Nelly Lahoud

Some Aspects of Islamic Allegory

This paper explores the interplay between the literal sense of the Qur'ãn and the various allegorical interpretations ( ta'wî l ) of many of its verses. It draws on the esoteric and the exoteric interpretations the Scripture lends itself to. On the one hand, the Qur'ãn presents itself as having the right to adjudicate the intellectual realm, especially in relation to the legitimacy and the merit of ideas and values. On the other hand, the Qur'ãn , itself, provides its audience an escape from this intellectual monopoly by describing its message as containing exoteric ( z?âhir ) as well as esoteric ( bât?in ) meanings. It indicates explicitly that its message contains 'some verses clear to be understood [ muh?kamât ], they are the foundation of the book; and others are parabolical [ mutashâbihât ].' [1] Coupled with the complex subtleties of the Arabic language, this distinction has provided a modality for thinkers, be they jurists, theologians or philosophers, who wished to explore and defend ideas beyond those explicitly sanctioned by Scripture.

To start with, it needs to be stressed that the study of ta'wî l in the Islamic tradition is a wide topic that has undergone different developments in the various intellectual disciplines. These disciplines include jurisprudence ( fiqh ), commentary ( tafsîr ), theology ( kalâm ) and philosophy ( falsafa ). [2] A distinct approach to ta'wî l is also developed in the mystical version of Islam, Sufism, especially by Ibn 'Arabî. This paper explores a limited aspect of ta'wî l . It argues that ta'wî l was not a mere intellectual device used by theologians, jurists and philosophers, but it was also a political tool that was used to justify the differences between the various rival schools of thought. It served to veil, when deemed undesirable, the restrictions that certain aspects of the Qur'ãn , if interpreted literally, would impose on their teachings. Of particular relevance to this discussion are the different approaches and applications of ta'wî l in the works of Ghazâ l î(1058-1111)&emdash;whose intention was to attack the philosophers and defend his orthodox ideas, which derived partly from the theological school of Ash'arism&emdash;, and those of (1126-1198)&emdash;whose goal was to defend philosophy and the pursuit of philosophical studies.

The Arabic Language and Allegory:

'Allegory' refers to two interlinked and sometimes complementary literary procedures. One is about writing allegorically, the other is about interpreting allegorically. An explanation needs to be made about these two genres. Writing allegorically is to write in a manner which apparent meaning differs from the intended message of the author. Interpreting allegorically, or allegoresis , is the process of bringing out/speculating about the hidden message of an allegorical work. [3] The allegoresis genre, it needs to be added, can turn into an allegorical work (i.e., an allegoriser turning into an allegorist), which in turn gives rise to another interpretive tradition.

Further, allegoresis is not limited to works intended to be interpreted allegorically. An allegoriser may treat as an allegoresis a work that is intended to be understood literally. One may do so for a number of reasons, either to enhance, add other dimensions to or even manipulate its message to suit a particular agenda. In other words, the allegoresis genre can be as much about constructing/inventing a new message of a given text as construing its intended meaning. A similar blurring can apply to the way in which a reader judges not only texts that fall under the allegorical and allegoresis genres, but also texts the meanings of which may be said to be apparent. That is to say, this complex distinction between allegory and allegoresis should not suggest that texts which may be said to fall outside these two genres are immune to the interpretative machinery. To use Solomon Simonson's words, what one reader may consider 'as an "interpretation," another will denounce as a "construction"; what one may regard as a "construction," another will disdain as a mere "interpretation".' [4] The allegoresis genre may then be discerned, in differing degrees, in various styles of writings, especially in works of exegesis, hermeneutics and commentaries.

In some genres of writings, allegoresis is associated with the inception of logical intellectual trends within a tradition, [5] or what is known as a move from mythos (associated with myth) to logos (associated with reason), a reference to the development of certain intellectual disciplines in ancient Greece. This relates to a process of demythologising texts with a strong mythological foundation that are held to be authoritative sources of truth. Such a process is intended to give these texts a significance different from the sense that they literally convey. [6] For instance, the succession from Uranus to Cronos to Zeus, as described by Hesiod, when read in this way, turns into a description of a system of emanation from 'One' to 'Mind' to 'Soul', as Plotinus expounds it. [7] A myth then may be read as an allegory, even if the allegorical sense may not have been present in the minds of the transmitters of the myth. It would be simplistic to reduce such an allegorisation to an intellectual shift from myth to reason. Such a generalisation does not adequately take into account the complexities of the intellectual environment from which myth springs, nor does it fairly represent the limitations of the assumptions of a reason-based intellectual environment. Nevertheless, it needs to be acknowledged that the re-formulation of existing literature to suit different intellectual environments indicates a certain level of sophistication on the part of the allegoriser.

The various interpretations of religious scriptures exemplify the abundant and differing meanings that may be attributed to a single text source. The Hebrew Bible, for example, has undergone numerous expositions and renditions by numerous scholars since the time it was compiled. One may trace such exposition back to the people who were responsible for establishing the canon, which make up the Torah and the rest of the Hebrew Bible. Those who established the canon themselves made certain interpretive statements by the choice of books that they included and those that they omitted. [8] Their choices gave rise to a tradition of commentaries, including the Palestinian and Babylonian Talmud s, out of which sprang a plethora of other interpretive traditions. [9]

Within the broad parameters of allegoresis , the Arabic language has many literary devices that one can use to write and interpret allegorically. They include sharh? and tafsîr (interpretation, commentary), isti'âra (metaphor), tashbîh (simile), ramz and majâz (symbolism or figurative), ishâra (intimation or allusion), bayân and balâgha (eloquence or good style). [10] Further, ta'wî l in the Arabic context can refer to content/meaning ( ta'wî l al-ma'na ) and to grammar ( al-ta'wî l al-nah?awî ). The two may be used for different ends. The grammarians, for example, used ta'wî l al-ma'na to serve the ta'wî l al-nah?awî , when some qur'anic verses did not conform to what they considered to be the rules that govern grammar. [11] An understanding of the interplay between grammar and meaning is a necessary foundation for the appreciation of the various subtleties and nuances in the polemical discourses between the theologians and the philosophers, in this case, in the discourses of Ghazâ l î and Ibn Rushd. Also to be emphasised is the central importance the Qur'ãn occupies in relation to both the Arabic language and to Islamic thought. This point is of particular importance given the use by Ghazâ l î and Ibn Rushd of the Qur'ãn to justify their different positions. Their writings suggest that they both knew the Qur'ãn by heart, and it informed almost every sentence of their discourse.

It is not an exaggeration to state that any discussion that seeks to address the development of Islamic thought needs to account for the central importance the Arabic language occupies in this field and the way in which the Qur'ãn features in the development of the Arabic language. On this aspect, the Arabic grammarian and literary historian Jirji Zaydan wrote that 'the Qur'ãn has an influence over the literatures of the Arabic language that no other religious text has in other languages.' [12] There is even more appreciation by scholars of the Qur'ãn 's literary style. A. H. Johns comments that the Qur'ãn is a 'mosaic of diverse styles' pointing to the impact the rhetoric of the book can have on listeners. [13] For Muslim scholars, the miracle of the Qur'ãn lies in the text itself, that is to say, in the i'jâz , or the inimitability of the discourse. The i'jâz of the Qur'ãn has a significant prominence equivalent, at least, to the reported miracles of Moses and the magic of Jesus. [14] Hence, the Arabic lexicon quotes an unnamed scholar who, writing in poetry, expresses the importance of mastering the Arabic language:

Our duty to learn languages

Is like that of memorising prayers

For no religion is understood

Except by the study of languages [15]

Furthermore, the Qur'ãn , Muslims believe, was revealed to Muhammad in Arabic as being the articulate discourse of God ( kalâm Allâh ). [16] The sublime authority of this claim meant that the followers of the religion of Islam were bound to adopt the Arabic language of the Qur'ãn . The Qur'ãn was the first Arabic book to be read and most of the intellectual disciplines which appeared after the emergence of Islam, Zaydan notes, 'either sprang from the Qur'ãn or originated as ancillaries ( khidmat ) to it.' [17] Hence, the statement that 'the science of the Arabic language is the religion itself'(by Abu 'Amru b. al-'Alâ') reflects accurately the complex dimensions linking Islam, Islamic thought and the Arabic language. [18] It is in light of this linguistic dimension that the following discussion on the use of allegorical interpretation ( ta'wî l ) by Ghazâ lî and Ibn Rushd needs to be understood.

Theology and Philosophy in the Debate between Ghazâ l î and Ibn Rushd:

The medieval debate between theology and philosophy, as played out by Ghazâ lî and Ibn Rushd, reflects what may be termed as a politicisation of ta'wî l . Political organisation in the Islamic context and milieu , it needs to be firstly noted, developed in association with and, in some respect, within other disciplines. Those other disciplines may be classified under three broad categories: theology (' ilm al - kalâm ), jurisprudence ( fiqh ) and philosophy ( falsafa ). The discipline of theology, with its two main schools Mu'tazila and Ash'arite, occupied a prominent role in the early period of Islam. [19] The background to the debate between Ghazâ lî and Ibn Rushd is the growing tension between Islamic theology ( kalâm ) and . Both camps used the intellectual tools provided by Greek thought. [20] The theologians used these tools both to legitimise Scripture and enhance the authority of their interpretation of it. [21] The philosophers, on the other hand, used scripture to justify the importance, if not the supremacy, of Greek philosophy. The two groups, one can argue, were interested in the same issues and questions but differed on the answers and sometimes on the methods of reaching those answers. The high point of tension between the two was reached when the Ash'arite theologian Ghazâ lî wrote Tahâfut al-Falâsifa (The Incoherence of the Philosophers) and Fays????al al-Tafriqa bayna al-Islâm wal-Zandaqa (The Clear Criterion for Distinguishing between Islam and Godlessness), henceforth abbreviated as TF and Fays?al , respectively.

In his TF , Ghazâ l î attacks the philosophers and their misconceptions about the nature of their pursuits and defends the religious law ( sharî ' a ), presenting it as having a higher authority than any intellectual human alternative. In his Fays?al , a book he wrote after TF , Ghazâ lî develops juridical classifications on the basis of which he condemns the philosophers as guilty of infidelity. Ghazâ l î's TF was widely read and quoted by the educated élites, and this popularity posed a problem for philosophers. Almost a century later, and in response to it, the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rushd wrote Tahâfut al-Tahâfut (The Incoherence of the Incoherence) and Kitab Fas? l al-Maqâ l (On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy), henceforth abbreviated as TT and Fas? l respectively. In TT , Ibn Rushd responds to Ghazâ lî's charges in TF from a philosophical standpoint and he responds in Fas? l to Ghazâ lî's charges in Fays?al from a juridical standpoint. [22]

In La Politique de Gazâ l î , Henri Laoust sums up Ghazâ l î's lifetime aim, as reflected in his writings as being '[t]o struggle against all forms of fanaticism and partisan intransigence, and against all sorts of blind attachment to a school of thought or a sect, and this is in order to rebuild the unity of the [Muslim] community around its prophet.' [23] To put Ghazâ l î's TF and Fays?al in context, therefore, one needs to discuss his political views vis-à-vis religion and the implications of philosophy, as he perceived it, for religion. A reunification of the Muslim community, according to Ghazâ l î, requires redressing ( istis? l âh? ) people and directing them towards the righteous path, and the craft of politics provides the means by which such a project may be accomplished. [24] The craft of politics, Ghazâ l î believed, is the most noble ( ashraf ) of all crafts and is tightly linked to the religious sciences, [25] an aspect often ignored by the philosophers. Ghazâ l î is correct on this observation. Fârâbî, for instance, whom Ghazâ lî attacks along with in TF , [26] treats politics as a craft closely tied to philosophy but independent of religion, a position tantamount to heresy in Ghazâ lî's view. [27]

The philosophers' ( falâsifa ) heresy, Ghazâ l î believes, derives from their own exaggerations about the extent of the knowledge achieved by their predecessors, the Greek philosophers. For example, the falâsifa assume that individuals such as Socrates, Hippocrates, and , excelled in the various sciences and they were able to discover what is otherwise unknown through deductive methods. They further assumed that these ancient philosophers, despite their intelligence, denied the legitimacy of religions ( nih?al ) and the religious laws ( sharâ'i' ), branding them as ploys ( h?iyal ) and concocted laws ( nawâmîsmu'allafa ). [28] By accepting these assumptions of the ancient philosophers, without careful evaluation, and by forsaking the religion of their ancestors, the heretics (referring to the philosophers) simply turned from emulating truth ( taqlîd al-h?aqq ) to emulating falsehood ( taqlîdal- bât?il ). [29]

Ghazâ lî is not exaggerating when he makes this claim. It is the case that some Muslim philosophers looked upon the Greek philosophers with aggrandised esteem and admired their work in a quasi- religious manner. [30] Ghazâ l î, therefore, decided to write TF , to show the incoherence of a number of ideas and beliefs of the ancient philosophers. [31] It is further intended to show that the ancient philosophers did believe in God and his messengers, but that they became confused in relation to some of the details of these basic ideas, and so went astray and caused others to go astray. [32]

Ghazâ lî's TF , therefore, needs to be understood in relation to this political agenda. He regards Hellenic philosophy, as espoused by Muslim philosophers, as a rival of Scripture, and, therefore, undertakes to destroy it by exposing its incoherence. To put it in its immediate context, falsafa (Arabic philosophy) presented a serious threat to theology ( Kalâm ). As George Hourani puts it, falsafa claimed to speak of demonstrative truth as something achievable by intellectual disciplines as informed by Greek sciences. This, on its own, did not threaten the mutakallimûn (theologians). But when the falâsifa spoke of demonstrative truth in relation to matters dealing with God and the world using Platonic and Aristotelian concepts and terms at the expense of, or even as a substitute for, religious doctrines, the religious camp felt threatened and the theologians took it upon themselves to take a leading role in the defense of religion, which was their raison d'être . [33]

To expose the incoherence of Hellenic philosophy and its followers, Ghazâ l î investigated twenty issues which can be classified under three main categories, and which he considered to be of central importance: (1) invalidating the assumptions that the world is eternal (and co-eval with God);(2) addressing the philosophers' assumptions/denial of the existence of God, of his attributes, his unity, his knowledge of particulars ( juz'iyyât ); and, (3) addressing the philosophers' rejection of bodily resurrection and the immortality of the soul. [34]

It is not of direct relevance to discuss these three categories in this paper. Only the first, the eternity of the world, is briefly discussed as an example. To summarise Ghazâ lî's arguments in relation to the creation versus eternity of the world, some of the philosophers' views are stated first, according to the way Ghazâ lî read them, followed by some of Ghazâ l î's refutations of their views. He points out that to deny creation ex nihilo , the philosophers stipulate that it is impossible that God exists prior to the world in time, as if to suggest that God took his time or hesitated before he decided to create the world. Such an assumption, the philosophers would argue, puts into question God's omnipotence ( qudra ) and his will ( irâda ). [35] In his reply, Ghazâ l î presents the Ash'arite view, which is that it is possible that God had willed from eternity the creation of the world to come about in a certain time.

Ghazâ l î further questions the rationale and the basis of the philosophers' argument, in view of their limited emphasis on an eternal will ( irâda qadîma ). He argues that such a proposition is not axiomatic and challenges the philosophers to defend their views logically, by providing a middle-term in conformity with the syllogistic method. If, however, they refuse to offer a proof for their argument syllogistically because they take their argument to be axiomatic, then this may simply be negated by pointing to a lack of consensus amongst philosophers on this matter. [36] He points out, for example, that, while most philosophers believe that the world is co-eval with God, Plato was not of this mind and believed that the world was created in tempore , and Galen chose not to comment on the matter at all, perhaps believing that it is impossible to ascertain its truth or otherwise. [37] Ghazâ lî further advances the argument that the notion of time is co-eval with the world, with God having created both time and the world. He uses, to his advantage, the Aristotelian view that time depends on movement. [38] This view served Ghazâ lî to support the argument that the world is co-eval with time. Having ascertained his theory using the argument of Aristotle, the very argument that the philosophers took as gospel, Ghazâ lî succeeded in overwhelming the philosophers on this issue. [39]

A few points are to be noted in relation to Ghazâ l î's refutation of what he argues in TF , in general, and on this matter, in particular. The first relates to the fact that he generalises the views of Avicenna and Fârâbî as common to all philosophers, ignoring the fact that some philosophers, like al-Kindi, had refuted Aristotle's ad infinitum theory. [40] The second relates to his methodology. He refutes the philosophers' arguments philosophically, i.e. using reasoning as his method of refutation. He does this either by way of reductio ad absurdum or by way of pointing out certain incoherencies in the philosophers' arguments. This is important because Ghazâ lî does not use the same mode of reasoning to justify apparent instances of inconsistencies in the Qur'ãn . In such cases, he resorts to allegorical interpretation ( ta'wî l ).

Ghazâ l î on ta'wî l :

It is important then to relate Ghazâ lî's use of ta'wî l to his overall intended political reform, that is, his goal of reuniting the Muslim community. It needs to be emphasized that Ghazâ lî's reform is an intellectual one. As far as the social sphere is concerned, he accepts a hierarchical division of society based on élitism, and in this, he shares the socio-political views of many of the philosophers. [41] In other words, in seeking to refute the philosophers' arguments, Ghazâ lî is not seeking to affect any social change that the philosophers may otherwise had caused or corrupted. This indicates the manner in which he conceived of the political. In this case, the positioning of the political vis-à-vis scripture is a way of demarcating the intellectual sphere (esoteric of the élites ) from the popular sphere (exoteric of the masses), an aspect that has parallels in Christian politico-theological thought. [42] Ghazâ l î's ta'wî l of Scripture, then, as will be discussed below, is intended to vindicate the Ash'arite school of thought, amounting not only to the politicisation of ta'wî l but also perhaps of Scripture too. This point is an important one, especially in view of the extensive use of Scripture with an emphasis on its literal sense, in contemporary Islamic politics.

Ghazâ lî argues that the Islamic Scripture/revelation is not contradictory to reason. For Muslims, the Qur'ãn , being the discourse of God, must be perfect. Notwithstanding its linguistic perfection, the language of the Qur'ãn is not void of inconsistencies, and despite its emphasis on the unique divinity of God, it does not avoid anthropomorphism. One, for example, may find references to God having physical features, such as eye, hand and so forth. Understanding Scripture, therefore, literally bilâkayf (without asking how), as some advocated, posed serious theological problems. It is worth noting the witty view presented by the quranic commentator Fakhr al-Dîn al-Râzî on the necessity, in certain cases, of applying ta'wî l to the Qur'ãn . Râzî points out that it would be absurd to stick to the literal meaning of the Qur'ãn . For if one were to collect the various physical quranic attributes associated with God, one would come up with the ugliest image. The Qur'ãn , he notes, has God featuring many eyes and hands, one leg and so forth. Râzî adds sarcastically that 'were such a creature to be a slave, nobody would want to buy him.' [43] Ghazâ l î too asserts that

Regarding that which reason judges to be impossible, then it is incumbent to translate allegorically what the Revelation states about it. It is inconceivable that Revelation contains a decisive text that is contradictory to reason. [44]

Ghazâ l î expands on the methodology and the rules by which ta'wî l may be applied. He divides the categories of ta'wî l in accordance with his division of existence ( wujûd ), of which there are five ranks:(1) essential existence ( al-wujûd al-dhâtî ), based on the obvious, independent of sensation and imagination, and for which no interpretation is required; [45] (2) sensible existence ( al - wujûd al-h?issi ), based solely on the faculty of vision and which may be visually experienced both in dreams as well as in a state of wakefulness; [46] (3) imaginative existence ( al-wujûd al-khayâ l î ), based on images of sensible objects which arise in one's imagination during the absence of these sensible objects; [47] (4) mental existence ( al-wujûd al-'aqlî ), based on acquiring only the abstract meaning of a thing which is made up of a "spirit" ( rûh ?), a reality ( h?aqîqa ) and a meaning; [48] (5) analogical existence ( al-wujûd al-shabahî ), when something only exists as a property of something else, such as anger or joy, which are used in relation to God. Given that the latter characteristics reflect a degree of imperfection, they cannot be used with respect to God. They should accordingly be interpreted as attributes ( s?ifât ) associated with such properties, like the will to punish, which results from feelings of anger. [49]

Ghazâ lî contends that all sects agree on the above five ranks with regard to ta'wî l . The rules of allegorical interpretation he sets out should fall within these five ranks and one should only resort to interpretation when the apparent meaning does not conform to apodeictic proof. He stresses, however, that the masses should always follow the literal interpretation of Scripture. [50] When interpretation is applied, he adds, one should descend one degree only when there is no apodeictic proof for the higher degree. [51] It is possible, he notes, that the various religious schools may differ on what constitutes apodeictic proof, but such differences do not give ground for taxing them with disbelief. [52] This point is a weak one and, as will be discussed, Ibn Rushd picks up on it to make a case in favour of broadening/extending the notion of ta'wî l to encompass the study of philosophy. [53] As discussed earlier in this paper, interpretation is inherently flexible and can lend itself to various meanings. While Ghazâ lî tries to confine interpretation to religious principles by providing a set of rules to follow, he himself ends up moderating his definition quite considerably to accommodate his co-religionists. He is not willing&emdash;arbitrarily one may contend&emdash;to extend the same bending to the philosophers and the Mu'tazilite theologians, [54] both groups being the strongest opponents of Ash'arism. In his Jewels of the Qur'ãn ( Jawâhir al-Qur'ãn ), a book in which he emphasises the importance of understanding the inner meanings of the Qur'ãn , Ghazâ lî alludes to the philosophers as those who rejected the literal meanings of the exoteric verses. Since they did not observe the correct principles of ta'wî l to these verses, he adds, they did not gain an insight into the spiritual world as the special people ( khawâs?s? ) do. Their intelligence, he says, destroyed them, and 'ignorance is closer to salvation than a curtailed discernment and imperfect intelligence.' [55] Ibn Rushd on Ta'wî l :

In response to Ghâzâ lî's TF , Ibn Rushd wrote TT , in which he defended philosophy against the attack of Ghazâ l î on it point by point. For the purposes of this discussion on ta'wî l , the Fas? l , however, is more relevant. The juridical perspective from which Ibn Rushd writes the Fas? l is, as noted above, in response to the juridical tone of Ghazâ lî in Fays?al , but it is also intended to address the politico- juridical environment of his geo-political environment, al-Andalus. The Fas? l was written in Andalus during the period of Almohades' empire. The latter had inherited from the kingdom of Almoravides, which they had conquered in 1146, a well-established Malikite system of Islamic law. The Malikite system is based on a literal interpretation of the religious texts. So strict was this system applied, that Ash'arite theology was banned and, under the Almoravides' rule, even Ghazâ lî's works were burnt. It is worth noting here that, though the study of theology was banned, the study of philosophy was encouraged&emdash;perhaps because, as Hourani suggests, philosophy was directed to a limited audience. [56]

The Fas? l makes use of two strategies by which to defend philosophy. The first is to show syllogistically that the Law ( shar ') compels the pursuit of demonstrative truth ( burhân ). Ibn Rushd does not indicate that he wants to prove this argument syllogistically, he does however follow a syllogistic method. To do so syllogistically is important for his case, given that Ghazâlî does not reject the use of logic and he favours its use in matters of jurisprudence. [57] The second strategy is to argue that it is required to apply ta'wî l on anything that Revelation contains, which does not conform to demonstration. [58]

The first strategy is dealt with in the first opening paragraphs of Fas? l . At the start of Fas? l , Ibn Rushd asserts that if philosophy is defined as nothing more than speculation ( naz?ar ) using intellectual reasoning ( bil-'aql ) about beings in as far as they are proofs of the Craftsman/Artisan ( S?âni '), [59] then, according to the Law ( shar '), such a study is either obligatory or recommended. [60] In support of this assertion, he cites verses from the Qur'ãn that urge speculation, e.g., 'reflect those of you with vision' (59: 2) or 'they reflect on the creation of the heavens and earth' (3: 9). Such verses, Ibn Rushd argues, can only mean that God compels the use of rational reasoning ( al-qiyâs al-'aqlî ). [61] Given that this is the case, i.e. (a) the Law compels speculation, i.e., the use of intellectual reasoning, on existent beings ( al - mawjûdât ), and reflection on ( i'tibâr ) them; (b) and since the latter consists of nothing other than inferring ( istinbât? ) the unknown from the known, burhân is the best way of achieving this form of knowledge; (c) it follows then that the Law compels the study of burhân . [62]

Before discussing Ibn Rushd's approach to ta'wî l , it is important to put his first strategy into its intellectual context. In seeking to ascertain a place for burhân in his scheme, Ibn Rushd is thinking here of Aristotlian divisions of knowledge using various forms of syllogisms, the most perfect being the one which proceeds from true premisses and which leads to true conclusions à la Posterior Analytics . [63] That is to say that Ibn Rushd's point of departure is biased towards philosophy. Further, it is worth noting that the eight attestations of the term burhân in the Qur'ân refer to proofs deriving from God. [64] In other words, in setting out to prove that the Law compels the study of burhân , Ibn Rushd, by omitting the quranic use of burhân as his middle-term, does not follow a demonstrative syllogism, but rather a rhetorical one, perhaps à la Rhetoric .

Ibn Rushd's way of arguing that Scripture compels the study of philosophy not only defends the latter, but presents it as superior to the other religious sciences, on the grounds that only philosophy opens the way to demonstration. He further ensures that the status of the philosophers is well above that of others, for while the study of demonstration ( qiyâs burhânî ) is relegated to the philosophers, the study of doxic syllogism ( qiyâs z?annî ) is relegated to the jurists. [65] Further, since the Law and Philosophy are both about truth, he writes, and given that 'truth does not oppose truth,' then it follows that 'it is in concordance with and testifies to it.' [66] However, in order to ensure the independence of philosophy, he resorts to and uses the subtleties of the Arabic language in as far as they flex the notion of ta'wî l for the purposes of philosophy. The meaning of ta'wî l , he writes, is the extension of the significance of an expression from real to metaphorical significance, without forsaking therein the standard metaphorical practices of Arabic, such as calling a thing by the name of something resembling it or a cause or consequence or accompaniment of it, or other things such as are enumerated in accounts of the kinds of metaphorical speech. [67]

As noted above, the family of metaphors in the Arabic language is rich in many different literary devices. It is convenient then for Ibn Rushd to say that when philosophy does not concord with the exoteric sense of Scripture, it is only fitting that one should apply ta'wî l to Scripture. [68] In other words, the conclusions of philosophy need not depend on nor conform to Scripture.

In addition to serving as an argument in favour of the independence of philosophy, the malleability of ta'wî l gives Ibn Rushd added ammunition to defend the study of Greek philosophy, as well as the views of the Muslim philosophers against Ghazâ lî's charges of disbelief. With regard to Greek philosophy, he argues that one should pursue the knowledge about demonstrative reasoning using all the available tools ( ãl ât ). If such tools, he adds, happen to have been developed before Islam, then one should use them to the advantage of Islam. [69] With regard to the Muslim philosophers, he points out that Ghazâ l î as well as other theologians and jurists themselves differ on the rules by which ta'wî l may be applied. The Ash'arites and the Hanbalites, he notes, disagree with regard to the meaning of certain verses in the Qur'ãn . [70] Ghazâ lî himself concedes, Ibn Rushd adds, that there is no unanimity with regard to ta'wî l in as far as the latter is dependent on apodeictic proofs. It follows then that Ghazâl î's charges of disbelief against Avicenna and Fârâbî cannot be categorical. [71]

Despite their apparent differences, both Ghazâ lî and Ibn Rushd share many of their intellectual approaches. They both believe that Scripture cannot but be in accordance with reason, and when it is not, then one must seek other meanings that for some valid reason the transmitter of Scripture chose not convey exoterically. In this sense, the way in which they approach ta'wî l is the same. The way they use it as a 'political' tool is also the same. They differ, however, on the purpose to which it is put. Ghazâ lî uses ta'wî l because he wishes to defend the Ash'arite school of thought, which he regards as the one most faithful to the meanings of Islam. Ibn Rushd, on the other hand, uses it to defend the study of philosophy and to ensure that philosophers do not suffer a fate similar to that of Socrates. Another dimension to the politicisation of the use of allegory is that it provided thinkers with a vehicle for intellectual dissent. This dissent took the form of the introduction of new ideas. This was by way of importing, transforming and assimilating foreign ideas. The result was the development of an intellectual environment, which despite its apparent conformity to monolithic views, was rich in diverse interests in the various sciences.

What is interesting about the way in which this debate between al-Ghazâ lî and Ibn Rushd developed is that they both use the means normally associated with the supposed rival. Ghazâ l î, as a theologian, attacks the philosophers philosophically. Ghazâ lî, it needs to be noted, also wrote Maqâs?id al-Falâsifa (The Intentions of the Philosophers) in which he enumerates the various sciences, following the explanations of Fârâbî and Avicenna, the same philosophers he attacks in TF . He wrote it before TF , and he later claimed that it is not a reflection of his own views. Some scholars, however, have questioned whether behind Ghazâ lî's exoteric antipathy for philosophy lies a certain empathy for the discipline. On this, Gabriel Said Reynolds notes that 'we must appreciate him [i.e., Ghazâ l î] as an important transmitter of the classical philosophical tradition.' [72] Richard Frank even questions Ghazâ lî's intellectual loyalty to Ash'arism, especially following his conversion to Sufism. Frank argues that on a number of matters, and in particular with regard to the perfection of the rational soul, Ghazâ lî departed from the teachings of the Ash'arite school only to agree distantly with the philosophers, from whom the Sufis had taken their views. [73] Ibn Rushd, on the other hand, shows in Fas? l that he is more of a jurist whose goal is to persuade than a philosopher seeking to demonstrate in the necessity of philosophy.

Conclusion:

Historically, Scripture has played important roles in many intellectual environments. The manner in which this role is manifest ranges from inducing, restricting to even banning the pursuit of intellectual activities. People's position vis-à-vis Scripture may vary from veneration, complete obedience, acceptance of some aspects and rejection of others, cynicism to complete rejection. Whatever the position taken, it is rarely, if ever, accompanied by indifference. The different positions are often justified and supported based on the different approaches to and readings of Scripture itself. Scripture, as discussed in the paper, often lends itself to different interpretations. For some people, the essence of Scripture lies in its exoteric message and they take it literally; for others, the essence lies in the esoteric meaning and it is understood symbolically; for yet others, the approach consists of a mixture of the two; and for others, Scripture is rejected as an authoritative guide to life.

In the case of Islam, ta'wî l has been used whenever certain contents of Scripture proved either incommensurable with ideas the philosophers, the mystics and the littérateurs wished to look into, or incoherent in matters the theologians and the jurists wished to justify or defend. Challenging the truth or the merit of Scripture is not an easy option, for it would amount to a direct challenge to the words of God. The practice of ta'wî did not come at the complete expense of the integrity of Scripture. At a certain level, ta'wî l imparted a certain mystique and depth to the scriptural message. At another level, it served to rectify perceived inconsistencies and contradictions that the defenders of Scripture might otherwise have found indefensible or unacceptable. In addition, ta'wî l has served to veil, unveil, bend and manipulate certain aspects of Scripture in accordance with the beliefs of a particular school of thought. As this paper has argued, the (ab)use of Scripture is not restricted to the philosophers, but extends to those deemed to represent views which are faithful to its meaning. Ghazâ lî, laurelled by Muslims as the Proof of Islam ( h?ujjat al-Islâm ) and Ornament of Religion ( zayn al-dîn ), chose to read into Scripture significances conforming with the beliefs of Ash'arism, the Qur'ãn in this case not taking priority. In light of the various politicisations of Scripture for different ends, one may question the validity and bases of notions of the so-called immutability of Scripture. One may further note that the current emphasis by Islamists on a literalist reading of Scripture is itself nothing but yet another mode of ta'wî l , adding yet another element to a long tradition of this diverse nomenclature.

[1] George Sale, The Korân , London: Frederick Warne and Co. Ltd., n. d., 3:7, p. 43. Perhaps 'analogical' expresses better the meaning of mutashâbihât .

[2] Muhammad 'Abed al-Jabri, Naqd al-'Aql al-'Arabî (2): Bunyat al-'Aql al-'Arabî fî al-Thaqâfa al-'Arabiyya , Beirut: Markaz Dirâsât al-Wihda al-'Arabiyya, 1996, see for instance section II, chapters 1 and 2.

[3] Jon Whitman, Earl Miner, Kang-i Sun Chang and Julie S. Meisami,'Allegory', in Alex Preminger & T. V. Brogan (eds), New Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics , Princeton, N. J.: Press, 1993, p. 31.

[4] Solomon Simonson, 'The Idea of Interpretation in Hebrew Thought', Journal of the History of Ideas , vol. 8, issue 4 (Oct., 1947), p. 472.

[5] Ibid .

[6] Jean-Pierre Vernant, Mythe et religion en Grèce ancienne , Paris:Édition du Seuil, 1990, pp. 35-40.

[7] Whitman et al.,'Allegory', op. cit. , p. 32. For more examples of allegorical interpretations, see Abdul Rahman Badawi, Madhâhib al-Islâmiyyîn , Beirut: Dar al-'Ilm lil-Malâyîn, 1997, pp. 754-9.

[8] For an overview of the various authors of the Old Testament, see A. Parmelee, A Guidebook to the Bible , London: The English Universities Press Ltd, 1962, Part I.

[9] On this point and for specific examples, see Solomon Simonson's article, op. cit ., pp. 467-74.

[10] It needs to be stressed that these literary devices are not the same, and they differ linguistically. To explain further, the following example indicates the differences, for example, between tashbîh and isti 'âra: sâfahtu rajulan kal-'asadi (I shook the hands of a man who looks like a lion). This sentence is qualified as tashbîh because it has the mushabbah , the thing compared ( rajulan , 'man'), the mushabbah bihi , the thing compared to ( asad , 'lion') and the particle specific to tashbîh ( k, like). Sâfahtu asadan (I shook the hands of a lion). This sentence is qualified as isti' âra , because it omits both the mushabbah and the particle of tashbîh .

[11] Hanâdî, Muhammad Abdul Qâdir, Zâhirat al-Ta'wî l fî I'râb al-Qur'ãn al-Karîm , Mecca: Maktabat al-Tâlib al-Jâmi'î, 1988, p. 14.

[12] J. Zaydan, Târikh Adâb al-lughât al-'Arabiyyat , ed. By Shawqi Dayf, Qâhirah : Dar al-hilâ l , 1981, volume 3 p. 17.

[13] Anthony H. Johns, 'The quranic presentation of the Joseph story: naturalistic or formulaic language?', in G. R. Hawting and Abdul-Kader A. Shareef (eds), Approaches to the Qur'ân , London: Routledge, 1993, pp. 39-40. [14] R. MacDonough Frank, Beings and Their Attributes: The Teaching of the Basrian School of the Mu'tazila in the Classical Period , Albany: State University of New York Press, 1978, p. 9.

[15] Majd al-Din Muhammad bin Ya'kub al-Fayruzabadi, al-Qâmus al-Muhît , second edition, 1952, volumes 1-2, Egypt: Mustafa al-Babî al-Halabî wa-'awlâduh, p. 7.

[16] For references in the Qur'ãn , see 48:15; 16:103. The referencing of the Qur'ãn in this paper is aided by the meticulously compiled index by Muhammad Fouad 'Abd al-Baqî, al-Mu'jam al-Mufahras li-Alfâz al-Qur'ãn al-Karîm , Beirut: Dar al-Jil, (n. d.).

[17] Zaydan, op. cit. , p. 11.

[18] Cited in Ibid ., p. 15.

[19] For an account of pre- Mu'tazilite Islamic theology, see Joseph Van Ess, 'The beginnings of Islamic Theology' (the article as well as the Discussion), in J. E. Murdoch and E. D. Sylla (eds), The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning , Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1975, pp. 88-90.

[20] On the influence of Greek thought on Islamic theology, see Michel Allard, Le Problème des Attributs Divins dans la Doctrine d'al-As'ari et de ses Premiers Grands Disciples , Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1965, pp. 156-9.

[21] On the importance of Scripture amongst the various theological schools, see Abi al-Hasan 'Ali Ben Ismail al-Ash'ari, Maqâ lât al-Islamiyyîn wa-Ikhtilâf al-Musallîn , in H. Ritter (ed.), Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1963, particularly see pp. 165-168.

[22] TF and TT are mostly referred to in the literature in association with this debate. In addition, Ghazâ lî also Faysal al-Tafriqah Bayna al-Islâm wa-al-Zanâdiqa (The Clear Criterion for Distinguishing between Islam and Godlessness) in which he developed the juridical bases for condemning the philosophers on the grounds of infidelity. Ibn Rushd wrote Fasl al-Maqâ l , Damîmat al-'Ilm al-Ilâhî , al-Kashf 'an Manâhij al-Adilla , and TT in which he addressed Ghazâ l î's refutation of the philosophers from the juridical, theological and philosophical positions. See the explanation in Iysa A. Bello, The Medieval Islamic Controversy between Philosophy and Orthodoxy: Ijma' and Ta'wî l in the Conflict between al- Ghazâ l î and Ibn Rushd , Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1989,'Introduction'.

[23] Henri Laoust, La Politique de Gazâ l î , Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1970, p. 365.

[24] Ghazâ lî, Ihyâ' al-'Ulûm , Misar: Shakkat Maktabât Mustafa al-Babi al-Halabi wa Awladah, 1939, vol. 1, p. 20.

[25] Ibid ., p. 20.

[26] Ghazâ lî, in Sulaiman Duniya (ed.), Tahâfut al-Falâsifa ( TF ) , Misar: Dar-al-marif, 1955, p. 75.

[27] See A. N. Al- Fârâbî, 'Fî al-'Ilm al-Madanî wa-'Ilm al-Fiqh wa-'Ilm al-Kalâm' ('On Political Science, Science of Jurisprudence and Science of Kalâm'), in Al- Fârâbî, A. N., Ihsâ' al-'Ulûm (The Enumeration of the Sciences), U. Amin (ed.), Cairo: Dar al-Fikr al-'Arabi, n.d.

[28] TF , p. 72. On Ghazâ lî's acceptance of some of the ancient philosophers' contributions, see also Ghazâ lî, al-Munqidh min al-dalâ l , Beirut: Commission Libanaise pour la Traduction des Chefs-D'oeuvres, 1969, pp. 20-7.

[29] TF , p. 72.

[30] See for example Fârâbî's views in 'On Political Science, Science of Jurisprudence and Science of Kalam', in Al-Fârâbî, A. N., Ihsâ' al-'Ulûm, op. cit., parag 3. See also by Fârâbî, kitâb al-jam' bayna Ra'yay al-Hakîmayn, introduced and commented on by A. N. Nadir, Beirût: Dâr al-Mashriq, 1986, p. 80 (1).

[31] TF , p. 73. [32] Ibid .

[33] George Hourani, 'Introduction' , Averroes: On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy , London: MESSRS. Luzac & Co., 1961, p. 3.

[34] See Ghazâ l î's division of these themes in TF ., p. 84.

[35] Ibid ., pp. 88-94.

[36] Ibid ., p. 96.

[37] Ibid ., pp. 86-7.

[38] For a comprehensive discussion on the eternity vs creation, see George F. Hourani,'The Dialogue between al-Ghazâ lî and the Philosophers on the Origin of the World', Muslim World , vol. 48, no. 3, Part I, pp. 183-91, and no. 4, Part II, pp. 308-14, 1958. futân , Beirut: Darم Ibid ., pp. 111-2. See also Yuhanna Qumir, Ibn Rushd wa- l-Ghazâ lî: al-Tah [39] al-Mashriq, 1986, p. 20.

[40] For a comprehensive view of al-Kindi's views and arguments on this issue, see Kevin Staley, 'Al-Kindi on Creation: Aristotle's Challenge to Islam', Journal of the History of Ideas , vol. 50, Issue 3 (Jul.-Sep.), 1989, pp. 355-370.

[41] See Ihyâ' , p. 20. On that point see Laoust, p. 202, and Richard M. Frank, Creation and the Cosmic tsverlag, 1992, p. 29. See also whatنSystem: Al-Ghazâ l î & Avicenna , Heidelberg: Carl Winter- Universit Ghazâ l î has to say on this matter in Ghazâ l î, Faysal al-Tafriqa bayna al-Islâm wal-Zandaqa ( Faysal ), in Majmû'at Rasâ'il al-Imâm al-Ghazâ lî, Beirut: ar al-Kutub al-'Ilmiyya, n. d., p. 85. See also the same attitude by Ibn Rushd in Fasl , parag. 23.

[42] See, for instance, Immanuel Kant's 'What is Enlightnment'. I am thankful for Bruce Buchan for making this point and pointing the comparison with Kantian ideas.

[43] Fakhr al-Din al-Râzî, Al-Tafsîr al-Kabîr , Beirut: Dar Ihyâ' al-Turâth al-'Arabî, 1980, vol. 26, p. 229. I am thankful for Tony Johns for bringing this reference in Râzi's work to my attention.

[44] Cited in Bello, op. cit. , p. 53.

[45] Faysal , pp. 79, 81.

[46] Ibid ., pp. 79, 81. As an example of this existence, he gives the utterance of Muhammad: "paradise was shown to me across of this wall." Such an utterance should simply be understood to mean that the image of the garden was represented on the wall, and not that the garden can be made to fit into a wall. This example suggests that even if certain statements do not conform entirely to apodeictic proof, it does not necessarily follow that they are false.

[47] Ibid ., p. 81. An example of such existence is the utterance of Muhammad: 'As if I was looking at Yunis, the son of Matta, dressed in two cotton cloaks, acceding and the mountains responding to him, and God be He exalted saying to him: "at your service, I am, O Yunus".' This utterance relates an event that preceeded the time of Muhammad. Hence, it should be interpreted to mean that the event related exists in Muhammad's imagination.

[48] Ibid ., pp. 82-3. An example of such existence is the utterance of Muhammad: 'God, be He exalted, leavened the clay of Adam with His hand for forty mornings.' This utterance is not intended to indicate that God has a hand. It should be interpreted to refer to the intellectual meaning and essence of the hand, related for example to striking or seizing.

[49] Ibid ., p. 83.

[50] Ibid ., p. 85. [51] Ibid ., pp. 84-5.

[52] Ibid ., pp. 83-88.

[53] The references to Fasl are based on the Arabic text in Marc Geoffroy (translator), Averroès: Le Livre du Discours Décisif , Paris: Flammarion, 1996, parag 24, p. 122. In my rendering of Arabic terms and quotations, I benefited from Hourani's English translation as well as Geoffroy's French translation.

[54] Faysal pp. 88-90.

.fâq al-Jadîda, 1983, p. 37أ-Ghazâ lî, Jawâhir al-Qur'ãn wa-Duraruh, Beirut: Dâr al [55]

[56] For a comprehensive background to Fasl , see George Hourani,'Introduction' , Averroes: On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy , London: MESSRS. Luzac & Co., 1961, especially pp. 6-18. See also the introduction by Alain de Libera, in Geoffroy, op. cit. While it may be true, as Hourani suggests, that the philosophers' audience was a limited one, it should be noted that the theologians' teachings were not exactly accessible to the masses. The latter's teachings were also of a high degree of sophistication. However, if understood, they would not have threatened the fundamental understanding of the religion.

[57] See above, footnote 35.

[58] One needs to bear in mind that Ibn Rushd is thinking here of Aristotle's Organon , which consists of the following books: Categories ( Kitâb al-Maqû lât ), Peri Hermeneias (or: De Interpretatione , Kitâb al-'ibâra ), PriorAnalytics ( Kitâb al-qiyâs ), Posterior Analytics ( Kitâb al-Burhân - Demonstration), Topics ( Kitâbal-Mawâdi' al-Jadaliyya - Dialectics), Sophistical Refutations (meaning al-Hikma al-Mumawwaha ), Rhetoric ( Kitâb al-Khatâba ) and Poetics ( Kitâb al-Shi'r ), the fourth book on demonstration being the most important of them all. Such was the approach of most Muslim philosophers.

[59] This term should be understood in light of Greek terms such as poisij (creation), tecnh (art/craft) and poiew (make/produce), Fasl , parag 2.

[60] The references to Fasl are based on the Arabic text in Marc Geoffroy, Averroès: Le Livre du Discours Décisif , op. cit. , parag. 2. In my rendering of Arabic terms and quotations, I benefited from Hourani's English translation as well as Geoffroy's French translation.

[61] Fasl , parag. 3.

[62] Fasl , parags 3-5.

[63] Fasl , parag. 5.

[64] See the following Suras: 4: 174, 12: 24, 23: 117, 2: 111, 21: 24, 27: 64, 28: 75 and 28: 32.

[65] Fasl , parag. 20.

[66] Fasl , parag. 18.

[67] Fasl , as translated by Hourani, p. 50.

[68] Fasl , parag. 19.

[69] Fasl , parags 9, 14.

[70] Fasl , parag. 22.

[71] Fasl , parag. 27, and see Faysal , p. 85.

[72] Gabriel Said Reynolds, 'A Philosophical Odyssey: Ghazzali's Intentions of the Philosophers ', in John Inglis (ed.), Proceedings for Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition in Islam, Judaism, and Christianity , The Twenty-Sixth Annual Richard R. Baker Philosophy Colloquium, Sponsored by the Department of Philosophy, University of Dayton, Dayton, Ohio, April 11-13, 1999, p. 186. On this point, it is worth noting that Giles of Rome has Ghazâ lî as one of the heretical philosophers, same source, footnote 11, p. 181.

[73] Richard M. Frank, Al-Ghazâ l î and the Ash'arite School , London: Duke University Press, 1994, pp. 95-6.

Nelly Lahoud is a postgraduate student in the Political Sciences Program of the Research School of Social Sciences, ANU.