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President Ayub's U S Visit What Has It Achieved ? K P Karunakaran

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President Ayub's U S Visit What Has It Achieved ? K P Karunakaran THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY August 5, 1961 President Ayub's U S Visit What Has It Achieved ? K P Karunakaran Ostensibly President Ayub Khan hoped to persuade the U S Government to cut down economic aid to India and bring pressure to bear on India to yet the the Kashmir dispute to Pakistan's advantage. He also hoped that he could get the United Stales to increase economic and military assistance to Pakistan through thinly, veiled threats to quit the alliance with the West. Nothing in the public statements of the American and Pakistani Presidents or the care fully worded communique signed by them suggests that President, Ayub Khan succeeded in any of his apparent objectives. Was his' much-publicised visit a fruitless one, then? PRESIDENT Ayub Khan's visit to New Strength for Pakistan Lobby to the U S. The foreign policy of the United States, his utterances By directly appealing to the alignment with the West has never there and the joint communique American public, who are still not been popular with the people of issued by him and the American Pre­ completely free from the hysteria Pakistan, who have inherited more sident have received much attention created by Macarthyism. and to or less the same political traditions in India, It is natural that the peo­ those elements in the State Depart­ as the people of India. The mass ple of this country should examine ment who are Dulles' legacy to it, public demonstrations in Pakistan closely the implications of the com­ President Ayub Khan has succeeded when Suez was invaded or when munique, because the Pakistani Pre- in weakening the position of those Lumumba was murdered showed sident started his journey with the advisers of President Kennedy, who where the sympathies of the people following avowed objectives: to per­ stand for a progressive re-orient­ lay. It is not without significance suade the U S to reduce her econo­ ation of American policy towards that even President Ayub Khan had mic aid to India and bring pressure Asia. This is no mean achievement, to tell the Pakistani people that he on India to settle the Kashmir dis­ because many pressures and coun­ had "protested" against the flight of pute to Pakistan's advantage. He ter-pressures are exerted on the State America's U-2 planes from Pakis­ also hoped that he could get Ame­ Department and even such a dyna­ tani territory. Pakistan did not send rica to increase economic and mili­ mic President-as Kennedy and such her troops to Korea. She has re­ tary aid to Pakistan by threatening intellectuals as Chester Bowles and cognised the Communist Covernment to quit the alliance with the West Adlai Stevenson are not free to for­ in China. and align with the Communist bloc. mulate their own foreign policy. If These are significant pointers to The public speeches of the American they were, the Cuban disaster would Pakistani policies. Many official and the Pakistani Presidents and the not have taken place. The Pakis­ spokesmen of the Pakistani Govern­ carefully-worded communique signed tani President is aware of this. He ment never tire of repeating that by them do not suggest that Presi­ wanted to strengthen the reaction­ Pakistan's search for security was dent Ayub Khan has succeeded in ary elements in America on whom based not on a fear of the Soviet achieving any of his objectives. he can rely. Everyone knows about Union, hut of India. They can, There will be no change in the U S a Chinese Lobby in the U S. Pakis­ therefore, sustain a military and policy on Kashmir or on the ques­ tan does not now have such a well- political alliance with America only tion of aid to the two countries. organised lobby, but she has the if it can be demonstrated that there­ rudiments of one. She has her What then has General Ayub by Pakistan is strengthening her friends in the U S and one of them, achieved by his visit? Has he come position vis-a-vis India. Phillip Talbot, occupies the key back empty-handed from the U S? position of the Assistant Secretary of Pakistan's Economic, Political Is the much-publicised visit refer­ State for South and South-East Asia. Failure red to as a historic one in the Pakis­ But the record does not indicate tani press—a fruitless one? As it Ayub has told the American pub­ that Pakistan has in fact done this. was clear from the very beginning lic directly that his country is the Pakistan is today militarily and eco- that Ayub would not succeed in the only reliable friend they have in nomically weaker than India and the objectives mentioned above, why Asia. In the present political cli­ pace of her economic development is did he undertake this visit at all? mate in the U S, many Americans also slower. In the initial phase of will be inclined to reciprocate this A closer examination of the effect the military Government, its spokes­ offer of friendship from a reliable of the Pakistani President's speech­ man could blame the situation on the friend rather than try to please India, es in the U S and in Pakistan will politicians. But now the politicians on whom they cannot rely. These reveal that he did succeed in two are no longer there. So the Govern­ may not be the most rational and limited fields—first, in strengthening ment must find a new scapegoat. informed people of the United States the position of the friends of Pakis­ They have found one in India and but they are neither a hopeless mino­ tan in America and, second, in con­ another in the new U- S Administra­ rity nor uninfluential. solidating at least temporarily, his tion's policy of giving massive eco­ power in his own country, which was The internal situation in Pakistan nomic aid to India, Hence the vigo­ increasingly getting shaky. also necessitated Ayub Khan's visit rous attack on both, 1257 August 5, 1961 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY The military Government in Pakis­ Mines of the Union Ministry of including above ground workers, as tan is facing another major difficulty. Labour and Employment. The compared with 1.41, 0.75 and 0.53 When General Ayub assumed power corresponding figures for the pre­ respectively for March, 1961. he assured the Pakistani public that vious month were 856 and 403,044 The percentage of absenteeism democratic government would be respectively. was 14.72 as against 13.87 in the restored to them at all early date, Output of coal per man-shift was preceding month. The over-all but, in fact, they now find that they estimated at 1.22 metric tons for cash earnings of the workers per are going farther and farther away miners and loaders, 0.64 metric week for the whole of Indian Union from democracy. The leaders of the tons for all workers below ground were Rs 23.41. The figures for coup did gain some popularity by and in open-cast workings and 0.46 Jharia and Raniganj fields being streamlining the administration and metric tons for all persons employed Rs 23.63 and Rs 23.00 respectively. getting the streets cleaned. But as they have nothing more to offer, the so-called "revolution" has exhausted its purpose. The people of Pakis­ tan are essentially democratic and freedom-loving. The present rulers of Pakistan can remain in power only as long as the democratic spirit of the people is not allowed to exert itself. So. in the name of the de­ mocratic rights of the people of Kashmir, which India is alleged to have denied to them, the Pakistani Government now tries to confuse its own people and to divert their at­ tention from internal political pro­ blems. Historical Instances Historically, similar attempts by dictators have occasionally succeed­ ed. The successes of Hitler and Mussolini are the most striking exam­ ples in modern times. But; unfor­ tunately, unlike Hitler, who could work within the framework of a high­ ly industrialised society, dictator Ayub Khan has to make repeated pilgrimages to the United States to get economic and military help. In America he has had to mortgage his whole country. That was what he meant when he said that Pakistan was the only reliable ally of the U S in Asia in the event of a major con­ flict. Such a statement may be popular in some circles in the U S; but it cannot be popular even among the extreme fascist sections in Pakistan, because fascism can be sustained only by aggressive nationalism and revolts at the spirit of dependency on others. Thus his visit to the U S has not helped the Pakistani President to resolve his dilemma. He has only postponed the date when he will have to face it more squarely. Coal Industry THE number of collieries reported to be working during April 1961 was 857, with an average daily employment of 394,995 workers, according to the Chief Inspector of 1258 .
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