Macroinstitutional Political Structures and Their Development in Armenia

MacroInstitutional Political Structures and Their Development in Armenia ALEXANDER MARKAROV Abstract: Semipresidentialism as a political phenomenon was quite rare fifteen to twenty years ago. Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, more than forty coun- tries have adopted semipresidential features in their constitutions. In this article I will examine semipresidential development in Armenia, which has evolved through various stages. I will analyze the constitutional alternatives that have been discussed in Armenia and will conclude with the constitutional amendment process that has been taking place since 1998 that ended with the amendments adopted at the referendum of November 2005. Key words: Armenia, constitutional and institutional design, executive-legislative relations, semipresidentialism he question of adopting forms of institutions, defining the manner in which T state institutions should interact, and defining executive-legislative relations was part of the political discourse of all post-Soviet nations, especially in the early 1990s. In some cases the debate is still raging and the processes are ongo- ing, such as in Armenia, where a revised constitution was put to a general referendum in November 2005. In Armenia the issues of institutional design and the adoption of a new constitution, were put forward soon after Armenia’s Supreme Soviet adopted the Dec- laration on Independence (which laid the groundwork for the referendum on the Declaration of Independence in September 1991). On November 5, 1990, the Par- liament established the Constitutional Commission, which was comprised of twenty politicians, members of the Parliament, and lawyers, to draft a new constitution. The chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Levon Ter-Petrossian, headed the Alexander Markarov is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Yerevan State University. His academic research interests include issues on democratic transformation and consolidation. His most recent research, writing, and consulting focus- es on regime formation and semipresidentialism. He has edited two books and is also the author or coauthor of more than twenty-five articles and book chapters devoted to the study of transformation in the former Soviet Union. Copyright © 2006 Heldref Publications 159 160 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA commission. However, before the commission’s first meeting on October 15, 1992, the Armenian political system had undergone considerable changes. Based on the Declaration on Independence, which separated the executive, legislative, and judi- cial branches of government, the Supreme Soviet decided to formally establish the presidency on June 25, 1991, and to hold elections three months later on October 16. Ter-Petrossian scored an overwhelming victory, receiving 83 percent of the votes cast. Paruyr Hayrikyan, of the Union of National Self-Determination Party (AIM), received 7.2 percent of the votes, while the candidate of the Armenian Rev- olutionary Federation (HHD) received 4.3 percent of the votes. While there was no doubt the presidency was necessary, there were disagree- ments over the limits of presidential powers. Two main camps, one favoring a stronger Parliament, the other a more powerful presidency, had already emerged in the summer of 1991. Those favoring the parliamentary system stressed its implicit democratic nature, cautioning against the ills of too much power being concentrated in the hands of one individual. They also argued that Armenia had a parliamentary tradition, pointing to the experiences of the First Armenian Republic (1918–1920) and Soviet Armenia. Furthermore, they argued, a strong Parliament would assist in the institutionalization of political parties, while a strong presidency would discourage it. Advocates of a strong presidency made their own argu- ments, stipulating that a nonprofessional Parliament, composed of weak political parties, would be detrimental to the young republic, leaving the country in anarchy, and thus one step away from the emergence of a dictatorship. They pointed out that using the Soviet system as an example was not a valid model, as real authority dur- ing the Soviet period was concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party and its first secretary, providing the basis instead of one-person and one-party rule. No less important for those arguing for a strong presidency was the context of the time, including the need for a strong leadership to transform the political and economic systems, in addition to the processes of state and nation building. Additionally, Armenia was overburdened by the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the economic blockades by Turkey and Azerbaijan. This led some to see a strong presidency as a more effective way of dealing with the problems of the time. In 1991, the Supreme Soviet adopted two laws—the Law on the President of the Republic of Armenia (August 1), and the Law on the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Armenia (November 19)—which were the first steps taken toward the creation of a strong presidency. The debates on presidential authority have continued to the present, generally falling into two camps: those in power favoring a strong presidency and those in opposition favoring a strong Parliament. After the introduction of the presidency in Armenia, and the adoption of the laws on the Supreme Soviet and the president, the balance in executive-legislative relations shifted in favor of the president. Before the adoption of those laws, Arme- nia could have been considered a parliamentary republic with an executive head, the chair of the council of ministers, and a government appointed by the Parlia- ment, subject to its vote of confidence. The Supreme Soviet could remove the government by a two-thirds majority vote. In general, the Parliament was the most powerful institution, responsible for passing laws and even amending the consti- MacroInstitutional Political Structures 161 tution, as well as filling political offices. According to the new laws, the president would be elected to a five-year term through a popular election and, as the chief executive, would have the power to appoint and dismiss the prime minister and suggest the removal of other members of the cabinet. The prime minister and cabinet ministers were subject to parliamentary votes of confidence. Following the establishment of a basic framework regulating executive-legislative relations, the Constitutional Commission began performing its duties more actively, and between October 15, 1992 and May 11, 1995, held one hun- dred nine meetings.1 On June 24, 1993, the Constitutional Commission presented its first draft for public discussion. The draft reflected the then-existing executive-legislative relations, favored a strong presidency. In addition to the official draft, others—such as lawyer Henrikh Khachatryan, the Ministry of Justice, the Standing Committee of the Parliament on State Building, and the Democrat-Lib- eral Party (RAK) and HHD—presented alternatives. In each draft the issue of presidential authority was a controversial issue. In 1993–1994, the opposition developed its own draft, known as the “Draft of Six.” Six of the major opposition parties signed it, including the HHD, the RAK, the Democratic, the Republican, the Agrarian Parties and the Union of Constitutional Self-Government (SIM). Two opposition parties, the Communists and AIM, abstained from signing the draft. The draft, developed mostly by the RAK, stipulated that the president would be elected by a special body, composed of Parliament members and an equal num- ber of representatives from local legislative bodies. The president would be capa- ble of dissolving Parliament in some cases, such as if Parliament withdrew its confidence in a government but was unable to agree on a new one within fifteen days, or if Parliament gave a vote of no confidence by voting against a new program or proposed law and could not agree on a new prime minister and cabinet within twenty-one days. Parliament could raise questions of confidence in the government at any time. Parliament could also exert control over the prime minister, having the right to confirm the president’s appointee as well as the power to elect one under specific circumstances. On April 20, 1994, the Constitutional Commission presented its new draft to the Supreme Soviet, which, on June 1, decided to expand the commission’s mem- bership to include at least one member from each political organization, as well as one member from each group presenting alternative drafts. This newly enlarged commission held fifty-six meetings until April 13, 1995, and was headed by then- chair of the Supreme Soviet, Babken Ararktsyan. On July 23, 1994, the Consti- tutional Commission finally decided which draft would serve as the basis for the final version. The authors of the “Draft of Six” opted not to vote for their own draft. The legislature began discussing the presented draft on May 2, 1995, and on May 12 decided to submit it to a referendum to be held on July 5 of that year. To be adopted, the draft needed to receive at least 50 percent of all votes cast, but no less than one-third of all eligible voters. The official results of the referendum, contested by the opposition, indicated that out of 2,189,804 eligible voters, 1,217,531 participated in the referendum, and 68 percent of those voters cast their ballot in favor of the proposed draft. 162 DEMOKRATIZATSIYA The adoption of the constitution was a major step in the development of the Armenian political system. Theoretically, the new constitution could be seen as semipresidential, but in practice it showed more signs of presidential dominance than an equal distribution of power with checks and balances. Under the constitution, the president is elected to a five-year term and is limited to two consecu- tive terms; the president appoints the prime minister, who then forms his own government. Within twenty days of the formation of the government, the prime minister must submit his cabinet and program to the National Assembly (NA) for its approval.

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