January 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 2

The Changing Face of and Mohammad al-Massari, both linked their media-hungry predecessors. For to al-Qa`ida through their opposition example, Usman “Uzi” Ali, a former Salafi-Jihadi Movements in to the Saudi government in the early member of al-Muhajiroun, Omar Bakri’s the 1990s, now restrict their activities to pro-jihadist group, who has claimed to Arabic language media and websites have helped British volunteers join the By James Brandon to avoid deportation to their home in 2001, preached pro-jihadist countries. Other leading Islamists— sermons for several years at an obscure a series of attempted Islamic terrorist most notably Rashid al-Ghanoushi and mosque in Woolwich, East , attacks in the United Kingdom since the Ali al-Bayanouni, the respective leaders leaving only after the mosque’s trustees July 7, 2005 London bombings seem, of the in Tunisia won a £30,000 court case to expel him.4 at first glance, to suggest that Britain’s and Syria—have similarly been allowed Soon afterward, Ali was appointed Salafi-jihadi networks—once among to remain in the United Kingdom as long Muslim chaplain to the nearby state- the most sophisticated in Europe— as they do not incite or plan violence. funded Queen Elizabeth Hospital have survived government crackdowns before being fired after Muslim patients largely unscathed. In particular, one In a further attempt to remove extremists’ complained about his anti-Western group’s attempt to detonate two car platforms, radical mosques—such as sermons.5 He now organizes prayers bombs in central London and then attack Abu Hamza’s mosque in Finsbury Park and meetings in gyms and community Glasgow airport in June 2007 appears in north London—have been put in the centers in East London and has told to indicate that the threat of further hands of more moderate preachers and his followers that he aims to establish jihadist attacks remain high.1 Other pro-jihadist websites shut down. In after-hours religious schools for their plots allegedly prevented by police addition, groups funneling volunteers children to counter the “un-Islamic” include separate attempts to kidnap and money to jihadist groups in South teachings of mainstream schools and and kill off-duty Muslim soldiers in the Asia and the have been mosques.6 Although arrested on at least British army2 and to explode bombs on a broken up, while the security services one occasion, he has not been prosecuted number of trans-Atlantic flights.3 Behind have proven themselves increasingly for any -related offenses. this apparent swell of jihadist activity, able to penetrate cells preparing however, government initiatives terrorist attacks. Supporters of jihadist ideologies who have significantly disrupted militant run their own mosques have also found networks, and jihadist ideologies are Evolution of Jihadist Networks ways to continue spreading pro-jihadist coming under increasingly effective While the government’s actions have teachings while avoiding prosecution. theological attack from Muslims in made radical less visible in the For example, in Luton, a town 30 miles Britain and abroad. United Kingdom—especially compared north of London with a large Pakistani to the “Londonistan” era of the late population, one mosque has apparently Government Crackdown 1990s—there are signs that this calm may circumvented laws against incitement Before the 2005 London bombings, be deceptive. Jihadist groups worldwide by using child imams who cannot high-profile radicals from the Middle are notable for their willingness to adapt be prosecuted as they are below the East—often Saudi-educated and/or to changing circumstances, and those in legal age of responsibility. In autumn veterans of jihadist violence—controlled the United Kingdom are no exception. 2007, one such child imam lectured mosques and held rallies in central worshippers on the injustices suffered London, while their supporters openly Increasingly, evidence suggests that a by Muslims held in prison on anti-terror ran publishing houses and websites and younger generation of preachers who laws before calling on the congregation forged close links with foreign militant sympathize with al-Qa`ida are presently to “resist” the British government.7 groups to whom they could channel adapting to the UK’s decreasing tolerance funds and volunteers. Since 2005, the for Islamic radicalism by operating Veteran Muslim Brotherhood members United Kingdom has jailed the most covertly, avoiding open clashes with the have similarly continued to incite prominent of these preachers, such authorities and spurning the national their followers while carefully skirting as Abu Hamza al-Masri, an Egyptian media. Typically, such preachers—often anti-terror laws. For instance, Azzam veteran of ’s anti-Soviet born and bred in the United Kingdom— Tamimi, a prominent defender of , and , a Jordanian operate in small mosques, community and a Muslim Brotherhood member, sometimes known as Usama bin Ladin’s centers and houses, frequently on told an anti- rally in London’s spiritual leader in Europe. Other the fringes of large towns. They will Trafalgar Square on July 10, 2006 radical preachers such as Omar Bakri also use more prominent locations, that “if they don’t want peace, we have and Shaykh Abdullah such as sympathetic Islamic societies another language—and we have every Feisal have left the United Kingdom. in universities, if such opportunities Others again, such as Saad al-Faqih arise. These developments are largely 4 Personal interview, eyewitness, London, January in keeping with widespread predictions 2008. 1 David Leppard, “Britain Under Attack as Bombers that any post-July 7 crackdown would 5 “Extremist Was Hospital Chaplain,” BBC, September Strike at Airport,” The Times [London], July 1, 2007. fragment the jihadist movement and 20, 2007. 2 David Byers, “Soldier Kidnap Terror Plot: Six Charged,” push it underground. 6 Personal interview, eyewitness, London, November The Times, February 9, 2007. 2007. 3 Adam Fresco, “Eleven Charged over Transatlantic These lower profile figures have a 7 Personal interview, eyewitness, London, October Bomb Plot,” TimesOnline, August 21, 2006. greater ability to escape detection than 2007. January 2008 . Vol 1 . Issue 2 right to use that language.”8 In some communist government. After returning Conclusion universities, radical Salafist preachers to the United Kingdom, he was heavily Salafi-jihadi networks in Britain have have similarly exploited traditions of involved in radical Salafist activism; changed significantly since the 2005 tolerance and freedom of speech. For for example, he wrote influential London bombings. Yet, while there example, a Friday sermon given to critiques of “pacifists” such as Hamza are signs that jihadist ideologies are hundreds of Muslims on the campus of Yusuf, a U.S.-based cleric.10 Today, losing ground to less violent forms of Imperial College University in London Hasan preaches religious tolerance Islam, this process remains fragile. in autumn 2007 reportedly ended in and integration at his mosque to a Any perceived victories for jihadist prayers for the “victory of the mujahidin traditionalist Salafist congregation, movements in Iraq, Afghanistan, everywhere in the world.”9 which averages 800-1,000 strong on Somalia or elsewhere at this critical time Fridays. “Usually if someone speaks will likely greatly strengthen British Challenges to Pro-Jihadist Ideologies against extremism, people say that he’s radicals and could badly undermine Although many Salafi-jihadi preachers a government agent but with those of us Muslim attempts to challenge jihadist have adapted to anti-terrorism who were in Afghanistan they can’t say theologies—underscoring how U.S. measures, there are signs that many that to us,” he said.11 success in Iraq and elsewhere remains British Muslims are becoming more critical to defeating Islamic extremism willing to tackle extremist preachers. Such indigenous refutations of jihadist globally. During the 1980s and 1990s, British ideas augment similar criticisms made Salafi-jihadis enjoyed a free reign to by Salafists abroad. The latest of these In addition, because Britain’s promote their ideology as the most is by Sayyid Imam `Abd al-`Aziz Imam Muslims are disproportionately poor, authentic form of Islamic practice and al-Sharif (also known as Dr. Fadl), the young and unskilled, they remain to present violence and martyrdom as former spiritual leader of Egyptian vulnerable to extremist ideologies. the greatest acts of faith. Since then, Islamic Jihad presently imprisoned in Socio-economic factors do not directly jihadist ideologies have come under , who recently wrote that Muslims cause jihadist violence, but they allow increasing attack. The most damaging who have an agreement or contract radical preachers to convince British attacks are those which have come from with a non-Muslim state (e.g. who have Muslims to locate themselves within within the Salafist tradition. received a European visa or citizenship) the global Muslim sense of victimhood are forbidden from attacking its citizens and to believe that their situation can Since the summer of 2007, one of the there.12 His thesis has been swiftly only be addressed through violence. most prominent British opponents attacked by British-based Salafists who Furthermore, the growing political of the jihadist worldview has been perceive such critiques as a threat. In savvy of the next generation of jihadist , a former member of December 2007, for example, Tariq preachers poses new challenges to the the leadership council of Hizb-ut- Ramadan, a prominent supporter of the United Kingdom’s security services— Tahrir (HT), a global group that wants Muslim Brotherhood, told students at especially as the fragmentation and to restore the . HT has been London’s School of Oriental and African dispersal of radical networks makes accused of radicalizing several British Studies that al-Sharif’s ideas were potentially militant individuals harder jihadists, most notably Omar Sharif, a invalid because people held in Egyptian to monitor. Together, these and other British student who attempted to carry prisons “will say anything.”13 factors ensure that British-based Salafi- out a suicide bombing in Israel in April jihadi movements—even if declining in 2003. Nawaz has begun a theological For many British Muslims, however, strength and influence—will continue refutation of HT’s ideology, publicizing such critics of are increasingly to threaten the United Kingdom for his views through mainstream media being vindicated by setbacks suffered by years to come. as well as to all Muslim audiences. In jihadist movements in , the many cases, the vitriolic responses to Middle East and North Africa. Strategic James Brandon is a senior research fellow his arguments suggest that his ideas are errors by al-Qa`ida—most notably its at the Centre for Social Cohesion in often perceived as dangerous not only decision to target Iraqi civilians—have London. He is a former journalist who has to , but even to the Islamic also done considerable damage to the reported on Islamic movements in Europe, faith as a whole. jihadist cause and have boosted those the Middle East and Africa for a wide who question the group’s Islamic variety of print and broadcast media. He Other damaging attacks on al-Qa`ida’s legitimacy. has a MA in Middle Eastern Studies from ideology have come from former the School of Oriental and African Studies jihadists. , an imam who (SOAS). runs a prominent Salafist mosque in Leyton in East London, is typical. In 10 Usama Hasan, “Recapturing Islam from the Paci- 1990, Hasan traveled to Afghanistan fists,” available on various websites, November 14, 2001. where he received military training 11 Personal interview, Usama Hasan, Masjid al-Tawhid, and briefly fought against the country’s Leyton, East London, December 28, 2007. 12 Jarret Brachman, “Leading Egyptian Jihadist Sayyid 8 Available at www.youtube.com/ Imam Renounces Violence,” CTC Sentinel 1:1 (2008). watch?v=zh6q02J6dJk. 13 Lecture by , “Introduction to Islam 9 Personal interview, eyewitness, London, November and Islamism,” SOAS Middle East Society, November 2007. 17, 2007.