DOCSLIB.ORG

On the 'Passions' and Reason

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
On the 'Passions' and Reason On the ‘passions’ and reason In a great book,“Stoicism” , the author, Donald Robertson, writes on the wisdom of Stoic thinking. “What does Stoic philosophy demand from us? What promise does it hold out in return? What are the causes of the irrational desires and emotional disturbances for which people seek a remedy in philosophy? What about positive feelings like joy, tranquility and love? Seneca Before getting further into theory and practice, it’s traditional explore what motivates people to become students of Stoic philosophy in the first place. Stoicism is a hard road to follow but we’re told its benefits should, in a manner of speaking, be common sense – with a bit of help, we should be able at least glimpse them from the outset. Although only the perfect Sage enjoys eudaimonia, Seneca claims that unless we embrace philosophy, the love of wisdom, life is not even bearable, because emotional disturbances are allowed free rein. Indeed, the initial motive for most people to study Stoic philosophy simply the alleviation of their own suffering, although the ultimate goal is to excel as a human being. So the promise of philosophy consists of both the supreme Happiness and fulfilment (eudaimonia) of the Sage and the aspiring Stoic’s gradual progress towards overcoming www.capitalideasonline.com Page - 1 On the ‘passions’ and reason disturbing desires and emotions (apatheia), sometimes called the Stoic ‘therapy of the passions’. As far as the ancient Stoics were concerned: ‘The philosopher’s school is a doctor’s clinic’ (Discourses, 3.23). Musonius Rufus Curiously, the Stoics appear to attribute the exhortation to philosophy to Zeus himself, who promises us relief from suffering. Musonius Rufus taught that Zeus ‘orders and encourages’ us to study philosophy. According to him, in a nutshell, the law of Zeus orders humans to be good, which means being philosophers, loving wisdom, being virtuous and magnanimous, rising above pain and pleasure, and being free from animosity towards others. Epictetus follows his teacher, and frequently places similar words in the mouth of Zeus, starting with the first of his compiled lectures. He actually breaks away from his conversation with students to describe an imaginary dialogue between himself and Zeus, who is portrayed as saying he has given us a small portion of himself, our ‘ruling faculty’, which gives us the power to make choices and decisions in life. It is our duty to take care of this divine faculty above all else, as it is our only true possession, and we are granted complete freedom in employing it. If we can learn to prize wisdom above all other things, ‘Zeus’ assures us we will never be obstructed, never become upset or complain, and never become angry with or subservient to any other person. www.capitalideasonline.com Page - 2 On the ‘passions’ and reason Zeus The point Epictetus was making is that the basic principles of Stoicism are learnable from reflection on human nature. They are fundamentally common sense, as Zeus has planted the seed of virtue deep within all of us and so the goal of life is in our very nature. Elsewhere, he asks his students whether Zeus or Nature has not already given them their orders, clearly enough, from the day they were born. Nature has given us what is ours, our judgement and volition, to use freely, in accord with virtue. She has placed everything else beyond our direct control, subject to obstacles and interference. ‘Guard by every means that which your own, but do not grasp at that which is another’s.’ Although the words vary, most of the time Epictetus portrays Zeus as thundering the same basic Stoic message: ‘If you wish any good thing, get it from yourself’ (Discourses, 1.29). Nature itself teaches us that if we want true Happiness, and the good life, we must seek it within ourselves rather than in external things. If we can only do this consistently, Epictetus says, we will achieve perfect freedom, and liberate ourselves from emotional suffering. Happiness or fulfilment, eudaimonia, was known in ancient times as ‘the promise of www.capitalideasonline.com Page - 3 On the ‘passions’ and reason philosophy’. All schools of philosophy basically agreed that this was what they were aiming for, but they disagreed about precisely what it meant. In fact, their different definitions of eudaimonia distinguished one school from another. Zeno described it very concisely as a ‘smoothly flowing’ or serene life, a life of freedom from being thwarted or obstructed in what we seek to achieve. He made it clear that this is achieved by living in harmonious agreement with Nature, and in accord with virtue. However, ‘life is warfare’, and the Stoic achieves serenity by arming himself to face whatever may be inflicted on him by the vicissitudes of events, the turning ‘Wheel of Fortune’. The promise of philosophy was therefore the promise of both Happiness and the emotional resilience to retain it in the face of setbacks. Cicero For what does the promise amount to? This that, heaven willing, philosophy will ensure that the man who has obeyed its laws shall never fail to be armed against all the hazards of fortune: that he shall possess and control, within his own self, every possible guarantee for a satisfactory and Happy life. In other words, that he shall always be a happy man. (Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, 5.7) www.capitalideasonline.com Page - 4 On the ‘passions’ and reason Elsewhere Cicero portrays Happiness in terms of the ‘inner citadel’ of Stoicism: ‘We want the happy man to be safe, impregnable, fenced and fortified, so that he is not just largely unafraid, but completely’ (Tusculan Disputations, 5.41). One of the most important philosophical arguments of the Stoics was that it is impossible to imagine someone who is on the one hand a wise and good man, having attained perfect eudaimonia, and, on the other hand, still plagued by emotional disturbance or pathological desires. The Stoics famously refer to these as the ‘passions’ (pathe); they believed them to be the root cause of all human suffering, and essentially toxic to eudaimonia. The ability to overcome unhealthy fears and desires is termed apatheia, being ‘passionless’ or rather without passions of the problematic sort. It’s where our word ‘apathy’ comes from, but that’s not what it means. As Keith Seddon, a modern Stoic author, puts it, ‘The Stoic will be apathes, without passion (not apathetic, but dispassionate), but not wholly without feeling’. The Stoics also refer to the Sage as having attained ‘tranquillity’ (ataraxia) and ‘freedom’ (eleutheria) from ‘enslavement’ by the passions. However, these endeavours to overcome the ‘passions’ have caused much confusion and led to the widespread misconception that the Stoics are somehow ‘unemotional’ or seek to repress their feelings. This is largely based on a misunderstanding caused by problems of modern translation and interpretation – it’s simply not what they meant. This misinterpretation was repeatedly addressed by the ancient Stoics themselves, though. So let’s pause to reflect on what they actually said… They [the founders of Stoicism] say the wise man is also passionless [apathe, whence our word ‘apathy’], because he is not vulnerable to them. But the bad man is called ‘passionless’ in a different sense, which means the same as ‘hard-hearted’ and ‘insensitive’. (Lives, 7.117) www.capitalideasonline.com Page - 5 On the ‘passions’ and reason Zeno meant that the wise man was not enslaved by his feelings of fear or desire, but we’re explicitly told here that’s not the same as being ‘hard-hearted’ and ‘insensitive’, which is the false impression many people have today of Stoicism. The Roman Stoic Laelius was portrayed, centuries later in a dialogue by Cicero, as saying that it would actually be the greatest possible mistake to try to eliminate natural and healthy feelings such as those of friendship, because even animals experience affection for their offspring, which Stoics viewed as the foundation of human love and friendship (Laelius, On Friendship, 13). We would not only be dehumanizing ourselves by eliminating such natural feelings, he says, but reducing ourselves below animal nature to something more like a mere tree trunk or a stone. We should therefore turn a deaf ear to anyone who foolishly suggests that the good life entails having ‘the hardness of iron’ in terms of our emotions. Epictetus subsequently taught his students that we ought not to be free from passions (apathi) in the sense of being unfeeling ‘like a statue’, because Stoics do care about their family and fellow citizens, for whom they continue to have ‘natural affection’ and a sense of kinship or ‘affinity’. Finally, Seneca, likewise, says: There are misfortunes which strike the sage – without incapacitating him, of course – such as physical pain, infirmity, the loss of friends or children, or the catastrophes of his country when it is devastated by war. I grant that he is sensitive to these things, for we do not impute to him to be hardness of a rock or of iron. There is no virtue in putting up with that which one does not feel. (On the Constancy the Sage, 10.4) www.capitalideasonline.com Page - 6 On the ‘passions’ and reason Diogenes There’s a strange problem, as Seneca points out here, with the notion that the Stoic Sage is completely devoid of emotion. It recalls a story about Diogenes the Cynic, who was asked by a Spartan if he was feeling cold, when training himself by stripping naked and embracing a bronze statue in winter. Diogenes said he was not, and the Spartan replied: ‘What’s so impressive about what you’re doing then?’.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Stoic Enlightenments
    Copyright © 2011 Margaret Felice Wald All rights reserved STOIC ENLIGHTENMENTS By MARGARET FELICE WALD A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School-New Brunswick Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Graduate Program in English written under the direction of Michael McKeon and approved by ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ ________________________ New Brunswick, New Jersey October 2011 ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION Stoic Enlightenments By MARGARET FELICE WALD Dissertation Director: Michael McKeon Stoic ideals infused seventeenth- and eighteenth-century thought, not only in the figure of the ascetic sage who grins and bears all, but also in a myriad of other constructions, shaping the way the period imagined ethical, political, linguistic, epistemological, and social reform. My dissertation examines the literary manifestation of Stoicism’s legacy, in particular regarding the institution and danger of autonomy, the foundation and limitation of virtue, the nature of the passions, the difference between good and evil, and the referentiality of language. Alongside the standard satirical responses to the ancient creed’s rigor and rationalism, seventeenth- and eighteenth-century poetry, drama, and prose developed Stoic formulations that made the most demanding of philosophical ideals tenable within the framework of common experience. Instead of serving as hallmarks for hypocrisy, the literary stoics I investigate uphold a brand of stoicism fit for the post-regicidal, post- Protestant Reformation, post-scientific revolutionary world. My project reveals how writers used Stoicism to determine the viability of philosophical precept and establish ways of compensating for human fallibility. The ambivalent status of the Stoic sage, staged and restaged in countless texts, exemplified the period’s anxiety about measuring up to its ideals, its efforts to discover the plenitude of ii natural laws and to live by them.
    [Show full text]
  • Stoicism a School of Thought That Flourished in Greek and Roman
    Stoicism A school of thought that flourished in Greek and Roman antiquity. It was one of the loftiest and most sublime philosophies in the record of Western civilization. In urging participation in the affairs of man, Stoics have always believed that the goal of all inquiry is to provide man with a mode of conduct characterized by tranquillity of mind and certainty of moral worth. Nature and scope of Stoicism For the early Stoic philosopher, as for all the post-Aristotelian schools, knowledge and its pursuit are no longer held to be ends in themselves. The Hellenistic Age was a time of transition, and the Stoic philosopher was perhaps its most influential spokesman. A new culture was in the making. The heritage of an earlier period, with Athens as its intellectual leader, was to continue, but to undergo many changes. If, as with Socrates, to know is to know oneself, rationality as the sole means by which something outside of the self might be achieved may be said to be the hallmark of Stoic belief. As a Hellenistic philosophy, Stoicism presented an ars vitae, a way of accommodation for people to whom the human condition no longer appeared as the mirror of a universal, calm, and ordered existence. Reason alone could reveal the constancy of cosmic order and the originative source of unyielding value; thus, reason became the true model for human existence. To the Stoic, virtue is an inherent feature of the world, no less inexorable in relation to man than are the laws of nature. The Stoics believed that perception is the basis of true knowledge.
    [Show full text]
  • Early Pyrrhonism As a Sect of Buddhism? a Case Study in the Methodology of Comparative Philosophy
    Comparative Philosophy Volume 9, No. 2 (2018): 1-40 Open Access / ISSN 2151-6014 / www.comparativephilosophy.org https://doi.org/10.31979/2151-6014(2018).090204 EARLY PYRRHONISM AS A SECT OF BUDDHISM? A CASE STUDY IN THE METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY MONTE RANSOME JOHNSON & BRETT SHULTS ABSTRACT: We offer a sceptical examination of a thesis recently advanced in a monograph published by Princeton University Press entitled Greek Buddha: Pyrrho’s Encounter with Early Buddhism in Central Asia. In this dense and probing work, Christopher I. Beckwith, a professor of Central Eurasian studies at Indiana University, Bloomington, argues that Pyrrho of Elis adopted a form of early Buddhism during his years in Bactria and Gandhāra, and that early Pyrrhonism must be understood as a sect of early Buddhism. In making his case Beckwith claims that virtually all scholars of Greek, Indian, and Chinese philosophy have been operating under flawed assumptions and with flawed methodologies, and so have failed to notice obvious and undeniable correspondences between the philosophical views of the Buddha and of Pyrrho. In this study we take Beckwith’s proposal and challenge seriously, and we examine his textual basis and techniques of translation, his methods of examining passages, his construal of problems and his reconstruction of arguments. We find that his presuppositions are contentious and doubtful, his own methods are extremely flawed, and that he draws unreasonable conclusions. Although the result of our study is almost entirely negative, we think it illustrates some important general points about the methodology of comparative philosophy. Keywords: adiaphora, anātman, anattā, ataraxia, Buddha, Buddhism, Democritus, Pāli, Pyrrho, Pyrrhonism, Scepticism, trilakṣaṇa 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Platonic and Stoic Passions in Philo of Alexandria Loren Kerns George Fox University, [email protected]
    Digital Commons @ George Fox University George Fox Evangelical Seminary 2013 Platonic and Stoic Passions in Philo of Alexandria Loren Kerns George Fox University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/gfes Part of the Christianity Commons, and the Church History Commons Recommended Citation Kerns, Loren, "Platonic and Stoic Passions in Philo of Alexandria" (2013). George Fox Evangelical Seminary. Paper 6. http://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/gfes/6 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in George Fox Evangelical Seminary by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox University. Kings College London Platonic and Stoic Passions in Philo of Alexandria A Dissertation submitted to The School of Arts and Humanities In Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Theology and Religious Studies By Loren Kerns London, United Kingdom July 2013 Copyright by Loren Kerns, 2013 All rights reserved. Abstract Philo of Alexandria forged his theory of the soul and its passions while expositing the meaning of Torah. Though writing as a Jewish teacher and disciple of Moses, his biblical reflections display a strong orientation toward Middle-Platonic philosophy. On the topic of the soul and its passions, however, Philo also exhibits significant Stoic influence. The introduction notes Philo’s apparent incompatible use of both the complex Platonic and the monistic Stoic psychological models. After assessing the degree to which Philo understood 'passion' to be a type of Stoic impulse or opinion (chapter one), chapter two demonstrates that Philo consistently drew upon the Stoics’ depiction of all passions as irrational, excessive, and unnatural.
    [Show full text]
  • Moore, K. 2009 'Persaeus of Citium: a Lapsed Stoic?' Rosetta 7: 1-21. Http
    Moore, K. 2009 ‘Persaeus of Citium: A Lapsed Stoic?’ Rosetta 7: 1-21. http://rosetta.bham.ac.uk/issue7/persaeus-citium/ http://rosetta.bham.ac.uk/issue7/persaeus-citium/ Persaeus of Citium: A Lapsed Stoic? Kenneth Moore Abstract: This article examines the historical evidence on the life of Persaeus of Citium, a Stoic philosopher and immediate student of Zeno, the founder of Stoicism. It also considers the anecdotal accounts of Persaeus’ actions with regard to Stoic philosophy as it was understood to apply during his lifetime. Persaeus was one of an elite group of scholars present at the court of Antigonus II Gonatus, King of Macedon and appears to have had a direct involvement in the political affairs of Macedonia. His activities, as recounted in the surviving sources, seem to run contrary to established Stoic customs, in particular the preference for praxis over theoria.1 However, there is also some indication that he may have been vilified by his scholarly and political enemies. This article provides a brief glimpse into the life and times of Persaeus as well as the turbulent fourth/third centuries in Greece. Introduction: Persaeus (ca. 306-243 BCE), of Citium, son of Demetrius, was a Stoic philosopher. He was also a student and close acquaintance of Zeno of Citium (ca. 334-262 BCE), the founder of Stoicism. It is difficult to obtain a clear picture of his life and philosophy since none of his own works survive and most of the sources that deal with him come from late antiquity and provide relatively little, albeit potentially quite significant, information.
    [Show full text]
  • Targeting Emotion in Early Stoicism
    Binghamton University The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB) The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter 12-28-2002 Targeting Emotion in Early Stoicism Scott M. Rubarth Rollins College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Ancient Philosophy Commons, and the History of Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Rubarth, Scott M., "Targeting Emotion in Early Stoicism" (2002). The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter. 353. https://orb.binghamton.edu/sagp/353 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). It has been accepted for inclusion in The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter by an authorized administrator of The Open Repository @ Binghamton (The ORB). For more information, please contact [email protected]. Targeting Emotion in Early Stoicism Scott M. Rubarth, Rollins College Presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at the 2002 meeting with the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association, in Philadelphia The Stoic sage is a cold, heartless being who would not grieve over the loss of a beloved companion or child. Unmoved, unemotional, uncaring, the sage is an ethical and emotional monstrosity hiding behind the pretension of the so-called virtues of detachment and austerity. That, at least, is how many who study Stoic ethics perceive the sage in regard to his/her emotional life. 1 In this paper I will argue that this conception of the Stoic theory of emotion and passion is misleading; emotions, in fact, are central to Stoic ethics and apatheia should not be confused with the contemporary idea of apathy or emotional flatness.
    [Show full text]
  • 2280-2; Most Can Also Be Found Grouped by Topic in Motto (1970)
    1 Not as a Deserter, But as a Spy: Seneca’s Reception of Epicureanism Within the history of Epicurus’ reception at Rome the figure of Seneca the Younger occupies a position of particular interest. Though not himself an Epicurean, Seneca is deeply engaged with Epicurean thought and Epicurean texts; in fact, he refers to Epicurus or to his doctrines and members of his community more than eighty times, in eight of his works, including over forty direct quotations from Epicurean writings.1 Yet his reactions are initially hard to fathom. At times painstakingly accurate, he is also capable of what seems like willful misrepresentation of Epicurus’ views; often antagonistic, he is also on occasion strikingly appreciative of what Epicurus has to offer. On some points he does not hesitate to express as his own view ideas which he knows to be Epicurean in origin. More than that, he will sometimes modify and develop those ideas in ways that make him a fascinating and yet puzzling case of Epicurean influence outside the Garden. The complexity of Seneca’s response at one time made him the case in point for that older view of Roman philosophy that spoke of “eclecticism.” Indeed the very notion of eclecticism as formulated by Eduard Zeller and Karl Praechter was devised in part as a way of accounting for Seneca’s extraordinary attitude toward the rival school.2 Even Pierluigi Donini, who in 1988 effectively demolished the wider picture of philosophy under the Roman empire as predominantly eclectic, finds Seneca to be “a completely isolated and peculiar instance.”3 More recently, numerous careful studies of the particulars of Seneca’s thought have established across the board that Seneca is indeed what he claims to be, a committed though not subservient adherent of Stoicism in all its essentials.4 For that reason it is all the 1 A full list of references is provided in Ferguson (1990), 2280-2; most can also be found grouped by topic in Motto (1970) .
    [Show full text]
  • Seneca-Letters.Pdf
    CLARENDON LATER ANCIENT PHILOSOPHERS Series editors: Jonathan Barnes, Universite´ de Paris IV—Sorbonne and A. A. Long, University of California, Berkeley SENECA SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius are a rich source of information about ancient Stoicism, an influential work for early modern philosophers, and a fascinating philosophical document in their own right. This selection of the letters aims to include those which are of greatest philosophical interest, especially those which highlight the debates between Stoics and Platonists or Aristotelians in the first century AD, and the issue, still important today, of how technical philosophical enquiry is related to the various purposes for which philosophy is practised. In addition to examining the philosophical content of each letter, Brad Inwood’s commentary discusses the literary and historical background of the letters and to their relationship with other prose works by Seneca. Seneca is the earliest Stoic author for whom we have access to a large number of complete works, and these works were highly influential in later centuries. He was also a politically influential advisor to the Roman emperor Nero and a celebrated author of prose and verse. His philosophical acuity and independence of mind make his works exciting and challenging for the modern reader. Brad Inwood is Professor of Classics and Philosophy at the University of Toronto. PUBLISHEDINTHESERIES Alcinous: The Handbook of Platonism John Dillon Epictetus: Discourses, Book Robert Dobbin Galen: On the Therapeutic Method, Books I and II R. J. Hankinson Porphyry: Introduction Jonathan Barnes Seneca: Selected Philosophical Letters Brad Inwood Sextus Empiricus: Against the Ethicists Richard Bett Sextus Empiricus: Against the Grammarians David Blank SENECA SELECTED PHILOSOPHICAL LETTERS Translated with an Introduction and Commentary by BRAD INWOOD 1 1 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
    [Show full text]
  • Locating Stoic Influence in Jules Barbey D'aurevilly's "Du Dandysme Et De Georges Brummell" and Charles Baudelaire's "Le Peintre De La Vie Moderne"
    Western University Scholarship@Western Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository 1-10-2014 12:00 AM The Evolution of Indifference: Locating Stoic Influence in Jules Barbey d'Aurevilly's "Du Dandysme et de Georges Brummell" and Charles Baudelaire's "Le Peintre de la vie moderne" Aurie Zeran The University of Western Ontario Supervisor Professor Angela Borchert The University of Western Ontario Graduate Program in Comparative Literature A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the equirr ements for the degree in Master of Arts © Aurie Zeran 2014 Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd Part of the Comparative Literature Commons Recommended Citation Zeran, Aurie, "The Evolution of Indifference: Locating Stoic Influence in Jules Barbey d'Aurevilly's "Du Dandysme et de Georges Brummell" and Charles Baudelaire's "Le Peintre de la vie moderne"" (2014). Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository. 1860. https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/etd/1860 This Dissertation/Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Western. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Western. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Evolution of Indifference: Locating Stoic Influence in Jules Barbey d’Aurevilly’s “Du Dandysme et Georges Brummell” and Charles Baudelaire’s “Le Peintre de la vie moderne” (Thesis format: Monograph) by Aurie Zeran Graduate Program in Comparative Literature A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts The School of Graduate and Postdoctoral Studies The University of Western Ontario London, Ontario, Canada © Aurie Zeran, 2013 i Abstract This thesis surveys the relationship between late Roman Stoicism and nineteenth century dandyism.
    [Show full text]
  • Practicing Philosophy
    Practicing Philosophy Practicing Philosophy Edited by Aleksandar Fatić and Lydia Amir Practicing Philosophy Edited by Aleksandar Fatić and Lydia Amir This book first published 2015 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2015 by Aleksandar Fatić, Lydia Amir and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-8104-X ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-8104-3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 I .................................................................................................................... 3 Ancient Philosophical Reflections on Two Conceptions of Happiness Dimitrios Dentsoras II ................................................................................................................ 22 The Philosophical Practitioner as a Co-Researcher Finn Thorbjøn Hansen III ............................................................................................................... 42 The Meaningfulness of and Satisfaction from Dialogues in Philosophical Practice: Considerations of Content and Methodology Anders Lindseth IV
    [Show full text]
  • The Enchiridion by Epictetus (Translated by Elizabeth Carter)
    The Enchiridion by Epictetus (Translated by Elizabeth Carter) Please note: this essay is located under Essays: Early Church simply because that section has more room. Introduction This text is not a scholarly presentation but an invitation to read an ancient text in the spirit of lectio divina, the theme of this homepage. That means a slow, meditative focus is the aim with a view toward incorporating what we read into our lives. While lectio divina more com- monly pertains to sacred scripture, there’s no reason to confine it there. It’s general princi- ples certainly can apply to philosophical texts, especially ancient ones as the Enchiridion. Most Introductions to texts with regard to scripture or as the one at hand take pains to point out, information about the author or text itself can be garnered from plenty of reliable sources. Such is not the purpose of this document. Hopefully Epictetus himself would give his approval to this lectio divina approach. It’s interesting to note that he was a Stoic philosopher more or less contemporary with Sts. Peter and Paul, all having lived in Rome under the emperor Nero. It gets even better. Epictetus was born a slave and was crippled either by birth, accident or deliberately. We’re simply not sure, but this adds a certain charm as well as authority to his writings. Furthermore, Admiral James Stockdale, a devotee of Epictetus, found support in his Stoic philosophy while a prisoner of war in North Vietnam for seven years. One such website details this and links a book he had written inspired by Epictetus.
    [Show full text]
  • Henry More As Reader of Marcus Aurelius
    Henry More as Reader of Marcus Aurelius JOHN SELLARS ABSTRACT: I examine Henry More’s engagement with Stoicism in general, and Marcus Aurelius in particular, in his Enchiridion Ethicum. More quotes from Marcus’s Meditations throughout the Enchiridion, leading one commentator to note that More ‘mined the Meditations’ when writing his book. Yet More’s general attitude towards Stoicism is more often than not critical, especially when it comes to the passions. I shall argue that while More was clearly an avid reader of the Meditations he read Marcus not as a Stoic but as a ‘non-denominational’ ancient moralist who confirms a range of doctrines that More finds elsewhere in ancient philosophy. In this sense More continues the Neoplatonic practice of downplaying doctrinal differences between ancient philosophers in order to construct a single ancient philosophical tradition. This is quite different from the approach of his contemporary and fellow Cambridge Platonist, Ralph Cudworth, who was keen to highlight doctrinal differences between ancient philosophers. Henry More’s Enchiridion Ethicum, first published in 1668 and translated into English as An Account of Virtue in 1690,1 is rich in references to ancient philosophical authors. Among these Aristotle is probably the most prominent, but a casual reader of the work cannot help be struck by the frequency with which More quotes from or refers to the Meditations of Marcus Aurelius. Indeed, the frequency led one recent commentator to claim that More ‘mined the Meditations’ when writing the work.2 More was by no means alone in being captivated by the Meditations during this period.
    [Show full text]