Austin Tobin, Leo Beranek and the Advent of Jet Travel
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Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2017/03 Public Demands and Technological Response: Austin Tobin, Leo Beranek and the Advent of Jet Travel Jameson W. Doig Research Professor in Government, Dartmouth College; Professor Emeritus, Princeton University Abstract As the Luddite protests in the 19th Century and resistance in the 20th Century to building nuclear power plants illustrate, technological change often generates powerful public opposition. In some instances, however, scientific strategies, joined with sustained pressure from well-placed supporters, can be used to ameliorate the worst effects of technological change - as the case described below illustrates. When Pan Am tried to introduce jet planes for travel in the US and across the Atlantic, it generated a battle that lasted more than two years. The public agency that operated all three major airports in the New York region - the Port Authority - had been designed to encourage its officials to emphasize scientifically based analysis in setting policy; and the agency's leader, Austin Tobin, had developed a strong reputation for political independence and integrity. He also had previous encounters with the airlines, described below, leading him to be suspicious of their assertion that jet planes were not unduly noisy. Therefore, to test jet noise, he recruited the nation's premier acoustical engineer, Leo Beranek, and when Beranek concluded that jets were perceived to be much louder than expected, the aircraft industry fought back, challenging the findings, appealing to federal officials, and alleging that Tobin might be corrupt. After two years of conflict, the airplane industry capitulated, and in a few years the standards developed for the New York airports were embraced by airport managers across the United States and Europe. This paper summarises the battle that ensued between the Port Authority and the airlines, leading to the development of noise limits for operations at the New York airports during the early days of jet travel. 1. Introduction By the mid-1950s, residents living near airfields in the United States began to complain about the level of noise, as an increasing number of propeller-driven planes took off and landed in their neighbourhoods. Those living near Newark Airport filed a lawsuit, and at New York's Idlewild Airport (now JFK), there were threats that "if the noise . increases, mothers with 25 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2017/03 baby carriages would go "onto the runways".1 Adding to the tension, in 1956 Pan American Airways asked for permission to fly a jet-powered plane, the Boeing 707, at Idlewild. 2 The Port Authority of New York & New Jersey operated the Newark and Idlewild airfields, as well as LaGuardia, as it does today. The executive director of the Port agency, Austin Tobin, was concerned that jet aircraft might be noisier than propeller-driven planes, but Boeing assured Tobin that a jet plane, as measured by Boeing's sound monitors, generates no higher noise levels than a propeller plane of the same size.3 Wary of Boeing's claim, Tobin and his aides decided to monitor the 707's noise level. Some background on the Port Authority and Tobin will be helpful at this point and is provided below. 2. An Unusual Public Agency and its Exceptional Leader The Port Authority (PA) had been created in 1921 through a formal compact between the states of New York and New Jersey that established a Port District encompassing New York City, portions of Long Island and Westchester County, and parts of nine counties in New Jersey. The Port Authority was designed to provide an unusual degree of independence for its officials. The agency was controlled by six commissioners, three appointed by each state governor for six-year terms, thus signalling that they could serve beyond the shorter terms of the appointing executives. Moreover, the PA was required to finance its activities from rents and tolls, so the state legislatures could not use the threat of withholding appropriations to bend the agency to achieve narrow political goals. In addition, the commissioners were expected, under terms of the 1921 treaty, to act in ways that would benefit the entire bi-state region, rather than focusing on short-term political benefits for the appointing governor or their own state.4 Austin Tobin, born in Brooklyn in 1903, graduated from the College of the Holy Cross, Worcester, Massachusetts, in 1925 and joined the staff of the Port Authority in 1927, while completing work on a law degree. Tobin signed on to the agency as it was completing 1 John Wiley, the Port Authority's Director of Aviation, as quoted on page 2 of Beranek (2004). "Idlewild" was the name of the golf course replaced by the new airfield, and "Idlewild" became the airport's informal but widely used name until 1963, when it was named John F. Kennedy International Airport. From 1947 to 1963, its official name, rarely used, was "New York International Airport". 2 The title of the agency was changed in 1972 from Port of New York Authority to Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, to better reflect the equal status of the two states in governing the agency. 3 Austin Tobin, Nov. 8, 1956, as cited in Beranek (2004), p.2. 4 Doig, 2001, chapter 3. In the 1920s, New York governors had two-year terms and New Jersey governors three-year terms. In 1927, the two governors were given the power to veto actions of the PA, and in 1930 the number of commissioners was increased to six from each state. Those who have followed the Port Authority's recent sad history will know that New Jersey's current governor, Chris Christie, appointed commissioners and patronage-linked staff members who misused their powers; in several cases, they were removed from the agency and found guilty of criminal behaviour (see Amanda Terkel, “Top Christie Aides Found Guilty of All Charges in Bridgegate Scandal" Huffington Post, Nov. 4, 2016). In the earlier era examined in this essay, the agency and its leaders were largely free from that kind of political incursion. 26 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2017/03 several major projects - three toll bridges connecting New Jersey and Staten Island, and the George Washington Bridge, which opened in 1931. In 1930-31, the PA also took control of the Holland Tunnel, which had been built by another bi-state body. The PA's hopes for a large influx of funds from bridge-and-tunnel revenues were sharply diminished by the Depression, and the agency was only able to undertake a few projects, notably the first tube of the Lincoln Tunnel. However, Tobin used his position on the legal team to take a dominant role in combating Franklin Roosevelt's attempt to eliminate tax-exempt bonds. Successful in beating FDR, Tobin won the admiration of most PA commissioners, and in 1942 he was appointed Executive Director; it was a position he would hold for nearly 30 years.5 With the agreement of the PA Board, Tobin recruited a talented staff to identify needed projects in the region and once World War Two was over, Tobin was ready to extend the PA's reach beyond bridges and tunnels. Gasoline rationing ended in 1946, and the Port Authority began receiving millions of dollars a year, mainly from tolls on the George Washington Bridge, the Holland Tunnel, and the Lincoln Tunnel (whose first tube opened in 1939). Tobin persuaded the PA commissioners to approve a range of major projects - a massive bus terminal in Manhattan, marine terminals that could be acquired or built on both sides of the Hudson, and the take-over and modernization of all the major airports in the region. By 1946, the entire PA Board supported expansion into new fields, and they deferred to Tobin and his executives in deciding on the steps needed to carry out these projects. 3. Working with the airlines. The PA's leaders faced several challenges in their efforts to win control of the region's major 6 airports - Newark, LaGuardia, and Idlewild. Newark's elected officials resisted turning over their airport, and in response Tobin announced a plan to invest $55 million in modernizing the field; he also promised to provide the city with millions more, in lieu of taxes. With Newark's leaders still reluctant, Tobin then enlisted the New Jersey State Governor, who suggested that rejecting the PA's offer might jeopardize substantial state aid to the city. Across the Hudson, Tobin faced resistance not only from New York City's mayor but also from Robert Moses, who had persuaded state officials to create a "New York City Airports Authority", to be controlled by Moses's appointees. Tobin challenged the Moses scheme, explaining to Juan Trippe (founder of Pan American World Airways), Eddie Rickenbacker (General Manager of Eastern Air Lines from 1935 and owner and President from 1938) and other airline executives that the Port Authority could use millions from its toll revenues to modernize and expand LaGuardia and Idlewild facilities; he expressed doubt that the new Moses creation would have the funds needed to modernize those airfields. Tobin also contacted Eugene Black, a prominent banker he knew from the 1930s battles on tax-exempt bonds. Black then called the Mayor and told him that the Moses agency could never raise the 5 Doig, 2001, chapters 9 and 10. 6 On the complex airport negotiations described below, see Doig, 2001, chapter 11, and Nicholas Dagen Bloom, 2015, chapter 1. 27 Journal of Aeronautical History Paper No. 2017/03 money needed to achieve the airlines' expansive needs. Tobin played the two sides against each other, arguing to New York officials that Port Authority investment in Newark could make that city the region's premier landing site; to Newark leaders he pointed out that their airport would soon lose to New York in the battle for regional eminence - unless PA was permitted to lease Newark Airport and invest heavily there.