DOCSLIB.ORG

Internet Use in Ukraine's Orange Revolution

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Internet Use in Ukraine's Orange Revolution Business Horizons (2006) 49,71—80 www.elsevier.com/locate/bushor Internet use in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution Myroslaw J. Kyj One University Place, School of Business Administration, Widener University, Chester, PA 19013-5792, USA KEYWORDS Abstract The Ukrainian presidential elections of 2004 witnessed a massive uprising Internet; of the Ukrainian electorate against the incumbent government’s tactics of vote Websites; rigging and ballot fraud. In this paper, ten Ukrainian websites focusing on the Ukraine; election are critically evaluated and compared by analyzing their website activity Political promotion data. Despite lacking access to mass media, supporters of democratic change compensated through skillful use of the internet to recruit volunteers, raise funds, organize campaigns, report breaking news, and garner the sympathy of the global democratic community. Comparisons with broader web usage are made, and social and business implications are suggested. D 2005 Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. All rights reserved. 1. Seeing orange out for support from the broader democratic global community. In the aftermath of massive demonstrations in To date, the great bulk of academic and popular Kiev, Viktor Yuschenko was elected president of literature has considered how the internet has Ukraine on December 26, 2004. Completing what altered relationships between sellers, customers, popularly became known as the bOrange and consumers. Thus, researchers have conceptu- RevolutionQ (named after the color adopted by alized the relationship of the web to traditional his political party), Yuschenko’s election was a media (Dholakia & Rego, 1998) and studied attri- startling outcome in that it overcame concerted butes of webpage design that attract and engage resistance from an entrenched, corrupt political visitors (Raman & Leckenby, 1998). The growing group that controlled the mass media, resorted to importance of the internet as a marketing tool has wholesale electoral fraud by certifying the elec- been recognized by colleges and universities, tion of Viktor Yanukovych, and had the active whose websites often serve as the first point of support of Russia’s president, Vladimir Putin. contact for many potential students and employees Information that was rapidly disseminated over (Larson & Kyj, 2003; McBane, 1997). Indication of the internet and throughout the campaign and the increasing utilization of the web as a govern- crowds during the fifteen day period of protests mental resource in the United States is provided by helped sustain the momentum of the Orange Curtin, McConnachie, Sommer, and Vis-Sommer Revolution. Equally importantly, it also reached (2004). This has led to the formation of what Howard Rheingold (2002) terms bsmart mobsQ: E-mail addresses: [email protected], technology-enabled groups capable of exploiting [email protected] their rapid access to information to advance 0007-6813/$ - see front matter D 2005 Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.bushor.2005.06.003 72 M.J. Kyj specific causes. Politicians have taken note of this that of the hyper-inflationary first transitional trend in Greek parliamentary elections (Demertzis, post-Soviet currency. Yuschenko’s career success Diamantaki, Gazi, & Sartzetakis, 2005), with evi- led to his selection by Kuchma to serve as the dence of winning candidates having superior web- country’s prime minister in 1999. In this capacity, sites (Prodromos & Lappas, 2005). Yuschenko resuscitated a national pension system Nina Koiso-Kanttila (2005) has proposed three that had fallen badly into arrears, an accomplish- consumer behavior tendencies that are helpful in ment which won him the admiration of a public that analyzing web usage: perceived time scarcity, was more used to taking abuse from the govern- competition for attention, and the quest for ment than being served by it. The more popular and authenticity. The internet is a time saver in that visible Yuschenko became, the more he presented a it is an efficient transmitter of information. The sharp contrast to the highly unpopular Kuchma, immediacy of real-time information has become a who grew increasingly jealous. The final straw defining expectation for the web. Paradoxically, came in the form of Yuschenko’s determined the wealth of information on the web has attempt to reform the country’s corrupt energy created a poverty of attention and puts a pre- sector, a principle source of sudden wealth for mium on creating bstickyQ websites that entice some of the oligarchs whose political parties viewers to linger. Authenticity suggests attributes represented more than 20% of parliament. of reliability, trustworthiness, and originality, and Yuschenko had been prime minister for some would be especially important for news sources. sixteen months when he was dismissed (Rodriguez, In the subsequent discussion, it will be pointed 2004). out how the websites in this study conformed to He did not go quietly. By this time, a coalescing these behavioral tendencies. However, in order to political group calling itself bOur UkraineQ was comprehend what the websites were trying to preparing to mount a political challenge to Kuchma, convey, it is necessary to understand some of the and reached out to the deposed prime minister to background leading up to the Orange Revolution. become the party’s leader. Next, we examine the With this in mind, let us turn our attention to factors that came into play permitting Yuschenko to some rough politics. compete politically for the presidency, despite being shunned by the mass media. 2. Muzzled against state power 3. Exposing entrenched corruption Viktor Yuschenko’s campaign for the presidency of Ukraine faced formidable obstacles from the cor- Through persistent reporting in his internet news- rupt political system put in place by Leonid Kuchma paper about rampant corruption within the admin- during a decade-long administration. During this istration, Kiev investigative reporter Georghi time, Kuchma erected an authoritarian administra- Gongadze ran afoul of president Kuchma. Gongad- tion and governed like a Mafia Don; tacit agree- ze’s website, Ukrayinska Pravda (Ukrainian Truth), ments with regional oligarchic clans, a largely became a principal forum for questioning govern- malleable judiciary, and unfettered powers over ment motives and conduct. One investigation the appointment of governors all further enhanced centered on Kuchma’s lack of oversight in the case presidential fiat in less obtrusive ways. Control of of Pavlo Lazarenko, a former prime minister who broadcast and print media was advanced through made off with several hundred million dollars after licensing and a program of intimidation that ex- being dismissed from office. Lazarenko went on an tended even to the murder of troublesome investi- odyssey throughout Europe and Central America gative reporters. While dissenting opinions and before finally ending up in the United States, unflattering reports continued, they were largely having traveled on forged passports. Ukrayinska limited to small regional papers or internet web- Pravda questioned where president Kuchma was sites. With the exception of one television station, during all this, and how he might be involved. news reports covering the president or government Subsequent investigations showed financial links to featured fawning praise, with parallel vilification of Mr. Kuchma’s family via allegations Lazarenko opposition parties and dissenting thought. arranged for the capitalization of Kyiv Star, a Yuschenko did have one significant advantage: a mobile phone start-up company that happened to good reputation as a former head of the Ukrainian have the president’s daughter as one of the Central Bank, under whom the country’s new principal officers (Kupchinsky, 2002). The average currency, the hryvnia, was successfully introduced. Ukrainian would be well acquainted with corrup- This positive experience was in direct contrast with tion in its many guises, from the petty to the Internet use in Ukraine’s Orange Revolution 73 astonishingly gross: avaricious police, bribe-seeking All websites in Ukraine with a core following bureaucrats, dishonest tax agents, and academi- subscribe to rating services, which monitor site cians seeking bgiftsQ to expedite the admission of activity in terms of number of visitors and students. frequency of visits. Rating services segment sites Within two weeks of this expose´, Gongadze’s according to genre (e.g., politics, news, sports, headless body was discovered some fifty miles business, personals, etc.) and rank them according north of Kiev (The Economist, 2001). The suspicion to popularity. Websites incorporated in this study of a political killing, another in a string of eleven included: unsolved murders of reporters during a two-year period, quickly fell on the administration. This was ! Our Ukraine and Yanukovych, the official sites of further fueled by the explosive revelation of a each presidential contender; secret tape recording made by one of Kuchma’s ! Maidan, Pora, Ostrov, and Donbass, samples of body guards, in which the president demands sites with strong regional or political orientation; bsomething be doneQ with Gongadze. Large scale ! Ukrayinska Pravda, ProUA, and Obozrevatel, protests erupted in Kiev accusing Kuchma of representing top-ten internet news journalism complicity in the murder and demanding he sites; and resign. The opposition called for a bKuchma-free ! Channel
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Hryvnia Drops in Value by 20 Percent Supreme Court Overrules Election
    INSIDE:• Ukrainian Broadcasting Network goes off the air — page 3. • Stranded freighter to leave New York harbor – page 3. • “Dity Ditiam” project helps Chornobyl victims — page 10. Published by the Ukrainian National Association Inc., a fraternal non-profit association Vol. LXVII HE KRAINIANNo. 33 THE UKRAINIAN WEEKLY SUNDAY, AUGUST 15, 1999 EEKLY$1.25/$2 in Ukraine Supreme Court overrules Election Commission, HryvniaT drops in Uvalue by 20 percent W Gas shortage seen as cause of destabilization admits more candidates into presidential race by Roman Woronowycz ures to stabilize the market for oil prod- by Roman Woronowycz as well. A day later the court accepted Kyiv Press Bureau ucts. Kyiv Press Bureau the appeal of Mr. Rzhavskyi, who leads “If we get a balanced situation in the the Single Family political association. KYIV – A gasoline shortage in market, we don’t exclude that we will KYIV – Ukraine’s Supreme Court, On August 11, Slavic Party nominee Mr. Ukraine has caused the destabilization of resort to [an intervention],” said Mr. exercising its authority and independ- Bazyliuk found salvation in another the hryvnia and a 20 percent drop in its Yuschenko on August 11. ence for the first time on the national Supreme Court decision and was regis- value against the dollar in the last two A day earlier, as the currency slightly political arena, has overturned several tered as the 13th candidate for president. weeks. rebounded, the NBU chairman said he Central Election Commission decisions The Supreme Court has been basing The Ukrainian currency, which had saw no reason to expand the corridor and not to register presidential candidates.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Yulia Tymoshenko Will Remain Imprisoned
    Why Yulia Tymoshenko Will Remain Imprisoned Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 8 Issue: 204 November 4, 2011 06:14 PM Age: 49 days By: Taras Kuzio (Source: AP) Western policymakers and Ukrainian experts are perplexed as to why President Viktor Yanukovych agreed to the court quickly sentencing Yulia Tymoshenko on October 11 to a seven year sentence, a three year ban from political life and a fine of 1.5 billion hryvnia ($190 million). The “7+3” charges ban Tymoshenko from the next two presidential and three parliamentary elections. The sentence, refusal to heed the flood of Western criticism and the new charges against Tymoshenko only one day later led the EU to cancel the October 20 visit to Brussels by Yanukovych. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) has launched two new charges against Tymoshenko related to when she was CEO of United Energy Systems in 1995-1997 and the assassination of Viktor Yushchenko’s protégé Vadym Hetman in 1998. Ten factors explain how and why the Yanukovych administration dug itself into a hole. Feral elites: Ukraine’s elites have little connection to society whose citizens and voters they treat with contempt and do not feel any responsibility toward. Feral elites believe the world is Machiavellian and the ends justify the means. Most Western media coverage used language similar to the Economist (October 11) to describe Yanukovych as “thuggish and vindictive” (The Times, October 14, The New York Times, October 17). National interests: personal and business interests are of greater importance than Ukraine’s national interests. Revenge against Tymoshenko for removing the opaque gas intermediary RosUkrEnergo from the 2009 gas contract with Russia is more important for the feral elites than European integration.
    [Show full text]
  • +1. Introduction 2. Cyrillic Letter Rumanian Yn
    MAIN.HTM 10/13/2006 06:42 PM +1. INTRODUCTION These are comments to "Additional Cyrillic Characters In Unicode: A Preliminary Proposal". I'm examining each section of that document, as well as adding some extra notes (marked "+" in titles). Below I use standard Russian Cyrillic characters; please be sure that you have appropriate fonts installed. If everything is OK, the following two lines must look similarly (encoding CP-1251): (sample Cyrillic letters) АабВЕеЗКкМНОопРрСсТуХхЧЬ (Latin letters and digits) Aa6BEe3KkMHOonPpCcTyXx4b 2. CYRILLIC LETTER RUMANIAN YN In the late Cyrillic semi-uncial Rumanian/Moldavian editions, the shape of YN was very similar to inverted PSI, see the following sample from the Ноул Тестамент (New Testament) of 1818, Neamt/Нямец, folio 542 v.: file:///Users/everson/Documents/Eudora%20Folder/Attachments%20Folder/Addons/MAIN.HTM Page 1 of 28 MAIN.HTM 10/13/2006 06:42 PM Here you can see YN and PSI in both upper- and lowercase forms. Note that the upper part of YN is not a sharp arrowhead, but something horizontally cut even with kind of serif (in the uppercase form). Thus, the shape of the letter in modern-style fonts (like Times or Arial) may look somewhat similar to Cyrillic "Л"/"л" with the central vertical stem looking like in lowercase "ф" drawn from the middle of upper horizontal line downwards, with regular serif at the bottom (horizontal, not slanted): Compare also with the proposed shape of PSI (Section 36). 3. CYRILLIC LETTER IOTIFIED A file:///Users/everson/Documents/Eudora%20Folder/Attachments%20Folder/Addons/MAIN.HTM Page 2 of 28 MAIN.HTM 10/13/2006 06:42 PM I support the idea that "IA" must be separated from "Я".
    [Show full text]
  • Health History Form ALLERGIES Are You Latex-Sensitive? Y N List Any Medication(S) You Are
    Health History Form Hello and thank you for choosing Fusion Physical Therapy as the provider for your current healthcare need(s)! We look forward to working with you to help make your day a little easier! To ensure you receive a complete and thorough evaluation, please provide us with your important background information on the following form. If you do not understand a question, leave it blank and your therapist will assist you. Name:_______________________________________ Age: ______ Gender: _______ Occupation:Patient ___________________________________________________________ Characteristics Leisure Activities: ______________________________________________________ ALLERGIES Are you latex-sensitive? Y N List any medication(s) you are allergic to: ___________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ List any other allergies we should know about:_______________________________ Please check (√) any of the following providers whose care you are under: ___Current medical Physicians doctor & ___ osteopath ___ dentist ___ psychiatrist ___ psychologist Non-physician providers ___ physical therapist ___ chiropractor ___ other: __________________________ Date of your last physical examination: ______________________ Has anyone in your immediate family (parents, brothers, sisters) ever been treated for any of the following? Y NRelevant Alcoholism Family History (chemical dependence) Y N High blood pressure Y N Cancer Y N Inflammatory arthritis Y N Depression Y N Kidney disease Y N Diabetes Y N Stroke Y N Heart Disease 1 | P a g e Health History Form Have you EVER been diagnosed as having any of the following conditions? Y N Arthritic conditions. If Y, what kind: _______________________________ Y N Asthma Y N Blood Clots Y N Cancer. If Y, what kind: _________________________________________ Y N Chemical dependence (e.g. alcoholism) Y N Circulation problems Y N Depression Y N Diabetes Y N Heart problems.
    [Show full text]
  • Ukrainian Civil Society from the Orange Revolution to Euromaidan: Striving for a New Social Contract
    In: IFSH (ed.), OSCE Yearbook 2014, Baden-Baden 2015, pp. 219-235. Iryna Solonenko Ukrainian Civil Society from the Orange Revolution to Euromaidan: Striving for a New Social Contract This is the Maidan generation: too young to be burdened by the experi- ence of the Soviet Union, old enough to remember the failure of the Orange Revolution, they don’t want their children to be standing again on the Maidan 15 years from now. Sylvie Kauffmann, The New York Times, April 20141 Introduction Ukrainian civil society became a topic of major interest with the start of the Euromaidan protests in November 2013. It has acquired an additional dimen- sion since then, as civil society has pushed for reforms following the ap- pointment of the new government in February 2014, while also providing as- sistance to the army and voluntary battalions fighting in the east of the coun- try and to civilian victims of the war. In the face of the weakness of the Ukrainian state, which is still suffering from a lack of political will, poor governance, corruption, military weakness, and dysfunctional law enforce- ment – many of those being in part Viktor Yanukovych’s legacies – civil so- ciety and voluntary activism have become a driver of reform and an import- ant mobilization factor in the face of external aggression. This contribution examines the transformation of Ukrainian civil society during the period between the 2004 Orange Revolution and the present day. Why this period? The Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan protests are landmarks in Ukraine’s post-independence state-building and democratiza- tion process, and analysis of the transformation of Ukrainian civil society during this period offers interesting findings.2 Following a brief portrait of Ukrainian civil society and its evolution, the contribution examines the rela- tionships between civil society and three other actors: the state, the broader society, and external actors involved in supporting and developing civil soci- ety in Ukraine.
    [Show full text]
  • Judicial Reform in Ukraine: Mission Possible?
    JUDICIAL REFORM IN UKRAINE: MISSION POSSIBLE? POLICY REPORT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AUTHOR: Mykhailo Zhernakov Today’s justice sector reform is by far the most comprehensive one in the Director at “DeJuRe Foundation”, modern history of Ukraine. What are the preconditions for this reform? Is it leading expert on judicial reform possible to transform Ukraine’s judiciary by keeping the old courts that failed of the “Reanimation Package of to provide justice in the last 25 years of the country’s independence, or should Reforms” civil coalition Ukraine rebuild its court system completely? What results could be achieved by implementing European standards in the judiciary in today’s Ukraine and what PEER REVIEW: is the impact of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement? Recently Ukraine’s constitutional provisions regarding judiciary were changed, Taras Shevchenko, opening the door for a full-fledged judicial reform, allowing, among other things, Roman Romanov, the creation of an entirely new Supreme Court. At this stage of the reform, the political leadership of the country and its civil society are concentrated on Dmytro Shulga, simultaneous development and adoption of the necessary secondary legislation Olena Halushka, and its implementation. Kornely Kakachia, Even though this process for the most part follows the existing Strategy for judicial reform, its success is far from decided. So far it is unclear whether the Stanislav Secrieru legislative framework provides enough effective tools, and the risk of further exertion of political influence on courts remains. Considering this, it is very important to not leave Ukrainian political elites alone with these choices. To ensure the survival of the reform, maximum public and international oversight and involvement are needed, in both legislative work and implementation.
    [Show full text]
  • Freedom on the Net, Ukraine
    Ukraine https://freedomhouse.org/country/ukraine/freedom-net/2020 The COVID-19 pandemic saw the authorities prosecute users for spreading rumors online and launch several initiatives aimed at stopping the spread of the disease, including an app that monitors individuals in mandatory isolation, that infringe upon users’ privacy rights. Online journalists continued to face extralegal retaliation for their work. Cyberattacks remain a regular occurrence, affecting government and nongovernment targets alike. C1 1.00-6.00 pts0-6 pts Do the constitution or other laws fail to protect rights such as freedom of expression, access to 3.003 information, and press freedom, including on the internet, and are they enforced by a judiciary that 6.006 lacks independence? The right to free speech is granted to all citizens of Ukraine under Article 34 of the constitution, but the state may restrict this right in the interests of national security or public order, and it is sometimes restricted in practice. Article 15 of the constitution prohibits censorship.132 Ukrainian courts are hampered by corruption and political interference, and public trust in the judiciary remains low.133 Serious crimes against journalists often remain unresolved (see C7). President Zelenskyy’s administration has at times denied reporters access to information (see B5). The IMI recorded 21 COVID-19–related restrictions on the work of journalists from mid-March 2020 until the end of April 2020, including cases in which journalists were prohibited from attending government meetings or prevented from reporting.134 C2 1.00-4.00 pts0-4 pts Are there laws that assign criminal penalties or civil liability for online activities? 2.002 4.004 No dedicated law mandates criminal penalties or civil liability specifically for online activities.
    [Show full text]
  • Old Cyrillic in Unicode*
    Old Cyrillic in Unicode* Ivan A Derzhanski Institute for Mathematics and Computer Science, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences [email protected] The current version of the Unicode Standard acknowledges the existence of a pre- modern version of the Cyrillic script, but its support thereof is limited to assigning code points to several obsolete letters. Meanwhile mediæval Cyrillic manuscripts and some early printed books feature a plethora of letter shapes, ligatures, diacritic and punctuation marks that want proper representation. (In addition, contemporary editions of mediæval texts employ a variety of annotation signs.) As generally with scripts that predate printing, an obvious problem is the abundance of functional, chronological, regional and decorative variant shapes, the precise details of whose distribution are often unknown. The present contents of the block will need to be interpreted with Old Cyrillic in mind, and decisions to be made as to which remaining characters should be implemented via Unicode’s mechanism of variation selection, as ligatures in the typeface, or as code points in the Private space or the standard Cyrillic block. I discuss the initial stage of this work. The Unicode Standard (Unicode 4.0.1) makes a controversial statement: The historical form of the Cyrillic alphabet is treated as a font style variation of modern Cyrillic because the historical forms are relatively close to the modern appearance, and because some of them are still in modern use in languages other than Russian (for example, U+0406 “I” CYRILLIC CAPITAL LETTER I is used in modern Ukrainian and Byelorussian). Some of the letters in this range were used in modern typefaces in Russian and Bulgarian.
    [Show full text]
  • CDDRL Number 114 WORKING PAPERS June 2009
    CDDRL Number 114 WORKING PAPERS June 2009 Youth Movements in Post- Communist Societies: A Model of Nonviolent Resistance Olena Nikolayenko Stanford University Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Additional working papers appear on CDDRL’s website: http://cddrl.stanford.edu. Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies Stanford University Encina Hall Stanford, CA 94305 Phone: 650-724-7197 Fax: 650-724-2996 http://cddrl.stanford.edu/ About the Center on Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law (CDDRL) CDDRL was founded by a generous grant from the Bill and Flora Hewlett Foundation in October in 2002 as part of the Stanford Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. The Center supports analytic studies, policy relevant research, training and outreach activities to assist developing countries in the design and implementation of policies to foster growth, democracy, and the rule of law. About the Author Olena Nikolayenko (Ph.D. Toronto) is a Visiting Postdoctoral Scholar and a recipient of the 2007-2009 post-doctoral fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. Her research interests include comparative democratization, public opinion, social movements, youth, and corruption. In her dissertation, she analyzed political support among the first post-Soviet generation grown up without any direct experience with communism in Russia and Ukraine. Her current research examines why some youth movements are more successful than others in applying methods of nonviolent resistance to mobilize the population in non-democracies. She has recently conducted fieldwork in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Serbia, and Ukraine.
    [Show full text]
  • Integrity on Trial: Judicial Reform in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova Steven Blockmans, Nadejda Hriptievschi, Viacheslav Panasiuk and Ekaterine Zguladze
    Integrity on Trial: Judicial reform in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova Steven Blockmans, Nadejda Hriptievschi, Viacheslav Panasiuk and Ekaterine Zguladze No 2018/04, June 2018 Abstract Under the terms of their Association Agreements with the EU, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova are expected to strengthen the independence of the judiciary, establish zero tolerance of corruption in the legal profession, and reform legislation regarding prosecutors, judges and lawyers. By taking a differentiated approach to improving relations with its neighbouring countries, the EU is keen to identify and build upon existing positive sources of resilience, as well as to track and respond to vulnerabilities with the mix of instruments and budgets at its disposal. In the case of Georgia, this raises the question of whether the radical overhaul of the Saakashvili-era reforms can withstand the corrosion of corruptive practices by narrow- minded political and economic operators. In Ukraine, the challenge is how to prolong and channel the positive reform dynamic to firmly anchor institutional and procedural change in the justice sector. In Moldova, the issue is rather to insulate the pockets of successful reform while supporting drivers of change in their fight against illiberal forces. This study identifies innovations in the three associated states’ justice sectors. It analyses changes to both the ‘hardware’ of the justice system, i.e. the constitutional and institutional frameworks, as well as the ‘software’, i.e. selection, appointment, promotion and disciplinary procedures and other means to fight corruption in the justice sector. It concludes with a review of the existing court practice with the AA/DCFTAs. By doing so, this paper not only gauges national judges’ awareness about the need to enforce their country’s contractual obligations with the EU, it also offers insights into the degree of domestic courts’ openness to use international/European law to put an end to conflicting national rules and bad practices.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia's Hostile Measures in Europe
    Russia’s Hostile Measures in Europe Understanding the Threat Raphael S. Cohen, Andrew Radin C O R P O R A T I O N For more information on this publication, visit www.rand.org/t/RR1793 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available for this publication. ISBN: 978-1-9774-0077-2 Published by the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, Calif. © Copyright 2019 RAND Corporation R® is a registered trademark. Limited Print and Electronic Distribution Rights This document and trademark(s) contained herein are protected by law. This representation of RAND intellectual property is provided for noncommercial use only. Unauthorized posting of this publication online is prohibited. Permission is given to duplicate this document for personal use only, as long as it is unaltered and complete. Permission is required from RAND to reproduce, or reuse in another form, any of its research documents for commercial use. For information on reprint and linking permissions, please visit www.rand.org/pubs/permissions. The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous. RAND is nonprofit, nonpartisan, and committed to the public interest. RAND’s publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of its research clients and sponsors. Support RAND Make a tax-deductible charitable contribution at www.rand.org/giving/contribute www.rand.org Preface This report is the collaborative and equal effort of the coauthors, who are listed in alphabetical order. The report documents research and analysis conducted through 2017 as part of a project entitled Russia, European Security, and “Measures Short of War,” sponsored by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • The Mediaʼs Role
    7KH0HGLD૷V5ROH Sergii Leshchenko Journal of Democracy, Volume 25, Number 3, July 2014, pp. 52-57 (Article) Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press DOI: 10.1353/jod.2014.0048 For additional information about this article http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/jod/summary/v025/25.3.leshchenko.html Access provided by username 'cohenf' (22 Aug 2014 15:19 GMT) The Maidan and Beyond THE MEDIA’S ROLE Sergii Leshchenko Sergii Leshchenko is a leading Ukrainian journalist and press-freedom activist. Since 2000, he has worked for Ukrayinska Pravda, where he specializes in anticorruption investigations and other political report- ing. From October 2013 to February 2014, he was a Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellow at the National Endowment for Democracy. It all began with a simple Facebook post. On 21 November 2013, after word got out that President Viktor Yanukovych was doing an about-face and scrapping his promise to steer Ukraine toward closer integration with Europe, online journalist Mustafa Nayyem took to his page on the popular social-media site to invite any fellow Ukrainians who shared his unhappiness with the policy reversal to meet in Kyiv’s Independence Square (the Maidan) at 10:30 that night so they could peacefully voice their discontent. A few hundred of Nayyem’s Facebook friends showed up, to be joined within days by several thousand students and members of opposition parties. When the regime launched a brutal paramilitary assault against the Maidan on November 30, the crowds swelled to at least half a million people who came out to condemn the government’s actions.
    [Show full text]