CHAPTER XI11 THE ADVANCE TO EL ARISH FROMBir el Abd the enemy withdrew his main force across the fifty miles of practically waterless country to El Arish. He left, however, a strong outpost at Mazar, some twenty- four miles east of Abd, and continued to maintain his garri- sons in the great barren range of central Sinai, as at Nekhl and Maghara, and further east at Hassaiia and Kossaima. He therefore remained in a position to menace the right flank o€ the British force as it advanced. These mountain garrisons were known to be weak, and by the middle of August the way was clear for General Murray to march on El Arish, as soon as he had a force sufficient for the enterprise and communications capable of bearing his supplies. But neither Lawrence nor the Commander-in-Chief entertained any serious thoughts of an immediate advance. The Romani operations, while owing to the work of the Anzac Mounted Division, they had inflicted a heavy defeat upon the enemy, served to emphasise to the British leaders the harsh terms which the desert imposes on its conquerors. Murray had recognised from the outset that the railway was an indispensable preliminary to progress, but he had not contem- plated having to carry the pipe-line all the way from Kantara to El Arish. The indifferent quality of the water avail- able on the desert convinced him that the rate of his further advance was the rate at which both railway and pipe-line could be pushed forward. What was still more disappointing, it had clearly shown that, even with the railway and the water- supply, British infantry was useless against the Turks on the soft sands of the Sinai wilderness. Sinai ,must be cleared by the Anzac Mounted Division, with the infantry merely holding the advancing base. Murray therefore settled down to urge on the railway and the pipe-line with all the means in his power. But he had many obstacles to overcome. His labour supply was assured in the Egyptians, but the material necessary for construction was restricted by the increasing submarine menace and the 194 hug.-Sept., 19161 THE ADVANCE TO EL ARISH 195 heavy demand from other battle centres upon British resources. Progress was at times miserably slow. The build- ing of the line from Kantara to E1 Arish, a distance by rail of 110 miles, occupied nearly a year-which is far slower than the rate at which railway lines have frequently been laid against similar physical obstacles by civil engineers in peace time. In the advance across the desert a simple procedure was followed with the forward army. The mounted troops main- tained their reconnaissance on the flanks and in advance of the creeping railhead, while the infantry marched up from position to position along wire-netting tracks, which had been laid down to facilitate their progress over the sand. These netting roads were another valuable improvisation which came from an Australian suggestion. Wire-netting is sometimes in the summer season spread over the dry sandy beds of Australian inland rivers to make the passage easy for wheels. In Sinai it was first used by the Anzac Mounted Division, and was quickly adopted for the whole army, until hundreds of miles of tracks were put down both on the desert and afterwards in southern Palestine. A few widths of netting securely pegged gave a firm highway over any sand, both to infantry marching in fours and to light motor traffic. Elaborate, costly, and extensive entrenchments were estab- lished at successive positions along the route as far as Bir el Mazar, and these were a greater tribute to the offensive quali- ties of the Turks than to the calculated resistance of the troops under Murray’s command. Throughout the year the internal affairs of Egypt made a heavy demand upon the Commander-in-Chief’s attention. No actual outbreak occurred, but seditious influences were always at work, and the position had been thought sufficiently dan- gerous to warrant the organisation of precautionary measures in Cairo and Alexandria, so as to ensure safety in the event of a rising. This unrest in Lower Egypt, together with the demands of his widespread command, now led Murray to a step which was to have a serious effect upon the Palestine campaign. He decided to withdraw his headquarters from Ismailia to Cairo, and obtained permission from the War Office to make the change. 196 SINAI AND PALESTINE [Sept., 1916 At the same time he asked for the assistance of a general officer, with the rank of a corps commander, to take over the operations in Sinai. The War Office approved ; Murray estab- lished his headquarters at the Savoy Hotel, in Cairo, 140 miles behind the advanced force at Romani; and Major- General Sir Charles Macpherson Dobell' was given the command at Ismailia, with promotion to the rank of lieutenant-general. The change is of interest, as showing Murray's strange failure to grasp the cause of the unfortunate confusion at Romani, which led to the escape of nearly half the Turkish force. He had been displeased with Lawrence's conduct of that fight; but now he was satisfied to delegate even greater powers to a leader whose experience up to that time had been very limited. General Dobell had, early in the war, attracted notice by the capable manner in which he had cleared up the enemy forces in the Cameroons; but there the troops engaged had been few in numbers, and were chiefly made up of natives. On the western desert in Egypt the operations in his time had been of a minor character ; and yet the Commander-in-Chief was content to retire to Cairo, and leave Dobell in command of a force of infantry and cavalry substantially larger and more difficult to handle than an ordinary infantry army corps. During September Murray asked the War Office for a siege battery, and continued his appeals for more aircraft. At the same time he complained that, when a recent lot of aeroplanes sent to Egypt were opened, it was discovered that the engines would not fit into the planes. The close of the Romani fight brought very little rest to the light horse. When the men were not engaged upon patrol, they were worked hard at improving the wells in the area of operations, which wcre developed until whole brigades could be quickly watered at niany places in the desert. At Mahadat seven wells became capable of yielding 19,000gallons in twenty-four hours; at Barda sixteen wells gave 136,000 gallons ; the Jefier wells, 92,000; Mageibra, 60,000 ; and Bayud, 46,000. But, with the exception of the flow at one limited well, none of this supply was fit for drinking by the troops. .~~ -- lMaj.-Gen. (temp. Lieut.-Gm.) Sir Charles M. Dobell, K.C.B.. C.hI G.. D.S.O.. P.S.C. Officer of British Regular Army; of London, Eng.; b. Quebec. Canada. 13 June, 1869. 1gth-17th Sept., 19161 THE ADVANCE TO EL ARISH 19: Early in September it was decided to make an attempt against the Turkish garrison at Mazar, some forty-four miles east of Romani, on the main northern track towards El Arish The Turkish force was believed to be 2,200 strong, made up of remnants of the troops which had fought at Romani, and supported by four mountain guns, a few anti-aircraft guns, and ten machine-guns. As there was no water-supply for the horses east of Salmana, 700 camels were organised to carry about twenty gallons each to a point ten miles east of Salmana, to meet Chauvel’s troops as they returned, and provide a drink for the animals of two brigades. The 2nd and 3rd Light Horse Brigades, with the 1st Brigade as covering troops, were the main attacking body, supported by two batteries of Royal Horse Artillery. A few Australian companies of the Imperial Camel Corps, commanded by Captain G. F. Langley,* and supported by two guns of the Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery, were ordered to proceed across the sands to the south, destroy a Turkish post believed to be at Kasseiba, and then join up with the main body before Mazar at daylight on September 17th. The engagement at Mazar was always afterwards referred to in terms of strong disapproval by the regimental officers who participated. Soundly entrenched, the Turks occupied a bare sand-ridge with a good command over the approach from all sides, although most of their trenches faced west. On the night of the 15th Chauvel led his three brigades as far as Salmana, and remained there under the palm hods during the day of the 16th. The cover, however, was but slight; in the aiternoon the Australians were discovered and machine-gunned by a German airman, and a few casualties were suffered. The pilot doubtless informed the garrison at Mazar of the British advance, and Chauvel was thus robbed of the chance of a surprise assault. Soon after dark the 2nd Brigade, which was now again under Ryrie’s leadership, and the 3rd Brigade, under Royston, moved out and marched for Mazar, while the 1st Brigade followed for about ten miles and then remained in support. Ryrie appeared on the west of the enemy’s posi- tion at dawn, and the 5th and 7th Light Horse Regiments,- I Lieut.-Col. G. F. Langley, D.S.O. Commanded 1st (Anzac) Bn.. Im Camel Corps. 1916/18. 14th L.H. Rent.. 10x8. High School teacher: of Mansfieb. Vic: b.