American Strategic Policy for the Indian Ocean Area, 1970-1980 Kimbriel Armistead Mitchell Doctorate of Philosophy London School
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AMERICAN STRATEGIC POLICY FOR THE INDIAN OCEAN AREA, 1970-1980 KIMBRIEL ARMISTEAD MITCHELL DOCTORATE OF PHILOSOPHY LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE UMI Number: U048388 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U048388 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ( h£S-£ S F 684k *£11 u o 7 6 / ^ 2 ABSTRACT This thesis analyzes America's strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area from 1970 to 1980 and assesses the efficacy of its contribution to the US security objectives there of upholding friendly, primarily Persian Gulf states' security and stability, maintaining access to oil, ensuring the safety of shipping and limiting Soviet influence. Minor intermittent naval display succeeded in balancing the Soviet naval presence, the main purpose of American policy until 1979, because that presence was too small to exercise significant influence. The littoral states, however, were ambivalent: they wanted the US to balance the USSR but feared a potential super-power naval arms race. Naval display failed as part of America's indirect threat in 1973-74 to retaliate against friendly Gulf Arab states if they continued the oil embargo caused by the October 1973 Middle East war. America modified its strategic policy when Gulf security became more precarious after the Iranian revolution in early 1979. It intensified its naval display and began to approximate a land force presence in South-West Asia in order to show greater concern for its interests, to reassure friends about its reliability as a security actor and to enhance the political and military balance against the Soviets. The US emphasized more direct and active deterrence against a potential Soviet or Iraqi attack and preparation for intervention, if necessary, within a friendly Gulf state in order to protect access to oil. America's modified policy gave some reassurance to friendly Gulf states that shipping would be safe, that, available in the background and if requested in a crisis, its armed forces would help them to cope with likely external threats and that the US was more determined to counter the USSR. But America was also perceived to be a political and potential interventionist danger to friendly countries and to be of uncertain reliability in the event of "worst case” Soviet or Iraqi aggression because its immediately available combat capability was weak. The US armed forces were unnecessary and virtually inappropriate for helping friendly regimes to maintain domestic stability or for preserving access to oil. America's strategic policy was of little relevance for limiting the USSR's improvement of its political and strategic position in South-West Asia in the late 1970s, and more direct and active US deterrence reinforced marginally at most the Soviet intention not to attack into the Persian Gulf. Black i A Vladivostok USSR • Ankara V _ Beijing • KOREA TU R K EY ^ JAPAN r - 7^ \ --- •Tehran "I d T U . SYRIA J IRAQ ) •* K a b u l* f Islamabad / CHINA Mediterranean Sea ^ ^Baghdad • L /AFGHANISTAN / 's ^ S u e r C anal 'SRAEL/?-^ IRAN t ^ ^ . KUW AIT ; Cairo West L V / V ' . JORDAN Cairo BHUTAN Strait ot H orm uz * 7 . p j EGYPT ManamaVj^X/y N ew Delhi Qena ■ BAHREIN~Jf. ^ A Riyadh- Ifesdhau, — BANGLADESH-V Dhaka y Ras Banas t • si r SAUDI ARABIA ' ' - f J * » \ * ,u8cal / < ) Seeb i BU R M A N j T Hanoi Masirahl. (Oman) \ YEMEN Thamarit Bengal ^ .* ( y ^ SOUTH ARABIAN SEA Salalah Khartoum • YEMEN Bab-al-Mandab S l/d /l SUDAN PHILIPPINES Guam Ob' Aden Socotra ( S. Ye m e n ) Andam an Is. ; V-f" L t------- Subic Bay ^ DJIBO UTI ( In d ia ) n Addis ’• ^B erbers KAMPUCHEA j f ) •A b a b a V Nicobar Is. 1. V V ETH IO PIA C o io m b o ^ ^ India ^ \ SRI LANKA MALDIVES .. Kuala Lumpur S ' f ' Malacca Strait \ ; ...... ( V M A L A Y S I A / - ^ j I KENYA Mogadishu Singapore w - ■ ■ _ t Nairobi I A . “ - V ■ SEYCHELLES $>0 tri Mombasa Mahe Diakarta INDONESIA TANZANIA Das es Salaam ^ Diego Garcia ( UK ) Sunda Strait 1*)Oc£=> c~=a '•5 0 ^ f ^ _(X 0 C om oros Is Lombok Strait INDIAN OCEAN Cocos Is. ( A u stralia) Darwin • Antananarivo 0 M A U R ITIU S ^ R EUNIO N North West Cape ./ \ MADAGASCAR ♦ Naval Support Facilities |. r - Pretoria AUSTRALIA .) • • /*,/Maputo O Naval Base SOUTH AFRICA Access Facilities r A Communication Facilities ^ . UAE - United Arab Emirates Cockburn Sound 0 miles 1000 Canberra • k m 1 0 0 0 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT p. 2 MAP p. 4 INTRODUCTION p. 6 CHAPTER ONE: RUDIMENTS OF POLICY p. 17 CHAPTER TWO: CREATION OF POLICY, 1970 p. 70 CHAPTER THREE: MINOR ADJUSTMENT OF POLICY, p. 118 1973-74 CHAPTER FOUR: ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH p. 181 THE SOVIET UNION, 1977-78 CHAPTER FIVE: MAJOR MODIFICATION OF POLICY, p. 228 1979 CHAPTER SIX: ELABORATION OF POLICY, 1980 p. 319 CHAPTER SEVEN: RESPONSES TO POLICY p. 402 CHAPTER EIGHT: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS p. 435 SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY p. 443 INTERVIEWEES p. 468 6 INTRODUCTION The United States' strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area from 1970 to 1980 consisted of mainly naval display and, from 1979, more direct and active deterrence and (preparedness for) intervention. That policy was intended to contribute to the achievement of America's security objectives principally in the Persian Gulf region: to promote the security and stability of friendly states, to assure continuous access to oil, to provide for the safety of shipping and to limit Soviet influence. Those objectives were pursued in the initial context of Britain's virtual military withdrawal from the Indian Ocean area in 1971, the establishment of a small, slowly growing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean from 1968 and the restraint imposed by the Nixon Doctrine on US security policy for the Persian Gulf, which policy looked to primarily Imperial Iran to maintain regional military security. The strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area originated by the US government in 1970 comprised occasional minor deployments by 7th Fleet detachments, retaining the small Middle East Force of three ships and constructing a communications station at Diego Garcia. US naval forces in a passive, defensive, essentially political role would, it was assumed, be adequate to show America's interest in the area, balance the Soviet naval presence, which was too small to pose a military threat or to exert important influence, and thereby reassure littoral states. America's interest in naval arms control negotiations with the USSR was not reciprocated in practice. The United States made a minor adjustment to its strategic policy for the Indian Ocean area in late 1973 and 1974, responding to the oil embargo (October 1973-March 1974) caused by the Arab-Israeli war in October 1973 and to the Soviets' perceived greater willingness shown during that war to use their armed forces abroad. It began regular naval 7 deployments to the Arabian Sea and it proposed to expand Diego Garcia into a logistic support facility. From late 1973 into 1975 America made veiled threats of retaliation against "friendly" Gulf Arab states should the oil embargo continue indefinitely and, later, of intervention if a new embargo were imposed. By 1977 political conditions in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean area, relations between the US and the USSR and the level and activity of their naval presences were stable enough for the super-powers to enter into negotiations for naval arms control. But in early 1978 the Americans postponed those talks indefinitely, not because of the serious bargaining difficulties rooted in the asymmetry between each side's force posture and operational practices but because of the USSR's intervention in the Ethiopian-Somali war and the doubling of its naval presence. In 1979-1980 the United States made a major modification in its strategic policy: it undertook more direct and active deterrence against the Soviet Union, suggesting that it might anticipate a Soviet attack into the Gulf region with pre emptive movement by the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) created in 1980, spread a conflict with the USSR to other regions or resort to tactical nuclear weapons, in view of its weak conventional capability. Deterrence applied also to Iraq, against whom the US was prepared to intervene, if necessary and requested, in support of a friendly Gulf Arab state under attack. Intervention in the event of unrest within a friendly Gulf state in order to "save" a regime or to "protect" access to oil became a legitimate policy option. Display was important for balancing politically as well as deterring the Soviet armed forces and for reassuring littoral states about the reliability of America's contribution to their security. The US enlarged its naval presence to two continuously deployed aircraft carrier task groups and augmented that display with visits and exercises in South-West Asia by land- 8 based forces from America. It began to expand anew Diego Garcia and gained access to military facilities in Oman, Somalia, Kenya and, informally, Egypt in order that it could support better its naval forces and the RDF in crises.