THE ADVANCE to EL ARISH Frombir El Abd the Enemy Withdrew His Main Force Across the Fifty Miles of Practically Waterless Country to El Arish

CHAPTER XI11 THE ADVANCE TO EL ARISH FROMBir el Abd the enemy withdrew his main force across the fifty miles of practically waterless country to El Arish. He left, however, a strong outpost at Mazar, some twenty- four miles east of Abd, and continued to maintain his garrisons in the great barren range of central Sinai, as at Nekhl and Maghara, and further east at Hassaiia and Kossaima. He therefore remained in a position to menace the right flank o€ the British force as it advanced. These mountain garrisons were known to be weak, and by the middle of August the way was clear for General Murray to march on El Arish, as soon as he had a force sufficient for the enterprise and communications capable of bearing his supplies. But neither Lawrence nor the Commander-in-Chief entertained any serious thoughts of an immediate advance. The Romani operations, while owing to the work of the Anzac Mounted Division, they had inflicted a heavy defeat upon the enemy, served to emphasise to the British leaders the harsh terms which the desert imposes on its conquerors. Murray had recognised from the outset that the railway was an indispensable preliminary to progress, but he had not contemplated having to carry the pipe-line all the way from Kantara to El Arish. The indifferent quality of the water available on the desert convinced him that the rate of his further advance was the rate at which both railway and pipe-line could be pushed forward. What was still more disappointing, it had clearly shown that, even with the railway and the water- supply, British infantry was useless against the Turks on the soft sands of the Sinai wilderness. Sinai ,must be cleared by the Anzac Mounted Division, with the infantry merely holding the advancing base. Murray therefore settled down to urge on the railway and the pipe-line with all the means in his power. But he had many obstacles to overcome. His labour supply was assured in the Egyptians, but the material necessary for construction was restricted by the increasing submarine menace and the

194 hug.-Sept., 19161 THE ADVANCE TO EL ARISH 195 heavy demand from other battle centres upon British resources. Progress was at times miserably slow. The build- ing of the line from Kantara to E1 Arish, a distance by rail of 110 miles, occupied nearly a year-which is far slower than the rate at which railway lines have frequently been laid against similar physical obstacles by civil engineers in peace time. In the advance across the desert a simple procedure was followed with the forward army. The mounted troops maintained their reconnaissance on the flanks and in advance of the creeping railhead, while the infantry marched up from position to position along wire-netting tracks, which had been laid down to facilitate their progress over the sand. These netting roads were another valuable improvisation which came from an Australian suggestion. Wire-netting is sometimes in the summer season spread over the dry sandy beds of Australian inland rivers to make the passage easy for wheels. In Sinai it was first used by the Anzac Mounted Division, and was quickly adopted for the whole army, until hundreds of miles of tracks were put down both on the desert and afterwards in southern Palestine. A few widths of netting securely pegged gave a firm highway over any sand, both to infantry marching in fours and to light motor traffic. Elaborate, costly, and extensive entrenchments were established at successive positions along the route as far as Bir el Mazar, and these were a greater tribute to the offensive qualities of the Turks than to the calculated resistance of the troops under Murray’s command. Throughout the year the internal affairs of Egypt made a heavy demand upon the Commander-in-Chief’s attention. No actual outbreak occurred, but seditious influences were always at work, and the position had been thought sufficiently dangerous to warrant the organisation of precautionary measures in Cairo and Alexandria, so as to ensure safety in the event of a rising. This unrest in Lower Egypt, together with the demands of his widespread command, now led Murray to a step which was to have a serious effect upon the Palestine campaign. He decided to withdraw his headquarters from Ismailia to Cairo, and obtained permission from the War Office to make the change. 196 SINAI AND PALESTINE [Sept., 1916 At the same time he asked for the assistance of a general officer, with the rank of a corps commander, to take over the operations in Sinai. The War Office approved ; Murray established his headquarters at the Savoy Hotel, in Cairo, 140 miles behind the advanced force at Romani; and Major- General Sir Charles Macpherson Dobell' was given the command at Ismailia, with promotion to the rank of lieutenant-general. The change is of interest, as showing Murray's strange failure to grasp the cause of the unfortunate confusion at Romani, which led to the escape of nearly half the Turkish force. He had been displeased with Lawrence's conduct of that fight; but now he was satisfied to delegate even greater powers to a leader whose experience up to that time had been very limited. General Dobell had, early in the war, attracted notice by the capable manner in which he had cleared up the enemy forces in the Cameroons; but there the troops engaged had been few in numbers, and were chiefly made up of natives. On the western desert in Egypt the operations in his time had been of a minor character ; and yet the Commander-in-Chief was content to retire to Cairo, and leave Dobell in command of a force of infantry and cavalry substantially larger and more difficult to handle than an ordinary infantry army corps. During September Murray asked the War Office for a siege battery, and continued his appeals for more aircraft. At the same time he complained that, when a recent lot of aeroplanes sent to Egypt were opened, it was discovered that the engines would not fit into the planes. The close of the Romani fight brought very little rest to the light horse. When the men were not engaged upon patrol, they were worked hard at improving the wells in the area of operations, which wcre developed until whole brigades could be quickly watered at niany places in the desert. At Mahadat seven wells became capable of yielding 19,000gallons in twenty-four hours; at Barda sixteen wells gave 136,000 gallons ; the Jefier wells, 92,000; Mageibra, 60,000 ; and Bayud, 46,000. But, with the exception of the flow at one limited well, none of this supply was fit for drinking by the troops. .~~ -- lMaj.-Gen. (temp. Lieut.-Gm.) Sir Charles M. Dobell, K.C.B.. C.hI G.. D.S.O.. P.S.C. Officer of British Regular Army; of London, Eng.; b. Quebec. Canada. 13 June, 1869. 1gth-17th Sept., 19161 THE ADVANCE TO EL ARISH 19: Early in September it was decided to make an attempt against the Turkish garrison at Mazar, some forty-four miles east of Romani, on the main northern track towards El Arish The Turkish force was believed to be 2,200 strong, made up of remnants of the troops which had fought at Romani, and supported by four mountain guns, a few anti-aircraft guns, and ten machine-guns. As there was no water-supply for the horses east of Salmana, 700 camels were organised to carry about twenty gallons each to a point ten miles east of Salmana, to meet Chauvel’s troops as they returned, and provide a drink for the animals of two brigades. The 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Brigades, with the 1st Brigade as covering troops, were the main attacking body, supported by two batteries of Royal Horse Artillery. A few Australian companies of the Imperial Camel Corps, commanded by Captain G. F. Langley,* and supported by two guns of the Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery, were ordered to proceed across the sands to the south, destroy a Turkish post believed to be at Kasseiba, and then join up with the main body before Mazar at daylight on September 17th. The engagement at Mazar was always afterwards referred to in terms of strong disapproval by the regimental officers who participated. Soundly entrenched, the Turks occupied a bare sand-ridge with a good command over the approach from all sides, although most of their trenches faced west. On the night of the 15th Chauvel led his three brigades as far as Salmana, and remained there under the palm hods during the day of the 16th. The cover, however, was but slight; in the aiternoon the Australians were discovered and machine-gunned by a German airman, and a few casualties were suffered. The pilot doubtless informed the garrison at Mazar of the British advance, and Chauvel was thus robbed of the chance of a surprise assault. Soon after dark the 2nd Brigade, which was now again under Ryrie’s leadership, and the 3rd Brigade, under Royston, moved out and marched for Mazar, while the 1st Brigade followed for about ten miles and then remained in support. Ryrie appeared on the west of the enemy’s position at dawn, and the 5th and 7th Light Horse Regiments,-

I Lieut.-Col. G. F. Langley, D.S.O. Commanded 1st (Anzac) Bn.. Im Camel Corps. 1916/18. 14th L.H. Rent.. 10x8. High School teacher: of Mansfieb. Vic: b. Port Melbourne; Vic., I May,.x891. 198 SINAI AND PALESTINE [17th Sept., 1916 dismounting from their horses, advanced to within 700 or 800 yards of the trenches. A few small outposts were rushed and carried, but the advancing line then encountered sharp fire from mountain batteries and rifles at an effective range. At the same time the 3rd Light Horse Brigade had come up on the south, where Royston was looking out keenly for Langley’s battalion of Camels. Langley, however, was late. He had found his route extremely sandy and slow, and in places the gullies between the dunes were so narrow that his men had to pass in single file. The 3rd Light Horse Brigade closed on the position on a very light front extending over two miles, with the right flank round as far as the telegraph wire on the east, which was cut. The whole line met with stout resistance ; but the squadrons to the east were looking into the trenches from the rear, and all ranks of the 3rd Brigade, like those of the 2nd, were confident as to their capacity to carry the position without heavy losses. Chauvel had explicit orders that, if the garrison was not taken by surprise and Overrun in the first rush, he was to consider the operation a reconnaissance in force and withdraw. On no account was he seriously to involve his brigades. Royston, on the south and south- east, took an unfavourable view of the prospect; after the regiments had been held up for nearly three hours Chauvel decided at 7 o’clock to break off the engagement. Chauvel was doubtless influenced by the absence of the camel detachment, and also by the fact that, owing to a miscalculation by the native guide (a sergeant in the Sinai police), his two batteries had not up to this time 17th Sept., 19161 THE ADVANCE TO EL ARISH 199 come into action. A further consideration, and one which always weighed with Chauvel, was the wretched prospect ahead of his wounded if the engagement should prove expen- sive. Langley arrived between 7 and 8 o’clock, after the brigades had withdrawn, and the division then marched back to the water dCp8t. Chauvel was satisfied that, in the circumstances, he had correctly interpreted his unsatisfactory orders, and Murray fully endorsed his decision ; but throughout the regiments there was bitter disappointment. The casualties of the division, most of which were suffered by the 7th Light Horse Regiment, were one officer and two other ranks killed, and nineteen other ranks wounded, while one Turkish officer and seventeen other ranks and a few Bedouins were captured. Lieutenant F. W. Slatter~,~of the 3rd Brigade Machine-Gun Squadron, was killed as he brought a machine-gun into action. The ambitious scheme for watering two brigades in the desert-which in its magnitude was probably without parallel -was frustrated by the absence of proper arrangements at the dBp8t. Sound organisation had deposited 14,000 gallons of water at the appointed place, but adequate steps were not taken to make it available for the horses. As the regiments arrived, there was a wild, disorderly scramble about the troughs. The water was exhausted before a large portion of the two brigades had come up, and many horses went thirty hours without a drink. The protracted desert work was now telling heavily on the horses, particularly on those of the 1st and 2nd Brigades, which had been so long upon the desert. They were much reduced in condition, and had taken to eating the sand and camp refuse. The horsefeed coming forward from Egypt and other sources was of wretched quality, and it was plain that either negligence or corruption was responsible for the approval of it at the base. After Mazar the 1st and 2nd Brigades were ordered back to the Canal for a richly earned rest. The enemy’s estimate of the strength of his position at Mazar, and the degree to .which he considered it menaced by Chauvel’s troops on September 17th, were shown by his evacuation of the place two days later. Romani, however,

‘Lieut. F. W. Slattery, rd Aust. M.G. bqdn. Carpenter; b. Bendlgo, Vic., 1885. Killed in action. 17 dept., 1916. 200 SINAI AND PALESTINE [Sept.-Oct., 1916 continued to be for some time the advanced base of the British army ; but substantial mobile forces were now encamped in advanced positions to the east of that stronghold, and were also extended over the oasis area to the south. From Romani could be seen, some forty miles across the broken and rolling sand-hills to the south, the gloomy, barren mass of the ranges of central Sinai. Waterless, except at occasional wells, and served only by lonely, narrow tracks which were always hazardous, and often impossible, for wheeled transport, these mountains were still in the possession of the Turks, and were a constant, if not a serious, menace to the British force advancing east along the seaboard. Murray's plan was to deal finally with the Turkish posts in the hills after he had reached El Arish; but it was decided in October to make an exception to the general scheme, and to endeavour to storm the Turkish stronghold at Maghara, from which troops had debouched by the passes during the Romani fighting. Maghara, an old settlement made up of a few stone houses, is perched on the northern shoulder of the range, about fifty miles south-east of Romani. A narrow defile, in places not more than twenty feet wide, falling steeply through the harsh, yellow, sandstone rocks, gives the settlement access by the Wady Baba to the plain below. Running along the foot-hills upon either side of the mouth of the Baba is a narrow flat of hard ground, clear except for a few mimosa bushes, and showing signs of cultivation. From this flat towards Bayud, to the north, stretches one of the most desolate and difficult expanses of sand-dune country in all northern Sinai. A column made up of the 11th and 12th Light Horse Regi- ments, one regiment of City of London Yeomanry, and 300 troops drawn from the camel companies, supported by two guns of the Hong Kong and Singapore Battery, was placed for the raid under the command of Major-General A. G. Dallas'-who afterwards led the unlucky 53rd Division at Gaza-with Brigadier-General S. F. MotP as second-in- command. From Bayud, where the column assembled, to

' Maj-Gen. A. G. Da!Iar, C.B . C.M.G., p S.C. Officer of British Regular Army; b. IO June, 1866. Died, a Feb., 1931. ' Maj.-Cen. S. B. Mott, C.B., P.S.C. Of Northamptonshire, Eng.; h. London, Enn.. ia Jan., 1873. 13th-1gth Oct., 19161 THE ADVANCE TO EL ARISH 201 Maghara is only twenty-five miles, and, allowing for the circuitous route through the sand-hills, the march would not exceed thirty-five. Over normal, well-watered country preparations for such a raid by a small mounted force would entail very little work or consideration. But, in view of the country to be covered, the arrangements were exceptionally elaborate. The force contemplated did not exceed 1,100 dismounted rifles; but water and rations had to be provided for men and horses for four or five days, and when the column moved out from Bayud its total strength, including native camel-drivers, was 5,000 men, 2,300 horses, 7,000 camels. The water-supply was drawn from Bayud, where a month earlier the wells had only been capable of supplying half a squadron in twenty-four hours. A squadron of the 12th Light Horse Regiment, under Lieutenant B. Lowing: worked constantly for a month at the improvement of the water, and sank and timbered to a depth of about twelve feet sixteen wells, which were capable of giving an abundant supply to the whole column. Marching by the stars, the column, with Grant of the 11th Light Horse Regiment and Lieutenant P. Goldenstedt' as guides, reached Zagadan and halted there for the day. That night, the 11th Light Horse still leading, the column moved on Maghara. The route wound through the intricate troughs among countless sand-hills devoid of distinguishing features. During the night a dense fog shut off the stars, but Grant, who had a phenomenal sense of locality and direction, kept on constantly at a sound pace through the sandy desolation. Shortly before dawn the horses came suddenly on to hard ground, and a little later, as daylight was breaking, the advanced screen was fired on by a Turkish outpost. The column had emerged from the maze of sand-hills directly in front of the Turkish position. Immediately the Turks fired, the leading troops, under Captain C. A. R. Munro* and

Maj. B. Lowing, M C. 12th L.H. Regt. Grazier; b. Parka, N.S.W., ag Oct., 1881. Died, a5 July, 1937 7 Lieut -Col. P. Goldenstedt, 15th L H. Re@. Adjutant 1st (Anzac) Camel Bn , 1916/17. Journalist; of Darlinghurst, Sydney, and Bathurst, N.S.W.; b. Glebe, Sydney, 31 Dec., 1887. shiaj. C. A R. Mnnro. 11th LH. Regt. Farmer: of Lismore. N.S.W.: b. Swan Bay, Richmond River, N.S.W., I Aug, 1884. 202 SINAI AND PALESTINE [15th Oct., 1915 Lieutenant Farlow, charged their outposts on t‘le foo!-hills at the gallop, although in the fog they had only the rifle-fire to guide them. A few prisoners were taken. General Dallas’s plan was to push the 11th Light Horse Regiment up the heights in the centre straight for the main defences; the 12th Light Horse Regiment and the yeotnanry were to work round on the north, while a half-squadron was to advance up the Wady Baba, which led into the pass. But the fog which enshrouded the range concealed all the objectives. Dallas’s orders were identical with those given to Chauvel at Mazar. If the Turks were in strength, he was not to risk his force, but was to consider the operations as a reconnaissance only ; accordingly, after consultation with the regimental leaders, he decided merely to make a demonstration and withdraw. The 11th Light Horse Reginlent was then ordered to advance on the main front, with the 12th to the right. After the long preparation for the raid, the Aus- tralians were exceptionally keen for a fight. Galloping across the narrow flat, they dismounted and advanced up the range with great eagerness. The fog was still heavy, but conditions improved as the men climbed. Covered by overhead fire from the two mountain guns and a number of machine-guns, they ascended a few hundred feet before encountering the enemy, and were then fired upon from a redoubt on a com- manding hill. Taking every advantage of the good cover provided by the rough hill-side, a squadron of the 11th crept forward with the bayonet, while the 12th Regiment, on the right, kept the Turks in the redoubt quiet with enfilade fire from machine-guns and rifles. The enemy, who throughout was completely surprised, refused a hand to hand fight, and fled up the heights. The light horsemen had now accomplished half their ascent, and the worst of the ground was behind them. The main Turkish position was in sight, and the squadron leaders were confident they could carry it without heavy losses. But communications were indifferent ; Dallas, having decided only to make a demonstration, now broke off the sporting little engagement, and the light horsemen, intensely disappointed, retired. One Australian was killed and a few men were wounded. Captain Munro won distinction in the bold leader- Oct., 19161 THE ADVANCE TO EL ARISH 203 ship of his squadron and in a gallant attempt to carry some Turkish wounded out under fire. From Maghara in October until late in December there was no further fighting. Lawrence advanced his section headquarters from Kantara to Mahemdia; the railway and pipe- line were constantly pushed forward; as each stage was completed, the infantry divisions. which had now been increased to four, marched eastward in support 01 the mounted brigades. Murray reduced his troops in the No. 2 and No. 3 Sections of the Canal Defences to a light holding force, and concentrated nearly all his strength on the Katia front. The British Government, still vacillating, was in October apparently less enthusiastic about the advance than it had been a few months earlier. During this month the Imperial General Staff informed Murray that the policy for Egypt in the immediate future must be, strategically at least, defensive, although the occupation of El Arish should, if possible, be accomplished, on account of its effect upon the malcontents in Syria and upon Arab operations in the Hejaz. Murray in his reply again expressed the opinion that an active defence of Egypt should rest upon El Arish. He also thought that his operations should be extended beyond the defence of Egypt, and should contribute to those of the Allies in general by endeavouring to prevent the withdrawal of any enemy troops from Palestine and Syria, while threatening the Turkish communications with the Hejaz. In February Sir Archibald had asked the War Office for five infantry divisions. Now, eight months later, he had only four under his command, and these were 6,000 rifles below full strength, while R great many of the men were still inexperienced. In urging that he should be allowed to direct his campaign towards something more than the protection of Egypt, he pointed out that the Turkish position by October had changed to the disadvantage of the enemy, who was now being subjected to strong and continuous pressure on his many battle-fronts. The Turks had not more than 16,000 rifles in Palestine and Sinai, and, although they had three additional divisions further north, in Syria, they could not leave less than two divisions there, in view of the possibility of a 204 SINAI AND PALESTINE [Oct.-Nov., 1916 surprise by the British Navy. There was thus no immediate prospect that the forces in Sinai and Palestine would be increased beyond 25,000. Murray did not think that the enemy, even if he withdrew troops from the Caucasus, could bring more than 55,000 troops into southern Palestine by an early date in 1917. Murray was at this time clearly busy on an ambitious scheme for a general advance into the Holy Land; with his railway only forty miles from El Arish by the end of October, he had reasonable grounds for hoping that he might make substantial headway during the coming winter. His optimism was heightened during November by reliable reports that the enemy was weakening his garrisons at El Arish and the neighbouring posts, Magdhaba, Rafa, and Masaid. Meanwhile the Arabs were doing well in the Hejaz, although it was clear that the Sherif’s price would impose a considerable additional strain on British resources and shipping. By the middle of October the Arabs had received from Murray (in addition to great sums of gold) 3,260 rifles, thirty-two Maxim guns, an Egyptian battery of field artillery, four 5-inch howitzers, eight Io-pounder guns, and ~S,ooo,ooorounds of small arms ammunition, together with nearly ~,OOO,OOOpounds of rice, 3,000,000 pounds of flour, 71,000 pounds of coffee, and 420,000 pounds of barley. High carnival ruled in the Hejaz. Never had the Arabs been so rich, so well fed, and so heavily armed. Around every centre at which arms and munitions were distributed the desert echoed with the noise of miniature battles, as the natives, with the delight of little children, tested their new weapons, displaying a military ardour more picturesque and amusing than convincing to their few experienced British instructors. Various suggestions were made to send troops from out- side to the Sherif’s assistance. Serious consideration was given to a proposal to land a small British and French force, to serve as a backbone for the men of the desert. Hussein at one time actually asked for such assistance, but afterwards declined it, on the ground that the religious susceptibilities of his followers might be offended if Christians appeared about the holy places. Finally Major P. C. Joyce was sent from the Soudan with 200 native Egyptian troops as escort to a flight of British aeroplanes, which were to assist the Arabs from a Nov.-Dec., 19161 THE ADVANCE TO EL ARISH 205 base at Rabegh. Joyce afterwards organised, and led through all the subsequent fighting in the Hejaz and to the north, a small body of Arab regulars which, mounted on camels, formed the one constant striking force of the Hejaz troops. Lieutenant-Colonels Newcomben and Parker, Captain Lawrence, and a few other British officers who afterwards gave to the Arabs their impulse and their leadership, proceeded on permanent service to the Hejaz at about the samse time. On December 26th Britain and France formally recognised Hussein, Grand Sherif of Mecca, as King of the Hejaz. As the year drew to its close, Murray, with his pipe-line, railroad, and infantry slowly but steadily closing on El Arish, devised a definite scheme for his firture operations. He expected that the Turks would make a stand at El Arish and endeavour to deny the favourable country of southern Pales- tine to the British, meanwhile safeguarding their garrisons in the Sinai Range. He therefore intended, when the 42nd and pnd Divisions were within striking distance of the old village, to attack with his infantry, while his mounted brigades, under Chauvel, were to be directed on an enveloping movement of the position by the south. Having captured El Arish, the Anzac Mounted Division would be used to destroy the sur- rounding eneniy garrisons, such as that at Magdhaba, some twenty-two miles up to the Wady el Arish. Raiding parties would then pierce the hills, and deal similarly with the remnants of the Turks at their scattered posts on the Sinai highlands. The Wady el Arish roughly marks the end of the desert sands, except for a strip a few miles in width which fringes the Mediterranean. Murray reckoned that, with the village in hand, the railway could be carried rapidly over comparatively firm soil to Rafa. The British army would then be soundly based on the edge of the undulating plains of southern Palestine, with a good supply of fresh water close to the coast, and the road would be open to combined operations by infantry and the mounted forces. Murray, it is interesting to notice, already appreciated the importance of the possession of Beersheba as a preliminary to a definite

~ ~~~~ gCol. S. F. Newcombe, D.S 0.: RE. C.RE., 2nd Aust. Div., 1915/16; Chief Engineer, Malta, 1gzg/3a. Of London; b. Brccon, Wales, g July, 1878. 206 SINAI AND PALESTINE [Oct.-Dec., 19x6 advance northwards into Palestine. Some weeks before, one of the British airmen engaged upon reconnaissance had looked down from his machine upon Jerusalem ; and, although the British Government had not yet sanctioned an invasion of the Holy Land, all ranks, as they laboured over the last miles of the sands of Sinai, in which they had been imprisoned and restricted for eight weary months, considered an ambitious offensive campaign as assured. Murray certainly shared in the general desire, and lost no opportunity of urging the project upon the War Office, and of making plans in anticipation of receiving the necessary orders. Towards the end of the year he asked the War Office for two additional infantry divisions from Mesopotamia, and for any further mounted troops that might be available in India. These requests, although they were not rewarded by any immediate additions to Murray’s army, were not without effect upon the British Government; if Sir Archibald was not destined to lead an army to the conquest of Palestine, it was his constant advocacy of an offensive campaign that brought the country eventually under British dominion. To his optimism and true appreciation of the strategic importance of a blow at Palestine and Syria, rather than to any understand- ing of the position by the British Government as revealed by the official papers at any time, must be ascribed the initiation of the project to oust the Turk from the Holy Land. On November 11th Chauvel, who then had the headquarters of Anzac Mounted Division at Mazar, received orders for a general move forward, as the preliminary to a blow at Masaid and El Arish. Never was an order more welcome to troops. Since the Romani operations there was scarcely an Australian who had ridden his horse at a pace beyond a walk. The men were, if not dispirited, at least exceedingly weary of the heat and flies and short water-supplies and heavy sands of the desert. Their progress towards the east after Romani had been constant, but movement had been so slow as to be almost imperceptible; as they shifted camp, they changed only from one sand-dune to another. For months there had been practically no sign of the enemy, and the only break in the dreary monotony of patrol work was the captiire of an occasional Bedouin and a few camels. 0ct.-Drc., 19161 THE ADVANCE TO EL ARISH 207

In October Dobell had taken over the command of “ Eastern Force,” the name given to the army advancing east of the Canal; Lawrence proceeded to Aldershot, and afterwards to France, where he subsequently became Chief of Staff to Haig-a position which he filled with great distinction in the decisive and triumphant days of 1918. Dobell at once displayed marked activity in his command, and made himself familiar with the country and his divisions; and for a time the new personality had a cheering effect upon the troops. A further development made in the command about this time introduced to the campaign still another British leader, one who was to leave a strong and permanent mark upon the Palestine operations. Sir Philip W. Chetwode,1° a British soldier-baronet, who took over the command of “ Desert Column ” (the name given to Dobell’s advanced troops), came to Sinai from France with an established reputation as a cavalry leader. In the retreat from Mons he had commanded the 5th Cavalry Brigade under General Allenby, and had done conspicuously well in that rare mounted company. He had fought in the Burma War of 1S92, and had thoroughly mastered open mounted fighting in the South African War. A far-seeing tactician, Chetwode was graced with a strong, sympathetic, and attractive personality, which, as the Palestine campaign developed, won for him a very high place in the respect and confidence of the men of many countries who made up this rapidly growing British army. Like all British leaders, with the exception of Birdwood and one or two others, Chetwode was some time in the field before he gained a correct appreciation of the Australians. Soon after his arrival in Sinai he complained strongly to Chauvel of the light horsemen’s carelessness about saluting. He rode about the camps followed by British mounted orderlies, whose smart dress and precise and stiff horsemanship were in strong contrast to the appearance of the casual and desert-worn Australians. “ Not only do your men fail to salute me when I ride through your camps,” he protested, “ but they laugh aloud at my orderlies.” But just as Murray’s complaints

10 Field Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode. Bt., G.C.B , 0 M.. G.C S I., KC.h.I.G., D S 0. Officer of British Regular Army; of Chetwode, Bucks., Eng.; b. London, Eng., ZI Sept., 1869. 208 SINAI AND PALESTINE [Dec., 1916 on the subject of Australian discipline ceased after the stand by the 1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades at Komani, so Chetwode (with one notable exception) was silent after the fine little engagements at Rafa and Magdhaba. Once British leaders recognised that the battle discipline of the Australians was beyond criticism, they became less insistent upon formalities, and shut their eyes to little breaches of con- vention in the camps away from action. A preliminary precaution to an assault on El Arish was the discovering of water in the area for the horses, SO that if necessary the attack could be maintained. About the beginning of December, therefore, long-distance patrols were sent by Anzac Mounted Division to prospect at night for supplies in the Wady el Arish, south of the village. These parties, which were accompanied by engineers with boring plants, probed the dry bed of the wady, but without success; it was decided, therefore, as the reports of enemy evacuation were apparently trustworthy, to rely upon the brigades to win quickly the water in the village. The plan which had been prepared for an advance by the infantry and mounted troops was then abandoned, and orders were issued to Anzac Mounted Division and the new Imperial Camel Corps Brigade to march during the night and envelop the place before dawn. This movement, in which the 1st Light Horse Brigade was the advance-guard, although it passed without incident, marked a decisive stage in the campaign. It released the mounted men from the sands of the desert and gave them firm foothold upon the extreme fringe of southern Palestine. No night ride in the whole campaign gave the light horsemen so much satisfaction. They left behind them one of the harshest regions in the world, a region devoid even of elementary civilisation, inhabited by one of the most wretched of peoples, and offering no sustenance beyond the dates from the palms and scattered water which was unfit for consumption by Europeans. Through the prolonged summer, with its continual blistering heat and blinding sand-storms and its myriads of flies, the horsemen of the two Dominions had ridden and fought and worked incessantly. And now in the magical, idyllic atmosphere of a Sinai night in December, with the heavens thickly sprinkled with stars peculiarly 20th-21st Dec., 19161 THE ADVANCE TO EL ARISH 209 brilliant and seemingly very near, the riders rejoiced as their horses stepped suddenly off the deep sand of the dunes on to the wide firm flat which flanks the great Wady el Arish. “That night,” said General Cox, of the 1st Brigade, “will always seem to me the most wonderful of the whole campaign. The hard going for the horses seemed almost miraculous after the months of sand; and, as the shoes of the horses struck fire on the stones in the bed of the wady, the men laughed with delight. Sinai was behind them.” At dawn the 1st Brigade had reached the Mediterranean coast east of El Arish, and the cordon about the village was complete. This long night ride, over twenty-three miles of unknown waste, denion- strated the extraordinary mastery which the Anzacs had gained over the desert. The 1st Light Horse Brigade was directed to the east of the village, with its flank on the sea, the Camel Brigade to the south, the New Zealanders to the south-west, and the 3rd Light Horse Brigade to Masaid. When dawn came up, each brigade was on its ground, and none was more than 200 yards out in its calculations. At the end of 1916El Arish had been in Turkish possession for more than two years, and the inhabitants of the old mud-built village, which is the largest centre of population upon the Sinai Peninsula, had probably begun to look upon the change in government as permanent. Doubtless, too, the village had enjoyed great prosperity during the Turkish possession ; for a substantial enemy force had been constantly encamped about the wady and in the noble plantation of palms between the village and the beach, some two miles away. But whatever were their true feelings in regard to the Turkish evacuation, the dramatic appearance of the Anzac horsemen encircling the town at dawn on the morning of December zIst caused the helpless, time-serving Arabs to greet the Aus- tralians with an excited demonstration of delight. As Cap- tain E. A. K. Hudson,” staff-captain of the 1st Brigade, rode into the dirty village, the natives hailed his party as deliverers ; the bearded elders, in many-coloured flowing dresses, crowded about the light horsemen, grasping their stirrups and kissing their boots, while the women and children swarmed shouting- 11 Maj. E. A. K. Hudson D S 0 D A.A G. Anzac hftd. DIV. 1918 Merchant. of Katoomba. N.S.W.; b. Erskineville, Sydney, N.S.W., 27 Oct, 187a. Died of Illness, 27 Oct., 1918. 210 SINAI AND PALESTINE [21st Dec., 1916 around them. The chief sheikh then foi nially surrendered the town, and handed over one Turk and a few spies. After Sinai, El Arish, with all its squalor, was to Australian eyes a pleasant, civilised town. Soon after 9 o’clock aeroplane reconnaissance, which, as usual, was making the work of the mounted troops incom- parably simpler than in previous wars, reported the surround- ing country clear of the enemy. Chauvel ordered a strong system of outposts to be established, and the day passed quietly ; but all ranks were restless with expectation of immediate operations against the Turkish posts within striking distance. Every trooper appreciated the significance of the changed conditions, and knew that the effectiveness of the mounted troops had been greatly increased by the firm ground for the horses and the fresh-water supply for the men in the country immediately ahead. During the day two men of the 1st Light Horse Brigade, who had served in Gallipoli, were blown to pieces by the explosion of a large mine which had been washed up on the beach. They had been bathing, and were examining the mine, when they accidentally touched it off. General Murray had during the year lost no opportunity to increase the strength of the camel companies which had been formed in January. The horses of his mounted brigades had shown endurance on the sands far beyond the most sanguine anticipations ; but the Commander-in- Chief continued to urge the establishment of a complete camel brigade ; and by December, as the desert campaign approached its end, the new body was ready for operations. If this brigade contributed very little to the fighting on the desert, for which it had always been specially intended, it was a most valuable addition to the British mounted troops and its composition and work will always be studied with interest by military leaders. The companies of Imperial Camel Corps were gathered into a brigade on December 19tI1, under the command of Brigadier-General C. L. Smith, V.C., who had led the com- posite horse and camel column with so much energy on the extreme flank during the Romani operations. The new force was probably called Imperial. It was made up of eighteen 19161 THE ADVANCE TO EL ARISH 21 1 companies, each of six officers and 169 other ranks, of which ten were Australian, six British, and two New Zealand. The Hong Kong and Singapore Battery of six mountain-guns firing a nine-pounder shell, manned by 240 Sikhs and Mohammedans who were ex-Indian Army regulars recruited at Hong Kong and Singapore, under six British and four native officers, provided its artillery ; British personnel manned its machine- gun squadron of eight Vickers, and each company was stiffened with a Lewis gun section of three guns. Complete with details, the brigade included 1,210 Australians, 981 British, and 370 New Zealanders, in addition to the Hong Kong and Singapore Indians and 142 Egyptians, who, under a British officer, made up the mobile veterinary section. The brigade had from 1,600 to 1,700 rifles available for the firing line, so that its battle strength was about equal to that of two light horse brigades. Of its four battalions No. I was recruited from Australian infantry brigades after Gallipoli; No. 2, which included six British Companies (of which only four served with the brigade at one time), from various British sources; No. 3, from Aus- tralian light horse regiments; while No. 4 included two companies of New Zealanders and two of light horse reinforcements from Australia. The use of camels for the transport of European infantry was first adopted in the Near East by Napoleon more than a century before, and in 1881 British Life Guards mounted on camels marched to the relief of Khartoum. For many years there had been at Abbassia, on the outskirts of Cairo, a school for teaching British soldiers to ride and handle camels, and when, in the January of 1916, it was decided to send a few companies of camel troops against the Senussi, on the western desert, this school was revived to give the necessary training. A beginning was made with four companies of Australians, the men being supplied by the brigades of the 1st and 2nd Australian Infantry Divisions. Perhaps half of these had been accustomed to horses before the war ; but, except a very few who might have handled camels in central Aus- tralia, all the recruits were entirely strange to the animals when they went into the camp at Abbassia. Moreover, most of the Australians were enthusiastic about proceeding to 212 SINAI AND PALESTINE t 19x6 France, and were therefore reluctant to join the new service. The call for volunteers failed to provide the numbers required; the result was that battalion commanders, in detailing the men, discarded a number whose association with the infantry was not looked upon as satisfactory. But, if the beginnings were not altogether promising, the men of the first four companies entered upon their work with much heartiness. They found the camels strange and difficult, sometimes even dangerous ; but, being Australians with a strong sense of humour, they also found them very entertaining and, as long as the new formation existed, they were one of the gayest and hardiest fighting bodies of men engaged in the war. Before 1916, three months had always been looked upon as the period necessary to train British regular soldiers to handle camels effectively. With the Australians and New Zealanders this period was soon cut down by half. A few weeks after the first four companies began to struggle with their ungainly remounts at Abbassia, the first company marclied out to Sollum, in the western desert. The remaining three companies quickly followed, and for six months were constantly engaged in various operations against the wily natives of the desert. Their activities extended from Luxor, 400 miles south of Cairo, to the Mediterranean coast; at one time they made contact with the Italians in Tripoli. Their actual battle engagements on the western desert were of minor importance. Most of their work was a prolonged and exhausting patrol, to prevent the hostile tribes of the desert from raiding the Nile valley. Depending almost entirely upon a ration of bully beef and biscuits, they would push out from their posts in the terrific heat of the summer for periods of from three to five days, and then return to water. The khamsin season that year was particularly severe; and, if the men had little to fear from the enemy, they always looked back upon this time as one of the most severe of their four years’ campaigning. General Murray had been keenly interested in their training and their subsequent bearing, and it was due to the standard of efficiency reached by the four pioneer companies of miscellaneous Australian origin that the complete brigade was subsequently formed. Major C. L. Smith, V.C., who had 19161 THE ADVANCE TO EL ARISH 213 special knowledge of camel work, was brought from England to supervise the training. Smith‘s subsequent work at Romani, when his column included some of the camel companies, stamped him as a bold and clever leader; and, when, later on, operations against El Arish drew near, the brigade was hastily assembled under his command. By this time most of the men were complete masters of their camels, and had discovered much to appreciate in them; but there was never between the stupid, unresponsive animal of the desert and its rider that warm bond which was SO strong between the trooper and his horse. The animals used in the brigade were the big, white, riding type, fleet of foot and exceptionally enduring, which is found in the lower Soudan, and between there and the Indian Ocean. A man on a camel could without trouble carry five days’ water and rations, together with a very generous allowance of blankets and kit. The animals could be packed with as much camping material as the resourceful Australian soldier could accumulate. But it was soon learned that the men who rode out to a serious engagement upon camels were engaged in a far more serious enterprise than those who rode on horses. If the light horsemen were approximately mounted infantry, troops mounted on camels were pure infantry favoured by a rapid method of transport. Camels could not be raced close up to the enemy position, or kept near at hand for a galloping escape if the enemy were found too strong, as at Bir el Abd. When once the camel troops dismounted, they were as definitely committed as ordinary infantry. The value of the new brigade as an addition to the reg;- ments of horse was demonstrated very early in its fighting career. Its superior strength and stability gave Chauvel’s brigades a definite pivot of manceuvre during action, and the reckless fighting qualities revealed by the camel battalions allowed the fullest advantage to be taken of the new force. Chauvel now had in the Camel Brigade what he lacked at Katia and Abd-a considerable body of infantry which, unlike the slender light horse line, could attack a sector firnlly in depth, while the horsemen could be moved about as the circumstances of the fight dictated.