SHAPE

and ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

1951-1971 TWENTY YEARS IN THE ESRVICE OF PEACE AND SECURITY

SHAPE AND ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE

TWENTY YEARS IN THE SERVICE OF PEACE AND SECURITY

1951 -1971

PREFACE

Th e articl es in this book w ere written to commemo­ rate the twentieth anniversary of the activation on 2 April 1951 of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Allied Command Europe. These articles are scheduled to appear simultaneously in a special issue of NATO's Fifteen Nations magazine devoted to the anniversary. The authors — all members of Allied Command Europe — represent not only a variety of nationalities but also a wide range of knowledge and experience covering the most significant areas of interest and concern to this command. This book is dedicated to the many men and women representing NATO nations who, as members of Allied Com­ mand Europe, have served the twin causes of peace and security. Their dedication to the principles of individual liberty and collective action, as embodied in the North Atlan­ tic Charter, has helped guarantee two decades of peace, stability and growing prosperity in the Western World. For the decades ahead, such dedication insures that Allied Command Europe w ill continue in the service of both peace and security as an effective military instrument of the Atlantic Alliance.

A.J. GOODPASTER General, United States Army Supreme Allied Commander 2 April 1971 SHAPE, Belgium All or part of this publication may be reproduced, with credit given to NATO's Fifteen Nations Magazine, in which this material first appeared. A complimentary copy of any publication which reprints this material should be sent to PID-SHAPE, B-7010 BELGIUM. TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE ......

IN THE SERVICE OF PEACE ...... General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SHAPE : BULWARK OF DEFENSE — A LESSON IN COOPERATION ...... Colonel Robert K. Sawyer, SHAPE Historian

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN THE PAST 20 YEARS ...... A SHAPE Report

THE CHALLENGE IN THE NORTH ...... General Sir Walter Walker, KCB, CBE, DCO, Com­ mander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe

THE CHALLENGE IN THE CENTER ...... General Jürgen Bennecke,Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe

THE CHALLENGE IN THE SOUTH...... Admiral Horacio Rivero, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe

ILLUSTRATIONS 6

THE EVOLUTION OF AIR DEFENSE IN ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE ...... 99 Air Commodore Joannes H. Knoop, Chief, Air Defense Component, Operations Division, SHAPE

ACE LOGISTICS ...... 113 Wing Commander Rupert L. Walker, Logistics Division, SHAPE

HOT LINES — COMMUNICATIONS IN ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE...... 129 Major Genera l Eberhard Gralka, Assistant Chief of Staff, Communications and Electronics Division, SHAPE

AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING IN ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE...... 141 Air Vice Marshal A. H. W. Ball, CB, DSO. DFC, RAF, Assistant Chief of Staff, Automatic Data Processing Division, SHAPE

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS IN SHAPE AND ACE ...... 149 IN THE SERVICE OF PEACE by General Andrew J. Goodpaster United States Army Supreme Allied Commander Europe

The annals of wo rld histo ry are fi lled with reports on alliances formed to achieve the objec­ tives of war. But when on April 2, 1951, in Paris, the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe, General Eisenhower, signed General Order Number One establishing SHAPE, it was a notable — and un­ precedented — event. Coming into existence for the first time in history was an Allied military o rganization devoted not to war but to peace. The creation of SHAPE was a meaningful manifestation of the determination of the peoples of the Atlantic Alliance to safeguard their freedom, common heritage and civilization. This union in a collective defense effort has succeeded in the service of peace and it has withstood the tests of the past two decades. Europe's political sta­ bility, its general economic health and, above all, the peace and security its people have enjoyed these many years all attest to the success of SHAPE'S efforts on behalf of the peoples of the Atlantic Alliance. 8

Encouragement can be drawn from the success of the past. Accomplishments of the present also ho ld out hope for the time ahead. As SHAPE and Allied Command Europe begin their third decade, we are encouraged by the results of the North Atlantic Council and the NATO Defense Planning Committee Meetings in December of last year in Brussels. These meetings marked the culmination of a year of hard, but productive work. They set the course for NATO defense efforts in the 197O's. Decisions which were taken in the context of both NATO and Europe infuse fresh impetus and new spirit in NATO and its Allied Commands. Those decisions should have the in­ terre lated effects of continuing an undiminished American presence in Europe, of generating a greater effort by European members of NATO to shoulder a larger share of Europe's defense, and of identifying priority areas where further work to strengthen our defenses is needed. But if we are encouraged today it is because over the years men and women assigned to NATO, to SHAPE and Allied Command Europe have dedicated themselves to the noble cause of peace and freedom. An understanding of NATO and of SHAPE'S origins provides a perspective to SHAPE and Allied Command Europe today. For this, it is necessary to recall the moods and attitudes, the circumstances and the challenges of 1945. In the aftermath of World War II there was hope — the same hope held in 1918 — that a war had been won to end war. But a fog of fear hung over Europe. Powerful military forces of the Soviet Union remained mobilized and, with the formidable 9 backing of the Red Army, the Communists already were fomenting strife. This was the period when Greece was threatened by a Communist take-over, when Turkey was being pressed to yield bases along its borders to Russia, and when brutal Communist tactics seized Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and Poland. In 1948 the Berlin blockade began and democracy was ruthlessly stifled in Czechoslovakia. The masters in the Kremlin were drawing an Iron Curtain across Europe from the Arctic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea. In those days the question heard was not " Will there be war ? " but rather, " In w h a t m onth will war start ? " An exhausted Western Europe, weakened and weary of war, faced a new threat — and it seemed only a matter of time until the threat would be carried out. That was the cli­ mate — the harsh, numbing, almost paralyzing climate — into which NATO was born. Less than two years after the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949, General Eisen­ hower was invited to become the first SACEUR, and the organizational work and planning to develop Allied Command Europe was started. General Eisenhower pointed out that in 1951 there had been " serious questions as to the state of public morale among the European members of NATO ". But by 1952 he could write that there had been a profound change in morale. Where in the beginning there had been scarcely fifteen divisions in Europe, by 1952, as a result of the collective efforts of the members of the Alliance, there were nearly double that number. Where national units pledged to 10

Allied Command Europe had been " for the most part poorly equipped, inadequately trained, and lacking essential support in both supplies and installations, " by 1952 they had markedly improved their combat readiness. The supply system behind them was also steadily expanding. Perhaps of even greater importance, a command organization had been formed to plan and direct their coordinated efforts. All this had been accomplished, in that sho rt time, by dint of NATO's collective efforts. In words General Eisenhower often used, the NATO Allies achieved a result which, if they had acted separately, would have been beyond the reach of any or of all.

SHA PE/ACE TODAY

In the twenty years since the creation of SHAPE, there have been further remarkab le and solid achievements in the defense posture of Allied Command Europe. Some of the more significant of these accomplishments are described in the articles following in this book/ We have today an organized military structure with strong forces of earmarked divisions, air squadrons and ships. There are international headquarters, with integrated military command and control communications systems, and an air defense system. The forces in readiness consist of conventional, tactical nuclear and strategic nuclear forces with effective plans and procedures under an agreed strategic concept of flexibility of response and forward defense. In addition, the very process of Allies cooperating in 11 an integrated Alliance has played a substantial part in the development of a more unified European and North Atlantic Community. This in itself has contributed to our security and prosperity. But as we note the achievements of Allied Command Europe — a vital part of the mi litary instrument of NATO — we must view those achie­ vements in relation to the objectives of the Alliance which NATO's military instrument is charged to serve. Traditionally, two such objectives have been recognized — deterrence and defense — but I would suggest that there are two others which deserve to be recognized. They are solidarity and detente. The traditional objective of deterrence — pre­ venting war and making peace secure — must be today, as it was in 1951, the paramount route by which we provide for our security while maintaining our freedom. Today, by any calculation, the destruc­ tiveness of war and the risks of nuclear escalation put a heavy premium on preventing war, while still maintaining our freedom and territorial integrity. The second traditional objective is defense. For deterrence to be effective, we must make unmistakably clear to any potential aggressor that the peoples of the Atlantic Community have the collective will and means to defend their territories and to make aggression unprofitable. Thus, both as the indispensable underpinning to deterrence and as the means to safeguard our nations if deterren­ ce should fail, we need strong and ready defense forces. The third objective of our military instrument is solidarity — collective action and unity in the 12

Alliance. This has proved to be a strikingly success­ ful means for the NATO nations to rise above the quarrels and conflicts of the past which have exhausted them and twice this century nearly destroyed them. By uniting their efforts for the collective defense, our nations have denied to any enemy the opportunity to take the nations on one at a time, or to play one against the other. A final objective in the military instrument of NATO is detente — a relaxation of tensions. To be meaningful and durable, a detente must be based upon reducing and removing the causes of tension — rather than merely the sym ptom s of tension — while at the same time preserving the security, the integrity, and the values of our societies. It is in this sense that NATO, in its 1967 Report on "The Future Tasks of the Alliance," has well recognized that defense is the basis and a prere­ quisite for detente, rather than the contrary. A sound defensive capability works for true and meaningful detente, rather than against it, as is sometimes assumed. One of the principal causes for tension in Europe is the overwhelming capabilities of the Soviet military forces and those combat-ready forces of the Warsaw Pact satellites which over­ hang Central and Western Europe. These military capabilities are far in excess of the requirements which would be needed solely for defensive pur­ poses. By their posture and structure, they are offensive forces posed against the defensive Alliance of NATO. Soviet and Warsaw Pact total capabilities — ar­ my, navy, air and rocket units — may be called, 13 in their aggregat e, the " gross threat. " This " gross threat" has been steadily growing, both quantita­ tively and qualitatively, as Soviet research and development and Soviet resources have been devoted in greater proportions to the military sector of the Russian economy1. The difference between NATO's defensive capabilities and the " gross Warsaw Pact threat" I call the " net threat." This threat too has been increasing, as some NATO forces have become obso lescent and as reductions in NATO's strength — to which I made repeated references last year — have become more apparent. The net threat as we begin the decade of the Seventies is reason for concern. Actions speak louder than words. The Soviets have been building in every category of military force a powerful series of strategic and tactical weapons systems. Their military capabilities — as demonstrated by Soviet and Warsaw Pact land, sea, and air exercises — give cause for disquiet by virtue of the modernity of their equipment, their increased tactical and strategic mobility, their preponderance in front-line divisions and armor, as well as their increased activity. Working in combination with Warsaw Pact ground units, the Warsaw Pact air forces are quantitatively superior by fifty percent to NATO air forces. This highlights a serious deficiency in Allied Command Europe's posture.

1. The dim ensions of the Sovi et th reat a re treated in greater detail in " The Development of Soviet Military Power in the Past 2 0 Years, " another article in this book. 14

The advantage of exercising the initiative — choosing the time, place, mode and weight of the attack — is held by the Warsaw Pact. Their geographic advantage of continuous interior lines of communication is another significant factor favoring the War eaw Pact. The elements of Soviet and Warsaw Pact capabilities, initiative and geography are critical in the defensive equation and in NATO's continuous military calculations.

ALLIANCE DEFENSE FOR THE SEVENTIES

The recent Study of Alliance Defense Problems for the Seventies was one of the most compre­ hensive efforts ever conducted by NATO. It examined the political and strategic factors in East-West relations and assessed the military balance. The Study recognized that at the strategic nuclear level the West has the means of inflicting devastating damage on the Soviet Union and that at the present time adequate tactical nuclear forces exist, although certain improvements in weapons are desirable. At the conventional level, however, it noted serious NATO deficiencies in relative Warsaw Pact and NATO strengths. The Study (known by its short title AD-70) concluded that specific areas in the conventional capabilities of Allied forces needed substantial improvement, some as a matter of urgency. The series of actions developed in connection with the AD-70 Study, and confirmed at the Brussels meetings in December 1970, are of present impor­ tance and have future potential. When implemen­ 15 ted, they will arrest the downward trend of NATO forces. These actions inaugurated a new, sorely- needed augmentation of infrastructure, focussed upon the high priority areas of communications and airfield protection. They recognized a need to keep up the level of national defense efforts and to share the burdens more equitably. Finally, AD-70 recognized and publicized the principal areas in which improvements need to be made. It can always be said, of course, that there remains a certain distance between recognizing what needs to be done and doing it. This is true. Nevertheless, the very act of recognition, on behalf of the governments that must take the action, is a tremendous accomplishment — not matched in NATO's history, in my memory, since its earliest years. The concreteness of the improvement areas that were recognized will, itself, encourage per­ formance to follow. They include : • Armor and antitank weapons — The Warsaw Pact outnumbers NATO in armor by, roughly, a factor of three. • Air defense including aircraft protection — NATO is quantitatively inferior to Warsaw Pact air forces and because we are a defensive Alliance, NATO forces are vulnerable to an attack without warning. Such an attack might catch a large part of our aircraft on the ground. • Overall maritime capabilities, with special reference to antisubmarine forces — Soviet sub­ marines greatly outnumber Allied submarines and the growing Soviet naval forces are the second largest fleet in the world, posing a threat to NATO's sea lines of communications. 16

• The situation on NATO's flanks — spe­ cifically in the areas of the Norwegian Sea and the Baltic Straits in the North, and the Mediterranean and Turkish Straits in the South — receives priority attention within Allied Command Europe. The importance of fuel resources in the Middle East and on the North African littoral to the Western European economy sharpens our concern for sta­ bility in the Mediterranean area. Soviet activity and the increased Soviet presence and commitment in that area are conditions that require constant NATO vigilance.

• The peacetime deployments of ground forces — The implementation of forward defense requires the efficient positioning of units where they can contribute to credible conventional deter­ rence and defense. • Allied mobilization and reinforcement capa­ bilities — Needed improvements have been iden­ tified and must be acted upon by the nations in close collaboration with the NATO structure if we are to insure effective collective defense. • NATO communications — The problems of command and control are intrinsically linked to capabilities in communications, and the recognition of the necessity for the improvements outlined in AD-70 will establish a high priority in this pro­ gram to keep pace with advancing technology. Along with other important areas for impro­ vement identified by the Atlantic Council, I would add that it is necessary that NATO defensive units have " staying power" — that is, the logistics 17 necessary to keep all of the defensive fo rces sus­ tained until further reinforcements arrive. This requires sufficient ammunition, fuel, spare parts, medical supplies and the many other expendable items, at stock levels which would keep our forces effective as fighting units in the early days of a possible war. No military organization can survive in modern war without adequate logistic support.

THE FUT URE OF ACE

The North Atlantic Council meetings in Brussels in December were preceded by meetings of NATO's European nations. The success of the Eurogroup in arriving at joint action is a favorable indication for the future which may well hold a special promise for more joint efforts. Joint European logistics undertakings, adoption of common weapons systems, and even uniform tables of organization and equip­ ment would be both economical and efficient in their direct result. Indirectly, such action could constitute an important step toward increased unity by forming a center of military research, technological and administrative power and de­ cision which would go a long way toward realizing Europe's full potential. Through the collective actions of Allies wor­ king in harmony for the betterment of the Alliance and the causes of peace and freedom which the Atlantic Alliance serves, I foresee more decades for a viable NATO. Through the sustained effort of our whole collective force, through constant innovation and re-orientation of our planning in 18 meeting new chall enges, the military instrume nt of NATO can and will continue to make a contri­ bution that will help the Alliance to be as successful in the future as it has been in the past. On the twentieth anniversary of the establish­ ment of SHAPE and Allied Command Europe, it is appropriate to recall the words of General Eisen­ hower in 1969 on the twentieth anniversary of NATO, "... the North A t lantic Treaty Organization is rich with promise of greatness and reward for its members and all the free world. The obstacles before it are no more formidable than those already surmounted. The essential ingredient for con­ tinuing success is perseverance in our loyal support of a partnership that has already paid rich dividends to fifteen nations. It is an example to free nations everywhere which seek the security and prosperity that is possible for them in like partnership There is every confidence that Allied Command Europe will, in the decades ahead, continue in the service of peace as an example to free nations everywhere. Our faith in NATO's future can be based on its sound performance in the past, con­ fidence in the cause of peace, and confidence in the worth of our democratic aspirations for which our Western Alliance strives. SHAPE BULWARK OF DEFENSE A LESSON IN COOPERATION by Co lonel Robert K. Sawye r United States Army SHAPE Historian

" Allied Command Europe, consisting of Su­ preme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and such additional operational headquarters, organizations and military forces as may from time to time be subordinated to the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, is activated at 0001 hours this date pursuant to authority vested in me by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. "

General Orders Number 1, dated April 2, 1951, from which the foregoing is quoted, also activated Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) as the headquarters of Allied Command Europe (ACE), with temporary station at Paris, France. The order was signed by Dwight D. Eisenhower. 20

ORIGINS OF CO LLECTIVE DEFENSE

Since the activation of NATO in 1949, Western Europe has enjoyed more than 20 years of peace and growing prosperity. Far from the prostrate and divided continent that invited Communist domination immediately after World War II, the countries of Western Europe have grown econo­ mically stronger and — despite temporary setbacks — politically more united. Their remarkable political and economic development was possible primarily because certain nations recognized the importance of mutual security. Realizing that security was indispensable to progress in other areas, these nations knew that real security could be achieved only by combining their defensive efforts.

In 1947 it became increasingly clear that Communist intransigence was impeding the work of the United Nations Organization. As a result, the democratic nations of the West began taking action to present a common front against possible aggression from the East. The United States undertook its vast programs of economic and military aid — the Marshall Plan and Mutual Defense Assistance Program (MDAP) — to the European nations whose economies had been disrupted by the recent war.

The first formal move toward collective defense by Western Europe was the signing of the Dunkirk Treaty by France and the United Kingdom in 1947 in a defensive alliance against aggression. This agreement was broadened by the signing of the Brussels Treaty on March 17, 1948, when Belgium, 21

France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom pledged mutual assistance. These nations agreed not only to strengthen their cultural and economic ties but also to establish a joint system of defense. In September 1948 they assigned certain executive responsibilities for secu­ rity and defense to a subordinate military body, the Western Union Defense Organization (WUDO).

They appointed Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, of World War II fame, as Chairman of a Commanders-in-Chief Committee with headquarters at Fontainebleau, France. Ge­ neral de Lattre de Tassigny of France, Air Chief Marshal Sir James Robb of Great Britain, and Vice­ Admiral Jaujard of France were named as Comman­ ders-in-Chief of Land, Air and Naval Forces, respectively.

It was evident, however, that the combined resources of these nations were inadequate in the face of what appeared to be an increasing Communist threat. Canada already had suggested a single mutual defense system for the entire North Atlantic area, including and superseding the Brus­ sels Treaty. The idea evoked interest on the part of Denmark, Iceland, Italy, Norway, Portugal and the United States, as well as the five Brussels Treaty nations, and on April 4, 1949 the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington, D.C. Greece and Turkey acceded to the Treaty in February 1952, and in October 1954 the London and Paris Agreements made it possible for the Federal Re­ public of Germany to join the Alliance the following year. 22

EA RLY DEFENSE PLANNING

At its first meetings, in September 1949, the North Atlantic Council — the supreme authority of the Alliance — began constructing a framework to insure continuing cooperation and joint action on the many problems of mutual interest to NATO countries. In the military field, the Council esta­ blished a Defense Committee composed of the Defense Ministers of member nations. This Com­ mittee was responsible for drawing up coordinated defense plans for the North Atlantic area. The Council also set up other military bodies including a Military Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of NATO countries, to advise the Council on military matters ; a Standing Group, as the Military Committee's executive body, with respon­ sibility for strategic guidance in areas in which NATO forces operated ; and five Regional Planning Groups covering Northern Europe, Western Europe, Southern Europe/Western Mediterranean, Canada/ United States, and the North Atlantic Ocean. These regional groups were charged with developing defense plans for their areas. In November 1949, in Paris, the Defense Committee agreed upon both a strategic concept for the integrated defense of the North Atlantic area and methods of working out a program for the production of arms and equipment. In April 1950, the Committee approved the first draft of a four-year NATO Medium Term Defense Plan. The Communist attack on the Republic of Korea in June 1950 had far-reaching implications for the development of the Atlantic Alliance. 23

Meeting in September 1950, theC ouncil consi­ dered how to defend the NATO area against possible aggression similar to that which had taken place in Korea. The NATO nations unanimously agreed that a Forward Strategy — defense as far to the east as possible, with no major withdrawals — should be adopted in order to ensure the defense of all European member countries. Such a strategy, however, required far greater military strength than the 14 divisions then available on the continent to NATO. The Council therefore requested the Defense Committee to develop plans to create an integrated NATO force under centralized command which would be capable of defending against the estimated 210 divisions then available to the Soviet Union. The Standing Group was to be responsible for the strategic direction of the force, which would be placed under a supreme commander appointed by NATO. Meeting in Brussels on December 18, 1950, the Council approved Defense Committee recom­ mendations for the creation of an integrated NATO defense force in Europe, the establishment of a supreme headquarters, and the reorganization of the NATO military structure. The Council asked President Harry S. Truman of the United States to designate General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). The President agreed, and the Council formally announced the appointment on the following day. The NATO Standing Group issued General Eisenhower his first terms of reference ten days later. These terms specified that NATO forces 24 made available for the defense of Western Europe were to be organized, equipped, trained and ready to implement agreed plans in event of an emergency. A Supreme Headquarters was to be established in Europe early in 1951. The Supreme Allied Commander would be supported by an international staff representing all nations contributing to the integrated force.

ESTA BLISHMENT OF SHA PE One of General Eisenhower's first acts was to visit each NATO nation to obtain first-hand information on the p r o b l e m s facing a Supreme Allied Command. Meanwhile, he selected Lieute­ nant General Alfred M. Gruenther as his Chief of Staff and instructed him to prepare plans for establishing a headquarters. General Gruenther, then Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations, United States Army, selected a handful of U.S. Army field-grade officers in Washington who immediately began studying the problems of setting up a peacetime international military headquarters. Known as the SHAPE Study Group, these officers spent the closing weeks of 1950 preparing background information for Generals Eisenhower and Gruenther, determining what organizational studies were needed, developing plans for SACEUR's initial European tour, and selecting additional personnel for assignment to SHAPE. They had no written directives or precise terms of reference, and had to rely mainly on their own imagination and initiative, personal qualities that General Gruen­ ther no doubt had considered when he selected them as his assistants. 25

Among this small group of hand-picked offi­ cers was Lieutenant Colonel Andrew. J Goodpaster, who was to assume command of Allied Command Europe 18 years later. Arriving in Paris in early January 1951, General Gruenther assembled a so-called " U.S. Advance Planning Group, SHAPE" at the Hotel Astoria near the Etoile. This hotel was chosen because it was centrally located with good communications nearby, and was vacant at the time. The small band of officers selected in Washington, which formed the nucleus of the Group, was augmented by US officers representing all three services who had been stationed with headquarters in various parts of Europe. With this augmentation, the Advance Planning Group consisted of about 40 officers and 20 other ranks, all American. Most other NATO nations had designated National Liaison Officers, however, who were in Paris awaiting a call to furnish officers for the new international headquarters. Available records indicate that Commander Dagfinn E. Kjeholt of the Norwegian Navy was the first non-US officer to arrive for duty with SHAPE, on 7 January 1951. The U.S. Advance Planning Group, SHAPE became the SHAPE Planning Group on 10 January, and thenceforth planning continued on an international basis. By the end of the month 39 Al lied officers from seven other nations — Bel­ gium, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, The Nether­ lands, and the United Kingdom — also had reported for duty. The SHAPE Planning Group was organized on a functional basis representing those basic 26 activities found in any military headquarters in one form or another. Informal staff sections exist ed as potential nuclei for later staff divisions. Among the tasks facing this Group were the development of plans for a SHAPE staff orga­ nization and the initiation of studies on overall command arrangements for Allied Command Eu­ rope. More immediately, the Group had to esta­ blish housekeeping arrangements, conduct surveys to locate a permanent SHAPE headquarters site, and take action leading to the early construction and occupation of a headquarters. It was known that General Eisenhower desired a headquarters near but not in a major city. When President Auriol of France made available a 67-acre sit e at Marly-le-Roi (near Rocquencourt), about 10 kilometers west of Paris, construction of a head­ quarters began on March 12, 1951. Although individual offices were occupied earlier, a new one-story SHAPE headquarters building with 18 wings was formally turned over to the Supreme Allied Commander by the French President in a flag-raising ceremony on July 23, 1951. When General Eisenhower assumed command of Allied Command Europe on April 2, 1951, officially activating Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, 183 officers from nine nations were serving at SHAPE along with 163 other ranks from six nations. International military cooperation on an unprecedented scale had begun.

EARLY PROBLEMS Formidable problems faced SHAPE. Although General Eisenhower's tour in January 1951 con­ 27 vinced him that NATO nations possessed the will to defend themselves, the 14-15 divisions and less than 1,000 operational aircraft then available to Allied Command Europe were inadequate to defend against the 210 divisions with commensurate air strength available to the Soviet Union. Moreover, Allied forces in West Germany and Austria had been disposed on an administrative rather than an operational basis after World War II, and there was no line of defense against the aggression that seemed imminent. The forces lacked cohesion and unified direction. The nations of the Atlantic Alliance were just beginning to learn to cooperate — at least, militarily — while the Soviet bloc appeared mono­ lithic and united in its aim to dominate Western Europe. SACEUR's most immediate task was to make SHAPE a workable peacetime integrated head­ quarters. Certain problems were inherent in the character of SHAPE itself. Apart from the six languages involved, the various nationalities repre­ sented were accustomed to differing staff organi­ zations, procedures and terminology. Military phi­ losophies and even mental outlook were different in some cases. Nationa l prestige (though never a major problem) was a factor to be considered. Lord Ismay, the first Secretary General of NATO, described the situation this way in his survey, NATO-The First Five Years, 1949-1954 : "... How was this staff to be organized ? On the American system, which was not unlike the French ? Or on the British system, which 28

was different from both ? How were the staff appointments to be distributed among the various nationalities so as to ensure that each and all were fairly represented ? What was to be the command structure through which the Supreme Commander would exercise control ? Where were the Headquarters to be situated ? These were some of the problems which kept the lights in the Hotel Astoria burning till after midnight seven nights a week for the first three hectic months." The solution to some of these problems lay in the experience gained by Allied commanders and staffs during World War II. The name of the first Supreme Allied Commander himself, for example, was associated with successful international coope­ ration. Other solutions were suggested by the experience of the Western Union Defense Organi­ zation at Fontainebleau, which — on a smaller scale — had grappled with similar questions as a peacetime international military headquarters. More important, WUDO provided SHAPE with officers of diverse nationalities who had had experience in working together in an Allied effort for a common cause. Acting as a catalyst for all other solutions, however, was the good will demonstrated by SHAPE-assigned personnel from the very beginning, and their determination to make the headquarters function successfully. This factor, more than any other, made it possible for General Eisenhower and the early SHAPE planners to solve fundamental problems and establish SHAPE as the first unified in­ ternational military head quarters of its kind in history. 29

S HA PE AS A N INTERNATIONAL HEADQUARTERS

Six Supreme Allied Commanders have exercized overall command of all NATO military headquarters in the area of Allied Command Europe during the 20 years since SHAPE'S establishment. Their com­ mand has included not only SHAPE itself but also the integrated staffs of the Major Subordinate Commands for the Northern, Central and Southern Regions, and of Army Groups and Allied Tactical Air Forces. SACEUR's command authority in peace­ time has not included forces below the integrated staff level, except for certain Allied air defense forces. At appropriate levels of alert, however, in accordance with pre-established procedures, SACEUR would assume overall command of na­ tional forces committed to ACE. No account of SHAPE'S activities can be limited to the Supreme Headquarters itself. SHAPE has existed to carry out NATO strategy and military requirements. SACEUR derives his mission and military objectives from strategic guidance contained in NATO directives. He is expected to make recommendations to the Military Committee in connection with any military question that affects his ability to carry out his responsibilities. SACEUR has always been authorized direct access to the Chief of Staff of any NATO nation. In certain circumstances, he may deal directly with Defense Ministers and Heads of Government. Each NATO country except Iceland and (since 1966) France, has maintained at SHAPE a National Military Representative (NMR) who is responsible 30 for liaison with his Chief of Staff. Since 1966, France has maintained a Military Mission at SHAPE.

Adjustments in SHAPE'S organization take place from time to time in response to changing requirements, but its structure has remained basic­ ally as it was in 1951. For the obvious reason that the first Supreme Allied Commander and his Chief of Staff were American, as were the original planners, the staff system was based on the American concept of separate bureaus for administration, intelligence, plans and operations, and logistics, with special provisions for other key functions like finance, communications and, in recent years, automatic data processing. Staff terminology and procedures also were large ly American in origin. Every officer was required to be proficient in either English or French, the two official SHAPE languages.

SHAPE'S uniqueness lay in its international staff composed (until the withdrawal of France) of officers from 14 NATO nations ; Iceland, the 15th, has no military forces and therefore was not represented. The first Deputy Supremellied A Com­ mander, Field Marshal Montgomery, was British. The first Air Deputy, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Saunders, l aso was British ; Vice Admiral Andre Georges Lemonnier, the first Naval Deputy, was French. The first Deputy for Nuclear Affairs (esta­ blished in 1963) was Lieutenant General Florent V.P. van Rolleghem of Belgium. Under the SHAPE Chief of Staff were a British Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations (DCPO), and a French Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics and Administration (DCLA). Below the Deputy Chiefs of Staff the heads of staff 31

divisions and their branches were represented by nearly every nation of the Alliance. The command structure throughout Allied Command Europe followed the same pattern. Although the majority of key SHA PE appointments in the earliest years seem to have been French, British and American, later changes included a wider representation of nationalities. The present e Dputy Chiefs of Staff, for example, are German (DCPO) and Italian (DCLA). In any case, a primary qua­ lification for any SHAPE officer, irrespective of his position or country of origin, was — and is — an ability to work well with other nationalities and services and to develop mutual confidence.

BEGINNINGS OF A UNIFIED WESTERN DEFENSE By mid-1951, the steps initiated by the NATO nations to create an integrated NATO force under centralized command had begun to materialize. SHAPE was firmly established as a workable peace­ time headquarters, and a framework of command arrangements and organization for Allied Command Europe had been defined. As shall be seen, SACEUR and his staff had already begun the detailed planning and coordination that were to draw together the military capabilities of 14 Allied nations and provide two decades of unified Western defense.

TWO DECADES OF UNIFIED WESTERN DEFENSE The NATO strategic concept, approved in January 1950, held that the primary mission of 32

NATO military forces was to deter aggression. These forces would be used against armed attack only if the deterrence was unsuccessful. lthough A the broad strategic plans developed to implement this concept varied through the years, the basic NATO concept of deterrence never changed. SHAPE'S role was to insure that the military forces required to implement the NATO strategy were organized, trained, equipped and prepared for immediate employment. This responsibility included air power and the logistical support required for an integrated force. It was visualized that th e active units assigned to NATO would serve as a " shie ld " along a forward line from the North Cape of Norway to Eastern Turkey. Their mission would be to hold against the initial shock of any aggression whi le reserve forces were being mobilized by the NATO nations and committed to the support of the active units. Early in 1950 the Standing Group had instructed the Regional Planning Groups (RPG) to base their planning on an assumption that war might begin by 1954. This date was selected because it was far enough in the future for long-range planning but near enough in time to insure that plans would be realistic. When completed, the plans were to be coordinated by the Standing Group, which then would estimate what forces would be needed to carry them out. The RPGs also were to develop contingency plans for use in the event of sudden aggression, even though no military forces were then assigned to NATO. Planning for the defense of NATO Europe accelerated with the creation of SHAPE. 33

In January 1951, the Standing Group decided to hav e Allied Command Europe take over the ope­ rational planning functions of three of the five Regional Groups1. Planning for Western (i.e.. Central) Europe was assumed by Allied Army Forces Central Europe (AAFCE) and Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AI RCENT) on April 2, 19512. Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) assumed planning responsibility for SouthernEurope and the Western Mediterranean on June 21, 19513. The RPG for Northern Europe relinquished its planning function to Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) on July 31, 1951*. Only 15 divisions and less than 1,000 aircraft were available to SACEUR when SHAPE was established. By the end of 1951, NATO had

1. The RPG for the North Atlantic Ocean eventually was d i­ vided into several naval commands, including Allied Com­ mand Atlantic and Allied Command Channel. The RPG for Canada / United States still meets alternately in Ottawa and Washington. 2. Allied Army Forces Central Europe was redesignated Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT) on August 2, 1951. Two years later, on August 20, 1953, Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) was establis­ hed over both LANDCENT and AIRCENT. At the same time. Flag Officer Central Europe, established on April 2, 1951, was redesignated Commander, Allied Naval Forces Central Europe (COMNAVCENT), also under AFCENT. NAVCENT was deactivated in 1962. 3. Allied Forces Mediterranean (AFMED) also existed as a Major Subordinate Command in the Southern Region from March 15, 1953 to June 5, 1967. 4. AFNORTH was not established by General Order. CINC- NORTH was appointed on April 2, 1951 ; HQ AFNORTH was established on a temporary basis in London and then moved to Oslo, Norway, on June 22, 1951. 34

35 active and reserve divisions in varying stages of readiness and nearly 3,000 aircraft. More significantly, underSACEU R and the ACE sub­ ordinate commands these forces were no longer a loose collection of national units. Training, communications and logistical support already had been substantially improved and the units were beginning to gain cohesion. A " NATO" force was beginning to emerge. By the time General Eisenhower departed in May 1952, the detailed planning needed to improve the ACE military posture had been largely accom­ plished. The NATO nations had accepted firm force goals for 1952, totalling 50 divisions (of which 25 were to be active) and 4,000 aircraft, as well as provisional estimates for 1953 and 1954. Most NATO forces stationed in ACE had been designated for assignment to SACEUR, and the ACE command structure had been improved. SHAPE, moreover, had issued its first emergency defense plan, setting forth a basis for strategy and providing instructions to commands in case of attack. This did not mean that SHAPE'S problems were solved, however, and that there now existed a NATO defense capable of resisting any aggression. Only a beginning had been made ; vexing problems still awaited solutions. Force goals, for example, were revised down­ ward in 1954 when the NATO nations realized that they could not maintain the level of effort originally planned. At about the same time, the Soviet Union's acquisition of nuclear weapons compelled NATO to review its forward defense 35 strategy. Prior to 1954, SHAPE had been concerned with developing a capability to prevent Soviet bloc forces from overrunning Western Europe. Because of the lack of conventional forces, NATO defense planning relied primarily on massive US nuclear retaliation as a deterrent. In 1957, the North Atlantic Council announced a new strategic concept that recognized the possibility of limited war but called for the use of nuclear weapons in response to any major aggression. SACEUR was to base his forward planning thenceforth on the assumption that a large range of nuclear weapons gradually would be introduced into both NATO and Soviet bloc forces. Soon thereafter, the nations of the Alliance agreed to establish stocks of nuclear warheads in Europe and to place intermediate range ballistic missiles at SACEUR's disposal. At this time, also, the North Atlantic Council requested that SHAPE study NATO's military capabilities in the light of a continuing threat over a long period of time, with a leveling off of defense expenditures by NATO nations assumed. These studies were to take into account the advent of new weapons, as well as 12 divisions, more than 1,000 aircraft and 90 naval units to be contributed by the Federal Republic of Germany, which had joined the Alliance in 1955. By 1960, SHAPE was developing new planning concepts based on the guidance provided by the Council. Meanwhile, it strove to modernize ACE forces, both conventional and nuclear, emphasizing improved communications and the development of systems for early warning, air defense coordi­ nation, and other means of command and control. 36

ACE forces at all levels were participating regularly in NATO exercises, including small-unit problems, command post exercises, maneuvers involving thou­ sands of NATO troops and their equipment, and high-level exercises at SHAPE itself. Specialist schools established in various NATO countries were accepting students from other NATO nations. Some nations sponsored training for air crews and radar observers whose own countries lacked that capability. It was during this year that certain NATO countries assigned to SACEUR ground and air units which could be dispatched immediately to any threatened area of ACE, particularly on the flanks. This multinational force was called the ACE Mobile Force. Created to deter any enemy who might consider launching a limited-objective attack against one of the countries of NATO, it still exists today.

D EVELOPMENT OF INFRASTRU CTURE

SHAPE, in the meantime, was deeply involved in developing infrastructure, a long word referring simply to those fixed installations needed for the deployment and operation of armed forces. Com­ mon infrastructure programming had been initiated by the Western Union Defense Organization prior to SHAPE'S existence. Although most of the in­ stallations required by WUDO were located in France and. The Netherlands, the five Brussels Treaty nations had agreed to share the cost of the program. NATO adopted this principle of cost- 37 sharing as the basis for its own infrastructure pro­ gramming, working out common financing on the basis of a formula accepted by all nations of the Alliance. In 1951, SACEUR had had at his disposal only a few airfields. As a consequence, at least half of NATO's infrastructure programs pertained to airfields for many years. Other programs led to the construction of headquarters, communications facilities, a vast network of fuel pipelines and storage facilities, radar warning and missile sites, and similar installations. SHAPE'S responsibility in the for­ mulation of annual common infrastructure " slices " — a NATO term referring to the annual programs — was to coordinate the requests of subordinate ACE commands prior to their submission to the Military and Infrastructure Committees of NATO to insure that proposed installations constituted actual mili­ tary requirements.

THE SECOND DECADE

The decade of the 196O's was one in which SHAPE planners concentrated on increasing ACE military strength generally, with emphasis on building up both a strategic and a tactical nuclear strike capability. As mentioned earlier, the assignment of nuclear weapons brought about the creation of a Deputy for Nuclear Affairs in 1963 to assist SACEUR with his operational planning. It also resulted in the development of arrangements for broader participation by officers of non-nuclear NATO countries in ACE nuclear activities. Among 38 other things, SHAPE studied proposals for dev­ eloping a so-called "m ultilateral" force, or MLF, equipped with nuclear weapons, a concept that never materialized. When a Nuclear Planning Group was created by NATO in December 1966 to deal with specific aspects of nuclear policy plans, pro­ grams and procedures, SHAPE found itself increa­ singly involved in conducting studies and providing advice on questions pertaining to the employment of nuclear weapons. It was during the 196O's that the mission of the SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center (SADTC), which had been established in February 1955 to provide scientific and technical advice and assistance to SACEUR on air defense matters, was broadened to include problems involving the entire spectrum of military ground, air and naval activity, both offen­ sive and defensive. In 1963 the SADTC was redesignated as the SHAPE Technical Center (STC)1. In 1967, NATO again revised the strategic concept when a changed world situation indicated that a major nuclear war was not necessarily the most likely form of conflict. The new strategy, considered more flexible, was based on controlling the progress of escalation rather than on planning to meet any attack with instant, massive nuclear retaliation. It adapted NATO strategy to current political, military and technological developments,

1. V igilance, No. 121, Aug-Sept 1970, contains an article on STC entitled " Scientific Cooperation for the Atlantic Alliance, " by 1 LT Frederic J. Gruber, US Army, SHAPE Public Information Division. 39 calling for a flexible and balanced range of responses, both conventional and nuclear, to all levels of aggression. It called for conventional forces that were capable of conducting a direct defense at any level of aggression, thereby deterring the possibility of escalation to major nuclear warfare. With its constant emphasis on forces-in-being, especially conventional forces capable of responding instantly at any point within Allied Command Europe, the new strategy and recurring stresses on the defense budgets and national economies of NATO nations raised new problems. These factors, coupled with an apparent air of détente vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, contributed to a seeming reluctance by some NATO nations to assign ne­ cessary resources to the Alliance. Their reluctance showed itself in a number of ways, including the dual-basing and redeployment of forces, e th elim­ ination of important command and support echelons, reductions in lenght of service to exces­ sively short terms, a growing obsolescence of equip­ ment, and inadequacies in command and control facilities and training programs. Since this attitude could have the gravest consequences, the Supreme Allied Commander was to bring to the attention of the nations again and again the need for Allied military authorities to have the capability to respond to crises throughout Allied Command Europe. This need had been underscored periodically throughout SHAPE'S existence by crises occurring in Europe and the Middle East. Events in Suez, Hungary, Cyprus and the Middle East, not to mention the continuing problem of Berlin, had emphasized the instability of the international situation and 40 the necessity for NATO to maintain an adequate defensive posture in Western Europe. The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the armed forces of the Soviet Union and four other Warsaw Pact nations in August 1968 reaffirmed in particularly stark terms the importance of maintaining NATO's mili­ tary capability.

RELOCATION OF SHAPE

On 21 February 1966, the President of the Republic of France declared in a press statement that " any foreign element... in France, will in the future be under French command alone". This announcement, followed by a series of French Government Aide-Memoires, brought about the withdrawal of French forces from participation in Allied military activities by July 1, 1966. It also made mandatory the removal from France of Allied and other national headquarters, forces and facilities by April 1, 1967. The French Government's action resulted in the end of an association that had begun on April 2, 1951 with the establishment of SHAPE and Al lied Command Europe. Although certain elements of French forces had been withdrawn previously from Allied command, SACEUR's peacetime au­ thority over the remaining French forces, and the French personnel assigned to his command, ended completely with the French withdrawal in 1966. Following a military and political reassessment, and re-evaluation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's strategic aims, the Allied authorities 41

concluded that the NATO defense effort should be not only continued but revitalized as well. Con­ sequently, the largest group of national and inter­ national military headquarters, forces and facilities ever assembled in peacetime for such an effort over such an extended period in one country was relocated within one year. SHAPE, and the Head­ quarters of Allied Forces Central Europe, both of which had been located in France since 1951, were relocated and re-established in Belgium and The Netherlands, respectively. The scope of this movement is suggested by the fact that SHAPE then consisted of about 3,000 Allied personnel with 6,000 dependents. About 40 percent of these individuals lived in a housing area near the headquarters called " SHAPE Village " ; the remainder had rented homes in and around the city of Paris. Not only did homes have to be found for hundreds of SHAPE families, provision also had to be made for the schooling in Belgium of some 900 SHAPE children who had been attending an international school run for the French Ministry of Education. AFCENT Head­ quarters, with 2,000 personnel assigned, had similar problems. More complex problems involved the read­ justment throughout Western Europe of SHAPE'S sophisticated communications network of tele­ phones, teletypes, land lines and radio links, and the relocation — or abandonment — of considerable NATO common infrastructure. Despite these and other problems, forced on SHAPE by France's decision, the movement was completed in record time. On March 30, 42

1967, two days before the time by which Allied headquarters would have to leave France, a final flag-lowering ceremony at Rocquencourt brought to a close the functioning in France of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. SHAPE con­ tinued operations on the following day in Casteau, Belgium, following a flag-raising ceremony at its new headquarters site.

SHAP E TODAY

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe is now situated about 50 kilometers southwest of Brussels, on the site of a former Belgian Army training area. The new SHAPE complex consists of a large, three-story square headquarters building, 600 homes composing the new "SHAPE Village", a shopping area, troop billets, and other buildings used by SHAPE personnel for working, living or recreation purposes. A SHAPE International School offers free tuition to children of all SHAPE families, from kindergarten through the twelfth grade. Other SHAPE families live in rented homes within a 20-kilometer radius of the headquarters. As Supreme Allied Commander Europe since July 1, 1969, General Andrew J. Goodpaster commands the integrated headquarters he helped to create in the Hotel Astoria 20 years ago. Currently, the SHAPE staff includes military and civilian specialists from 12 NATO countries. Luxembourg is represented by a National Military Representative only, and France maintains a M ili­ tary mission at SHAPE; Iceland, as mentioned 43 earlier, has no military forces and therefore is not represented. The mission of SHAPE and ACE remains : To support the political objectives of the Alliance by deterring any agression against NATO Europe and, if deterrence fails, to defend as far forward as possible. Under SACEUR's guidance, SHAPE continues its effo rts to broaden and strengthen the defensive capabilities of Allied Command Europe. Its more recent accomplishments include many highlights. Allied communications, for example, have been expanded and integrated through the years, and now include two NATO satellites hovering above the earth. Steady development of the interlocking system of radars, computers and air defense ins­ tallations known as NADGE (NATO Air Defense Ground Environment) gives increasing security against possible air attack. NATO's position in the sensitive Mediterranean area is stronger because of the activation (in 1968) of Maritime Air Forces Mediterranean (MARAIRMED), with its contri­ bution to aerial surveillance, and the establishment (in 1969) of a naval "o n -c a ll" force (NAVOC- FORMED) representing several NATO nations, that can be called together at short notice for exercices or periods of tension. Readjustments made ne­ cessary by France's withdrawal from the NATO military structure are well along toward completion. SHAPE planners, meanwhile, are carrying out their routine but important planning activities in connection with the training, deployment and employment of forces, contingency situations, lo­ gistics, and similar areas of staff interest. They also participate actively in NATO studies on im­ 44

portant subjects such as mutual and balanced force reductions and civil defense emergency planning. Recently, SHAPE made a major contribution to AD 70, a study of NATO defense problems in the 197O's in the light of current and prospective military and political developments. It is worthy of note that the NATO Ministers, at their meeting in Brussels in December 1970, accepted AD 70 as the basis for NATO strategic planning in the Seventies.

THE MEANING OF SHAPE

SHAPE'S primary significance lies in its con­ tribution to common defense and the maintenance of peace. Through SHAPE, the Allies have been able to plan out and agree on joint strategies and train forces-in-being in preparation for the day when they might jointly have to defend NATO Europe. Equally important, the NATO Allies have already organised, through lengthy and difficult effort, the systems of communication, intelligence and logistics that would be required for effective international cooperation in the event of war. During the 20 years under review, this integrated headquarters has drawn together the military capa­ bilities of 14 nations and woven them into a solid deterrent that has kept the peace in Western Europe since world War II. SHAPE has shown that the way for individual countries to achieve national defense is through mutual defense. SHAPE'S role as an integrated international headquarters holds special significance. In SHAPE, 45 for the first time in the history of international rela­ tions, an integrated command consisting of military and civilian representatives from virtually all member countries of an Alliance was created and maintained during a prolonged period of peace. This command undertook successfully the highly-complex, detailed planning and coordination necessary for the em­ ployment of forces from 14 countries in an area stretching 3,600 miles from the northern tip of Norway to Eastern Turkey. Professional soldiers and civilian specialists with diverse cultural back­ grounds, languages and training demonstrated that good will and a willingness to put aside pre­ conceived ideas are indeed the keys to international cooperation. The implications of their successful joint undertaking hold out encouragement for the free nations of the world and point the way to the future.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN THE PAST 20 YEARS

A SHAPE Report

At the end of World War II, the USSR had four and a half million men under arms, the largest single military force in Europe. While the Western powers disarmed as rapidly as they could — within one year the total of British, Canadian and American forces in Europe was reduced from 4,720,000 to just under 880,000 — the USSR maintained all her forces on a war footing and kept her armament production going at full scale. The reason for retaining these forces soon became apparent. Soviet expansion had in fact started before the war with the annexation of the Baltic States and parts of Finland, Poland, Rumania and Czech­ oslovakia. At the end of the war the presence of the victorious Red Armies in the heart of Europe, coupled with Soviet political techniques, compelled Albania, Bulgaria, Rumania, Eastern Germany, Po­ land, Hungary and Czechoslovakia to fall com­ pletely under Soviet domination. Although these countries — with a total population of about 87 million — were incorporated into the Soviet 48 empire by a political process of " conquest without war, " it was the Soviet military machine which gave credence to the political demands. Recognizing the political and military threat posed by Soviet expansionism, Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom joined in signing the Treaty of Brussels in March 1948. These countries resolved to set up a joint defensive system and to strengthen their economic ties. The ink was scarcely dry on the signatures to the treaty, however, when the three major western powers found themselves in their first direct confrontation with the Soviets — the blockade of West Berlin. In the context of the international tensions created by this blockade and the defiance it demonstrated, plans for Western defence were rapidly completed and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization came into being as the embodiment of those defensive plans. The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949 precipitated a rapid change in Soviet policy. Faced by the resolute and growing collec­ tive defense measures being taken in Western Europe, the Soviet Union found the momentum of the earlier successes she had achieved through coercive encroachment suddenly halted. None of the nations that had joined the new Western Alliance were prepared to tolerate an armed attack on one of their number. It soon became evident, however, that the Soviet Union, although inhibited by the concerted determination of the NATO nations, would not be restrained from continuing to pursue her expansionist policies. She embarked on a countinuing and 49 wide-scale program to increase the quality and capabilities of her forces, and to build up an armory of weapons of unprecedented destructive capabi­ lities.

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE W ARSAW PACT

Thus, in the past twenty years, there has been a steady increase in the capability of the armed forces of the USSR. This improvement has occurred even though the number of men under arms has fallen to some extent. The continuing build-up was enhanced significantly in May 1955 when, declaring their security threatened by the accession of the Federal Republic of Germany to the NATO Alliance, the Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe joined the Soviet Union in signing the Warsaw Pact. While this Pact was essentially political in nature, it fore­ saw the creation of a unified command for the armed forces and the deployment of those forces in Eastern Europe " in accordance with the require­ ments of mutual defense." This last statement now gave the Soviet Union a legal basis for station­ ing its troops in the satellite countries. The increase in Soviet military power has been based to a great extent on a comparable technological advance. In contrast to the tremen­ dous stimulus to science and technology that World War II provided in Western countries, the capability of the USSR in these fields remained relatively untouched during the war. The pre-war lack of emphasis on advanced scientific education and a lack of research facilities were the primary 50 reasons why, at the end of the war, the Soviets found themselves many years behind the Western powers in the scientific and techno logical race. Recognizing that approximate equality in science and technology with the West in general and with the United States in particular was vital to their politica l and military aims, the Soviet leaders embarked on a vast program of development whose results have been observed during the 20 years of NATO's existence.

TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS

Considering the base from which they had to start, Soviet progress has been remarkable. Lacking facilities for their own basic research and development, their first steps involved the direct adoption of the Western state-of-the-art in many fields. In the years immediately following the war, much of the expertise was provided by German scientists. With such limited facilities it was obvious that effort would have to be channelled into projects of prime importance, to the neglect of other possible areas of development. The Soviet leaders chose to consider the military balance of power as the primary requirement for state security and development. This concentration of effort in the military field soon began to show significant results, and in some areas the Soviets surpassed the progress made by Western countries. There can be no doubt that after World War II the development of an atomic bomb received the highest priority. 51

Clearly, in the Soviet view, unless they possessed an atomic bomb and thus had use of the threat it implied, there could be little independence in external policy. The effort involved is reflected in the speed of their atomic development: the Soviets were credited with a viable nuclear weapon by the end of 1949. Associated projects were favored with the same priority and the Soviets were not far behind the USA in missile delivery systems for their nuclear warheads. Probably the best known and most spectacular outcome of this program was the accomplish­ ment of the first manned space flight on 12 April 1961, a mere 16 years after the end of the war in Europe — in view of the humble beginnings, a truly tremendous achievement.

BALLISTIC MISSILES

One of the first successes of Soviet techno­ logical efforts was demonstrated in the field of ballistic missiles. The deployment of these weapons by both the USA and USSR started in the late 195O's. While the US deployment of medium and interme­ diate range missiles soon gave way to total concen­ tration on the deployment of ICBM, the Soviets continued to place emphasis on IRBM/M R BMs for use against European targets. The US deploy­ ment of the shorter range missiles never exceeded 100 whereas, by 1964, the Soviet armory of IRBMs and MRBMs totalled over 700 and has remained at that figure over since. Although the Soviets started to deploy ICBMs in 1960, they did so at a much slower rate than the 52

US and soon found themselves outnumbered. In 1964, however, almost all missile production facilities were turned over to the production of ICBMs and, in 1966, the deployment rate rose dramatically. By 1969 the Soviets had achieved parity with the USA in numbers of ICBM and continued to deploy them while the US deployment levelled off.

A further vital point discernible in the last few years is that the Soviets have placed increasing emphasis on the provision of a first strike capability as opposed to the wholly retaliatory force which they established in the early years of deployment. The reported development of a multiple re-entry vehicle launched by the SS-9 missile is evidence of this trend and represents a potential threat to American missile sites.

AIRCRAFT DEVELOPMENT

The Soviets have also excelled in aircraft development. This success is particularly note­ worthy. Although they have relied little on outside ideas and expertise, in the past 20 years the Soviets have consistently developed aircraft, such as the M IG series of fighters, equal to or better than con­ temporary designs produced in the west. Although the Soviets are not yet credited with an operational VTOL aircraft, the VTOL and STOL development aircraft which have been displayed show that the research effort on this type has probably been more extensive — and is probably more advanced — than in any other country. 53

Helicopter development is another speciality of the Soviet aircraft industry. In heavy lift heli­ copters at least, the USSR is considered to be the world leader. A more widely publicised example of the Soviet lead in aircraft development is the advent of the world's first supersonic transport aircraft.

BASIC SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH

Although the Soviet scientific and technolo­ gical effort has been concentrated primarily on military needs, there are some areas which, although not having obvious and direct military applications, nevertheless show promise of enhancing the general economy of the state and have therefore been favoured with major effort. One of these areas is the considerable research effort in the field of plasma physics. The big prize is the realisation of a virtually unlimited source of power from con­ trolled thermo-nuclear reactions : in essence, the harnessing of the H-bomb to useful purposes. This work is still in the realm of fundamental scientific research and many years from a practical solution but, nevertheless, the Soviets appear to hold a lead over the rest of the world in this field.

MODERNIZATION OF THE ARMY

The Soviet Army entered the 195O's with an inheritance from World War II of some 175 divisions, but the majority of these divisionslacked modern equipment and the mobility necessary 54 to survive in the nuclear battlefield. With charac­ teristic determination in exploiting the country's economic resources, Soviet forces embarked on a vast modernization program, so that now, in 1971, the world is faced with the most powerful army ever seen in days of peace — an army which can carry out Soviet expansionist ambitions under either conventional or nuclear conditions. The major re-equipment program which began in 1952 soon provided the Soviet ground forces with a high degree of mobility and firepower. One of the greatest achievements was the rapid development of modern armored vehicles and the re-equipment of the satellite nations. By 1954, the strength of the Soviet ground forces had re­ mained fairly constant at 175 divisions, but their mobility and firepower had been greatly increased by the mechanization and modernization of equip­ ment. The number of satellite divisions at that time had almost doubled since the late 194O's, bringing the total to about 80 divisions. Thus, in 1954 the USSR and her satellites had an aggregate of six million men under arms, of which four and a half million were in the ground forces. In 1955 the signing of the Warsaw Pact brought all these forces under central control — Soviet control. Modernization of the Warsaw Pact armies continued in the period 1950-1960. Production of T-34 and T-44 tanks was stopped and the powerfully-armed, well-designed, infra-red equipped T -54 became the main battle tank of all Warsaw Pact forces. After several major alterations, the T-55 tank was introduced with such refinements as stabilization and power elevation for the main 55

armament. Similar developments appeared in the field of armored personnel carriers, guns, multiple rocket launchers and amphibious vehicles. The first large unguided field artillery rocket, FROG-1, appeared in 1957 and since has been produced in seven versions. The first tactical ballistic missile, SCUD, was also introduced in those years. During the decade 1960-1970, total Warsaw Pact manpower declined by more than 1.5 million men, with ground forces receiving the heaviest cuts, i.e., one-third of their strength. These reduc­ tions did not reflect an easing of cold war conditions, nor were they due to economic trends or a bene­ volent desire to promote disarmament. The cuts occurred quite simply because the introduction of more modern weapons enabled the Soviets to maintain the same overall military capability with far fewer men under arms in those divisions.

RECENT IMPROVEMENTS

Despite these manpower cuts, modernization has continued. The heavier T-62 tank, with its 155-m m gun, is replacing the T -5 4 /5 5 series and is in service in all Warsaw Pact countries. The latest in the series of unguided field artillery rockets (FR O G -7) and SCUD tactical missiles, both with a nuclear capability, are now supporting armies and fronts throughout the Warsaw Pact. Cross­ country and river crossing capabilities have been vastly improved with the introduction of first class bridging equipment and amphibious vehicles. Strat­ egic mobility has also been enhanced by the recent introduction of large numbers of tank transporters, 56 and by the use of infra-red devices for night move­ ment. There is also evidence that the Warsaw Pact accepts the use of chemical and biological weapons as a form of warfare and all arms are trained in self-protection against such hazards. Thus, as we enter the 197O's, the Warsaw Pact ground forces have an estimated strength of nearly 3,000,000 men organized in about 200 tank, motorized and airbone divisions. Among these formations are approximately 50,000 airborne troops, one third of which could be simultaneously airdropped or air landed in any area. These armies have been specifically organised and equipped to meet modern tactical doctrines, the most impor­ tant of which demands that whole fronts be capable of advancing up to 100 kilometers per day under conditions of nuclear warfare. In perfecting this military machine the Soviet Union has achieved a remarkable balance in con­ ventional and nuclear weapons that gives her an attractive number of options in any military situa­ tion. The entire Warsaw Pact command and con­ trol organisation and its logistic plans are designed to support a major sustained offensive into the heart of Europe under either conventional or nu­ clear conditions.

NAVAL DEVELOPMENT

By tradition a " land animal," the Soviet Union made little use of her navy during World War II. As a result, many of her ships were old and in a poor of repair at the end of the war. Exper­ 57 ience in both World Wars, however, had clearly demonstrated the value of submarines and the vulnerability of western nations to attacks on their vital sea lines of communication. Furthermore, the war in the Pacific, and to some extent in Europe, had shown what could be achieved by sea-borne forces. The build-up of an extensive force received first priority. From very small beginnings, the Soviet submarine fleet grew in size to 300 by 1954 and 430 by 1960. The majority were long-range attack submarines specifically designed to harass NATO's sea lines of communication. In the late 195O's, two developments added to the potential of submarines. First, nuclear power improved sub­ marine performance and allowed them to remain submerged and thus virtually undetected for months on end. Secondly, the Soviets began to equip their boats with cruise missiles, giving them the ability to attack land targets on the European and North American coasts. In the early 196O's the Soviet submarine fleet reached its peak in terms of size ; since then there has been an increasing emphasis on quality. Nu­ clear-powered boats now constitute nearly 25 % of the present fleet of 350 submarines. The " Y " Class submarine, similar to the American POLARIS and carrying 16 ballistic missiles launched from under water, is now on regular patrol in the Atlantic.

A FLEET OF S URFACE SHIPS

To back up this underwater threat, the Soviet Navy has built up a fleet of surface ships which 58 is now second in size only to that of the United States. Starting in the early 1950's, the Soviets concentrated their efforts on large gun-armed cruisers and destroyers to counter the NATO strike fleets and to defend the homeland against assault from the sea. Many of these old cruisers and destroyers are still in commission, but since 1960 there has been an increasing emphasis on building missile-armed ships. Unlike Western navies, the Soviet N avy has no aircraft carriers to extend the range of its weapons and provide fighter air cover for the fleet. The Soviets, presumably be­ lieving that large carriers are too vulnerable and expensive, have placed their reliance on surface-to- surface and surface-to-air missiles to fill these two roles, so much so that now over 40 percent of all major surface ships are armed with missiles. Surface-to-surface missiles, such as those fitted in the KRESTA class of cruiser, with a range of 400 nautical miles and capable of carrying a nuclear warhead, significantly enhance the offensive capa­ bility of the Soviet Navy. Soviet shipbuilding effort has not, however, concentrated entirely on large warships. In 1960, the OSA and KOMAR fast patrol boats first entered service. Construction of these boats, armed with the 25-nautical mile STYX surface-to-surface mis­ sile, has continued, and the USSR and her Warsaw Pact allies now have about 200 of these highly effective craft. Thus, in the past two decades the Soviet Navy has achieved one of the most remarkable transformations in military history : from a fifth rate naval power in 1950 it has become a modern, 59

sophisticated fleet of some 1,500 combat ves­ sels today. This transformation has not been concerned with ships alone. Soviet naval aviation and amphibious forces — both nonexistent at the end of World War II — have been developed as w ell. Supersonic aircraft armed with 300-nautical mile air-to-surface missiles or equipped to hunt and kill submarines range daily over the world’s oceans and complement their surface and submarine counterparts. The Warsaw Pact naval infantry, numbering some 16,000 men and armed with the latest weapons, stand ready to seize the entrances to land-locked seas or to assist the ground forces by attacks behind the enemy's lines.

CHANGES IN SOVIET NAVAL POLICY

Soviet naval policy has changed dramatically during the last decade. Until the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 the fleet, apart from its submarines, had been assigned a defensive role — the defence of the homeland. The Cuban crisis must have demonstrated clearly that any Soviet attempt to influence events in countries outside the European land mass had to be backed by a military capability in the area. A navy provides a ready means to demonstrate this capability, and the presence of ships in " foreign " waters has the added advantage of " showing the flag" for political purposes. In the past few years, therefore, there has been a rapid build-up of Soviet ocean-going support ships and an increase in naval deployments far from the boundaries of the USSR. A permanent presence 60 has been established in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean and, it now appears, in the Caribbean as well. Soviet naval and military activities in th e Mediterranean area are especially worthy of note. Not only do they increase the threat to NATO's Southern Region significantly, but they also suggest a probable pattern for similar penetration into other areas — patterns that are, in fact, already evident in the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. The Mediterran­ ean presence started with a token force of ships and submarines supported by auxiliaries at anchor­ ages mainly in the Eastern Mediterranean. This force has now expanded to an average daily total of some 35 ships and 10 submarines supported not only at anchorages throughout the area but also by repair and logistic facilities in the ports of some Arab countries. The Arab/Israeli War and the urgent Arab need for arms has given the Soviet Union the opportunity to extend this purely naval presence to the other arms of the service. Now Soviet military " advisors" and aircraft form the nucleus of a well-balanced force that could be despatched to the area at any time.

THE SOVIET AIR FORCE

The Soviet air force has not undergone the dramatic changes evident in the other two services. Indeed, from a total strength of about 20,000 air­ craft in 1950, the force has been reduced to a present- day total of about 11,000 aircraft. It is true that 61 this number is now augmented by the constantly improving air forces of the other Warsaw Pact countries, but the 2,500 or so aircraft of these countries still leaves a total reduction in numerical strength. The quality of aircraft, however, has con­ sistently kept pace with contemporary trends and, as a result, the overall effectiveness of the air forces have probably remained unimpaired. Regardless of any reduction, the Soviets still maintain a larger air force than the corresponding NATO air forces ; in the Northern and Central areas of Europe there are now about 3,900 Warsaw Pact aircraft compared with NATO's 2,100. In the past, the disparity in numbers has been offset in part by the superior performance of NATO aircraft, but the latest Soviet aircraft to enter operational service — the FOXBAT and FLAGGON — are superior to their NATO counterparts.

THE MILITARY THREAT

This, then, is how the military threat to the Western world has developed over the past two decades. In the technological race, in the ballistic missile field, and in the air, the Soviet Union and her Warsaw Pact allies have, in general, achieved parity with NATO. At sea, the Soviets have made some dramatic advances and now rank as the second great naval power in the world. On the ground, the standing forces of the Warsaw Pact far outnum­ ber those of NATO and are on the whole better equipped. Looking to the future, we can be sure that the Soviet Union will strive to achieve more than 62 just parity. If she succeeds, her expansionist ambitions, so far held in check by the North Atlantic Alliance, will be more readily attainable and she may be prepared to take greater military risks in the furtherance of her political aims. THE CHALLENGE IN THE NORTH by

General Sir Walter Walker, KCB, CBE, DSO Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe

The Soviets are now attempting to push their defense line forward to the gap between Iceland and the Faroes. This is the conclusion reached by a group of political scientists of the Norwegian Foreign Political Institute who have published an analysis of the Soviet naval expansion in Northern Europe. In establishing our position today, as a result of 20 years of steady development, it is befitting to emphasize the situation at sea. With public attention these days generally focused in the Mediterranean area, the sea threat in the North sometimes is overlooked by the public. The fact is that we face something like 900 sub­ marines and surface vessels plus several hundred auxiliaries of the Soviet Northern and Baltic fleets, which are based on our very doorstep. Most of the Soviet nuclear submarines are said to be in the Northern fleet, based in the Kola Peninsula. During the last ten years, the Soviet Navy has grown from what was mainly a deadly sub­ marine threat to include a modern and powerful 64 surface force. This force is now built around more than 100 modern or modernized frigates and destroyers, some of which are equipped with surface-to-surface guided missiles. Another venture in Soviet naval power is the development of a substantial assault capability, employing reactivated Marines and large landing ships. This new capability poses some special problems to us in the Northern European Command1 (NEC) because of our extensive — and very lightly defended — coastline. The new Soviet helicopter carriers also have a significant assault capability which increases the amphibious threat should the Soviets choose to operate them in northern waters. This development emphasizes the importance of the high-sea navies of NATO in the Atlantic to the defense of this Command. Also, it points up the need for the best possible coordination of effort between the Northern European Command and the commanders at sea. As CINCNORTH, I must view warfare in three dimensions: at sea, in the air and on land. Of prime importance to me is the security of our sea and air lines of communication, as well as the defense of the long land territories of Norway, Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein. Two quite dif­ ferent types of land warfare are involved, one in the mountainous country of Norway, the other

1. Editor's Note: Although not an official designation, the term " Northern European Command" frequently has been used interchangeably with that of Allied Forces Northern Europe. 65 in the flat country of Denmark and Schleswig­ Holstein. Extensive sea, land and air reinforcements are required for the successful defense of this north­ ern NATO flank. In war, my main task as CINCNORTH is to receive, administer, deploy, and command or con­ trol these external reinforcements in concert with our own internal forces, naval, air and land. Although the Northern European Command has several thousand miles of coastline, only a small local-water navy is under its command. The NEC is therefore entirely dependent on the high-sea navies of Allied Commander-in-Chief Channel and Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic for naval support, both operational and logistic. This support w ill provide essential strength and depth to the defense of our territories. The high- sea navies are equipped to protect our convoys, secure our flanks, give air support and, indeed, to provide land reinforcements.

THE MODERN SOVIET POSTURE

In addition to the Soviet naval build-up in Northern Europe, a remarkable modernization of Soviet ground and air forces has taken place. This modernization clearly shows a develop­ ment of Soviet military doctrine that takes full account of the presence of nuclear weapons on the battlefield. The Soviet ground forces have great mobility. There are a great number of armored 66 personnel carriers and fighting vehicles with an amphibious capability, which show that they would be able to exploit any weaknesses and achieve maximum results with a minimum employment of force. This is just what is required in situations where nuclear weapons could come into play; and we cannot forget that tactical nuclear weapons are an integral part of the Soviet armory. Great mobility and hard-hitting small units are also ideal in any military action designed to achieve quick results without causing escalation such as could be termed limited war. The Soviet introduction a few years ago of what can be des­ cribed as a mixture of a tank and personnel carrier, capable of transporting a full infantry squad, is a typical example of this approach. The Soviets also have continued to develop modern tactical aircraft capable of operating under primitive conditions. This provides yet another example of the purposefulness with which the Soviets continue to build up a flexible military posture. It also should be remembered that the Soviets can concentrate their forces in any area on which they wish to bring pressure. They have the tre­ mendous advantage of working with internal lines of communication where reinforcements and sup­ plies do not constitute insoluble problems. The swift occupation of Czechoslovakia and the Soviets' proficiently conducted large-scale exercises on land and at sea demonstrate professional military competence that is all the more serious because it has been purposefully achieved by a totalitarian expansionist regime. 67

FORCE RATIOS AGAINST US

There are some 6 -8 Soviet divisions facing Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark, which is numeri­ cally superior to the NATO forces on the land side. In the North, two Soviet divisions are for­ ward in the Kola Peninsula. This numerical supe­ riority could be increased quickly — to NATO's disadvantage — because the Soviet Union can bring forward large forces rapidly from rear areas. They have the initiative and they have the strength. They can apply that strength wherever they choose, and probably without much warning. That is the situation we face on the northern flank of NATO.

NATO STRATEGY

The new NATO strategy, popularly termed " the strategy of the flexible response ", is designed to put the onus on the aggressor to decide if and when all-out nuclear war, embodying his self­ destruction, shall be the result of his military action. A great deal of complicated reasoning is the basis of this defense posture. It assumes that a selective defensive use of nuclear weapons against an aggres­ sor would not cause him to relinquish restraint in the use of such weapons and commit suicide by unleashing all-out nuclear war. On the other hand, even a selective defensive use of such weapons would create a situation which nobody has faced before. It would, therefore, embody a number of uncertainties. For this reason, increased emphasis has been placed on NATO's ability to react to aggression, short of nuclear war. 68

In the Northern European Command, there are seven requirements for the successful implementation of the strategy of the " flexible responseWe must have : — Sufficient warning, — Timely political decisions, — Presence of sufficient forces which must be — Combat-ready, and — At the right place — At the right time so as to ensure that there will be — A vigorous response to any aggression or threat of aggression With the superiority on the other side, we cannot expect much warning, and political decisions necessarily require time to be reached and imple­ mented. It is the man behind the gun, the number of men in the gun crew, the armored fighting vehicle and the armored personnel carrier which count. Unless the crews are up to their full authorized strength, and highly trained, and unless every gun, fighting vehicle and personnel carrier in that authorized strength is in commission, we shall not be combat ready at the right place at the right time. Therefore, we can no longer afford to econo­ mize on the training of the man or on the quality of his weapons and equipment. If we do, there will certainly be a big penalty to pay in the light of the heavy odds already arrayed against us.

OWN FORCES

In spite of these odds, the quality of our standing forces is improving. A marked development has 69 taken place over the years and is still proceeding. The Norwegian Army has received new German LEOPARD tanks, self-propelled artillery and new personnel carriers. The Navy is equipping its coastal craft with highly effective No rwegian- developed short-range surface-to-surface missiles. The Air Force is also being re-equipped. Denmark has embarked on a 5-year re-equipment plan. New armored personnel carriers and other modern equipment for the Army have made it possible to regroup the standing forces into four brigades, in contrast to the previous three. Of particular impor­ tance to the defense of the Baltic Approaches is the arrival of the German LUTJEN Class missile destroyers which will give more depth to the defense of this area. Our own standing forces are comparatively small in number, but the odds against us would be reduced with the mobilization of reserves in Denmark and Norway. Denmark can mobilize more than 80,000 reservists in about 24 hours and, in a matter of hours, almost 70,000 Home Guard. In Norway, 110,000 reservists, plus 70,000 Home Guard can be mobilized in the same way. Although the immediate combat value of reserve forces is somewhat in question, both countries do have very effective voluntary rifle training clubs. In Norway these clubs contain 200,000 active riflemen between 15 and 90 years of age I In Denmark, the rifle clubs have 85,000 active members. Some riflemen in both countries, as members of the Home Guard and local defense units, or as guerillas, could put a rifle bullet between the eyes of an enemy intruder at a distance of 200 70 yards. This widespread skill with firearms, there­ fore, is of considerable deterrent value. This deterrent value would be of particular importance if a guerilla force were trained to operate hand in glove with the field army — for one of the main roles of the guerillas is to wipe out tanks. It is interesting to note that the standing forces of Denmark and Norway, compared to their population, are higher than those of both the UK and Germany. The Norwegian standing forces amount to some 0.99% of the population. In Denmark, the figure is 0.93%, as against the Federal Republic whose standing forces amount to 0.79%, and the UK to 0.73%. In comparison, the standing forces of the United States amount to 1.70%.

OUTSIDE SUPPORT

Despite the military effort made by the coun­ tries in the NEC, we are entirely dependent on outside reinforcements for a successful defense of our area. The key words in the defense planning in Northern Europe are, therefore, Strategic Mobility. The most remarkable development has taken place with respect to mobile reinforcements. The reduction of British forces from " East of Suez" should improve the military situation in Northern Europe. More strategic reserves of al l British services now will be available for pos­ sible employment in the Northern European Command area. 71

As I see it, there is a growing awareness in Great Britain of the importance of a successful defense of Denmark and Norway to the security of Britain herself. Taking the naval situation into account, we in the NEC were relieved when the British Government decided to retain the aircraft carrier H M S A rk Royal. Aircraft carriers available to the northern flank provide a great deterrent value; at the same time, they make coordination of effort more simple and effective.

The British Mobile Force, trained and equipped as it is for strategic mobility, is also of great impor­ tance both as a deterrent and as a reinforcement of the NEC in an emergency. This force has, since the assignment of its new role, taken part in NATO exercises in our area. During the past few years, British units also have been exercising more frequently with Norwegian and Danish forces on a bi-national basis.

SACEUR's international ACE Mobile Force (AMF) can quickly deploy to the flanks to deter limited aggression. The force itself, which is now well established and could arrive in the AFNORTH area in a matter of days if requested, has been conducting a series of exercises both in North Norway and in Denmark. It has been a great instrument in training command staffs and troops in the techniques of strategic mobility.

A new development with respect to earmarked reinforcements for the Northern command is the recent commitment of a Canadian air/sea trans­ portable brigade, which is equipped for winter warfare. In addition, there are, of course, the signi­ 72 ficant US reinforcements which are part of SACEU R's Strategic Reserve. On the navy side, a most important develop­ ment in the light of the expansion of Soviet naval power is the establishment of the standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT). The primary task of this standing NATO naval force, under the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, is to maintain a multinational NATO presence in northern waters in a deterrent role. This force will be seen by a potential aggressor as an advance element of the powerful Striking Fleet Atlantic, which is capable of giving such extensive support to this Command. The reaction time of air forces is naturally shorter than for naval or land forces. During the 196O's, NATO air forces significantly improved their ability for quick reinforcement. We have had some interesting exercises whereby tactical air support, based in the United States, has flown non-stop from bases in America, refuelling in the air, to arrive combat-ready in our theatre. The ACE Mobile Force also has an air component, and in this way more regular air support of rein­ forcements has been exercised.

COMMAND & CONTROL ORGANIZATION

This extensive programme of reinforcement requires a clear and effective command organization, and great progress has been made in this respect. In the early 6O's, the Baltic Command organization was established as a unified regional command, 73 subordinate to CINCN ORTH. CINCNORTH's own headquarters was subsequently reorganized also, incorporating the previously separate subordinate commands of the naval and air forces, to make possible effective coordination and quick reaction. In a new development, this Headquarters in an emergency will now have governmental repre­ sentatives as well as national military liaison officers. This will facilitate political consultation at CINC­ NORTH's level, and will probably make it easier for the responsible governments to reach important decisions on matters of defense earlier and on a sounder basis than otherwise possible. Another development at AFNORTH Head­ quarters was the arrival in the autumn of 1970 of a small nucleus of Canadian staff officers, bringing the number of nations represented at this head­ quarters to six. In Norway, a reorganization of the top manage­ ment of Defense is nearing completion. As a result, we will soon have clear-cut regional inte­ grated command organizations for all three main areas in AFNORTH: North Norway, South Norway and the Baltic Approaches.

COMMAND & CONTROL COMMUNICATIONS

Most significant developments have taken place in electronic communications, enabling the command staffs to fulfill their functions more effectively. Since the establishment of the Forward Scatter 74

system, there has been a steady improvement in our communications. We will shortly acquire terminal stations for the NATO communications satellites in South Norway, as well as in Northern Jutland, so that Commander Baltic Approaches will also be connect­ ed to the satellite communication system. Another electronics improvement is the compu­ terized NATO Air Defense Ground Environment system, providing automated command and control facilities for air defense. This system is now being installed in the Northern command; parts of it are already operational. A further development in communications is the new very-low-frequency transmitter facilities which provide better control of our own submarines.

IMPROVEMENTS OFFSET BY SOVIET BUILD-UP

There has been a tremendous development, therefore, in the NEC defense posture over the years. A clear, effective command organization has evolved, based on the needs for military efficiency and political contro l. Our own forces have been, or are being, modernized. Considerable out­ side reinforcements have been earmarked for our area. To maintain our defense posture and improve our defensive capability, we conduct a regular training and exercise program. In spite of the improvements that have taken place, however — considerable though they may 75 be — the overall defense situation in N orthern Europe has not improved. This is because of the increased combat-value of the Soviet forces resulting from their continuing modernization and their steady development of new offensive capabilities. Of particular importance to us are timely political decisions to put additional defensive measures into effect, should an emergency occur. I have presented a picture which I believe to be realistic. To some it may appear a gloomy one, but in reality it is not, because it is easily within our reach to put things right. First, I believe that it is unwise under the circumstances to economize on the training of our conscripts and their equipment; we must strive for the best quality possible. Secondly, I believe that more frequent call- ups of reservists would substantially increase their quality and combat-value, thereby significantly reducing the odds against us. Thirdly, by devoting more attention to methods by which we would force an aggressor to commit larger forces to obtain limited objectives, we would contribute to an effective deterrent, and F o u rth ly , by assigning a more clearly defined complementary role to Home Guard forces, we would substantially increase the existing defense potential. These measures are all in the " low cost" category. The challenge of peace is to explain to the public the needs of an effective defense. Experience shows that, when properly explained, those needs will be met.

THE CHALLENGE IN THE CENTER by Genera l Jurgen Bennecke German Army Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe

The badge worn by personnel of Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) is an excellent symbol of the challenge facing the North Atlantic Alliance in the Seventies. This badge portrays the tower at Aachen (Aix-la-Chapelle) and, together with the shield, represents the con­ tinuing need for a strong defense against those who may seek to destroy the peace and security of the Central Region. Behind the tower is the great sword of Charlemagne which symbolizes our ability and willingness to use our forces if we are attacked. To meet the challenge of keeping the peace we must continue to recognize the need for political determination, collective defense and military capability. This need is as great today as it was when the Alliance was formed. Marechal de France Alphonse Juin, the first Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Central Europe, devised the AFCENT badge in 1953 to symbolize the European community which was first estab­ 78 lished by Emperor Charlemagne in the ninth century. This great monarch made Aachen his capital and from there unified most of Western Europe, including the countries which now compose the Central Region — Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany (less Schleswig-Holstein), Luxembourg and The Nether lands. Geographically, the Central Region also includes France, which is a member of the Western Alliance, though her forces do not belong to the integrated mi litary structure. Behind the NATO shield, these nations have once again become prosperous and powerfu l. In fact, the industrial and economic resources available in the Central Region are equa lled only by those of the United States and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union. Moreover, the 120,000,000 or more people within its boundaries live in freedom and are dedicated to the preservation of peace. Within the NATO command structure, the task of organizing and planning the land and air defense of this important area is the responsibility of Headquarters Allied Forces Central Europe. When AFCENT was established in 1951, many European countries — Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania and the three Baltic nations — had already been brought under the domination of the Soviet Union. The Communist attack upon South Korea, one of the important catalysts in the formation of Allied Com­ mand Europe, was still in progress. There seemed little doubt that Central Europe would be the next target, and less doubt that the greatest threat to peace throughout the Western world was concentrated in the Soviet Union. Consequently, AFCENT was 79 given the mission of deterrence and defense against any attempted aggression against the Central Region. It has the same mission today. The accomplishment of this vital mission re­ quires readily available land and air forces, both conventional and nuclear, sufficiently strong to withstand any attempted aggression against the Central Region. The primary task of our forces is to deter aggression. However, should deterrence fail, we shall use our forces with the greatest deter­ mination to convince the aggressor that negotiation is preferable to further escalation, which could ultimately lead to large-scale destruction throughout the world. AFCENT discharges its responsibilities through four subordinate commands — Northern Army Group (NORTHAG), Central Army Group (CENTAG), Second Allied Tactical Air Force (2ATAF), and Fourth Allied Tactical Air Force (4ATAF). The headquarters of these commands are situated in the Federal Republic of Germany: NORTHAG and 2ATAF in the north ; CENTAG and 4ATAF in the central and southern part of the country. The formation of the Atlantic Alliance played an essential part in counterbalancing Soviet threats, and, over the last 20 years. Central Europe has been able to develop in an atmosphere of peace and security. Today, however, there seems to be a growing feeling among some people that this region is no longer seriously threatened by the Soviet Union and that the main threat now lies elsewhere. This is a dangerous assumption, for the present military capability of the Warsaw Pact countries 80 to commit an aggression against the Central Re­ gion is as great, if not greater, than it has ever been. Today, the Soviet Union maintains far more con­ ventional forces behind the Iron Curtain than it needs for defense or for the domination of the satellite countries. In East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, the Warsaw Pact maintains some 28 Soviet and 28 non-Soviet divisions, totalling about 855,000 men and 13,500 tanks. In addition, substantial rein­ forcements could be rapidly brought in from ad­ joining territories. Facing these large, conventional forces, AFCENT has far fewer divisions and tanks. The Warsaw Pact also has a similar ratio of superiority in air forces, at least in numbers. There are three other points that must be remembered. First, Central Europe is highly vul­ nerable to an attack from the East. There are few natural obstacles to prevent or hinder a large scale land invasion across its long border with the Warsaw Pact countries. This is the prime area in the whole of Allied Command Europe where Warsaw Pact forces could launch a massive land invasion. Secondly, the fundamental causes of tension which led to the creation of the Alliance are still with us. For example, the problems of Berlin and a divided Germany remain unresolved, while the might of the Red Army still casts its shadow over the whole region. And lastly, the Central Region must still be an area of principal interest to the Soviet Union. With its richness in technical know­ how and industrial capacity added to that of their own, the Soviets could hope to achieve their professed goal of world domination. 81

The nuclear disparity between the Soviet Union and the United States, moreover, has been substantially narrowed. The Soviet Union has created the second largest naval force in the world, and is becoming more and more active around the Middle East, Africa and other strategic areas of the world. These developments may influence the world-wide balance of power, but certainly they will not diminish the threat facing the Central Region. Additional evidence that this threat is a very real one can be found in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, one of the most sobering events of the past decade. The Soviet occupation of this country was an important lesson. W e learned that the Warsaw Pact forces are able to deploy quickly and effectively and that they are able to mask such deployments behind exercises and maneu­ vers. There are also military consequences resulting from the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Not only is the Central Region now faced by five more Warsaw Pact divisions located in that country, but also the Soviet Union now has forces immediately adjacent to Austria and could force her way through that neutral country into the southern part of the Federal Republic of Germany, south of the Danube, in terrain ideally suited to mechanized warfare. Furthermore, the invasion of Czechoslovakia demon­ strated once more the Soviet Union's will and determination to maintain domination of her satel­ lites. For these reasons I think it important to empha­ size, and to keep on emphasizing, the vital necessity of maintaining adequate and well trained military 82

forces in being. Our determination and ability to defend the Centra l Region through the provision of sufficient on-the-spot forces, both conventional and nuclear, together with a known ability for absorbing strong and timely reinforcements, is and will remain a vital part of the general deterrent to aggression.

During their meeting in Brussels in December 1970, NATO Ministers reaffirmed the intention of the Alliance to continue to seek improved East- West relations. Within the framework of this effort, one of its principal aims will be to engage the Soviet Union and its allies in meaningful talks on mutual and balanced force reductions and other disarmament measures. Until the Warsaw Pact group of countries have demonstrated a clear willingness to adopt a similar policy, however, it would be extremely dangerous to relax our vigi­ lance in any way.

There can be no doubt that a great deal has been achieved in the Central Region since the establishment of AFCENT Headquarters in 1951. Progress has been maintained in meeting changing political and military situations.

AFCENT was created when the defense policy of the West was one of " massive retaliation The Allied conventional forces in Western Europe in the early Fifties were inadequate and ill-equipped to meet the growing menace in the East. The Central European nations concerned, in concert with various NATO headquarters, began the slow, laborious process of building up their conventional forces and tactical nuclear delivery systems. 83

The contributing nations — Belgium, Canada, France, the Federa l Republic of Germany, Luxem­ bourg, The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States — were responsible for the improvement and modernization of the forces earmarked for the defense of the Central Region. AFCENT commanders had long favored a policy of forward defense, and the integration of the Federal Republic of Germany into NATO further emphasized the need for such tactics. It was in the political interest of the Federal Republic, as well as the Alliance as a whole, to defend — not to surrender — its territory. As a result the land area east of the Rhine became of primary impor­ tance. But the resulting lack of depth for maneuver has further re-emphasized the need for adequate forces, particularly conventional land and air forces, capable of responding quickly, at the level required, to any aggression. Another development of immense importance to the defense of the Central Region was the inte­ gration of assigned air defense forces, which contributed significantly to the effectiveness of our air defense system. In addition, in 1960 the ACE Mobile Force was created, which, as well as demonstrating NATO solidarity, provided a highly mobile and flexible "Fire Brigade" forceforSACEUR's use. The responsibility for coordinating the air movement of this multinational force was delegated to AFCENT Headquarters. By the end of 1965, the strength of the Allied military forces in the Central Region had reached a peak. They included some 2,000 modern jet aircraft and 25 divisions of land forces. However, 84 the whole Alliance was entering a period of change and adjustment. One of the first manifestations of this change was the French withdrawal from active participation in the integrated military struc­ ture of the Alliance. The "French Initiative" had far reaching consequences in Central Region defense plans and in the location of its headquarters. Prior to moving from France to The Netherlands in 1967, Headquarters AFCENT underwent a thorough reorganization which was not finally completed until after AFCENT was established in its present facilities in Brunssum. Originally the AFCENT command had three major subordinate headquarters — Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT), Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AIRCENT), and Allied Naval Forces Central Europe (NAVCENT). The principal reorganization was the merger of land and air functions within one headquarters, resulting in a more economical and effective structure with a soldier as Commander-in-Chief and an airman as his deputy. As far as NAVCENT was concerned, most of its functions had previously been transferred to other naval headquarters. However, a naval advisor was retained to coordinate naval matters. A 40 percent saving in personnel was effected, and since one level in the command structure had been removed, the communication of decisions, orders and ideas could be made more effectively and quickly. The integration of land and air staffs into one single headquarters also resulted in greater cooperation between land and air forces. Instead 85

of working in separate compartments, land and air staffs in AFCENT were able to work shou lder to shoulder and AFCENT is now well prepared to fulfill all its operational responsibilities. One of the first tasks after the move from France was the creation and development of a new general defense plan based on the revised strategic concept of forward defense. The new plan took into consideration the changes that had taken place in the Central Region, and its completion marked the end of the former defense policy of massive retaliation. During this period considerable progress was achieved in the development of Allied forces' capabilities through large-scale map and field exercises. On the other hand, there has been a reduction of conventional forces within Central Europe's military structure in the last six years. In addition to the withdrawal of French participation there was a reduction in Belgium's contribution and the United States withdrew some on-the-spot forces under the dual-based concept. These latter forces are still committed to the Central Region, but they are now stationed in their home country. More recently the Canadian Government reduced its forces in the Central Region. This erosion of conventional on-the-spot forces has made even more imperative the timely arrival of land and air reinforcements in this theater in a time of tension and when the possibility of aggres­ sion appears likely. Early and far-sighted political decisions are a necessary and essential preliminary 86 to such actions. Far from exacerbating the situa­ tion, such moves would demonstrate Allied deter­ mination, strengthen the deterrent and help prevent aggression. Today there are many intangibles in favor of the Alliance. One of the most important of these, I believe, is the international cooperation and mutual respect that is so characteristic of the NATO defense organization. This is the greatest difference between our present Alliance and the old military coalitions. A good example of our present organization is the integrated staff structure and international teamwork within AFCENT and its subordinate commands. The different uniforms of the inte­ grated staff are scarcely noticed and it soon becomes apparent that to serve NATO is also the best way to serve one's own country. This teamwork is further exemplified in our multinational forces and in the integrated competi­ tions and exercises which are conducted each year. In summary then, the threat posed by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries is in no way declining. Indeed, the spread of Soviet influence, particularly in the Middle East, North Africa and the Indian Ocean, together with the increase and modernization of the Warsaw Pact military forces have increased the challenge to be faced by NATO and, within NATO, by the Central Region. Until the Soviet Union demonstrates a clear desire for peace and a willingness to reduce its military strength, we must not reduce our own defense 87 efforts. There is, on the contrary, an urgent require­ ment for more on-the-spot conventional forces, more standardization in equipment and a greater degree of cooperation in the field of logistics. I believe that we must increase our efforts to achieve these aims. This then is the situation with which the Cen­ tral Region is faced today. But what of the Seven­ ties ? We can but hope that the Soviets give a clear sign of movement toward a real détente and that some agreement may be reached between the East and West for mutual and balanced force reduc­ tions. But until this comes about, we can draw reassurance from the views recently expressed by NATO Ministers who reaffirmed their determination to strengthen NATO's common defense, and also by President Nixon's public statement made in Ireland in October last year that " The United States will under no circumstances reduce unilaterally its commitment to NATO As long as this collective will prevails we can look forward with confidence, knowing that inter­ national cooperation and a united defense will continue to protect Central Europe and give us peace and prosperity in the decades to come.

THE CHALLENGE IN THE SOUTH by Admiral Horacio Rivero United States Navy Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe

The lessons of history and the demands of geography are entwined in NATO's Southern Region where the problems of defense are replete with challenge and change.

Europe, Africa and Asia — the three continents that have held the stage of history longest — meet in the Mediterranean. This sea has been the scene of much of their history, and the civilized world as we know it today finds its roots in this area of continental convergence.

History shows that every power bent on world domination sooner or later has been tested in the Mediterranean, and the story of our own day proves that the contest for human freedom cannot escape the fascination, pull and attraction of this stage.

The ambition to contro l this inland sea and its littoral has been the cause of more rivalries, battles and wars than have been engendered in any other comparable body of water on the globe. 90

This sea has been a focal point for conflict and its history is the oldest continuous commentary on man's contention with the forces of war and peace. The Mediterranean washes the shores of 18 sovereign states with a total population of more than 263 million. The people are Europeans, Asians and Africans of different racial origins, religions, civilizations, traditions and world outlook. Some of them at various times have built empires that dominated the entire sea or a considerable part of it. Their governments range from modern demo­ cracies to one-party socialist states. Some are allied with the West, some with the East, and others are non-committed. They represent some of the world's wealthiest and most advanced industrial areas as well as some of the most underdeveloped regions on the surface of the earth. Their history is one of alternate wars and alliances, deep sus­ picions, and yearnings for new understandings. Some of them are intensely and emotionally in­ volved in the Middle East crisis to an extent that conditions every aspect of their existence and poses a serious threat to the peace of the world. It was another threat to the peace of the world — the occupation and subversion of Eastern Europe by the Soviet Union — that led to the creation of Allied Forces Southern Europe as part of the military structure of NATO. In 1949 Italy signed the North Atlantic Treaty. In 1950 the NATO Council decided to establish an integrated force under a centralized command. General Eisenhower was selected to organize 91

Allied Command Europe, and on 19 June 1951 he announced the establishment of Allied Forces Southern Europe. Admiral Robert B. Carney, USN, then Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Naval Forces in the eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, became the first AFSOUTH Commander-in-Chief, (CINC- SOUTH). At 1000 hours on 21 June 1951 he unfurled his flag as CINCSOUTH on the USS Mount Olympus moored in Naples. In Admiral Carney's words : " Because of its inseparable con­ nection throughout the centuries with the story of the Mediterranean, it is particularly appropriate that Naples was selected as the site for this head­ quarters ". Admiral Carney's area of responsibility included Italy and the western and central Mediterranean as far east as a line drawn from Cape Matapan, Greece to the Tunisia-Libya border. General Eisenhower also named himCommander of Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe. In addition, he retained his U.S. Naval Command. On the same day that Admiral Carney raised his NATO flag. Vice Admiral Matthias B. Gardner ,USN, Commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, placed his warships under the NATO control of CINCSOUTH. General Eisenhower appointed General Mauri­ zio di Castiglioni, Italian Army, as Commander Allied Land Forces Southern Europe and Major General David M. Schlatter, USAF, as Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe. General di Castiglioni activated his head­ quarters in Verona on 9 July and General Schlatter established his headquarters in Florence on 4 August 1951. 92

The Italian government was requested to assign land, air and sea forces to AFSOUTH. The build-up of Allied staffs and allocated forces be­ gan. On 21 August the combined CINCSOUTH/ COMNAVSOUTH/CINCNELM staff moved its head­ quarters to the USS Adirondack, because the USS Mount Olympus was due for normal rota­ tion to the United States. Meanwhile, arrange­ ments were made to lease a shore-based head­ quarters, and on 15 September CINCSOUTH and his staff inaugurated it in a newly completed building in Naples. Greece and Turkey acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty on 18 February 1952. Greece was exhausted from continuous hostil­ ities that had begun with her entry into World War II on the side of the Allies in 1940 and did not end until 1949 when the devastating insurrection of Communist guerillas was crushed. Turkey had been under pressure from the USSR to revise the Montreux Convention in order to permit the Soviet Union to participate in the defense of the Turkish straits. The Soviets also desired special transit privileges through the straits for warships of the Black Sea powers and denial of the straits to warships of non-Black Sea powers. In addition, the USSR had pressed Turkey to cede to the Soviet Union the provinces of Kars and Ardahan. The accession to the NATO Alliance of Greece and Turkey extended AFSOUTH's area of respon­ sibility to include those countries, all of the Mediter­ ranean, and the Black Sea. 9 3

CINCSOUTH now relinquished his U.S. Navy command to give full time to his NATO responsi­ bilities, retaining NATO control of the Sixth Fleet. In September 1952 Lieutenant General Willard G. Wyman, US Army, established the headquarters of Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe, in Izmir, for command of Greek and Turkish ground forces assigned to NATO. Subsequently, the headquarters of the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force was organized in Izmir for NATO command of assigned Greek and Turkish air units. Ninety-eight million Italians, Greeks and Turks became associated in an alliance, for the first time in history joining in common defense. Now they were united, together with the other members of the Alliance in, a mutual effort to guarantee their survival as independent nations in the face of a threat that had been real enough to swallow Eastern Europe. During the first tw o years of AFSOUTH's existence, the command of various Allied forces was rotated successfully in exercises among officers of the various nations. Entrusting the command of forces belonging to one nation to a commander from another nation demonstrated the new and fundamental solidarity that provided the basis for the future growth of the command. The extension of AFSOUTH's area of respon­ sibility to include the territorial and air defense of Greece and Turkey, created a total land front from northwest Italy to southeastern Turkey, stretch­ ing almost 2,000 miles along borders with 94

Switzerland, Austria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, the Black Sea and the Soviet Union. Turkey, with its 280-mile frontier with the USSR, joined Norway to become the only other NATO country bordering the Soviet Union. Allied Forces Southern Europe became the largest Major Subordinate Command in NATO, with boundaries including a land mass of 464,000 square mi les in addition to the entire Mediterranean Sea. The three countries of the Southern Region comprise, in effect, three peninsulas, separated from each other by the sea. As a whole, the Southern Region is separated from the rest of NATO Europe by a belt of neutral or non-aligned countries and France, which today is not a part of the NATO integrated military command. There exists, therefore, a theater of war which is indepen­ dent geographically from the theaters of central and northern NATO Europe. On the southern littoral of the Mediterranean are a series of non-NATO countries with different degrees of political alignment and military strength. The current Soviet political and psychological penetration into many of these countries raises the question of what their alignment might be in the event of confrontation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. It is natural, in view of these considerations, that the Mediterranean Sea constitutes a vital factor in AFSOUTH strategy and plans. Without control of this sea, the supply of our fighting forces and, indeed, the economies of our countries would be seriously affected. Loss of control of the sea, 95 moreover, would also mean exposure of the land forces to attack on new and unpredictable fronts. On the other hand, NATO control of the Mediterra­ nean would deny its use to an enemy attempting to outflank forces in Central Europe and would permit its exploitation in carrying the war to him. The most striking development of recent years affecting the strategic balance in the Mediterranean area has been the build-up of the Soviet fleet. The military aspect of the Soviet naval build-up is well known. From a virtually non-existent Mediterranean presence in 1964, the Soviet force has evolved into a fleet having routinely an average of almost 50 ships of all types. The precise number fluctuates to a certain degree during the year, being reduced during the bad weather months in winter and climbing during exercise periods in spring and autumn. Aside from representing a military threat, the new presence is also an instrument of the political and psychological offensives undertaken by the Soviet Union. There is strong impact as this power­ ful force roams the Mediterranean and shows the flag of the Soviet Union in the ports of friendly non-aligned nations. Those who are not well informed about the naval strength of NATO may be unduly impressed, or suffer exaggerated fears from the Soviet naval presence; they may be led to believe that NATO naval power has been neutral­ ized or that the Alliance has lost its ability to defend its interests. This is certainly one of the psycho­ logical effects that the Soviets would like to achieve. But it is necessary to maintain a balanced perspective while viewing this new threat and the 96 shifting strategic demands. While it is natural that we should be concerned at the appearance of a new threat, we can take some comfort in the fact that the power of the Soviet naval squadron is substantially inferior to that of NATO's naval forces. Furthermore, I am confident that the NATO naval and air forces could effectively neutralize major units of the Soviet surface fleet in reasonably short order in the event of an emergency. In the long run, our superior naval power will prevail. Our margin of superiority is assured by the availability to NATO of the aircraft carriers of the United States Sixth Fleet, which in wartime would become NATO's striking and support force. The outcome of modern nava l combat operations is influenced by the degree to which surface forces enjoy control of the air. Our carrier aircraft enable us to exercise this necessary control of the air over the areas of naval operations and would also be most effective for neutralization of the opposing surface fleet, which does not include a tactical air component. One danger seen on the horizon is the possibility of political situations developing on the North African littoral under which the Soviets would be permitted to operate tactical aircraft. Soviet political influence and presence has increased in certain countries. Were this to extend to Soviet use of airfields for their air force, a new threat to our lines of communications could develop which would seriously affect the strategic balance in the area. The threat presented by the strong Soviet submarine fleet in the Mediterranean is a matter of concern. We can foresee a dangerous period 97

in a w a r of attrition when losses would be sustained until the submarines w ere neutralized. The prob­ lem of the submarine threat continues to hold the center of our attention. Just as the Soviet Union took advantage of the power vacuum and instability in Eastern Europe following World War II, so is it now attempting to profit in the Mediterranean from the changed political alignments in the Middle East and North Africa and by the instability produced by the Arab- Israeli conflict. The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and on its southern littoral is, in a sense, an effort to outflank the NATO defenses in Europe, and it also derives from the imperatives of Russia's historical expansionist drives toward warm waters. But it is also related to the changed strategic policies of the Soviet Union, and its transformation from a continental power into a power claiming world­ wide interests and influence. Whatever the reason, this presence presents new challenges to NATO and has required increased Allied efforts, as well as certain organizational improvements on NATO's part. Responding to the challenge, the No rth Atlantic Council, in 1968, authorized the activation of a new maritime command to coordinate — and, in wartime, to direct — surveillance and other maritime air operations. This new command. Mari­ time Air Mediterranean, with headquarters in Na­ ples, has been functioning for over tw o years, and has provided effective means for maintaining current information on the activities of the Soviet Mediterranean force. A Naval On-Call-Force-Medi­ 98 terranean, has already been activated to symbolize and demonstrate NATO naval solidarity in the face of the new challenge. Our naval exercises, conducted at frequent intervals throughout the year, and in which all the NATO Mediterranean navies take part, further serve to show the dimen­ sions of NATO naval power and the cohesion of the Alliance. The successful history of the past 20 years has demonstrated the effectiveness of our military Alliance based on the principles of collective se­ curity and mutual defense. It gives encouragement to the hope that the peace and the security of the countries of the Southern Region will be strengthened and preserved. Faced with new challenges, but sustained by the strength that derives from both its arms and the princip les upon which it is founded, the Alliance in the Southern Region looks with confidence to the future. 95 moreover, would also mean exposure of the land forces to attack on new and unpredictable fronts. On the other hand, NATO control of the Mediterra­ nean would deny its use to an enemy attempting to outflank forces in Central Europe and would permit its exploitation in carrying the war to him. The most striking development of recent years affecting the strategic balance in the Mediterranean area has been the build-up of the Soviet fleet. The military aspect of the Soviet naval build-up is well known. From a virtually non-existent Mediterranean presence in 1964, the Soviet force has evolved into a fleet having routinely an average of almost 50 ships of all types. The precise number fluctuates to a certain degree during the year, being reduced during the bad weather months in winter and climbing during exercise periods in spring and autumn. Aside from representing a military threat, the new presence is also an instrument of the political and psychological offensives undertaken by the Soviet Union. There is strong impact as this power­ ful force roams the Mediterranean and shows the flag of the Soviet Union in the ports of friendly non-aligned nations. Those who are not well informed about the naval strength of NATO may be unduly impressed, or suffer exaggerated fears from the Soviet naval presence; they may be led t o believe that NATO naval power has been neutral­ ized or that the Alliance has lost its ability to defend its interests. This is certainly one of the psycho­ logical effects that the Soviets would lik e to achieve. But it is necessary to maintain a balanced perspective while viewing this new threat and the 96 shifting strategic demands. While it is natural that we should be concerned at the appearance of a new threat, we can take some comfort in the fact that the power of the Soviet naval squadron is substantially inferior to that of NATO's naval forces. Furthermore, I am confident that the NATO naval and air forces could effectively neutralize major units of the Soviet surface fleet in reasonably short order in the event of an emergency. In the long run, our superior naval power will prevail. Our margin of superiority is assured by the availability to NATO of the aircraft carriers of the United States Sixth Fleet, which in wartime would become NATO's striking and support force. The outcome of modern naval combat operations is influenced by the degree to which surface forces enjoy control of the air. Our carrier aircraft enable us to exercise this necessary control of the air over the areas of naval operations and would also be most effective for neutralization of the opposing surface fleet, which does not include a tactical air component. One danger seen on the horizon is the possibility of political situations developing on the North African littoral under which the Soviets would be permitted to operate tactical aircraft. Soviet political influence and presence has increased in certain countries. Were this to extend to Soviet use of airfields for their air force, a new threat to our lines of communications could develop which would seriously affect the strategic balance in the area. The threat presented by the strong Soviet submarine fleet in the Mediterranean is a matter of concern. We can foresee a dangerous period 97 in a war of attrition when losses would be sustained until the submarines were neutralized. The prob­ lem of the submarine threat continues to hold the center of our attention. Just as the Soviet Union took advantage of the power vacuum and instability in Eastern Europe following World War I I, so is it now attempting to profit in the Mediterranean from the changed political alignments in the Middle East and North Africa and by the instability produced by the Arab- Israeli conflict. The Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and on its southern littoral is, in a sense, an effort to outflank the NATO defenses in Europe, and it a lso derives from the imperatives of Russia's historical expansionist drives toward warm waters. But it is also related to the changed strategic policies of the Soviet Union, and its transformation from a continental power into a power claiming world­ wide interests and influence. Whatever the reason, this presence presents new challenges to NATO and has required increased Allied efforts, as well as certain organizational improvements on NATO's part. Responding to the challenge, the North Atlantic Council, in 1968, authorized the activation of a new maritime command to coordinate — and, in wartime, to direct — surveillance and other maritime air operations. This new command. Mari­ time Air Mediterranean, with headquarters in Na­ ples, has been functioning for over two years, and has provided effective means for maintaining current information on the activities of the Soviet Mediterranean force. A Naval On-Call-Force-Medi­ 98 terranean, has already been activated to symbolize and demonstrate NATO naval solidarity in the face of the new challenge. Our naval exercises, conducted at frequent intervals throughout the year, and in which all the NATO Mediterranean navies take part, further serve to show the dimen­ sions of NATO naval power and the cohesion of the Alliance. The successful history of the past 20 years has demonstrated the effectiveness of our military Alliance based on the principles of collective se­ curity and mutual defense. It gives encouragement to the hope that the peace and the security of the countries of the Southern Region will be strengthened and preserved. Faced with new challenges, but sustained by the strength that derives from both its arms and the principles upon which it is founded, the Alliance in the Southern Region looks with confidence to the future. GENERAL OF THE ARMY DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 2 April 1951 — 30 May 1952 GENERAL LAURIS NORSTAD GENERAL LYMAN L. LEMNITZER SACEUR, 1956-1963 SACEUR, 1963-1969 GENERAL ANDREW J. GOODPASTER Supreme Allied Commander Europe, 1 July 1969 — c o m m o n infrastructure NATO pipelines deliver fuel to Allied Command Europe SPACE COMMUNICATIONS FOR THE ALLIANCE A NATO satellite is launched READINESS ON THE LAND A llied capabilities are tested in a land warfare exercise

AIR DEFENCE FOR NATO EUROPE A HAWK missile crew protects ACE against air attack

v i g i l a n c e in t h e a i r A formation of F5s on patrol STRATEGIC MOBILITY Amphibious forces move to protect NATO's flanks

PREPAREDNESS AT SEA An Allied destroyer cooperates with a helicopter during an antisubmarine warfare exercise

ALLIED MILITARY COOPERATION One nation's helicopter supplies another's destroyer SUPREME HEADQUARTERS ALLIED POWERS EUROPE SHAPE, Belgium THE EVOLUTION OF AIR DEFENSE IN ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE by Air Commodore Joannes H. Knoop Royal Netherlands Air Force Chief, Air Defense Component, Operations Division, SHAPE

Vigilance is the keynote of air defense in Allied Command Europe today. Air defense forces main­ tain a constant alert, day and night, in all weather conditions, and thereby make a vital contribution to the NATO principle of deterrence — defense twenty-four hours around the clock... But let us turn the clock back twenty years.

THE LEAN YEARS

As early as 1948 the Brussels Treaty Nations, through their Western Union Defense Organization, agreed upon a plan for the air defense of their territories. The creation of NATO in 1949 increased considerably both the area to be defended and the means available for that defense. The welcome introduction of Greece and Turkey into NATO in 1952 further compounded the air defense prob­ lem and expanded the area of responsibility. THE EVOLUTION OF AIR DEFENSE IN ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE by Air Commodore Joannes H. Knoop Royal Netherlands Air Force Chief. Air Defense Component. Operations Division. SHAPE

Vigilance is the keynote of air defense in Allied Command Europe today. Air defense forces main­ tain a constant alert, day and night, in all weather conditions, and thereby make a vital contribution to the NATO principle of deterrence — defense twenty-four hours around the clock... But let us turn the clock back twenty years.

THE LEAN YEARS

As early as 1948 the Brussels Treaty Nations, through their Western Union Defense Organization, agreed upon a plan for the air defense of their territories. The creation of NATO in 1949 increased considerably both the area to be defended and the means available for that defense. The welcome introduction of Greece and Turkey into NATO in 1952 further compounded the air defense prob­ lem and expanded the area of responsibility. 100

Initially, air defense in NATO remained a nationa l responsibility. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) was given the authority to assume operational command of national units in war, but there were many practical problems associated with assuming control and coordinating these individual forces. The member countries continued to take their own national air defense measures based on their individual concepts of operation, differing economic potentials and choices of equipment available. Such a variety of systems resulted that it became apparent that the independent conduct of air defense in adjoining Allied countries was an unsound proposition. Thus, the Fifties were the lean years of air defense in NATO, but they were also critical years, in which plans were formulated for a coordinated and integrated system. By 1954, overall NATO air defense deficiencies had been fully recognized. General Alfred M. Gruenther, SACEUR, decided that the problem should be studied as a whole, with a view to orga­ nizing air defense on a truly international basis. This decision, and the Allied need for scientific assistance in solving a myriad of technical prob­ lems, led to the establishment of a SHAPE Air Defense Technical Center — the forerunner of the present Allied-sponsored SHAPE Technical Center in The Hague1.

1. The part p layed by SADTC in the study of air defense requirements was covered in Vigilance, Supplement No. 121 to NATO'S Fifteen Nations, dated Aug-Sept 1970, under the title "Scientific Coope ration for the Atlantic Alliance — The Role of the SHAPE Technical Center," by 1 Lt Frederic J. Gruber, US Army. 101

The next important event was the coordination of NATO air defense into four regions in 1955, though the peacetime responsibility for air defense did remain in national hands. By 1956 some voluntary integration of national forces had taken place in the Central Region. In addition, improve­ ment in some national early warning systems made continuous operation of the system possible, instead of the limited operation which had been a feature of earlier years because of personnel and equipment shortages.

Although these improvements represented prog­ ress, they were not the desired solution. Equip­ ment was becoming obsolete and there was little exchange of air defense information throughout NATO Europe. It became increasingly clear that a unified and integrated system was required if efficiency was to be achieved. The princip le of complete integration was pursued vigorously. The alternative concept of coordinating individual na­ tional forces operating within national boundaries could not provide the requisite flexibility, com­ patibility of equipment and standardization of procedures.

In 1958, in an encouraging step forward, Belgium, The Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany decided to form the International Planning Group (IPG), to improve their air defenses collectively. However, the lack of an integrated air defense system still remained among the most urgent problems facing NATO as a whole. Finally, after many years of discussion and planning, a major plan was developed to consolidate air defense 102 into an integrated system, under which the NATO Commanders would have the vital authority for control in peacetime.

ACHIEVEMENT

In 1960, the NATO Council approved the creation of an integrated air defense system under the command and control of SACEUR. The principle of integration was that the nations would assign to SACEUR — subject to provisions for safeguarding national interests — the responsibility, the authority and the necessary forces to defend them against air attack .

This decision was a major milestone, but integration did not occur overnight. Lead-in time was required for the production, installation and testing of equipment, as well as the training of personnel. In 1961 the United Kingdom Air Defense Region assigned its air defense forces to SACEUR, and almost three years later, in 1964, the complete integration of al l four regions was accomplished.

Money and personnel for the air defense system were allocated to provide for a " family" of weapons, including the correct balance of surface- to-air missiles and interceptors. It was uneconom­ ical, however, to establish and maintain a force of modern weapons without a parallel moderni­ zation of the electronic ground environment and the command and control system. Compatibility of equipment and procedures remained a vital prerequisite to an effective air defense. In 1963 103 final approval was given to the establishment of an integrated ground environment based upon compatible radar and electronic data-handling equip­ ment, commonly designed and funded. Planned within NATO military headquarters and coordinated with the NATO nations with regard to the resources to be allocated, the final NATO Air Defense Ground Environment Improvement Plan (NADGE) was developed over a period of several years.

Even before the integrated air defense system was approved by the NATO Council in 1960, and the NADGE plan was developed it was realized that a coordinated Early Warning System was needed to cover the air approaches to Allied Command Europe. The basis of this security system was a chain of high performance radars to provide maxi­ mum early warning of potential attack to the appropriate levels of operational command. Instal­ lation of the equipment progressed in 1960 and 1961 and the system became operational in the United Kingdom in 1960, in the Northern Region in 1962, and in the Central and Southern Regions in 1963.

PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS OF AN AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM

A firm plan for a truly integrated ACE Air Defense System therefore is now in the process of being realized. The principal components of this modern system a re : 104

A Command and Control Organization, An Electronic Ground Environment for Early Warning and Weapons Control,

Weapons Systems, and

Rapid and Secure Communications. C o m m a nd a nd Control. Operational com­ mand and control is exercised in peace and war by SHAPE through four regional headquarters, subsidiary air defense operations centers and subor­ dinate sector operations centers. The sector oper­ ations centers are directly linked to radar sites, interceptor aircraft bases, surface-to-air missile units and locations for other air defense weapons. The command and control organization is manned on a twenty-four hour-a-day basis by allied officers. In each area air defense commanders maintain overall responsibility for air defense and coordinate their activities with army and naval commanders to ensure the most effective employment of weapons. Ground Environment. The ground environ­ ment is an extensive network of NATO-funded early warning radars and national control-and-reporting radars which scan the skies continuously for pos­ sible intruders or unidentified aircraft. Manned by experienced operators, the radars provide imme­ diate facilities for the responsible commander's use in assessing the air situation and deciding upon the appropriate action : the suitable defensive weapon can be selected and the target can be assigned instantaneously. W e ap o n s S ystems. The nature of the threat requires that a variety of weapons be available to 105 provide all-round defense. There are, therefore, interceptor-aircraft, surface-to-air missiles and short- range weapons. No other weapon can match the interceptor for flexibility, capabi lity of rapid rein­ forcement and ability to carry out peacetime policing. Those who condemned the piloted interceptor to a premature death were clearly wrong. The surface- to-air missile systems provide high, medium and low level coverage. These are deployed to provide the most effective defense in close concert with the interceptors. The shorter-range weapons are used mainly for point defense although many self-pro­ tection weapons are in use by field armies. Through­ out Allied Command Europe weapons are main­ tained on constant alert. Interceptors can be rapidly scrambled to intercept any unidentified aircraft and missile systems are available as a back-up.

Communications. Efficient communications are the nervous system of our defenses. Close and rapid coordination between all components of the air defense system is achieved by a network of reliable communications, whose integrity is main­ tained by a multiplicity of circuits.

T H E T H REAT

The question may well be asked — why do the NATO countries need such an extensive and comprehensive air defense organization? The answer is in part that the Soviet and Warsaw Pact air forces facing NATO today are of considerable strength. Their modernization and improvement 106 programs continue relentlessly. Although ballistic missiles are a serious part of the threat, there has been no decrease in the manned aircraft threat. Therefore it is of paramount importance that NATO presents to any potential enemy an effective system of air defense forces in sufficient strength, and in such a state of readiness as to deter attack.

MIS SION

Against the background of this threat, the NATO air defense mission can be summarized. In peace the ACE mission is to maintain the integrity of NATO airspace and to guard against attack. In war the role is to protect Allied Command Europe by maximum destruction of the enemy air threat, utilizing all available weapons with maximum efficiency.

TRAINING

The ACE air defense units' peacetime activity involves constant training to ensure automatic reaction and peak performance during an emergency. In addition, air defense forces have a vital peacetime task to perform : " scrambling " regularly against all unidentified aircraft and possible intruders. Training is a national responsibility, but the overall standards are defined by SHAPE and are carefully monitored. All personnel are trained to function effectively as part of the air defense system. Despite the complexity of integrating personnel 107 from so many nations who speak different basic languages and possess such varying degrees of education and technical skills, standardization of procedures, rules and operating techniques has been achieved. Frequent exchanges of pilots and controllers between the various countries, as well as multi­ national exercises, improve the standards and overall efficiency of the system. Furthermore, every air defense unit undergoes no-notice tactical evalu­ ations by international teams of experts. These " surprises" ensure a constant check on combat readiness and unit efficiency. As a bonus, just to keep people on their toes, frequent alert exercises take place, at any time of day or night. Automatic reaction is thus required of all members of the vast air defense team.

IMPROVEMENTS

Continuing techno logical development has brought many improvements in the ACE air defense system. The overall number of radars has in­ creased, thereby providing a cohesive network throughout the command. Radar performance has improved both in range and height capability. More recently, an automated air defense system which will form part of NADGE was put into operation, as a result of the cooperation between the IPG countries of Belgium, The Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany. In the field of communications, data-link and automated facilities have been installed. 108

The weapons story is also one of constant improvement. The big brother of the surface-to-air missile family, the NIKE missile — providing medium and high level defense — has been deployed in quantity in Central Europe and other NATO coun­ tries since 1959. In 1960 the medium and low level HAWK missiles were first installed operationally. This weapon can destroy attacking aircraft flying from as low as 100 feet to over 35,000 feet, thus complementing the NIKE system. The HAWK air defense system can maintain a high rate of fire, and it has the additional advantage of being fully transportable. Since 1969 a number of HAWK battalions have been modified to a self-propelled configuration, a change which considerably im­ proves the system's mobility, and which provides significant tactical advantages. Other improve­ ments in the NIKE and HAWK missile systems also have been made over the years.

The relative balance between interceptors and surface-to-air missiles has been amended to meet the changing threat. Although reduced in numbers, the interceptor force now consists of a much higher proportion of all-weather aircraft, such as the F4E PHANTOM the F1O4G, and the LIGHTNING. Air­ craft performance has considerably increased — the kick of the afterburner and the tug of the brake parachute are familiar experiences to the fighter pilot of today. The destructive capacity of aircraft weapons has been increased to give maximum potential at a greater range, thus improving defensive capability. One example is the tremendous fire­ power of the 6,000 rounds-per-minute Gatling gun 109 which is carried as a second a ry weapon on the F4E and F1O4G. In recent years the improvement of low-level air defense weapons has been emphasized to provide protection in the battle area and in the critical rear areas, especially for airfield protection. The United States VULCAN is one such modern weapon. It has a six-barreled automatic gun with a selective rate of fire between 1,000 to 3,000 rounds per minute, and is particularly effective against aircraft flying at extremely low altitudes. There are two versions of the VULCAN now in service, self­ propelled and towed. CHAPARRAL, used in con­ junction with VULCAN, is a guided-missile system mounted on a tracked vehicle. Further comple­ menting the VULCAN/CHAPARRAL system is a forward area alerting radar, a highly mobile and high-resolution instrument which can detect moving targets at tree-top-level. Complete systems of this type have been deployed in Central Europe since 1969. New systems are also being introduced by other nations to add to the wide range of conventional light antiaircraft weapons already deployed through­ out the command. Thus a comprehensive and complementary range of weapons provides pro­ tection for Allied Forces against attack from a very low level to high altitudes.

TODAY

The NADGE Improvement Plan has now reached the stage of site implementation. Testing 110 and training are now in progress throughout the countries involved. At the same time, a viable air defense is being maintained. When fully implemented the NADGE complex will considerably improve the ACE capability to detect, identify and track aircraft, while the auto­ matic exchange of information between tracking and control centers will provide commanders with the means of rapidly evaluating and reacting to any threat. Existing early warning radars, surveillance radars and height finding radars will be extensively modernized. Sites will have data display consoles and data processing systems, including high speed computers, as well as an integrated communications data link network between installations and con­ trolling agencies. With a project of this magnitude stretching from Northern Norway to Eastern Turkey, it is inevitable that slippages have occurred. There have been problems. However, with the continued coopera­ tion, goodwill and efforts of all participants these are being satisfactorily resolved, and will ultimately result in a truly integrated and automated system. To meet changing conditions the system will certainly need to be further modernized and im­ proved. Constant planning for the future is also a part of military vigilance.

TOMORROW

In twenty years, the NATO nations of Europe have seen the growth of an integrated air defense system, from germination to fruition. But it is a 111 story without end. The tasks in the years ahead cannot be underestimated. Complacency plays no part in air defense. Absolute perfection cannot be reached, no matter how desirable. Progress in the field of air defense has been a splendid example ofA Hied cooperation and achieve­ ment, but the future demands even greater effort. Defense is not cheap, either in money or in effort, but peace is priceless for all the nations of NATO.

ACE LOGISTICS ITS PAST ACHIEVEMENTS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS by Wing Commande r Rupert L. Walker Royal Air Force Logistics Division, SHAPE

Some cynic once said : “ Generals are happy, self-confident men glow­ ing with the assurance that comes of being divorced from the logistics realities of life in peace. They establish headquarters in the field by tapping a map with widespread fingers, they invade continents with the stab of a forefinger at a likely point, they conjure armies forward from their imaginary bridge­ heads with wide sweeping gestures of either hand, they determine the situation by sticking out their chins and standing four­ square to the map. " Populations stand fast to enable soldiers to deploy unhindered, vehicle availabilities defy the laws of mechanics, stocks of supplies spawn, disperse and reproduce themselves afresh, men cease to fal l ill and the lame walk - War spoils this game 114

No commander, however skillful, can fight without adequate resources at his disposal; this is what logistics is all about. Logistics is the science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. It includes the pro­ duction, supply, distribution, and maintenance of stores; the building of facilities, the evacuation and hospitalization of casualties and the feeding and clothing of troops. In short, logistics is the very life-blood of the armed forces and its ability to keep pace with the battle may well decide the outcome. In 1951, one of the many problems facing Allied Command Europe (ACE) was how to ensure adequate logistic support for the forces assigned to the Alliance, bearing in mind that at that time 12 nations were involved, each having its own logistics system, weapons and equipment. One of the most important provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty lies in Article V, which provides for the mutual defense of the signatory nations in the event of aggression by an enemy power. In support of this principle SHAPE has, over the years, striven to provide a mutually compatible logistic system, capable of supporting the various national forces assigned to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). This is a very difficult goal to achieve. It is an axiom within ACE that logistics is a national responsibility ; that is, each nation is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces. Herein lies SACEUR's principal difficulty. Infrastructure excepted, SACEUR has no funds with which to provide the logistic support he deems necessary. NATO is not a supranational organi­ 115 zation, so neither does he have the authority to order nations to meet his demands. The reasons for this situation are diverse. They include economic, financial and other considerations which affect nationa l interests. In addition, some nations have commitments outside the NATO area and they must, therefore, develop equipment to meet a wide variety of operational situations and climatic con­ ditions. It would be unreasonable to expect them to spend large sums developing equipment spe­ cifically for the European theater. What then, under these circumstances, has been achieved towards providing adequate logistic support for the forces assigned to ACE ?

PRODUCTION AND SUPPLY

It is obvious that if all nations could use the same weapons and equipment, logistic support would be great ly simplified. It is understandable, therefore, that Allied logisticians have expressed the desire for a greater degree of standardization and compatibility between different national prod­ ucts such as aircraft, tanks and weapons. Ideally, this requirement could best be met by nations pooling their resources to develop and produce commonly agreed designs. Such cooperation was not possible in the years immediately following World War II, when production capacity and tech­ nical know -how was at a premium in Europe. But some commonality was achieved through the supply of equipment from the United States of America. However, by 1958, following discussions 116 among NATO and Heads of Government, the United States agreed to release information to selected European countries to produce U .S. devel­ oped projects under license. This agreement led to the HAWK ground-to-air missile and the SIDE­ W INDER air-to-air missile projects. In the naval field a program was set up to make the U.S. Mk 44 antisubmarine torpedo. Perhaps the most successful project of this nature was the construction of the F1O4G STARFIGHTER under a co-ordinated pro­ gram agreed to by Belgium, Germany, Italy and The Netherlands. Between 1960 and 1966 nearly 1,000 aircraft were built, and the STARF IGHTER is still in operational use today. All of these projects, plus others, were under­ taken as a result of joint agreement by two or more NATO countries. The first European multinational venture for development and production was the Fiat G91 aircraft, begun in 1954 on the initiative of the NATO military authorities, who stated the requirement. Since then the increasing complexity of weapon systems, coupled with the increasing costs of development, has discouraged research and development on a purely national basis and compelled the nations to seek ways of pooling their resources. The latest multinational projects, the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MRCA) and the JAGUAR are good examples of this welcome trend. In addition to co-operation in the development and production fields, it is of interest to note that the nations have set up an international support Organization, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Organization (NAMSO), for a number of weapon systems. These include HAWK, SIDEW INDER, 117 and the F1O4G, as well as certain communication systems, to name but a few. The lack of standardized equipment can bring with it grave military disadvantages. For example, nations operating different types of aircraft would be unable to service and turn round one another's aircraft should the necessity arise. To meet this problem SH A PE initiated the aircraft cross-servicing program whose aim is to permit aircraft of one nation to be serviced at the airfields of another. This program brings in its train a whole series of standard­ ization requirements, ranging from common spec­ ifications for aviation fuels and lubricants, which are in being, to common or compatible weapon systems which are only partly realized. The evidence seems to show that nations are becoming increasingly conscious of the benefits to be gained from pooling resources. Progress in this field will be slow and difficult but, if more multinational products follow, undoubted advan­ tages will accrue from the military point of view, not the least of which is the simplification of logistic support.

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

In an era of limited budgets and increasing costs, maximum use must be made of all available resources. The advent of the digital computer on a commercial scale has put a tool into the hands of management to assist in this formidable task. Inevitably, as history shows, the military commander seldom, if ever, receives all the resources he requires. 118

The staffs must, therefore, in the first place decide what is most wanted and then make the most economical use of what is provided. This involves the computer in two roles, that of determination of priorities and of data recording. In determining priorities the staffs must ask themselves, what is our most urgent need? Is it more stocks and, if so, which commodities? Is it fuel, ammunition, weapons, aircraft, tanks or vehicles or possibly some combination of these? Again, it might be lines of communication or the means of transport. In the context of national logistics this is a complex problem. It is much more complex when the needs of 14 nations have to be considered. The permutations and combinations that can arise are innumerable. The assistance that the computer can give to the solution of these problems is invalu­ able, and SHAPE is putting considerable effort into mathematical modelling and war gaming techniques for studies of logistic problems and their effects on operations. The work is in progress at the SHAPE Technical Center (STC), and it is hoped that in due course considerable benefits will be gained from the use of these modern techniques. The efficient management of resources depends to a great extent on the availability of accurate data. This, in turn, demands a comprehensive, rapid, accurate and up-to-date reporting system. To evaluate the combat capability of his force at any given time the commander must know what these resources are and what capability exists to employ them wherever his forces are committed. From the inception of the Alliance the procedure for reporting the logistic status has undergone 119 constant review and revision to keep pace with changing conditions. With the introduction of Automatic Data Processing (ADP) SHAPE is now adapting the most modern procedures of ADP to this task.

MEDICAL SUPPORT

In war the evacuation of casualties and the treatment of the wounded is of the highest impor­ tance. It should not be forgotten that in a conflict the forces of ACE will be truly multinational, and it cannot be guaranteed that a wounded man will necessarily receive initial treatment from his own medical services. This brings problems in its train, not the least of which are those of language and differing medical practice. To offset or alleviate these difficulties SHAPE has developed, in concert with the NATO nations, a Handbook of Emergency War Surgery. This handbook lays down the prin­ ciples and methods of war surgery with the object of standardizing the initial surgical treatment of war wounds. Continuity of treatment when wound­ ed personnel are evacuated through medical units of different nations is thus ensured. All the NATO nations have formally agreed to base their teaching and practice on this handbook and, to assist in overcoming the language difficulty, a multilingual phrase book has been produced for use by patients and medical staff.

NATO COMMON INFRASTRUCTURE

Undoubtedly the most dramatic achievements in the past 20 years have been in the field of NATO 120

common infrastructure, which means the con­ struction of permanent facilities such as airfields, communications systems and pipelines. The need for common infrastructure first became apparent in 1950, after the Western Union Defense Organi­ zation had been formed under the Brussels Treaty. At that time the forces available were limited, and a construction program for that year — o r" slice " — of 32 million pounds sterling (89.6 million dollars) was agreed by the five member nations. This agreement was the origin of cost sharing and the beginning of common infrastructure. The idea was later adopted by the newly formed North Atlantic Treaty Organization for the second and all subsequent annual slices.

Under the infrastructure system, the NATO nations made money available not only to build facilities for their own use (in fact, certain of the major contributors initially received little or nothing) but to provide facilities for, and in, all nations of the Alliance in support of specific plans. There is no doubt that many of these supporting facilities would not otherwise have been built, for the simple reason that the majority of NATO nations in the ea rly days lacked the resources.

Today, some 20 years later, common require­ ments continue to be built with common funds under substantially the same rules and procedures established long ago. It says much that in this epoch of rapid change this system has continued unaltered for so long and, as will be explained later, seems destined to go on well into the future. 121

Financial A spects The funds contributed by the NATO nations to the common infrastructure pool, even when contrasted with the enormous national military budgets of the '70s, constitute a formidable total. No less than 1,500 million pounds sterling (4.2 billion dollars) have been passed from national to international control. Funds for Allied Command Europe are normally allocated to cover a five-year period and, once granted, come under the control of SACEUR. However, the facilities that SACEUR wishes to build must be approved by every nation. The large sum mentioned above and the continued willingness of the nations to subscribe is outstanding proof of the solidarity of the Alliance. The NATO Military, Infrastructure, and Pay­ ments and Progress Committees, acting on behalf of the nations, are charged with ensuring the best use of the funds available. The work of these committees has contributed greatly to the success of the Infrastructure Program. Infrastructure is not alone in facing difficulties stemming from rising costs and decreasing resources. This problem came to a head in 1970 when it became apparent that a serious shortfall existed and that some of the most important projects could not be funded. Fortunately, recent developments indicate that the European NATO nations now intend to make good a great part of the deficit. Undoubtedly, this has been a difficult decision for them to take, but whatever their reasons may have been, it seems to give proof of the value they place on a continuing and successful infrastructure program. 122

Categories of Infrastructure

There ar e many installations funded through the Infrastructure Program and these fall into a number of categories. Brief mention will be made of some of the more important. Consideration in detail of one specific category would do much to provide insight into the magnitude of the facilities which have been provided.

Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL)

The vast quantities of fuel required by modern warfare impose an impossible burden on normal transport media, which can only move compara­ tively small quantities. For example, a six-inch diameter pipeline can pass 100 cubic meters an hour, equivalent to the arrival of a rail tank car every 12 minutes throughout the working day. Pipelines, however, efficient as they are in transporting fuel and lubricants, are fixed installations and must be carefully sited so that they are able to support a wide range of operations in the area in question. For this reason the whole question of fuel resupply was carefully examined before the decision was taken to base our logistics on a pipeline system. A fleet of military road tankers, trucks or rail tank cars of the size needed for war would be largely unused in peacetime, and its consequent manning and deployment in war would be fraught with difficulties. A pipeline, on the other hand, can be partially used in peacetime and retain its round- the-clock potential intact. It can also undertake civilian work and, to some degree, earn its keep. 123

These reasons, together with the need to reduce the logistic burden on conventional lines of com­ munication, led the members of the Alliance to choose pipelines as their means of petroleum resupply.

Once this decision was taken it became clear that a pipeline must, like other lines of communi­ cation, be available for all to use. Thus, the NATO pipelines take in, transmit and deliver fuel to all those member countries that require it, in peace and war. Originally the pipelines were instituted only to supply the NATO airfields, for aircraft jet-fuel comprises over half of our petroleum re­ quirements. Now .however, the systems can handle motor gasoline and diesel fuel, as well, so that all consumers are served.

Since the formation of the Alliance, an impres­ sive network of pipelines with their own entry points and tanker discharge, and bulk depots and pump stations, has grown up in all those NATO countries where their provision is practicable. They exist in all regions of A C E ; Northern Europe has 474 km., Central Europe 5,070 km., and the Southern Region, comprising Italy, Greece and Turkey, 3,580 km.

The biggest and most sophisticated of these is the Central European Pipeline System, which supports the forces deployed under command of Allied Forces Central Europe. The system comprises a network based on entry points on the Mediterra­ nean, Atlantic and North Sea coasts. These main arteries develop into a network of smaller and more numerous lines which cover the areas in which 124 the various Army Group and Tactical Air Forces operate. However, the French decision in 1966 to cease participation in the NATO integrated mili­ tary commands has resulted in some important revisions to these arrangements. The system differs from civilian pipelines in many important aspects. Civilian pipelines are largely concerned in moving large consignments to large-scale depots. The Central European Pipe­ line System is, by comparison, more of a retail distribution system. It serves individual airfields and field depots where it is equipped to dispense fuel into rail tank cars and road tanker trucks. Some depots are also designed to receive fuel from rail and barge, which gives them an alternative source of supply. While a fixed pipeline might appear vulnerable to enemy attack, much can be done to offset this. The pipeline is buried, the storage tanks are semi­ buried, and the pump stations are protected against blast. All stations have independent power sources and, besides holding stocks of essential spares, the line is so built that military pipeline units can plug into the system to bypass damaged depots and pump stations. These measures, together with the ability to re-route through alternative paths in the network, serve both to protect the fuel supply system and to make the switching of fuel stocks from one area to another a more practical proposition than it would be were the fuel carried in normal road and rail transport. The NATO Pipeline System is still not com­ plete ; there are improvements to be made. As military doctrine and technology change over th e 125 years, the system must change with them. As it stands, however, ACE has a fuel supply system well capable of supporting the forces of the Alliance in their appointed tasks.

Airfields

In 1951, General Eisenhower had at his dis­ posal only a handful of airfields. Consequently, in succeeding years a major proportion of the infrastructure budget was allocated either to airfield construction or to the modification of existing airfields to bring them up to NATO standards. Today there are some 220 airfields ACE-wide, built at a cost of about 400 million pounds sterling (1.1 billion dollars). All of these are suitable for the operation of a variety of aircraft and are equipped with essential installations such as fuel for both jet and piston aircraft, and electronic devices to permit all-weather use. The most important future development in this category of infrastructure is the provision of improved measures of all kinds to protect the aircraft and airfield facilities against attack.

Communication Systems

Initially, investment by NATO in communi­ cations consisted of the improvement of existing national networks, especially in the Northern and Southern Regions of ACE. Lately, effort has been directed toward providing systems which are opera­ tionally independent of civil organizations. The 126

Forward Scatter System, military controlled and operated, provides vital secure circuitry for the sole use of NATO military commands. Equally inde­ pendent of national facilities is the NATO satellite network, SATCOM. This provides communica­ tions for military purposes as well as for certain aspects of political consultation. In the communications category, the whole of ACE has been linked by some 50,000 kilometers of landlines, radio links and submarine cables. These achievements notwithstanding, there is still a need for further and more secure communi­ cations facilities throughout ACE, and it will be to this end that further substantial funds will be allocated.

Air Defense

By far the largest single defense project in ACE at the present time is concerned with early warning of the approach of hostile aircraft and missiles. It is known as NATO Air Defense Ground Environment, or NADGE, and is estimated to cost 110 million pounds sterling (308 million dollars) on comp letion1. Briefly, the system consists of an overlapping chain of radars, computers and air defense installations stretching from Norway to Turkey, which makes it possible to observe all aircraft and missiles approaching or cross­ ing the boundaries of NATO Europe. It can,

1. See preceding article, " The Evolution of Air Defense in Allied Command Europe." 127

by use of its computers, determine whether or not an intruder might be hostile and if necessary launch and guide an aircraft to intercept ora missile to destroy it. This very important system will clearly require continuous improvement to keep it immune from enemy counter measures and abreast of the latest technical developments.

Other Categories

Other categories that have received support from NATO common infrastructure include war headquarters, missile defense, air and naval navi­ gational aids and naval harbo r installations. Finally, in Germany, Turkey and Italy, multinational land, air and missile training is being undertaken on NATO funded facilities.

CONCLUSION

An attempt has been made in this article to describe the logistic activities in ACE over the past 20 years. Some of the problems confronting the Alliance have been stated and the more notab le achievements highlighted. What then are the pros­ pects for the future and what goals does ACE hope to attain ? During 1970, at the instigation of NATO, a comprehensive study was undertaken, in which the Allied countries participated, to examine NATO defense problems over the next decade. The 128 theme of increased cooperation and integration in the logistic field was reiterated as being essential to the continued success of the Alliance. There are already signs that nations are now more willing to pool their knowledge and resources to produce common equipment. The MRCA and JAGUAR aircraft exemp lify this. There are also signs of willingness to move towards closer co­ operation in the non-material field. While logistics will almost certainly continue to be a national responsibility, there is evidence that the future years will see an advancement in closer co-operation and co-ordination of logistics systems which will improve the ability of the various forces of the Alliance to operate in combination, one with the other. Such an advancement is likely to prove one of the most significant developments in the improvement of the deterent posture of the Alliance. HOT LINES COMMUNICATIONS IN ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE by

Major General Eberhard Gralka German Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff Communications and Electronics Division, SHAPE

V lg ilia Pre tium Libertatis is the well- known motto of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Indeed, vigilance is the price of freedom — vigilance day and night, week after week, year after year.

Vigilance means the continuous surveillance of the air, land, and maritime areas of Allied Command Europe and the capabi lity of reacting quickly when­ ever necessary.

Vigilance requires a constantly active nerve­ system to transport the information from the senses to the brain and to carry orders when necessary from the brain to the limbs. That is the task of communications personnel and equipment; to pro­ vide the nerves, the " Hot Lines " of Allied Command 130

Europe. These " Hot Lines » are the subject of this article : how they have developed ; how they are now, on the Twentieth Anniversary of SHAPE and ACE ; and how they will look in the years to come.

BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF ACE COMMUNICATIONS

When SHAPE and Allied Command Europe were established in 1951, the communications available to support the new headquarters and to permit the exercice of its command and control functions were critically inadequate. The only available communications media were leased cir­ cuits from the existing networks of the European PTT Administrations. These networks were limited in capacity and most vulnerable to sabotage and air attacks, as the underground cables were running through major cities and industria l areas. To give a fair example of the conditions pre­ vailing at that time, it is worth recalling that the first circuits established between SHAPE and the Northern European Command in Norway were routed through a non-NATO country because of the lack of direct available circuits. The first communications efforts of SHAPE and NATO were devoted to the improvement and reinforcement of the networks of the European PTT Administrations in order to meet the most urgent military requirements. Before the establishment of SHAPE and ACE, a first step had already been initiated by the first annual increment (slice) of common infrastructure, established by the Western 131

Union Defense Organisation (WUDO, comprising Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and the United Kingdom). This allocation of common funds financed some supplementary under­ ground cables and cable outlets of national military headquarters to PTT networks. But the real start was made with the second infrastructure slice, approved in September 1951 by the Atlantic Council : 56 million pounds sterling were devoted to communications projects in the Central Region, with 45 million pounds for France alone. Supplementary long distance underground (or submarine) cables and radio relay systems were established within and between the NATO nations of the Central Region, to become an integral part of the PTT networks. In many cases, these projects constituted an earlier implementation of long-term plans of the PTT Administrations. In addition, protective works for the most sensitive PTT instal­ lations were realised. The same general policy was applied to the countries of the Northern and Southern Regions during subsequent infrastructure slices (1952 to 1956). However, despite the considerable improve­ ments brought by these different projects to the PTT networks (increased capacity, flexibility and protection), it was soon realised that the vital ACE communications were still relying nearly completely on circuits implemented and routed by PTT per­ sonnel ; the need for at least a minimum of vital communications, fully under the control of the military authorities and operated by military personnel, was recognised and accepted by the NATO Council. 132

THE ACE HIGH SYSTEM

In 1956, SHAPE developed a plan for an exclu­ sive military communications system based on the new troposcatter technique, which would include the minimum essential circuits (Early Warning, Alert, implementation of the Special Weapons Strike Plan). The proposed system would extend from Northern Norway through Central Europe to Eastern Turkey. In June 1956, the Council accepted a United States offer to finance the installation in Norway of two experimental links, which received the code name of HOT LINE. The HOT LINE experiment proved to be quite valuable and achieved a high degree of reliability. As a consequence, the NATO Council approved under the 8th infrastructure slice (1957-1958) the programming of the Forward Scatter System, for a total amount of 27.5 million pounds sterling. This approval was developed under special condi­ tions, detailed in NATO document C-M(56)93, which constitutes the " birth certificate " of the ACE HIGH System. These special conditions were as follows : SHAPE would be given centralised control of the operation, maintenance and security of the system, with the right to re-deploy equipment within the system, if necessary across national boundaries. This control would entail, also, the direct technical authority over the military personnel operating the system and provided by the different NATO nations hosting the system. A main contractor (International Standard 133

Electronics Incorporated) was appointed for the installation and the initial operation of the electronic equipment. The nations hosting the system were tasked with the installation of the buildings and the electric power supply, as well as with the con­ struction of the roads. The whole was financed by infrastructure funds. In January 1964 the system was accepted for operational use. There were 84 stations, including 46 tropospheric scatter sta­ tions and 38 line-of-sight stations. The initial capacity of the backbone route was 36 voice chan­ nels, with three voice channels used normally as telegraph bearers. A technical reliability higher than 99 % is ordinarily achieved. The requirement for special technical training of the personnel operating the system was soon recognised, and a NATO training facility was set up under NATO financing at Latina, Italy. After the relocation from France of SHAPE and AFCENT, new connections to the ACE HIGH System were realised and a supplementary route between Belgium, Germany and Northern Italy was implemented. Furthermore, the capacity of the backbone system was increased from 36 to 60 channels.

OTHER MILITARY SYSTEMS

Starting around 1960, planning and implemen­ tation of other military communications systems were initiated, including hierarchical radio relay systems in the Central Region to meet the operational requirements of the Allied Tactical Air Forces and Army Groups. 134

In the Northern Region, a very sophisticated high-frequency radio communications system called W HITE FOX was implemented to assure reliable communications with Strike Fleet Atlantic.

Along with the improvement of these commu­ nications systems, new high-grade on-line crypto­ graphic equipment was introduced which permits NATO commanders to communicate in a secure mode with increased speed.

SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS

With the evergrowing requirement for rapid, reliable, flexible and secure means of communica­ tion, it became apparent that another means of transmission, capable of spanning the entire area of NATO, was required. Communications satellites were the obvious answer, as the entire NATO area can be covered with only one relay — the satellite itself.

The present NATO satellite program has been described elsewhere,1 and will not be discussed further, here. The proposed satellite system, in­ cluding Phase III, will play a most important part in providing the transmission media required to meet the full objectives of the NATO Integrated Commu­ nications System, described in the last part of this article.

1. " NATO's Communications Satellite System, " by Colonel D.R. Valentine, US AF, in Vigilance, Supplement No. 122 to NATO's Fifteen Nations, dated Oct-Nov 1970. 135

MANAGEMENT OF ACE COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

By the late 6O's it became evident that the existing organizations and procedures for controlling communications in ACE could not guarantee that maximum use of these systems would be obtained. Each of the existing systems, such as ACE HIGH, the regional military microwave systems, the HF radio systems as well as the national PTT networks were individually controlled and managed. The result was that the flexibility essential for the re­ routing of vital circuits in the event of military necessity was missing. A working party was convened at SHAPE and charged with the task of proposing a management organisation that could guarantee the most effective use of all ACE communications systems in order to meet SACEUR's communications requirements. In particular, the management organization would have to perform the day-to-day technical and traffic control of the networks. This working party re­ commended that an ACE communications agency be formed, specifically to deal with day-to-day management. The urgency of the need for centralized manage­ ment of operational communications was reco­ gnised by SHAPE. Pending the ratification of the proposals for a major reconfiguration of the existing communications management organiza­ tions, the decision was taken in January 1970 to create a nucleus of the " communications agency " in the form of a newly established Communications 136

Support Branch within the Communications and Electronics Division, SHAPE. Since the primary objective of any communi­ cations system is to provide the users with rapid and reliable means of conveying information from one place to another, particular attention was devo­ ted to the ACE teletype network. This resulted in a number of measures to improve its efficiency. The growth of the ACE automatic data pro­ cessing capability, with the attendant need for digital data communications links, is also a target for action by the Communications Support Branch. The indications are plain. The communica­ tions facilities which had served NATO very well for 20 years have now reached the limit of their operational capability. What is needed for the new decade, or longer, is a new communications concept that will provide SACEUR with rapid, secure, flexible and survivable communications. Automation is clearly on its way into the communi­ cations area.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

The ever-changing political scene during the past years, as well as the continuing progress in technical and weapons development, make it clear that to provide for any possible future changes in the strategic concept communications should be developed so that all possible requirements can be met efficiently. In 1964-65, therefore, system characteristics were developed which served as a basis for detailed studies in SH A PE and the SHAPE Technical Center (STC) to develop a concept 137

for such a system. To assist STC, three study contracts were awarded to industrial firms for recommended solutions to the most important technical conceptual problems. The results of these studies were available in mid-1969. The proposed concept was to provide a fully-automatic, switched, common-user system with a grid network configuration, serving the entire ACE area. It was planned that maximum use of all existing transmission media (such as military tropospheric forward scatter systems, high frequency and satellite communications, and civil PTT facilities) wou ld be utilized in establishing this grid network. A network of such configuration and characteristics using all the different trans­ mission means mentioned would have a high degree of survivability and be able to handle vital traffic even under severe overload and network damage conditions. In addition, it would allow itinerant users such as mobile headquarters and external reinforcements to link themselves into the network at any geographical location prescribed by the strategic situation. Its high flexibility would enable the system to accommodate any change arising from the development of operations. It was considered mandatory that the proposed system make use of the most advanced techniques presently available. It was planned that the future Satellite Phase I II system would provide long distance circuitry and those links required to integrate the mobile users and afloat units that must be served. It need not be said that the techniques proposed for this system must guarantee a speed of service that meets the requirement for immediate trans­ 138 mission of vital information and orders. The normal transmission speed for telegraph traffic will be 800 words per minute, so that an average message can be transmitted in about 30 seconds ; higher and lower transmission speeds can be used. In such cases the conversion of the transmissions to the required speeds will take place in message distribution centers. These centers are included in the network for a variety of purposes, the most important being the handling of multiaddress traffic, which is of considerable importance in the NATO military organisation. The very conspicuous advantages of the pro­ posed system and the necessity to start planning for a future replacement of the Phase II Satellite led, during the process of approval of this ACE NET concept by the NATO authorities, to the decision that the proposed system should be expanded to meet also the requirements of the civil NATO authorities and the other Major NATO Commanders, i.e., SACLANT and CINCHAN. Consequently, the plan was expanded to cover all NATO users and, as a result, the name of the project was changed to " NATO Integrated Communications System " (NICS ). A remarkable effort by the planning teams involved made it possible to submit the results of the new studies required in connection with the expansion of the system in time for consideration by the NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers at their meeting on 2-3 December 1970. Here, they approved the proposed concept in principle and charged the Defense Planning Committee with, the further action necessary to implement the system. 139

It was recognised that, for financial, mana­ gerial and technical reasons, a project of such magnitude could not be implemented in less than 10 years, and should best be divided into imple­ mentation phases. The first phase would provide a restricted network, viable on its own and capable of expansion. In order to carry out detailed plan­ ning and implementation in the most efficient way, a management organization will be established in the very near future. In the meantime, the exis­ ting planning team at SHAPE/STC continues that part of the planning which has to be carried through with certain short deadlines in order to maintain the proposed timetable.

It can be concluded that action is under way to ensure that, for the benefit of not only ACE but for the entire Alliance, a communications system of the greatest conceivable efficiency will be imple­ mented in the shortest possible time.

AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING IN ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE by Air Vice Marshal A. H . W. Ball, CB, DSO, DFC, RAF Assistant Chief of Staff Automatic Data Processing Division. SHAPE

Today the use of computers and automatic data processing (AD P) is recognized as an integral part of efficient management in military as well as civil organizations. Automated support is now being introduced into the Atlantic Alliance wherever necessary as a fundamental element of military modernization. Already a number of computers are making contributions to air defense, air traffic control, and communications and administration. The highest priority, however, is given the wider and all-embracing area of command and control. Inextricably entwined with command and control is the requirement for the exchange of in­ formation and data management generally. Within NATO, the two have become one entity, known as "Command Control and Information Systems" (CCIS). It is within this context that the present status of ADP in SHAPE and its extension through­ out Allied Command Europe will be considered. 142

The need for automation, particularly in support of higher military management and to facilitate timely decision making, was first recognised by SHAPE in the early 1960s. By then it was apparent that the volume of data flowing into the headquarters, particularly operational information, was becoming too great to be handled efficiently by manual methods alone. To consider what could be done to improve the situation consultations took place with computer manufacturers. Extensive studies were conducted in conjunction with the SHAPE Technical Center (STC), and trials were carried out during major exercizes. By 1966 it was clear that the best solu­ tion lay in the introduction of ADP. Unfortunately, at this stage the move of SHAPE and NATO Head­ quarters from France to Belgium imposed a delay. It was not until 1967 that a submission was made to the NATO Military Committee to provide an ADP capability to support SACEUR's command and control functions. This, then was the starting point. During the past four years, SHAPE has progressed through simple punch card equipment to a third-generation general purpose computer which will be operating later this year. Let us look now in rather more detail at the requirements, the road down which we have come and, more important, where it will lead in the years ahead. In 1963, as a result of a joint discussion between SHAPE and the STC, an ADP team visited the United States to discuss automation in the command and control field. During this visit, American tech­ nical advice and assistance were offered, including the supply of computer program packages already 143

in use by the U.S. Department of Defense. SHAPE'S interest increased and, although delayed by the move from France to Belgium, an ADP study group was established to examine and identify SHAPE'S specific needs to support the operations, intelligence, logistics, plans and communications functions of the headquarters. SACEUR accepted the group's report in Oc­ tober 1967, and in July 1968 the Military Committee endorsed the SHAPE request for an ADP system. Negotiations were started to obtain the necessary NATO funding. In January 1969 the Military Budget Committee set up a team of international ADP experts to consider the SHAPE requirement. This team recommended the acceptance of the SHAPE proposal for the procurement of a large- capacity third-generation computer which would be operated under the US military data management system (formally titled National Military Command System Information Processing System - or NIPS, for short). NIPS, offered by the U.S., had been developed over a period of some 10 years specifically to support military management and command and control genera lly. It was well suited to meet SHAPE'S requirements. An ADP Division was established at SHAPE to formulate plans and policy for the Command and to operate and maintain an ADP system to support SACEUR in planning, directing and con­ trolling the forces and resources of Allied Command Europe. The first effort was to prepare technical spec­ ifications for the overall computer facilities that would be required to meet the task. Preparing 144 these specifications took about four months, and an international invitation for bids was issued in mid-1969. After the most detailed evaluations, including tests of the software data management system (information storage and retrieval programs) on the computers offered, an IBM 360/5 0 machine was selected as the one which best met SHAPE requirements. Budgetary approval was given in July 1970.

The peripheral hardware, which supports the centra l processing unit, includes eight magnetic tape transports, one large-capacity disc storage unit, one high-speed and one low-speed printer, one card reader and punch, and tw o visual display units.

A major problem now faced SHAPE: how to acquire military personnel experienced in ADP from the NATO nations; for few nations were well equipped in this field at the time. It was therefore decided to hire professional contractors to fill the gap over the first few years of the project. After complex technical and cost evaluations of some twenty responses by software firms, a two-year contract was awarded to the Bunker-Ramo Cor­ poration to supply technical experts to assist in the overall system design, application, development, and program writing.

The computer and its associated equipment has now been installed at SHAPE. Acceptance tests of all aspects of the computer machinery and its associated operating system are now being conducted in the most stringent manner. Formal acceptance should occur by June 1971. There will then follow two to three months of program 145 testing, during which the total system will be thoroughly proved prior to starting computer opera­ tions in August. In July 1970, the SHAPE ADP Division began the detailed definitional analysis of the ADP requi­ rements of each SHAPE staff division. Thirty- two requirements had been identified in 1967, but by 1970 this number had more than doubled. During this analysis the Command and Control Group of the SHAPE Technical Center worked with the SHAPE ADP Division, giving invaluable support for the three months it required ; indeed, the task could not have been completed without their considerable expertise. All requirements considered feasible for auto­ mation were then documented in readiness for the system design to be completed. This pattern of development will be repeated as new requirements arise. What of the future of ADP in Allied Command Europe ? Although obviously the main effort of the A D P Division has so far been directed toward the successful installation and implementation of the facility at SHAPE, much thought and planning has gone into the development of an integrated ACE-wide system. The task assumes large propor­ tions when one considers the many headquarters involved, each of which tends to have some unique requirements. At present, in NATO Headquarters and at AFNORTH, AFSOUTH and AFCENT, there are small computers performing limited operational and administrative tasks. It is planned to link these computers to SHAPE, and to each other, to form 146

a nucleus of an A C E ADP system which can then grow over the years ahead.

Communications clearly play a major part in the overall system we have in mind. Good, secure and rapid communications have always been the prerequisites for effective command and control. With the introduction of automation and the possibility of speeding up transmission and processing times, their importance will become absolute. The highest standards will be required if the full potential of automatic data processing is to be achieved, and if ADP is to play its part in operational decisions as well as in planning. The proposal for an integrated communications system for NATO, known as NICS, does call for engineering to these standards. When developed, NICS will be able to handle the very high speed digital data that will be flowing in the ACE CCIS.

With such developments in mind, the impor­ tance of compatibility within ACE, with the rest of NATO and with the systems being developed for national use, becomes very clear. To facilitate this compatibility, and to co-ordinate ADP growth throughout the Alliance, the NATO Council has approved the establishment of a senior joint civil/ military organisation called the NATO Command Control and Information Systems and Data Pro­ cessing Committee. This committee is supported by the CCIS Division of the International Military Staff. It is within these organizations that the broader NATO-wide problems of interface are tackled; however, the ACE requirements, which are already under examination at SHAPE, are similar 147 and closely related and their resolution may well point the way. The road ahead is difficu lt. There are problems, and solutions will be costly. However, many of the difficulties are already appreciated and the answers can be found. Financing may be the major stumbling block — it will certainly be a delaying factor — but, in the long run, the funds are expected to be available. This, then, is the A D P /C C IS position today. For the future, given the necessary communications, ADP/CCIS offers a dynamic and efficient command and control system capable of embracing all NATO. The system is capable of advancing with the state of the art and, above all, of progressively contri­ buting to timely decision-making and, thereby, to a more effective use of our resources.

CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

1948

17 March Brussels Treaty signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and United Kingdom.

10 December Western Union Defense Organization (WUDO) headquarters opened at Fon­ tainebleau, France.

1949

4 April North A tlantic Treaty signed by Foreign Ministers of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Neth­ erlands, Norway, Portugal, United King­ dom and United States (12 nations).

1 December Defense Committee announced agree­ ment on strategic concept for defense of North Atlantic area.

1950

6 January North Atlantic Council approved recom­ mendations for integrated defense plan for North Atlantic area and approved strategic concept. 26 September North Atlantic Council agreed to establish an integrated European defense force under a Supreme Commander. 150

1950

26 October Military Committee agreed on unified military command for NATO Europe and appointment of a Supreme Commander.

18 December Defense Committee officially approved MC's documents on Creation of an Integrated European Defense Force ; Es­ tablishment of a Supreme Headquarters in Europe ; and Reorganization of NATO military structure. NAC unanimously agreed to request US to make available General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower to serve as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).

19 December Official announcement made of General Eisenhower's appointment as SACEUR. Hotel Astoria, Paris, selected as first (temporary) SHAPE Headquarters.

1951

2 April General Order No. 1 activated Allied Com­ mand Europe (ACE) and Supreme Head­ quarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Announcement made of establishment of Allied Army Forces Central Europe (AAFCE) and Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AIRCENT) ; and designation of Flag Officer Central Europe and Commander in-Chief, Allied Forces Northern Europe.

19 June Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH) established.

22 June Headquarters Allied Forces Northern Europe (A FN O R T H ), established in April on temporary basis in London, moved to Oslo. 151

1951

23 July President of France turned over new SHAPE Headquarters buildings to SA­ CEUR in ceremony at Rocquencourt, France. 2 August AAFCE redesignated Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT). 22 Octobe r Protocol on accession of Greece and Turkey to NATO signed.

1952

18 February Greece and Turkey acceded to the North Atlantic Treaty. I March Official raising of national colors of Greece and Turkey at SHAPE. 30 May General Matthew B. Ridgway assumed command as SACEUR.

1953

15 March Allied Forces Mediterranean (AFMED) activited. I I July General Alfred M. Gruenther assumed command as SACEUR. 2 0 August Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) established over both LANDCENT and AIRCENT. Flag Officer Central Europe redesignated Commander Allied Naval Forces Central Europe (COMNAVCENT), also under AFCENT.

1954

23 October Signing of Paris Agreements. NAC invited Federal Republic of Germany to join NATO. 152

1955

15 February SHAPE Air Defense Technica l Center established. 5 M ay Federa l Republic of Germany officially became a member of NATO. 9 M ay German flag raised at SHAPE.

1956

11 M ay NAC approved establishment of Forward Scatter system. 20 November General Lauris Norstad assumed command as SACEUR.

1960

19 August ACE Mobile Force established. 30 September NAC approved creation of an integrated air defense system under the command and control of SACEUR.

1961

1 M ay UK Air Defense Region became part of ACE integrated system.

1962

1 July NAVCENT deactivated.

1963

1 January General Lyman L. Lemnitzer assumed command as SACEUR. 1 March SHAPE Air Defense Technical Cente r (SADTC) established as an international military organization under the direction of SACEUR. 153

1963

31 October SADTC redesignated SHAPE Technical Center (STC).

14 November Public announcement of completion of ACE HIGH Forward Scatter communica­ tions network ; final station in operation.

20 November NAC gave approval in principle to NATO Air Defense Ground Environment (NADGE) Plan.

1966

7 March President de Gaulle informed United States of French intention to cease parti­ cipation in NATO integrated military com­ mands.

10 March French Government forwarded Aide Me­ moire to NATO nations proposing to end assignment of French forces. France also proposed simultaneous withdrawal from French territory of al I Al I ied mi I itary forces a nd Headquarters of SHAPE and AFCENT.

29 March France announced that French force assignments would end on 1 July 1966 and noted that withdrawal of French elements entailed relocation of Allied facilities from France by 1 April 1967.

7 -8 June NATO Ministers agreed to transfer NATO military headquarters from France.

21 June Belgian Chamber of Representatives ap­ proved transfer of SHAPE to Belgium.

13 September Decision made to transfer SHAPE to Casteau, near Mons, Belgium. 154

1966

10 Octobe r Decision made to transfer AFCENT to Brunssum, The Netherlands.

10 November NATO Defense Planning Committee (DPC) invited Military Committee to move from Washington to Brussels.

15 November LANDCENT and AIRCENT disestablished and their functions transferred to AFCENT.

1967

30 March Final flag-lowering ceremony at SHAPE in France.

31 March Following flag-raising ceremony, SHAPE became officially operational in Belgium.

1 June AFCENT officially opened at Brunssum, The Netherlands.

5 June AFMED deactivated.

13-14 December NATO Ministers adopted new strategic concept based on flexible and balanced range of appropriate responses, convention­ al and nuclear, to all levels of aggression or threats of aggression.

1969

1 July General Andrew J. Goodpaster assumed command as SACEUR.

1970

27 April First activation of Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED), for 13-day training period. 155

1 970

3-4 December NATO Ministers accepted the study AD 70 as the basis for NATO strategic planning in the 1970's. European nations of NATO adopted a special European Defense Improvement Program designed to improve Alliance capability in specific fields including com­ munications and aircraft survival, identified in the AD 70 study as of particular impor­ tance.

1971

2 April SHAPE-ACE Twentieth Anniversary ob­ served by ceremony at SHAPE.

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