G-2 Ouerations . Dur Ing Lfarch;^1917; MEMORANDUM FOR: the Director, 2D Yaar Class, Command and General Staff School, Port Leavenworth,Kansas
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i IT;?A^:R; Y - H I;V S^-T^^B^Y j . " ' G-2 ouerations . dur Ing lfarch;^1917; MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, 2d Yaar Class, Command and General Staff School, Port Leavenworth,Kansas. SUBJECT: A study of the British G-2 Operations during March, 1917, Palestine Campaign, World War. !• PAPERS ACCO24PANYING. 1. A "bibliography for this study. 2. A Chart, marked No. 1, showing probable intelligence organization. 3. Two maps showing location of the more important command posts just prior to the first battle of GAZA, and the situation at 6:30 Pit, 26 March 1917. THE STUDY PRESENTED. — .Was the organization for intelligence at British GHQ, the headquarters of the HEastern PorcefV also the HDesert Column11, such as would properly meet conditions as existed in March 1917, prior to and during the first battle of GAZA. III. HISTORICAL PACTS RELATING TO THE STUDY. ~ 1. At the olose of 1916 a British force kn*h as the HEastern Column11, under command of Lieutenant General Sir Charles Dobell, but operating directly under the control of General Sir Archibald Murray at Cairo, advanoed from the Suez Canal and by the end of February had reached El Arish, with a portion of the foree forward of Rafah, and with the cavalry occupying Khan Yunis. (l) This force as organized, consisted of three divisions of infantry (52d, 53d, 54th), two divisions of mounted troops (Australian: and New Zealand), The Imperial Camel Corps, and ai'jciliaries such as airplanes, armored oars, some tanks, and heavy artillery. (2) Following their defeat at Romani, remmants of the original Turkish forces opposed the advance of the British by fighting rear guard actions and delaying the advance at successive organized positions until finally reaching a partially organized position at Shellal, which they commenced to improve* \Z) Arrangements were made to attack the Turkish position at Shellal but on the 5th of March, British airplanes reported the enemy withdrawing from that position. The Turks, estimated at two and one half divisions,with some cavalry, withdraw to Gaza and Beersheba with forces between these two places. (4) The country Ahead was now clear for the advance of the British to the gateway of the Palestine. However, before any 3-112, 138. 5-276, 280. 8-185, 186. 9-38, 39) 1-28. 4-69. 8-186. 11-255) 3-107, 112. 5-277. 8-186* 12-111) 1-29. 5-277f 278, 280. 9-39) -1 operations of consequence could "be undertaken^it would be necessary to await further extension of water and supply lines and to obtain information concerning the enemy and the terrain• (5) 2.Up to now the main dependence of British GHQ and of the forces in the field for information concerning enemy movements and dispositions was on the airplane• Especially important was the taking of aerial photographs to be used in the reproduction of necessary maps. About the 8th of March, Turkish airplanes of a new type and manned by excellent German p.il&tsy appeared on the front and obtained air superiority. (6) This made it necessary to rely more on other means of obtaining information, especially by mounted patrols, but the latter, like other operations could only extend a limited radius beyond water and supply points. (7) Light car patrols were first used with success at in January and demonstrated that the radius of reconnaissance could be extended beyond that of mounted patrols,although the importance of this means of obtaining and relaying information does not seem to have been realized during the Gaza operations.(8) It is probable that the organization for intelligence within General Murray1s forces in March 1917 was similar to that shown in Chart No. 1, appended. No similar organization, or at least no indication of any, existed at the headquarters of the Eastern Force (Army), the information collected by divisions and brigades in the field being transmitted to GHQ at Cairo for evaluation and dissemination in the form of intelligence. (9) 3. To prevent any further withdrawal of Turkish iorce, the British decided to attack Gaza as soon as practicable,or about the 25th-or 26th of March, depending on the arrival of the railhead at Raffah. (10) Shortly after the middle of March,operation plans of the Eastern Force for the attack on Gaza were approved by British GHQ. The British forces available consisted of about 22,000 effectives, (ll) Preliminary reconnaissances by aviation and ground patrols wiu&more or less limited just prior to the attack on Gaza. Prom reconnaissances and information obtained from inhabitants, prisoners, and GHQ,, it was estimated that the Turkish forces in the Gaza- Beersheba area were about 15,000 troops. 4000 were believed to be at Gaza, about 2000 at Beersheba, with the remainder within from ten to twenty miles of Gaza and located near Kuj, Abu Hureira, and Tel el Nejileh. (12) The decisive terrain feature in the vicinity of Gaza is an arroyo k/§mn as the Waddi Ghuzze. The Turks were in position in rear of this arroyo covering the approaches to Gaza and Beersheba with a system of detached strong points, partially organized, and on a front of about ten miles. (13) 5 1-27. 3-139. 5-278. 8-186. 10-66, 11-248) 6 3-9, 13, 109. 5-276. 7-88. 10-71. 11-262. 13-202) 7 3-19, 112. 8-186. 10-66) 8 3-122, 123, 140. 11-243, 287, 288, 293) 9 5-289,310. 6-1. 11-245, 246. 13-193) 10 (3-133. 5-278. 9-39. 11-248) 11 11-262, 265) 12 8-186. 11-253, 265. 12-126) 13 (8-186. 9-38. 11-263) -2 The plan for capturing Gaza was to send mounted troops around the position to the east and north to hold off supporting columns, and cut off the retreat of the garrison, while a direct attack was to be made on the Turkish lines from the south with two infantry divisions in assault and one infantry division in reserve* (14) To'obtain secrecy and prevent Turkish intelligence from gaining information of contemplated operation, it was necessary to guard and restrict movements of the local inhabitants. (15) 4. The British concentrated in the vicinity of Rafah and the move forward by night marches was commenced on the 21st March. By midnight of the 25th the forces were disposed as follows: Australian and New Zealand Mtd Division - Deir el Belah 54th Division - In Seirat, 52d Division - Khan Yunis, 53d Division - Belah. For the attack/General Dobell assigned command of the Desert Column to General Chetwode, retaining command of the 54th Division himself. Both these commanders established headquarters together near In Seirat, on the Belah side of the Waddi Ghuzze, with some portion of General Dobell18 headquarters remaining at Rafah. Altogether, there seems to have been but three general staff officers available for both headquarters, comparable to that of an Array and Corps for operations. GHQ, was still in Cairo, some two hundred miles away, but General Murray, to keep in touch with General Dobell, had by the evening of the 25th, established an advanced headquarters in a railway train at SI Arish, with wire connections to Raffah. (16) Limited mean of communication established initially down to Brigades, consisted of wire, radio and helio. Due to scarcity of signal equipment, the extension of lines was seriously inadequate. The operation of radio was more or less nullified by the powerful Turkish station at Gaza. (17) A general reconnaissance of the Gaza position was made by mounted troops on the 25th. Behind the mounted screen staff officers made a personal and more detailed survey of the terrain* With the exception of this reconnaissance, no other ground reconnaissances were made this date, the troops remaining concealed with no movement during the day. (18) The move forward against Gaza from the Belah area was made the night 25-26th March. (19) If animals and troops were to exist, Gaza would have to be captured by dark of the 26th. (20) The main attack was not launched, however, until nearly noon due to delays caused by time taken out for reconnaissances, giving of orders, non arrival of units, and a heavy morning fog.(21) By nightfall the mounted troops had largely accomplished their mission of encircling Gaza and were in position to report or resist any advance of Turkish reinforcements from the north or east. (22; 14 5-281. 8-186. 12-126, 266) 15 11-259. 12-117) 16 # 17 5-285, 286, 288, 289. 9-39. 10-89* 11-266, 275, 277, 278. 13-lf 18 10-89. 11-292, 293) 19 5-284, 285* 10-84. 85. 11-263. 12-125) 20 9-39. 11-262. 263) 21 5-305* 8-186) 22 5-295, 256. 8-187. 9-39) 5-299f 303. 8-187. 11-270, 271) -3 A small supply of the precious water had also "been located and reported, (23) The infantry, due to delays incurred, had not as yet penetrated the last defenses sufficiently to capture town* (24) To the forces in contact, and from information obtained from prisoners/it seemed certain that Gaza must soon fall, (25) That the situation within the garrison of Gaza itself was . desperateyis indicated by intercepted wireless messages between the garrison commander and higher headquarters* As the enenjy messages were intercepted they were quickly deciphered, translated, and the contents of at least four,telegraphed from GHty at Cairo to the headquarters of the Sastern Force at Rafah, prior to 6:30 PM. (26) Due to the distance from Rafah to advanced head quarters in the field and to lack of headquarters organization, these messages do not have seemed to have reached General Dobell or his staff in time to offset reports concerning the approach of Turkish reinforcements.