CONFIDENTIAL APPENDIX to AUSTRALIA'S SECURITY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 1957-63 .. by Hanno Weisbrod The following is a Tecord of interviews with officials of the Australian and American Government. They were held between February 1964 and April 1967. The interviews were granted under the proviso that only . th~ three academic ex~miners wQuld have temporary access to the information offered by the respondents. The Department of International Relations of the Australian National Uni- versity has promised that all copies of the Appendix be kept secure from public scrutiny for fifteen years. Anyone who might b~ granted special access to the Appendix during that time must agree not to compromise -its confidential nature. Much information which would have been difficult if not impossible to obtain from public so~rces was derived from these intf;!rvi.ews. In most ca_ses, references .to the Confidential • Appendix were used to supplement the open sources. In some instances, assertions in the thesis could be substantiated only by reference to the material in the Aopendix~ The author recognizes that it cannot be assumed that the memory of these officials is infallible or their judgment wholly objective. To protect the identity of the respondents a consecutive paragraph numbering system has been employed. ''··:·. TABLE OF CONTENTS Sir Philip McBride Pages 1 - 5 Sir Valston Hancock 6 - 18 Supplementary 18 - 19 A.P. Renouf 19 - 22 Doyle, Martin, John Shumate 22 - 24 D.W. Douglass 24 - 26 A.B. MacFarlane 26 - 30 Sir Robert Menzies 30 - 36 T.D. Younge 36 - 38 E.J.H. Howard 38 - 42 Sir Garfield Barwick 42 54 Sir Frederick Scherger 55 - 64 Geoffrey C. Kitchen 64 - 67 Sir Roy Dowling 67 - 76 Supplementary 76 - 77 K.C.O. Shann 78 - 83 Supplementary 83 - 88 Richard Wbolcott ·ss - ·go Sir James Plimsoll 91 - 101 Alan Griffith 101 111 Sir Ragnar Garrett 112 - 113 Sir Hastings Harrington 113 - 115 Charles Wilbourn 115 - 120 -----oOo------ CONFIDENTIAL INTERVIEW WITH SIR PHILIP McBRIDE Minister for Defence 1950-1958 * 3 September 1965. Australian Defence Planning After Korea: 1. Sir Philip said there was a continuous review to "match Australia's defence needs against the threat". The Government wanted to achieve a balance between the requirements for development and the spending on defence. Of course, it was "only common sense" to concentrate on development while there was no immediate threat after the Korean war. In addition, the Government felt that Australia should develop a large defence production capacity, so that the availability of defence supplies would be free from enemy interdiction. Submarines were considered to be the greatest danger all through the 1950's, because they could possibly prevent allied help from reaching Australia. US Acceptance of Australia's Role: 2. Sir Philip claims that while he was Mini&ter for Defence he never once received any criticism from any American Gover·nment official. He said that all the people he dealt with in Washington had complete and sympathetic understanding for Australia's development needs. Dulles told him, in 1957, that Australia was a most valuable ally, and specifically on Australia's defence effort the Secretary of State said, 'Within your field you are doing alright'. Sir Philip said, "We did not pretend to be a big power. We did not have the money to maintain large standing forces. But we thought that through our National Service Scheme we could provide a big pool of partially trained reserves". Sir Philip denied that there was any "really deep criticism" by the US, but he said that the cut-back of the National Service Scheme in 1957 was done * See Personal evaluation at para. 11. : ' 2. in consultation with the Americans. But apparently to dispel the notion that the Australian Government had done this under pressure from the US Sir Philip quickly added that "All of our planning is done in consultation with our. rnajor allies". Standardisation with US: 3. He said, up to 1957, the Australian Services had bought mainly British goods. The RAAF had favoured integration with the Americans before this time. The Sabre fighters were bought because the British had no planes which had the same range capabilities. After the Suez crisis, there no longer could be any question about buying British equipment only for sentimental reasons. "We had to be hard-headed about this. The Americans were the only ones who could supply us. The Canal crisis had showed us how vulnerable Britain's presence in this area was." 4. He said in World War II the cost for -double equipment was terribly high. Australia was determined not to let this happen again. Standardisation was a necessity, and the US was the logical choice. On the other hand, Australia also wanted to maintain compatability with British forces because Australia was in Malaya with the British, and while there depended ·largely on Bri·tish logistics. Ruestow Mission: 5. Sir Philip emphatically denied that his trip to the United States in 1957 was a "begging mission". He said the Australian Government simply wanted some help from American defence planners on how Australia should best allocate her defence budget so as to get maximum value out of it. He tied his trip to the programme of having continuous defence reviews. "We wanted to get a technical evaluation by the Americans". (I said that it had been reported that the Government wanted help from the Americans in the form of a purchasing plan so that when the St. Mary's munitions filling factory would be completed it would not lie idle) . He denied that the Government was embarrassed about the St. Mary 's project. Howe\rer, he i admitted that one of the primary pur{)oses of General Rues tow ,.,s ;I 11 : I I il 3. J technical mission of 1958 was to look over Australia's defence production potential, "to see what production tasks could be assigned to Australia in time of war. Also it was conceivable that our factories could produce some things more economically and that the mission might recommend a purchasing programme". 6. One of the important results of McBride's talks with the Americans was the working out of arrangements for American logistics support if an Australian battalion was required in the SEATO Treaty area. The Ruestow Mission gave detailed advice on how best to standardise our equipment so that an Army battalion could be integrated easily into the logistics programme of an American force in the same area. The plan to reorganise the Army on a modified concept of the American Pentomic Army organisation was also due to the Australian desire to have forces and equipment compatible with those of the Americans. Defence Trust Funds: 7. Sir Philip said that as the tension lessened the Government felt more and more reluctant to give in to the demands of the Services for expensive equipment. He thought the story on the F-104 Starfighter was a classical example of the Services "always wanting the very best". The. RAAF had wanted this top fighter plane, "because it looked like the best thing on the market". But when Sir Philip went to Washington in May 1957 and brought up the topic of the F-104, General Twining, the US Air Force Chief of Staff, asked, 'What's wrong with your Sabres? We consider them the best planes for your role'. 8. He said that one of the troubles with the Services was that they always wanted the latest or the best. This often meant that after certain pieces of equipment had been ordered the Service people would demand modifications which would make the equipment more expensive . Sir Philip said he grew very impatient over this. In his opinion it was much wiser to get · "something good rather than the best". "With Aust'ialia'·s I I limited resources, it \vas next to impos sibl e to afford the M:$t",, 'I ,, 4. He claimed that these demands for modifications also caused delays in delivery schedules. Sir Philip and the Treasury took the attitude that if certain eqtlipment did not arrive within a specified budget period it was due to faulty planning of the Service. He did not see why the Services should get away with this. They should make detailed specifications and then submit an order for equipment which most nearly fitted those requirements. If they kept changing their minds after that, they should pay the penalty for it. So whenever equipment did not arrive on time and he felt that the delay was caused because new specifications had been added, he forced the Service to resubmit the proposal · for the next budget. He claimed:.most of the underspending of those years was because the Services could not decide among themselves how they were going to allocate the fixed sum total for defence of around two hundred million pounds. Then their demands for modification put back the delivery schedules. 9. Money which was unspent by the end of the year ,.,as put into a Defence Equipment Trust Fund, pending an investigation whether the inability to spend the money was due to reasonable causes or whether it had been occasioned by bad planning or sudden changes in the order. If the latter was the ~ase, the Service would have to take it out of the following year's allocation. (I asked him if he made the evaluation whether a delay was unreasonable). "Oh, no, these things are much too technical for me. I'm a woolgrower. Why I ever became Minister for Defence I'll never know". The recommendation was usually made by a group of technical experts from the Department of Defence, the Treasury and the Defence Business Board.