From Civil War to Civil Society

The Transition from War to Peace in Guatemala and Liberia

the World Bank and the Carter Center 1 Background

The Liberian Civil War secure most of the country. More recently, an electoral commission has been estab- reed American slaves began to settle lished, efforts to repatriate the refugees what is currently known as Liberia have began, 25,000 ex-combatants have in the 1820s, often in the face of been demobilized, and elections are hostilityF from the local inhabitants. By planned for May of this year. 1847, the ex-slaves and their descendants had declared a republic and began a 150 Historical tribal and political divisions year period of Americo-Liberian elite rule have been exacerbated by the continuing based on domination and exploitation of struggle for power and material gain. the indigenous population. In 1980, Wholesale profiteering and looting have Americo-Liberian rule ended with a been key factors in the continuation of military coup staged by Samuel Doe. The war. Illegal resource trading is an esti- ensuing regime, violently suppressed any mated $350 million per year business. form of opposition for the next ten years, And at the combatant level, living by the creating deadly ethnic cleavages. gun has become a way of life. A dangerous external and internal equilibrium has In late 1989, the National Patriotic Front developed in a country where the state for Liberia (NPFL), under the leadership apparatus has almost completely disap- of Charles Taylor, began a rebellion in the peared. Hence, a major component of any north. When it reached the capital, peace process will be handing control of Monrovia, during the summer of 1990, natural resources over to civil society, the NPFL was repelled by an Economic breaking oligopolistic access to the large Community of West African States profits which have underwritten the (ECOWAS) peacekeeping force violent conflict. To date, both interna- (ECOMOG). Shortly after, President Doe tional donors and the UN system have was killed by a splinter faction of the been ambivalent about supporting secu- NPFL and a Liberian National Transitional rity measures and more willing to provide Government (LNTG) under the leadership humanitarian assistance rather than of Amos Sawyer was installed. making a long-term commitment to reconstruction measures. Major peace talksstarted the subse- quent year in Yamoussoukro, Côte d’Ivoirefailed and new factions The Guatemalan civil strife emerged. The next five years witnessed factional fighting and numerous failed Twentieth-century Guatemalan history peace accords. Heightened conflict in has two key characteristics: 1992 and 1996 exposed ECOMOG’s authoritarianism and instability. With 6 limitations in providing security for a coups d’etat, 5 constitutions and 35 comprehensive settlement. Violent different governments (15 of them mili- clashes between armed factions around tary juntas) in 96 years, the Guatemalan Monrovia in April of 1996 resulted in the people have suffered widespread physical evacuation of most foreigners and many and human destruction, and wide-scale Liberians. However, in August of 1996, a social fragmentation and polarization. new peace accord was signed in Abuja and Effectively, the civil war began in 1960 partial demobilization began a few month with a group of young army officers later. During the same period, ECOMOG revolting against corruption, accompa- forces were bolstered to enable them to nied by the training of anti-Cuban forces 1 From Civil War to Civil Society

on Guatemalan territory. The revolt failed Three years later, civil society was explic- but the officers disappeared into the rural itly brought into the negotiations with the areas, formed a guerrilla army, and began establishment of a Civil Society Assembly. a war against the government. The ensuing agreementbringing to- gether accords on democratization, Initially, the movement was aligned with human rights, displaced populations, Cuban revolutionary forces and concen- indigenous rights, socioeconomic issues, trated in the Ladino areas of the country. and the role of civil society and the However, over the next two decades, militarytook almost six years to reach political and social reforms became a and was signed in December 1996. rallying point, with the indigenous populations playing a major role. The government counter-insurgency cam- From civil war to paign, characterized by large-scale human civil society rights violations, successfully restrained the guerrilla movement. Yet, the struggle Though the transition from war to sus- continued, partly due to the strength of tainable peace is multifaceted and non- guerrilla movements in neighboring linear, we can distinguish the three countries. In 1982, the groups united overlapping phases of making peace, into the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional keeping peace and sustaining peace, with Guatemalteca (URNG). each phase requiring a mix of political, security, humanitarian and developmental The transition to peace began in the early activities. Yet, it is difficult to determine to mid-1980s with a new constitution, the which set of activities will achieve its election of a civilian president, political objectives in a given situation. Moreover, pluralism, and personal liberties such as the appropriate timing of and the interac- freedom of speech. In 1987, the Guatema- tion between the various interventions is lan president, in concert with other not well understood. The international Central American heads of state, signed a community is working within a multi- declaration outlining procedures for the disciplinary and inexact science. establishment of sustainable peace in the region. For Guatemala, an important The following report has four main sec- component of this agreement was the tions: the three overlapping phases of war establishment of National Reconciliation to peace transition and a brief conclusion. Commissions (NRC). The first section, making peace, discusses the peace process, including the role of The next three years were spent preparing civil society and the international commu- for the negotiations. This process in- nity. The second section, keeping peace, cluded a series of NRC consultations with addresses post-conflict governance, political parties, the private sector, elections and issues related to implement- religious groups, academics, labor unions, ing the peace accords. The third section, and other members of civil society. These sustaining peace, explores reconstruction meetings were mediated by the Catholic and reconciliation. The final section Church and a UN observer. In 1991, concludes by emphasizing the need for an formal discussions began between the integrated strategic framework—a coher- URNG and the newly formed government ent approach to sustainable peace. commission for peace (COPAZ).

2 2 Making Peace

The peace process

he essential element of a peace process is political willingness by all Not only is physical capital destroyed and financial capi- warring factions to enter into tal flight common in the course of violent struggles, but Tnegotiations and a security framework to equally devastating is the loss of human and social capi- maintain the peace. This usually requires tal. Many of the best trained are killed or flee, families extensive investments in time and money are separated, commercial and social networks are frac- before the parties are brought to the tured, and trust is diminished. negotiating table. In particular, the various parties must overcome the lack of The machinery of the UN and of the international agen- interpersonal trust that has developed cies was designed to deal with wars between states, but during the conflict. Another important now most wars tend to be within states. component is the need for all involved to view the negotiations as a “way out” of We must think in terms of a socially and environmen- the conflict where not all demands will be tally sustainable development strategy itself as one con- meet. As conflict results from differing tributing measure to prevent conflict: equity, social co- societal perceptions, even the best peace hesion, mobility and participation being the hallmarks process will result in a compromise. of a more stable society. However, to minimize discontent, main- ...to reduce the misery and horror that accompany civil tain momentum and reach the “largest strife...we [must] bear witness to their common denominator,” the process needs misery...contribute to the collective efforts...[and build] to be comprehensive, transparent, and inclusive. This means that all social, on the synergies so that the whole is more than the sum economic and political aspects of the of the parts. conflict should be addressed in an open forum, allowing all interested members of Ismail Serageldin, Vice President of Environmentally the society an equal opportunity to Sustainable Development, World Bank participate. Throughout the process, no sector of society should dominate. Civil society, including women’s associations and even the combatants who may be responsible for atrocities, should be nomic, social and political issues, address- represented. To expedite the process, ing the major underlying causes of the each group and/or faction should have a conflict; and (d) a prioritizing of issues, negotiator with a clear mandate. negotiating the substantial areas before Marginalization of a significant group or dealing with operational aspects. issue often leads to more violence.

The following premises were suggested for For the peace to extend beyond the effective negotiations: (a) dialogue negotiating table to the larger society, a between factions allows for the conceptu- number of transformations need to occur. alizing of peace; (b) an agreement on how First, behavior must be altered from the to identify issues, participants and proce- application of violence to more peaceful dures, thereby legitimizing the process forms of dispute settlement; second, a and actors; (c) a consensus that the transition from a wartime to a peace substantive agenda should include eco- mentality needs to occur; third, the 3 From Civil War to Civil Society

system of risks and rewards should exercise in national conflict resolution encourage peaceful pursuit of livelihoods, and reconstruction. As already noted, civil rather than intimidation, violence and participation legitimizes the peace rent-seeking; fourth, adversaries must process and outcome. come to view each other as members of the same society, However, participation by civil society working toward a common requires that the factions open the goala peaceful and prosperous process to all interested members of The nature of war future; and fifth, structures and society, that institutional mechanisms are determines the institutions must be amended at in place to guarantee civil participation, all levels of the society to and that resources are available to sup- nature of peace support these new peaceful port local peace-building and conflict transformations. management efforts. A workshop partici- pant described this as “inclusiveness in Participants also noted that the meaningful institutions.” This process “nature of war determines the may be very difficult in a highly milita- nature of peace.” This means that the rized society. factors which produce and sustain the conflict will directly impact the ensuing Involving civil society in the peace process peace settlement. can contribute to psychosocial healing. Civil societythe network of informal and The Guatemalan peace process offers formal relationships, groups and organiza- many lessons: first, transparent processes tions which bind a society togethercan increased trust and reduced suspicion; provide the environment within which the second, participation by most of the levels of trust and sense of community stakeholders built a sense of partnership necessary for durable peace are con- among the various components of society, structed. By allowing civil society to legitimizing the process and outcome; and third, the agreements addressed the root causes of the conflict, providing a blueprint for socioeconomic development. Involving civil society in In this manner, the agreements went beyond addressing military arrangements the peace process can to provide a comprehensive package for a contribute to psychoso- new nation. Participants stressed that the peace was brokered by the Guatemalans cial healing themselves, not imposed by outsiders.

participate in the peace settlement, The role of civil society reconciliation becomes part of the peace- making process itself. Civil society can play an important role during the peace process by: (a) ensuring The displacement and destruction associ- that discussions and recommendations ated with conflict usually has an adverse take into account the needs of the larger effect on civil society. Yet, some aspects of society, and (b) monitoring the implemen- civil society usually survive and can be tation of these very recommendations. In built on. This is the case, even in Liberia, this manner, the agreements become an where civilians were targeted by the 4 various warring factions. Involving civil society in the peace process is a way of articulating social capital (societal trust Peace that is not “home- and cohesiveness), the backbone of every society, in the political arena. grown” tends to be weak and short-lived The international community can support civil participation by “creating space” for civil society to realize its full potentialboth as peacemaker and peacekeeper. Local methods of dispute problem, and (b) it is invited by all war- settlement, reconciliation, and institu- ring factions. tion-building should be encouraged. The international community should be During the Guatemalan peace process, careful not to contribute to or exacerbate civil society played a unique role. It was the conflict. Often, foreign intervention instrumental in defining the issues and lacks coherence or even a common agreements, and nurturing the peace desired outcome. Moreover, external process itself. This potential has yet to be solutions may not be able to influence the realized in Liberia, conceivably threaten- source of the conflict. It is important for ing the emerging peace. The establish- external assistance to go beyond settling ment of a multi-sectoral electoral com- competing local claims to engaging the mission with broad representation could factions in more comprehensive dialogue. be a fundamental transitional political However, outsiders should not impose a instrument for bringing Liberian civilians peace process or agreement on the local into the peace process. population; peace that is not “home- grown” tends to be weak and short-lived, as the case of Angola illustrates. The role of the international community Regional organizations also may be instrumental in the process, especially The international community plays an where refugees and regional support for important role in facilitating or expedit- different factions produce a regional ing peace processes. Development institu- dimension to the conflict. Regional bodies tions and donor governments can provide may be better-placed to assist the peace technical and financial support, as well as process because their judgments are programs which strengthen civil society. based on a more comprehensive under- The “Group of Friends,” an organization standing of the conflict and its regional of countries supporting the Guatemalan implications. In Central America, for peace process, played a critical role in example, the Contadora Group has that country’s conflict resolution. The influenced the settlement of several United Nations, which is considered more conflicts. However, in West Africa, at- impartial than any one government, can tempts by ECOWAS and ECOMOG to fill another important role. However, the bring about a resolution to the Liberian United Nations can only play a meaningful civil war by intervening militarily have role if (a) its participation is based on an demonstrated that regional solutions also understanding of and sensitivity to the can be hindered by regional politics.

5 From Civil War to Civil Society

The peace accord Building confidence often involves a trade-off between justice and reconcilia- The end of violence does not mean the tion. A society emerging from conflict has end of conflict. Disputes and differing to balance the quest for justice for the views on social, political and economic victims of violence with the need to get development will continue. Moreover, the on with life as one society. In some cases, signing of an accord is just the beginning further conflict can erupt when judg- of a lengthy and arduous process of ments are deemed excessively harsh. In building a society on a nonviolent funda- other cases, the process becomes time- ment. Sustainable peace requires accom- consuming and expensive without contrib- modating the divergent needs and time- uting to reconciliation. A “culture of tables of various segments of society. This impunity,” on the other hand, could usually means the reconciliation of undermine the reconciliation process and competing agendas and addressing the encourage people to take the law into many factors which lead to the conflict. their own hands. A participant suggested that “justice as opposed to vengeance” may be the appropriate balance.

The end of violence Post-genocidal Rwanda is a daunting example of the difficulties of balancing does not mean the justice with reconciliation. So far, the process has been expensive, mismanaged end of conflict and time-consuming, with little justice or reconciliation. The process in Guatemala, on the other hand, is illustrative. The reconciliation process began with a Yet, as mentioned above, it is important “national dialogue” where over one to recognize that no accord will compre- hundred organizations “learned” to hensively address all demands. Even with communicate about previously shrouded the Guatemalan accord, perhaps the most issues. Next, arrangements were made to comprehensive set of peace agreements identify the needs of direct victims of signed in the post-cold war era, opposition violence and create conditions for them continues from a small number of groups to pardon their aggressors. These arrange- who feel that they gained comparatively ments were then institutionalized into a little. commission to investigate human rights violations. However, a participant ques- The peace accord is a critical step toward tioned the validity of comparing genocide restoring the fundamental element of a with civil war. functioning society: confidence. Confi- dence rests on the mutual understanding that former adversaries will not take up arms again. A participant noted that confidence also demands mutual respect.

6 3 Keeping Peace

Post-conflict governance ambitious programs may produce public dissatisfaction and loss of faith in the n the final analysis, two important process. Moreover, while establishing a elements of successful peace accords macroeconomic framework may be are active involvement by civil society necessary to reduce inflation and stabilize Iand skillful governance. With the state the economy, regulatory and administra- apparatus and civil society both weakened tive procedures should be kept to a by conflict, good governance  the minimum. Incentives for good behavior, management of resources on behalf of all however, need to be included early on. citizens with fairness and openness  is an important goal. Successful governance, Participants also emphasized that good in this and other contexts, has several key governance does not always require features: political democracy. Unelected regimes can manage public resources openly and Transparency, which requires budget, fairly, while democratically elected gov- debt, expenditure, and revenue disclosure. Who pays and who benefits must be apparent to all. Accountability, which means that the Good governance governing body will be responsible for how it is generating revenue and does not always allocating expenditure. Rule of law, which demands a legal require political framework by which government and democracy society conduct themselves. Institutional pluralism rather than unitary structures, which supports the forgoing conditions. ernments can be corrupt and incompe- Participation, which implies the tent. Such distinctions have important involvement and empowerment of all implications for societies emerging from those affected by governance. conflict. While ill-advised to follow politi- cal blueprints, such societies should seek Participants suggested that the following to establish the institutional basis for a considerations might ease the burden on move toward democracy. post-conflict governing bodies and facilitate good governance. To the extent possible, authority should be decentralized to In search of a increase the participation of civil society. representative government Community-centered development and increasing capacity at the local level may Although democracy may not always produce quick impact and sustainability. coincide with good governance, popular Decentralization may also avoid a “winner participation in decision-making does takes all” scenario. Another important encourage transparency and accountability. consideration is that the relatively weak These are two key features of good gover- administrative capacity of the government nance, and in the long term, good gover- means that it should concentrate on a few nance is correlated with socioeconomic priorities. A small number of targets should development. Representative government— be set and pursued with vigor. Overly and elections as a means of achieving it— 7 From Civil War to Civil Society

becomes an important consideration for tives such as South Africa’s transitional post-conflict societies. government of national unity may prove more effective in the medium-term. If conflict is about power, then elections are Democracies can have various forms of a peaceful method of allocating power. They articulating participation. In Guatemala, can be a first step in the peace-building the peace process involved almost six process where political institutions are years of negotiations and involved three created to represent political positions and different governments. When elections manage diversity without violence. Elec- were held, the voter turnout was relatively tions are also a way of admitting the low given the level of civil involvement in “public into the negotiations.” However, the electoral process. This may have been elections must not be seen as an end in due to the fact that elections had become themselves. As a workshop participant meaningless after many years of authori- warned, “Once on the right road, it is tarian rule. Still, democracy not only important to keep moving, otherwise you preceded but also influenced the peace risk being run over by subsequent events.” process.

Although there appears to be little In Liberia, the election process remains in consensus on the necessity of precondi- doubt: 700,000 refugees have not re- tions for elections, it is important to build turned and will not be able to participate trust and legitimize the process by involv- from their camps, offering an advantage ing all factions and civil society (including to any faction that can transport its own refugees and the displaced). International ethnic supporters. The time frame is actors can add legitimacy to the process tight, an electoral register has not been by allaying suspicions of established, and the media is dominated rigging or intimidation. by one faction. In addition, elections will Peer contacts, such as largely depend on security, especially the meetings between continuation and sustainability of the The success of a British Parliamentarians demobilization program. Given the and their South African current state of affairs, elections present democracy is often counterparts, can be a formidable challenge. very useful. Another contingent on how it critical factor is the role treats its losers assigned to the loser. As Implementing the the success of a democ- peace accord racy is often contingent on how it treats its CHALLENGES losers, it is often wise to Once a transitional or elected governing define this role before elections take body is in place, it faces the complex task place. of implementing the peace accords. Major challenges in this area include: In many cases, elections, or “first-class democracy,” may not provide immediate · Avoiding business as usual. Conflict answers. Winner-takes-all solutions may and the subsequent peace need to be not be appropriate as the cases of Angola viewed as a means by which society  and Cambodia illustrate, especially if the can recreate itself establishing a new state is a major employer and can with- set of behaviors, mindsets, institu- hold or provide various benefits based on tions, etc. Otherwise, a return to 8 political affiliation. Power-sharing alterna- violence is inevitable. An end to the fighting is one stop on the long road HUMAN AND INDIGENOUS RIGHTS toward improving the living standards Neglected during conflict, human rights of society. protection and promotion are crucial in · Meeting expectations. In order to war to peace transitions. To begin the achieve consensus among warring process, human rights could be incorpo- factions and other groups with com- rated in peace accords, including protec- peting agendas, peace accords often tion for indigenous identity and rights offer a wish list, ignoring resource where necessary. The Guatemalan accords constraints. Translating political were very successful in this area. If human discourse into concrete actions will rights monitors are deemed necessary require a more realistic approach and during the transition process, their role timetable. should be clearly defined. · Restructuring the wartime economy. Conflict societies undergo fundamen- The United Nations High Commissioner tal economic changes, which may take for Human Rights recognizes five roles for years to reverse. The implementation human rights monitors: (a) dissuasive of peace accords can restore confi- presence in the rural area, (b) human dence and promote the return of rights verification and monitoring, (c) private capital. Legitimate activities strengthening and training the justice must replace the exploitation of system, i.e., civilian police, prisons, judges resources that sustains the warring and courts, (d) facilitating the return of factions. internally displaced populations (IDPs) · Targeting high-payoff interventions. and refugees, and (e) human rights Given the weak economic base that promotion, institutional development and characterizes most post-conflict support for civil society. societies, targeted interventions with immediate impact are essential. Participants suggested the following Access to land and alternative sources measures to improve a country’s human of income, and support for civil rights situation, increase social cohesion society and women’s groups, inter and prevent the escalation of ethnic alia, should be considered. tensions: (a) drawing on revered interme- · Neutralizing private violence. The diaries (teachers, lawyers, etc.) from instability caused by the transition different groups, (b) promoting economic period coupled with sluggish imple- autonomy at the group and, where pos- mentation of the peace accord often sible, individual level, (c) providing a leads to an increase in crime rates. predictable degree of rule of law, (d) Reductive measures in this area need ensuring absorptive capacity in the to include “carrots” (counseling, economy to encourage private invest- training and employment generation ment, and (e) encouraging ethnic identity programs for vulnerable groups, and heritage development, including especially ex-combatants) and “sticks” reconstruction of historic and religious (a civilian security force and justice sites. All members of society, including system). the different ethnic groups and factions, should participate economically, socially and politically.

9 4 Sustaining Peace

articipants stressed that achieving a Post-conflict economic lasting peace requires time and management patience. The impact of war is Pprofound and resentments run deep. It Peace also requires a wide range of usually takes years for the economy to confidence-building measures (e.g., job take off and generations for the wounds to creation, training for ex-combatants, road heal. Achieving the peace dividend is even rehabilitation) in the area of economic management. Otherwise, as one partici- pant noted, the society will begin to wonder: what is peace for, if not improved We have more conflicts on earth now than ever before living standards? in history, and the reasons are well known to Catalyzing the private sector is an impor- us...declining power of the military in areas like the tant part of this confidence-building. This former Soviet Union...lifting of colonial requires the reduction of three key domination...abject poverty...deterioration of the constraints: lack of business confidence, environment...movement of massive populations from lack of capital, and lack of infrastructure. the rural areas where they were self-sufficient into ur- Reducing uncertainty and boosting ban areas dependent on largess. business confidence is a precondition for transforming the private sector into an For every soldier killed today, there are about nine ci- engine of growth for the economy, permit- vilians who perish from landmines, bombs, stray bul- ting the flow of capital necessary for lets and exposure to the elements. reconstruction. The removal of this constraint will catalyze the removal of the How do we get beyond the crisis management of a di- other two. Decreasing uncertainty re- saster, or even the maintenance of peace,...and move to quires: (a) reestablishing political author- a permanent realization of the hopes and dreams of ity and direction; (b) increasing security, people who have suffered so long? i.e., demobilization, police and military reform; (c) providing a stable macroeco- ...the core of future activities [should]...sustain peace nomic framework; and (d) establishing a once a tenuous peace has evolved, sustain democracy transparent legal and regulatory environ- when an embryonic or juvenile democracy has been ment. Yet, support for demobilization and formed, and try to avoid the disillusionment that forces police reform are often underfunded or not addressed up-front; and the process of people back into repetitive or sustained despair. stabilizing the economy (controlling inflation, consolidating fiscal manage- President Jimmy Carter, Chairman, the Carter Center ment, improving the tax system, establish- ing a customs agency, setting up a legal framework, and normalizing financial more challenging for poor, multi-ethnic intermediation) requires considerable states. Involving civil society in the process effort, commitment, and capacity. With- is one way of buying social patience and out political direction, authority and consensus, sharing the burden of waiting security, i.e., an enabling environment, and ensuring that everyone receives a bit of the private sector will not rise to the the pie as it becomes available. In Guate- challenge. mala, for example, a national consensus has emerged that taxes need to be raised to pay An enabling environment is also impor- for the reconstruction effort. tant in the context of a Marshall Plan-like 10 tive to violence; (c) sensitizing communi- ties receiving ex-combatants, especially Involving civil society in where atrocities had been committed by the returning veterans in the same the process is one way community; (d) accommodating other vulnerable groups (refugees, IDPs, widows, of buying social patience the disabled) to avoid resentment; (e) and consensus timing and duration; (f) addressing the special needs of child soldiers; and (g) managing ethnic dimensions, which are often difficult for outsiders. response during the post-conflict period. Some participants raised the issue of Local leaders can play a role in rekindling jump-starting the economies of recent the social fabric around the veterans. post-conflict societies in the same manner Guerrilla and other forms of informal as the European economies were revital- warfare, where casual fighting has become ized after World War II. However, it was a coping strategy, present unique chal- also mentioned that the absorptive lenges during demobilization and reintegra- capacity of the particular country is tion. It may be difficult to get faction important. Typically, post-conflict econo- leaders to demobilize, especially when they mies undergo long periods of recovery are used to commanding many people and with a slow buildup of business confidence controlling lucrative resources. and local investment.

Assistance to ex-combatants

Peace requires confidence, which is in turn contingent on security. When a Reducing uncertainty and boosting country is transitioning from war, disar- mament and demobilization become business confidence is a precondition defining features of security and the for transforming the private sector into subsequent peace. With peace, the most vulnerable and potentially destabilizing an engine of growth group is the ex-combatants. In this context, demobilization and reintegration programs (DRPs), which disarm soldiers and provide them an alternative to the gun, are critical. In Liberia, previous DRPs have not been well designed or supported. The current To provide security, however, DRPs need demobilization is not linked to reintegra- to be designed and implemented in detail. tion, and neither cantonment nor civic Participants believed that the following education were planned, though the should be addressed in the design and resources were available. Moreover, the implementation of DRPs: (a) including a timetable of only ten weeks was unrealis- reintegration component to demobiliza- tic. There is thus a need for a more tion at the planning stage; (b) offering a detailed preparatory exercise beginning credible and sufficiently lucrative alterna- with a profiling of the ex-combatant 11 From Civil War to Civil Society

characteristics, needs and aspirations. important for long-term reintegration, Reinsertion and reintegration opportuni- especially for the transitional poor. ties should then be provided in the form of transitional safety nets and programs An important subgroup within all of these promoting sustainable livelihoods. groups is women. As single heads of households, they have unique socioeco- nomic needs; and as victims of sexual Assistance to other violence, they require particular attention war-affected populations during the reconciliation processes, especially since most of them will not The other main categories of war-affected disclose such information due to shame populations include refugees, IDPs and and fear of rejection. those who stayed. The third group often suffers equal hardship but is frequently overlooked in post-conflict reconstruction From emergency to efforts. These groups, like the ex-combat- development assistance ants, have special needs that must be addressed with well-designed programs. As a society makes the transition from war For example, a participant noted that the to peace, the role of the international return of displaced persons should ensure community changes from saving lives to their safety and dignity, and they should sustaining livelihoods, from relief- to be provided legal documentation. development-oriented activities. Sustain- ing livelihoods after a period of prolonged Reintegration programs for all war- violence requires (a) rebuilding social, affected groups should concentrate on economic and political infrastructure, and addressing basic needs, i.e., food, health (b) providing credible economic alterna- tives to avoid further conflict. In this context, the international community needs to consider the following set of Land reform and, possibly, access to issues to ensure successful reconstruction credit can also be important for long- and sustainable socioeconomic develop- ment. term reintegration, especially for the PLANNING. Preparation is crucial to the transitional poor success of any reconstruction program. Often this process can begin before an official cease-fire is in place.

care, shelter, and building morale. Also, CONTINUITY. Building on the experience where possible, people should be empow- gained during the emergency phase, e.g., ered to meet their own needs, especially the secondment of relief staff, is important in the area of employment. However, for informing reconstruction planning and providing basic primary education for all, implementation. training and large-scale employment will stretch an administratively weak transi- COORDINATION. To avoid duplication and tional government. Experience in Latin improve collaboration, the international America has shown that land reform and community, could work towards (a) joint possibly access to credit can also be training, (b) joint needs assessment, (c) 12 joint planning, (d) complementary inter- SECURITY. The reduction of illegal resource ventions, (e) agreed indicators/measures trafficking requires, inter alia, external of success, and (f) single leadership. sanctions (on the companies trading with the factions), and support for internal SPEED. Procurement, funding, and report- censures (policing) and incentives (job ing procedures need to be expedited opportunities, training, access to credit). during the transition phase. A trade-off exists, however, between quick disburse- LONG-TERM PERSPECTIVE. The short-term ments, and transparent and accountable interests of donors must not compromise use of funds. Civil society can play an the longer term interests of war-torn important role in ensuring that govern- societies. ments follow an acceptable set of prin- ciples. ON THE GROUND. Field presence is instru- mental to ensuring appropriate interven- LIMITING THE SCOPE. Immediately after a tions and necessary alterations. cease-fire, small-scale interventions play an important role in reducing the likeli- The impact of any donor-sponsored hood of renewed violence. When the measure ultimately depends on support at situation becomes more stable, more the local level. In this context, it is elaborate projects and programs become important for governments to set their useful. own priorities and say “no” to projects and programs that do not conform to WORKING CAPITAL. Transitional support for their agenda, even when they involve current expenditures is important for grants. Also, civil society can be empow- financially restrained governments under- ered to assign roles to and responsibilities taking massive reconstruction programs. for the international community.

REACH. The donor community needs to adopt more flexible and responsive proce- dures to reach beneficiaries.

13 Toward an Integrated 5 Strategic Framework

theme that emerged repeatedly PEACE HAS A PRICE. During the transition during the workshop was that the phase, the overriding objective needs to be transition from war to peace is a political. Financial assistance and peace highlyA complex process, laden with dilem- become mutually dependent. Hence, the mas, paradoxes and tensions. Moreover, “wait-and-see” and “show-us-first” mental- each situation is unique and requires a ity which demands peace on the ground before funds are available is not appropriate. Limited political will needs to be overcome and risks taken. There is no continuum from peace-keeping to relief to development. All of these things have to go together. We need concurrent and integrated action on many fronts at once. THERE IS NO CONTINUUM BETWEEN RELIEF Also, every country is different. We cannot have a standard recipe. AND DEVELOPMENT. Humanitarian and I have been struck by the number of what I would call dilemmas, paradoxes and development agencies should work tensions....poverty as one of the root causes for instability...excesses of riches in the together to fill the gaps between their wrong hands can become an incentive to maintaining a conflict...winner takes all is respective mandates. For example, not a recipe for stability...powersharing before the elections can equally be prejudicial to peace...conventional macroeconomic wisdom may run counter to political relief agencies should consider the objectives...dilemma between reconciliation and justice... long-term economic impact of food aid, while development programs How do we empower civil society? When do the outside players enter? How do they enter? A need for a realistic timetable and a realization that you are in for the long could take advantage of the lessons haul....the question of the timing of elections...what comes after the elections...democracy learned and institutional arrange- can take many forms... ments established during relief ...the need for a comprehensive approach..the need for partnerships, the need for pool- operations. ing of resources, the need for complementary actions...downstream into the creation of livelihoods...upstream to give increased attention to emergencies. POVERTY AND INEQUALITY OFTEN LEAD TO INSTABILITY I see an emerging consensus in two areas...the need for a broad gamut of confidence- . Wealth in the wrong hands building measures...[and] the need for new approaches and techniques. can exacerbate conflict.

We are faced with a plethora of actions and there are also a plethora of actors. ELECTIONS DO NOT EQUAL DEMOCRACY. [The international community should approach] these situations with great humility Elections are not an end in them- because, after all, we do not have the answers. The answers are somewhere there at selves. And it is often important to the local level. We can perhaps help to bring them about. Essentially our role is mediat- have certain conditions in place ing and supporting, making the maximum use of national resources for peace. So the aim must be to foster national institutions, capacities and self-reliance. Now, in many before they take place. For example, it cases this requires a very different mindset and approach. may be important to mitigate the divisive elements of the electoral The overriding objective is political in nature. We are trying to avert a relapse into conflict and that means that all actions must combine toward that end. process by assigning a clear role for the loser and avoiding a “winner- There is quite a consensus on what needs to be done in these situations, but, with the takes-all” scenario. Failed elections exception of certain countries, there is not sufficient political will to do something and put the money there. can lead to renewed violence and loss of faith in the democratic process as Dame Margaret J. Anstee, former UN Under-Secretary General and former demonstrated by the Angolan experi- Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Angola ence. It is also important to recognize that democracy can take many forms such as power-sharing arrangements and a council of elders. singular approach. However, we have learned some lessons which can improve TIMING IS IMPORTANT. It is essential to (a) set the design and implementation of future a realistic timetable, (b) target peace from transition programs. many angles, starting many interventions at 14 once but avoiding duplication, and (c) be where they are deemed necessary and committed to long-term objectives, not beneficial. At the country level, interven- quick-fixes. tions should (a) reflect local realities and aspirations, (b) be homegrown and bottom- RECONCILIATION VS. JUSTICE. A tension exists up, (c) be inclusive of political, social and between getting on with reconstruction economic institutions, (d) have clear and building new lives and bringing those objectives and priorities, (e) be flexible, (f) who have committed atrocities to justice. mobilize not displace local human and Each society needs to decide how it will financial capital, and (g) be monitorable address the reconciliation process. with distinct indicators.

EMPOWERING CIVIL SOCIETY is an important In more general terms, the participants way to inform the design, implementation, advocated an integrated strategic frame- and monitoring of transition programs and work characterized by: to buy social patience during this volatile period. • a coherent and comprehensive ap- proach by all actors; • RECOGNIZING THAT CONFLICT IS PA RT OF SOCIAL partnerships and coordination between INTERACTION and that the challenge is finding the various members of the interna- nonviolent forms of conflict management tional community and the national and resolution. government; • a broad consensus on a strategy and In terms of responding to these tensions, related set of interventions; consensus is emerging in two areas. First, • careful balancing of macroeconomic though every society is different and and political objectives; requires its own mix of interventions, there • the necessary financial resources. is a need for a broad gamut of confidence- building measures early in the transition Perhaps most important, however, is a sense process. These include restoration of of humility. The international community economic processes (demining), demobili- should not underestimate its level of zation, reintegration (training, job cre- ignorance as to why conflicts occur and ation), good governance, human rights, how they can be resolved. Also, the ulti- security (neutral police, sound judicial mate responsibility lies with the peoples system), democratic institutions, and and governments themselves. The interna- empowerment of civil society and women. tional community can only play a support- Second, new approaches and techniques ing role, fostering local institutions, capac- are needed. Perhaps most important is the ity and self-reliance. We have come a long need to mobilize local human and financial way in our understanding of war-to-peace resources for peace, and to identify and issues, activities and processes. We are address demands at the local level. beginning to know what needs to be done in generalbut the question often remains What are the implications of these lessons how. The answers are complex and ill- and the emerging consensus? At the understood at the country level. As stated international level (UN Security Council by a participant at the conclusion of the and Secretary-General), there is a need for workshop, what is needed is “less intelli- preventative actions and early warning gence and more wisdom.” systems, and more collaboration between the UN system, governments, and NGOs. Intervention should be limited to situations 15 Annex 1 Annex 1 Workshop Agenda

Wednesday, February 19 The Carter Center, Atlanta 5:30pm Opening remarks: Greetings by President Carter and World Bank Vice President Ismail M. Serageldin; discussion of workshop objectives

6:15pm Plenary Discussion: Panel on Peace Negotiations and Demilitarization Moderator: Nat Colletta, World Bank Panelists: Jean Arnault, United Nations Jimmy Carter, The Carter Center

7:30pm Reception for workshop participants

Thursday, February 20 The Carter Center, Atlanta 8:30am Continental Breakfast

9:00am Small Group Discussion

10:30am Coffee Break

10:45am Plenary Discussion: Reports from small groups

11:30am Plenary Discussion: Panel on Post-Conflict Governance and Economic Management Moderator: Gordon Streeb, The Carter Center Panelists: Robert Pastor, The Carter Center Nils Borje Tallroth, World Bank Ian Bannon, World Bank Thomas O. Melia, National Democratic Institute for International Affairs

12:45pm Lunch

2:00pm Small Group Discussion

3:30pm Coffee Break

16 3:45pm Plenary Discussion: Reports from small groups

4:30pm Plenary Discussion: Panel on Social and Economic Reintegration of Vulnerable Groups in Transition Moderator: Anne Willem Bijleveld, UNHCR Panelists: Carlos Boggio, UNHCR Guatemala Ian Martin, University of Essex Edelberto Torres Rivas, UN Research Institute for Social Development Victor Tanner, Creative Associates

5:45pm End of day

Friday, February 21 Ritz Carlton Hotel-Downtown, Atlanta 8:00am Continental Breakfast

8:30am Small Group Discussion

10:00am Coffee Break

10:15am Plenary Discussion: Reports from small groups

11:00am Plenary Discussion: Panel on Conflict Transformation, Restoration of Social Capital, and Strengthening of Civil Society Moderator: Harry Barnes, The Carter Center Panelists: Mamadou Dia, World Bank Roger Plant, MINUGUA Christopher Mitchell, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution William Partridge, World Bank

12:15pm Lunch

1:30pm Small Group Discussion

3:00pm Coffee Break

17 Annex 1

3:15pm Plenary Discussion: Reports from small groups

4:00pm Plenary Discussion: Integrated Strategic Planning Moderators: Nat Colletta and Gordon Streeb Panelist: Margaret J. Anstee

5:30pm Closing Remarks

18 Annex 2 Working Groups

Group A Group B Group C

Arne Aasheim Preeti Arora Napolean Abdulai Rodrigo Asturias Amadou Ould Abdallah Jean Arnault Andy Agle Dame Margaret J. Anstee Eileen Babbit Mikael Barfod Mikihiro Arakawa Harry Barnes Tahseen M. Basheer Alejandro Bendana Peter Bell Anne Willem Bijleveld Carlos Boggio Hans-Petter Boe Landrum Bolling Sumana Brahman Hugh Cholmondeley Hans Brattskar Horst Breier Robert Cox Alvaro Colom Caballeros Jason Calder Tom Crick Mark Cackler Nat Colletta Adrienne Yande Diop David Carroll Rachel Fowler Nigel Fisher Becky Castle Mike Godfrey Johanna M. Forman Fermina Lopez Castro Bernd Hoffman Benjamen Jlah M.S.Kappeynevan de Coppello Steven B. Holtzman Markus Kostner Mamadou Dia Morris Kaba Krishna Kumar Ahmed Baba Ould Deida Anders Kompass Terrence Lyons Christina Eguizabel Lisa Kurbiel Yuji Miyamoto Mukesh Kapila Comfort Lamptey Otto Perez Molina Kari Nordheim-Larson Ian Martin Byron Morales Mike Mahdesian Thomas O. Melia Joyce Neu Dayton Maxwell Charles E. Nelson Jean-Victor Nkolo Christopher Mitchell Taies Nezam Angel Oropeza Elizabeth Mulbah Susan Palmer Famatta Osode Inga M.W. Nyhamar Roger Plant Vitalino Similox Salazar William Partridge Pierre Pont Colin Scott Pamela Reeves Chanpen Puckahtikom Ismail M. Serageldin Edelberto Torres Rivas Barnett Rubin Alejandro Guidi Vasquez Timothy Siklo Jennifer Schirmer Christine Wing John J. Stremlau Gordon Streeb Mark Woodward Nils Borje Tallroth Ricardo Stein Sally Zeijlon Engelbert Theuermann Victor Tanner Sara Tindall Samuel K. Woods, II

Facilitator: Liz McClintock Facilitator: Nat Colletta Facilitator: Diana Chigas

19 Annex 3 Annex 3 List of Participants

Mr. Arne Aasheim Mr. Mikihiro Arakawa Regional Adviser for Latin America Consul Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs Consulate of Japan Oslo Atlanta, GA NORWAY USA phone: (+47-22) 24 34 48 Phone: (404) 892-2700 Ext. 18 FAX: (+47-22) 24 95 80 FAX: (404) 881-6321

Mr. Napoleon Abdulai Mr. Jean Arnault Program Officer Special Representative of the Secretary International Alert General to Guatemala 1 Glyn St. MINUGUA London SE11 5HT Avenida Las Americas 18-36, Zona 13 UK Guatemala City phone: (+44-171) 79 38 383 GUATEMALA FAX: (+44-171) 79 37 975 phone: (+502) 33 93 431 FAX: (+502) 36 12 460 Ambassador Amadou Ould-Abdallah Executive Secretary Ms. Preeti Arora Global Coalition for Africa Country Economist for Liberia 1750 Pennsylvania Ave., NW The World Bank Group Suite 1204 Washington, DC 20433 Washington, DC 20006 USA USA phone: (202) 473-8275 phone: (202) 676-0845 FAX: (202) 473-8136 FAX: (202) 522-3259 Mr. Rodrigo Asturias Mr. Andy Agle Comandancia Director of Operations Unidad Revolucionaria Global 2000 Nacional Guatemaliteca The Carter Center Mexico City One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway MEXICO Atlanta, GA 30307 phone: (+525) 45 52 943 USA FAX: (+525) 60 40 818 phone: (404) 420-3850 FAX: (404) 874-5515 Dr. Eileen Babbitt Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy Dame Margaret J. Anstee Tufts University Former UN Under-Secretary-General Medford, MA 02155 Former Special Representative of the USA Secretary-General to Angola phone: (617) 627-3796 c/o Ms. Sirkka Corpel FAX: (617) 627-3712 UNDP Resident Representative 1350 Marizqual Santa Cruz 9072 La Paz BOLIVIA FAX: (+591-2) 39 13 79

20 Mr. Ian Bannon Dr. Alejandro Bendana Chief Economist Central America Director The World Bank Group Centro de Estudios Internacionales Washington, DC 20433 Apartado 1747 USA Managua phone: (202) 473-9042 NICARAGUA FAX: (202) 676-1464 phone: (+505) 27 85 413 FAX: (+505) 26 70 517 Mr. Mikael Barfod email: [email protected] Head of Unit Policy Analysis and Strategic Planning Mr. Anne Willem Bijleveld European Community Humanitarian Regional Representative Office U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees Rue de la Lol 200 Regional office for the U.S. and Caribbean B-1049 Burssels Washington, DC BELGIUM USA phone: (+32-2) 295 45 78 phone: (202) 296-5191 FAX: (+32-2) 299 28 53 FAX: (202) 296-5660

Ambassador Harry Barnes Mr. Hans-Petter Boe Director Chief of Mission Conflict Resolution and Human International Organization for Migration Rights Programs 1750 K St., NW The Carter Center Suite 1110 One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway Washington, DC 20006 Atlanta, GA 30307 USA USA phone: (202) 862-1826 phone: (404) 420-5189 FAX: (202) 862-1879 FAX: (404) 420-3862 Mr. Carlos Boggio Ambassador Tahseen M. Basheer Chief of Mission The National Center of Middle East UNHCR Guatemala Studies Guatemala City 1 Saad El Aly Street Apt. 163 GUATEMALA Midan Koulry El-Galaa phone: (+502) 339-0463 Doukki, Giza FAX: (+502) 332-5982 Cairo email: [email protected] EGYPT phone: (+202) 36 12 029 Dr. Landrum Bolling FAX: (+202) 36 08 717 Director at Large for the Balkans Mercy Corps International Mr. Peter Bell 2852 Ontario Rd., NW Apt 32 President Washington, DC 20009 CARE USA 151 Ellis Street NE phone: (202) 518-9466 Atlanta, GA 30303 FAX: (202) 241-2850 USA phone: (404) 681-2552 FAX: (404) 577-5977 21 Annex 3

Ms. Sumana Brahman Dr. David Carroll Assistant Director Associate Director Office of Public Policy and Government Latin American and Caribbean Program Relations The Carter Center CARE USA One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway Washington, DC Atlanta, GA 30307 USA USA phone: (202) 223-2277 phone: (404) 420-5172 FAX: (202) 296-8695 FAX: (404) 420-5196

Mr. Hans Brattskar President Jimmy Carter Assistant Director General Chairman Division of Development Cooperation The Carter Center Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway Oslo Atlanta, GA 30307 NORWAY USA phone: (+47-22) 24 36 00 phone: (404) 331-3900 FAX: (+47-22) 24 95 80 FAX: (404) 331-0283

Mr. Horst Breier Mrs. Rosalynn Carter Head, Economics and Environment The Carter Center Division One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway Development Co-operation Directorate Atlanta, GA 30307 Organization for Economic Cooperation USA and Development phone: (404) 331-3900 2 Rue Andre-Pascal FAX: (404) 331-0283 75775 Paris Cedex 16 FRANCE Mrs. Becky Castle phone: (+33-1) 45 24 90 20 Program Coordinator FAX: (+33-1) 45 24 19 96 Latin American and Caribbean Program The Carter Center Mr. Alvaro Colom Caballeros One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway Executive Director Atlanta, GA 30307 Fondo Nacional Para la Paz (FONAPAZ) USA A Ave 8-50 Zona 9 phone: (404) 420-5146 Guatemala City FAX: (404) 420-5196 GUATEMALA phone: (+502) 33 14 155 Ms. Fermina Lopez Castro FAX: (+502) 33 14 155 Founder and Coordinator Coordinadora Nacional de Viudas de Mr. Jason Calder Guatemala (CONAVIGUA) Program Coordinator 8a. Avenida 2-29 Global Development Initiative Zona 1, Guatemala City The Carter Center GUATEMALA One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway phone: (+502) 25 37 914 or 23 25 642 Atlanta, GA 30307 FAX: (+502) 23 25 642 USA phone: (404) 420-3722 22 FAX: (404) 420-5196 Ms. Diana Chigas Mr. Robert R. Cox Regional Director Advisor and Coordinator of Operations Conflict Management Group European Community Humanitarian 20 University Road Office Cambridge, MA 02138 Rue de la Lol 200 USA B-1049 Brussels phone: (617) 354-5444 BELGIUM FAX: (617) 354-8467 phone: (+32-2) 299 94 22 FAX: (+32-2) 299 11 72 Mr. Hugh Cholmondeley Senior Advisor Mr. Tom Crick UN Development Programme Executive Assistant to the Director of United Nations Staff College Project Programs 10 Waterside Plaza, Apt 36D The Carter Center New York NY 10010-2609 One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway USA Atlanta, GA 30307 phone: (212) 889-9473 USA FAX: (212) 213-8128 phone: (404) 420-5156 email: [email protected] FAX: (404) 420-5196

Mr. Nat Colletta Mr. Ahmed Baba Ould Deida Lead Social Policy Specialist Senior Special Advisor to the Director Economic Management and Social Policy General Department UNESCO Africa Region Paris The World Bank Group FRANCE 701 18th Street phone: (+33-1) 45 68 2110 Room J-2145 FAX: (+33-1) 45 68 5552 Washington, DC USA Mr. Mamadou Dia phone: (202) 473-4163 Country Director West Africa FAX: (202) 473-7913 The World Bank Group Washington, DC 20433 Ms. Marion S. Kappeyne van de Coppello USA Director, Conflict Management and phone: (202) 477-1234 Humanitarian Aid Department FAX: (202) 477-6391 or 473-5450 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Bezuidenhoutseweg 67 Dr. Adrienne Yandé Diop P.O. Box 20061 Director of Information 2500 EB Economic Community of West The Hague African States (ECOWAS) THE NETHERLANDS Lagos phone: (+31-70) 34 85 001 NIGERIA FAX: (+31-70) 34 84 486 phone: (+234-1) 263-7075 FAX: (+234-1) 263-7052

23 Annex 3

Ms. Cristina Eguizabel Dr. John Hardman Program Officer Executive Director Human Rights and International The Carter Center Cooperation One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway Ford Foundation Atlanta, GA 30307 320 East 43 Street USA New York, New York 10017 phone: (404) 420-5151 USA FAX: (404) 331-0283 phone: (212) 573-4937 FAX: (212) 599-4584 Mr. Bernd Hoffmann Head of Division 426 Mr. Nigel Fisher Emergency and Refugee Aid Director, Emergency Division GTZ UNICEF Postfach 5180 United Nations Plaza D-65726 Escborn New York, NY 10017 GERMANY USA phone: (+49-6196) 79 13 23 phone: (212) 326-7163 FAX: (+49-6196) 79 71 30 or 79 61 70 FAX: (212) 326-7037 Mr. Steven B. Holtzman Dr. Johanna Mendelson Forman Social Scientist, ENVSP Senior Advisor The World Bank Group Office of Transitional Initiatives Washington, DC 20433 U.S. Agency for International USA Development phone: (202) 473-3455 Washington, DC FAX: (202) 522-3247 USA phone: (202) 647-3990 Mr. Mukesh Kapila FAX: (202) 647-0218 Senior Humanitarian Aid Adviser email: [email protected] ODA, UK Foreign Office Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ms. Rachel Fowler 94 Victoria Street Assistant Program Coordinator London SW1 Human Rights Program UK The Carter Center phone (+41-171) 917-0778 One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway FAX: (+44-171) 917 0502 Atlanta, GA 30307 USA Ambassador Anders Kompass phone: (404) 420-5182 Assistant Under Secretary of State FAX: (404) 420-5196 Ministry of Foreign Affairs Stockholm Mr. Mike Godfrey SWEDEN Guatemala Country Director phone: (+46-8) 405 1000 CARE International FAX: (+46-8) 723 1176 Guatemala City GUATEMALA phone (+502) 239-1139 FAX: (+502) 239-1166 24 Dr. Markus Kostner Dr. Terrence Lyons Human Resource Economist Senior Research Analyst The World Bank Group The Brookings Institution Washington, DC 1775 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W. USA Washington, D.C. 20036-2188 phone: (202) 237-7501 USA FAX: (202) 237-7505 phone: (202)797-6185 or 797-6000 Mr. Krishna Kumar FAX: (202)797-6004 Policy Program Coordination Bureau email: [email protected] U.S. Agency for International Development Mr. Mike Mahdesian Washington, DC Deputy Assistant Administrator USA Bureau for Humanitarian Response phone: (703) 875-4964 U.S. Agency for International FAX: (703) 875-4866 Development Washington, DC Ms. Comfort Lamptey USA Program Specialist phone: (202) 647-0216 UNIFEM FAX: (202) 647-0218 304 E. 45th St. 6th Floor Dr. Ian Martin New York, NY 10017 Fellow USA Human Rights Centre phone: (212) 906-6891 University of Essex FAX: (212) 906-6705 Wivenhoe Park Colchester, Essex Ms. Kari Nordheim-Larson UK Minister of Development Cooperation phone: (+44-1206) 873764 Government of Norway FAX: (+44-1206) 873627 Oslo NORWAY Mr. Dayton Maxwell phone: (+47-22) 24 39 26 Senior Advisor, Complex Emergencies FAX: (+47-22) 24 95 88 World Vision Relief and Development, Inc. 220 I Street, NE Ms. Nancy Lindborg Suite 270 Senior Program Officer Washington, DC 20002 Mercy Corps International USA 2852 Ontario Rd., NW Apt 32 phone: (202)547-3743 Washington, DC 20009 FAX: (202)547-4834 USA phone: (202) 518-9466 Ms. Liz McClintock FAX: (202) 518-9465 Consultant Conflict Management Group 20 University Road Cambridge, MA 02138 USA phone: (617) 354-5444 FAX: (617) 354-8467 25 Annex 3

Mr. Thomas O. Melia Ms. Elizabeth Sele Mulbah Senior Associate Executive Director National Democratic Institute Christian Health Association of Liberia for International Affairs Post Office Box 10-9056 1717 Massachusetts Ave., NW 7th Street, Sinkor Fifth Floor 1000 Monrovia 10 Washington, D.C. 20036 LIBERIA USA phone: (+231) 226 823 phone: (202) 328-3136 FAX: c/o Lowell Lynch, USAID FAX: (202) 265-0168 (+231) 226 152

Dr. Christopher Mitchell Dr. Joyce Neu Institute for Conflict Analysis Associate Director and Resolution Conflict Resolution Program George Mason University The Carter Center Fairfax, Virginia 22030-4444 One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway USA Atlanta, GA 30307 phone: (703) 993-1300 or 993-1306 USA FAX: (703) 993-1302 phone: (404) 420-5174 FAX: (404) 420-3862 Mr. Yuji Miyamoto Consul General Taies Nezam Consulate of Japan War to Peace Transition Atlanta, GA Africa Region USA The World Bank Group phone: (404) 892-2700 Ext. 29 Washington, DC FAX: (404) 881-6321 USA email [email protected] phone: (202) 477-1234

Mr. Byron Morales Mr. Jean-Victor Nkolo Union Sindical de Trabajadores Liason Officer de Guatemala (UNSITRAGUA) Bureau for Africa and the Middle East 9 Avenida International Organization for Migration 1-43 Zona 1 Geneva Guatemala City SWITZERLAND GUATEMALA phone (+412) 2717 9111 phone/FAX: (+502) 238 2272 FAX: (+412) 2798 6150

General Otto Perez Molina Ms. Inga M.W. Nyhamar COPAZ Royal Norwegian Embassy Rm. 5.5 Ruta al Atlantico Washington, DC Guatemala City USA GUATEMALA phone: (202) 333-6000/ phone: (+502) 334 3622 944-8982 FAX: (+502) 232 0916 FAX: (202) 337-0870

26 Mr. Angel Oropeza Mr. Pierre Pont Chief of Section for Humanitarian Head of Delegation, ICRC Operations Regional Delegation for Regional Bureau for Latin America the United States and Canada International Organization on Migration 2100 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Geneva Washington, DC 20037 SWITZERLAND USA phone: (+412) 2717 9261 phone: (202) 293-9430 FAX: (+412) 2798 6150 FAX: (202) 293-9431

Ms. Susan Palmer Mr. Jan Pronk Senior Advisor, Africa and the Minister of Development Cooperation Near East International Foundation The Hague for Election Systems THE NETHERLANDS (IFES) phone: (+31-70) 348 4445 1101 15th Street, N.W., 3rd Floor FAX: (+31-70) 348 5310 Washington, DC 20006 USA Ms. Chanpen Puckahtikom phone (202) 828-8507 Assistant Director FAX: (202) 452-0804 Policy Development Review Department email [email protected] International Monetary Fund 700 19th St., NW Dr. Robert Pastor Washington, DC 20431 Fellow and Director USA Latin American and Caribbean Program phone: (202) 623-8780 The Carter Center FAX: (202) 623-4231 One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway Atlanta, GA 30307 Mr. W. Stacy Rhodes USA Guatemala Mission Director phone: (404) 420-5180 U.S. Agency for International FAX: (404) 420-5196 Development Guatemala City Mr. William Partridge Guatemala Chief of Social Division, LAC phone (+502) 331-1541 The World Bank Group FAX: (+502) 331-8885 Washington, DC USA Dr. Edelberto Torres Rivas phone: (202) 473-8622 Director, Guatemala Office FAX: (202) 676-9373 War-torn Societies Project UN Research Institute for Social Mr. Roger Plant Development Advisor for Indigenous Issues Guatemala City MINUGUA GUATEMALA Avenida Las Americas 18-36, Zona 13 phone: (+502) 337 0611 Guatemala City FAX: (+502) 377 0304 GUATEMALA phone: (+502) 339-3431 FAX: (+502) 361-2460 27 Annex 3

Dr. Barnett Rubin Mr. Ismail M. Serageldin Director Vice President for Environmentally Center for Preventive Action Sustainable Development Council on Foreign Relations The World Bank Group 58 East 68th Street Washington, DC 20433 New York, NY 10021 USA USA phone: (202) 473-4502 Phone: (212) 734-0400 FAX: (202) 473-3112 FAX: (212) 517-4967 email: [email protected] Mr. Timothy Siklo First Secretary Mr. Vitalino Similox Salazar Embassy of Liberia Executive Secretary Washington, DC Conference of Evangelical Churches USA of Guatemala phone: (202) 723-0437 7 Avenida FAX: (202) 723-0436 1-11 Zona 2 Guatemala City Mr. Ricardo Stein GUATEMALA Special Adviser to the President of phone: (+502) 232 2293 or 082 1121 the Republic FAX: (+502) 232 1609 Guatemala City email: [email protected] GUATEMALA FAX: (+502) 221 4425 Dr. Jennifer Schirmer email [email protected] Fellow, Program in Human Rights Policy Pacific Basin Research Center Ambassador Gordon Streeb JFK School of Government Interim Director of Programs Harvard University Director, Global Development Initiative Cambridge, MA The Carter Center USA One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway phone: (617) 496-2269 Atlanta, GA 30307 FAX: (617) 496-0063 USA email [email protected] phone: (404) 420-5170 FAX: (404) 420-5196 Mr. Colin Scott Operations Evaluation Department Dr. John J. Stremlau The World Bank Group Special Advisor to the Director Washington, DC 20433 Carnegie Commission on USA Preventing Deadly Conflict phone: (202) 473-6884 2400 N Street, NW, Sixth Floor FAX: (202) 522-3125 Washington, DC 20037 USA phone: (202) 429-7979 FAX: (202) 429-9291

28 Mr. Nils Borje Tallroth Ms. Christine Wing Chief Economist West Africa Program Officer The World Bank Group Peace and Security Washington, DC 20433 Ford Foundation USA 320 East 43 Street phone: (202) 473-4876 New York, New York 10017 FAX: (202) 473-8136 USA phone: (212) 573-5000 Mr. Victor Tanner FAX: (212) 599-4584 Senior Associate Creative Associates Mr. Samuel K. Woods, II 5301 Wisconsin Ave., N.W. Director Washington, D.C. 20015 Justice and Peace Commission USA P.O. Box 10-3569 phone: (202) 966-5804 1000 Monrovia 10 FAX: (202) 363-4771 LIBERIA phone: (+231) 227 657 or 225 930 Mr. Engelbert Theuermann FAX: (+231) 227 838, 226 006, or Counselor 226 469 Permanent Mission of Austria to the United Nations Mr. Mark Woodward New York, NY Senior Poverty Officer USA The World Bank Group phone: (212) 210-9869 Washington, DC 20433 FAX: (212) 953-1302 USA phone: (202) 473-8112 Ms. Sara Tindall FAX: (202) 473-7913 Program Coordinator email: [email protected] Conflict Resolution Program The Carter Center Ms. Sally Zeijlon One Copenhill, 453 Freedom Parkway Country Officer for Central America Atlanta, GA 30307 The World Bank Group USA Washington, DC 20433 phone: (404) 420-5162 USA FAX: (404) 420-3862 phone: (202) 473-8780 FAX: (202) 676-1464 Mr. Alejandro Guidi Vazquez email: [email protected] Program Manager Organization of American States Del Ministerio de Gobernacion 1 cuadra al Lago Managua NICARAGUA phone: (+505-2) 282072, 282073, 282074, or 223844 FAX: (+505-2) 282056 or 282043

29 Annex 3

30 From Civil War to Civil Society

As part of a global workshop series on the transition from war to peace, the World Bank, in collaboration with the Carter Center, held a workshop focusing on Liberia and Guatemala in Atlanta, Georgia between February 19-21, 1997.

The Workshop was organized by Nat J. Colletta, Head, War to Peace Transition, Africa Region, the World Bank and Gordon Streeb, Interim Director of Programs, the Carter Center. They were assisted by Markus Kostner, Human Resource Economist, the World Bank, and Sara Tindall, Program Coordinator, Conflict Resolution Program, the Carter Center. Diane Chigas and Liz McClintock of the Conflict Management Group, Cambridge, Massachusetts, facilitated the small group discussions.

This report was prepared by Markus Kostner, Taies Nezam, and Colin Scott under the guidance of Nat J. Colletta. It has been reviewed by the Carter Center, the World Bank, and participants from Guatemala and Liberia. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and partici- pants, and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of the Carter Center, the World Bank, or any of the World Bank’s affiliated organizations.

Lawrence Mastri provided valuable assistance in the final editing, design, and production of the report. Cover design byTomoko Hirata.

June 1997

ii Preface

nding violent conflict in countries process. Hence, lessons and experiences suffering from chronic instability need to be shared on a more systematic is a prerequisite for sustainable basis and support measures synchro- Esocial and economic development. The nized in this relatively new discipline. It transition from war to peace, however, is is also important to increase collabora- a complex process marked by the need tion not only among the development to establish basic security (including community but also between the devel- disarmament and demobilization), opment community and the peoples and protect the most vulnerable war victims, governments of the war-torn societies. reintegrate displaced populations, rehabilitate basic infrastructure and The Atlanta workshop sought to facili- productive assets, stabilize the tate this process by promoting the economy, promote transparent and exchange of knowledge and experience accountable government, restore social among politicians, policymakers, and capital, and strengthen civil society. In practitioners to (a) build capacity, (b) recent years, as the number of countries provide opportunities for collaboration, undergoing violent conflict has in- and (c) improve coordination among creased, a growing number of govern- different actors involved in war to peace ments and agencies have become transition. involved in the war to peace transition

Module Relevant Issues

Peace Negotiations Methods of peace negotiations and demilitarization and Demilitarization Instruments for reconciling disputes and early warning systems Potential for disarmament, demobilization, and arms conversion Instruments ensuring respect for human rights

Post-conflict Governance Good governance and available instruments and Economic Management Democratization of society and processes towards elections An independent press Conflict-related imbalances in the economy Sustainable post-conflict macroeconomic framework Enhanced regional economic cooperation Marshall Plan-type approach for jump-starting economies

Social and Economic Reintegration Identification of characteristics of Vulnerable Groups in Transition Prerequisites for voluntary return Risks of failed reintegration Rights and obligations Support strategies for emergency and development Intervention guidelines

Conflict Transformation, Restoration Principles for international peacekeeping of Social Capital, and Strengthening Local dispute mediation mechanisms of Civil Society Institutional requirements for conflict transformation Approaches to reconciliation and psychosocial healing Institutions and mechanisms for strengthening civil society

iii From Civil War to Civil Society

OBJECTIVE: Using Liberia and Guatemala PARTICIPANTS: Workshop participants as case studies, the workshop sought to included senior government and opposi- enable discussion on resolving conflicts tion officials from Liberia and Guate- peacefully, facilitating the transition mala, representatives from Liberian and process, and preventing future out- Guatemalan civil society, and represen- breaks of violence tatives from UN organizations (UNRISD, UNHCR, UNIFEM, UNDP/OPS, UNICEF, ISSUES: Workshop discussions were MINUGUA), multilaterals (World Bank, organized around four issue areas or IMF, OAS, EU, OECD), regional organi- modules: (a) peace negotiations and zations (ECOWAS), bilaterals (USAID, demilitarization, (b) post-conflict ODA, GTZ), donor governments (Norwe- governance and economic management, gian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch (c) social and economic reintegration of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish vulnerable groups, and (d) conflict Ministry of Foreign Affairs), regional transformation, restoration of social and international NGOs (CARE, ICRC, capital, and strengthening civil society. IOM), foundations (Ford Foundation), and the Carter Center. A list of partici- ORGANIZATION: A plenary session and pants is included in Annex 3. working groups were organized around each module. During the plenary WORKSHOP REPORT: The following report sessions, resource persons with perti- summarizes the presentations made by nent experience made keynote presenta- speakers during the plenary sessions tions. Participants and group facilitators and the ad hoc discussions of the then divided into three working groups working groups. It does not offer to discuss the issues raised by the solutions independent of the ideas presenters. A workshop coordinator was expressed by the workshop participants. responsible for the overall organization While the report adheres closely to the of the conference. For the workshop actual presentations, discussions and agenda and a list of working group observations, it does not present an members, see Annexes 1 and 2. exhaustive treatment of the issues. Examples from Liberia and Guatemala are given where possible; in cases where participants had extensive experience in other countries, examples are cited from those situations.

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