The Decision to Attack Iraq: a Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making Author(S): Alex Mintz Source: the Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol
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The Decision to Attack Iraq: A Noncompensatory Theory of Decision Making Author(s): Alex Mintz Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Dec., 1993), pp. 595-618 Published by: Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/174541 . Accessed: 19/03/2013 12:48 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Conflict Resolution. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 152.2.176.242 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 12:48:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Decision to Attack Iraq A NONCOMPENSATORY THEORY OF DECISION MAKING ALEX MINTZ TexasA&M University This article attemptsto explain the decision to use force againstIraq using a noncompensa- tory theory of decision making. Ratherthan choosing an alternativethat maximizes utility on the basis of a holistic comparisonprocess as suggestedby the expectedutility model, or selecting an alternativethat "satisfices"a certain criterion as predictedby the cybernetic model, the noncompensatorytheory suggests that decisions on the use of force are often madebased on the rejectionof undesirablealternatives on the basis of one, or at most a few, criteria. This article attemptsto explain the decision to use force againstIraq using a noncompensatory,multidimensional theory of decision making. This the- ory highlights the role of distinctcontextual dimensions associated with the decision to use force and integratesnoncompensatory strategies of decision making into this multidimensionalframework. At the core of this theory is the assumption that policy makers are confronted with a set of feasible alternativesand a set of contextualdimensions that enter into their calculus of decision making. Associated with each policy alternative,there are con- sequences thatfollow from the pursuitof the alternative.If a certainalterna- tive scores low on a given dimension,then a high score on anotherdimension cannot "compensate"for it, and hence the alternativeis rejected. A decision situation typically consists of a set of "feasible alternatives A = (a,. ..., am) and a set of attributes or evaluators of the alternatives (X1, ..., Xv).Associated with each alternativea in A, there is a corresponding consequence (X,(a), X2(a) ...., Xn(a)) in the n-dimensional consequence space X = X1 x X2 x... X," (Sage 1990, 345). Rather than choosing an AUTHOR'SNOTE: An earlierversion of this articlewas presentedat the annualmeeting of the InternationalStudies Association,Acapulco, Mexico, March23-27, 1993. I am gratefulto NehemiaGeva for manyinvaluable discussions. JOURNALOF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 37 No. 4, December1993 595-618 ? 1993Sage Publications, Inc. 595 This content downloaded from 152.2.176.242 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 12:48:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 596 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION alternative that maximizes utility on the basis of a holistic comparison process, or selecting an alternativethat "satisfices"a certain criterion,the theory suggests that foreign policy decisions are often made based on the rejection of undesirablealternatives on the basis of one, or at most a few, criteria. This theory differs significantly from the rationalactor-expected utility model of the use of force (see Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 1985) and the cyberneticsatisficing political use of force model (see Ostromand Job 1986). WhereasBueno de Mesquitaand Lalman (1990) and Ostromand Job (1986) used compensatorystrategies of decisionmaking, the model presentedin this article uses a noncompensatorystrategy. 1. COMPENSATORYSTRATEGIES OF DECISION MAKING According to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita(1981, 1984, 1985), nations are led by rational,forward-looking, expected-utility-maximizing leaders. The strategies these leaders select are a function of "the values they attach to alternativeoutcomes andthe beliefs they hold regardinghow theiradversary will respond to their strategicdecisions" (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1990, 750). Decision makersevaluate the costs and benefits associatedwith each alternative to obtain "the largest net gain (expected utility) at an acceptablelevel of risk"(Bueno de Mesquita 1984, 228). The rationalist, microeconomic, expected utility approachto decision making is a powerful one, but it has limitations. Cognitive psychologists (e.g., Schwab, Olian-Gotlieb,and Heneman 1979; Klein 1989; Mitchell and Beach 1990) and students of behavioralorganization theory (e.g., Simon 1985) attributeto the expected utility and other analyticaldecision-making strategies the requirementfor extensive processing time, cognitive effort, concentration,and skills that in many cases are not available, especially undertime pressuresand rapidly changing conditions, and in othercases are not worthy to the decision. Accordingly,these scholars argue that decision makersseldom maximize utility. Accordingto the boundedrational model, of which the cyberneticsatisfic- ing model of decision makingis one type (see Simon 1985; Steinbruner1974; Ostromand Job 1986), policymakersoperate under constraints while search- ing for an acceptable outcome (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990). These limitations or bounds stem from deficits in the informationbase and from limitationof processingcapabilities (e.g., cognitive and motivational).Con- sequently,the decision process is less comprehensivebecause only a subset of alternativesand dimensionsis considered. This content downloaded from 152.2.176.242 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 12:48:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Mintz/NONCOMPENSATORY THEORY 597 Expected-utility studies (Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1990) and cyberetic models of the use of force (Ostromand Job 1986) have relied on what is known in the informationprocessing/cognitive psychology literature as the "compensatory"strategy of decision making (Ford et al. 1990). According to this model, in choice situations,if a certain alternative(e.g., use of force) is low on a given dimension, then a high score on another dimension can compensatefor it, and hence the alternativeis adopted.This is reflectedin the elegant mathematicalequations in Bueno de Mesquitaand Lalman(1990) and Ostromand Job (1986). In these studies, a high score on one dimension (e.g., military) can compensate for a low score on another dimension (e.g., political). These are combined to maximize (Bueno de Mesquitaand Lalman 1990) or "satisfy"(Ostrom and Job 1986) utility. Two models are used in describingthe compensatorystrategy. According to the linear model,each dimensionfor a decision alternativeis given a value and the dimensionsare combinedadditively to producean overall value for each alternative.The decision makercompares the alternativeson the basis of these overall values and chooses the alternativewith the highest value (Einhornand Hogarth1981; Fordet al. 1990). Accordingto this model, then, a high score on the militaryor internationaldimension can "compensate"for a low score on the politicalvariable and vice versabecause the political leader makes a decision to use force based on the overall score. The second model is the additivedifference model, by which alternatives are compared on each dimension and differences across dimensions are summed.This summationresults in a preferencefor one decision alternative (Olshavsky 1979). Compensatorymodels are additive.Compensatory processes are marked by interdimensionalsearch (i.e., a search within an alternative) using a constantamount of informationper alternative(Billings and Scherer 1988). The additive difference model is compensatorybut proceeds from an in- tradimensionalsearch pattern (i.e., across the portfolioof alternatives). Using a compensatorystrategy, the decision makermay tradeoff a high value on one dimension of an alternativewith a low value on another dimension. The essence of this model is that the various components of a multidimensionalobject are combined for a "score"(e.g., "netgain," "critical value,""satisfactory score," etc.) and contributeindependently to its overall worth or utility (Einhornand Hogarth 1981). With a few exceptions, linear equationshave been used to approximatethe cognitive processes underlying decision making. Although the expected utility and other analytic models have produced accuratepredictions of policy decisions and outcomesin numerousinstances (see Bueno de Mesquita 1981, 1984, 1985), such models seldom capturethe This content downloaded from 152.2.176.242 on Tue, 19 Mar 2013 12:48:53 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 598 JOURNALOF CONFLICTRESOLUTION underlyingcognitive processes involved in decision making.An alternative theory of foreign policy decision makingis presentedbelow. 2. THE NONCOMPENSATORY DECISION-MAKING THEORY OF THE USE OF FORCE A growing number of studies of foreign policy decision making have shown that policymakers adopt cognitive shortcuts to rational decision making (see Jervis 1976, 1985;Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1985; George 1980; Holsti 1990; Herek, Janis, and Huth 1987; Maoz 1990; Vertzberger1990). George(1980), for example,points