NARCO-CARTELS: NEW ACTORS of IRREGULAR WARFARE Cristobal Fundora

4. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONFLICTS HISTORY NARCO-CARTELS: NEW ACTORS OF IRREGULAR WARFARE Cristobal Fundora

Abstract DOI: 10.26410/SF_1/18/9 Narco-Cartels are becoming new actors of Irregular Warfare. The purpose of this document is to guide force development, capacity building and create a comprehensive scenario. This research will provide necessary knowledge to analyze the Narco-Cartels´ strategies and to examine the operational roles of the military, security forces and civil action in countering these threats. Cristobal Fundora Key words Narco-Cartels, government, strategies, irregular warfare, Adviser to the Deputy 4-3, population, global threat, conventional warfare, targets, National Assembly, violence, drugs, corruption, force development. Republic of Panama

Overview Nowadays not only criminal gangs and of Narco-Cartels are leading to regional in- terrorist organizations threaten the national stability, extreme violence and unrest. security. The rapid growth and expanding According to RAND Corporation, since of the Narco-Cartel around the world is World War II, there have been more than 80 undisputed. Narco-Cartels are irregular en- irregular conflicts. These irregular conflicts emies that simultaneously and adaptively include countries such as Rwanda and employ conventional weapons in a fused Somalia (Civil Wars), Colombia and Sudan mix of insurgencies, terrorism, disinforma- (Guerrilla warfare), Chechnya (rebellions) tion, propaganda and organized crime ac- several countries in the Middle East (Po- tivities in order to accomplish their objec- litical and religious extremism); they involve tives. irregular elements fighting against other ir- The globalization brought developmentin regular elements, regular forces of a cen- areas such as communication, transport, tral government, or an external intervention computer technologies, global networks, force. information sharing, defenseand secu- In relation to the rapidly developing en- rity. These factors made the connection vironment, the nature of conflicts is chang- between the states more transparent and ing, and we are increasingly confronted interconnected. The consequences of the- with ways that are difficult to distinguish seimportant changes, complex vulnerabili- clearly between traditional or irregular ties, threats and crisis situations has also warfare. A US military theorist in the field increased and we are facing the growth of armed conflict and military political strat- of new sophisticated threats in developed egy, formerly an officer of the US Marine and/or developing countries. The presence Corps. And now an investigator in the US 106 4.1. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONFLICTS HISTORY

Department of Defense, Frank G. Hoffman to strengthen their influence in the region. introduced the definition of hybrid warfare, In his publication Professor Bruce Michael where several types of combat operations Bagley of the University of Miami says that are used, and the conflict takes many forms international expansion of Russian organ- to achieve the objectives. ized crime isreflected in a three-pronged pattern. The birth of the cartels The first focus of Russian organized Chinese Influence: There is tendency crime in the early 90´s was the former that when people hear the word Cartels it Soviet Union States, which obtained in- is only related to Mexico, when in fact its dependence and then further to Western origin is very complex. The origin of drugs Europe and the European Union through in Mexico, as well as the appearance of the Eastern and Central Europe, the Balkans first Narco-Cartels in this region can be at- and in the south to the Caucasu sinto Iran, tributed to the end of the nineteenth cen- Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The tury. The wave of immigration from China to second target of the Russian mafia expan- the United States increased greatly due to sion was China and Korea. The third prong the arise of Taiping rebellion in 1848. The in early 90´s was focused onthe USA and Act of 1882 banned Chinese immigration. Canada. But in the middle ofthe 90´s, the As a result the Chinese immigrants had to Russian mafia became significantly in- established themselves in the Mexican ter- trested also in Latin America and the Car- ritory, mainly at the border between the US ibbean markets for their criminal activities. and Mexico. At the same time opium was Colombian and Mexican drug cartels also first introduced to Mexico by Chinese im- discovered new opportunities in this new migrants. avenue. The Russian mafia was involved Since the beginning of the 20th century in drug traficking, money laundering and both opium and marijuana were grown in arms trafficking. Many of the Russian Mexico by the Chinese community. Mari- mafia were former KGB agents and had juana was brought to Mexico for the first control over many banks in Moscow and time in 1525 by the Spaniards. Since then, established others in Panama and the Car- Mexico has developed its specialized skills ibbean to launder hundreds of millions of in the production of drugs. Thanks to the dollars in illicit drug profits. easy smuggling between borders at that Colombians and Mexicans were pro- time and an excellent profitable market in vided with access to sophisticated weap- the North, it has developed into the power- ons, intelligence-gathering equipment and ful drug business that we have nowadays douglas Farah, “RussianMob, Drug Cartels in Mexico. Joining Forces”, The Washington Post, published September 29, 1997 – https://www.washingtonpost. Russian Influence: Narco-Cartels use com/archive/politics/1997/09/29/russian-mob- members of Russian organized criminal drug-cartels-joining-forces/b838dca0-5717-4c91- 9d07-b798a435544d/?utm_term=.4eda7cbaed38 groups, as well as former KGB agents, to bruce Michael Bagley, GlobalizationAndTransnat smuggle drugs into the United States, and ionalOrganizedCrime: The Russian Mafia In Latin America And The Caribbean. School of International Studies. University of Miami. Coral Gables, Florida. F. de Jonge, “Mexico and the Drug Cartels: A His- November 15, 2001, p. 8-9. tory of Fascination,” Peace Palace library (blog), 4 douglas Farah, “Russian Mob, Drug Cartels Joining May 2017. Forces”, The WashingtonPost, publishedSeptember Isaac Campos, Home Grown: Marijuana and the 29, 1997 – https://www.washingtonpost.com/ origins of Mexico´s War on Drugs. (North Carolina: archive/politics/1997/09/29/russian-mob-drug- The University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 1. cartels-joining-forces/b838dca0-5717-4c91-9d07- b798a435544d/?utm_term=.4eda7cbaed38 NARCO-CARTELS: NEW ACTORS OF IRREGULAR WARFARE 107

other military hardware for drugtrafficking, surgents as defined by the laws of war. The along with a split of the profits. Most of the Director of the Texas Department of Public money laundering operations are conduct- Safety and former FBI agent Steven C. Mc- ed by Russians in various offshore zones in Craw, stated that the Mexican Situation is Haiti, Cuba, the Dominican Republic and both a public safety and national security Puerto Rico. Russians export large quanti- issue. ties of drugs that are being shipped to the Mexico’s violence is notable not mere- United States. ly for the scale of killing but forits deliber- On May 03, 2001, the US Coast Guard ately savage quality. Kidnappings, mass detained a ship with a mixed Russian- killings and massgraves are common. Ukrainian team, carrying 12 tons of cocaine. Victims are brutally tortured and often A Belize-flagged fishing trawler named the beheaded.Messages are sent pinned “SvesdaMaru”, with a crew of 10 Russians to corpses. The purpose is terror, but and Ukranians and loaded with some 12 theviolence exceeds what is required tons of cocaine, provided new evidence of to eliminate rivals and intimidateauthori- Russian mafia involvement in drug traffick- ties10. ing in Latin America . RAND Corporation At the moment the Russian mafia indi- rectly affects economic growth, effective The political scientist Benjamin Lessing democratic governance and stability of the of the University of California, Berkeley, regime in the countries of the region. But claimed that the strategy of Narco-Cartels in the future, Russian transnational crimi- is due to the intensity of the repressive nal networks can become a more direct force that the government uses to enforce threat to state security throughout the Latin drug control laws11. American region. The networks which were created initially for the transport of drugs NARCO-CARTELS AND and light weapons may possibly be recon- figured to move heavy weapons, chemical IRREGULAR WARFARE The U.S. policy classified the cartels as or biological weapons of mass destruction- sophisticated criminal organizations12. Tra- and contract killers. ditional warfare typically involves force-on- In earlier years, the Narco-Cartel´s oper- force military operations in which adversar- ationsappeared more like the Italian Mafia, ies employ a variety of conventional military but their activities nowadayshave increasingly developed and changed into a new see On the Border and In the Line of Fire: U.S. Law Enforcement, Homeland Security, and Drug Cartel hybrid activities more similar to those of Violence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Over- international terrorist organizations and insight, Investigations, and Mgmt. of the H. Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. 40 (2011). 10 cNN “Shipand Suspectsin Major Cocaine Bust New Challenges to U.S. Counterterrorism Efforts: Arriveat San Diego,” CNN. com., May 14,2001. An Assessment of the Current Terrorist Threat: http://www.cnn.com/2001/US/05/14/cocaine. Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. th seizure.txt/index.html and Governmental Affairs, 112 Cong. 5 (2012) bruce Michael Bagley, Globalization And [hereinafter Jenkins Statement July 2012] (state- Transnational Organized Crime: The Russian ment of Brian Michael Jenkins, RAND Corporation). 11 MafiaIn Latin America And The Caribbean. School Lessing, B. (2012). The Logic of Violence in Criminal of International Studies. University of Miami. Coral War: Cartel-State Conflict in Mexico, Colombia, and Gables, Florida. November 15, 2001, p. 28. Brazil. Chapter 3Logics of Violence in Cartel-State carrie F. Cordero, Breaking the Mexican Cartels: Conflict., pp. 28-29. 12 A Key Homeland Security Challenge for the Next see Southern Border Violence: Homeland Security Four Years, Georgetown University Law Center, Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Responsibilities: Hear- Pag. 292, 2013. ing Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Govermental Affairs, 111th Cong. 2, 8 (2009). 108 4.1. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONFLICTS HISTORY

capabilities against each other in the air, as well as states increasingly resorting- land, maritime, space, and cyberspace do- to irregular forms of warfare as effective mains13. The traditional form of warfare is ways to challenge conventional military when direct military confrontation is used powers. Advances in technology and to defeat the enemy’s armed forces, de- other trends in the environment will stroy its military power and either capture render such irregular threats ever more or preserve territory in order to change the lethal, capable of producing widespread enemy’s government or force it to change chaos, and otherwise difficult to counter. politics. These threats are enmeshed in the pop- The basis for Irregular Warfare is the cen- ulation and increasingly empowered by tral role of the relevant population groups astute use of communications, cyber- in the nature of the conflict. It changes the space, and technology, such that their concept of war since its focus is on the impact extends regionally and globally. control and/or on the impact created on Many of these conflicts are essentially the population, rather than on the manage- contests for influence and legitimacy ment of enemy forces or territory. Irregular over relevant populations15. Warfare is a political struggle against vio- The Countering Irregular Threats Joint lent and non-violent components and the Operating Concept (JOC) control and/or influence, as well as for the support of the respective population. Par- Hoffman argues that future conflicts will ties of the conflict, whether they are states be multi-modular (they will be conducted in or armed groups, seek to undermine the le- different ways) not fitting into the framework gitimacy and credibility of their opponents of a simple characteristic by the principle and isolate them from the relevant groups of division into black and white. There are of the population physically and psycho- mixed forms of war, the frequency of which logically. At the same time, they strengthen increases. In irregular warfare, the enemy is their own legitimacy in order to exercise most often a unique combination of threats, power over the same population. instead of individual adversaries with fun- To understand what irregular warfare is, damentally different approaches (tradition- let’s use a few definitions. al, non-traditional,terrorism and criminal A violent struggle among state and non- activities) all of which are now expected be state actors for legitimacy and influence used and possibly simultaneously. over the relevant populations. IW favors According to Joint Publication 3-24, indirect and asymmetric approaches, Counterinsurgency, defines insurgency as: though it may employ the full range of the organized use of subversion and vio- military and other capabilities, in order lence to seize, nullify, or challenge political to erode an adversary’s power, influence, control of a region16. Narco-Cartels employ and will14. similar strategies in order toweaken the United States, Department of Defense. structures of governance and rule of law Adaptive adversaries such as terror- to secure maneuver room for their own ists, insurgents, and criminal networks operations and influence. This can give 13 Curtis E. Lemay Center, Volume 3 Command, Op- erations and War, 22 Nov. 2016. 15 Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats 14 Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dic- Joint Operating Concept (JOC) version 2.0, 17 May tionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2010. 2001 (as amended through 30 September 2010). 16 JointPublication 3-24. “Counterinsurgency.” 22 November 2013. NARCO-CARTELS: NEW ACTORS OF IRREGULAR WARFARE 109 a more secure operational area for them to extortions, and theft19. operate. Experts in the field feel that drug cartels Narco-Cartels follow a criminal insurgen- should be treated as international terrorist cy strategy (their actions can be described organizations, and this perception is rapidly as criminal activities, terrorist actions, func- growing20. The main issue in evaluating the tional tactics, and information warfare) di- necessity to shift the United States policy vided ina three-pronged attack: and whether it should strategically go be- 1. Attrite or co-opt law enforcement offic- yond or complement the law enforcement ers through a campaign of terror. model, is whether it is possible and nec- 2. Conduct information warfare (IN- essary to consider cartels as international FOWAR) to degrade public and state terrorist organizations under the laws and resolve, intimidate rivals. policies pursued after 9/11. 3. Martial support; and conduct high pro- Narco-Cartels have an impact on the file assassinations of state officials17. state through violence. A terrorist psy- Narco-Cartels are becoming increasingly chological campaign is launched by dis- militarizedin the way in which they execute playing brutally publicly murdered bodies, tactical operations, potentially a result of designed to frighten their target audience the integration of ex-military and police – the population, the government and rivals members into the organization. Their mili- as well in order to generate a sense of fear, tary capabilities improve as they continue crisis and attendant political costs for lead- to acquire high military power such as high- ers21. When drug cartels face morerepres- powered automatic weapons, sniper rifles; sion from official powers, they are resorting light, medium, and heavy machine guns; to higher violent strategies. grenades and grenade launchers; light anti- Due to unrest and dissention between tank weapons; rocket-propelled grenades; each link in the legal chain there is much armor-piercing munitions; 60-mm mortars fragmentation of the overall system. Police with high explosive rounds;improvised ex- complain of hours lost on laborious forms; plosive devices, heavy vehicles and IT ca- prosecutors blame judges for setting crimi- pabilities18. They are wining more territory nals free; judges accuse poorly trained by using these capabilities since police police of botching crime scenes. Powerful forces are far less capable and do not pos- drug cartels, meanwhile, are taking advan- sess the same equipment and trainings. tage of this weaknesses in the new sys- [The cartels] use military and terror- tem and strong-arming targets with death ist tactics and weaponry ... They em- threats and bribes22. ploy horrific tactics to intimidate their 19 Id. at 42-43 (stating that equipment used by the adversaries and the public such as de- cartels is military and nation-grade including: “communication intercepts, interrogations, trend capitations, acid baths, skinning people analysis, secure communications, coordinated alive, torture and Improvised Explosive military-style tactical operations, GPS, thermal imagery, and military armaments including fully au- Devices and they have expanded their tomatic weapons, rocket-propelled grenades, and criminal operations to profit from kid- hand grenades”). 20 Border and in the Line of Fire: U.S. Law Enforce- nappings, robberies, human trafficking, ment, Homeland Security, and Drug Cartel Vio- lence: Hearing Before H. Subcomm. On Oversight, 17 John P. Sullivan and Adum Elkus. “State of Siege: Investigations, and Mgmt., 112th Cong. (2011). Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency”. The Small Wars 21 Lessing, B. (2012). The Logic of Violence in Criminal Journal. 19 August 2008. War: Cartel-State Conflict in Mexico, Colombia, and 18 Geoffrey Ramsey. “Poverty a Recruitment Tool for Brazil. Chapter 3. Logics Of Violence In Cartel-State Mexico’s Criminal Gangs.” InSight Crime. 20 July Conflict, p. 32. 2011. 22 JoshuaPartlow, Mexico’s crisis of justice, The Wash- 110 4.1. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONFLICTS HISTORY

Targets of acts of violence to force their payments Authorities: Authorities who refuse to co- and at the same time teach a lesson to oth- operate with drug cartels are also in danger, ers. This creates an effect of intimidation i.e. Marco Antonio Leal Garcia. the mayor andmaintains a state of fear of possible of Hidalgo, in the violent border state of violence, i.e. an arson attack on a casino Tamaulipas, Mexico was killed. He refused in Monterrey in August 2011, that killed 52 to cooperate with Los Zetas cartel and was people. The target was the owner of the ca- killed in August 201023. He was brutally sino who refused to pay a protection fee to 26 murdered, and his daughter was injured as the cartel . a result of the attack. Social Media: Other targets of their ter- Military and Law Enforcement: The com- ror campaigns are representatives of social ponents of security and defense become media. In 2017 Latin America and the Car- targets when theyentere cartel territory, in- ibbean was the deadliest region for jornal- terfere with the flow of drugs from South ists. And Mexico is the most dangerous America to markets in the United States or country. Though the government tries hard perform counter operations and repressive to implement more mechanisms to defend action against the Cartels. In April 2007, threatened journlists, yet they remain inef- 27 seven attacks against police and security fective . Journalist are threatened to report forces were made resulting in the deaths of any act of violence. Also, the bloggers, at least eight police officers, including the ofeten become victims of Narco-Cartel vio- commander of the Durango state anti-or- lence, i.e. the blogger ‘Rascatripas» (or or ganized crime unit and Guerrero state Po- Belly Scratcher) in the city of Nuevo Laredo, lice Chief Ernesto Gutierrez Moreno24. was found killed on November 09, 2011 with Civilians: Civilians who were not at all in- a message left with the body: “This hap- vloved in drug war became the victims of pened to me because I didn’t understand 28 the violence executed by Narco-Cartels. that I shouldn’t report on the internet” . He This is to generate fear against the adver- was the moderator of the web-site which saries and gain more terrain (operational reported about Narco-Cartels. area), i.e. The massacre of 72 migrants in Mexico and Afghanistan can serve as ex- Mexico. The migrants were trying to reach amples of such Irregular Warfare (IW). i.e., USsoil, butwhile crossing Los Zetas cartel the drug war in Mexico, which has killed 29 territory they were forced by cartel mem- more than 50,000 people since 2006 , is bers to hand over all their things and when directly related to the internal struggle for they refused to do so, they were brutally spheres of influence between drug cartels, murdered25. corruption in law enforcement agencies Business: Often the owners of legal busi- and US intervention. In Afghanistan, it is a nesses are forced to pay a part of their in- combination of local tribes, veterans of the come, inthe case of refusal to pay a trib- Afghan-Soviet war (Mujaheddin), Taliban ute to drug cartels, they become targets 26 BBC News, “Mexico arrests ‘mastermind’ of Monter- rey casino fire”, 6 January 2012. ington Post, 29 December 2017. 27 IFEX network, «Mexico most deadly countr yforjour- 23 TracyWilkinson, “Mexican drug traffickers blamed nalists in 2017», International PressInstitute (IPI), 24 in killing of second mayor”, Los Angeles Times, Au- December 2017 gust 30, 2010. 28 Pen International, “MEXICO: Another Blogger Mur- 24 stratfor, Mexican Drug Cartels: Targeting the Mili- dered and Decapitated by the Carteles”, published tary, May 11, 2007. Tuesday 15 November, 2011 25 FoxNews, “Survivor Details Massacre of 72 Mi- 29 Alan Taylor, The Atlantic, Mexico’s Drug War: 50,000 grantsby Drug Cartelin Mexico”, published August Dead in 6 Years, May 17, 2012. 25, 2010. NARCO-CARTELS: NEW ACTORS OF IRREGULAR WARFARE 111 and Al-Qaeda movements and the funding Sates. This will also enable the States to for their activities through opium produc- use the country’s national defense system- tion, raising funds from Salafite Islamists sin conjunction with the actions of the na- and the methods of attacks on NATO bas- tional police to combat and counter these es and transport convoys, terrorist acts and threats, which will provide the additional killings of individuals. power in the war. The combination of highly As addition, the nexus between crimi- effective counter insurgency (COIN), force nal and terrorist organizations is no longer protection, operational designs for Irregular something that requiresproof. The growth Warfare (IW) with proper training and real of terrorist and transnational organizations actions will help to reduce the level of vio- that use smuggling, drugs, human traffick- lence that we are witnessing today as a re- ing and racketeering to fund their opera- sult of the increased capacity of the Narco- tions and undermine the legitimacy of lo- Cartels. We can also expect new develop- cal or national government is undisputed. ments in strategies, operations and tactics Terrorists can deliver special training and from these Irregular Groups. To be able to organized crime can facilitated funds and employ a balance between effective poli- a safe heaven. It can be assumed that the cies, we must perform a comprehensive growing problem of Narco-Gangs (Hybrid approach and carefully combine the full Terror-Crime Organizations) as a form of spectrum of military, Law Enforcement and destructive force within The Americas and Civil action to achieve success. This is what in Mexico portends great problems in the Eric T. Olson call “The Balance of Warfare”. future for the world at large.

RECOMMENDATIONS OUTCOME Conclusions • Reduce or eliminate un- The modern Irregular Warfare (IW) per- necessary redundancies. • Increase processing and formed by the Narco-Cartels is unpredicta- • Cooperation with analytic capability. ble and is a global threat that hits its targets, Partners • Provide intelligence that • Joint intelligence. enhance situational un- physically and psychologically. Narco-Car- derstanding by describ- tels exist and develop in specific operation- ing and assessing the al environments. The weaknesses within operational environment • Educate People the judicial system and the inequality of ex- INFO-OPS • Big Impact at Political perience, training, tactics capacity, integra- Level tion of forces and technological advances • Better Approach • Flexible in Operational between individual nations contributes to Regular Trainings Planning the abilities of the Narco-Cartel to exist and • Accuracy in Tactical Level cripples the ability of response to these • Risk assessments. Develop strategies which global threats. These environments need • Encourage Public-Pri- address risk-based vulner- vate partnerships in-sec- to be understood by the governments of abilities tor and across sectors. these nations, intelligence agencies, mili- • Transnational law en- tary and security forces in order to apply forcement and military Empower Military and law cooperation and info- proper response. enforcement sharing The acknowledgment of The Narco-Car- • Additional resources for tels as an Irregular Warfare (IW) actor, will capacity-building significantly improve the level of capacity building, cooperation and training between 112 4.1. LESSONS LEARNED AND CONFLICTS HISTORY

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