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Home , Archibald Murray, Desert Column, First Battle of Gaza

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j . " ' G-2 ouerations . dur Ing lfarch;^1917; MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, 2d Yaar Class, Command and General Staff School, Port Leavenworth,Kansas. SUBJECT: A study of the British G-2 Operations during March, 1917, Campaign, World War.

!• PAPERS ACCO24PANYING. 1. A "bibliography for this study. 2. A Chart, marked No. 1, showing probable intelligence organization. 3. Two maps showing location of the more important command posts just prior to the , and the situation at 6:30 Pit, 26 . THE STUDY PRESENTED. — .Was the organization for intelligence at British GHQ, the headquarters of the HEastern PorcefV also the HDesert Column11, such as would properly meet conditions as existed in March 1917, prior to and during the first battle of GAZA. III. HISTORICAL PACTS RELATING TO THE STUDY. ~ 1. At the olose of 1916 a British force kn*h as the HEastern Column11, under command of Lieutenant General Sir Charles Dobell, but operating directly under the control of General Sir at Cairo, advanoed from the and by the end of February had reached El , with a portion of the foree forward of , and with the cavalry occupying . (l) This force as organized, consisted of three divisions of (52d, 53d, 54th), two divisions of mounted troops (Australian: and New Zealand), The , and ai'jciliaries such as airplanes, armored oars, some tanks, and heavy artillery. (2) Following their defeat at Romani, remmants of the original Turkish forces opposed the advance of the British by fighting rear guard actions and delaying the advance at successive organized positions until finally reaching a partially organized position at Shellal, which they commenced to improve* \Z) Arrangements were made to attack the Turkish position at Shellal but on the 5th of March, British airplanes reported the enemy withdrawing from that position. The Turks, estimated at two and one half divisions,with some cavalry, withdraw to Gaza and with forces between these two places. (4) The country Ahead was now clear for the advance of the British to the gateway of the Palestine. However, before any 3-112, 138. 5-276, 280. 8-185, 186. 9-38, 39) 1-28. 4-69. 8-186. 11-255) 3-107, 112. 5-277. 8-186* 12-111) 1-29. 5-277f 278, 280. 9-39)

-1­ operations of consequence could "be undertaken^it would be necessary to await further extension of water and supply lines and to obtain information concerning the enemy and the terrain• (5) 2.Up to now the main dependence of British GHQ and of the forces in the field for information concerning enemy movements and dispositions was on the airplane• Especially important was the taking of aerial photographs to be used in the reproduction of necessary maps. About the 8th of March, Turkish airplanes of a new type and manned by excellent German p.il&tsy appeared on the front and obtained air superiority. (6) This made it necessary to rely more on other means of obtaining information, especially by mounted patrols, but the latter, like other operations could only extend a limited radius beyond water and supply points. (7) Light car patrols were first used with success at in January and demonstrated that the radius of reconnaissance could be extended beyond that of mounted patrols,although the importance of this means of obtaining and relaying information does not seem to have been realized during the Gaza operations.(8) It is probable that the organization for intelligence within General Murray1s forces in March 1917 was similar to that shown in Chart No. 1, appended. No similar organization, or at least no indication of any, existed at the headquarters of the (Army), the information collected by divisions and in the field being transmitted to GHQ at Cairo for evaluation and dissemination in the form of intelligence. (9) 3. To prevent any further withdrawal of Turkish iorce, the British decided to attack Gaza as soon as practicable,or about the 25th-or 26th of March, depending on the arrival of the railhead at Raffah. (10) Shortly after the middle of March,operation plans of the Eastern Force for the attack on Gaza were approved by British GHQ. The British forces available consisted of about 22,000 effectives, (ll) Preliminary reconnaissances by aviation and ground patrols wiu&more or less limited just prior to the attack on Gaza. Prom reconnaissances and information obtained from inhabitants, prisoners, and GHQ,, it was estimated that the Turkish forces in the Gaza- Beersheba area were about 15,000 troops. 4000 were believed to be at Gaza, about 2000 at Beersheba, with the remainder within from ten to twenty miles of Gaza and located near Kuj, Abu Hureira, and Tel el Nejileh. (12) The decisive terrain feature in the vicinity of Gaza is an arroyo k/§mn as the Waddi Ghuzze. The Turks were in position in rear of this arroyo covering the approaches to Gaza and Beersheba with a system of detached strong points, partially organized, and on a front of about ten miles. (13) 5 1-27. 3-139. 5-278. 8-186. 10-66, 11-248) 6 3-9, 13, 109. 5-276. 7-88. 10-71. 11-262. 13-202) 7 3-19, 112. 8-186. 10-66) 8 3-122, 123, 140. 11-243, 287, 288, 293) 9 5-289,310. 6-1. 11-245, 246. 13-193) 10 (3-133. 5-278. 9-39. 11-248) 11 11-262, 265) 12 8-186. 11-253, 265. 12-126) 13 (8-186. 9-38. 11-263)

-2­ The plan for capturing Gaza was to send mounted troops around the position to the east and north to hold off supporting columns, and cut off the retreat of the garrison, while a direct attack was to be made on the Turkish lines from the south with two infantry divisions in assault and one infantry in reserve* (14) To'obtain secrecy and prevent Turkish intelligence from gaining information of contemplated operation, it was necessary to guard and restrict movements of the local inhabitants. (15) 4. The British concentrated in the vicinity of Rafah and the move forward by night marches was commenced on the 21st March. By midnight of the 25th the forces were disposed as follows: Australian and New Zealand Mtd Division - Deir el Belah 54th Division - In Seirat, 52d Division - Khan Yunis, 53d Division - Belah. For the attack/General Dobell assigned command of the to General Chetwode, retaining command of the 54th Division himself. Both these commanders established headquarters together near In Seirat, on the Belah side of the Waddi Ghuzze, with some portion of General Dobell18 headquarters remaining at Rafah. Altogether, there seems to have been but three general staff officers available for both headquarters, comparable to that of an Array and Corps for operations. GHQ, was still in Cairo, some two hundred miles away, but General Murray, to keep in touch with General Dobell, had by the evening of the 25th, established an advanced headquarters in a railway train at SI Arish, with wire connections to Raffah. (16) Limited mean of communication established initially down to Brigades, consisted of wire, radio and helio. Due to scarcity of signal equipment, the extension of lines was seriously inadequate. The operation of radio was more or less nullified by the powerful Turkish station at Gaza. (17) A general reconnaissance of the Gaza position was made by mounted troops on the 25th. Behind the mounted screen staff officers made a personal and more detailed survey of the terrain* With the exception of this reconnaissance, no other ground reconnaissances were made this date, the troops remaining concealed with no movement during the day. (18) The move forward against Gaza from the Belah area was made the night 25-26th March. (19) If animals and troops were to exist, Gaza would have to be captured by dark of the 26th. (20) The main attack was not launched, however, until nearly noon due to delays caused by time taken out for reconnaissances, giving of orders, non arrival of units, and a heavy morning fog.(21) By nightfall the mounted troops had largely accomplished their mission of encircling Gaza and were in position to report or resist any advance of Turkish reinforcements from the north or east. (22; 14 5-281. 8-186. 12-126, 266) 15 11-259. 12-117) 16 # 17 5-285, 286, 288, 289. 9-39. 10-89* 11-266, 275, 277, 278. 13-lf 18 10-89. 11-292, 293) 19 5-284, 285* 10-84. 85. 11-263. 12-125) 20 9-39. 11-262. 263) 21 5-305* 8-186) 22 5-295, 256. 8-187. 9-39) 5-299f 303. 8-187. 11-270, 271) -3­ A small supply of the precious water had also "been located and reported, (23) The infantry, due to delays incurred, had not as yet penetrated the last defenses sufficiently to capture town* (24) To the forces in contact, and from information obtained from prisoners/it seemed certain that Gaza must soon fall, (25) That the situation within the garrison of Gaza itself was . desperateyis indicated by intercepted wireless messages between the garrison commander and higher headquarters* As the enenjy messages were intercepted they were quickly deciphered, translated, and the contents of at least four,telegraphed from GHty at Cairo to the headquarters of the Sastern Force at Rafah, prior to 6:30 PM. (26) Due to the distance from Rafah to advanced head­ quarters in the field and to lack of headquarters organization, these messages do not have seemed to have reached General Dobell or his staff in time to offset reports concerning the approach of Turkish reinforcements. (27) From about 4:00 PM until shortly before dark, airplanes and mounted watching patrols reported the following concerning dispositions and moves of Turkish reinforcements: Approaching from Huj to the southwest - an estimated force of 3000 infantry and 2 squadrons of cavalry, Approaching from Deir Sneid, three infantry columns, estimated at 300• A force of cavalry halted 5 miles from Gaza on the Hareira road - estimated at 200. Four converging columns of infantry marching from the direction of Hareira - estimated at 7000. (28) Based more or less on the foregoing reports and that Gaza with its needed water and supplies was still in Turkish hands, Generals Dobell and Chetewode issued early orders for withdrawal under cover of darkness, first the mounted troops, then the remainder of the forces* (29) To the immediate commanders of troops who were in touch with the situation,this seemed incredible. General Chauvel even asked that his order be, "put in writing". Up to the time these orders were received, enemy columns were still several miles from Gaza and the British mounted troops were in favorable position to outpost the town and protect the advance of infantry divisions. (30) The march to the rear was well under way by midnight with no molestation from the Turkish reinforcements or any reports concerning their immediate presence before dawn of the 27th. (31) By the 28th March, all British forces had been withdrawn, the mounted forces behind the Waddi Ghuzze arroyo with the infantry holding the arroyo itself,as an advanced line, with patrols towards Sharia and Beersheba. (32) 23 11-293, 294) 24 9-39. 12-127) 25 9-39. 10-91. 11-282, 283) 26 5-310. 11-289. 12-127) 27 5-310. 11-289,

-4­ IV. OPINION OF THE AUTHOR: 1. Discussion.— According to the foregoing historical information the British organization for intelligence, during the period of March 1917, did not meet the requirements imposed "by the transition to semi-open warfare, largely because of the following: a. Lack of qualified general staff officers and assistant for duty with the field forces. b. Shortage of signal equipment, and in particular, cables for telephone and telegraph. c. Excessive distances between the headquarter© of the commanders responsible and with the operating troops. d. lack of an adequate messenger service possessing a high degree of mobility. The above are important factors in determining why the British organization for intelligence failed, especially at the first battle of Gaza, but in the aggregate do not seem to have justified the withdrawal ordered and which was concurred in by the officer soley responsible, General Murray,, From the front* there appeared to be no lack of enemy information, obtained largely as a result of operations, and the same might be said of information from the rear, such as radio intercept, forwarded by GHty. Despite a laok of qualified staff officers, almost any officer designated and held responsible for the sorting, evaluation, and determination on message priorities concerning enemy information, would have produced different results* * The collection of and transmission back and forth of information concerning the enemy could have been speeded up to meet open warfare situations by the establishments of forward collecting centers and of relay posts between which mounted messengers and light cars could have operated. Even the airplanes with the Eastern Force could have been utilized at times on messenger or command missions. To overcome the excessive distance between GHQ at Cairo and the headquarters of the Eastern Force at Rafan* a portion of the trained intelligence personnel and equipment could have been moved forward to the advance GHQ established at El Arish on 25th March. If this had been done, surely a correct estimate of the actual enemy situation could have been made by General Murray and erroneous decisions by lower commanders of the field forces corrected. Also, as previously mentioned, a responsible officer at the Raffiih* echelon of the Eastern Force headquarters would have appreciated the value of the intercepted radio messages/ concerning the plight of the Gaza garrison, and given such messages extreme priority so as to actually reach General Dobell,further forward, with the minimum of delay. Even if light motor cars were not used within a messenger chain, valuable use could have been made of such transportation to have extended communications forward of the headquarters at In Seirat or to have carried Generals Dobell and Chetwode forward on personal reconnaissances,to hav*' determined the actual situation concerning that of the enemy and their own troops. Front all souroes consulted, it appears that the light car patrols were used lolSXy for fighting at Gaza. From the beginning of the fight at Gaza, both Generals Dobell and Chetwode seem to have agreed on a predfetvrmined deoision to retire if enemy reinforcements appeared or if Gaza, with its water and other supplies, were not captured by nightfall*

-5­ 2. Conclusion.— Careful consideration of the foregoing Justifies the conclusion, that the British organization for intelligence during Maroh 1917 was defective and did not meet requirements imposed, that no attempts seem to hare been made to rectify earlier deficiencies noted, and finally and largely as a result of failure to properly classify and appreciate information concerning the enemy, three commanders concurred in a decision to withdraw from an important battlefpractically won* V. RECOMMENDATIONS.— None required. . CONCURRENCES.— None required.

Thos. S. Smith, Major Infantry (DOL) Student 2d Ywar Class, 1930-1931

-6­ BIBLIOGRAPHY Keyi (2-10, 25) equals No* 2 text (below) pages 10 and 25, 1. Outline of the Egyptian and Palestine Campaigns* By Maj. Gen* Sir M. Bowman - Manifold* W & J. Mackay and Co*, Ltd*, Chatam, England, 1922* 2. History of the Great War. Volume II. By John Buohan* Thos. Nelson and Sons, Ltd*, London, Paris* Houghton Mifflin Co*, Boston, New York, Chicagof 1921. 3* Sir Archibald Murray1 s Dispatcher,. J* M. Dent and Co*, London and Toronto? 1920* 4* The Palestine Campaigns* By Colonel A. P. Wavell. Constable and Co., London, 1928* 5* British Official History of the Great War. Military Operations in and Palestine* Volume I and Maps. By Lt. Gen. Sir George MacMunn and Capt. Cyril Falls. His Majesty1s Stationery Office, London, 1930. 6. Intel.ligence Service as Carried Out in Palestine Campaign* M.I.D* U.s. War Department. Transmitted to General Service Schools by letter dated August 20, 1920. An important source but methods more properly relate to the reorganization and conduct for open warfa» as instituted by General Alleriby.

7 # A Brief Record of the Advance of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. British Official Account. The Palestine News, Ctiro, 1919. 8. Campaigns of the World War* By Col. C.J*Fiebeger,. U.S.Military Academy Printing Office, West Point, N.Y., 19^1* 9* With the in the Holy Land* By Maj. H*0*Luck. Robert Scott Publisher, London, 1919. 10* New Zealand Official History. Voluir.e III. By Lt. Col. C* G. Powles* Whitecombe and Tombs, Auckland, Christchurch, Dunedin and Wellington, , 1922. 11. Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918, Volume VII. By H* S* Gullett* Angus and Robertson, Ltd*, Sydney, Australia, 1923. 12* History of the Royal Glouoestirshire Hussars Yeomanry. By Frank Fox. Philip Allan and Co*, London, 1923* 13* Alleriby of Armageddon* By Raymond Savage. Bobbs- Merrill, Indianapolis, Indiana, 1926*

All sources were obtained from the Library, C & GS School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

•7­ CHART 1J 0 - 1 .

GBHBRAL HEADQUARTERS Head of Intelligence

t l B SECRETARY 1. Receiving, Obtaining information, Receiving all 2. Coordinating Agents, correspondence and checking Prisoners of war in coming into "I* 3. Distribution compounds* and distributes^

'•*•• KAPPIJTG AND C3NSORS PROPAGANDA AIR PHOTOS

CORPS - Head of *I* Section (G.S^Officer), 2 Assistants (officers)* DIVISION - Head of "I" Section (G.S.Officer), 1 Assistant (officer). BRIGAKE - 1 Assistant Officer (Rgtl,, Officer). FIRST BATTLE OF GAIA

Petition at 630pm on Mar

THE DESERf^CAMPAION