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Abu Qatada Al-Filistini by Emrullah Uslu

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Abu Qatada Al-Filistini by Emrullah Uslu VOLUME VI, ISSUE 14 u JULY 10, 2008 IN THIS ISSUE: ABU QATADA’s ComfORTABLE BRITISH JIHAD By Raffaello Pantucci.....................................................................................1 FUELING THE TaLIBAN: POPPIES, GUNS AND INSURGENTS By Muhammad Tahir......................................................................................4 NIGERIA’s NAVY STRUGGLES WITH ATTacKS ON OFFSHORE OIL FacILITIES By John C.K. Daly............................................................................................6 TacKLING THE PKK: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR Turkey’s SPECIAL FORCES Abu Qatada al-Filistini By Emrullah Uslu.............................................................................................9 Terrorism Monitor is a publication of The Jamestown Foundation. Abu Qatada’s Comfortable British Jihad The Terrorism Monitor is designed to be read by policy- By Raffaello Pantucci makers and other specialists yet be accessible to the general n June 17, amidst much furor, a British Special Immigration Appeals public. The opinions expressed within are solely those of the Committee (SIAC) allowed the release on bail of Abu Qatada al-Filistini, authors and do not necessarily Oa radical preacher described by Spanish counter-terror judge Baltasar reflect those of The Jamestown Garzon as “al-Qaeda’s spiritual ambassador to Europe.” Home Secretary Jacqui Foundation. Smith said she was “extremely disappointed” by the ruling, adding that she would appeal it. In the meantime, Abu Qatada was released from Long Lartin prison to join his family at a £800,000 home in West London, where he is under virtual house arrest. Only allowed out for two hours a day, Qatada wears an Unauthorized reproduction or electronic tag, is not allowed to use the internet, computers or mobile telephones. redistribution of this or any He is also forbidden to visit mosques, lead prayers or give religious instruction. Jamestown publication is strictly Police have powers to search his home at their discretion, and he has a rather prohibited by law. comical list of individuals who he is banned from meeting with, including Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and imprisoned preacher Abu Hamza al-Masri. Aside from his solicitors and family, all other visitors must be approved by the Home Secretary (BBC, June 18; Times, June 19). This entire process would appear to be a vindication of Qatada’s own boast to his followers after his first arrest in 2002 when he claimed Britain’s “ponderous For comments or questions about our publications, please send an 1 extradition laws meant that it was far from certain he would ever be expelled.” email to [email protected], or To the horror of observers, the entire process was repeated on July 3, 2008, contact us at: when the same court released an Algerian man the British press can only identify 1111 16th St. NW, Suite #320 as “U,” though it has been revealed in the foreign press that the suspect is likely Washington, DC • 20036 to be Abu Doha (New York Times, July 4). While he is to have equally rigid Tel: (202) 483-8888 1 Sean O’Neill and Daniel McGrory, The Suicide Factory, (London: HarperCollins, 2006) Fax: (202) 483-8337 p.109 Copyright ©2008 TO SUBSCRIBE TO THE TERRORISM MONITOR, VISIT http://www.jamestown.org TerrorismMonitor Volume VI u Issue 14 u July 10, 2008 bail conditions, the release of this individual—who of the GIA’s brutal targeting of civilians, Abu Qatada is suspected of being involved in the LAX bombing denounced the group as “innovators” and formally cut attempt in December 1999 and the plot to attack the his ties.4 His work was not, however, solely focused on Christmas market in Strasbourg in December 2000— Algeria and he raised thousands of pounds for Islamist is seen as a further blow to British counter-terrorism groups around the world. When he was questioned in efforts (Telegraph, July 3). February 2001, he was found to have £170,000 in cash, including an envelope with £805 in it labeled “for the The release of these two individuals may soon be followed mujahideen in Chechnya” (BBC, February 26, 2007). by more, as the British judicial system contends with He also acted as a mentor for another London preacher, a double problem in these terrorist cases. First is the Abu Hamza, reportedly calling him “the best student he inability of British prosecutors to produce evidence that ever had” and being “very impressed [at] how quickly will stand up in court—something which is, in part, the Abu Hamza memorized the Koran and Hadith” under result of the inadmissibility in court of wiretap evidence, his tutelage.5 a reality that is currently under review—and secondly, the inability of Britain to deport individuals such as these While in London it is alleged that Abu Qatada was back to their home countries due to EU and UK laws directly involved in plots abroad, with the Jordanian stating that individuals cannot be deported to nations government trying and sentencing him to life where they may be tortured (Jordan in Abu Qatada’s imprisonment in absentia for a bombing plot timed case, and Algeria in “U’s”). While such concerns were to coincide with the Millennium and investigators meant to have been addressed with “memorandums of connecting him with terrorism cells in Spain, France, understanding” that the British government signed with Italy and Belgium (Washington Post, July 10, 2005; Libya, Jordan and Lebanon concerning the treatment Guardian, August 11, 2005). Both 9/11’s “20th hijacker” of such returnees, British courts decided that other Zacarias Moussaoui and “shoe bomber” Richard Reid concerns remain—in Abu Qutada’s case there were fears sought religious advice from him and he was a known that evidence used in his Jordanian conviction may have figure at the infamous Finsbury Park Mosque in London been obtained through torture (Sunday Mirror, June (BBC, February 26, 2007). Most ominously, tapes of 22). his sermons were found in the Hamburg flat used by Muhammad Atta and others before the 9/11 attacks. The Life and Times of Abu Qatada At various points, it has been claimed that Abu Qatada Born in Bethlehem when it was still part of Jordan in was an informant for Britain’s Security Service MI5, 1960, Abu Qatada first came to the UK in September something that is sometimes pointed to as the reason 1993 on a forged passport from the United Arab for why Britain’s services failed to interdict him in the Emirates. While it remains unclear exactly where he face of an apparent litany of allegations by continental was coming from, he was apparently in Peshawar in European intelligence services.6 It is also claimed that 1990, where he attracted many followers before going during the mid-1990s, he met with MI5 agents and into Afghanistan in 1992 after fighting had ended in offered to help ensure that terrorist attacks would not Kabul (CNN, November 3, 2001). Upon arriving in the take place in the UK (BBC, February 26, 2007). The UK and gaining asylum in June 1994, Qatada started final piece of evidence that is offered is the fact that he to get involved in the London Islamist scene, eventually disappeared from MI5’s surveillance just before he was becoming one of “Londonistan’s unholy trinity” due to be arrested in December 2001, even though he (the other two being Abu Hamza and Omar Bakri was finally found elsewhere in London 10 months later, Mohammed).2 He quickly adopted the Algerian jihad as “a few minutes’ walk from MI5’s headquarters.”7 While his focus, and became editor of the al-Ansar Newsletter on the run he remained in close contact with jihadists while preaching and writing from London in support of around the globe through the internet—apparently the Groupe Islamique Armé’s (GIA) actions.3 including Abu Musab al Zarqawi—as well as issuing a legal ruling justifying the 9/11 attacks. This continued until mid-1996, when, in the face of widespread condemnation throughout the Arab world 4 Omar Nasiri, Inside the Global Jihad, (London: Hurst, 2006), p.272 2 Ibid, p.106 5 O’Neill and McGrory, p.29 3 Brynjar Lia, Architect of Global Jihad, (London: Hurst, 6 Ibid., p.151 2007), p.188 7 Ibid., p.108 2 TerrorismMonitor Volume VI u Issue 14 u July 10, 2008 The Wit and Wisdom of Abu Qatada questions and definitions, before turning to the topic of jihad. In response to the question “What is required in Amongst Britain’s radical preachers, Abu Qatada usually order to establish an Islamic state?” Abu Qutada replied distinguished himself as the most erudite and productive that “dignity is only established through jihad.”12 After in literary terms of “Londonistan’s unholy trinity.” a long series of detailed explanations, Abu Qutada Omar Nasiri, who worked undercover in London for justifies the use of jihad: British and French intelligence and attended a number of his lectures, identified him as “very intelligent [and] It is jihad that breaths life into the ummah very learned,” speaking a language of jihad that Nasiri [Muslim community]. It is the jihad that noted as “almost identical” to that used in the Afghan distinguished the Muslim from the hypocrite. training camp he had attended.8 Qatada’s writing We must be proud that we are the tool that Allah advocates the separation between the Muslim and non- uses against the kuffar to punish them. What is Muslim world; his most cited text, Islamic Movements this life that’s so precious to us? It is worse than and Contemporary Alliances, details the dangerous that of a dog, this humiliated and submissive development of Muslim “involvement in alliances with life where the ummah is subjected to the worst modern non-Islamic powers,” providing an analysis of of crimes, and groups still insist that Muslims numerous instances across the Muslim world where this should use peaceful measures in order to bring has not worked.9 change.
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