more respect and give them the benefit ofthe doubt. The lessonlesson therethere isis thatthat
Secretaries~GeneralSecreta.ries~General have to recognize that sometimes their mediating role,role, and thethe implementation of a peacekeeping role, requires UN officials toto play inin a lessless deferentialdeferential way than they normally do towards heads of state.
JS: I have two questions. The first is, as we've said before, therethere was, especially inin
Washington, but also in San Salvador, a feeling that the United Nations was lessless thanthan totally impartial in the negotiations. That they were, that de Soto inin particular, favoredfavored the FMLN. What was your impression of this? 71
MG:MO: I think that it is true that Alvaro and the rest of us all liked our FMLN interlocutors more than we liked the government lot, with one or two exceptions. There was a nice old man whose name I have forgotten who is in this picture.
JS: Diallos?
MG:MO: No, what was he called? Eduardo Torres. I liked him, but on the whole we didn't like the government team very much. Whereas we did like the FMLN team. That's one, that was our personal likes. I don't believe that it at any time affected the way in which we conducted the negotiation. We might come out of the room spitting at one side, usually the govemment side, and might make rude jokes about them. But we conducted the negotiation in an impartial way, in a neutral way, because we knew, I mean we'd all been in this business for some time, we all knew that if we didn't do that we weren't going to bring the bacon home.
JS: Second question in this respect is the role ofthe Secretary...
MG:MO: One other point and that was the fact that Washington was so keen to get a ceasecease- fire, and we were saying that the dynamics of this negotiation were such that you're going to get the cease-fire only at the end. That made us appear to be partial to the FMLN. But that was a dispassionate judgment. • 72 JS: Right. The other question is the same as with regard to Cambodia, the role of • Perez de Cuellar as Secretary-General. How important was it, how crucial was his • presence at the end, which was the very end of his term, in bringing the agreement to • fruition? • MG: I think that his personal role was tremendously important, both in the deadline, the midnight on the 31 5tst of December deadline, which was of such symbolic importance that
• itit helped bring that final negotiation to an en~.en~. But more widely, he was very important • because he is Latin American, and the fact that Alvaro is Latin American helped to, I III know theythey talkedtalked about los dos peruanitos. But the fact that a Latin American was seen , toto be dealing with a Latin American problem probably helped a very sovereignty-sovereignty conscious part of thethe world toto accept the UN, the introduction of the UN into their affairs.
, And thatthat was another reason why I had no problem with being subordinate to Alvaro,
because itit was good for thethe negotiations thatthat he and Francesca [Vendrell][VendrellJ should be out in
front.
JS: Let me go ahead then,then, toto your unique assignment, as far as I know in your career,
of developing an agricultural reform plan for El Salvador. How did that happen?
MG: What happened was that in those last wild days before midnight on the 31 5tst of
December, thethe provisions inin thethe agreement relating toto thethe distribution of landland toto
demobilized combatants from both sides were drafted. But theythey were drafted inin a very 73 loose way, without any technical input, except we got thethe Guatemalan with aa GennanGennan name who was the head of ECLAC in Santiago ......
J8: I don't know him.
MG: Gert Rosethal. We got him to come at the very end toto give somesome advice.advice. ItIt waswas too late, really, the train was moving so fast then. There were all sortssorts of ambiguitiesambiguities andand loopholes in that very brief passage in the agreement, as a resultresult of which thethe governmentgovernment was able to go slowly. That of course was very threatening, because of thethe peoplepeople inin thethe encampments who wanted to get out and get onto the land.land. And so Cristiani agreedagreed thatthat we should in effect, not exactly renegotiate the provisions, but expand themthem andand getget agreement on the transfer of land. And I was there as a sort of political leaderleader ofof thatthat butbut
Graciana did all the work.
J8: And that was after the ...
MG: That was after implementation had begun, when itit became clear thatthat thisthis waswas- there were other parts where the agreement hadn't been terriblyterribly well negotiated. WhenWhen things were going wrong because of the differences between thethe twotwo sidessides aboutabout whatwhat exactly was it that had been agreed to. But this is thethe main one, so thisthis isis II supposesuppose aboutabout six or nine months after the signature. 7474
JS: That's right, and it was done in El Salvador, right? The negotiations took place there.
MO:MG: Right.
JS: And who participated in these negotiations there?
MO:MG: The senior staff of ONUCA, ... no, ONUSAL, IqIqbalba! Riza again and his civilian people. And OracianaGraciana and myself. I feel there were agricultural experls,experts, but I can't remember...
JS: But it was with the government? The FMLN no longer existed as a part.
MO:MG: Yes it did. The FMLN was party to the agreement. That upset the government a lot too, they felt they should have disappeared when the troops were disbanded. They were party to the agreement.
JS: Oh, and they negotiated in that capacity and not as the successor political party.
MO:MG: COlTect; as parties to the agreement they signed in Chepultapec.
JS: I see. Did you conclude these negotiations with any optimism that they would result in land reform? 75
MO:MG: Not land reform. It was simply redistributing state landland and otherother landland thatthat waswas available to the state. So it wasn't really a reform program. There had beenbeen aa landland refonnrefonn program sometime before. But this was only a matter of using available land,land, somesome thatthat had to be bought, and the existing land, to provide thethe livelihoodlivelihood forfor bothboth sides'sides' exex- combatants. And this again, coming to lessons learned,learned, Jim, thisthis isis a tremendouslytremendously important lesson to all these operations, that one of thethe highest priority things,things, andand oneone ofof the most expensive things, is to provide gainful civilian employment forfor thethe exex- combatants as soon as possible after demobilization.
JS: Yes. That was really the general question I wanted toto ask you, takingtaking intointo accountaccount all the areas we've been talking about. The reintegration of thethe formerformer combatantscombatants hashas not worked well any place. And number one, were you aware of thethe problemproblem therethere asas these various agreements were reached, and so forth? Was some effort mademade toto devisedevise ways in which reintegration could be successfully done, and toto what extentextent diddid you,you, fromfrom the perspective of the United Nations, figure in a role for NGOs inin thisthis process, inin youryour planning?
MG: We became more and more aware of the need, became a littlelittle bitbit cleverercleverer inin planning for it, and in stockpiling resources, agricultural equipment, thatthat kindkind ofof thing.thing.
But we had great difficulty, and still have great difficulty, even getting member statesstates toto put money up front. It's difficult for them to see thisthis isis a terriblyterribly importantimportant program.program. It'sIt's also difficult for some of the agencies to see it's a terriblyterribly importantimportant program. BecauseBecause ifif
------7676
you'reyou're inin aa developmentdevelopment agency,agency, youyou willwill think,think, "God,"God, wewe couldcould spendspend thatthat moneymoney
elsewhereelsewhere and getget a much better returnreturn inin termsterms of thethe increaseincrease inin thethe GDP ofof thethe country
concerned. Better development returnreturn thanthan giving itit toto thesethese people who've been killing
civilians for thethe last twenty years." So you have to bypass thethe developmental imperative,
and persuade the developmentalists toto allow their resources to be used for a political
purpose. And that's not easy to do. As far as the NGOs are concerned, I'm not
conscious.... The NGOs got involved in demining, but I'm not sure they had been
involved much in these programs. But I'm getting a bit out of touch now, I left DPKO a
long time ago. It may be that there are programs involving NGOs.
JS: There are some. Good, well those are my questions. Again, my final comment is,
do you have something you'd like to add to this review of, really, tlrree crucial operations
inin which you were centrally involved?involved?
MG: II don't thinkthink so,so, Jim,Jim, I'veI've got somesome general observations,observations, andand my answers toto your
specificspecific questions. II thinkthink thatthat thethe overalloverall recordrecord ofof whatwhat thethe UNUN hashas done inin thethe peacepeace
andand securitysecurity fieldfield inin thethe tenten years sincesince thethe endend ofof thethe ColdCold WarWar isis prettypretty good.good. SomeSome
fairlyfairly majormajor blotsblots 011on thethe copybook,copybook, butbut therethere areare aa lotlot ofof ticktick marks,marks, too.too. II dodo thinkthink thatthat
we'vewe've learnedlearned aa lot.lot. AndAnd II thinkthink we'rewe're cleverercleverer atat itit nownow thanthan wewe werewere tenten yearsyears ago.ago. II
shuddershudder toto thinkthink sometimessometimes aboutabout thethe easeease withwith whichwhich wewe slippedslipped intointo somesome ofof thesethese newnew
operationsoperations afterafter thethe initialinitial successsuccess inin Namibia-suchNamibia-such asas thethe PakistaniPakistani battalionbattalion wewe sentsent
intointo SomaliaSomalia inin 19911991 withoutwithout anyany realreal analysisanalysis ofofthethe threat,threat, withoutwithout anyany realreal definitiondefinition ofof
whatwhat itsits mandatemandate waswas goinggoing toto be,be, withoutwithout anyany realreal consentconsent from from AideedAideed...... ''':',''.:i,~,'icc.1"·- ,'v
""'",.;:,i.", > , .!i" 'i,~!'\fi' ;. 11; Ill.. I ,.,..-1 7777 EndEnd ofof TapeTape 33 SideSide 11 I It!
Yale-UN Oral History Project Marrack GouldingGou Iding James S. Sutterlin, PeacekeepingPeacekeeping June 30, 19981998 Oxford, EnglandEngland
Name Index: UN Peacekeeping Operations
Ahmed, Rafi 44 Ahtisaari, Martti 3-5,13, 16-23,25,30,33-35,47,49-50 Akashi, Yasushi 34-35,37-40,43-50 Annan, Kofi 40,6940,69 Aronson, Bernie 5959 Baena Soares, Joao 54 Baker, JamesJames 5959 Botha, Pik 13,2113,21 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 12,34,39-40,48,50,7012,34,39-40,48,50,70 Buckard, Alfredo Cristiani 67-70, 73 Chamorra, Violetta 56 Chand, Prem 4,18-19,21-22 Crocker, Chet 2,9 Dayal,Dayal, Viru 15,17,31 dede Soto, Alvaro 31,51,53,57,59-62,64-65,68,70,72 deldel Castillo,Castillo, Graciana 68,73-7468,73-74 Diallo,Dial 10, IssaIssa 1212 Dibuama,Dibuama, Timothy 4,16,32 dosdos Santos,Santos, JoseJose Edual'doEduardo 8-10, 12,26-28 Eliasson,Eliasson, JanJan 40 Farah,Farah, AbyAby 15,3115,31 Fleischhauer,Fleischhauer, CarlCarl 1616 Gharekhan,Gharekhan, ChinmayaChinmaya 4040 Gurirab,Gurirab, Theo-BenTheo-Ben 1414 Hamutsuya,Hamutsuya, HidipoHidipo 1414 II11 Sung,Sung, KimKim 99 Jah,Jah, NaNa 1313 Jonah,Jonah, JamesJames 15,3115,31 Legwaila,Legwaila, LegwailaLegwaila JosephJoseph 2121 McNamara,McNamara, DennisDennis 38-3938-39 Mudge,Mudge, DirkDirk 27-2827-28 Nujoma,Nujoma, SamSam 8-10,8-10, 12-15,12-15, Opande,Opande, DanielDaniel 19,2119,21 Ortega,Ortega, HumbertoHumberto 56S6 Pelletier,PeJletier, MicheleMichele 6565 PerezPerez dede Cuellar,Cuellar, JavierJavier 3,8-9,11-12,16-17,27,30-31,35,39,48,51,54,57,3,8-9,11-12,16-17,27,30-31,35,39,48,51,54,57, 59, 63-65, 68, 71-72 Perez,Perez, CarlosCarlos AndresAndres 6565 Petrovsky,Petrovsky, VladimirVladimir 4848 Richardson,Richardson, WilliamWilliam 5353 Riza,Riza, IqbalIqbal 52-54,52-54, 56,56, 65,65, 7474 Rosenthal,Rosenthal, Gel1Gel1 7373 Sanderson,Sanderson, JohnJohn 35-36,41,4335-36,41,43 Sary,lengSary,leng 4444 Sen, Hun 46 Sihanouk,Sihanollk, Norodom 39,46 Sol, Calderon 70 Thatcher, Margaret 16,20-21,31 Thornberry, Cedric 3-5,17-18,23-25,30,33 Torres, Eduardo 71 Urquhart,Urquhart, Brian 1, 5 Vargas, Nury 61 Vendrell,Vendrel1, Francesce 72 Viera de Mello, Sergio 38 Villalobos,Villalobos, Fernando Naranjo 61,63-64,67