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Annex 5: Responses to Human Rights Watch

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Annex 5: Responses to Human Rights Watch Annex 5: Responses to Human Rights Watch Letter from Baroudi and Associates to Human Rights Watch From: Josiane Lahoud < > Sent: Monday, July 12, 2021 2:19 PM To: HRW Beirut < > رﺳ ﺎ ﻟ ﺔ ﻣ ﻦ ﻫﻴﻮﻣﻦ را ﻳ ت ﺲ و و � ﺶ :Subject: RE ﺑ ﻌ ﺪ اﻟﺘﺤﯿﺔ، ﺑﺎﻻﺷﺎرة اﻟﻰ ﻛﺘﺎﺑﻜﻢ ّاﻟﻤﻮﺟﮫ اﻟﻰ ﻣﻜﺘﺒﻨﺎ ﺑﺘﺎرﯾﺦ 8 ﺗﻤﻮز 2021 ، ﻧﻌﻠﻤﻜﻢ ان اﻟﻘﺎﻧﻮن ّﯾﺤﻈﺮ ﻋﻠﯿﻨﺎ ﻛﻤﺤﺎﻣﯿﻦ اﻻﺟﺎﺑﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ أﺳﺌﻠﺘﻜﻢ اﻟﻮاردة ﻓﻲ ﻛﺘﺎﺑﻜﻢ اﻟﻤﺬﻛﻮر، ﻻ ﺳﯿﻤﺎ وأن اﻟﺘﺤﻘﯿﻘﺎت اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺠﺮﯾﮭﺎ اﻟﺴﻠﻄﺎت اﻟﻘﻀﺎﺋﯿﺔ اﻟﻤﺨﺘﺼﺔ ﻻ ﺗﺰال ﺟﺎرﯾﺔ. وﺗﻔﻀﻠﻮا ﺑﻘﺒﻮل اﻻﺣﺘﺮام، اﻟﻤﺤﺎﻣﯿﺔ ﺟﻮزﯾﺎن ﻟﺤﻮد Greetings, With reference to the letter that you sent to our office on July 8, 2021, we would like to inform you that the law prevents us as lawyers from answering questions in your abovementioned letter, especially that investigations by competent authorities are still ongoing. Sincerely, Josiane Lahoud, Esq. Josiane Lahoud Partner Baroudi & Associates “THEY KILLED US FROM THE INSIDE” 690 Letter from Tammam Salam to Human Rights Watch 691 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | AUGUST 2021 Tammam Salam To Ms. Lama Fakih Crisis and Conflict Director Beirut Office Director Dear Ms. Fakih, In response to the letter that you sent me on behalf of Human Rights Watch seeking information about the events that lead to the Beirut port explosion, I am keen to express my appreciation for your efforts to investigate the circumstances that lead to the Beirut port explosion on August 4, 2020. First, I would like to highlight that your work worldwide and your concern with the catastrophe that befell the Beirut port, as well as the city and its people, is noble. Concerning your questions, my response is the following: 1- I learned for the first time about the presence of ammonium nitrate in hangar 12 at the Beirut port from media outlets, which circulated the letters addressed by the Directorate General of State Security to His Excellency the President and His Excellency the Prime Minister a while before the explosion took place. 2- Concerning the risks posed by ammonium nitrate in hangar 12, I learned about them as all the Lebanese people did – after the explosion and its repercussions took place. 3- Concerning whether I had information about this substance, I was not informed about the matter in any way. I have previously stated that I have not seen any official correspondence in this regard during my premiership, hence I cannot comment on paragraphs a and b. I salute your efforts and wish you the best of luck, hoping to be provided with a copy of the report upon its release. Sincerely, [SIGNATURE] Tammam Salam Beirut, July 15, 2021 “THEY KILLED US FROM THE INSIDE” 692 Letter from Nijab Mikati to Human Rights Watch ﺑﯿﺮوت ﻓﻲ۱٥ ﺗﻤﻮز ۲۰۲۱ اﻟﺴﯿﺪة ﻟﻤﺎ ﻓﻘﯿﮫ ﻣﺪﯾﺮة ﻗﺴﻢ اﻟﻨﺰاﻋﺎت واﻷزﻣﺎت ﻣﺪﯾﺮة ﻣﻜﺘﺐ ﺑﯿﺮوت ھﯿﻮﻣﻦ راﯾﺘﺲ ووﺗﺶ اﻟﻤﻮﺿﻮع: أﺟﻮﺑﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ أﺳﺌﻠﺘﻜﻢ ﻋﻦ ﺗﺴﻠﺴﻞ اﻷﺣﺪاث اﻟﺘﻲ أدت إﻟﻰ اﻧﻔﺠﺎر ﻣﺮﻓﺄ ﺑﯿﺮوت ﻓﻲ 4 آب 2020. ﺗﺤﯿﺔ طﯿﺒﺔ ﺑﺎﻹﺷﺎرة إﻟﻰ اﻟﻤﻮﺿﻮع أﻋﻼه واﻟﺮﺳﺎﻟﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ وﺻﻠﺘﻨﻲ ﺑﺎﻟﺒﺮﯾﺪ اﻻﻟﻜﺘﺮوﻧﻲ، اود ان أؤﻛﺪ ﻟﻜﻢ اﻧﻨﻲ ﺧﻼل اﻟﻔﺘﺮة اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻮﻟّﯿﺖ ﻓﯿﮭﺎ ﻣﮭﺎم رﺋﺎﺳﺔ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻟﻠﺒﻨﺎﻧﯿﺔ، ﻟﻢ ﯾﺼﻠﻨﻲ أي ﺗﻘﺮﯾﺮ ﯾﻌﻠﻤﻨﻲ او اﯾﺔ ﻣﺮاﺳﻠﺔ ﺗﻔﯿﺪﻧﻲ ﺑﺪﺧﻮل ﺑﺎﺧﺮة ﻣ ّﺤﻤﻠﺔ .ﺑﻤﻮاد ﺧﻄﺮة، ﻣﺜﻞ ﻧﯿﺘﺮات اﻻﻣﻮﻧﯿﻮم، اﻟﻰ ﻣﺮﻓﺄ ﺑﯿﺮوت :وﻋﻠﯿﮫ، ﺗﺠﺪون ﻓﻲ ﻣﺎ ﯾﻠﻲ اﺟﻮﺑﺘﻲ ﻋﻠﻰ اﻷﺳﺌﻠﺔ اﻟﻤﻄﺮوﺣﺔ ﻓﻲ رﺳﺎﻟﺘﻜﻢ -ھﻞ ﻋﻠﻤﺘﻢ اٴن ﺳﻔﯿﻨﺔ ﺗﺤﻤﻞ 2,750 طﻦ ﻣﻦ ﻧﯿﺘﺮات اﻷﻣﻮﻧﯿﻮم رﺳﺖ ﻓﻲ ﻣﺮﻓﺎٴ ﺑﯿﺮوت ﻓﻲ ﻧﻮﻓﻤﺒﺮ/ﺗﺸﺮﯾﻦ اﻟﺜﺎﻧﻲ ۱ 2013؟ .ﻛﻼ ﻟﻢ اﻛﻦ اﻋﻠﻢ -ﻣﺘﻰ ﻋﻠﻤﺘﻢ ﺑﺎٴن ﻧﯿﺘﺮات اﻷﻣﻮﻧﯿﻮم ﻣﺨﺰﻧﺔ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻨﺒﺮ 12 ﺑﻤﺮﻓﺎٴ ﺑﯿﺮوت؟ ﻛﯿﻒ ﻋﻠﻤﺘﻢ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ؟ ﻣﻦ زودﻛﻢ ﺑﮭﺬه ۲ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت؟ .ﻋﻠﻤﺖ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ اﻟﺼﺤﻒ ﺑﻌﺪ ﻛﺎرﺛﺔ ٤آب -ﻣﺘﻰ ﻋﻠﻤﺘﻢ ﺑﺎﻟﻤﺨﺎطﺮ اﻟﺘﻲ ﯾﻤﺜﻠﮭﺎ ﺗﺨﺰﯾﻦ ﻧﯿﺘﺮات اﻷﻣﻮﻧﯿﻮم ﻓﻲ اﻟﻌﻨﺒﺮ 12؟ ﻛﯿﻒ ﻋﻠﻤﺘﻢ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ؟ ﻣﻦ زودﻛﻢ ﺑﮭﺬه ۳ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت؟ .ﻋﻠﻤﺖ ﺑﺬﻟﻚ ﻣﻦ ﺧﻼل اﻟﺘﻘﺎرﯾﺮ واﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت اﻟﺼﺤﻔﯿﺔ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﻠﺖ ﻛﺎرﺛﺔ ٤آب ،-إذا ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻟﺪﯾﻜﻢ ﻣﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺑﺸﺎٴن ھﺬه اﻟﻤﺎدة ﺧﻼل ﺗﻮﻟﯿﻜﻢ ٴرﯾﺎﺳﺔ ﻣﺠﻠﺲ اﻟﻮزراء٤ اٴ. ﻣﺎ اﻟﺨﻄﻮات اﻟﺘﻲ اﺗﺨﺬﺗﻤﻮھﺎ ﻟﻠﺘﺼﺪي ﻟﻠﻤﺨﺎطﺮ اﻟﺘﻲ ﺗﺸﻜﻠﮭﺎ ھﺬه اﻟﻤﺎدة؟ ب. ﻟﻤﺎذا ﻟﻢ ﺗﻀﯿﻔﻮا ھﺬه اﻟﻤﺴﺎٴﻟﺔ إﻟﻰ ﺟﺪول اٴﻋﻤﺎل اﻟﻤﺠﻠﺲ اﻷﻋﻠﻰ ﻟﻠﺪﻓﺎع؟ ﻛﻤﺎ ذﻛﺮت آﻧﻔﺎً ﻟﻢ اﻛﻦ اﻋﻠﻢ ﺑﻮﺟﻮد ھﺬه اﻟﻤﻮاد اﻟﺨﻄﺮة داﺧﻞ أي ﻣﻦ ﻋﻨﺎﺑﺮ ﻣﺮﻓﺄ ﺑﯿﺮوت ﺧﻼل ﺗﻮﻟﻲ اﻟﻤﺴﻮؤﻟﯿﺔ ﺣﯿﺚ دﺧﻠﺖ ﻣﺮﻓﺄ ﺑﯿﺮوت ﺑﻌﺪ ﻗﺒﻮل اﺳﺘﻘﺎﻟﺔ ﺣﻜﻮﻣﺘﻲ وﺗﺸﻜﯿﻞ اﻟﺤﻜﻮﻣﺔ اﻟﺠﺪﯾﺪة 693 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | AUGUST 2021 أﺗﻤﻨﻰ ان ﺗﻜﻮن اﺟﻮﺑﺘﻲ واﺿﺤﺔ ﻟﻜﻢ ﻣﻊ اﻣﻠﻲ ان ﺗﺆدي ﻣﻼﺣﻘﺘﻜﻢ ﻟﮭﺬه اﻟﻘﻀﯿﺔ اﻟﻰ ﻣﺴﺎﻋﺪة اﻟﺘﺤﻘﯿﻖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺟﻼء ﺣﻘﯿﻘﺔ ﻣﺎ .ﺟﺮى ﻣﻊ ﺗﺤﯿﺎﺗﻲ ﻧﺠﯿﺐ ﻣﯿﻘﺎﺗﻲ Best regards Najib Mikati “THEY KILLED US FROM THE INSIDE” 694 Beirut, July 15, 2021 Ms. Lama Fakih Crisis and Conflict Director Beirut Office Director Human Rights Watch Subject: Answers to your questions regarding the chain of events that led to the Beirut port explosion on August 4, 2020 Dear Ms. Fakih, In reference to the subject above and the letter that I received by email, I would like to confirm that during my mandate as Lebanon’s prime minister, I did not receive any report or correspondence informing me that a ship carrying a hazardous substance, such as ammonium nitrate, had entered the Beirut port. Hence, you will find below my answers to the questions in your letter: 1) Did you know that a ship carrying 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate docked in Beirut’s port in November 2013? No, I did not know. 2) When did you learn about the ammonium nitrate being stored in hangar 12 in the Beirut port? How did you learn about it? Who shared this information with you? I learned about this from newspapers following the August 4 catastrophe. 3) When did you learn about the dangers the ammonium nitrate being stored in hangar 12 posed? How did you learn about them? Who shared this information with you? I learned about this from media reports following the August 4 catastrophe. 4) If you had knowledge about the material during your tenure as Prime Minister, 695 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | AUGUST 2021 a. What steps did you take to address the risk that the material posed? b. Why did you not add this issue to the agenda of the Higher Defense Council? As I mentioned earlier, I was not aware of the presence of this hazardous substance inside any of the Beirut port hangars during my mandate. I entered the Beirut port after the resignation of my cabinet and the formation of a new cabinet. I hope that my answers are clear to you and that your pursuit of this case helps the investigation to uncover the truth of what happened. Sincerely, Najib Mikati “THEY KILLED US FROM THE INSIDE” 696 Letter from Nohad Machnouk to Human Rights Watch 697 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | AUGUST 2021 “THEY KILLED US FROM THE INSIDE” 698 Nohad Machnouk Deputy of Beirut To: Mrs. Lama Fakih Director – Crisis & Conflicts Division – Beirut Office Human Rights Watch Greetings, I received your letter dated July 7, 2021. Please find below my answers to your questions: 1- The first and only time I knew about the presence of ammonium nitrate, and in this quantity, in hangar 12 at Beirut Port, was after the explosion of August 4, 2020, given that the information became available to everyone in the media. 2- I never knew about the risks posed by the storage of ammonium nitrate in hangar 12, before the explosion because I was not aware about the storage of these substances in the aforementioned hangar except after August 4, 2020. 3- The information I received about these substances when I was in office at the Ministry of Interior for 5 years from February 14, 2014 to January 31, 2019, was from one confidential report dated May 16, 2014 issued by General Security under the title: “Impounding the Commercial Ship ‘MV Rhosus’ in the Port of Beirut”, whose objective was to inform me about the effects of the decision to impound the captain and the crew, who were Russian nationals. It was mentioned at the beginning of the report that as a result of a judicial dispute, the “Rhosus” was provisionally impounded with several tonnes of extremely hazardous substances onboard shipped from Georgia to the port of Mozambique and was passing in Beirut in transit to its final destination, which means that these substances will consequently continue all the way to the port of Mozambique and will not be unloaded or stored in the Port of Beirut. The report, dated May 16, 2014, was the only correspondence received by the Ministry of Interior during the period I was in office and it was issued by General Security since it is the authority responsible of the entry/exit of individuals in the Port of Beirut and does not have any executive functions in following-up on security and customs affairs 699 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH | AUGUST 2021 in the port according to its competences. I did not receive any other correspondence to inform me about the unloading of the ammonium nitrate from the ship and its storage in the port. I assume I saw the report on May 21, 2014 since between May 16 and 20, 2014 I was on an official visit to the United Arab Emirates in an attempt to obtain an authorization allowing Emirati nationals to travel to Lebanon. I knew later on, after the explosion of course, that during my stay outside the Lebanese territory, the Higher Defense Council convened on May 18, 2014 under the presidency of the President of the Republic and in the presence of the Prime Minister and the heads of the security agencies, and after reviewing the meeting minutes, it has been found that the subject of the ship and its cargo was not listed on the agenda of that meeting, and none of the participants mentioned it as well. On May 25, [2014], the mandate of the former president General Michel Sleiman ended, and the Higher Defense Council did not convene during the entire period of the presidential void, that is around 3 years, given that the President of the Republic is as well the president of the Higher Defense Council and he is the one who can legally invite the Council to convene.
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