Chapter 5 the Chinese Model of Development: Substances and Applications in and Beyond China Yu-Wen Chen; Obert Hodzi

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Pre-print version Chen, Yu-Wen; Hodzi, Obert (2021) The Chinese Model of Development: Substances and Applications in and Beyond China, in Chris Shei and Weixiao Wei (ed) The Routledge Handbook of Chinese Studies. London: Routledge. Chapter 5 The Chinese model of development: substances and applications in and beyond China Yu-Wen Chen; Obert Hodzi

Introduction

Scholars in and outside of China have sought to decipher the China model (中国模式) but there remain variegated interpretations and findings making it impossible to determine what the China model is. In most (but not all) cases, the term “China model” is referred specifically to the developmental model of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Exactly when the term “China Model”, which generally speaking refers to economic growth without political pluralism came into being is unknown, but terms such as “China’s economic development model” or “China’s economic development path” appeared in Chinese and Western academic literature after Deng Xiaoping’s Southern Tour in the 1990s (Yip 2012: 16; Qin 2016: 141- 142). Because PRC scholars are usually more linked to the Chinese government than scholars in the West, it is difficult to distinguish the academic from the state’s political position. This is also clearly reflected in their writings. For instance, Wang Huning (王沪宁) (1995), a scholar at China’s Fudan University (and later one of China’s top political leaders) declared that Deng Xiaoping has found a development model that is more suitable for China.

On the other hand, academic debates in the West on the China model started in earnest with

publication of Joshua Cooper Ramo’s “Beijing Consensus” (北京共识) in 2004, in which the former Time magazine editor and the then-Tsinghua University professor asserted that China has found a distinct path of modernization. Since then, the ‘China Model’ concept, whether the model exists or not, and what it really entails, has been debated not only in scholarly literature in the fields of contemporary Chinese studies, International Relations (IR), and development studies, but also among policymakers in and beyond China. pre-printIn practice, China’s economic and political footprint isversion increasing in Asia, Africa, Latin America and some parts of Europe. Increasingly, leaders in developing countries, such as Cambodia, Sri Lanka, South Africa, Kenya, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe are looking up to China for an alternative development model. It may not be difficult to understand why. In less than

four decades, China has grown from being the ‘sick man of Asia’ to a global power, seeking more influence and say in global governance commensurate with its new global power status. The Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the China-Africa Development Fund are examples of recent China-led projects mainly focused on infrastructure development, thus strengthening Beijing’s footprint in developing countries. In themselves, these initiatives as pointed out by some scholars may not prove the existence of a China model. The Chinese government has also in the past denied the existence of a China model, let alone advocate for its global adoption. Yet more recently, Chinese president Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’ has boldly admitted and advocated the uniqueness of the China model in stark contrast to the Western values - suggesting that there is some sort of a China Model. Based on the above background, this chapter offers a timely and comprehensive overview of waves of debates on the substance of the China model by the model’s promoters, opponents, and even imitators. Furthermore, this chapter provides an overview of scholarly views on whether the China model is successful and sustainable or not. Success is defined as China’s ability to reach economic growth without political reform to change regime or liberalize the society. This chapter is structured around four main questions that have been heatedly debated among scholars and policy-makers. The first question is whether there is a China model. Second, what are defining characteristics of the model if it exists? Third, what is the prospect of the China model in terms of its success and sustainability? Fourth, can the China model be replicated outside of China? The next two sections tackle the first and second questions.

Is there a China model?

Is there a China model and what are the defining characteristics of the model if it exists? The term “model” requires a bit of focus because various scholars have interpreted the term in varied ways. Sometimes it is used to mean a developmental path, or specific developmental guidelines, principles, strategies or policies with distinct characteristics (Fang 2016:3; Qin 2016:143; Yu 2016: 124). Others understand it as a kind of Chinese experience or Chinese case (Qin 2016:144). In most literature, the term “model” is meant to generalize China’s overall development and modernization, but, rarely is it used to denote China’s development in a specific sector or region (Qin 2016: 148). For instance, Yu Keping, Deputy Director of the Compilation and Translation Bureau of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and Peking University professor, defines the China model as both a strategic choice that China undertakes to achieve modernization in the context of globalization as well as a set of developmental strategies and governance patterns that the country has gradually crafted during reforms and opening up (Yu et al. 2006; Yu 2016:124).

Yip (2012: 15-16) in his review of existing literature on the China model discerns the Western pre-printSchool and the Chinese School of thoughts - representing versionthoughts by Chinese scholars. Yip’s categorization of Western and Chinese schools of thought gives a useful summary of all the variants of debates on the China model. The Chinese School is mainly comprised of scholars of Chinese politics and International Relations. The most notable ones being famous scholars

like Zhang Weiwei and Pan Wei (Yip 2012: 19). These Chinese School scholars generally agree that there is a China model, that the model is adapted to the unique circumstances of China, and that it explains China’s economic development trajectory. The Western School, however, questions the existence and uniqueness of the China model (Chen 2010; Horesh 2013; Yip 2012: 27). Scholars in this school are mostly economists or libertarians who have received Western education (Chen 2010; Yip 2012: 27). They argue that China has mostly borrowed experiences, principles and values from Western economic theories to undertake its reform - hence what is being referred to as the China model is actually a cocktail of East Asian development model components and aspects of the Washington Consensus. Famous scholars such as Chen Zhiwu (2010), for instance, have contended that the China model never existed because China adopted and adopts “universal values”. Even though some (e.g. Qin Hui, a historian at Tsinghua University) in the Western school agree that China has its own development path or model, they do not necessarily believe that the model can sustain China because Chinese people desire greater freedom and welfare than what the China model can provide (Qin 2010; Horesh 2013: 341-342). In a nutshell, scholars in the Chinese School tend to examine the China model in the context of China’s unique circumstances (or the so- called Chinese civilization) while those of the Western School look at the China model in the framework of universal values (Chen 2010; Yip 2012: 27).

Beijing Consensus and the China model

Despite a diversity of interpretations of the China model, the kernel of the various versions is the model’s authoritarian foundation and state-led market economy characteristic (Ambrosio 2012: 382). In this regard, most scholars focus on the evolution of China’s governance and its goals, strategies and approaches to enhancing governance (Bell 2015; Chen and Naughton 2017; deLisle 2017). The push for an academic conceptualization of the China model, however, comes from scholars based outside of China - the foremost being Joshua Cooper Ramo’s 2004 proposal of the so-called “Beijing Consensus”. In his description of the Beijing Consensus, Ramos argues that China found a unique development strategy, which he contrasted with the Western, neoliberal “Washington Consensus” model. In contrasting the two models, Ramo (2004) contends that China’s 1) technological innovation, 2) pursuit of equitable and sustainable economic growth, as well as 3) insistence on self- reliance and refusal to accept Western intervention define the Beijing Consensus. The impact of Ramo’s Beijing Consensus proposition is that several other scholars have in their writings often conflated the term China model with Beijing Consensus (Qin 2016:147). However, scholars such as Pang Zhongying argue that the Beijing Consensus is distinct from the China model. For him, the Beijing Consensus merely summarizes China’s experiences (Pang 2004). He therefore argues that there is a need to research the essence of the China model. In the next section of this chapter, we will, as argued by Pang further explore the essence of the China pre-printmodel. version Ramo’s Beijing Consensus elicited criticisms from scholars in and out of China. Breslin (2011) and Kennedy (2010) are known for their critiques of Ramo’s Beijing Consensus. They contend that claiming technological innovation is the main driver of China’s economic growth is

misleading (Kennedy 2010: 469; Breslin 2011: 1332) as China has been borrowing innovations from elsewhere to undertake economic reforms (Kenney 2010: 470-471; Dickson 2011: 43). It might be more accurate to say that China aspires to have more “indigenous innovation” as well as equitable and sustainable economic growth than claiming that China already has these achievements (Kennedy 2010: 469; Breslin 2011: 1325; Dickson 2011: 43). Scholars also commented that strong state involvement in a country’s development is normal throughout history. One cannot consider the state-led development in China as unique and exceptional (Breslin 2011: 1323). While the term “consensus” denotes widely acknowledged or agreed solutions (Yu 2016:124), Breslin (2011:1328) questions how one could identify agreed solutions for China’s development since there is a “huge diversity of developmental trajectories within China itself” (Breslin 2011:1328). Literature that focuses on articulating the China model at the sub- national/regional level or in a specific sector exist, but is comparatively fewer. The majority of writings on the China model or Beijing Consensus tend to generalize China’s overall experience in development. Despite criticism of the Beijing Consensus and the absence of consensus on what the China model really entails, the topic still is popular among China scholars. This has led some scholars to reason that the China model’s popularity as a subject of study is not just because of a global drive to understand China’s rise, but motivated by the increasing insecurity of Western Europe and North American policymakers and intellectuals. The West, broadly defined, is concerned that the China model, however conceptualized, challenges their own system and values that are globally dominant (Horesh and Lim 2017).

Waves of the China Model Discourse The China model discourse has several waves of development. Zhao Suisheng identifies three waves of the China model discourse. He argues that if Ramo’s Beijing Consensus and its critiques are the first wave of scholarly contention over the China model, the second wave of debate arose in conjunction with China’s 2008 Beijing Olympics achievements (Zhao 2017). After Beijing’s successful hosting of the Olympic Games and that it largely remained unscathed by the 2008 global financial crisis, literature on the China model proliferated (Zhao 2017; Yip 2012:3). Since then, the term has been used in discussions on “the rise of China” (中国崛起) and “the miracle of China” (中国奇迹) (Zhao 2017). However, the Hu Jintao-Wen Jiabao administration hesitated to endorse such a discourse for fear of raising concerns of a China threat in the global arena (Zhao 2017). The third wave of the China model discourse began in 2012 when Xi Jinping assumed the presidency of the PRC. His domestic and foreign policy was hinged on the great national rejuvenation, which prompted a resurgence of the China model debate. Unlike previous leaders of China, Xi is more confident of China’s major power status and is vocal in elaborating on the pre-printChina model. His main assertion is that the China model is versionnot just a result of China’s economic achievements but a consequence of the Communist Party of China’s leadership, which steered the country toward prosperity. Xi’s version of the China model also emphasizes Chinese uniqueness and pits itself against Western norms.

Propelling Xi’s national rejuvenation project are scholars such as Zhang Weiwei (张维为), the founding director of Fudan University’s China Development Model Center. His book, “The China Shock: The Rise of a Civilizational State” published in 2011 explains the China model, and was recommended by Xi Jinping. Published in both Chinese and English, the Chinese version is written in a more patriotic, if not nationalistic tone. The book’s main premise is that China is the only civilizational state (文明型国家) still existing in the contemporary world. Its sheer size, huge population, super long history and abundantly rich culture make its developmental path unique and inapplicable, even incomparable to other countries. Emphasising China’s exceptionalism, he argues, as does Xi Jinping that other countries’ rules cannot be used as a yardstick to measure China. As put by Shaun Breslin, this kind of Chinese exceptionalism discourse has “far more than semantic importance” (Breslin 2011: 1341-1342). It not only feeds into understandings of China’s place in the world but also has important domestic uses and consequences. It explains why China does not have to follow anything—including any path that sees democratization as an inevitable consequence of economic liberalization (Breslin 2011: 1341-1342). Among other Western proponents of the China model is Daniel Bell, professor at Shandong University in China. For him, what defines the China model is meritocratic elite governance by which Chinese leaders are selected on the basis of their good performance at lower levels of government (Bell 2015). Their ascension to national level governance is based on their ability to deal with crises and spur economic development, which is usually contrasted with the ‘messy’ nature of electoral democracy (Bell 2016). At the core of the China model is the performance-derived-legitimacy that Chinese leaders and the CCP have to continue ruling (Bell 2015). On that basis, China’s model of development is underpinned by a unique model of governance, which cannot be replicated elsewhere.

Substances and Effectiveness of the China model

Is the China model effective and sustainable? Essential to answering this question is need for some sort of agreement on what constitutes the China model. However, such consensus does not exist, judging from the existing literature. Nonetheless, most scholars agree that the China model is silhouetted in a system of the market economy allied to one-party rule system. Also, several scholars have referred to Chinese pragmatism and gradualism traits in steering the country toward modernization. Those traits are usually contrasted with the Washington Consensus’ “shock therapy” and one-solution-fits-all approach (Hsu, Wu and Zhao 2011; Chen and Naughton 2017: 19). Arguably, Western-bred democracy theories are built on the premise that economic growth should lead to modernization, liberalization and democratization. Francis Fukuyama’s (1992) “End of History” thesis summaries this view on mankind’s pre-printultimate path to democracy. version China and Singapore are often raised as counter-examples of countries that achieved modernization with limited democratic development. The explanation is that what makes China and Singapore’s regimes sustainable is their ability to offer performance legitimacy. It is this performance legitimacy that underpins the China model. Accordingly, supporters of the model

insist that good governance, mostly in the economic domain, gives the CCP legitimacy to remain in power. Reliance on raw economic growth to sustain the regime is in the ultimate, as argued by some scholars, both flawed and unsustainable (Zhao 2017; Dickson 2011). Fault-lines in the China model’s emphasis on preeminence of economic growth include environmental degradation, corruption, exploitation of labour, non-observance of labor rights, inequality and social unrest (Kennedy 2010; Dickson 2011: 46; Zhao 2017; DeLisle 2017). Notably, as people’s basic needs are met, it has proved that they start demanding other rights, such as protection of their environment, transparency, accountability and redress of social and economic inequalities. It therefore follows that a regime, whose legitimacy exclusively depends on economic reforms rather than political reforms will in the end unravel, and the problem is acute in times of economic recession (Thornton and Thornton 2018: 215). It is in this vein that scholars outside China mostly agree that the China model cannot be a substitute of the Western model of development, in which democracy and market economy develop in tandem (Halper 2010; Zhao 2017). Instead, the China model can become a brand in itself and compete with the Western neoliberal model (Halper, 2010). Some scholars seem dissatisfied with such a development and have called for China’s democratization in order to balance its state power, “like what happened in several other East Asian countries” (Zhao 2017: 17). To sum up, discussions on the China model, whether by Chinese or non-Chinese scholars have often led to a dichotomized way of looking at the matters: the West vs. China, and democratization vs. authoritarianism as illustrated above. To some extent, there is nothing wrong in discerning differences in practices and values. But the constant dichotomization of the matters can be “potentially dangerous” if the knowledge that the debates produce becomes too simplified - fueling “zero-sum” conflict between the West and China in their approaches to human development and governance. Scholars, such as Callahan (2013) and Mulvad (2018), have cautioned the danger of such ideological cleavage in contemporary debates on China.

Applications of the China model beyond China

Can the China model be replicated elsewhere and how? The China model is usually defined by what it is compared to - the Washington Consensus - rather than what it is. Ian Taylor, a professor at St Andrews University notes that the China model or the Beijing Consensus “draws its meaning and appeal not from some coherent set of economic or political ideas… but from its intimation of an alternative pole, from which those opposed to Washington and, by extension ‘the West’, can draw inspiration” (Taylor 2014:115). The implication is that to understand what the China model offers to developing countries, the focus is not what the China model is, but what it is not in relation to the Washington Consensus. pre-printSuch a comparative approach to defining the China versionmodel influences its geographical application beyond China. Because the China model is framed as an alternative to, and sometimes as a competitor of the Washington Consensus, its application is limited to developing countries in the Global South. He Yafei, China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs,

opined in the China Daily, that the Chinese model “offers other developing countries an option different from the ‘American model’ for economic development” (He 2018). This is contrary to the near-universal application of the Washington Consensus, which He Yafei refer to as the ‘American model’. There is no doubt that the two models differ on mechanisms of their application and replication in other countries. The main difference is on the nature of the Chinese and American states and their respective positions on promotion of development abroad. Unlike the Washington D.C., Beijing’s official position is that developing countries are free to choose elements of the China model that are applicable in their contexts. Beijing’s position has been parroted by government officials, scholars, public intellectuals and Chinese journalists such as Wang Wenwen. In 2018, Wang published an op-ed in the Global Times reiterating that China does not want African countries to copy its model. Rather, by lending its development experiences, China hopes that these countries can explore their own development path and become another young global economic locomotive and world factory (Wang 2018). More than a template for development and modernisation, the China model, as further argued by Xi Jinping is a new option for other countries that need to speed up their development while preserving their independence and sovereignty. Rhetoric and reality are often blurred in China’s foreign policy positions, especially when it relates to the China model. The rhetoric is that the China model should not be replicated abroad; the reality is however complex - states can pick and choose elements of the China model that they can replicate, which suggests that the model is replicable. Naughton (2010) argues otherwise - a model is to be taken as a whole. If only elements are taken on board it is by definition not a model, but a series of useful elements. It can therefore be argued what is referred to as the China model in other countries is actually a series of elements of the model being implemented. Selecting elements of a development model applicable to a country’s context is not an option for developing countries wanting to implement the Washington Consensus - as is the case for countries opting for the China model. The differentiating factor as identified by Francis Fukuyama is the nature of the United States and its global outlook. Unlike China, the United States bilaterally and multilaterally impose principles and values of the Washington Consensus on countries in the Global South - forcing them to institute economic and political reforms and implement the Washington Consensus in its totality. China seemingly imposes no such conditions. Neither does it impose political and economic reforms on other countries or seek to institute regime change in cases where its model is resisted (Hodzi 2018). In line with its denial of hegemonic ambition, China appears reluctant to encourage replication of the China model abroad. But, the United States has imposed sanctions and unilaterally intervened to enforce its values on other countries. As a result, the Washington Consensus, as put by Rita Abrahamsen (2000: x), “has been accepted by the vast majority of multilateral and bilateral donors, and there is general agreement on the desirability of both economic liberalism and pre-printliberal democracy”. version The ‘general agreement on the desirability of both economic liberalism and liberal democracy’ need to be historicised. In the Global South, especially in Africa and Latin America, countries that required financial assistance after the Cold War had no choice but align with economic liberalism and liberal democracy. The imposition of conditions tied to aid and development

assistance by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries ensured that the liberal development paradigm and its liberal democracy became universal and unchallenged. The ‘forced’ application of the Washington Consensus on developing countries in the form of Structural Adjustment Programmes of the 1980s failed to “deal with Africa’s unsustainable debt and economic decline… [and they failed] to rekindle economic growth on the continent” (Abrahamsen 2000:37). The same happened in Latin America. For China, a non-Western power self-identifying as a non-interventionary power, there seem to be no possibility of the China Model becoming universal for as long as China does not seek to impose it on other states or is not a global hegemony shaping the world in its image. Nonetheless, the transferability and replicability of the China model in other countries has been a subject of both academic and policy debate. With limited existing literature on whether the China model is transferable or replicable, much of the existing knowledge is derived from statements by political leaders and opinions in media outlets - making it difficult to distinguish between rhetoric and reality. Albeit, scholars differ on whether the China model is transferable or not. Some, such as Zhang Weiwei, who are focused on China’s exceptionalism contend that it is hard for others to follow China’s development path (Zhang 2012). With the China model intricately underpinned by the Communist Party of China, Margaret Lewis (quoted in Weiss 2019) argues that “China’s Party-state structure is rooted in a particular history that does not lend itself to an easy copy-and-paste abroad.” Andrew Nathan (2015:161) summed it up when he stated, “it is rare to find an argument, even by pro regime independent intellectuals, that portrays the Chinese experience as a universal model that should be adopted everywhere.” As argued earlier, Nathan’s assertion reflects the complexities of China’s foreign policy - that on one hand promotes the rhetoric that the model cannot be adopted elsewhere, but on the other urging that it is an alternative for developing countries seeking to speed up their modernization and development. The denialism is also part of China’s strategy against the ‘China Threat’ thesis. Thus, China is keen on being seen as a non-interventionist and non-hegemonic power with no ambition of promoting its development guidelines and blueprints abroad. In the few cases that Chinese officials have alluded to existence of the China model, they have hastily argued that it is not universal but that other countries can draw lessons and implement elements that fit their contexts. This argument should be understood for what it is - a diplomatic offensive on the West. “China denounces the idea of ‘universal values’ as a form of Western subversion of states that try to protect their autonomy from Western influence” (Nathan 2015:158). The Washington Consensus has often been criticized for trying to offer “one-size- fits-all” solutions to other countries problems. If the China model is aimed to be different from Washington Consensus, then it cannot similarly offer “all-purpose” solutions (Breslin 2011: 1337). Yet, scholars such as Shaun Breslin use this to argue that the China model is more of a metaphor than a reality - hence there is no such thing as a model that can be applied elsewhere (Breslin 2011: 1328; 1337-1338). But metaphorically, the concept of the China model, by its refusal to be a one-size-fits-all, and insistence that countries can pick aspects of China’s path to development that work for them, resembles the freedom and sovereignty over development pre-printthat the model has come to be known for in Africa and otherversion regions of the developing world. The China model, is therefore a symbol that every country can find its own developmental path relevant to its context.

Sovereignty to choose own path to development fits into the idea that China is offering the developing world an alternative model to development. Xi Jinping stated in his 19th CPC National Congress report that “the path, the theory, the system, and the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics have kept developing, blazing a new trail for other developing countries to achieve modernization. It offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind” (Xinhua 2017).

Appeal of the China model in developing countries By strategically not presenting the China model as a rival to existing development paradigms, but as one of the options, the desirability of the China model in Africa has increased. In principle, it offers African countries the opportunity to choose between the neoliberal development models of the West and China’s model of development, however they conceptualize it. Linked to that is China’s push to be recognized as a developing country that is altruistic enough to be an alternative economic collaborator for poor regions of the world. The result has been popularity of the China model of development in authoritarian states burdened by conditionalities imposed by the United States, European powers and the Bretton Wood institutions. To those countries, China provides economic benefits with relatively fewer but deceptively conditional strings attached (e.g. the one-China policy) and no demands for democratic reforms and respect for human rights (Breslin 2011: 1337-1338; DeHart 2012: 1362). As put by Naidu and Davies (2006:80), most governments see China as a “refreshing alternative to the traditional engagement models of the West… [in particular] African governments see China’s engagement as a point of departure from Western neocolonialism and political conditions.” It is in that vein that outside of China, political leaders in developing countries such as Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Kenya and Zimbabwe have alluded to a China model of development that inspires their own development trajectories. Anchored on non-conditionality, sovereignty and freedom of states to choose their own path to development, the China model seems more desirable for developing countries, mostly in Africa. Speaking at the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) conference in Beijing, Monica Mutsvangwa, Zimbabwe’s Minister of Information, Publicity and Broadcasting Services said: “We are heartened by the offering of a more diverse and competitive global financial architecture beyond the IMF-World Bank of the Bretton Woods System… The BRI summit is a shining example of how China wants to generously and selflessly share out its experience with all nations” (The Herald 2019). Such profiling of China as a responsible global power able to provide public goods and contributing to international development has enhanced China’s status in the Global South. In addition, the inception of infrastructure development projects such as the BRI and the growth of China as the biggest trading partner of countries in the Global South and financier of development projects has added to the attractiveness of the pre-printChina model of development. Hence, China is constantly citedversion as a model of development and poverty reduction. In Ethiopia, especially under the leadership of the late Meles Zenawi, the China model was preferred because it challenged the neoliberal assumption that development is linked to

democratic governance. In declaring that Ethiopia needs to strengthen its development autonomy, Zenawi said: “I think it would be wrong for people in the West to assume that they can buy good governance in Africa. Good governance can only come from inside; it cannot be imposed from outside. That was always an illusion. What the Chinese have done is explode that illusion. It does not in any way endanger the reforms of good governance and democracy in Africa because only those that were home-grown ever had a chance of success.” (Zenawi 2007). As aptly put by He Yafei “given a choice between market democracy and its freedoms and market authoritarianism and its growth, stability, improved living standards, and limits on expression - a majority in the developing world and in many middle-sized, non-Western powers prefer the authoritarian model” (He 2015:129). Even after Zenawi, Ethiopia’s development and industrial strategies are closely aligned with China’s special economic zones, industrial parks and public investment in major infrastructure development projects. Ethiopia is however not alone. “States as disparate as Ethiopia, Rwanda, Kazakhstan, and Bolivia seek to replicate China’s economic transformation” (Kaplan 2018). Beyond Africa, the China model of development has had increased traction in Southeast Asia. According to Kurlantzick (2013), surveys on political values in Southeast Asia suggest that “people in many Southeast Asian countries share a willingness to abandon some of their democratic values for higher growth, and the kind of increasingly state-directed economic system that many of these countries had, in their authoritarian days, and that China still has today.” Thitinan Pongsudhirak (2018), director of the Institute of Security and international Studies at Chulalongkun University in Thailand argues that across Southeast Asia, particularly in Cambodia, Brunei, Laos and Vietnam, increased authoritarianism in those countries “is crucially underpinned by China’s successful system of centralized control combined with economic dynamism.” The result is that as China’s economic dominance over the region increases and the countries become more dependent on China. There is a “shift of the center of regional economic gravity from Japan to China” and “authoritarianism remains a fierce competition to democracy in East Asia” because “China is seen as having demonstrated a viable path of growing out of a planned economy and as showing how sequencing political and economic change makes possible a transition from communism to postcommunist authoritarianism”(Chu et. al 2008 :9-10). The China model was framed along the developmental state discourse (Knight 2014). The emphasis is on a strong state that intervenes in the economy, promote industrialization and exercises autonomy and sovereignty in determining its development trajectory. As put by Nathan,“ by demonstrating that advanced modernization can be combined with authoritarian rule, the Chinese regime has given a new hope to authoritarian rulers elsewhere in the world” (Nathan 2015:158). However, the China model is no longer just appealing to repressive authoritarian regimes but has increased its “leverage over democracies in the developing world, and made Beijing’s model of development more attractive even in freer nations, places where there has already been some degree of democratic transition” (Kurlantzick 2013). Thus, as put by Wibowo, “the attraction to the China model is unconscious - a silent admiration of the pre-printspectacular rise of China” (Wibowo 2004: 217). version In the view of opposition political parties in Zimbabwe and Ethiopia, the implementation of the China model by ruling parties in the two countries is meant to mask human rights abuses, suppress political dissent and consolidate political power. Tendai biti, vice-president of the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance Party in Zimbabwe argues that

“Mnangagwa clearly does not know a lot of things. He probably wants to take the Beijing model, which has liberalisation of business while there is absolute closure of political space… He envies Xi’s position where he has effectively made himself life president. China is not a socialist state, but practices state capitalism where everything is run by central government, but still projects the characteristics of a capitalist society. There is a state capitalism in China. When Mnangagwa says he wants to copy the Chinese model he wants to be president for life chosen not by the people, but by the politburo while the country trades with everyone” (The Standard 2018). Similarly, the former Chair of the Oromo people’s Congress in Ethiopia said: Really, Meles wants the Chinese model because staying in power is his sole, ultimate goal … As far back as 1994, 1995, Meles sent a delegation to China, to look very closely at the way China is developing, and especially how to deal with diversity the Chinese way and how to effectively use democratic centralism … he sent the number two, number three [most senior] people to China (Chair of Oromo People's Congress quoted in Fourie 2015:299). The focus of the two opposition political parties is not on the economic and developmental aspects of the China model, but the political system that it represents. Accordingly, the applicability of the China model in Africa is interpreted differently by local actors according to their economic and political interests. In sum, regardless of developing countries claiming to follow the China model of development, there is scholarly consensus that the China model is yet to be fully developed and that people view it differently. What each of the different countries are following, are specific elements of China’s development experience - which on their own are not the China model. Naughton (2010) concurs that because both the Beijing Consensus and the China model do not accurately describe China’s development trajectory, no country can claim to be following the model, although they can derive lessons. As it appears, from Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and other countries, political leaders are seeing the China model as providing them with an opportunity to choose and define their countries’ path of development rather than the predefined path imposed by the Washington Consensus. Although this preference may be due to the political leaders’ selfish aims as alleged by the opposing parties, this level of development autonomy and the extraordinary economic success of China, is attracting more countries including Hungary that are increasingly showing preference for “the economic and political approach of China, a model of state capitalism in which the state steers production and the economy” (Moyo 2018:112).

Conclusion

The China model eludes a concise definition - scholars, policymakers and journalists continue to disagree on the existence of the model, and among those that agree there is a China model, pre-printthere is no consensus on what it is. The conflicting signals versionfrom the government of China adds to the complexity of conceptualizing the China model, let alone its application beyond China. Yet, as shown in this chapter, there have been three waves of debates on the substance of the model by the model’s promoters, opponents, and even imitators outside of China. As China becomes more comfortable with defining its global role as a major power, there is likely to be

a fourth wave of debate on the China model. Xi Jinping’s ‘China Dream’, Belt and Road Initiative and China’s alternative multilateral financial institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) suggest a China gearing for more expressions of its global ambitions. With China becoming a financier of development projects and infrastructure development projects in Asia, Africa and Latin America, the role of China as a model of development or as Xi Jinping puts it, a ‘new option’ is becoming more illuminated. Countries seeking to derive material benefits from China, and those genuinely attracted to China’s development success are increasingly drawing lessons from China and applying aspects of China’s development paradigm in their own contexts. The COVID-19 global pandemic manifested China’s assertiveness and claim to being a model in effectively dealing with global pandemics. From being the first to announce the testing of possible COVID-19 vaccination to donating the much-needed medical supplies and expertise to both developed and developing countries, China showed its global influence and indispensability. However, there have been criticisms of China’s handing of COVID-19. For instance, the United States and other Western countries such as the UK, France and Germany accused the Chinese government of hiding the truth in the beginning of the outbreak while other countries have complained about the defective nature of medical equipment donated by China. Regardless, the crisis gave China a good opportunity to demonstrate the effectiveness of its authoritarian governance and exposed the weakness of a plethora of liberal democratic governments. One can say that the 2020 pandemic is a game changer for China to further promote the comparative, if not absolute advantage of its model in the world. The fourth wave of debate should therefore focus on the variants of the China model in the different countries where aspects of the China model are being implemented, with or without China’s knowledge. The next question will not be whether China has a model of development, but what variants of the China model exist beyond China.

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Abstract

Does China have a unique model of development? Scholarly debates starting from the publication of Joshua Cooper Ramo’s “Beijing Consensus” article in 2004 assert that China found a distinct path of modernization. Since then, the ‘China Model’ concept, whether the model exists or not, and what it really entails, have been debated in three waves of scholarly literature. This chapter offers a comprehensive overview of those waves of debates on the substance of the model by the model’s promoters, opponents, and even imitators outside of China. Furthermore, this chapter offers scholarly views on whether the Chinese path of development is successful and sustainable or not. Note on Contributors Yu-Wen Chen is Professor of Chinese Studies at the University of Helsinki in Finland and Hosting Professor of Asian Studies at Palacký University in Czech Republic. Chen’s research concerns China’s international relations and ethnic politics in China. Chen is editor of Asian Ethnicity (Routledge) and Journal of Chinese Political Science (Springer).

Obert Hodzi is a Lecturer in Politics at the University of Liverpool, UK. Hodzi is an International Relations scholar focusing on international politics, conflict and security, and non-western emerging powers in global governance with empirical expertise in China and Africa. This chapter was written when Hodzi was a postdoctoral researcher at the Department of Cultures at the University of Helsinki.

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