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Chinese Commercial Espionage and the Arrest of Meng Wanzhou | James Mulvenon China Is Once Again Conducting Cyber-Enabled Theft of U.S
Chinese Commercial Espionage and the Arrest of Meng Wanzhou | James Mulvenon China is once again conducting cyber-enabled theft of U.S. intellectual December 11th, 2018 property to advance its technological capabilities. To combat the problem, the United States should build a multinational coalition, INTRODUCTION sanction Chinese companies, and strengthen cyber defenses. – CFR James Mulvenon is Vice-President of Defense Group Inc.’s (DGI) Intelligence Division and Director of DGI’s Center for Intelligence Research and Analysis (CIRA). Dr. Mulvenon is an expert on the Chinese military and Chinese cyber issues, and has published widely on Chinese military affairs, party-army relations, C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, and reconnaissance), and nuclear weapons doctrine and organizations. Among his professional affiliations, Dr. Mulvenon is a founding member and current President of the Cyber Conflict Studies Association, is presently a member of the National Committee for U.S.- China Relations, and was a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations between 1999 and 2004. He is a regular commentator on both the Chinese military and cyber warfare in major U.S. print and TV media. Dr. Mulvenon's book, Soldiers of Fortune (Sharpe, 2001) details the rise and fall of the Chinese military's multi- billion-dollar international business empire. His more recent publications include Chinese Industrial Espionage: Technology Acquisition and Military Modernization (co-authored with William C. Hannas and Anna B. Puglisi; Routlege, 2013) and “PLA Computer Network Operations: Scenarios, Doctrine, Organizations, and Capability,” (in Roy Kamphausen, et al. Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan, NBR, 2009). Dr. -
On the Horizon
On the Horizon What to Watch in 2020 Wilson Center Experts Weigh In years years years 50 Years of Excellence - why us, why now? “There are many voices of counsel, but few voices of vision.” - Woodrow Wilson Decoding a World of Change for Washington In a world marked by complexity, volatility, and a din of competing agendas, the Wilson Center is the nation’s indispensable resource for decoding today’s most pressing foreign policy challenges. Leveraging its global expertise and perspective, award-winning scholar- ship and analysis, and a fiercely nonpartisan spirit, the Center informs actionable ideas for policymakers across the political spectrum. Chartered by Congress 50 years ago as a living memorial to President Wilson, the Center’s work today spans more than a dozen regional and thematic programs to tackle hot-button security issues – from the North Korean nuclear threat to the implications of a risen China and from North American trade to global cyberwarfare. The Center also serves a vital role in linking Washington to the world, hosting U.S. lawmakers and global leaders, while continually expanding its unparalleled network of some 5,000 former fellows. The next generation of policy leaders will also trace its roots to the Wilson Center, as the Foreign Policy Fellowship Program and Cybersecurity and AI Labs connect select Congressional staff with top scholars and practitioners to help prepare them for current and future challenges. Scott Walker Chairman of the Board of Trustees Jane Harman Director, President, and CEO One Woodrow Wilson Plaza Aaron C. Jones 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Director of Congressional Relations Washington, DC 20004-3027 [email protected] www.wilsoncenter.org 202.691.4140 [email protected] facebook.com/woodrowwilsoncenter @thewilsoncenter 202.691.4000 B Our Programs Africa Program............................................................................................. -
The China-Iran Partnership in a Regional Context
Occasional Paper Series No. 38 l September 2020 Last Among Equals: The China-Iran Partnership in a Regional Context By Lucille Greer and Esfandyar Batmanghelidj INTRODUCTION to reorient the balance of power in the Middle East in defiance of the United States, even In early June 2020, a scan of an 18-page though China’s policy is not to make alliances in document began circulating on Iranian social the region. media. Titled “Final Draft of Iran-China Strategic Partnership Deal,” the document, which While that the leaked document included no appeared to have been leaked from the Iranian financial targets, many news reports stated that Ministry of Foreign Affairs, immediately caused the deal would see China invest $400 billion in a firestorm among the general public and Iran, a completely fictitious number that can politicians alike. Soon, the international media be traced back to a dubious article published picked up the document and headlines blared in the spring of 2019.1 Such errors reflect the that Iran and China were forging a new “alliance” long-running overestimation of China’s economic Middle East Program Occasional Paper Series No. 38 l September 2020 engagement not just in Iran, but also in the wider China’s measured approach to building relationships Middle East. Reporting on potential or promised with several countries despite the mutual financing or investment is rarely balanced by the antagonism in the region. actual amount of capital committed and how it is applied across the region. This is the crucial context that is absent in most recent analysis of this deal and its ramifications. -
HZS C2BRNE DIARY – August 2020
1 HZS C2BRNE DIARY – August 2020 www.cbrne-terrorism-newsletter.com 2 HZS C2BRNE DIARY – August 2020 www.cbrne-terrorism-newsletter.com 3 HZS C2BRNE DIARY – August 2020 PART B Cover photo: Lebanese artist Fatima Dia is auctioning her painting of last week’s tragic Beirut explosion, “Rising Angels,” to help those affected by the blast which tore through the capital on Aug. 4 from the city’s port area, killing over 135 and injuring thousands more. The artist will donate 100 percent of the proceeds to people who lost their homes and were affected by the blast. Indian nuclear forces, 2020 By Hans M. Kristensen & Matt Korda Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2020, Vol. 76, No. 4, pp.217–225 Source: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00963402.2020.1778378 India continues to modernize its nuclear arsenal, with at least three new weapon systems now under development to complement or replace existing nuclear-capable aircraft, land-based delivery systems, and sea-based systems. Several of these systems are nearing completion and will soon be combat-ready. India is estimated to have produced enough military plutonium for 150 to 200 nuclear warheads but has likely produced only 150. Nonetheless, additional plutonium will be required to produce warheads for missiles now under development, and India is reportedly building several new plutonium production facilities. India’s nuclear strategy, which has tradition-ally focused on Pakistan, now appears to place increased emphasis on China, and Beijing is now in range of Indian missiles. Hans M. Kristensen is director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists where he provides the public with analysis and background information about the status of nuclear forces and the role of nuclear weapons. -
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament
Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Annual Report 2016–2017 Chair: The Rt. Hon. Dominic Grieve QC MP Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Annual Report 2016–2017 Chair: The Rt. Hon. Dominic Grieve QC MP Presented to Parliament pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of the Justice and Security Act 2013 Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 20 December 2017 HC 655 © Crown copyright 2017 This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open- government-licence/version/3 Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned. This publication is available at isc.independent.gov.uk Any enquiries regarding this publication should be sent to us via our webform at isc.independent.gov.uk/contact ISBN 978-1-5286-0168-9 CCS1217631642 12/17 Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum Printed in the UK by the APS Group on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENT This Report reflects the work of the previous Committee,1 which sat from September 2015 to May 2017: The Rt. Hon. Dominic Grieve QC MP (Chair) The Rt. Hon. Richard Benyon MP The Most Hon. the Marquess of Lothian QC PC (from 21 October 2016) The Rt. Hon. Sir Alan Duncan KCMG MP The Rt. Hon. Fiona Mactaggart MP (until 17 July 2016) The Rt. Hon. -
Industry Development Offers Many 'Opportunities to Qataris, Residents'
SLOWER PACE | Page 4 Fed shift ing to more cautious rate path Sunday, December 9, 2018 Rabia II 2, 1440 AH OPEN FORUM FOR EMPLOYEES : Page 20 Qatargas holds 1st GULF TIMES post-integration BUSINESS Town Hall session Industry development off ers many ‘opportunities to Qataris, residents’ By Peter Alagos continued thrust on off ering qual- training programme as an incubator Business Reporter ity education to youngsters has for the next generation of business tremendously helped in retaining leaders and decision-makers in Qatari talent to the land of oppor- Qatar’s emerging fi nancial services atar is strategically invest- tunities. The fact that Qatari econ- industry. ing “massive resources” to omy is witnessing boost from all the Moreover, the Qatar Institute for Qdevelop all its industries as a quarters has also substantiated this Public Finance (QIPF) is a Mena- key source of “opportunities esca- very situation,” he continued. wide initiative aimed at actively lation” for all its citizens and resi- Al-Horr stressed that “‘brain tackling knowledge gaps and shar- dents as the country strives to build drain’ is not an issue in Qatar.” Nev- ing expertise and best practice in a knowledge-based economy, Qa- ertheless, the QFBA has designed the public fi nance fi eld, al-Horr tar Finance and Business Academy its curriculum in such a way that it noted. CEO Dr Khalid al-Horr has said. prepares the youth to take right de- “Expanding our reach to include “Qatar recognises that a highly- cisions and paves the way for their higher education platforms, we skilled human capital is the foun- growth in Qatar specifi cally, he have joined forces with Northum- dation by which steady growth can stressed. -
Making Central Beneficial Ownership Registers Public
Making central beneficial ownership registers public Policy Briefing May 2021 Overview 2 Public beneficial ownership data user groups 5 Government users 5 Private sector users 6 Civil society 8 Considerations for implementers 12 Centralised registers 12 Data accessibility and usability 13 Establishing a legal basis 14 Mitigating potential negative effects of public access 17 Conclusion 20 Page 2 of 25 / Making central beneficial ownership registers public Overview The question of whether data should be made open and publication of personal data in BO registers on the grounds accessible to the public, and the concerns about personal of GDPR have followed. It is important that this is being privacy and security risks to individuals, are some of the tested in the courts, and their outcomes will no doubt have most debated issues in beneficial ownership (BO) reform. a profound impact on the debate. In other countries, such These are important, connected issues that need careful as Mexico, there are concerns for kidnapping and personal consideration by implementers. As beneficial ownership safety. These need to be assessed and understood. transparency (BOT) is a relatively new policy area, there The publication of any data, personal or otherwise, as part is not yet a large body of evidence on the impact of making of BO disclosures has some known consequences as well registers public. Nevertheless, where public registers as some potentially unknown consequences. BO data is have been implemented, early evidence is emerging and different from many other datasets being made open, such specific benefits of making BO data publicly available can as contracting data, as it must contain personally iden- be identified. -
Huawei C.F.O. Is Arrested in Canada for Extradition to the U.S. - the New York Times
1/7/2019 Huawei C.F.O. Is Arrested in Canada for Extradition to the U.S. - The New York Times Huawei C.F.O. Is Arrested in Canada for Extradition to the U.S. By Daisuke Wakabayashi and Alan Rappeport Dec. 5, 2018 SAN FRANCISCO — A top executive and daughter of the founder of the Chinese tech giant Huawei was arrested on Saturday in Canada at the request of the United States, in a move likely to escalate tensions between the two countries at a delicate moment. The arrest of Meng Wanzhou, the chief financial officer, unfolded on the same night that President Trump and President Xi Jinping of China dined together in Buenos Aires and agreed to a 90‑day trade truce. The two countries are set to begin tense negotiations in hopes of ending a trade war that has been pummeling both economies. Those talks now face an even steeper challenge. The aim will be for the United States to ease its tariffs; in exchange, China will be expected to lower trade barriers and further open its markets to American businesses. What’s more, Ms. Meng’s detention raises questions about the Trump administration’s overall China strategy. Beijing is now likely to pressure Canada to release her and to press the United States to avoid a trial. “The arrest of a family member linked to Huawei’s founder indicates how the tension between the two sides is rapidly escalating,” said T.J. Pempel, a professor of political science at the University of California, Berkeley, who specializes in East Asian politics and economy. -
A Democratic Licence to Operate Report of the Independent Surveillance Review
A Democratic Licence to Operate Report of the Independent Surveillance Review Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies A Democratic Licence to Operate Report of the Independent Surveillance Review Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies ii A Democratic Licence to Operate Over 180 years of independent defence and security thinking The Royal United Services Institute is the UK’s leading independent think-tank on international defence and security. Its mission is to be an analytical, research-led global forum for informing, influencing and enhancing public debate on a safer and more stable world. Since its foundation in 1831, RUSI has relied on its members to support its activities, sustaining its political independence for over 180 years. London | Brussels | Nairobi | Doha | Tokyo | Washington, DC The views expressed in this publication are the authors’ own, and do not reflect the views of RUSI or any other institution. Published in 2015 by the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution – Non-Commercial – No-Derivatives 4.0 International Licence. For more information, see <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/>. Whitehall Report 2-15, July 2015. ISSN 1750-9432 Printed in the UK by Stephen Austin and Sons, Ltd. Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies Whitehall London SW1A 2ET United Kingdom +44 (0)20 7747 2600 www.rusi.org RUSI is a registered charity (No. 210639) Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations v Preface ix Executive Summary xi Recommendations xv Introduction 1 I. The Digital Society in an Information Age 5 II. -
New Document Releases MI5 Files Introduction These Pages Offer A
New Document Releases MI5 Files Introduction These pages offer a brief overview and description of some of the most interesting files within the latest release of Security Service records. This is the seventh and largest Security Service release, consisting of approximately 200 files, bringing the total number of MI5 records in the Public Record Office to 919. As with previous releases, the bulk of records are personal files, relating to agents, double agents, intelligence officers and renegades, or those under suspicion of being so, the large proportion of which relate to Germany during the period 1939-45. However, this release does include a number of files under new categories, including refugees (KV 2/469- 482), pre-war Soviet intelligence officers (KV 2/483) and agents (KV 2/484- 485), right-wing extremists (KV 2/486-497), communists, communist sympathizers and communist front organisations (KV 2/498-513). There are also a number of policy and subject files. Highlights of the release described in these pages include: • Double agent SNOW (KV 2/444-453) • Double agent GW (KV 2/468) • Double agent ZIG ZAG (KV 2/455-463) • Double agent TREASURE (KV 2/464-466) • Eamon De Valera (KV 2/514-515) • Leon Trotsky (KV 2/502-505) • Grigori Zinoviev (KV 2/501) • Harold Cole (KV 2/415-417) - A British soldier who betrayed Allied escape lines, resulting in the deaths of over 50 people. • Otto Skorzeny (KV 2/403) - SS officer who liberated Mussolini in September 1943 and trained a group of special agents. • Kurt Wieland (KV 2/400-402) - Leader of a small German/Arab paratroop subversive group directed against Jews in Palestine. -
Calendar Entries and Telephone Calls for AG Bill Barr
May 21, 2019 Tuesday 1:45 PM - 2:30 PM Meeting: Paul Nakasone, NSA -- AG's Conference Room POC: Seth DuCharme Attendees: Brian Rabbitt and Seth Ducharme NSA Attendees: General Paul Nakasone and Glenn Gerstell POC: (b)(3) -50 U.S.C. § 3605 3:30 PM - 4:30 PM SPEECH REVIEW 3:30 PM - 3:45 PM Paper PC -- AG's Office Attendee: Seth DuCharme 9:30 PM - 10:00 PM En Route to Residence (via DOJ) In Limo: AG, Will Levi, Brian Rabbitt, John Moran 4 00677-0004 May 22, 2019 Wednesday 8:30 AM - 9:00 AM En Route to DOJ 10:00 AM - 10:15 AM Swearing-In: DAG Jeff Rosen -- AG's Conference Room POC: Brian Rabbitt Attendees: AG, DAG and his wife (Kathleen Nichols Rosen), Ed O’Callaghan, Brian Rabbitt, Patrick Hovakimian DOJ Photographer 11:00 AM - 11:00 AM En Route to DoS In Limo: AG and Brian Rabbitt 11:15 AM - 11:45 AM Meeting with Secretary Pompeo -- Dept. of State, 2201 C Street, NW, WDC 20520 POC: Brian Rabbitt Scheduler: (b) (6) – (b) (6) Attendees: AG and Brian Rabbitt 11:45 AM - 11:45 AM En Route to DOJ In Limo: AG and Brian Rabbitt 1:30 PM - 2:00 PM Meeting -- AG's Office POC: Brian Rabbitt Attendees: Brian Rabbitt and John Durham 2:00 PM - 2:15 PM Secure Phone Call to Director Gina Haspel -- AG's Office POC: Brian Rabbitt Attendee: Brian Rabbitt (b) (6) 4:45 PM - 4:45 PM En Route to DOJ In Limo: AG, John Moran and Rachel Bissex 5:00 PM - 6:00 PM FBI Briefing -- JCC POC: Seth DuCharme Attendees: Brian Rabbitt, Seth DuCharme, DAG Rosen, Patrick Hovakimian, Ed O’Callaghan, Tash Gauhar, (b) (6) , David Burns FBI: Dir. -
Israeli-Made Spyware Used to Monitor Journalists and Activists Worldwide
They Are Watching You: Israeli-Made Spyware Used to Monitor Journalists and Activists Worldwide By OCCRP In Hungary, Szabolcs Panyi exposed spy intrigue and murky arms deals. In India, Paranjoy Guha Thakurta probed the ties between business and political interests. In Azerbaijan, Sevinj Vaqifqizi caught vote-rigging on tape. Separated by thousands of miles, these journalists have one thing in common: their governments considered them a threat. All three were among dozens of journalists and activists around the world whose smartphones were infected by Pegasus: spyware made by Israeli firm NSO Group that is able to secretly steal personal data, read conversations, and switch on microphones and cameras at will. The attacks were revealed by The Pegasus Project, an international collaboration of more than 80 journalists from 17 media organizations, including OCCRP, and coordinated by Forbidden Stories. What Does ‘Selected for Targeting’ Mean? The phones of Panyi, Thakurta, and Vaqifqizi were analyzed by Amnesty International’s Security Lab and found to be infected after their numbers appeared on a list of over 50,000 numbers that were allegedly selected for targeting by governments using NSO software. Reporters were able to identify the owners of hundreds of those numbers, and Amnesty conducted forensic analysis on as many of their phones as possible, confirming infection in dozens of cases. The reporting was backed up with interviews, documents, and other materials.The strongest evidence that the list really does represent Pegasus targets came through forensic analysis. Amnesty International’s Security Lab examined data from 67 phones whose numbers were in the list. Thirty-seven phones showed traces of Pegasus activity: 23 phones were successfully infected, and 14 showed signs of attempted targeting.