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New Relationship Is Hallmark of Putin's Visit to Ukraine Orange INSIDE:• Public events slated for Yushchenko visit to Washington — page 3. • Canada’s budget gives green light to redress for internment — page 4. • Preview: the new Ukrainian Museum in New York City — pages 13-15. Published by the Ukrainian National Association Inc., a fraternal non-profit association Vol. LXXIII HE KRAINIANNo. 13 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, MARCH 27, 2005 EEKLY$1/$2 in Ukraine Ukraine’sT procuracy UNew relationship is hallmark ofW Putin’s visit to Ukraine focusing on charges by Zenon Zawada country will deal with a Ukrainian leader- Mr. Yushchenko will support the Single Kyiv Press Bureau ship that has made it clear it will determine Economic Space (SES) of former Soviet its future independent of Russian interests. republics that he has yet to endorse. of election fraud KYIV – Russian President Vladimir Both Mr. Putin and Ukrainian President Meanwhile, Mr. Yushchenko stressed Putin visited Ukraine for the first time since Viktor Yushchenko used the March 20 the need to settle any remaining border by Zenon Zawada the Orange Revolution, beginning an work visit to advance their priorities. For disputes, a matter that Mr. Putin pre- Kyiv Press Bureau unprecedented relationship in which his Mr. Putin, that meant figuring out whether ferred to put on his back burner. Transporting Russian gas and expanding KYIV – The Procurator General’s its consumer base in Western Europe were Office of Ukraine, the government’s lead points of consensus for the two leaders. prosecuting body, is gaining momentum Mr. Putin set the tone for the Kyiv in its attempts to bring charges against visit at a morning press conference, after those who committed election fraud and concluding meetings with European falsified votes during the presidential leaders in Paris. He reassured the group, election. which included German Chancellor Viktor Shokin, the deputy procurator Gerhard Schroeder, that Russia would be general, said on March 23 his office will respectful of the new political landscape. prosecute at least two members of the “We will do all that we can to support Central Election Commission (CEC) for the Ukrainian leadership and use all our their role in falsifying votes. influence to avert any political crisis in He also raised the possibility that for- this nation,” Mr. Putin said. mer CEC Chairman Serhii Kivalov Arriving in Kyiv at 1 p.m., Mr. Putin would be held responsible. was immediately whisked to one of the “I don’t want to jump too far ahead, presidential residences, the famous but I think that since Serhii Vasyliovych “Budynok z Khymeramy” (Building was the head of the CEC, he will have to with Chimeras), which architect answer for his actions,” Mr. Shokin told Vladyslav Horodetskyi decorated with Channel 5 Ukraine’s 24-hour television elaborate sculptural reliefs. news station. Mykola Lazarenko/UNIAN Their discussions and press confer- As of March 9 there were 255 alleged ence were conducted in Russian “for cases of criminal acts committed in rela- Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko, right, with his wife, Kateryna, show convenience,” Mr. Yushchenko said. tion to the presidential elections, accord- Russian President Vladimir Putin their antiquarian collection during a meeting ing to the Procurator General’s office. at their country house near Kyiv on March 19. (Continued on page 21) Of these, the Ukrainian government is prosecuting 48 cases, while 16 cases are closed. There are 105 criminal cases involv- ing government employees, of which 68 Orange Revolution’s spirit captured in music and book releases cases involve members of local election by Zenon Zawada surrounding the Presidential Battle). committees, 16 cases involve police offi- Kyiv Press Bureau Administration Building, or at the steps Mr. Skrypka himself contributed his of the Museum of Ukrainian Art just enthusiastic accordion melodies and cers, and only 11 involve government KYIV – With nostalgic interest in the authorities, according to the Procurator down the street from the protests at the deep, eccentric vocals in two songs on Orange Revolution already creating a Cabinet of Ministers. the album. General’s Office. market, Ukraine’s most talented musi- The Committee of Voters Ukraine The idea to dispatch singers to the bar- On the literary front, Kyiv-based pub- cians and writers have produced work to ricades came to Mr. Skrypka during a lisher Yaroslaviv Val has released one of (CVU) expressed its disappointment relive those historic days and cherish the with much of the investigation into elec- spontaneous moment on the stage of the first accounts of the Orange revolt’s spirit. Independence Square – a.k.a. the maidan Revolution, “Peysazh dlia tion fraud that has taken place so far. Ukrainian rock legend Oleh Skrypka In particular, the CVU is disappointed – when he and fellow musicians decided Pomaranchevoyi Revoliutsiyi” has taken the lead among musicians by to sing with all their might, “My Smilo v (Landscape for the Orange Revolution), with prosecuting bodies for not pursuing compiling and producing an album that enough investigations against high-rank- Biy Pidem,” a song written in 1918 dur- written and reported by Mykhailo captures the inspiring patriotism and ing Ukraine’s struggle for independence. Slaboshpytskyi, this year’s national lau- ing government officials who gave tumult that lay behind the uprising. orders to commit election fraud. The audience’s reaction was so pow- reate of the Shevchenko Prize, which is The 16-track album is not a collection erful that Mr. Skrypka resolved to organ- Ukraine’s highest distinction for writers. Another concern is the unusual rate of of rock songs that pop stars sang on investigations as broken down by ize folk musicians at every barricade, Rather than rely on a strictly objective maidan’s stage (though it does include an where they’d chime patriotic songs into account, Mr. Slaboshpytskyi’s work is a oblasts, the committee said. acoustic version of Greenjolly’s “Razom For example, 25 investigations are the hearts of protesters all through journalistic narrative, or what he deems a Nas Bahato”). ongoing in Kirovohrad, 19 in Sumy December and onto victory. “chronicle-collage” in which he offers “There was some discord,” during the oblast and 16 in Kyiv. Passionate Kozak songs dominate the readers his own personal lens through Revolution, Mr. Skrypka said. “In partic- However, only one investigation each album, including a remarkable, soul-stir- which to view the panorama of events ular, many felt a lack of revolutionary is occurring in the Donetsk Oblast, ring rendition of Taras Shevchenko’s that became known as the Orange songs on the maidan – riflemen’s (strilet- Odesa Oblast and Crimea, where some “Hamalia” as performed by 10-year-old Revolution. ski) songs, Kozak songs and dumy.” of the most serious fraud took place. bandura prodigy Sviatoslav Sylenko. His romantic prose is filled with the “Dukh Ne Vmyraye, Dukh Ne Zhasa” The CVU is funded by 15 private and His father, bandurist Taras Sylenko, keen insight and sharp humor that collects some of Ukraine’s most talented government sources, including American performs a Haidamak song from the 18th brought him to literary prominence in contemporary folk artists, some of whom and European groups, said Oleksander century. Ukraine, his colleagues said at the book’s authored songs during the revolution, Chernenko, a committee spokesman. Others artists include Foma, lead presentation held on March 21. while others echoed lyrics written cen- The committee also asked that the singer of Mandry; Eduard Drach, an “All present here are people of the procurator general investigate illegal turies ago. impressive acoustic guitarist and song- maidan,” Vice Minister of Defense interference into the computer database The selected songs were performed writer; and bandurist Taras Minister Volodymyr Pasko told the audi- of the Central Election Committee dur- during a concert series organized by Mr. Kompanichenko, who sings the rifle- ence of more than 100 gathered at ing the first round of the presidential Skrypka in late November to inspire the men’s march that inspired Mr. Skrypka Ukraine’s National Museum of Literature revolutionaries standing in the freezing and his colleagues, “My Smilo v Biy (Continued on page 21) temperatures, whether at the barricades Pidem” (We Will Bravely Go Into (Continued on page 3) 2 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, MARCH 27, 2005 No. 13 ANALYSIS Is new pro-Yushchenko party NEWSBRIEFSNEWSBRIEFS Kyiv continues anti-corruption drive production. Mr. Yushchenko was also scheduled to discuss arms sales to more than a party of power? KYIV – Hennadii Moskal, the deputy Turkmenistan. (RFE/RL Newsline) chief of Ukraine’s Internal Affairs Ministry by Jan Maksymiuk ment before those of the people. (MVS), announced that criminal charges Oblast wraps up vote fraud probe RFE/RL Newsline It was widely expected that President have been filed against 12 former deputy Yushchenko would build a new political heads of oblast administrations and 58 heads ZHYTOMYR – Prosecutors in the More than 6,000 delegates gathered in force based on parties participating in his of raion administrations. All of the suspects Zhytomyr Oblast have ended their investi- Kyiv on March 5 to set up a party called Our Ukraine parliamentary bloc. This, are accused of bribe-taking and “exceeding gation into election rigging during the presi- Our Ukraine People’s Union (OUPU), however, did not happen. The OUPU con- their authority,” Interfax reported on March dential election in 2004 and indicted eight which is to provide political support to stituent congress was organized by the 22. Mr. Moskal also stated that the head of individuals, whose trials are either over or the government of President Viktor public movement For Ukraine! For former President Leonid Kuchma’s property still in progress, UNIAN reported on Yushchenko and vie for a substantial par- Yushchenko! coordinated by the presi- office, Ihor Bakai, who is believed to be in March 22.
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