The Strategies of China's Storytelling in the New

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

The Strategies of China's Storytelling in the New THE STRATEGIES OF CHINA’S STORYTELLING IN THE NEW ERA How has the Chinese propaganda department propagated stories in and outside of China through its new-type mainstream media since the 18th Party Congress in 2012? An analysis of online video clips JULIA VOERMANS Master Thesis East Asian Studies Thesis Supervisor: Prof. Dr. S.R. Landsberger 15-12-2018 Table of Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 3 2. China’s international power debate .......................................................................................... 6 Perception, prejudice or paranoia: Sinophobia discourse .................................................................. 6 China’s ‘soft use of power’ .................................................................................................................. 8 The Beijing Consensus ....................................................................................................................... 11 3. China’s propaganda system .................................................................................................... 13 Propaganda, xuanchuan .................................................................................................................... 13 The CCP’s propaganda system .......................................................................................................... 14 Two Sessions 2018: what changed and why? ................................................................................... 16 New forms of media use and content ............................................................................................... 17 China’s international image .............................................................................................................. 19 4. Methodology .......................................................................................................................... 23 5. Case studies: audio-visual analysis of propaganda video clips .................................................. 26 5.1 Foreign audiences ....................................................................................................................... 26 5.1.1 Shisanwu ............................................................................................................................... 26 5.1.2 The Belt & Road is How ........................................................................................................ 28 5.1.3 Belt and Road Bedtime Stories ............................................................................................. 29 5.2 Chinese audiences ....................................................................................................................... 30 5.2.1 Xi Jinping describes a perspective of win-win cooperation for Asia-Pacific cooperation .... 30 5.2.2 Let’s go Belt and Road .......................................................................................................... 31 5.2.3 The world, what’s going on? ................................................................................................ 33 5.3 Chinese and foreign audiences ................................................................................................... 34 5.3.1 How leaders are made ......................................................................................................... 34 5.3.2 One Belt One Road: prosperous together ............................................................................ 35 6. Discussion .............................................................................................................................. 37 6.1 The Chinese Dream and Rejuvenation Narrative ........................................................................ 37 6.2 The Belt and Road Initiative ........................................................................................................ 39 6.3 Inclusivity and diversity ............................................................................................................... 40 6.4 Xi Jinping as a popular idol .......................................................................................................... 41 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................. 44 Bibliography ............................................................................................................................... 46 1 Appendix ................................................................................................................................... 56 Table 1: General information about the video clips.......................................................................... 56 Table 2: Main topics retrieved from the shot protocols ................................................................... 57 Shot protocol 1 .................................................................................................................................. 58 Figure shot protocol 1.2 ................................................................................................................ 65 Shot Protocol 2 .................................................................................................................................. 66 Shot Protocol 3 .................................................................................................................................. 70 Episode 1: What’s the Belt and Road Initiative? ........................................................................... 70 Episode 2: The Belt and Road belongs to the world ..................................................................... 72 Episode 3: The Belt and Road Initiative and Globalization ........................................................... 74 Episode 4: Who can join the Belt and Road Initiative? ................................................................. 75 Episode 5: Who will finance the Belt and Road Initiative?............................................................ 76 Shot Protocol 4 .................................................................................................................................. 79 Figure shot protocol 4.1 ................................................................................................................ 84 Shot protocol 5 .................................................................................................................................. 85 Shot protocol 6 .................................................................................................................................. 92 Shot protocol 7 .................................................................................................................................. 99 Shot protocol 8 ................................................................................................................................ 105 2 Introduction Since the 18th Party Congress of the Communist Party of China (CCP) in 2012, the CCP has improved its ‘modernised type of propaganda’1, by using new visual means to shape the mainstream political culture in China.2 This period, which is still going on, can be referred to as the ‘New Era’, or ‘Xi Era’, in which China’s president Xi Jinping and his propaganda team appear to have understood that they had to adapt to new audiences and new market trends.3 An example of this is the new media-management strategy that was launched on August 18, 2014, in which traditional media, such as printed media, and new media, such as the Internet were integrated.4 Xi said this would create a new-type mainstream media (xinxing zhuliu meiti 新型主流媒体) that is ‘powerful, influential and credible’.5 Recently, state- owned media companies have put this into practice and have started using new visual means, such as animated cartoons, online promotional video clips6, Graphics Interchange Formats (GIFs) exclusive to WeChat7, music videos and even online mobile games.8 Especially online promotional clips, animated video clips and music videos are extensively used by the CCP’s Central Propaganda Department (CPD; 中共中央宣传部 [The Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee]). These videos have received great attention online, for example on the blog WhatsonWeibo and the current-affairs magazine for the Asia-Pacific, the Diplomat. 9 However, academic work on this topic is scarce and further examination on it is needed. The CPD’s shift to communication via online services is recent and still developing, which makes it interesting to examine these new media products and place it within related academic debates. 1 Landsberger, 2009, p.331 2 Chang & Ren, 2018, p.1 3 Ma & Thomas, 2018, ‘In Xi We Trust: How Propaganda Might Be Working in the New Era’ 4 Ng, 2014, ‘Xi Jinping calls for new style of media organisation’ 5 Brady, 2015, p.55. Original source: People’s Daily, 2014, ‘Xi Jinping: Constructing a Socialist Cultural Great Power and Improving Cultural Soft Power’ 6 Chang & Ren, 2018, pp.9-12 7 WeChat is a multi-purpose chatting, social media and payment app of the greatest content provider in China, Tencent. It was used by more than 1 billion people worldwide in 2018. Statista, 2018, ‘Number of monthly active WeChat users from 2nd quarter 2011 to 2nd quarter 2018 (in millions)’ 8 Koetse, 2017, ‘China’s Central Commission for Discipline Inspection’s New Online Campaign: “Anti-
Recommended publications
  • Joint Action Against Online Video Piracy in China
    November 13, 2013 Joint Action Against Online Video Piracy in China Lawsuits Seeking RMB300 Million in Damages Filed Against Baidu and QVOD on Claims of Spreading Pirated Videos and Engaging in Hotlinking BEIJING, Nov. 13, 2013 /PRNewswire/ -- Youku Tudou, Sohu Video, Tencent Video, LeTV, MPA, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), CODA, Wanda Films, Enlight Media, Letv Films announce a joint declaration today in Beijing to fight online video infringement and piracy both on PC and mobile Internet in China. Meanwhile, the joint action announces legal action has been taken against Baidu and QVOD for compensation as high as RMB300 million. Representatives from more than a dozen Chinese and international film and television production companies attended the joint action announcement in Beijing. International attendees included the Motion Picture Association of America, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Warner Brothers, Disney and Paramount. Chinese attendees included the Capital Copyright Industry Alliance Capital Protection Division, the China Radio and Television Association of the Television Production Committee, and many Chinese production companies. "Since 2009, the video industry is facing a more severe anti-piracy situation," Sohu Group Chairman and CEO Charles Zhang said. "Especially when those big Internet companies with resource advantages participate in large-scale piracy. We cannot keep competing because where thieves and robbers are having their way, law-abiding companies cannot survive. We may even have to exit online video industry if such practices continue. Nobody will invest in content, and China's online video industry will face the sad situation as the music industry, which has already been destroyed by piracy, had faced before.
    [Show full text]
  • State of Mobile 2020
    1 1 2 0 2 0 S T A T E O F M O B I L E Executive Summary 204B $120B 3.7 Hrs 825% 60% Worldwide Downloads Worldwide App Store Per day spent in mobile Higher avg IPO Higher per user in 2019 Consumer Spend by the average user valuation for mobile engagement in 2019 in 2019 companies in 2019 by Gen Z vs older demos in 2019 2 State of Mobile | Copyright 2020 | App Annie Table of Contents ● Macro Mobile Trends 5 ● Gaming 13 ● Finance 22 ● Retail 27 ● Streaming 32 ● Social 36 ● Other Industries Embracing Mobile Transformation 40 ● Worldwide Rankings 45 3 State of Mobile | Copyright 2020 | App Annie The Mobile Performance Standard Through our mobile data and insights platform, we help create winning mobile experiences for those aspiring to achieve excellence 4 State of Mobile | Copyright 2020 | App Annie MACRO MOBILE TRENDS Top Countries by App Store Downloads Consumers Downloaded a Record 120B 240B 100B 200B Growth From 2016 to 2019 204 Billion Apps Worldwide Downloads Worldwide 80B 160B ● Annual worldwide downloads have grown 45% in — Worldwide 45% the 3 years since 2016 and 6% year over year, — China 80% 60B 120B which is particularly impressive given this excludes — India 190% re-installs and app updates. — United States 5% 40B 80B — Brazil 40% ● Downloads are largely fueled by emerging Country-Level Downloads Country-Level markets, including India, Brazil and Indonesia. — Indonesia 70% 20B 40B ● Consumers in mature markets like the US, Japan and Korea have seen download growth level off, 0B 0B but are still seeking out new apps.
    [Show full text]
  • Read the Report
    23 Dec 2020 CMB International Securities | Equity Research | Company Initiation iQIYI (IQ US) BUY (Initiation) China’s online Disney in the making Target Price US$23.2 Up/Downside +34.8% Current Price US$17.2 We keep positive on IQIYI’s long-term subs trend and margin improvement , backed by its sizable users, unique original content and valuable IP. We forecast iQIYI to deliver 11% revenue CAGR during FY20-22E, with subs price hike and China Internet Sector ads recovery. Given fundraising partly priced in, we think iQIYI’s valuation is attractive. Initiate with BUY with DCF-based TP US$23.2. Sophie Huang An online video leader: Not only “Netflix”, but more. iQIYI is a leading (852) 3900 0889 online video platform in China, with 105mn subs. Backed by its sizable users, [email protected] vibrant original content and IP reserve, we forecast iQIYI to deliver 11% rev CAGR in FY20-22E, with subs price hike, ads recovery, and user expansion. Miriam Lu (852) 3761 8728 Original content makes the difference. With online video industry growth [email protected] tapering off, we believe content matters more to users than traffic or subsidies. iQIYI exceled itself with exclusive original content in both popular dramas and variety shows. Moreover, it bore initial fruits from short-episode dramas (e.g. Stock Data Mkt Cap (US$ mn) 13,499 the popularity of The Bad Kids <隐秘的角落>), and would further enrich Light Avg 3 mths t/o (US$ mn) 180.41 on Series (迷雾剧场) with stronger pipeline. We expect short-episode dramas 52w High/Low (US$) 28.03/ 14.51 series to stimulate its subs & brand ads momentum with higher ROI, such as Total Issued Shares (mn) 373 Who is Murderer<谁是凶手> in 2021 pipeline.
    [Show full text]
  • From Western TV Sets to Chinese Online Streaming Services: English-Language TV Series in Mainland China
    . Volume 16, Issue 2 November 2019 From Western TV sets to Chinese online streaming services: English-language TV series in mainland China Xiaoran Zhang, University of Nottingham, UK Abstract: In the age of multiple screens, online streaming has in the 2010s become the most significant way of consuming overseas television programs in Mainland China. Due to rather strict government policy and censorship, foreign television series are presently only legally distributed and circulated on licensed online streaming services. Focusing on the streaming of US/UK TV series, this paper examines online streaming services’ distribution activities in order to understand both streaming websites’ business practices surrounding transnational TV and the features they employ to cater to online audiences for these series. To grasp how the online distribution of English-language TV series operates in China, I begin by looking at China’s five major video streaming services, analyzing the design of their interfaces, scheduling of programs, and accessibility for different tiers of users. I then examine how streaming services use social media as a major tool to promote their US and UK TV series. Through this analysis, I argue that transnational TV flow has had to be localized to achieve distribution and marketing goals in a Chinese context, resulting in the uniqueness of these streaming practices. This article concludes that, with the development of online streaming technologies, distinctive modes of audience consumption in China have informed the localization of this specific transnational TV content. Keywords: Online streaming, streaming consumption, television distribution, transnational TV, Tencent Video, HBO, Game of Thrones Introduction As one of HBO’s most successful high-end shows, Game of Thrones (2011-) has earned a worldwide reputation that includes the fandom of Chinese viewers.
    [Show full text]
  • Tencent Announces 2017 Fourth Quarter and Annual Results
    For Immediate Release TENCENT ANNOUNCES 2017 FOURTH QUARTER AND ANNUAL RESULTS Hong Kong, March 21, 2018 – Tencent Holdings Limited (“Tencent” or the “Company”, 00700.HK), a leading provider of Internet value added services in China, today announced the unaudited consolidated results for the fourth quarter of 2017 (“4Q2017”) and audited consolidated results for the year ended December 31, 2017 (“FY2017”). FY2017 Key Highlights Revenues: +56% YoY, non-GAAP Profit attributable to equity holders of the Company: +43% YoY . Total revenues were RMB237,760 million (USD36,387 million1), an increase of 56% over the year ended December 31, 2016 (“YoY”). Operating profit was RMB90,302 million (USD13,820 million), an increase of 61% YoY. Operating margin was 38%, up from 37% last year. Profit for the year was RMB72,471 million (USD11,091 million), an increase of 75% YoY. Net margin increased to 30% from 27% last year. Profit attributable to equity holders of the Company for the year was RMB71,510 million (USD10,944 million), an increase of 74% YoY. Basic earnings per share were RMB7.598. Diluted earnings per share were RMB7.499. On a non-GAAP2 basis, which excludes certain non-cash items and certain impact of M&A transactions: - Operating profit was RMB82,023 million (USD12,553 million), an increase of 41% YoY. Operating margin decreased to 34% from 38% last year. - Profit for the year was RMB66,404 million (USD10,163 million), an increase of 44% YoY. Net margin decreased to 28% from 30% last year. - Profit attributable to equity holders of the Company for the year was RMB65,126 million (USD9,967 million), an increase of 43% YoY.
    [Show full text]
  • Mobile Live Video Broadcasting Live Broadcast
    Mobile Live Video Broadcasting Mobile Live Video Broadcasting Playback Product Documentation ©2013-2019 Tencent Cloud. All rights reserved. Page 1 of 22 Mobile Live Video Broadcasting Copyright Notice ©2013-2019 Tencent Cloud. All rights reserved. Copyright in this document is exclusively owned by Tencent Cloud. You must not reproduce, modify, copy or distribute in any way, in whole or in part, the contents of this document without Tencent Cloud's the prior written consent. Trademark Notice All trademarks associated with Tencent Cloud and its services are owned by Tencent Cloud Computing (Beijing) Company Limited and its affiliated companies. Trademarks of third parties referred to in this document are owned by their respective proprietors. Service Statement This document is intended to provide users with general information about Tencent Cloud's products and services only and does not form part of Tencent Cloud's terms and conditions. Tencent Cloud's products or services are subject to change. Specific products and services and the standards applicable to them are exclusively provided for in Tencent Cloud's applicable terms and conditions. ©2013-2019 Tencent Cloud. All rights reserved. Page 2 of 22 Mobile Live Video Broadcasting Contents Playback Live Pull iOS Android LEB iOS & Android ©2013-2019 Tencent Cloud. All rights reserved. Page 3 of 22 Mobile Live Video Broadcasting Playback Live Pull iOS Last updated:2021-09-16 10:16:36 Basics This document introduces the live playback feature of the Video Cloud SDK. Live streaming and video on demand In live streaming, the video streams published by hosts in real time are the source of streaming.
    [Show full text]
  • Beijing Consensus
    Review China in Africa: the Washington Consensus versus the Beijing Consensus Ronald I. McKinnon Professor of International Economics Stanford University 9 August, 2010 _______________________________________________________________________ Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 Vivien Foster, William Butterfield, Chuan Chen, Natalyia Pushak: Building Bridges: China’s Growing Role as Infrastructure Financier for Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington: The World Bank, PPIAF, 2009. Stephan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century. New York, Basic Books, 2010. These three books complement each other in describing the truly astonishing growth of China’s aid, investment, and trade in Sub-Saharan Africa since 2000. For China, foreign aid, investment, and trade are not really distinct categories. As Deborah Brautigam emphasizes, these parts are bound together by intricate financial arrangements under China’s Export-Import Bank with other commercial arrangements orchestrated by the Ministry of Commerce, within which the Department of Foreign Aid is nested. Foster, Butterfield, Chen and Pushak are World Bank economists who bring additional data to bear on aid by China compared to Western sources. Stephan Halper focuses more on the political implications of the remarkable rise of China, and worries about the decline of the United States and its “Washington Consensus” as a model for developing countries. In contrast to China’s, foreign aid agencies of the mature capitalist countries in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are typically lodged in ministries of foreign affairs, which decide on worthy poor recipients. The U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Halper, S. (2010). the Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian
    THE Halper, S. (2010). The Beijing consensus: How China's authoritarian model will dominate the 2r' century. New York: Basic Books. INTRODUCTIOH SECRETARY OF STATE HILLARY CLINTON'S decision to visit China within weeks of assuming office in 2009 provided evi• dence of the importance Washington now attached to Sino- American cooperation.' CUnton called for a "deeper" and "broader" U.S.-China partnership, saying that cooperation be• tween the United States and China on global issues such as the economy was "imperative."^ In similar tones;Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao told former U.S. President Jimmy Carter shortly before Clinton's arrival that the only path for China and the United States was to "strengthen mutual trust and cooperation, and pass through the difficulties together."^ Wen's words were a perfect iteration of the so-called new China that we've seen emerging on the world stage over the last decade. Long gone are the ideological crusades of the 1960s—crusades that took Maoism to Africa, spread revolution in Southeast Asia, and sought to overthrow the great powers of the West. On the contrary, capitalism is now a global phenomenon—with China among its greatest champions. And since this new incarnation has embraced the capitalist road, the country has come to rely on international markets, global institutions, and free trade to achieve economic growth. This 2 The Beijing Consensus Introduction 3 has allowed living standards to rise, contributing to poHtical economic power; meanwhile, today's emerging markets are stabihty at home. In the process, China has progressively en• increasingly drawn to a new and compelling doctrine of state- gaged with the international community it once spurned, show• managed capitalism.
    [Show full text]
  • White Cat, Black Cat Or Good Cat: the Beijing Consensus As an Alternative Philosophy for Policy Deliberation? the Case of China
    DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY AND INTERVENTION BARNETT PAPERS IN SOCIAL RESEARCH White Cat, Black Cat or Good Cat: The Beijing Consensus as an Alternative Philosophy for Policy Deliberation? The Case of China Reza Hasmath WORKING PAPER 14-02 November 2014 Editor: Erzsébet Bukodi Department of Social Policy and Intervention University of Oxford Barnett House 32 Wellington Square Oxford, OX1 2ER [email protected] White Cat, Black Cat or Good Cat: The Beijing Consensus as an Alternative Philosophy for Policy Deliberation? The Case of China Reza Hasmath School of Interdisciplinary Area Studies, University of Oxford Email: [email protected] Abstract This paper argues that the Beijing Consensus represents a philosophical movement towards an ultra-pragmatic view of conducting policy deliberation. Contrary to models of development which provide a subset of policy prescriptions for the policymakers’ disposal or a fundamentalist adherence to a particular economic tradition, the philosophical intentionality of the Beijing Consensus is reflected in the infamous words of Deng Xiaoping “I do not care if it is a white cat or a black cat … It is a good cat so long as it catches mice”. That is, the Beijing Consensus inherently recognises that each development scenario has a potential set of challenges that may require unique and/or experimental solutions factoring the current political, social and economic environment. This ultra-pragmatism will require the policymaker to engage in greater policy experimentation, and to have a larger risk-elasticity. Further, this philosophy is most aptly demonstrated by looking at the aggregation of practices and lessons learned using the recent policy experiences of China.
    [Show full text]
  • A “China Model” for the “New Era”
    Centro de Estudios y Documentación InternacionalesCentro de Barcelona E-ISSN 2014-0843 B-8438-2012 D.L.: opinión A “CHINA MODEL” FOR THE 503 “NEW ERA” OCTOBER 2017 Sean Golden, Associate Senior Researcher he “extraordinary elevation” of Xi Jinping -Donald Trump’s description of the result of 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC)- echoes the extraordinary rise of China as a geoeconomic super- powerT after Deng Xiaoping inaugurated the “reform and opening up” policy in 1978. Geoeconomic power tends to become geopolitical power. This is Xi Jinping’s mid- to long-term objective. He has divided the history of the socialist revolu- tion in China into three 30-year periods: the first dominated by “Mao Zedong Thought”, the second dominated by “Deng Xiaoping Theory”, and the new pe- riod to be dominated by “Xi Jinping Thought” on “socialism with Chinese char- acteristics for the New Era”. The “West” characterises China as an “emerging” economy. In historical terms China is re-emerging. It is returning to the pre-em- inent position it held in the world economy before being subjected to Western imperial aggression in the 19th century. This is the essence of Xi’s “China Dream”. He defines it as the “rejuvenation” of China. In traditional Chinese terms, this means the consolidation of wealth and military power, two of the major themes of his political report to the National Congress. The first priority is to consolidate and maintain the CPC’s control of the political system. The second is to improve the people’s standard of living.
    [Show full text]
  • The Beijing Consensus Versus the Washington Consensus: the Dilemma of Chinese Engagement in Africa
    Vol. 12(1), pp. 1-9, January 2018 DOI: 10.5897/AJPSIR2016.0920 Article Number: EA2069655609 African Journal of Political Science and ISSN 1996-0832 Copyright © 2018 International Relations Author(s) retain the copyright of this article http://www.academicjournals.org/AJPSIR Full Length Research Paper The Beijing consensus versus the Washington consensus: The dilemma of Chinese engagement in Africa Jarso Galchu Department of Civics and Ethical Studies, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Bule Hora University, Ethiopia. Received 7 July, 2016; Accepted 1 September, 2016 This study discusses the reason behind the Chinese hastened engagement in Africa. The study particularly emphasizes debates surrounding such massive involvements from the African, European and Chinese point of view focusing on the main tenets of Washington and Beijing consensuses. The study shows that Beijing consensus has been perceived cynically by traditional western power contending that Chinese involvement in Africa has been built on china’s narrow, and parochial interest of grabbing African’s resources on one hand, and reversing of democratization and human rights improvements taking shape on the continent. The pro- Chinese narratives, on the other hand, argue that Chinese involvement in Africa has been built on the continent’s historical relations with China when fighting colonial imperialism and apartheid system. In addition, it is their shared experiences of humiliation and subjugation at the hand of western imperialist colonial power that coach China and Africa to free their relationship from western style of involvements in one another’s domestic affairs. Africans view Chinese engagement in Africa optimistically as a relief from century-old “civilizing mission” of the former colonial powers.
    [Show full text]
  • State Practice of Asian Countries in International Law Vietnam
    State Practice of Asian Countries in International Law Vietnam Tran Viet Dung* International Economic Law – Expropriation – Investor-State Dispute Settlement – Property Taking – Investor Protection Trinh Vinh Binh v. Socialist Republic of Vietnam (International Court of Arbitration – International Chamber of Commerce) From 21 August 2017 to 27 August 2017, the International Court of Arbitration (ica) begun the hearing between Mr. Trinh Vinh Binh, a Dutch-Vietnamese businessman, and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The case concerns the alledged breaches by Vietnam the 1994 Treaty between Vietnam and Nether- lands on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments (bit). The Trinh Vinh Binh v. Vietnam case was originally initiated in 2003 before the Stockholm Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce by Mr. Trinh. The case arose out of Mr. Trinh’s investment in real estate, food processing and several tourism assets in Vietnam in the early 1990s. As the Law on Foreign Investment 1987 did not allow foreigners (including Vietnamese with foreign citizenship) to use their own names to buy house and receive transfer of land ownership, Mr. Trinh asked his family members to use their names to register ownership of the land, houses and a few Vietnamese busi- nesses in order to justify these certificates prima facie. In 1996, Mr. Trinh was arrested and prosecuted by the provincial competent authorities for many criminal charges, including violations of regulations on land rights, tax evasion and bribery. It was reported that until the time of being arrested, Mr. Trinh held the de facto ownership of 11 houses, 114 grounds and 2,847,745 meter square of land.
    [Show full text]