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A Russian Airbase Close to the Western Base in Kyrgyzstan in October 2003 Was "A Crucial Sphere for Our Security" Russia in Central Asia after 9/ I I Ingerid M. Opdahl Forsvarsstudier 3/2005 Acknowledgements Some source work and the interviews for this study were carried out in Moscow in November 2004. I would like to thank all my interviewees for their time and cooperation, as well as for interesting discussions. In January 2005 I took part in a course at the Russian Diplomatic Academy, and the lively discussions with teachers and participants there were valuable as background. Thanks go especially to Zhansaya Zhabina from the Kazakh National Pedagogical University in Almaty, Martin Malek from the National Defense Academy of Austria and Endre Szalipski from the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I would like to thank my colleagues at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies for their support during the work on this study. For and foremost, my thanks go to Sven Holtsmark, who has read and commented upon several drafts and been a valuable discussion partner. An early draft benefited greatly from the comments of several colleagues at an Institute seminar at Guriset in March 2005. The work on later drafts has been enjoyable thanks to very constructive comments and support from Anna Therese Klingstedt, our editor. This study would not have been possible had it not been for funding from the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Oslo, August 2005 Ingerid M. Opdahl Contents Abbreviations ................................................................... 10 Introduction .......................................................................... 11 Research design ................................................................ 13 Recent research on Russia and Central Asia ..................... 16 Sources ............................................................................. 17 Chapter 1 Background and context ........................................................ 19 Russian policy in Central Asia before 9/11 ....................... 19 Putln"tt'd" S 5 fa eglc eclslon .................................................. 22 Putm . ,s deClSIOn .. In. t hR'e usslan context ............................ _74 US strategic goals in Central Asia ..................................... 25 · .. 7 C entra I Asw In a strategIC context ................................... _8 Chapter 2 The first weeks after 9111 ..................................................... 33 Russia's initial response to 9/11 ........................................ 34 US bases in Central Asia ................................................... 36 Russian reactions to US plans in Central Asia ................... 37 'Yes' without ambiguity .................................................... 39 A serious and long term presence ...................................... 42 Conclusions ...................................................................... 44 Chapter 3 Russia's reactions to the West ................................................ 45 The Crawford summit and after ....................................... 46 Seriously and for the long term? ...................................... .48 Conflicting signals from the Russian government ............. 50 Disagreement over Iraq ..................................................... 51 "A crucial sphere for Ollr security') ................................... 53 Summing up: Russia's reactions to the West .................... 55 Conclusions ...................................................................... 57 Chapter 4 The Russian political debate .................................................. 59 Restricted criticism in Moscow ......................................... 59 Quid pro quo ................................................................... 61 The divisive strategic decision ........................................... 63 Seriously and for the long terml. ....................................... 65 A second wave of apprehension ........................................ 68 Who offers what in a zero-sum game? .............................. 69 Attempts at reassurance .................................................... 73 A nai've foreign policy ....................................................... 75 Putin speaks ...................................................................... 76 Martial arts in foreign policy ............................................ 79 A lost region for Russia? ................................................... 81 Renewed interest in Central Asia ...................................... 84 A new Military Doctrine ................................................... 85 Summing up: the Russian political debate ......................... 87 Conclusions ...................................................................... 91 Chapter 5 Russia's policies in Central Asia ........................................... 93 Renewed Russian interest in Central Asia ......................... 93 Seriously and for the long term ......................................... 95 A more active policy ......................................................... 97 Focus on Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ................................. 101 Progress at Kant ............................................................... 104 A cold er climate between Moscow and Dushanbe ............ 106 Two Russian-controlled bases .......................................... 109 The change in military doctrine ........................................ 111 Russia's energy engagement .............................................. 112 Summing up: Russia's policies in Central Asia .................. 116 Conclusions ...................................................................... 119 Chapter 6 Analysis: Russia's reactions to the Western bases .................. 121 Reactions towards the United States and the West ............ 121 The Russian political debate ............................................. 123 Russian policy in Central Asia .......................................... 124 Correspondences and discrepancies .................................. 126 Correspondences between the aspects of the response ...... 127 Discrepancies between the aspects of the response ............ 130 The portrayal of Russia's ambitions ................................. 132 Conclusions ...................................................................... 135 Chapter 7 Motivations for Russian policy .............................................. 137 Domestic politicS as motivation ........................................ 138 Russian-American bilateral relations - a motivation? ....... 140 Strategic interests and Russian Central Asia policy ........... 143 The military engagemem ................................................. 144 A lack of economic engagement........................................ 149 The engagement in energy ................................................ 150 Demands for Russian involvement .................................... 154 Strategic interests in Russian explanurions ........................ 158 Conclusions ...................................................................... 159 Chapter 8 Russian-American relations and this study ............................ 161 The Russian-American bilateral relationship .................... 161 The war on terrorism and Central Asia ............................ 163 Russian-American relations reconsidered .......................... 166 Prospects for a strategic partnership ................................. 167 Chapter 9 Conclusion ............................................................................ 169 Russia's response to Western bases in Central Asia .......... 170 Reassertion motivated by strategic interests ...................... 172 A temporary strategic alignment. ...................................... 175 Literature Abbreviations ABM Treaty Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty AWACS Airborne Warning and Control Sys­ tem BTC Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (pipeline) CACO Central Asian Cooperation Organisa­ tIon CENTCOM US Central Command CIS Commonwealth of Independent States CSTICSTO Collective Security Treatyl Collective Security Treaty Organisation FSB Federalnaia sluzhba bezopasnosti (Federal Security Service) G-8 Group of eight GUUAM Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs MID Ministerstvo inostrannykh del (Minis­ try of Foreign Affairs) NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NMD National Missile Defense RIIA Royal Institute of International Affairs SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organisation SVOP Sovet po vneshnei i oboronnoi politike (Council on Foreign and Defence Pol­ icy) TRACECA Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus­ Central-Asia UES Unified Energy System "A CRUCIAL SPHERE FOR OUR SeCURITY" 11 Introduction From 6 October 2001, the United States and its allies deployed military personnel and airplanes in former Soviet Central Asia in the campaign against global terrorism. The countries concerned were Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. The Western military activity and presence in these states was considerable in connection with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, especially in the most intensive military phase of the operation through March 2002.1 On 24 September 2001 Russia's president, Vladimir Pntin, stated that each of the post-Soviet countries had full freedom to decide whether to allow American bases on their territory. Putin's support for the operation in Afghanistan and in the war against international terrorism emphasised how relations between the United States and Russia had improved after 11 September 2001.
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