DIPLOMACY DEVELOPMENT and SECURITY in the INFORMATION AGE

Shanthi Kalathil EDITOR Séverine Arsène David Faris Sarah Granger Craig Hayden georgetown university school of foreign service James Herlong Gerald Hyman Lorelei Kelly Andrew Puddephat Joseph Siegle James Valentine

institute for the study of diplomacy ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The richness of Georgetown University and its close tive—now play increasingly important roles in the relationship to Washington’s politics and diplo- conduct of international politics and finance and are macy offer boundless opportunities for an institute leading us to think differently about global finance like ours. ISD’s presence at Georgetown reflects the and development, conflict and reconciliation. university’s dedication to study and action and to These new issues, conditions, and actors are help- social justice and global engagement. ing to refine, and perhaps redefine, what diplomacy The contours of diplomatic engagement are means and how it is conducted. They set the context changing rapidly, as are the environments in which for ISD’s work as we identify issues that are global in diplomacy is crafted, honed, and practiced. New origin and diplomatic reach, and examine carefully media have changed the pace and content of politi- the ways that states and nonstate actors respond to cal awareness and provided new tools for diploma- them and to one another. cy. Porous borders challenge national sovereignty, This agenda infuses our studies, teaching, train- the conduct of war, and the ways in which peace can ing, and outreach. Our associates and colleagues join be pursued. The capacities of states and multilateral with the many communities that engage the impor- institutions to prevent and fix problems are chal- tant, hard, enduring, and often unanswered issues lenged daily by the enormous agendas that global that define our global polity. Together, we study the issues like health and the environment pose for the ways that diplomacy can shape global action and international community. serve our complex global societies. And as we have Each of these global issues tests the assumptions for three decades, we continue to take our cues from and practices of traditional diplomacy. Perhaps the worlds of politics and education and from the most important for our work, nonstate actors— university’s generous and abiding commitments to whether benign or malign, constructive or disrup- the worlds of words and deeds.

Institute for the Study of Diplomacy Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057–1025 Copyright 2013 by the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. You are permitted to copy, distribute, and transmit this work, provided you attribute the work to the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, do not use this work for commercial purposes, and that you may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. CONTENTS

Acknowledgments v

Introduction

Transparency and Volatility: International Relations in the Information Age 3 Shanthi Kalathil

Diplomacy in the Information Age

Social Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, and Network Power 17 Craig Hayden

From the Age of Secrecy to the Age of Sharing: Social Media, Diplomacy, and Statecraft in the 21st Century 35 David M. Faris

Development in the Information Age

The Chinese ICT Development Strategy in Africa: Transparency, Sovereignty, and Soft Power 51 Séverine Arsène

Complicating the Already Complicated: Diplomacy, Development, and the New Media 63 Gerald F. Hyman

iii iv Contents Transparency in Aid Programs 79 Andrew Puddephatt

Security in the Information Age

Cybersecurity and Modern Grand Strategy 99 Sarah Granger & Lorelei Kelly

Managing Volatility with the Expanded Access to Information in Fragile States 113 Joseph Siegle

If You Are Seeking an Advantage, Information Does Not Matter 125 James Valentine & James Herlong

About the Authors 139 Acknowledgments

This volume began as a series of discussions with volume, somehow eliciting order from chaos. Char- Paula Newberg, then the head of the Institute for lie’s thoughtful comments, and his patient shep- the Study of Diplomacy (ISD) at Georgetown, who herding of the papers through publication, proved was particularly interested in exploring the com- invaluable. plexities of international affairs in the information The funding for my work on this project was pro- age. Her encouragement and insight helped shape vided by the Yahoo! Business and Human Rights the themes that have emerged here. I owe her and Program. I am thankful to them for making this pos- the Institute a debt of gratitude for providing a wel- sible. The Institute also wants to thank the Joseph coming platform to test and argue new ideas. J. Schott Foundation for its support of the author Additional food for thought was provided working group and the printing of the publication. through the lively lunch meetings of the Institute’s Finally, my deep appreciation goes to this vol- I-Diplomacy group, which met on a quarterly basis ume’s stellar lineup of authors, who have together to hash over issues ranging from Chinese soft power created an invaluable cache of knowledge. Their to the changing role of diplomats. dedication to this task has helped provide a build- Special acknowledgement and thanks are due ing block for future research and understanding of a to Katie Seckman and Charlie Dolgas at ISD. Katie crucially important, yet still emerging, area. skillfully managed the processes leading up to this Shanthi Kalathil

v

Introduction

Transparency and Volatility: International Relations in the Information Age Shanthi Kalathil

The information revolution is permanently chang- threats (cyber and otherwise), networked forms of ing the face of international relations. Wired, net- organization, asymmetrical conflict, decentraliza- worked protestors help power and publicize the tion, recentralization, altered global governance Arab Spring, leading to the downfall of authoritar- structures, multicentrism, information asymmetry, ian regimes long believed unshakable. Secret cables new development models, contested global norms, published by Wikileaks expose the mechanics of and much more. All of these present challenges and U.S. foreign policy decisionmaking to a global pub- opportunities for states and nonstate actors and re- lic. Chinese Internet users spread photo evidence to quire a substantial rethink of the lens through which expose corrupt local officials. Israelis and Palestin- we view international affairs. ians use video and social media to add another di- Yet fresh thinking on these issues, while taken up mension to real-time conflict. by specialized academics, rarely makes it onto the But what do these disparate events really tell us? public agenda. Such research tends to get tucked The popular narrative generally holds that time and away into the vibrant but often impenetrable (to distance are collapsing, everything and everyone outsiders) fiefdom of communications research, is scrutinized, filters are nonexistent, and nonstate such that followers of international affairs do not actors hold disproportionate and ever-increasing tend to encounter it on a regular basis, if at all. Thus, power. While powerful, and containing some ele- the initial analysis of events hardens into an ac- ments of truth, this narrative is rarely re-examined cepted truth, and it becomes increasingly difficult in the context of policy discourse or the decisions to pose alternate narratives or even further explore that arise from it. the dominant one. There is far more to understand about interna- This working paper series intends to illuminate tional relations in what is commonly termed the in- this narrative by delving further into the trends in formation age. Changes in the speed, volume diver- international affairs that have been accelerated or sity, nature and accessibility of information, as well otherwise augmented by the information revolu- as the ways in which it is exchanged, have contribut- tion. Because this task could easily prove unman- ed to a variety of emerging and evolving phenome- ageable, the series will examine in particular two na. These include the rise of nontraditional security separate but linked phenomena enhanced by the

3 4 Shanthi Kalathil INTRODUCTION information age: heightened transparency and in- than they deserve. creased volatility. This series thus proposes to unpack the concepts As Craig Hayden notes in his paper for this se- of transparency and volatility across three major are- ries, both transparency and volatility have come to nas of international affairs: security, diplomacy, and define the practice of contemporary diplomacy and development. Each issue-area features two essays, international relations. While separate, they are in- each focusing on different aspects of transparency creasingly inextricable, he argues—in that transpar- and/or volatility. Two additional essays (by Gerald ency is facilitated by the same information and com- Hyman and Joseph Siegle) examine the ramifica- munication technologies (ICT) that also promote tions of the growing interplay between issue-areas instability, risk, and uncertainty in international in the information age. Some authors situate their affairs. Civil society actors—including nongov- research within the context of academic literature, ernmental organizations (NGOs), citizen journal- while others are more focused on policy and/or ists, and the broad public—have been most visibly operational contexts. Taken together, the papers in adept at taking advantage of volatility to advance this series seek to usefully organize the issue under their interests as well as using heightened transpar- inquiry in order to render it manageable and under- ency to press for accountability. But states and other standable to a wider scholarly, policy, and practitio- large institutional actors must also respond to these ner audience. trends and in some cases are doing so innovatively. While this paper series uses transparency and The examples at the beginning of this paper il- volatility as a framework for examining interna- lustrate transparency and volatility at work in in- tional relations in the information age, it does not ternational affairs. But anecdotes cannot usefully necessarily place information and communication convey how transparency and volatility have them- technologies at the forefront of the analysis. While selves become globally shared conditions, values, some papers do focus on ICT, the purpose is not and/or norms. Transparency, argues Hayden, does to minutely examine new forms of technology and more than simply put information out there—it in- their impact. Rather, the premise for this series is culcates a shared value that information should be that ubiquitous global communication flows have, available. And while volatility as a term does not over time, created an encompassing information en- share the same normative emphasis, it, too, tran- vironment that nurtures transparency and volatility scends individual instances of technology usage to as pervasive conditions and/or guiding norms. This embody a defining condition of diplomacy, devel- larger focus on the changing information environ- opment, and security. ment is intentional; it is hoped that by broadening Of course, transparency and volatility are hardly the focus beyond the narrow application of ICT, we new concepts to observers of international affairs. may emerge with nontechnocentric solutions to a Yet their salience has grown over the last decade variety of complex problems. and cannot easily be ignored. Moreover, it is easy for In focusing on transparency and volatility, the foreign policy practitioners to make misguided as- papers in this series also serve to deconstruct the sumptions about their impact—assumptions that, hype surrounding key concepts of the information if left unexamined, can lead to undesired policy out- age. For instance, entities from the World Bank to comes. With traditional international and regional the U.S. government to Bono have lauded the vir- security concerns dominating the foreign policy tues of “open data” and transparency. While these agenda, these issues have received less attention hold great promise, there is frequently a gap between Transparency and Volatility: International Relations in the Information Age 5 rhetoric and reality. Increasingly, governments, cor- crafting open covenants, secretly arrived at, then the porations, and other large institutions extoll the heightened transparency of the information age has concept of transparency in public while maintain- perhaps irreversibly damaged this secrecy. Foreign ing opaque practices. Moreover, the promise of policy is now “made in an environment of radically transparency may serve as a cover for manipulation, increased transparency, visibility and contention, deception, and misdirection. Just as “greenwashing” which will lead inevitably to struggles over message evolved in response to pressures for environmental discipline, engagement and policymaking in a more responsibility, so might “clearwashing” become a volatile world,” he says. common practice in the information age. This has both positive and negative implications. Other terms, such as “information dominance,” As Gerald Hyman points out, increased transparen- “decision advantage,” and anything beginning with cy can expose discussions of statecraft prematurely, the prefix “cyber,” are bandied about frequently in before consensus is reached or while positions are security-focused circles but are not as frequently still fluid. It can disrupt sensitive negotiations, ex- held up to scrutiny. The security-themed papers in posing the bargaining stances of any or all parties this series offer context and explanation for these in a conflict. It can also expose information, both terms and, in some cases, propose alternatives to classified and not, that can harm various interests these concepts. (such as parties to a conflict who may have agreed “Digital diplomacy” is also something of a buzz- to meet with NGOs or other neutral parties to seek word that has been quickly adopted yet poorly un- a solution). But it can also help expose hypocrisy or derstood. Much current writing on this practice double standards in policymaking, allowing a global tends to lead with technology, offering techcentric audience to hold public officials to account for the solutions to diplomatic practice while failing to ac- gap between their words and their deeds. count for the larger trends at work. Several authors Second, nonstate actors (and, more broadly, in this series go beyond the dominant narrative of global public opinion) are not merely just partici- tweeting ambassadors to more fully explain the pating but also are exerting a powerful influence ways in which transparency and volatility have al- on the practice of diplomacy. International NGOs tered the landscape of international diplomacy and can now bring attention to their agendas through to offer tangible recommendations to those engaged skillful use of media; this has the effect of placing in diplomatic practice. little-known conflicts, for example, on the global public agenda. States must become adept at quickly DIPLOMACY responding to public outcry over a growing num- ber of issues, many of which may have remained Of the three fields, diplomacy perhaps most visibly cloaked in obscurity in the past. Ironically, while in demonstrates the effects of heightened transpar- the past governments may have had a hard time jus- ency and volatility. The authors in this section point tifying engagement in such issues to their publics, out several broad trends affecting the policy and they may now be faced with the opposite dilemma. practice of diplomacy. “Cooling things down may now be at least as com- First, there is now a pervasive notion that diplo- mon as revving them up,” says Hyman. macy can and should operate out in the open. If, as Finally, the practical definition of diplomacy is David Faris notes in his paper, modern diplomacy itself changing, blending traditional diplomacy with has traditionally been defined as the practice of the subset of public diplomacy as well as aspects of 6 Shanthi Kalathil INTRODUCTION development and governance. If diplomacy is now they are yet ripe. In such fashion, transparency may increasingly conducted out in public, then engaging compromise the effectiveness of long-term diplo- credibly with multiple audiences is even more im- matic initiatives. portant. Yet even with the advent of concepts like Yet Craig Hayden argues in his paper that U.S. the U.S. State Department’s “21st Century State- policymakers should see both transparency and craft,” practitioners of diplomacy are still struggling volatility as opportunities to be seized, “in ways to understand this fusion, particularly when it comes that reflect broader transitions in the diffusion of to interacting with new actors on new platforms. In state power and the kinds of strategic arguments recent years public diplomacy has, at least on paper, that drive diplomatic objectives.” While U.S. foreign embraced dialogue rather than monologue, empha- policy is increasingly geared toward “digital diplo- sizing the “listening” role of diplomatic outposts. macy” and is shifting its attention, tools, and tactics This emphasis has now spread to the more tradi- accordingly, Hayden argues that policymakers must tional side of diplomacy, with embassies attempt- move beyond the hype to understand the new form ing to engage with multiple publics through social of ideal diplomatic engagement, which fuses tradi- media. It remains to be seen how effective state bu- tional diplomacy, public diplomacy, and strategic reaucracies are at managing this new, fused form of communication. diplomacy, since few studies have yet systematically This form of diplomatic engagement hinges on reviewed and assessed these undertakings. several working concepts for a new “social diplo- Hyman’s paper explores these and other trends, macy,” as he puts it—including persuading and en- focusing in particular on the intersection between gaging networks; understanding the once separate, diplomacy, development, and new media. The pres- now converging diplomatic functions of representa- ence of new actors, such as citizen journalists, has tion and governance; and the notion of optics, used helped elevate the agenda-setting role of the public, as a metaphor to describe the capacity of diplomatic he says, keeping highly localized conflicts higher on organizations to convene resources to solve trans- diplomatic and assistance agendas than they may national issues. This last function is particularly im- otherwise have been. These new actors have also portant, Hayden says, as the traditional role of the made it harder for autocratic governments to main- diplomat as information gatherer or source of con- tain their monopoly on information, even when textual intelligence is eroding. Rather, network-ori- they still retain extensive powers to regulate infor- ented, relation-focused diplomacy can take advan- mation flows. tage of both transparency and volatility to cultivate For democratic governments, transparency has networks and increase the sensitivity of policymak- had complex effects, Hyman notes. It “illuminates ing to interconnected constituencies. without favoritism” and may help reduce overclas- Hayden says there has long been a sense that sification of information. But it also serves to reduce conceptions of political authority and influence the ground for quiet compromise, a crucial element have changed in ways that undermine traditional of traditional diplomacy. “Deviating from hard of- foreign affairs institutions. But the descriptions ficial lines or initial principles, especially through that frequently stem from this analysis must move testing of alternative compromises, is rendered beyond uncritical, narrow, or overly optimistic as- more difficult by fear of exposure,” he says. Prema- sessments of the relationship between technology ture exposure may also spoil useful diplomatic ini- to foreign affairs, particularly if they are to prove of tiatives by opening them to public debate before value in transforming diplomatic structures. Transparency and Volatility: International Relations in the Information Age 7

David Faris, in his paper, also explores the in- reduced corruption, improved service delivery, and terplay of citizen journalism, involuntary transpar- so on. Indeed, “transparency” writ large has become ency, and policymaking in the digital age, narrowing increasingly celebrated, lauded by technocrats and the focus to recent events in the Middle East. Such Bono: “Open data and transparency will turbo- events perfectly illustrate what he calls the disap- charge ending poverty,” he said during a November pearance of the “Age of Secrecy” in favor of the “Age 2012 meeting with World Bank President Jim Yong of Sharing,” characterized in part by the pervasive Kim. use of social media by nonstate actors to collectively But what does transparency actually mean in read, annotate, and criticize government policies the development context? Generally speaking, and actions. Policies that were possible in the Age of transparency is conceptualized in two separate, Secrecy, including U.S. dealings with autocratic and if linked, ways. The first treats transparency as, es- semiauthoritarian states in the Middle East, have sentially, a normative component of accountability, become more difficult to execute in the Age of Shar- good governance, and (if relevant) democratization ing, he argues. in developing countries. In this sense, transparency Faris also notes that another, third, dimension is seen to be a desired result of programs that focus has been added to the classic “two-level games” of on building independent media, improving access foreign policy, which traditionally involve negotia- to information legislation, promoting open govern- tions between states, and again between states and ment data, and bringing civil society into the pro- their domestic constituencies. This third level is the cess of governance through participatory budgeting networked elite, who serve as an intervening vari- and other measures. A frequently cited World Bank able between state policies and mass global audi- project in Uganda, for example, sought to reduce ences. Understanding and interacting with the net- corruption in the education sector through imple- worked elite will be an essential skill set for policy menting a public expenditure tracking survey: when actors in the information age, he concludes. it was revealed that centrally allocated funds were not reaching their intended targets, the public out- DEVELOPMENT cry and push for accountability led to subsequent funds reaching their intended schools. In recent years, the linkage between good gover- Here, transparency is seen as a bottom-up phe- nance and accountability to positive development nomenon that facilitates state accountability in outcomes has grown stronger. Bilateral donors, as developing countries. It amplifies other good gov- well as multilateral organizations such as the World ernance goals: enabling government accountability, Bank and the regional development banks, have reducing corruption, improving service delivery, placed increasing emphasis on programs that sup- etc. There are several examples of grassroots initia- port good governance and democracy. In this envi- tives that have strongly and successfully advocated ronment, the concept of transparency as both a val- for transparency. Many cite the highly successful ue and a positive development outcome has gained right to information programs at the state and local a great deal of currency. level in India as proof that such transparency-related As the thinking goes, transparency is associ- initiatives can indeed demonstrate provable out- ated with a range of desired development results, comes. That said, there is still a dearth of well-doc- including (but not limited to) good governance, umented evidence regarding the success and failure empowered civil society, increased accountability, of project-level transparency ­efforts. 8 Shanthi Kalathil INTRODUCTION

The second conceptualization treats transparen- Puddephat argues, opacity in aid reinforces a disem- cy as both policy matter and evolving global norm at powering relationship between donor and recipient the donor country level. In this sense, transparency and isolates civil society from the aid process. is defined as disclosure of information by developed Why might the most developed countries be un- donor countries, particularly regarding the ways do- willing to fully embrace transparency in aid flows, nors spend money, the outcomes of that spending, despite rhetoric to the contrary? Puddephat posits and the effectiveness of their development policies. that cost could be a deterrent, as well as fear of tax- As Andrew Puddephat notes in his paper, donors payer revolt over the revelation of failed programs. can no longer simply give aid; this aid must now be “Exposing cases where aid has failed to produce re- accountable to global civil society. This change, he sults is a risk many donors aren’t willing to take,” he says, “is driven by the belief that transparency will notes. empower those in receipt of aid and reduce the risks The emergence of new donors, such as China, of corruption or misuse of resources, thereby ulti- may also have an effect on the global transparency- mately improving the quality of development.” Of- in-development agenda. These new players in the ficial donor pronouncements, including the 2008 development field may be less willing to adhere Accra Agenda for Action, call explicitly for donors to this agenda, preferring to set rules that benefit to publicly and regularly disclose information on themselves more clearly. As both Puddephat and development expenditures to enable audit by the Séverine Arsène point out, China is emerging as a recipients of that aid. In this sense of the word, major player on the development scene, but it is do- transparency facilitates a top-down sharing of infor- ing so while challenging the consensus-driven, par- mation that also promotes accountability, but this ticipatory model of development that has emerged time among donor countries regarding their devel- over the last few decades. New donors may operate opment policies. outside the establishment, traditional donor model Puddephat argues that transparency is thought which—at least on paper—supports transparency to increase the effectiveness of aid by empowering and accountability. civil society organizations to monitor aid and to en- In her paper, Arsène examines more closely the sure public awareness of aid flows. Conversely, lack role of China, particularly as relates to its involve- of transparency can undermine public confidence ment in the telecom sector in Africa. This sector in aid, in both donor and recipient countries. Es- is particularly important, she notes, as its develop- sentially, transparency does not guarantee account- ment, and related legislation, affects not just social, ability in the aid process, but the lack of it can make political, and economic development but state secu- obtaining accountability much harder. rity and sovereignty as well. Thus, even while Africa Yet, Puddephat says, despite much enthusiasm may not be China’s top priority, Chinese aid and in- and rhetoric about the benefits of this second form vestment in Africa’s telecommunications sector can of transparency, some donor countries are still un- have important knock-on effects. willing to implement transparency practices, par- In its own domestic telecom policies, China has ticularly concerning the impact of their aid projects. famously chosen to leverage ICT for economic de- Studies commissioned by the group Publish What velopment while simultaneously attempting to con- You Fund have found that aid information is often trol their political impact. Arsène points out that inaccessible, not systematically available, or hard China may choose to promote this particular model to find. In what is already an unequitable process, within Africa and that it has the capacity to do so. Transparency and Volatility: International Relations in the Information Age 9

Indeed, she uses examples such as Ethiopia, where pear chaotic, random, and unpredictable. Threats deep packet inspection can block proxy services, al- are distributed and human centered, requiring in- legedly with support from China. However, Arsène novative and nontraditional solutions. Yet national is careful to point out that not all African countries security policy has not evolved to the point where it where China has a presence have adopted such poli- can comfortably anticipate and manage, rather than cies. The difference between various country poli- react to, this state of affairs as an ongoing condition. cies seems to depend, she notes, on the level of de- The new era requires new tools and new policy velopment of ICT infrastructure and on the type of frameworks, which emphasize, for example, cred- regime, rather than on the presence of Chinese aid ible influence over coercion, participation over ex- or investment. clusion, networks over borders, and resilience over At a higher level, China may also influence the reaction. They also require viewing security as a incorporation of transparency as a value in global larger concept than war-fighting or hardware domi- governance norms for the Internet and other tech- nance, Granger and Kelly argue. nologies. China’s position on global Internet gover- In this context, cybersecurity policy could be nance is one that deemphasizes the role of nonstate the catalyst for a much-needed conversation about actors in governance (the current multistakeholder these necessary shifts. Since addressing cybersecu- model) and prioritizes the role of the state. In doing rity requires the integration of such diverse issues so, it positions itself as a representative of develop- as security, offensive capabilities, defensive capa- ing countries’ interests, says Arsène, arguing that bilities, deception, privacy, civil liberties, civic trust, multistakeholder governance gives more influence Internet freedom, and global governance, as well as to developed countries. By pushing back against this a focus on the inherently rapid rate of change (i.e., model, China is attempting to reject the increased in the quality and quantity of attacks and perpe- transparency and volatility stemming from the in- trators), it encompasses much of the complexities volvement of nonstate actors in favor of a more pre- and inherent volatility that national security policy dictable, statist model. today must address. However, the terminology it- self—the deliberate use of the throwback term “cy- SECURITY ber”—helps place cybersecurity in a box, elevating it to “a dark chaotic threat only fit for military man- Whereas the effects of heightened transparency are agement,” say Granger and Kelly. Because the termi- more readily evident in the development and diplo- nology dictates how we respond to the issue, it has macy arenas, it is its associated condition, volatil- led to a situation where many stakeholders prefer no ity, that surfaces more clearly in the security realm. action at all (or simply abrogating civilian oversight Whether in the context of cybersecurity or fragile of the issue) rather than dealing with the complex- states, volatility affects national security at the level ity of devising a policy process. of grand strategy on down. Fragile states also provide a complex testing As Sarah Granger and Lorelei Kelly point out, ground for the heightened effects of volatility on the guns vs. butter battles of the Cold War era have international security, with ICT asymmetrically been replaced by volatile, ongoing crises requiring enabling the capability of small groups of nonstate political and social solutions. While security issues actors who possess otherwise limited conventional were previously framed as linear and measured, military power, says Joseph Siegle in his paper. These with predictably scalable solutions, they now ap- groups are capable of disrupting the global system 10 Shanthi Kalathil INTRODUCTION by using technology to communicate, plan, gather of development lessons learned, the adoption of information, transfer funds, organize, and establish best practices, and the introduction of new ideas command-and-control networks from disparate that can help improve living standards. Watchdog and isolated locations around the world, he points groups can make use of heightened transparency to out. Access to ICT may also allow certain nonstate spotlight corruption, monitor elections, and help actors to effectively push certain narratives, thus improve oversight of government—all of which enabling spoilers’ capacity to undermine the legiti- enhance the efficiency and equity of government, macy of fledgling governments or provoke identity- contributing to greater stability. In fragile states and group-based violence. The security implications of some developing countries, the expansion of the in- these threats are nontrivial, as are the developmen- formation-rich environment thus presents a trade- tal consequences. off between greater short-term volatility and the Yet the flip side of the coin is also important. long-term, institutionally based benefits of transpar- While volatility may amplify the reach of violent, ency, he concludes. antisystem actors in fragile states, transparency in Finally, James Valentine and James Herlong dis- an information-rich environment also provides cuss the practical aspects of transparency and vola- important opportunities for governments and/or tility, particularly as they pertain to U.S. national prosystem actors to engage with public opinion, security strategy. In doing so, they also question the thus shaping their own narratives. Understanding significance of certain terminology used heavily in the importance of public opinion is crucial in fragile the context of U.S. military and intelligence docu- states; for instance, the greater the degree to which a ments: “information dominance” and “decision ad- government is viewed by its citizens as illegitimate, vantage.” Both terms are predicated on the idea that corrupt, or ineffective, the more susceptible it is to information and its associated technology provide instability, Siegle says. While whitewashing such is- strategic advantage in national security. Such terms, sues is no recipe for success, fledgling governments they say, misguidedly focus attention on the accu- sometimes fall victim to not being able to success- mulation of overwhelming amounts of information fully speak to their own successes. “Winning the through technological superiority. “Because of our battle for public support, then, is the linchpin for the modern degree of transparency, in the greatest para- development-security nexus in fragile states,” notes dox of the ‘information age,’ information doesn’t Siegle, “and, for this, information is a vital tool.” matter,” they argue. Siegle suggests that in the long run, greater ac- Rather than “information dominance,” the Unit- cess to information can be a force for development ed States (and other states) should be focused on and stability. In societies exposed to a diversity of what they term “cognitive dominance,” a concept information and ideas, he argues, authorities must that attempts to go beyond information dominance respond to alternative proposals and justify their by shifting the emphasis from ICT to human re- choices, theoretically leading to fewer ideologi- sources and their associated expertise. Cognitive cally driven and/or ineffective policies. Moreoever, dominance, as Valentine and Herlong define it, in- spoilers have a harder time maintaining their narra- cludes depth of useful and relevant knowledge, ex- tives in an information-rich environment, as their pertise, and experience; the ability to generate more claims can be held up to scrutiny. A vibrant infor- accurate and precise conclusions than one’s adver- mation environment can also facilitate the sharing sary; the agility to marry the right information with Transparency and Volatility: International Relations in the Information Age 11 the right expertise; the ability to protect all parts As Valentine and Herlong argue, amassing ever of this network from disruption and exploitation; greater amounts of information, or the technology and the resilience to rebound from major losses or to acquire it, no longer necessarily confers strategic catastrophes. As a test case, Valentine and Herlong ­advantage. “Where information dominance focuses examine China’s cognitive dominance in the realm on information, IT [information technology], and of cyberwarfare capabilities. They conclude that, security to create a decisional and thus competitive in this instance, China has successfully executed a advantage, cognitive dominance focuses on knowl- strategy of cognitive dominance, giving it the tools edge, people, and active resilience,” they point out. to manage increased volatility. In the same vein, adapting diplomatic institu- tions to transparency and volatility does not mean FRAMING FOREIGN POLICY IN AN ERA OF opening policymaking to the entire global public; TRANSPARENCY AND VOLATILITY as Hayden puts it, “The United States, for example, should not render its foreign policy from a social For decades, the fields of diplomacy, development, media plebiscite.” But shaping diplomatic institu- and security evolved slowly but, at their core, var- tions around an ethos of listening (which can use ied little. Now, within the space of the last several social media and other applications as a platform), years, they have become more complex, less stable, several authors argue, demonstrates credibility and and less predictable. As Gerald Hyman notes in his provides benefits to the diplomatic process by add- paper, “It is part of the work of this new era to maxi- ing insight and intelligence. mize the advantages of the new information age and Joseph Siegle notes that true impact requires to minimize its disadvantages.” reform-minded actors to effect meaningful change To do this, policymakers must acknowledge that for ordinary citizens; technological tools must be surviving in this new era requires more than apply- anchored in organizational structures that can ana- ing some kind of ICT “patch,” the way one might lyze, inform, and mobilize around key reforms and update software. This new era is not about technol- sustain the process over time. These institutional el- ogy per se but rather about applying a new lens for ements go far beyond technology and speak to the understanding international relations. resilience of the societies in which they are embed- Taken as a whole, the papers in this series give ded. rise to several broad suggestions for policymakers and practitioners of foreign policy. Transparency and volatility are inherently difficult for large bureaucracies but promise To better understand and devise solutions opportunities for innovation in statecraft for the information age, do not lead with and other areas. technology. As Craig Hayden points out, transparency and vola- Because transparency and volatility derive from the tility are not just buzzwords for ways in which the technologies that power the information age, it is field of international relations has changed. Nor are easy to assume that policy prescriptions should be they conditions that diplomats, military planners, based on ICT and its supposed impacts. But dis- and policymakers should innately fear, despite bu- cussions of “digital diplomacy,” “ICT for develop- reaucracy’s instinct to keep situations stable and ment,” or “cyberwar” sometimes miss the point. information closely held. These conditions should 12 Shanthi Kalathil INTRODUCTION be “posed in proactive terms, rather than conditions automatic, nor do they flow automatically as a by- that simply hinder strategic thinking, because they product of ubiquitous communication in the infor- ultimately impact the practical dimension of state mation age. Right to information campaigners in power: how diplomats translate foreign policy into India, for instance, did not simply depend on the workable programs and campaigns,” says Hayden. passive diffusion of technology to gain transparency Of course, translating into workable practices at the local level; it took years of hard work, paid for must be done with a considerable degree of finesse. sometimes with lives, to institute even basic access Diplomats in the Middle East will continue to play to information reforms. a key role in policymaking and mediation, says Da- Moreover, the idea of transparency as a positive vid Faris, but they must do so with newfound ap- value can be used as a shield for the powerful to hide preciation for public opinion as channeled through behind; recent surveys have critiqued a multitude the networked elite, while maintaining a degree of of countries for taking the positive step of passing caution about the representativeness of those elites. freedom of information laws but then failing to ef- Influencing the influencers will require “building fectively comply with them. With open government horizontal networks of trust and reciprocity be- data now the Next Big Thing on the transparency tween lower-level members of the hierarchy, eas- agenda, it remains to be seen how well both devel- ing restrictions on the production of content by oping and developed country governments live up government employees and diplomatic personnel, to its inherent promise. The allure of transparency and understanding that lifting barriers will lead to as a desired value may lead to “clearwashing,” or ap- the occasional embarrassment when someone says plying a veneer of transparency to business as usual. something that was unfiltered and unwelcome.” Volatility also leaves the door open for manipu- Diplomats must genuinely engage with, and lation, particularly when parts of the global public embed themselves in, local social media networks are not media literate. Siegle cites the example of in order to combat misinformation and maintain spoilers affecting narratives in fragile states, for in- the credibility of information. This does not mean stance. The information revolution has amplified using social media technologies as “high-tech soap- the reach and potential impact of global public boxes,” as Faris puts it, but to engage in genuine opinion, forcing policymakers to adjust for its po- back-and-forth dialogue with followers in their own tency. But public opinion may be a force for destabi- languages. Moreover, this back-and-forth exchange lization and chaos if it is uninformed public opinion. must take place in real time, at the speed of a typical Public information literacy, thus, is a key aspect of exchange—that is, not at Washington speed, requir- ensuring that publics are not misled or manipulated. ing time for multiple layers of approval.

While transparency and volatility can have To harness opportunities in the information positive impacts, they also may be age, states and nonstate actors alike should manipulated to suit various actors’ aims. focus on a strategy of resilience, credibility, Transparency in international affairs has a primar- and adaptability. ily positive connotation, particularly as it pertains The themes of resilience, credibility, and adaptabil- to the idea of holding the powerful to account. Yet ity resonate through many of the papers in this se- these normative aspects of transparency are not ries. Taken together, they form the crux of a proac- Transparency and Volatility: International Relations in the Information Age 13 tive approach to the challenges and opportunities of exactly what they want to hear; rather, it may be transparency and volatility. exemplified by in-depth engagement and a clear ex- Resilient societies, say several authors, are well planation of positions as well as adopting the ethos placed to respond to the volatile shocks of the in- of listening recommended by many of our paper formation age. Resilience is already exemplified by authors. This ethic, says Craig Hayden, does not a variety of institutions, say Granger and Kelly, from mean foreign policy practitioners should abandon redundant data storage to distributed power grids to the self-interested aspect of their strategic calculus strong community identity. While hierarchical gov- or completely disavow the power politics of previ- ernments and bureaucratic structures have limited ous eras. At its crux, credibility reflects the acknowl- flexibility, even they can understand that it is easier, edgement that publics are key to diplomatic success. and less costly, to manage risk than it is to manage Adaptability is the value perhaps most inherent- crisis. Resilience, therefore, is not just an ideal op- ly linked to the technologies that characterize the in- tion but also a sensible (and cost-effective) one. formation age, but its adoption in policy structures State engagement with nonstate actors is an im- is not as easy as simply using a new technology. Na- portant part of resiliency: The depth of civil society tional security and other bureaucracies accustomed networks has been shown to be a key predictor of to rules and procedures that have existed for time resilience and the success of democratic transitions, immemorial (and that presumably were created for Siegle notes. Stiff, hierarchical, nonparticipatory or- good reasons) will not easily transform into flexible, ganizations or institutions are likely to find it more easily morphing structures. Yet, as Granger and Kel- difficult to cope with unpredictability or exposure. ly point out, in this era “threats will be diverse and The concept of resilience in diplomacy, devel- dispersed; therefore, the capability to respond must opment, and security is already taking root in vari- follow suit.” Wholesale bureaucratic change is diffi- ous institutions. The U.S. Agency for International cult, perhaps impossible; but efforts such as the U.S. Development (USAID), for instance, recently State Department’s 21st Century Statecraft reflect a launched a “resilience agenda,” defining resilience willingness to adapt that should be lauded, even if as “the ability of people, households, communities, the practice sometimes falls short. countries, and systems to mitigate, adapt to and re- Ultimately, this series seeks to spark better and cover from shocks and stresses in a manner that re- further understanding of the changing face of inter- duces chronic vulnerability and facilitates inclusive national affairs in the information age. This includes growth.”1 ensuring that analysis is not confined to an echo Credibility, particularly in the realm of diplo- chamber of communications scholars or technol- macy, has always been the coin of the realm; now, in ogy adherents. The papers presented here make the an era of competing voices, narratives, and loyalties, case that transparency and volatility characterize it is crucial. Heightened transparency, of course, both the present and foreseeable future of interna- means that credibility is ever more difficult to fake. tional affairs. Understanding the relevance of these Credibility does not mean telling various audiences conditions should be considered foundational for any scholars, analysts, and policymakers concerned with international affairs today. 1. USAID, “The Resilience Agenda” (Washington, DC: 2012). http://transition.usaid.gov/resilience/Re- silienceAgenda2Pager.pdf.

Diplomacy in the Information Age

Social Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, and Network Power Craig Hayden

INTRODUCTION a “convener” to cultivate domestic and international networks. What are the consequences of a social turn in U.S. Diplomatic practice, driven in part by the cul- diplomacy—in terms of policy, practice, and gover- tural and social consequences of ubiquitous com- nance? What is the source of this transformation? munication technology, is transforming as a result There is no shortage of sensationalist claims about of this crucial context. But technology is more than how technology has brought about a “digital diplo- a tool—it carries socially constructed values, proce- macy,” claims that are also met with strident skepti- dures, and expectations that are as much an affor- cism.1 At the risk of some controversy, however, it dance of the technology as they are a reflection of is reasonable to argue that the social consequences the world they help create. Transparency and vola- of new media technologies have indeed resulted in tility are two aspects of technological transforma- tectonic shifts in the attention, tools, and tactics of tion that impact diplomacy. U.S. diplomacy. The purpose of this paper is to unpack two con- One way to understand this change is in the cepts, transparency and volatility, as technologically anticipated strategic audiences and interlocutors derived conditions that impact the conceptualiza- for U.S. diplomacy—and how this transforms the tion and implementation of U.S. diplomatic prac- expected scope of impact. For example, according tice. It presents these concepts as conditions that to Anne-Marie Slaughter, the former State Depart- can be realized as opportunities to be seized in ways ment director for Policy Planning, U.S. foreign pol- that reflect broader transitions in the diffusion of icy is building structures that may not be visible for state power and the kinds of strategic arguments some time. Speaking to the UK (United Kingdom) that drive diplomatic objectives. This paper draws Parliament in 2012, Slaughter argued that the big- upon speeches, policy statements, and initiatives gest development in foreign affairs is the rise of soci- conducted by the U.S. government to assemble eties as agents in the international system.2 U.S. for- a working understanding about how the United eign policy, therefore, is increasingly geared toward States has recognized the requirements of interna- “seeing” a country as both a government and a pub- tional influence and is attempting to reconfigure- ex lic, while at the same time leveraging connections as isting institutions to adapt to pressing demands of

17 18 Craig Hayden DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE transparency and volatility. The paper also explores ity.8 If transparency engenders volatility, can these how these efforts reflect more global trends in the two interrelated contexts be managed effectively by shifting burdens of diplomatic practices. diplomacy—the nuts-and-bolts infrastructure of in- Strategic statements calling on the United States ternational relations?9 to leverage social media and network-centric plat- Neither of these concepts are necessarily new to forms to facilitate or convene as an ideal form of how U.S. policymakers and scholars understand the diplomatic engagement also begin to illustrate the practice of international statecraft and its relation to fusion of diplomacy, public diplomacy, and strategic information technologies.10 Foreign policy analysts communication.3 The objective is to critically assess and political communication scholars have long appeals to terms like “networks” and new forms of been aware that transparency has at the very least “power” in order to move beyond hype while distill- impacted the conditions of foreign policymaking.11 ing the more durable implications of a technolog- But transparency has a broader conceptual im- ical-charged diplomacy. In other words, this is an plication for policymakers and practitioners. Trans- attempt to clarify how U.S. diplomatic practitioners parency as a strategic concern renders state actions “grasp the obvious” at the intersection of technol- as always already available for public consumption: ogy, culture, and diplomacy.4 It is not just a problem for policymakers; it is built into the context of doing international politics.12 TRANSPARENCY AND VOLATILITY: Rather than consider transparency as a hindrance to FROM CONTEXT TO PRACTICE information sovereignty—such as in the case of the U.S. response to the Wikileaks controversy—trans- Transparency and volatility reflect pressing con- parency also signals opportunity in the practice of ditions that define the practice of contemporary statecraft and the formulation of foreign policy. diplomacy and international relations.5 They have Understanding how transparency is an opportu- become salient given the ubiquity of global com- nity involves understanding how transparency has munication flows, the empowering potential of new transformed what international “actors” (from indi- and social media technologies, and the preponder- viduals to networks to states), actually do with com- ance of nonstate actors that work to both hinder munication tools as much the social and cultural and enable the actions of states.6 Transparency and expectations that are now tied to such media tech- volatility are also increasingly inextricable concepts nologies.13 When these technologies begin to ac- tied to technology. Transparency is facilitated by crue meaning—such as the relation between social the same technologies that promote instability, risk, media and democratic organizing or sousveillance, and uncertainty in the business of international re- the capacity of transparency becomes freighted lations. Transparency as a context works to invite with potential and purpose. Transparency becomes more actors into the fold of international affairs— an ethic for the practice of international communi- but not through the well-worn habits and traditions cation. It is not simply an ingredient for legitimacy of diplomatic actors. in democratic politics, but it is a value that is funda- The pluralization of international relations mental to the everyday significance of communica- means that more actors matter and that these ac- tion technologies around the world. tors have agency in ways that are not conditioned by Opportunity begins with the social role that the “rules” of international politics.7 In other words, transparency plays in conditioning credibility and transparency creates an element of risk and volatil- legitimacy.14 It is not so much that transparency puts Social Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, and Network Power 19 information “out there.” Transparency inculcates a applicable to the tumultuous social and political shared value that information should be available— changes witnessed abroad and at home. Transpar- where communication is a value for its own sake.15 ency is a crucial context for global influence and also Transparency can be a kind of social power, a norm a means to devise programs and tactics that build off or value that conditions how other states therefore the ethic of transparency through public diplomacy must act.16 Transparency as a policy guidance is al- and programs of 21st Century Statecraft. Volatility ready embedded in the universalizing ethos of the reflects the uncertainty in how traditional instru- U.S. “Freedom to Connect” agenda and on display ments and strategies continue to apply to foreign through U.S. ambassadors aggressively utilizing the policy. These terms are posed in proactive terms, potential of social media platforms to connect with rather than in conditions that simply hinder stra- their constituencies.17 The currency of transparency tegic thinking, because they ultimately impact the as a value forces hard choices for practitioners, es- practical dimension of state power—how diplomats pecially in the aftermath of U.S. resistance to the translate foreign policy into workable programs and Wikileaks distribution of diplomatic cables. campaigns. Volatility is commonly understood as a descrip- tion of the international political climate that impli- MAKING SENSE OF THE cates the unpredictability of previously stable rela- DIFFUSION OF POWER tions among and within states. Yet it is not enough to say that foreign policy practitioners must con- What does an ambiguous term like “power” have to tend with a context radically changed by new media do with transparency and volatility in international technology.18 Certainly, the way in which practitio- affairs? Much has been said about the way in which ners do their jobs is impacted by communication “power” is now diffused.19 Indeed, the capacity to technologies that shorten decision-making cycles, get other actors to do something appears trans- increase the range of stakeholders, and heighten vis- formed in radical ways, especially when ideas like ibility. Yet volatility also implies the difficulty of -re “collaborative power” seem to indicate that power liable prediction; models and narratives that guide may increasingly be less about “power over” than the practice of statecraft are increasingly unreliable. “power with.” Former Undersecretary of State for Volatility, likewise, suggests that the “art of the pos- Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Judith McHale sible” in conducting foreign policy must adapt. described power as fundamentally transformed, This paper proposes that volatility is more than where the “bottom of the pyramid”—citizens, trans- an assessment of the political landscape. It is also an national advocates, and civil society has overturned institutional condition that compels planners and dictators and fomented rapid political change.20 policymakers to reconsider the traditional compo- Alec Ross, the U.S. special advisor for technology to nents of international statecraft: diplomacy, devel- the secretary of State speaks of a “post-Westphalian” opment, and the broader constellation of units that system that is defined by a “massive shift in geo-po- execute U.S. foreign policy. litical power taking place globally.”21 Ross bases his Transparency and volatility are not just buzz- dramatic assessment about system volatility on the words for ways in which international politics has prevalence of “hyper-transparency”—a distinctly changed. Rather, we should consider these terms techcentric view. as pivot points in the way the United States recog- From Joseph Nye’s pronouncements about pow- nizes its own institutional resources as useful or er “diffusion” to the compelling narratives of the 20 Craig Hayden DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

Arab Spring there is a palpable sense that concep- gies are just new tools for old purposes. Especially tions of political authority and influence have irre- when so much of the academic literature appears to vocably changed in ways that undermine traditional rehash arguments about the diminished power of institutions of foreign affairs. This change is very nation-states, how might we look to diplomacy as a often described as a direct consequence of infor- source of innovation in both the strategy of state- mation and communication technologies (ICTs).22 craft as much as the tools that define diplomatic -ac But these depictions need to be unpacked to assess tion?28 why such technologies are so transformative in ways It is suggested here that we pause to consider that are available (or not) to policy planners and the consequences of the “terministic compulsion” practitioners in order to move beyond uncritical, to carry out the implications of talk about new and narrow, or overtly optimistic assessments of the re- social media technologies.29 New social media tech- lationship of technology to foreign affairs.23 Behind nologies are used in relation-building, in storytell- the high-profile stories of transnational nonstate ing, and as modes of alternative political expres- actors and civil society networks lies the uncertain- sion, yet what are the institutional transformations ties of those public servants and policyplanners that emerging in the wake of these practices? If credibil- still represent state actors. Do new, so-called “dis- ity and legitimacy are the currency of soft power, ruptive” technologies facilitate conversations and then understanding the social dimension of the organize foreign policy resources in ways that were networks enabled by ICTs is crucial to the practice previously unavailable?24 of statecraft. At the same time, the social dimension One way to address this question is to argue of these technologies transforms the institutions of that the business of statecraft is increasingly carried diplomacy that are busily adapting to new contexts. out through technological platforms. Tools are re- Getting past the hype surrounding new and social defining tasks and perhaps even purpose. As Sena- media technologies means identifying the connec- tor Richard Lugar claimed in 2010, new and social tions between technology, volatility, and transpar- media technologies have the capacity to reach audi- ency in ways that can be translated into workable ences crucial to U.S. foreign policy objectives and policy and practice solutions that signal real insti- provide solutions to pressing problems such as de- tutional change. mocracy promotion and counterterrorism. These kinds of arguments, however, suggest a strong con- WORKING CONCEPTS FOR A vergence between the imperatives of public diplo- SOCIAL DIPLOMACY macy and that of “traditional” diplomacy.25 This is plainly evident in the 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy This paper hinges on some conceptual observations and Development Review (QDDR), which situates in order to make broader arguments about how the objectives of U.S. diplomacy with the mandate U.S. diplomatic practice is changing. The follow- for an ambiguously articulated notion of “engage- ing section explains these concepts and how they ment.”26 work to help understand the kinds of big, “struc- Part of the explanation for this lies in how com- tural” changes at work behind U.S. diplomatic in- munication is understood as relevant to politics in stitutions. It provides a provisional “vocabulary” these kinds of important strategic statements.27 If in order to make arguments about how diplomatic the business of statecraft is merelyrepresenting a institutions may have changed under conditions of nation-state’s interest, then new media technolo- transparency and volatility. Social Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, and Network Power 21

Transparency requires states to recognize net- and commonsense, and it is important for nation- works, the fundamental unit of social organization states to recognize the durability of these proper- underneath and above the nation-state, as the “tar- ties. David Grewal points to ideas and practices that get” of policy-making and partnerships to achieve become “powerful” because they propagate across ends.30 Why? Because networks are a social struc- networks and become difficult to dislodge, like the ture that most readily carries out the business of pervasiveness of the English language as a global politics.31 This position is hardly new, but it requires lingua franca.36 When thinking about influence, a reorientation to a polylateral view on getting state- healthy understanding of networks as a social shape craft accomplished.32 Networks are significant to is important. the workings of transparency, because we can wit- For example, statecraft may not be about finding ness the diffusion and propagation associated with the key influencers but about identifying bound- transparency as a network effect. A transnational, ary spanners and those on the “fringe” of networks cascading spread of information or its terminus in that can propagate change. This means thinking enclaves of interest is the property of network rela- about the relations and communication practices tions. But networks are more than just “maps” of that make publics cohere as publics. For example, relations. They are imbued with qualities that reflect this might mean paying attention to where certain the effect of those relations—shared ideas, norms, groups or individuals serve to connect different in- and values. terest or identity-based groups as opposed to placing Persuading and Engaging Networks. How states overt emphasis on opinion leadership. Anne-Marie can engage networks to change their actions or at- Slaughter’s argument is to focus on societies—to titudes relies on two principal starting positions: cultivate publics rather than seek out specific influ- influence through credibility (the reality of social encers. Slaughter quotes former Secretary of State power) and the impact of relational structure. Net- George Schultz in her 2012 UK speech, to describe works—whether they be extremist organizations, the business of diplomacy as “gardening”—to grow domestic political coalitions, or transnational advo- “confidence” and “understanding” through relation- cacy groups—are defined in part by shared norms, building activities, providing means for foreign au- values, and objectives. They are, in network theorist diences to communicate among themselves and to Manuel Castells’s term, programmed with these con- build identification with the United States through cepts that serve to both direct action and to define everyday symbolic connections, such as U.S. Am- identity within the network.33 Understanding how bassador to New Zealand David Heubner spending networks police, motivate, and coordinate them- 20 percent of his workweek tweeting about matters selves is a key step toward understanding the con- unrelated to U.S. foreign policy.37 Yet it is unclear textual requirements of engagement rather than es- whether adaptation to social media has clearly dem- tablishing a better message or market segmentation. onstrated success for diplomats, as the controversial There are no magic bullets for diplomatic messaging communications of U.S. Ambassador Michael Mc- through networks.34 Faul appear to suggest, or the long-term impacts of It is one thing to suggest that there will be more the State Department’s Digital Outreach Teams on “networks” than treaties in the future of U.S. diplo- critical arguments about the United States online.38 macy.35 It is quite another to suggest the practical But this kind of facilitative turn toward a socially implications for what that means. Networks have focused diplomacy required institutional adapta- the structural effect of legitimizing shared beliefs tion. The change has been anticipated for some 22 Craig Hayden DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE time. After the rapid growth of the Internet in the through the capacity of diplomats to convene a va- 1990s, emerging implications of the technology to riety of international stakeholders. The point here is shape social relations and change communication not simply to reiterate the relevance of “multilater- practice provoked speculation among U.S. critics alism.” Rather, it is to suggest that diplomats are ac- that the institution of diplomacy needed to change. tively brokering governance decisions that circum- Jamie Metzl, a key public diplomacy advisor during vent traditional sovereign boundaries. the Clinton administration, argued in 2001 that this Optics. The notion of “optics” in this case is a emergent context required a fundamental rethink- metaphor to describe the unique capacity of diplo- ing of diplomatic practice. “Because the conceptual matic organizations to convene or marshal resources space of a network is global and does not fully re- to solve transnational issues. The idea of optic turns spect traditional boundaries, preparing individuals the traditional concerns of information sovereignty to engage in this space requires both conceptual and on its head. Instead of states pursuing “markets for organizational change,” according to Metzl.39 For loyalty” through management of media spaces, the Metzl, diplomacy as a set of rules, practices, and tra- transparent information environment can be a tool ditions needed to adapt. While adaptation appears for statecraft and not a liability. Alec Ross describes evident in recent U.S. practices and programs, it is this convening power as central to the way in which less obvious that this facilitative turn has yielded fa- diplomats can add value.41 For Ross, diplomats can vorable policy outcomes. match technology developers with civil society ac- Representation versus Governance. Diplomatic tors or otherwise “local” experts who have intimate adaptation is forged both in practice and at the level knowledge of issues that need attention. of purpose. Diplomacy is classically understood as The idea of diplomacy as optic comes at an im- a political institution charged with managing rela- portant time. Sarah Wynn-Williams, an advisor to tions between peoples who choose to live apart.40 Facebook, argues that the traditional role of the Traditionally, this is conceived as “representation.” diplomat as information gatherer or source of con- Diplomats mediate relations between states. The textual intelligence is rapidly eroding.42 The trans- idea of representation gets more complicated, how- parency afforded by information technologies like ever, when ambassadors engage in social media- social media render this historical role as increas- based diplomacy—where the constituency is ex- ingly out of place. Diplomacy has indeed been con- panded and transparency is a tool. This is diplomacy cerned with identifying key influencers and points in public. of leverage, but the idea of optic is intended to de- But increasingly, diplomacy scholars have noted scribe prescriptively how a network-oriented, rela- that diplomatic practice has expanded beyond the tion-focused diplomacy can seize the prospects of sphere of representation and has come to take on transparency to identify and cultivate networks that the burdens of governance. For example, around can add the sensitivity of policy-making to increas- the world ambassadors are now posted to specific ingly interconnected constituencies. issues as well as to sovereign nation-states. In the What does this mean in practice? Diplomacy case of the Untied States, they are also embedded can leverage the resources of foreign ministries in military operations to manage and facilitate state- to become involved, to cultivate, and to empower building operations. As the notion of “21st Century international development, advocacy networks, Statecraft” reveals, U.S. diplomacy is increasingly and issue-defined organizations that are more about facilitating relations and providing solutions ­intimately engaged in knowing about these interna- Social Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, and Network Power 23 tional ­issues. Diplomacy in a facilitative mode can understand the nature of the actors involved. function as an open source clearinghouse for what The term “actors” can mean a lot of things in Joseph Nye calls “contextual intelligence.”43 The academic and policy-oriented treatments of inter- following sections talk more in-depth about what national affairs. They are states, but they are also these concepts mean in practice. nonstate actors, such as terrorist organizations, civil society groups, nongovernmental organizations WHERE THE CHANGE IS HAPPENING (NGOs), transnational advocacy networks, celeb- rities, and so on. Actors may also be considered One of the key assumptions argued here is that communities built on physical or virtual infrastruc- diplomatic institutions—the norms, routines, and tures—that are oriented as temporary coalitions or other kinds of organizational frames that shape how collaborations to achieve a particular end. As politi- diplomatic practitioners and policymakers engage cal communication scholar Lance Bennett observed in their work—require some rethinking. The inten- nearly a decade ago, the technological context for tion is not to say that “everything is now different,” social action removes a variety of barriers to entry as diplomatic institutions have historically been de- to become involved, whether as a dedicated inter- fined by the inertia of past practice.44 Yet it is impor- national activist or a casual slactivist demonstrating tant to recognize that diplomacy is an “infrastruc- support through “likes” on Facebook.49 “Actors” can ture” of the larger field of international relations and assemble relatively quickly. not an isolated community of practice.45 Diplomacy For diplomatic practitioners, the problem is is not divorced from other social and cultural insti- that planning policies and programs around actors tutions or developments—like globalization. We is increasingly difficult, because actors are not as cannot assume that the historically conservative rigidly defined by specific kinds of political agency. and insulated practice of diplomacy is otherwise Political communication scholar Andrew Chadwick immune to technology-driven changes happen- demonstrated that there are “network repertoires” ing in culture, identity, and politics.46 This section shared across social movement participants, politi- explores how particular aspects of diplomacy as an cal campaigners, and other kinds of online organiz- institution have changed and what this means in ers that do not fit neatly into a historical catalog practice. of what these actors do.50 The dramatic success of Oscar Morales in organizing the “1 Million Voices Actors against the FARC [Fuerzas Armadas Revoluciona- One of the problems with trying to parse the lan- rias de Colombia–Revolutionary Armed Forces of guage of recent, vivid caricatures of international Colombia]” campaign is one of many illustrations affairs is that it is not always clear about the impacts of how the labor of political power gets diffused and of the sweeping abstractions involved. While the distributed. Put another way, we cannot just pay Arab Spring has rightly captured attention as an in- attention to roles assigned to actors, but also to ac- dication of a power shift, the legacies of movement tions and behaviors. International actorhood is no politics empowered by new, network-organizing longer a stable category. forms have been around for some time.47 At the same time, however, it is not necessarily prudent for Behaviors policymakers to dismiss technology evangelists for Public diplomacy scholar Robert Kelley’s discus- naïve optimism.48 To begin with, it is important to sion of “evolution” in diplomatic affairs settles on 24 Craig Hayden DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE this very point. Rather than talking about how the at once collaborative and inherently credible.56 For- categorical concept of diplomacy or nation-states eign policy “solutions” in this view are best reached has changed, we should be focused on how particu- when they are not the product of hierarchical deci- lar practices associated with diplomacy are becom- sionmakers, but rather the provisional consensus of ing visible among decidedly nondiplomatic actors, stakeholders invested in the issue at hand. The early be they citizen diplomats, journalists, human rights involvement of civil society organizations in the workers, or cyber-activists.51 The diffusion of diplo- World Summit on the Information Society confer- macy is a symptom of a larger social and technologi- ences demonstrate this more expansive and inclu- cal context. This diffusion, however, need not be a sive process for global governance, but Fisher ex- negative development but rather a broader recogni- tends the argument to suggest that influence among tion that diplomacy is a practice that encompasses the stakeholders necessitates collaboration from the social relations as much as political ones. ground up. As diplomacy scholar Geoff Wiseman argues, di- Fisher’s take on diplomacy shares some con- plomacy cannot be discounted in whatever form of ceptual terrain with the “participatory” trend in “new” diplomacy is devised to deal with the social international development.57 The distinction Fisher media revolution and the rise of networked-based, offers, however, is at the level of influence strategy. transnational political actors.52 Scandinavian dip- To deal with the effective “hyper-transparency” of a lomats seized on the potential of the Second Life networked world, foreign policy should look to the virtual worlds platform for public diplomacy well potential of crowdsourcing. This is not to say that ahead of other larger institutional actors.53 More- time-worn, strategic arguments for foreign policy over, the South Korean government has encouraged are no longer relevant. The United States, for exam- an innovative arrangement of public/private part- ple, should not render its foreign policy from a social nerships to cultivate foreign policy objectives that media plebiscite. Rather, the limited resources of are not firewalled within traditional foreign policy nation-states to manage their interdependent policy institutions.54 In addition, the United States is work- obligations to deal with concerns that are increas- ing to facilitate collaborative encounters between ingly transnational require both tools and strategies civil society and technological developers. The dip- that are equally inclusive. Security dilemmas still lomatic objectives of agenda setting, representation, exist, but their success increasingly involves a wider and mediation are, in this sense, increasingly diffuse net of actors committed to shared purposes. and distributed. Shaping your diplomatic institutions around To that end, public diplomacy scholar Ali Fisher an ethic of “listening” symbolically demonstrates has written extensively on how insights from social credibility to foreign constituencies but also invites networking analysis and marketing techniques that perspectives, insight, and intelligence in the crafting aggregate individual experiences can effectively of better policy. Fisher describes an “open source” transform the hierarchical nature of power in tradi- diplomacy as a more viable route to influence given tional statecraft. For Fisher, organizations like Ama- the nature of how publics already communicate zon and Ebay are examples of how an asymmetrical- and relate around subjects of mutual interest and ly powerful actor can accrue influence (or power) identity.58 But this paper also contends that an open based on building communities.55 Fisher draws source optic is just as crucial—a sensory capacity to from the “open source” movement in technology forge a better, more informed policy calculus. This development to suggest a model for statecraft that is kind of “engagement” can cultivate the power to Social Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, and Network Power 25 know and anticipate latent issues and emergent cri- ment of technology with policy is most evident in ses. the “Freedom to Connect” agenda advocated by Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, where a Conceptual Tools narrative of technological empowerment animates a What does this look like in practice? The United significant new direction in U.S. foreign policy and States has piloted this perspective through the so- programs to facilitate the spread of so-called delib- called “21st Century Statecraft” concept. This con- erative technologies.60 cept is based on facilitating linkages between or- Communication scholars Shawn Powers and ganizations that recognize problems or issues with Will Youmans have argued that a public diplomacy technology and knowledge providers that can work based on providing so-called “deliberative technol- to address these issues, such as empowering wom- ogies” illustrates the potential of leveraging tech- an, improving democratic practice, and leveraging nologies of transparency. Specifically, they propose technological tools for development and conflict that international broadcasters can provide techno- prevention. logical platforms to encourage the development of This orientation towardfacilitation as an opera- democratic institutions within failed states—a key tive term for statecraft (both in public diplomacy context for U.S. foreign policy objectives. Rather and traditional diplomacy) can be seen in the earlier than subsidizing information, this form of public writings of Anne-Marie Slaughter and in the work diplomacy would subsidize “deliberative develop- of British diplomacy scholar Brian Hocking, which ment.”61 The idea extends the domain of diplomacy emphasize the capacity of networks to accomplish into the realm of social practice. They hold up the diplomatic objectives and act as stakeholders in Voice of America pilot project “Middle East Voices” their own right.59 In straightforward terms, net- and the Al-Jazeera “Somali Speaks” projects as de- works are the most relevant actors that diplomatic monstrative of this concept. agencies must deal with—as much as they are part- Similarly, Steven Livingston’s work on the ca- ners to getting the business of diplomacy accom- pacity of new media technologies to sustain a new plished. Hence the shift to a moresocial diplomacy. form of the CNN Effect directly addresses the dif- But what is the “business” of a new social diplo- fusion of statecraft.62 Livingston argues that the rise macy? of geospatial social media technologies—like the A common observation among diplomacy com- crisis-mapping Ushahidi mobile phone platform— mentators is that transparency is the irrevocable signals the diffusion of governance. These kinds of context for practice and that this is a constraint on surveillance technologies provide both a constraint what diplomats can do. What is less obvious is how (publics can be forged around the monitoring of a transparency can be a tool for statecraft. Assuming state’s activities) as well an opportunity to empow- transparency as an asset, however, suggests there is er publics and cultivate long-term relations—the something different about statecraft than the (often “gardening” that Slaughter implies in her society- secretive) preservation of agreements and interstate focused diplomacy. relations that secure state interests. Transparency But perhaps the clearest statement that impli- can be an end in itself—such as the strategy embod- cates the intersection of technology with foreign ied in the so-called “Freedom to Connect” agenda. policy is in official U.S. arguments about strategic But an Internet freedom agenda is closely shaped by communication. Such a direct connection between an ethic derived from the technology. The entangle- technology and foreign policy thinking is plainly 26 Craig Hayden DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE evident in the following excerpt from the 2012 Up- messages. Snipe’s comments highlighted the social date to Congress on [the] National Framework for context of the technology that ultimately affects the Strategic Communication: modes and ethics of the communication. Rachel Graaf Leslie, likewise, noted the struggle Events of the past 2 years have only reinforced to use social media as a means to recognize and the importance of public diplomacy and strate- counter misinformation in Bahrain during its politi- gic communications in advancing U.S. interests. cal uprising in 2011.65 Her experience highlighted The continued rapid evolution of global com- the way in which the technological platform, along munications is creating a landscape where our with what users “do” with its communication ca- ability to engage and communicate with actors pacities, is not easily controlled, curated, or subject across societies is essential. The development to verification. She noted that the social media sites of new media platforms is empowering global provided by the United States were appropriated as populations to reach out and communicate with a tool for conflict by social groups within Bahrain. others in ways they could not just a few years This illustrates the risks inherent in the long game ago, and social and political movements are be- of Anne-Marie Slaughter’s focus on convening and coming savvier at mobilizing constituencies.63 providing fora for communication. Social media technologies are increasingly inex- These brief examples, however, describe the tricable from strategic formulations about U.S. for- way in which public diplomacy has adapted to the eign policy, its methods, and its objectives. This has context of transparency and volatility. The no- also sparked innovation and organizational learning tion of “21st Century Statecraft” provides a policy at the level of practice—the diplomatic post. template that invites analysis of how technology is In a 2011 conference on best practices in public integrated into translating strategy into practice. diplomacy at the George Washington University, U.S. foreign service officers shared their experiences in trying to cope with the potential of new and social 21ST CENTURY STATECRAFT AND media technologies, along with their evolving man- [PUBLIC] DIPLOMACY date to conduct diplomacy for the United States. Public diplomacy officer Aaron Snipe described the The idea of 21st Century Statecraft is based on an challenge of trying to use the U.S. embassy Face- expansive, polylateral view of diplomacy, where a book page in Baghdad.64 After the embassy staff multitude of nonstate actors are enabled by network adapted their practices toward speaking in the local technologies. The concept’s principal evangelist language and reorienting content toward what the at the U.S. State Department was Alec Ross, then audience found useful and interesting, they noted senior advisor to former Secretary of State Hillary a significant change in the attention they received Clinton. Ross describes 21st Century Statecraft as from the Iraqi public as well as the kind of commen- an “agenda” that “complements traditional foreign tary and feedback. policy tools with newly innovated and adapted in- Snipe described this as a fundamental “con- struments that fully leverage the networks, technol- cept shift” in the way diplomats communicate with ogies, and demographics of our networked world.”66 publics. Snipe argued that change was necessary Such new diplomatic methods are deemed nec- in “how we communicate”—rather than having a essary because, as Ross declares, “the very clear better means of dissemination and transmission of evidence of recent years demonstrates that network Social Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, and Network Power 27 technologies devolve power away from nation-state known as the Virtual Student Foreign Service, col- and large institutions.” While the 21st Century laborative events such as the Tech@State series Statecraft idea attempts to capture a range of prob- of conferences that draw together technology de- lems and issues that U.S. diplomacy must confront, velopers and other nonstate actors, the Apps for the concept is hard to separate from its technologi- Africa competition to develop mobile technology cal underpinnings. As the QDDR states, “Technolo- solutions for regional development, and other ini- gies are the platform for the communications, col- tiatives to promote women and mobile finance so- laboration, and commerce of the 21st century. More lutions in developing countries.70 Twenty-first Cen- importantly, they are connecting people to people, tury Statecraft has been manifested as foreign policy to knowledge, and to global networks.”67 Twenty- through the Freedom to Connect agenda, in which first century statecraft is an inclusive attitude to- the United States promotes open access to the so- ward technology that sees it both as policy tool and cial, political, and economic benefits of information policy itself. technology.71 What is the purview of diplomacy under this Interestingly, Ross has demurred on the subject agenda? The business of U.S. statecraft is increas- of public diplomacy and its relation to 21st Century ingly one of orchestrating and facilitating policy so- Statecraft. During a presentation in 2012, Ross ar- lutions made possible through technology. Accord- gued that 21st Century Statecraft should not be ing to Ross, a “growing ecosystem of technology equated with public diplomacy. Rather, he offered and developers” can be leveraged to achieve policy that traditional public diplomacy “doesn’t work in gains.68 Social media and the social networks they the digital age.”72 Ross’s perspective on public diplo- foster function to direct diplomatic attention and macy appears grounded in a more traditional and drive the coordination of services and governance. historical view of public diplomacy as propaganda Ross argues that the United States can look to “civil and monological, persuasion-oriented communica- society to identify pressing problems, and then tion. match these actors with technologists to develop Instead of public diplomacy, Ross suggests that solutions.”69 diplomacy can benefit from creating dialogue with To justify his claims, Ross paints a sweeping nontraditional interlocutors and should focus on portrait of a world transformed in which U.S. di- ways to “bring people in.” An engagement strategy plomacy must operate. Technology has accelerated based solely on public diplomacy cannot work in movement-making, as evidenced by the use of so- the wake of the “shocking” and “disappointing” con- cial media tools for political change. The informa- sequences of the Iraq War for the U.S. brand. “We tion environment is also disrupted by such technol- can do all the communications we want,” he argues, ogy to destabilize the centrality of state actors in but “actions speak louder than words.”73 Yet it is using information technology to manage the inter- clear that the mandate of 21st Century Statecraft to national environment. The United States must con- connect and build relationships across a variety of tend with the “hyper-transparency” of networked foreign stakeholders shares many aspects with what politics that transgresses entrenched political hier- scholars and practitioners understand as the “new” archies and state borders. public diplomacy.74 This conceptual convergence Some high profile efforts of 21st Century State- of diplomacy and public diplomacy shares a good craft include the recruitment of university students deal with the kind of social diplomacy argued for to aid in new media efforts of the State Department by Slaughter and is exemplified by how Secretary 28 Craig Hayden DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

­Clinton describes the mission of U.S. diplomacy af- the perceived limits of state power and, likewise, the ter the QDDR: relations that must be leveraged to accomplish for- eign policy objectives. Arguments for a 21st Centu- [T]he department is broadening the way it ry Statecraft are mostly a context-driven assessment conceives of diplomacy as well as the roles and of what states can no longer do with impunity. The responsibilities of its practitioners. . . . But in- technologists’ argument for facilitation and conven- creasing global interconnectedness now neces- ing power creates the warrant for thinking about sitates reaching beyond governments to citizens diplomacy as engagement, an expanded purview of directly and broadening the U.S. foreign policy governance as much as representation. The QDDR, portfolio to include issues once confined to the for example, is grounded in an idealized vision of domestic sphere, such as economic and environ- engagement that pushes the boundaries of diploma- mental regulation, drugs and disease, organized cy to manage complex transnational concerns and crime, and world hunger.75 coordinate a diversity of nonstate actors. On the surface, this depiction suggests a trans- While commentators like David Rieff find this formative moment in diplomacy as an institution, strategic template to be overly ambitious, the real which transcends the question of whether this is unresolved issue may simply be that diplomacy is about technology. Indeed, Clinton’s broader argu- not always about engagement.78 Diplomacy is also ments share similar claims with Condoleezza Rice’s about secrecy and stability. However, transparency “Transformational Diplomacy.”76 Yet spokespeople and volatility seem to animate the rhetoric of Ross’s such as Ross nevertheless frame their pronounce- arguments and, indeed, provide a basis for the call ments as inevitably tied to the implications of to arms in the language of the QDDR—to valorize technology. For some skeptics, this rhetoric is too the opportunities, risks, and institutional change in celebratory of technology as a tool and policy ob- diplomatic practice. jective. Evgeny Morozov argues that “Twitter won’t make any of those pesky non-digital issues simply CONCLUSION go away.” 77 Morozov doubts whether the implica- tions of communication technologies are fully un- The idea of a social diplomacy—driven and perhaps derstood when they are translated into the field of even sustained by transparency and volatility—im- foreign policy practice. plies a fair dose of speculative thinking. On the one Another problem with Ross’s pronouncements hand, a social diplomacy of facilitation and relation- is that they ignore the contributions of public diplo- building is a necessity in a time of decreased state macy to the business of diplomacy through a narrow legitimacy in global politics. So a social diplomacy interpretation of the term. Public diplomacy has a involves more than the ascendance of public diplo- lengthy history of establishing relations between macy, but the integration of technological tools, people in ways that are not simply defined by propa- publics, and state institutions in the formation of gandistic overtures. Indeed, both public diplomacy policy and successful programs or interventions. and traditional diplomacy have a long tradition of Technology offers a revised “art of the possible” for “engagement” among nonstate actors, citizens, and diplomats, but it also impels the conditions that ne- organizations. cessitate these practices. The value of Ross’s rhetoric and its reflection in Yet there is an undeniable tension in how states documents like the QDDR is in the way it diagnoses respond to the context of transparency and volatil- Social Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, and Network Power 29 ity. On the one hand, notions like “collaborative These differences are not simply ensconced power” and the kind of strategic templates that in competing governments but are also a reflec- follow from this perspective (like 21st Century tion and product of social will. Relations among Statecraft) appear well “adapted” to the social and publics were, in this view, the responsibility of di- political consequences of today’s networked states plomacy. Increasingly, this mandate is inextricable and publics. Power resides not in singular actors but from a technologically charged milieu. The newly emerges as a property of collaborative, coordinated appointed ambassador to Zimbabwe, Bruce Whar- activity that coheres around transnational issues ton, offered that diplomats operating in Africa were and moments of crisis. required to be “social entrepreneurs” in ways that But collaborative power does not mean that the could leverage technology to meet “social needs.”82 older obligations of diplomacy no longer matter. But there also are inevitable consequences to the Nor does it suggest that the stewards of foreign pol- way in which states recognize stakeholders as pub- icy must abandon the self-interested aspect of their lics—publics that are in part shaped by the choices strategic calculus. Indeed, arguments about more state institutions make in reacting to flows of con- “engagement” could serve to adorn the rhetoric tent within social media. In other words, we need of self-interested foreign policy.79 It is not as if the to be aware that relations and interactions are con- strategic norms of U.S. diplomacy reflect a whole- ditioned by the platforms used to reach and “see” sale disavowal of the power politics of previous eras. publics as publics. At best, this ambiguity obviates But it does suggest the need for what U.S. Ambas- the need for a more rigorous understanding of me- sador to Brazil Thomas Shannon calls “reversing dia and communication effects. At worst, it could the polarity” of diplomacy toward the “listening” create dangerous expectations around technology ethic that so animates prescriptions of public diplo- to uncritically carry the burdens of diplomatic rela- macy scholars and critics.80 The insight that publics tion-building.83 matter in ways that fundamentally shape the social Any power in contemporary statecraft will result conditions for success in diplomacy is not a new in- from recognizing the social levers and characteris- sight. Shannon draws inspiration from Elihu Root, tics of the network form.84 A social diplomacy fo- who argued, in the inaugural issue of Foreign Affairs cused on the construction of latent communities in 1922, about the enduring purpose of diplomacy of goodwill and tolerance toward the United States that has become more apparent. Shannon is worth will derive from understanding the communication quoting at length: ethics that underscore how and why people identify through networks that are transnational, local, and And he [Root] described the purpose of diplo- interest focused. Transparency is such an ethic. Vol- macy as being to rescue from the field of differ- atility is an operational hazard. This requires an anal- ence and controversy and transfer to the field ysis of the benefits and limits of collaborative power, of common understanding and agreement one and the institution capacity—the organizations, the subject after another. And that diplomacy in knowledge, the agency—to put these ideas into itself is the history—the long history—of the practice. If we are operating in a revolutionary mo- process of adjustment between different ideas ment in diplomatic affairs, then it remains to be seen and of the prejudices and passions and hitherto if the anecdotal evidence, the strategic policy argu- irreconcilable differences which had baffled- ad ments, and the available resources can cohere into a justment.81 truly adaptable diplomatic institution. 30 Craig Hayden DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

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Metzl, “Network Diplomacy,” George- vilian Power: Redefining American Diplomacy and De- town Journal of International Affairs 2 (2001): 77. velopment,” Foreign Affairs (December 2010). 40. Paul Sharp, Diplomatic Theory of International Re- 27. Craig Hayden, The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public lations (Cambridge University Press, 2009). Diplomacy in Global Contexts (Lexington Books, 2011). 41. Ross, “Remarks at Digital Diplomacy.” 32 Craig Hayden DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

42. Sarah Wynn-Williams, “Remarks at Digital Di- cy” (presented at the International Studies Association, plomacy: A New Era of Advancing Policy” (presented at San Diego, CA, 2012). the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Wash- 56. Ali Fisher, “Music for the Jilted Generation: ington, DC, May 17, 2012). http://carnegieendowment. Open-Source Public Diplomacy,” Hague Journal of Diplo- org/2012/05/17/digital-diplomacy-new-era-of-advanc- macy 3: 2 (September 2008): 129–152. ing-policy/apnu. 57. Nancy Morris, “A Comparative Analysis of the 43. Nye, Jr., The Future of Power. Diffusion and Participatory Models in Development 44. Geoffrey Pigman, Contemporary Diplomacy (Pol- Communication,” Communication Theory 13: 2 (2003): ity, 2011). 225–248. 45. Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann, “The Future of 58. Fisher, “Music for the Jilted Generation.” Diplomacy.” 59. Hocking, “Rethinking the ‘New’ Public Diplo- 46. Iver B Neumann, “The English School on Diplo- mac y.” macy: Scholarly Promise Unfulfilled,” International Rela- 60. Daniel R. McCarthy, “Open Networks and the tions 17: 3 (September 1, 2003): 341–369. Open Door: American Foreign Policy and the Narration 47. Manuel Castells, The Power of Identity. The Infor- of the Internet1,” Foreign Policy Analysis 7: 1 (January mation Age: Economy, Society, and Culture (Malden, MA: 2011): 89–111; Shawn M. Powers and William You- Blackwell, 1997). mans, “A New Purpose for International Broadcasting: 48. Morozov, The Net Delusion. Subsidizing Deliberative Technologies in Non-transi- 49. W. Lance Bennett, “New Media and Power: tioning States,” Journal of Public Deliberation 8: 1 (2012): The Internet and Global Activism,” in Contesting Me- 13. dia Power: Alternative Media in a Networked World, ed. 61. Peter Evans, “Development as Institutional Nick Couldry and James Curran (Rowman & Littlefield, Change: The Pitfalls of Monocropping and the Poten- 2003), pp. 17–38. tials of Deliberation,” Studies in Comparative International 50. Andrew Chadwick, “Digital Network Reper- Development (SCID) 38: 4 (2004): 30–52. toires and Organizational Hybridity,” Political Communi- 62. Steven Livingston, “The CNN Effect Reconsid- cation 24: 3 (2007): 283–301. ered (again): Problematizing ICT and Global Gover- 51. John Robert Kelley, “The New Diplomacy: Evo- nance in the CNN Effect Research Agenda,”Media, War lution of a Revolution,” Diplomacy & Statecraft 21: 2 & Conflict 4: 1 (April 1, 2011): 20 –36. (2010): 286. 63. United States National Security Council, Nation- 52. Wiseman, “Polylateralism: Diplomacy’s Third al Framework for Strategic Communication (Washington, Dimension.” DC, 2009). 53. Cory Ondrejka, “Collapsing Geography (Sec- 64. Aaron Snipe, “Remarks on Social Media at The ond Life, Innovation, and the Future of National Pow- Last Three Feet: New Media, New Approaches, and er),” Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization 2: New Challenges for Public Diplomacy” (presented at 3 (2007): 27–54. The George Washington University, Washington, DC, 54. Stephen Noerper, “Remarks on Korea at the November 3, 2011). http://www.gwu.edu/~ipdgc/ Public Diplomacy in Northeast Asia: A Comparative events/2011_11_03_last3feet/index.cfm. Perspective Conference” (presented at the The Brook- 65. Rachel Graaf Leslie, “Remarks on Social Media ings Institution, Washington, DC, May 30, 2012). at The Last Three Feet: New Media, New Approaches, http://www.brookings.edu/events/2012/05/30-asia- and New Challenges for Public Diplomacy” (presented diplomacy. at The George Washington University, Washington, DC, 55. Fisher, “Looking at the Man in the Mirror;” Ali November 3, 2011). http://www.gwu.edu/~ipdgc/ Fisher, “Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Building events/2011_11_03_last3feet/index.cfm. Blocks for a Collaborative Approach to Public Diploma- 66. Ross, “Digital Diplomacy and 21st Century Social Diplomacy, Public Diplomacy, and Network Power 33

Statecraft.” gust 23, 2007). 67. “21st Century Statecraft” (Washington, DC: 77. Evgeny Morozov, “The 20th Century Roots U.S. Department of State). http://www.state.gov/state- of 21st Century Statecraft,”Foreign Policy (Septem- craft/overview/index.htm. ber 7, 2010). http://neteffect.foreignpolicy.com/ 68. Ross, “Remarks at Digital Diplomacy.” posts/2010/09/07/the_20th_century_roots_of_ 69. Ibid. the_21st_century_statecraft. 70. Jacob Comenetz, “Innovating Public Diplomacy 78. David Rieff, “Battle Hymn of the Diplomats,”Na - for a New Digital World,” Washington Diplomat, July 27, tional Interest, April 2012. http://nationalinterest.org/ 2011. http://www.washdiplomat.com/index.php?Ite bookreview/battle-hymn-the-diplomats-4912?page=1. mid=428&catid=1476&id=7955:innovating-public- 79. Edward Comor and Hamilton Bean, “America’s diplomacy-for-a-new-digital-world&option=com_ ‘Engagement’ Delusion: Critiquing a Public Diplomacy content&view=article; Lichtenstein, “Digital Diploma- Consensus,” International Communication Gazette 74: 3 c y.” (April 1, 2012): 203–220. 71. McCarthy, “Open Networks and the Open 80. Nicholas J. Cull, Public Diplomacy: Lessons from Door.” the Past (Los Angeles, CA: Figueroa Press, 2009). 72. Ross, “Digital Diplomacy and 21st Century 81. Shannon, “Remarks to the Public Diplomacy Statecraft.” Council.” 73. Ibid. 82. Bruce Wharton, “Remarks at The Last Three 74. Jan Melissen, Beyond the New Public Diplomacy, Feet: New Media, New Approaches, and New Challenges (Clingendael, The Netherlands: Institute of International for Public Diplomacy” (presented at The George Wash- Relations, Clingendael Paper, October 2011). ington University, Washington, DC, November 3, 2011). 75. Clinton, “Leading Through Civilian Power.” http://www.gwu.edu/~ipdgc/events/2011_11_03_ 76. Kennon Nakamura and Susan Epstein, Diplo- last3feet/index.cfm. macy for the 21st Century: Transformational Diplomacy 83. Morozov, “The Future of ‘Public Diplomacy 2.0’.” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Au- 84. Castells, Communication Power.

From the Age of Secrecy to the Age of Sharing: Social Media, Diplomacy, and Statecraft in the 21st Century David M. Faris

INTRODUCTION are manipulating information flows in ways that re- ally are unique. Scholars have debated for years whether social me- The volatility inherent in the Age of Sharing was dia are a democratizing influence on authoritarian never more apparent than during the tumultuous states. Only recently, however, have we begun to ask and deadly events that occurred on September 11, how the global explosion of social media usage is af- 2012, when protestors scaled the walls of the Amer- fecting traditional diplomacy. Unfortunately, thus ican embassy in Cairo and when Libyans mounted far, we have many more questions than answers. a separate attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Can social media transform the traditional prac- leaving four dead including the U.S. ambassador tice of diplomacy in the same way it has altered the to Libya, J. Christopher Stevens. The Cairo dem- universe of activism and advocacy? And if so, what onstrations were ostensibly a response to a U.S.- would this transformation look like? produced film called “The Innocence of Muslims,” What is clear is that the new social media envi- which had been crudely dubbed in Arabic and post- ronment poses all manner of problems, challenges, ed to YouTube during the summer. This YouTube and opportunities for the leaders of sovereign states, version depicted the Prophet Muhammad in deeply whether democratic or autocratic. The best way to unflattering terms. As it became clear that trouble conceptualize these changes is to think of ourselves was brewing, Larry Schwartz, senior public affairs as having departed the Age of Secrecy and entered officer at the U.S. embassy in Cairo, sent out a Tweet the very beginning of a new epoch—what I call the on the embassy’s account, USEmbassyCairo,1 that “Age of Sharing.” sparked a controversy that reverberated all the way In the Age of Sharing, consumers and subjects to the U.S. presidential election. The Tweet read: have become producers, content-collaboraters, and citizens, and they use the applications of social me- The Embassy of the United States in Cairo con- dia to share information with one another. Whether demns the continuing efforts by misguided in- they are posting about the latest episode of Mad dividuals to hurt the religious feelings of Mus- Men or the most recent policy statement from the lims—as we condemn efforts to offend believers secretary of State, individuals in the Age of Sharing of all religions. Today, the 11th anniversary of

35 36 David M. Faris DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the cratic and authoritarian publics are using these tech- United States, Americans are honoring our patri- nologies not only to expose the actions of states but ots and those who serve our nation as the fitting also to organize opposition to them. At the same response to the enemies of democracy. Respect time, individuals use social media to circulate dubi- for religious beliefs is a cornerstone of American ous theories, such as the idea that the U.S. govern- democracy. We firmly reject the actions by those ment is in bed with the Egyptian Islamist move- who abuse the universal right of free speech to ment, or to disseminate hateful videos like “The hurt the religious beliefs of others.2 Innocence of Muslims.” Finally, diplomats are using social media to communicate with one another, The Republican nominee for president, Mitt which has created a new channel of state-to-state Romney, immediately seized on this statement as communication that promises to alter interstate re- evidence that the Obama administration “sympa- lations in ways we have only begun to imagine. In thized with the attackers.” While Romney was criti- many ways the dilemma faced by U.S. diplomats af- cized for toying with the timeline—he suggested ter the Arab Spring resembles that of state media or- that Schwartz’s Tweet was an official Obama -ad ganizations under authoritarianism. Both must find ministration response to the attacks in Libya, which ways to make deeply unpopular policies palatable postdated the Tweet by many hours—the Obama to local publics. Because Israel will remain a valu- administration quickly distanced itself from the em- able American ally in the region for the foreseeable bassy’s behavior and told reporters that the Tweet future, the United States will be forced to continue had not been approved by Washington. Whatever engaging in unpopular acts of public support for the its role in the election, the embassy’s Twitter ac- Israelis and to defend policies in places like Bahrain count, as well as the general dissemination of the in- and Saudi Arabia that very clearly contradict Ameri- citing video over YouTube, are both representative can values. In addition, the diffusion of social me- of features of the Age of Sharing that are here to stay, dia technologies at a rapid pace throughout the re- whether governments like it or not. gion gives Arab citizens the capability of organizing Well prior to the tragic events of September difficult-to-predict challenges to these policies. For 2012, American diplomacy began featuring an in- the leaderships of these newly democratic states, stant “talk-back” feature, in the sense that hundreds they will also find it more difficult to cooperate with of thousands of Arabs will routinely get on Twitter American grand strategy, even if leaders are elected and Facebook and engage in spirited debate, criti- who are willing to do so. In other words, American cism, or deconstruction of U.S. policy pronounce- policy is now made in an environment of radically ments, speeches, or initiatives. At the same time, increased transparency, visibility, and contention, many American embassies are now engaged with which will lead inevitably to struggles over message these publics via the very same social media plat- discipline, engagement, and policymaking in a more forms. Thus the Cairo embassy’s Tweet was not volatile world. an aberration but a continuation of long-standing This essay will explore the complicated interplay policy in the State Department. This change is even of citizen journalism, involuntary transparency, and more important, because the region now features policymaking in the digital age and the ways that several newly democratic or protodemocratic states those relationships unfolded during the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya with newly permissive of 2010–2011 and beyond. By doing so, it will high- information environments. Citizens in both demo- light new challenges to American diplomacy as well From the Age of Secrecy to the Age of Sharing 37 as identify ways that the new information environ- are publicly unpopular or whose domestic policies ment can be best managed to harmonize American clash with U.S. values. No one wants to get caught interests and policies. The essay will also outline making unsavory deals with unpopular foreign lead- some commonsense alterations to American pub- ers. The net effect of this change is probably greater lic diplomacy and the way that Americans with all complication and difficulty in U.S. dealings with -au kinds of affiliations with the government can work tocratic and semiauthoritarian states. together to advance the general cause of peace and In other words, policies that were possible in the understanding between citizens of different states. Age of Secrecy—the era that ended with the explo- sion of social media—are more difficult to execute THE AGE OF SECRECY VERSUS THE during the Age of Sharing—the new epoch in which AGE OF SHARING ordinary citizens spend hours each day reading, annotating, and creating criticism of government Modern diplomacy has been described by Mark policies and then sharing their thoughts with online Page and J. E. Spence as the process of crafting social networks ranging from a few hundred to the “open covenants, secretly arrived at.”3 Traditionally, hundreds of thousands. These “Twitterati,” as they secrecy has served a variety of purposes in relations are sometimes dismissively referred to, have become between states in the international system. Secrecy among the most important opinion leaders in the prevents sensitive negotiations from being blown region, not because they have their own perches on apart by the revelation of unpopular concessions Al-Jazeera’s expensive talk shows but rather because and allows frank discussion between diplomats they are funny, biting, and absolutely relentless in whose domestic constituents may disapprove of their exposure of state hypocrisy and also of the portions of the agreement. The resulting agreements tensions inherent in American regional policymak- are of course (usually) made public, but the norm ing. Nothing better encapsulates this trend better has been for details of the negotiations to remain se- than the pictures that circulated constantly, during cret until participants are prepared to defend their the Egyptian revolution, of protestors holding tear choices. The advent of social media has jeopardized gas canisters with the phrase “Made in America” the element of secrecy in diplomacy, perhaps irre- printed on them. The United States has been selling versibly. Wikileaks is the most explosive and well weapons and riot control gear to regional authori- known of the methods of involuntary disclosure ties since long before even Al-Jazeera became a re- but hardly the only one. Diplomats can no longer be gional opinion leader—the prominence of Amer- certain that their cables are secure, and even if they ican-made weapons has been a constant staple of assume the temporary security of those cables, they discourse about Israeli incursions into Lebanon, for cannot be certain that at some point in the future instance. But the Age of Sharing has made it more their thoughts will not be revealed to audiences for or less impossible to avoid knowing who manufac- which they were never intended. This already hap- tured the tear gas for Egyptian riot police, and these pens, of course, when archives are opened, but typi- images did incalculable damage to America’s stand- cally the participants in such releases are dead or ing in Egypt—even after the Obama administra- sufficiently removed from the public eye as to make tion did a dramatic volte face and abandoned Hosni the revelations unremarkable. The inevitable result Mubarak at the height of the uprisings. of this paradigm shift is likely to be greater difficulty Secrecy in all its myriad forms was part of the for the United States in engaging with regimes that long-term survival strategy of all Middle East 38 David M. Faris DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

­dictatorships. The standard information model Anwar El-Sadat of Egypt was unable to preempt ri- from the 1950s to the 1990s (which was shattered ots in 1977 by telling people that the price of bread first by Al-Jazeera) was total state control over all was lower than it was. Sadat was certainly not able arms of mass media empires, from state television to keep the Camp David Accords a secret—he was and radio stations to government-run or affiliated not even able to hang onto his life. But it is certainly newspapers.4 Secrecy served three purposes. Do- true that not every foreign policy decision of the mestically, secrecy and information control could 1990-vintage Mubarak regime was subject to pub- isolate instances of public discontent and keep them lic and instant scrutiny in quite the same way as are hidden from the broader public. Second, secrecy those of today’s leaders. Today, nearly everything concealed from Arab publics the exact content and is public. This does not mean that authoritarian performance of authoritarian policies as well as al- regimes are doomed or that they have not devised lowed authoritarian elites to construct vast archipel- clever strategies for dealing with social media, but agos of secret corruption. How else could one ex- rather that the old days of closed, centralized infor- plain the bizarre Qaddafi family dwellings found in mation control are over. Libya by astonished citizens and reporters? Would A telling anecdote involves an Egyptian activist, the Qaddafi regime have ever constructed such who remarked to me that during the 1990s, if he was monstrous monuments to greed and obliviousness at a demonstration and saw someone with a cam- if they thought they would be found out? Of course era, he assumed it was someone from state media not. But the truth is that authoritarian attitudes have trying to get pictures of faces for surveillance and not quite caught up to the paradigm shift wrought harassment. Today, someone with a camera phone by social media, and many tyrants and their hang- is almost certainly a citizen or journalist looking to ers-on still apparently believe they can get away document state abuse (although the balance may be with flaunting their opulence while their citizens changing again with the advent of facial recognition suffer. This is precisely the miscalculation that the software that can be exploited by states to identify Ben Alis (of Tunisia) made when, for instance, the dissidents).5 Social media have completely upend- family and its “entourage” managed to stash away $5 ed or, at the very least, deeply complicated, the dy- billion in assets. It is much more difficult to keep the namic between surveillance regimes and ordinary existence of a “private jet” secret when citizens can citizens, by creating in the Middle East a culture snap pictures of you boarding or deplaning the jet of sousveillance—the watching of the watchers by and send them to tens of thousands of people in an the watched. It was sousveillance culture that first instant. It might even make you think about wheth- brought the issue of torture into the Egyptian pub- er you would not be better off flying coach on Tunis lic sphere by passing around videos of police abuse, Air like everyone else and avoiding the scrutiny. posting them to blogs and YouTube, and generat- And finally, throughout this period, secrecy al- ing public outcry against the arbitrary deployment lowed Arab leaders to engage in diplomatic ma- of state power against ordinary citizens. In the Age neuverings that were at odds with expressed public of Secrecy, authoritarian regimes could do more or desires. Now, it is important not to oversell this. less whatever they liked to their own citizens, be- Egyptians knew that the Mubarak regime was coop- cause the media belonged to the authoritarian elites. erating with the U.S.-led response to Saddam Hus- But in the Age of Sharing, state media operations sein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and they made their are becoming increasingly irrelevant, eclipsed by a displeasure known with massive street protests. participatory Internet and mobile sharing culture­ From the Age of Secrecy to the Age of Sharing 39 that, if it engages with state media at all, does so to the state versus society and, given the arrangement mock, undermine, and deconstruct. Opposition of forces, it was the state that usually won, with quite media outlets are increasingly merged with elite rare exceptions. Today, however, the blending of so- digital networks of activists, who transition seam- cial media with traditional journalism (Al-Jazeera lessly between one realm and another, providing an harvesting citizen accounts of news events, for in- entirely alternate universe of information and think- stance), means that the distinction between citizens ing, available to enterprising citizens even when the and journalists has become blurry at best. Even state tries hard to close off all avenues of access, as in large, bureaucratic media organizations are lever- Tunisia prior to December 2010. aging the capabilities of ordinary citizens, who are often practicing a kind of incidental journalism that THE RISE OF THREE-LEVEL GAMES has become ubiquitous in an age in which millions of citizens are carrying supercomputers around This dynamic works on the United States as much in their pockets. It is this third-level audience that as it does for local elites. In the 1980s, Ronald Rea- has proven most difficult for authoritarian regimes gan could deliver a speech on regional policy and to master without resort to draconian filtering and have it received by no one except its intended au- censorship policies. dience—dictators and foreign policy elites in the Bruce Gregory has argued that “public diplo- Middle East. The conduct of foreign policy has macy is now so central to diplomacy that it is no been famously characterized by the political scien- longer helpful to treat it as a sub-set of diplomatic tist Robert Putnam as “two-level games”—in other practice.”7 The blurring of the lines between public words, negotiations between states, and then again diplomacy and traditional diplomacy is what Secre- between states and their domestic audiences.6 Put- tary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton has dubbed nam argues that successful diplomacy required not “21st Century Statecraft.”8 The essence of the Clin- just an agreement between diplomats or states but ton vision is an increase in horizontal ties, enabled also the management of public expectations and by social media, which increase person-to-person interests at home. This domestic audience could (read: civilian to civilian) and person-to-nongov- in some cases scuttle international agreements ernmental organization (NGO) contacts. The hope through opposition to key concessions. One need was that these contacts could bypass the lumbering look no further than the attempt to reach agreement “white guys with white shirts and red ties” (in the on climate change issues to see how domestic audi- now-famous words of Jared Cohen)9 diplomatic ences and interest groups can prevent agreements model, not so that citizens could make policy with from coming to fruition. With the advent of social other citizens but so that the efficacy of American media, even policymakers in some authoritarian re- policy would be reliant much less on diplomats and gimes must now count a third audience in addition more on relationships between Americans and citi- to voters and negotiating partners. That audience is zens of other countries, relationships that are not the networked elite, who often serve as an interven- necessarily mediated by bureaucrats. The truth, of ing variable between policies and mass audiences. In course, is that diplomats will continue to play a key the past, the “interveners” were the foot soldiers of role in policymaking and mediation, but they will state media outlets, and regimes hardly had to worry be forced to do so, especially in the Middle East, about whether they would fall in line or at least keep with new-found appreciation for public opinion as their criticism to the acceptable minimums. It was channeled through the focal points of social media. 40 David M. Faris DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

Diplomats must also be careful not to impute too Innovation to former secretary of State Hillary much importance to what they see being discussed Rodham Clinton Alec Ross is going to have limit- on social media channels—in poorer countries like ed effect, since everyone knows who Ross worked Egypt, the networked elite may not be representa- for and what his limitations are likely to be, given tive of the population as a whole. his affiliation. Influencing the influencers means Unfortunately, much of the thinking on the In- building horizontal networks of trust and reciproc- ternet remains years behind developments in the ity between lower-level members of the hierarchy, social media universe. This thinking is grounded in easing restrictions on the production of content by developments in what was called “the blogosphere,” government employees and diplomatic personnel, despite the fact that the blogosphere is shrinking and understanding that lifting barriers will lead to in terms of relative influence to other spheres and the occasional embarrassment when someone says “verses” like the “Tumblrverse” and Facebook. something that was unfiltered and unwelcome. It Citizens are increasingly forgoing creating their means understanding that a third level has been own stand-alone web pages, and then trying to at- added to the diplomatic game. tract eyeballs to them, in favor of using the built-in sharing and networking capabilities of social media SECRET CORRUPTION, OPENLY EXPOSED sites. The essence of these technologies is not the one blogger versus the universe model of the acer- That third level was something that the Ben Ali bic Egyptian blogger The Sandmonkey; it is sharing. clan clearly did not understand. Tunisian activists No site was more influential in shaping the Egyptian will argue that the role of Wikileaks in inspiring the uprising than Facebook. If Wael Ghonim had gone revolution is vastly overblown. This is probably true. to Wordpress and started a blog rather than collabo- The general perfidy and extravagance of the Ben rating on a Facebook page, he may never have found Ali clique was not exactly a secret in Tunisia prior the influence he achieved with We Are All Khaled to the revolt. But this is not to say that the various Said. That page built not on Ghonim’s fame (he was revelations contained in Wikileaks did not have an more or less completely unknown in May 2010) but effect or did not contribute to confirmation of open rather on the ideas and iconography of his Facebook suspicions about the activities of the ruling elite.10 page, which grew through sharing—the sharing of The Ben Ali family was hardly the first dictatorial the “like” function, which built its membership into clan to abuse their privileges, but they were prob- the hundreds of thousands by the time the revolu- ably the first whose corruption was so spectacularly tion started, and the sharing of ideas and informa- revealed by leaked diplomatic cables. If you were on tion on the group’s wall. the fence about whether the government was cor- Now, information that is shared by more promi- rupt—in other words if you were engaging in the nent members of these communities obviously has understandable game of wishful thinking where an advantage over information shared by nonelites. you give your own government the benefit of the To influence these influencers does not require doubt—the Wikileaks revelations probably over- duplication of their efforts with government Twit- came even the worst case of cognitive dissonance. terers or Tumblrs. Given the restrictions still in Therefore one should conceptualize the leaked dip- place on employees of the U.S. government using lomatic cables as only one digital variable among social media in an uninhibited way, even a highly many—notably the community blog Nawaat, run networked individual like then Senior Advisor for from France by Sami Ben Gharbeia—that contrib- From the Age of Secrecy to the Age of Sharing 41 uted to an overall souring of the public mood with of Sharing, when any foreign policy shift is going to respect to the Ben Alis. be blasted through the Twitterverse the moment it These scandals were in many ways reminiscent is announced (and when lies or hypocrisy are likely of corruption scandals that had plagued authoritar- to be exposed quickly), the kind of up-is-downism ian regimes throughout the Age of Secrecy. Again, required to execute a policy of support for the Ben we need to distinguish firmly between arguing Alis while still espousing support for universal free- that social media are necessary to expose corrup- dom and dignity is simply not possible. Or if it is tion or whether they merely make it much more possible, it would have come at a domestic and inter- likely that corruption will be exposed. Egypt’s King national price that the Sarkozy government was not Farouk became an international laughingstock in willing to pay. The Obama administration learned the 1940s, long before a single Egyptian so much as this lesson the hard way barely a month later and owned a TV. Make enough appearances at casinos just forty-eight hours after the start of the Egyptian and brothels, even in the Age of Secrecy, and your uprising, when Vice President Joe Biden announced perfidy is likely to make its way into the news. But in that Mubarak was “not a dictator” and should not the Age of Sharing, “the networked” can withdraw step down. Certainly, the channels of social media their “consent” (as Rebecca MacKinnon would put are often clogged with rumor, innuendo, or false it11) in a flash. Thus we witnessed the spectacle of information. And some governments, particularly French diplomacy during the Tunisian uprising, Russia, have become adept at flooding those chan- when Foreign Minister Michèle Alliot-Marie effec- nels with proregime propaganda. But on certain tively offered French assistance in putting down the high-profile issues, it has become much more dif- Tunisian revolt. In the Age of Secrecy, her declara- ficult for authoritarian regimes to propagate—and tion may have been buried in the pages of Le Monde, indefinitely maintain the credibility of—preposter- but in the Age of Sharing, scarcely five minutes had ous lies. For a lie to lose its utility and its relevance, passed before both French and Tunisian activists it is not necessary for everyone in a country to stop took to their designated social media outlets to de- believing it. If even small numbers of people have nounce the government’s perfidy. Whether Alliot- access to the truth, then the calculus of authoritar- Marie’s words actually represented French policy ian information hegemony is forever altered. or not was immaterial; the damage was done, and it was done much faster than anyone could have an- THE PERSONAL ACQUAINTANCE IS POLITICAL ticipated. Alliot-Marie’s ordeal (she was forced to resign) The speed and low cost of passing information was representative of a broader shift wrought by the through those Facebook feeds is part of why social social media age. It is not simply about this one of- media have become the default organizing plat- ficial and her off-the-cuff remarks but rather about a forms for dissent in many authoritarian countries. wholesale cultural shift, from authoritarian citizens Clay Shirky was among the first to foresee how as passive, recipient subjects, to empowered, net- social media would be used to organize dissent worked critics. In the Age of Secrecy, it is entirely in authoritarian environments.12 Shirky argued plausible that the French foreign policy elite could that dissidents in nondemocratic countries would have quietly engineered a rescue for the embattled gravitate toward the simple group-forming and in- Ben Alis, or at least provided some material assis- formation-sharing facets of emerging social media tance to give them a fighting chance. But in the Age and collaborate on common goals for a fraction of 42 David M. Faris DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE the prior cost of collective action. Sharing is central genius is the way it embeds ordinary and possibly to his vision of influence through Facebook and nonpolitical individuals in a web of social connec- Twitter, as individuals reveal their ideas and prefer- tions full of people who really do care about politics. ences to others in their social networks. The revela- These “influencers,” can help turn even nonpolitical tion of this “private information,” as it was termed individuals into sharers of political information. by Timur Kuran,13 prompts changes in individual They can also lead nonpolitical people to block or calculations about revolt and the durability of au- hide the content of political “over-sharers,” but it thoritarian control—leading to what is known as takes an act of volition to block a friend’s Facebook an “informational cascade.”14 Shirky’s vision came feed, and it is more rare than you think for someone to its most mature realization with the Arab Spring, to take this step. as networked publics used two distinct methods These dynamics become particularly important for leveraging the capabilities of social media in the during moments of crisis. Again and again during the face of sustained authoritarian interference. We Are Egyptian uprising, the Mubarak regime used state All Khaled Said built a Facebook army that collabo- television to broadcast the president’s stale and in- rated on choosing the date of the uprising as Janu- creasingly delusional speeches to the public—each ary 25, a brilliant stroke of tactical jujitsu, seeing as offering a series of concessions whose acceptability how January 25 had become an Orwellian holiday had already been eclipsed by events that Mubarak meant to celebrate Egyptian police forces, who had and his staff either were not watching or did not un- grown to be loathed in part due to the effort of lone derstand. Before he had even finished speaking, he wolf bloggers during the mid-2000s.15 These blog- was rejected by two technologies—one older than gers, among them Noha Atef, Wael Abbas, and Hos- television and one newer. Listening on Al-Jazeera, sam El-Hamalawy, used the old model of building particularly during the president’s last attempt to a web page, loading it with content, and then hop- salvage his own rule, you could literally hear the ing the eyeballs would follow. But they have mostly howl of rejection tearing through the throngs in stopped “blogging,” whatever that actually means Tahrir. This was a message that the regime would, in an era in which content from many different sites belatedly, receive. Simultaneously, the Twitterati, and sources is often aggregated in some form on the many of them standing in the middle of the square same platform. while they were updating their feeds and profiles Blogs are limited in their capacity to build com- and Tumblrs, were broadcasting their rejection to munity. Even the most leveraged community blogs, anyone who was paying attention or listening. Their like Daily Kos, still require people to join, provide message, broadcast over the many channels of the login info to participate, and then proceed over to new social media empire, reached even friends and Daily Kos. The site also presupposes, generally, an acquaintances who were not deeply invested in the interest in left-wing politics. Chances are, if you are departure of Mubarak. That kind of cumulative mes- more or less ambivalent about politics, you prob- saging can have an effect, both in terms of boosting ably have never directed your browser to Daily Kos, initial turnout and of spreading word about ongoing or the right’s Real Clear Politics, or any of the other events. political web sites that have exerted their influ- They played perhaps an even more important ence on American politics over the past twelve or role when the regime deployed its time-worn strat- so years. On Facebook, part of the site’s accidental egy of declaring that is up is down during the up- From the Age of Secrecy to the Age of Sharing 43 rising. On the infamous “Day of the Camel,” when the Middle East. mounted hooligans in the service of the regime stormed Tahrir Square and murdered dozens of in- ENGAGING HORIZONTAL NETWORKS nocent protestors, the government tried to declare that “foreign hands” were behind the mayhem. Per- How indeed should the United States proceed in haps in another media age this strategy could have the Age of Sharing? First, it is essential to maximize been minimally plausible or effective. When Gamal the utility of the massive investments that the gov- Abdel Nasser declared, shortly after the Six-Day ernment has already made in informal regional as- War began, that Egyptian forces were nearing vic- sets—the scholars, aid workers, and journalists who tory, citizens had no reason, or any capability, re- have been the recipients of government largesse to ally, to disbelieve him. Today, the same event would go and learn about the Middle East. These people have been witnessed by thousands of citizens, who do not have to be employees of the U.S. govern- would have Tweeted under the hashtag #airforce- ment, or even contractors. One thing the U.S. gov- destroyed. Or perhaps a rogue air force pilot would ernment can do much better is to maintain relation- have posted something on Facebook about what ships with stakeholders who have benefitted from had actually happened. In either case, the deception American support for their research, studies, and would have been sniffed out almost immediately, as work. The U.S. Department of Education has spent it was during the uprising of 2011. Declaring the in- untold millions training U.S. students and scholars surrection to be influenced by the United States or in acquiring exotic languages, and it desperately Israel was not simply contrary to the common sense needs a better network to keep track of these invest- of the Egyptian people, who after all were respon- ments and to better incorporate them into public sible for organizing and executing the protests, but diplomacy. Fulbright scholars, Foreign Language was also belied by every available source of social Area Studies (FLAS) recipients, and ordinary re- media, which was full of actual Egyptians Tweet- searchers are often in the same country at the same ing, Facebooking, blogging, and texting about the time and have few opportunities to interact with events. None of these people was obviously a spy one another. This is typically because the network or a foreign agent. Many digital activists in Egypt of U.S. informal ambassadors is conceived too nar- have told me that part of the reason they have risked rowly. Anyone who is in, for instance, Egypt doing life and limb to share their information is so that work, research, or studies that are financed in any the government cannot lie any longer. They under- way, shape, or form by the U.S. government should stood, long before many elites in the West realized have the opportunity to meet with one another this, that government propaganda is endangered more regularly. This goes doubly for diplomats, who by an open Internet. This view has its skeptics, of are often perceived as a separate entity by other in- course, the most prominent being Evgeny Morozov, dividuals doing work in these countries. who has detailed the ways that savvy regimes like One of the many reasons this is important is be- Russia and China have manipulated the Internet cause it is rarely the senior diplomatic staff that will and flooded it with proregime propaganda.16 Given have meaningful contacts with ordinary Egyptians. the distant kinship of government propaganda and It is the anthropologists doing field work in poor or “public diplomacy,” this should make us consider rural areas, or the political scientists running around the effects of these changes on U.S. policymaking in conducting open-ended interviews with members 44 David M. Faris DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE of the elite, or the sociologists studying systems ­unfolding events and discussions is tantamount to of social support in informal areas. Getting these destroying their credibility and efficacy or, worse, groups talking to one another through social media putting anyone who works for the government should be a major goal of “21st Century Statecraft.” under suspicion of working for the CIA. To put But getting the Americans to talk to one another is it another way, to prevent Americans from acting one thing—how might the United States build in- like normal human beings only contributes to their fluence with the young, networked Arabs who have alienation from the very cultures they are ostensibly gained so much influence over the past decade? observing. Their “secret” cables are thus unlikely to These are the individuals who are most political and be full of much wisdom anyway. Remember the ac- thus most likely to object to one or many aspects of cidental genius of Facebook—incidentally exposing U.S. policymaking in the region. Connecting Amer- ordinary citizens to the basic decency of State De- icans who are fluent in Arabic, familiar with the im- partment employees might help undo some of the portant issues of Egyptian politics, and who have re- damage of America’s ongoing refusal to reevaluate cently spent time in the country not only creates an its relationship with Israel. This also does not mean invaluable resource for U.S. policymakers but also using Twitter in “broadcast mode,” as James Cara- familiarizes Egyptians with the best and brightest fano would put it—sending messages out to tens of Americans—those most likely to make an impres- thousands of recipients but not engaging in any real sion that contradicts stereotypes about Americans conversation.18 Barack Obama is the most followed and who can challenge deeply held beliefs about the “diplomat” in the world, but his Twitter account is country. not the source of real engagement or conversation. Concomitant to this network-building, it would Better to have diplomats using embassy Twitter -ac be helpful if employees of the U.S. government counts to engage in back-and-forth with followers in could be even freer in their use of social media. their own languages, rather than using the platform This does not mean disguising State Department as a high-tech soapbox. This is happening in some employees or Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) countries but not all. agents as Berkeley anthropologists or study abroad At first glance, the Cairo embassy incident students, but rather harnessing the truth-sniffing might seem like evidence that the State Depart- aspects of social media as much as possible in the ment should rein in rather than unleash their dip- service of breaking down linguistic, cultural, and lomats on social media platforms. Certainly, having economic barriers. Restrictions on the speech, and diplomats free to engage with local publics in na- particularly the social media usage of U.S. govern- tive languages opens up the possibility of further ment employees abroad, are classic Age of Secrecy political embarrassment. This is especially true for anachronisms. They reflect a mentality of accumu- the Obama administration, as the State Department lating stamps of authority before a piece of writing, itself has long been a bête noire of critics who be- thinking, or advocacy can be seen by anyone. Or lieve that it is staffed by anti-American diplomats as Michele Kelemen has written, the State Depart- who have spent too much time falling in love with ment seems to be “promoting social media while their areas of expertise.19 But the Cairo embassy also trying to control the message and keep tabs also used Twitter in the days following the attacks to on personal blogs of foreign service officers.”17 In push back against the idea that the U.S. government the Age of Sharing, deliberately clamping down on funded or approved of “The Innocence of Muslims” the freedom of young diplomats to participate in and pointed out discrepancies between the Muslim From the Age of Secrecy to the Age of Sharing 45

Brotherhood’s English and Arabic Twitter accounts, the public domain, but the cost has gone up—both among many other positive things. In fact, the em- the costs of storage and protection, and the costs of bassy’s engagement with the Egyptian public in the failure. wake of the attack was arguably much more impor- Scholars are only beginning to tackle the ques- tant than any Tweet sent at the height of panic about tions raised by the intersection of social media and a possible breach of the compound. As long as U.S. diplomacy. For instance, what are the actual effects diplomats will be forced to work behind blast walls of U.S. diplomats using social media? Are their and massive security architectures due to ongoing Tweets influential—i.e., are they passed through threats, it is in fact those social media networks that networks of influencers? Are they simply retweet- might provide the best path of communication be- ed? The much-maligned account for the U.S. em- tween diplomats and local audiences. This is what it bassy in Cairo (@USEmbassyCairo) has nearly means to be part of a global public sphere. And the eighteen thousand followers but appears to have truth is that you are either in or out. In the Age of little traction in terms of how often their messages Twitter, you simply cannot wait for permission from are “retweeted” (i.e., copied and sent out by other Washington to respond to a Tweet. By the time that users for the purposes of sharing and discussion).20 permission comes through, the original Tweet will Or are they part of complex and important debates be long lost in the never-ending data stream. about U.S. power, democracy, and the future of governance in the Middle East? These are empiri- CONCLUSION cal questions that can only be answered by further, in-depth research. Whatever the results of these There is a tendency, after some disruptive techno- inquiries, U.S. diplomats and policymakers will be logical or epochal shift, for people to want to put the grappling with the shift from the Age of Secrecy to old world back into existence again. For diplomacy, the Age of Sharing for the foreseeable future. the old world was not just a time, but a manner of For U.S. diplomacy, this shift means that de- being, the whole range of relationships that consti- bates about U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East tuted the Age of Secrecy. Those media monopolies will take place publicly, will involve the views of and information chokeholds are as bygone as the ordinary citizens as mediated through the new net- corner bookstore, and no amount of wishing and worked elite, and will result in the instantaneous hoping will bring them back. If you could simmer exposure of any real or perceived hypocrises in poli- the essence of the Age of Secrecy down to an emul- cymaking and rhetoric. It will also result in surprise sion, it would be this: States had an overwhelming controversies and the propagation of conspiracy information advantage over their own citizens, and theories or misinformation. Clearly, part of the role they used it. This information advantage typically of social media in the Age of Sharing is to maintain allowed authoritarian regimes to remain several the credibility of information and to combat misin- steps ahead of their opponents and allowed demo- formation about the United States. The more that cratic states to engage in unpopular deal-making diplomats and assets are genuinely embedded in with tyrants. These deals still required managing social media networks throughout the Middle East, and public diplomacy, but states possessed an in- the better. The Age of Sharing means a permanent herent advantage. It should be clear that the Age of complication of efforts to maintain ties with unpop- Sharing has deeply cut into that information advan- ular or morally suspect allies like Bahrain and Saudi tage. States are still able to keep information out of Arabia and at the least will mean that a higher price 46 David M. Faris DIPLOMACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE for those alliances will be exacted by networked 4. William Rugh, Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, publics. It means immediate firestorms will be cre- Radio and Television in Arab Politics, (New York, NY: ated when representatives of the state like Joe Biden Praeger, 2004). or Michèle Alliot-Marie go off-message and under- 5. Iason Athanasiadis, “Iran Uses Internet As Tool mine attempts to build alliances and improve the Against Protestors,” Christian Science Monitor, January 4, 2010. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2010/0104/ public image of great powers in the region. If some- Iran-uses-Internet-as-tool-against-protesters. thing is Made in America—whether it is a policy 6. Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Poli- or a tear gas canister—that information is likely to tics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Orga- become public knowledge faster than the diplomat- nization 42:3 (Summer 1988): 427-460. ic apparatus is going to be able to respond. This is 7. Bruce Gregory, “American Public Diplomacy: the real meaning of volatility in the digital age—an Enduring Characteristics, Elusive Transformation,” increased difficulty in managing messages and the Hague Journal of Diplomacy 6 (2011): 351-372. necessity of engaging unpredictable new actors. 8. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Remarks on Innova- It also means that dedicated friends of the United tion and American Leadership to the Commonwealth States can make inroads into public opinion merely Club” (San Francisco, CA, October 15, 2010). http:// by engaging with the sharers on their own terms and www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/149542.htm. their own platforms. The United States can respond 9. Jesse Lichtenstein, “Digital Diplomacy.” New in two ways: either it can try to wish the old world York Times Magazine, July 16, 2010. http://www. nytimes.com/2010/07/18/magazine/18web2-0-t. back into existence, or it can try to seize the very real html/?pagewanted=all. opportunities for networking, engagement, and al- 10. Tom Malinowski, “Whispering at Autocrats: liance-building that are built-in features of the new In one fell swoop, the candor of the cables released by environment. WikiLeaks did more for Arab democracy than decades of Whatever choice is made, the only certainty is backstage U.S. diplomacy,” Foreign Policy, January 25, 2011. that it will be shared. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/01/25/ whispering_at_autocrats?hidecomments=yes. ENDNOTES 11. Rebecca MacKinnon, Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom (New York, 1. Josh Rogin, “Inside the Public Relations Disaster NY: Basic Books, 2012). at the Cairo Embassy,” The Cable, Foreign Policy (Sep- 12. Clay Shirky, Here Comes Everybody: The Power of tember 12, 2012). http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/ Organizing Without Organizations (New York, NY: Pen- posts/2012/09/12/inside_the_public_relations_disas- guin Press, 2008). ter_at_the_cairo_embassy. 13. Timur Kuran, “Now Out of Never: The Element 2. Glenn Kessler, “The Romney Campaign’s Re- of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989,” peated Errors on the Cairo Embassy’s Statement,” World Politics 44: 1 (October 1991): 7-48. Washington Post, September 13, 2012. http://www. 14. Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo washingtonpost.com/blogs/fact-checker/post/ Welch, “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural the-romney-campaigns-repeated-errors-on-the- Change as Informational Cascades,” Journal of Political cairo-embassy-statement/2012/09/13/978a6be6- Economy, 100: 5 (October 1992): 992-1026. fdf0-11e1-b153-218509a954e1_blog.html. 15. David Faris, Dissent and Revolution in a Digital 3. Mark Page and J. E. Spence, “Open Secrets, Age: Social Media, Blogging and Activism in Egypt (Lon- Questionably Arrived At: The Impact of Wikileaks on don: I.B. Tauris and Co., 2012). Diplomacy,” Defence Studies 11:2 (June 2011): 236. 16. Evgeny Morozov, The Net Delusion: The Dark From the Age of Secrecy to the Age of Sharing 47

Side of Internet Freedom (PublicAffairs, 2011). The Romance of an American Elite (New York, NY: The 17. Michele Kelemen, “Twitter Diplomacy: State Free Press, 1995). Department 2.0,” All Things Considered, National Public 20. www.retweetrank.com. Data as of September 4, Radio, February 21, 2012. 2012. The Cairo embassy’s retweet rank is 109,184. For 18. James Carafano, Wiki at War: Conflict in a Socially some perspective, the Egyptian volunteer news organiza- Networked World (2012). tion Rasad News Network (RNN) is ranked 684. 19. See for instance Robert D. Kaplan’s The Arabists:

Development in the Information Age

The Chinese ICT Development Strategy in Africa: Transparency, Sovereignty, and Soft Power Séverine Arsène

THE RISE OF ICT IN DEVELOPMENT POLICIES around the world. AND THE ADVENT OF NEW PLAYERS On the other side, ICTs could be used to im- prove the management of development projects Increasingly, transparency is identified as one of themselves. By sharing and publicizing informa- the key challenges in the field of development aid. tion on their development aid initiatives, donors Transparency was mentioned as a condition to im- improve aid coordination, control, and efficiency. prove accountability and aid effectiveness in the Major donors, such as the World Bank,6, 7 the U.S. 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, complet- Agency for International Development (USAID),8 ed in 2008 by the Accra Agenda for Action.1 In 2011, and other international actors like the Organiza- the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co- tion for Economic Cooperation and Development operation2 reaffirmed this principle. (OECD),9 are, therefore, rethinking and prioritiz- Information and communication technolo- ing the role that ICTs can play in achieving favor- gies (ICTs) are considered as an important tool to able development outcomes and good governance. achieve this goal. An entire field of research and As an example, the OECD Development Centre practice has emerged under the title “ICT for devel- has developed two wikis aimed at sharing data on opment” (ICT4D).3 It underlines the potential of development and on women—Wikiprogress10 and ICTs for development in general (it could provide Wikigender.11 more economic opportunities, especially in remote In this context, new players are gaining an in- places) and for transparency in particular.4 creasingly important role in building the ICT This promise of ICTs for transparency is two- infrastructure of developing countries. This is fold. On the one side, it could empower civil soci- particularly true in Africa, where most ICT infra- ety, increase participation, or help fight corruption,5 structure—from telecommunications backbones all of which considerably improve local governance to customer services—is just starting to be devel- and have a positive impact on development. From oped, at a very rapid pace. Chinese companies are that perspective, reducing the “digital divide” be- particularly under scrutiny as they gain new markets tween countries and within countries has become in Africa and win public bids to implement telecom- one of the top priorities of development agencies munications technologies.

51 52 Séverine Arsène DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

Several studies focus on the impact of this in- considerably in recent years, not only through aid creasing Chinese presence within the international but also through a range of financial tools that en- aid architecture. For example, they assess whether able Chinese companies to invest in infrastructure Chinese practices could undermine previous efforts development projects. by the international donor community to establish Chinese development aid policy is now coor- norms in terms of international debt, supported ex- dinated by the Chinese Ministry of Commerce port credits, social and environmental standards, or (MOFCOM) and executed through the two Chi- governance and transparency, among others,12 or, nese “policy banks”—China Exim Bank and China on the contrary, whether such practices would give Development Bank. Some of the financing tools African countries an alternative to the neocolonial- used by China fall under the category of “official ism that is embedded in some traditional donors’ development assistance” (ODA) as defined by the practices.13 OECD Development Assistance Committee. They It is not my intention to discuss the impact of generally consist of concessional (subsidized) loans China on development norms in general. Instead, by Exim Bank. According to the China White Paper I would like to outline a number of issues that are on Foreign Aid issued by the Chinese State Council, specific to ICTs and transparency. Africa was the recipient of 45.7 percent of Chinese Indeed, these technologies have important foreign aid in 2009.15 The White Paper on China- stakes in terms of fundamental rights, from freedom Africa Economic Trade and Cooperation, published of expression to privacy to the rule of law.14 The by the Information Office of China’s State Council very rapid development of telecommunications in 2010, states that “from 2007 to 2009, China pro- infrastructures in countries where they were not vided US$5 billion of preferential loans and pref- available so far—and the subsequent adoption of erential export buyer’s credit to Africa. It has also legislation to control them—is a crucial moment in promised to provide US$10 billion in preferential these countries, affecting not just the social, politi- loans to Africa from 2010 to 2012.”16, 17 cal, and economic development but also their state In fact, the main tools of the Chinese develop- security and sovereignty. It has an impact on global ment policy in Africa do not count as “aid,” accord- Internet governance as well. In this paper, I intend ing to the OECD standard (they fall into the cat- to explore the logical tension between these sensi- egory of “Other Official Flows”), although they do tive stakes and the transparency promises that are contribute to infrastructure development. That es- both embedded in ICTs. sentially includes export buyers’ credits (loans with The arrival of new actors like China, which plays or without a preferential rate) and other financial a central role in this development process and may tools that facilitate Chinese corporations’ exports be a game changer, is an excellent lens through in Africa. Deborah Brautigam quotes Li Ruogu, which to explore this issue. president of China Exim Bank, who announced in 2007 $20 billion of export buyers’ credits over three CHINA HAS BECOME A CENTRAL PLAYER IN years. She also mentions that by 2010, China Devel- AFRICAN ICT DEVELOPMENT opment Bank had committed more than $10 billion to projects in Africa in loans at commercial rates. China has been involved in development aid for de- Besides, Chinese policy banks can use “strategic cades as part of its diplomatic strategy. Its influence lines of credit” to help key Chinese corporations in African countries’ development has increased invest in Africa through a combination of sellers’ The Chinese ICT Development Strategy in Africa: Transparency, Sovereignty, and Soft Power 53 credit, export buyers’ credits, import credits, and the Ethiopian telecommunications backbone net- preferential loans. work.22 The Chinese commitment to increase trade and cooperation with African countries was confirmed I. CITIZENS’ RIGHTS by the creation of the Forum on China-Africa Co- operation,18 which has held summits every three One key feature of the discourse about telecom- years since 2000. In a report for the OECD, Martyn munications in terms of development is that ICTs Davies underlines that this is part of a Chinese “state- are supposed to enable more transparent and, there- capitalist” approach, with state-owned companies fore, more efficient governance. ICTs are conceived in key sectors and policy banks through which Chi- as tools for better planning and resource allocation. na can make strategic commitments to Africa. This The digitization of administrations is supposed to enabled China to increase the outbound foreign reduce bureaucratic burdens and increase the effi- direct investment (FDI) in a “countercyclical” man- ciency of public policies. E-government and open ner.19 Although Africa may not be China’s top prior- data are supposed to improve accountability and ity, Chinese aid and, even more important, Chinese transparency. In general, the development of tele- investments in Africa have increased considerably, communications may be a source of empowerment making China one of the key actors in development for civil society. In other words, ICTs not only may in Africa, at a time when contributions from other be a leverage tool for economic development but donors and investors (mainly western countries) also may carry the potential to improve the func- may stagnate or decrease as a consequence of the tioning of democracy itself. global economic crisis. In that perspective, the increasing success of While these investments mostly go to such sec- China in developing countries is puzzling, because tors as mining, resource extraction, energy, or fi- China is one of the earliest and most efficient cen- nancial services, they also fund a certain number sors of telecommunications and particularly of the of important infrastructure projects in the field of Internet in its own territory. The organization Re- telecommunications. For example, the White Paper porters Without Borders qualifies China as an “ene- on China’s African Policy states that “the Chinese my of the Internet”23 because of its censorship prac- Government will step up China-Africa cooperation tices and its repression of cyberdissidents. China in transportation, telecommunications, water con- was also one of the main targets of Hillary Rodham servancy, electricity and other types of infrastruc- Clinton’s speech on “Internet Freedom” in 2010.24 ture.”20 In fact, beyond the question of freedom of As a result, such companies as the Chinese man- speech per se, the specificity of China is to have ufacturers Huawei and ZTE are becoming major bet on ICTs as leverage for economic development players, winning huge contracts to implement tele- without really introducing democracy, which ques- communication networks that are still underdevel- tions the assumption of a link between ICTs, trans- oped in many countries. One of the most striking parency, and democratization. The Internet is part examples is the case of Ethiopia, where, according of the strategy of the Chinese government to mod- to Brautigam, “ZTE was able to offer finance for ernize the country and provide business opportu- the Ethiopian Government’s Millennium Telecoms nities throughout the territory. Administrations are Project, securing a US$1.5 billion deal.”21 In 2008, also supposed to modernize and become more ef- ZTE was chosen as the exclusive partner to build ficient and accountable through the use of ICTs. At 54 Séverine Arsène DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE the same time, ­Chinese citizens’ expression online ing in Sub-Saharan Africa,30 while most countries is tightly controlled and subtly channeled so that in the Middle East and North Africa region use they can let off steam, but they can never seriously various methods of Internet filtering and control.31 question the regime.25 Rebecca MacKinnon calls The differences between countries seem to depend this “networked authoritarianism.”26 on such factors as the level of development of ICT Therefore, one of the main concerns when it infrastructures (the Internet access rate is on aver- comes to Africa is that China may promote its own age much higher in the Middle East and North Af- conception of telecommunication, as both an accel- rica region than in Sub-Saharan Africa, and so are erator of economic development and a tool of social the corresponding censorship technologies) and, control. Indeed, China has the capacity to provide of course, on the type of regime, rather than on the African countries with technologies as well as legal presence of Chinese providers. and practical expertise to censor public opinion and What may have changed, though, is that if re- spy on dissidents. quired by an African government, censorship tech- There are examples of African countries that nologies cannot anymore be purchased exclusively censor telecommunications. Ethiopia strengthened from western companies32 but may be purchased its control of telecommunications substantially in from Chinese companies, which have acquired a the last few years, while engaging in efforts to de- more competitive position in this market. In fact, velop infrastructure (only 1.1 percent of the Ethio- Chinese corporations seem to have similar reputa- pian population has access to the Internet so far).27 tion problems as western companies when it comes The country now uses deep packet inspection to to providing censorship technologies to authoritar- block proxy services such as Tor, allegedly thanks to ian countries. Both Huawei and ZTE have had to technologies provided by China with a $1.5 billion promise to reduce their partnership with Iran after loan.28 Ethiopia is considering legislation that would the fact that they had provided censorship technol- make voice over Internet protocol (VoIP) illegal and ogies was revealed, and also out of concerns about that would give “the ministry of communications the Iranian nuclear projects.33 and information technology the power to supervise As their business is growing, Chinese compa- and issue licenses to all privately-owned companies nies are now putting much work into improving that import equipment used for the communication their image globally, including through transparen- of information,” according to Reporters Without cy efforts. This happens in a context where the ICT Borders.29 The latter measure, which would intro- sector is perceived as extremely sensitive, notably duce a kind of intermediary liability, is one of the because of the cybersecurity and sovereignty issues key characteristics of the Chinese domestic Internet that it raises. control architecture (although holding intermediar- ies liable for content is now prevalent throughout II. TRANSPARENCY, CYBERSECURITY, AND the world). SOVEREIGNTY However, not all the African countries where Chinese companies operate have adopted such pol- Precisely because ICTs bear important democratic icies and censorship technologies. There are great promises, they are particularly sensitive in terms of differences throughout the continent. For example, state sovereignty and public order. For example, the apart from the Ethiopian case, the Open Network vice president of Huawei, Guo Tianmin, announced Initiative has found no evidence of Internet filter- that his company was able to provide the Congolese The Chinese ICT Development Strategy in Africa: Transparency, Sovereignty, and Soft Power 55 authorities with adequate infrastructure for con- Yafang, the chairwoman, used to work for China’s ducting a population census, identity card fabrica- Ministry of State Security.40 Although Huawei is tion, and electoral filing for future elections.34 Al- formally a privately owned company, the personal though the promises brought by such technologies and informal ties that link its leadership to the Chi- are extremely appealing, there are risks such as data nese authorities may be binding (which the Chi- theft (for foreign intelligence) or manipulation (to nese firmly deny). destabilize the country). One may wonder whether Besides, there is a relative lack of transparency it is safe for a country to put such data and power in in Chinese development projects in Africa (and the hands of foreign companies, be they Chinese or elsewhere) and the amounts invested.41 China does other. not report aid to the Development Assistance Com- This concern is emerging at a time when cyber- mittee—whereas other nonmember countries do. security is becoming an important issue in global It is also very difficult to find figures broken down affairs, China and the United States being among by country or by sector. This lack of accurate and the key players of a sort of “cyber war.”35 In this con- up-to-date data about Chinese aid and investments text, the United States and Australia have barred in Africa is a source of concern for the donor com- Huawei and ZTE from participating in bids to munity, which is trying to increase coordination build network construction projects on their terri- efforts in order to improve aid efficiency.42 This is tories.36 Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress investigated particularly paradoxical, since ICTs are usually as- whether the “networking equipment sold could se- sociated with greater transparency. However, this is cretly contain Chinese military technology to spy also a very sensitive and strategic area, that is, in the and interfere with U.S. telecommunications”37 and eyes of the Chinese, not so much about aid but es- concluded that Chinese telecom equipment makers sentially about exports and investment. should be kept from the U.S. market.38 It is notable Indeed, the dynamism of the Chinese banks that the Chinese government also claims that China and manufacturers in this region is primarily an is the victim of many cyber attacks.39 In general, ev- element of the Chinese “going-out strategy.” This ery country in the world is paying more attention to strategy, launched by the Chinese leaders in 2000, cybersecurity and to the impact of ICTs in terms of is an encouragement for Chinese companies to in- state sovereignty. vest abroad in order to reduce the volatility of Chi- True, there is not enough transparency among nese financial assets and expand their markets. The Chinese corporations to be able to dispel concerns handling of the issue by MOFCOM instead of the about cybersecurity. First, there are intricate links Ministry of Foreign Affairs also suggests that the between the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese perspective is now more economic than leadership of the Chinese corporations. This is a diplomatic. In other words, these projects are con- very common feature in China, due to the frequent sidered as a strategic element of the Chinese eco- conversion of political positions into economic re- nomic and industrial expansion, which explains a sponsibilities since the beginning of the 1980’s eco- certain level of secrecy. nomic reforms, but it is considered with particular The Chinese telecommunications companies suspicion in this sensitive sector. For example, Hua- have made some efforts, however, to increase their wei’s founder, Ren Zhengfei, is known for having level of transparency in order to reassure potential held the position of deputy director in the Chinese commercial partners.43 In December 2010, Hua- People’s Liberation Army’s engineering corps. Sun wei opened a “Cyber Security Evaluation Centre” 56 Séverine Arsène DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE in Great Britain44 where they let potential buyers benefit of western countries.47 Indeed, foreign aid test their products for potential threats. In spring is most often conditional upon or designed so that 2011, the annual report of the company, audited contracts are signed with multinational corpora- by KPMG, released for the first time the names of tions from the donor countries. Financial support Huawei’s board members (but only to receive more from international organizations (the International criticism when Sun Yafang’s past at the Ministry of Monetary Fund, the World Bank) is also condition- State Security was revealed, as well as the presence al upon governance reforms that are often consid- of several members of the Ren family in the list).45 ered locally as infringements of sovereignty (priva- Huawei is said to be considering a potential listing tizations, deregulation, suppression of trade tariffs, in the U.S. stock market, which would force Huawei etc.). to disclose even more information.46 In that regard, the relative opacity in which Chi- These transparency efforts highlight the uncom- nese contracts are signed may be considered as an fortable position of the Chinese telecommunica- advantage for African countries that want to keep an tions companies. ICTs are considered to be an ex- upper hand on their own development policies and tremely sensitive area in China, monitored closely on the negotiations with international investors. by the authorities. As such, the lack of transparency Chinese investments are often considered locally as and the links between the party and the company more politically neutral, since they are not tied to are not surprising, just like in any leading economic political conditions and governance reforms. sector in China. At the same time, as industrial gi- But are they really? ants, Huawei and ZTE are supposed to take part in the Chinese “going-out strategy” and conquer new III. THE OPAQUE POWER OF NORMS markets. Although it may be technically possible to implement devices or software enabling some True, the Chinese actors in this field do not seem forms of spying or manipulation, any discovery of interested in changing political regimes or govern- such technologies on Chinese installations could ment practices in Africa. However, investing in ruin the companies’ decade-long efforts to gain Africa as part of the “going-out strategy” is clearly global trust and could seriously hamper profits. In aimed at raising China’s position as a global power. that sense, there is no evidence to support the hy- As such, it is one element of the Chinese govern- pothesis that Chinese companies would be differ- ment’s recently enhanced “soft power” strategy. ent from any of their western counterparts that are Based on Joseph Nye’s theory,48 this strategy aims competing for the same markets and that could also at improving China’s global influence and image raise cybersecurity issues. not only through economic and industrial develop- Actually, from an African point of view, cyberse- ment but also by promoting Chinese language and curity is only one among various sovereignty con- culture, products, trademarks, standards, and tech- cerns. As there are relatively few local resources in nological know-how.49 The global expansion of the terms of technology and know-how, most African Chinese media is a central element of this strategy, countries rely on foreign development projects to particularly in Africa.50 The expansion of Chinese develop their ICT infrastructures. Moreover, de- expertise, technologies, and norms in the ICT field velopment aid in Africa by western organizations is also a crucial element of this strategy. and companies is sometimes considered to be a Indeed, investing in African markets is part of new form of “imperialism” or “colonialism” to the a strategy to climb the ladder of innovation. China The Chinese ICT Development Strategy in Africa: Transparency, Sovereignty, and Soft Power 57 is investing a lot to develop its own technical stan- stakeholder governance gives more influence to dards in order to reduce its dependency on foreign developed countries (particularly to the United technologies and actually start earning royalties. States). These governments and for-profit and not- Moreover, implementing networks based on Chi- for-profit organizations all have better resources for nese technologies in Africa may weigh in favor of lobbying than do those of developing countries. China in the global negotiations over technical This argument seems to resonate with a number of norms. As China is very active in pushing for the developing countries. This year’s negotiations at the adoption of norms that are favorable to the Chinese ITU will be an excellent occasion to assess whether interests in such fora as the Internet Engineering some African countries take positions that are close Task Force (IETF) or the International Telecom- to the Chinese and what they are. munication Union (ITU),51 the fact that China is equipping an important part of the world may result CONCLUSION in a kind of fait accompli. Therefore, it would be in- teresting to look more closely at the technological The fact that new actors like China are acquiring choices involved in these contracts, to assess how an increasingly important role in the development they may shape these countries’ future relationships of new infrastructures in Africa certainly has the with China and with the international community. potential to deal the cards. In the field of informa- Another related issue that will be crucial to look tion and communication technologies, there are at in the near future is whether China will influ- important stakes beyond the field of development ence its African partners’ positions in telecommu- aid, from freedom of speech to cybersecurity and to nications governance. For example, Huawei’s Guo global telecommunications governance. Tianmin recently announced the opening of a new Not all Chinese practices are different from training center in Kinshasa (one of five in Africa).52 western countries’ practices. Chinese companies, Could this have any influence on the opinion of fu- too, are selling technologies that are supposed to ture African ICT experts on these issues? increase transparency and accountability in Afri- As the treaty known as International Telecom- can countries. Chinese companies, too, are selling munications Regulations, which dates back in 1988, technologies that help governments monitor, filter, is being renegotiated in 2012, China is taking very or censor their citizens’ expression. But the well- conservative positions that include the defense of known expertise of China in using ICTs to control digital sovereignty and the transfer of key compe- its own population has shed a new light on the fact tencies to the United Nations through the ITU.53 that there is no direct link between ICTs, transpar- The “multistakeholder” governance scheme that ency, and democratization. This all depends on currently prevails in this field and that allows non- various factors and particularly on the recipient state actors to take part in negotiations certainly country’s political agenda as well as on the people’s does not have the support of China, as it is much appropriation of the technologies. too “volatile,” so to speak, compared to the very As a consequence, the very attempt to study the codified, exclusive standards of intergovernmental Chinese role in “Africa” is very limited. It symboli- negotiation.54 cally implies that African countries would be pas- In this context, China is positioning itself as a sive objects of other entities’ actions, which is not representative of developing countries’ interests, the case. Africa is a very diverse continent, with all arguing (with relatively good reason) that multi- sorts of political regimes, levels of development, 58 Séverine Arsène DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE and local dynamics. At this stage, it seems impor- ordination (though this seems justified) but also by tant to advocate for more specific case studies in a a perceived potential threat to their own interests in series of African countries. Africa.55 Chinese and western companies are also not This puts at the forefront the issue of the politi- that different in that they raise cybersecurity and cal importance of “code” and technical standards.56 sovereignty issues for African countries that put These stakes have remained relatively opaque to the their most sensitive data and government processes public so far, perhaps partly because of their highly into these companies’ hands. All of them are now technical character. Opacity may also be inherently competing to develop, implement, and normalize linked to the development of ICTs as it is shaped new technological standards and therefore exercise now, based on a race to impose proprietary tech- power on the people and countries that will use nologies. Therefore, one might suggest the idea that them. The very sensitive character of these technol- open source technologies, together with techno- ogies and the geopolitical stakes paradoxically lead logical training, could be an interesting solution to to a certain level of secrecy around the technologies efficiently improve transparency, better guarantee that are supposed to bring more transparency. developing countries’ sovereignty, and avoid getting However, China is different from other coun- trapped in a technological race at the expense of us- tries in that its development projects are most of- ers and citizens. ten not considered as aid but as investment, for the conquest of new markets in the framework of the ENDNOTES “going-out strategy.” More generally, this is part of the Chinese “soft power” strategy, which aims at 1. Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and increasing China’s global power through economic, Accra Agenda for Action (2008). www.oecd.org/datao- technological, and cultural domination. Both Africa ecd/11/41/34428351.pdf. and ICTs are clearly identified as strategic goals in 2. http://www.aideffectiveness.org/busanhlf4/im- that regard. The initiatives to increase transparency ages/stories/hlf4/OUTCOME_DOCUMENT_-_FI- undertaken by such companies as Huawei and ZTE NAL_EN.pdf. are, in fact, only the result of an effort to gain trust 3. Tim Unwin, ICT4D: Information and Communi- in the international markets, not that of a will to cation Technology for Development (Cambridge Univer- increase coordination with other donor countries. sity Press, 2009). Several journals are entirely dedicated The flip side of this coin is that it gives recipient to this field: Information Technology for Development; countries more autonomy in their own political and Information Technologies and International Development; economic choices, whereas governance require- Electronic Journal of Information Systems in Developing ments by other donor countries (including trans- Countries, etc. 4. At the same time, more and more studies warn parency) are perceived as a new form of western against techno-determinism and underline that this in- hegemony. creasing role of ICTs is coming along with a new set of What the Chinese rise underlines is in fact the technological, economic, political, and anthropological hard competition that the world’s biggest techno- issues. See a good bibliography on the blog of Ismael logical powers are involved in and the importance Peña-Lopez, ICTlogy. http://ictlogy.net/bibliography. of developing countries as an enormous stake in this 5. John C. Bertot, Paul T. Jaeger, and Justin M. battle. Western calls for more transparency seem Grimes, “Using ICTs to create a culture of transparency: not only motivated by the need to improve aid co- E-government and social media as openness and anti- The Chinese ICT Development Strategy in Africa: Transparency, Sovereignty, and Soft Power 59 corruption tools for societies,” Government Information eign Aid (Beijing, China: March 21, 2011). http://eng- Quarterly 27: 3 (July 2010): 264-271. lish.gov.cn/official/2011-04/21/content_1849913.htm. 6. World Bank, Information and communication 16. Information Office of the State Council,White for development 2012—Maximizing mobile (Washing- Paper on China-Africa Economic Trade and Cooperation ton, DC: 2012). http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ (Beijing, China: December 2010). http://english.gov. EXTINFORMATIONANDCOMMUNICATION- cn/official/2010-12/23/content_1771603.htm. ANDTECHNOLOGIES/Resources/IC4D-2012-Re- 17. Brautigam estimates that Chinese aid (ODA) port.pdf. to Africa was about $1.2 billion in 2008 and probably 7. World Bank, Information and communications for $1.4 billion in 2009. Deborah Brautigam, “Chinese Aid: development 2009: extending reach and increasing impact What, Where, Why and How much?” in Rising China. (Washington, DC, 2009). http://web.worldbank.org/ Global challenges and opportunities, ed. Jane Golley and WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTINFORMA- Ligang Song (Canberra, Australia: ANU E Press, 2011), TIONANDCOMMUNICATIONANDTECHNOLO- pp. 203–222. http://epress.anu.edu.au/wp-content/up- GIES/EXTIC4D/0,,contentMDK:22229759~menuPK loads/2011/08/ch131.pdf. :5870649~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSite 18. Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (Beijing, PK:5870636,00.html. China). http://www.focac.org/eng/. 8. See their policies at http://www.usaid.gov/our_ 19. Davies, How China is influencing Africa’s develop- work/economic_growth_and_trade/info_technology. ment. 9. Richard Heeks, “The ICT4D manifesto” (Man- 20. Information Office of the State Council,White chester, UK: OECD Development informatics working Paper on China’s African Policy (Beijing, China: January paper series, Institute for Development Policy and Man- 2006). http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200601/12/ agement, 2009). eng20060112_234894.html. Emphasis added. 10. http://www.wikiprogress.org/index.php/ 21. Deborah Brautigam, “Chinese Aid,” pp. 203– OECD_Development_Centre. 222. 11. http://wikigender.org/index.php/New_Home. 22. ZTE Corporation, “ZTE to Help Ethiopia 12. For example, Algeria banned Huawei and ZTE Telecommunications Corporation Build National Net- from bidding in public markets for two years last June work,” ZTE (Beijing, China: July 2, 2008). http:// because employees of both companies were convicted of wwwen.zte.com.cn/en/press_center/news/200807/ bribery. Juha Saarinen, “Huawei, ZTE banned from Alge- t20080703_156835.html. ria,” IT News (June 14, 2012). http://www.itnews.com. 23. Reporters Without Borders, “World Day Against au/News/304858,huawei-zte-banned-from-algeria.aspx. Cyber Censorship” (March 12, 2011) (Paris, France). 13. Deborah Brautigam, China, Africa, and the global http://march12.rsf.org/en/#ccenemies. aid architecture (Abidjan, Ivory Coast: Africa Develop- 24. Hillary Rodham Clinton, “Internet Free- ment Bank, 2010). http://www.american.edu/sis/fac- dom,” Foreign Policy (January 21, 2010). http://www. ulty/upload/Rev-working-paper-china-africa-aid-archi- foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/01/21/internet_ tecture-August-2010.pdf; Martyn Davies, How China freedom?page=full. is influencing Africa’s development (Paris, France: OECD 25. Séverine Arsène, Internet et politique en Chine Development Centre, 2010); Johan Lagerkvist, “For- (Paris, France: Karthala, 2011); Séverine Arsène, eign aid, trade and development,” Occasional UI papers 5 “Chine : Internet, levier de puissance nationale,” Politique (2011). étrangère 2 (2012): 291–303. 14. See, for example, Rebecca MacKinnon, Consent 26. Rebecca MacKinnon, “China’s Networked Au- of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Free- thoritarianism,” Journal of Democracy 22: 2 (2011): 32– dom (New York: Basic Books, 2012). 46. 15. China State Council, China White Paper on For- 27. ITU (Geneva, Switzerland, 2011). http://www. 60 Séverine Arsène DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/explorer/index.html. gate China’s Huawei, ZTE,” PCWorld, November 18, 28. Andrew Jacobs, “China’s News Media Are 2011. http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/ar- Making Inroads in Africa,” NYTimes.com, August 16, ticle/244210/us_committee_to_investigate_chinas_ 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/17/world/ huawei_zte.html. africa/chinas-news-media-make-inroads-in-africa. 38. Jim Wolf and Lee Chyen Yee, “China’s Huawei, html?pagewanted=all. ZTE should be kept from U.S.—draft Congress report,” 29. Reporters Without Borders, “Government steps Reuters, October 8, 2012. http://uk.reuters.com/ar- up control of news and information” (Paris, France: June ticle/2012/10/08/uk-usa-china-huawei-zte-idUK- 7, 2012). http://en.rsf.org/ethiopia-government-steps- BRE89702A20121008. up-control-of-07-06-2012,42735.html. 39. Information Office of the State Council,White 30. OpenNet Initiative, “Sub-Saharan Africa.” Paper on the Internet in China (Beijing, China: June 15, http://opennet.net/research/regions/ssafrica. 2010). http://china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/ 31. OpenNet Initiative, “Middle East and North Af- node_7093508.htm. rica.” http://opennet.net/research/regions/mena. 40. Kevin Brown, “Huawei’s opacity a colourful is- 32. It is useful to note that western corporations like sue for US,” Financial Times, April 19, 2011. http://www. Cisco, McAfee, or Websense sell most censorship tech- ft.com/cms/s/0/65e93b90-6a84-11e0-a464-00144fea- nologies in the world. Helmi Noman and Jilian York, West b49a.html#axzz1uafyc2XQ. Censoring East: The Use of Western Technologies by Middle 41. Sven Grimm, “Transparency of Chinese Aid: East Censors, 2010–2011, OpenNet Initiative, March an analysis of the published information on Chinese ex- 2011, http://opennet.net/west-censoring-east-the-use- ternal financial flows,” University of Stellenbosch (Cape western-technologies-middle-east-censors-2010-2011. Town, South Africa: Centre for Chinese Studies, August 33. Steve Stecklow, Farnaz Fassihi and Loretta 2011). http://www.aidtransparency.net/wp-content/ Chao, “Huawei, Chinese Tech Giant, Aids Iran,” WSJ. uploads/2011/08/Transparency-of-Chinese-Aid_final. com, October 27, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/ pdf. SB100014240529702046445045766515035778232 42. Deborah Brautigam, China, Africa, and the global 10.html; Bryan Bishop, “ZTE follows Huawei’s lead, aid architecture (Abidjan, Ivory Coast: Africa Develop- promises to curb Iran business after surveillance system ment Bank, 2010). http://www.american.edu/sis/fac- sale,” The Verge (March 24, 2012). http://www.theverge. ulty/upload/Rev-working-paper-china-africa-aid-archi- com/2012/3/24/2898835/zte-follows-huaweis-lead- tecture-August-2010.pdf. promises-to-curb-iran-business-surveillance-system. 43. In fact, these transparency efforts seem to be ai- 34. Angelo Mobateli, “Congo-Kinshasa: Kabila in- med at European and U.S. decisionmakers rather than at augure le centre régional Huawei de formation des ex- developing countries. perts,” Allafrica, May 26, 2012. http://fr.allafrica.com/ 44. Huawei, “Huawei Opens Cyber Security Evalu- stories/201205260006.html. ation Centre in the UK” (Beijing, China: December 6, 35. Nick Hopkins, “US and China engage in cyber 2010). http://www.huawei.com/en/about-huawei/ war games,” guardian.co.uk, April 16, 2012. http://www. newsroom/press-release/hw-093468-ukcenter-security. guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/apr/16/us-china-cy- htm. ber-war-games. 45. Economist, “Huawei, The long march of the in- 36. Yueyang (Maggie) Lu, “Australia Bars Huawei visible Mr. Ren,” June 2, 2011. http://www.economist. From Broadband Project,” NYTimes.com, March 26, com/node/18771640. 2012. http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/technol- 46. Spencer E. Ante, Telis Demos and Anupreeta ogy/australia-bars-huawei-from-broadband-project. Das, “China’s Huawei Considers an IPO [initial public html. offering],” Wall Street Journal, October 4, 2012. http:// 37. Michael Kan, “US Committee to Investi- online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390443493304 The Chinese ICT Development Strategy in Africa: Transparency, Sovereignty, and Soft Power 61

578036860213855012.html. van Beijnum, “ITU bellheads and IETF netheads clash 47. Y. Z. Ya’u, “The new imperialism & Africa in the over transport networks,” ars technica (March 03, 2011). global electronic village,” Review of African Political Econ- http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/03/ omy 31: 99 (2004): 11–29 ; Olivier Sagna, “De la domi- itu-bellheads-and-ietf-netheads-clash-over-mpls-tp.ars. nation politique à la domination économique: une his- 52. Mobateli, “Congo-Kinshasa: Kabila inaugure le toire des télécommunications au Sénégal,” tic&société 5: centre régional Huawei.” 2–3 (2012). http://ticetsociete.revues.org/1030 ; Jørn 53. Robert McDowell, “The U.N. Threat to Internet Støvring, “‘The Washington Consensus’ in relation to the Freedom,” WSJ.com, February 21, 2012. http://online. telecommunication sector in African developing coun- wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204792404577 tries,” Telematics and Informatics 21: 1 (2004): 11–24. 229074023195322.html; Ben Woods, “Schmidt: UN 48. Joseph S. Nye, Soft power: the means to success in treaty a ‘disaster’ for the internet,” ZDNet UK (Febru- world politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). ary 29, 2012). http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/regula- 49. Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, “Sources and tion/2012/02/29/schmidt-un-treaty-a-disaster-for-the- limits of Chinese ‘soft power’,” Survival 48: 2 (2006): 17– internet-40095155/. 36. 54. For more details, see Milton Mueller, “China 50. Jacobs, “China’s News Media”; Iginio Gagliar- and Global Internet Governance,” in Access contested, ed. done, Maria Repnikova and Nicole Stremlau, China in Ronald Deibert, Rafal Rohozinski, and Jonathan Zittrain Africa: a new approach to media development? (University (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012): 177–194. http:// of Oxford, 2010). http://stanhopecentre.org/china-afri- access.opennet.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/ ca/mod/file/download.php?file_guid=1926. accesscontested-chapter-09.pdf. 51. See the examples of the WLAN Authentication 55. Joanne Wagner, “‘Going Out’: Is China’s Skillful and Privacy Infrastructure (WAPI) standard or the Mul- Use of Soft Power in Sub-Saharan Africa a Threat to U.S. tiprotocol Label Switching (MPLS). Christopher Gib- Interests?” Joint Force Quarterly 64 (July 2012). http:// son, “Technology Standards—New Technical Barriers to www.ndu.edu/press/chinas-use-of-soft-power.html. Trade?” The standards edge: golden mean, ed. Sherrie Bolin 56. Lawrence Lessig, Code and other laws of cyber- (Ann Arbor, MI: The Bolin Group, 2007). http://papers. space (New York, Basic Books, 1999). ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=960059; Iljitsch

Complicating the Already Complicated: Diplomacy, Development, and the New Media Gerald F. Hyman

The core of diplomacy has varied little for close to a paradigms (diplomacy and development), but it has millennium. It involved exchanges of emissaries be- brought nontrivial change. For one, the object of, tween sovereigns: kings, queens, emperors, sultans, and conduit for, diplomacy and development is no and chiefs. The eighteenth century brought elected longer always the state or the sovereign, the result sovereigns. The nineteenth and certainly the twen- most obviously of the attacks of September 2001 tieth century brought the nation-state and much on New York and Washington and the resulting but more immediate methods of communication be- new fixation on terrorism and conflict within states tween capitols and their emissaries—telegraph and and internationally through opaque networks for telephone, for example—so instructions could be which state boundaries are irrelevant. For another, more specifically tailored and diplomatic discretion the modes of communication inside and, more im- reduced, but the basic pattern remained. portantly, outside government, have changed mark- Similarly, the first few decades of development edly. Governments are only one kind of actor, and assistance after the end of World War II created a generally their domestic and international control fairly consistent pattern among donors and between has diminished, partly as a result of globalization, donors and recipients. The donors’ objective was to partly as a result of internal and external conflict, contribute to creating consistent improvement in partly because governments in many states have the countries in which they were engaged. Indeed, lost the monopoly of force and also of communica- the mission of the U.S. Agency for International De- tions, partly for a myriad of other reasons. Perhaps velopment (USAID) was “sustainable development’ more important, the formerly secondary “public in “sustainable development countries,” the vocabu- diplomacy” has become more central. Public per- lary most articulately employed during the Clinton ceptions are now more pivotal to diplomacy. Secret administration but that also characterizes previous agreements and personal relations are less binding administrations and is characteristic as well of the than they once were. Still important, they no lon- other bilateral donors and the multilateral donors, ger suffice to define interstate relations, if they ever like the World Bank and its sister regional banks. did. Similarly, development projects can no longer It would be hyperbolic to say that the past de- be simply the result of quiet agreements between cade has brought dramatic change to those two diplomatic or assistance emissaries and prime

63 64 Gerald F. Hyman DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

­ministers, presidents, or kings. The result is some, sions, and stoke hatred and violence. It is part of the again, nontrivial change in both diplomacy and de- work of this new era to maximize the advantages of velopment and in their interconnection. the new information age and to minimize its disad- Two features, in particular, help define the new vantages. landscape of diplomacy and development, at least for the United States. First, the new media have DIPLOMACY AND DEVELOPMENT: created a much more transparent environment in THE HISTORICAL RELATIONS which everything is now public, or at least should be assumed to be public, because soon enough it will Notwithstanding the mistaken nostalgia of much be. As a minor corollary, the connection between of the foreign assistance community, development diplomacy and development is now also more vis- was never truly independent of foreign policy and ible. The consequences are mixed. The public is diplomacy in the United States, or, for that mat- now far more exposed, and therefore engaged, in ter (again notwithstanding widespread views to the intricacies of diplomacy that were once under- the contrary), among the other donors either. In taken in quiet discussions and paneled offices. That fact, Congress has for decades divided the omni- engagement “democratizes” the relations between bus International Affairs Budget, the so-called 150 countries, including their assistance relations. But account, into ten or twelve subaccounts of which it can also expose the discussions of statecraft “pre- only one, for Development Assistance (DA), is the maturely,” while they are still being fashioned and budget normally associated with broad, sustainable molded. It can also expose classified information development goals.1 that harms a variety of legitimate interests including One such other account is, probably mislead- the bargaining position of any or all of the parties in ingly, called Economic Support Funds (ESF). If the a relation. Second, relations between coherent states Development Assistance account supports primar- is only one dimension of diplomacy, albeit still per- ily long-term sustainable development allocated to haps the dominant one. Fragile, failing, fragmented, countries whose policies and performance justify and conflict-ridden societies (not just states) are confidence that U.S. assistance will contribute to also part of the diplomatic and developmental en- their developmental progress, ESF is allocated pri- vironment, and they create very different kinds of marily for foreign policy reasons and covers a wide problems: How does a state relate to an entity with range of projects, only a fraction of which deal di- formal legal character but unable really to speak for rectly with economic issues. While DA has in the its citizens let alone to claim the old sine qua non for past been programmed almost entirely by USAID, a state: monopoly of legitimate force and authority? the official development agency, ESF has always In effect, the world has become more transpar- been under the policy direction of the Department ent, mostly for the better but with complications of State. The State Department decides, in some for diplomacy, development, and their connections. degree of partnership with USAID, the countries to Publics know better what their governments, cor- which ESF should go, the amounts for each country, porations, and other centers of power are doing. and (more recently) what should be done with it. Autocrats cannot hide but neither can democrats. State’s regional bureaus make their requests through Groups can organize better, more cheaply, and more the secretary of State to the Office of Management anonymously to oppose torture, abuse, and tyranny and Budget, and the State regional bureaus are but also to inflict terror, exacerbate communal ten- at least the senior partners in the country budget­ Complicating the Already Complicated: Diplomacy, Development, and the New Media 65

­determinations. The degree of their partnership provided to North Korea beyond the amounts of with USAID has varied from region to region, time the past, not only because the chronic famine has to time, and sometimes from person to person. But worsened but also as part of the Six-Party Talks until recently, State has not normally directly imple- aimed at the disclosure and reduction of its nucle- mented assistance programs. It has relied on US- ar resources, research, and potential for weapons. AID to make the actual grants or contracts. So State Moreover, South Sudan received millions of dollars has traditionally laid out the policies, while USAID in assistance, initially primarily humanitarian relief has designed the specific programs and managed in the “rebel-held” part of Sudan, now to help it suc- the funds.2 ceed as an independent country. Most thematic (as But if foreign policy has determined assistance opposed to geographic) bureaus at State now have levels and policies, assistance has also been a part of assistance programs. The amount of ESF was not foreign policy. It has been one of the tools available reduced after the Cold War nor were its purposes to diplomacy for influencing the policies of other systematically reconsidered once the lens of Soviet states. State has used it as one incentive among containment was removed. Instead, the door was several to gain allies and affect behavior.3 In that re- opened for a florescence of creativity at Foggy Bot- spect, it has both shaped and mirrored the relations tom, as almost any project in almost any bureau was between the United States and other counties coun- fair game. So for a while at least, ESF was a potential tries at least since the Marshall Plan and (during the source of funding for a lot of different projects in a Cold War) the policy of containment, in both cases lot of different countries, some large and important over a decade prior to the creation of USAID. For to core foreign policy and security considerations, example, Turkey received ESF in part because of its others definitely not. If anything, it might be argued geostrategic position astride the Bosphorus and the that greater conceptual and policy discipline should Dardanelles, in part because of support by the Turk- be reasserted over the many foreign policy princi- ish military, and in part because of Incirlik Air Base. ples that drive ESF funding. Similarly, the Philippines got substantial amounts of ESF primarily because of U.S. access to Clark Air Force Base and Subic Bay Naval Base, not as much TERRORISM, INSURGENCY, AND CONFLICT because of its development record. Egypt is the classic case, with a $750 million assistance package That discipline and purpose have to some extent because it signed the Camp David agreements and been supplied not by some positive conception of made its peace with Israel. national interest or development but, unfortunately, Even after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and by the tragedy of September 11. The first direct -at then the Soviet Union—so after the Cold War— tack on the United States came, ironically, not from Congress created two totally new ESF-like assis- the military strength of the industrialized Soviet tance accounts. One was for Central and Eastern empire for which the West had developed such ex- Europe, and later another was for the countries of tensive doctrine and defense. It came instead from a the former Soviet Union itself both with special as- few dozen, at most a few hundred, barely armed reli- sistance coordinators, in both cases housed at State. gious zealots who developed their plans in the caves Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger and villages of a barely agricultural collection of was the first coordinator for the counties of Central violent internecine rivalries between ethnic groups, and Eastern Europe. Substantial food aid has been tribes, and clans. 66 Gerald F. Hyman DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

Two effects for the relation between diplomacy commanders with sometimes large amounts of ac- and development resulted. The first and most obvi- tual cash to distribute to local individuals, groups, ous were the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq together or “governmental” structures. In theory, CERP was with the subsequent doctrine of counterinsurgency, for projects, but “projects” sometimes as individual revised from that of Vietnam. Shock and awe may as rebuilding a family home, opening or stocking a have been enough to dislodge both the Taliban small store, or repairing an irrigation sluice. Some- and Saddam Hussein, but they were insufficient to times these very funds were retaxed by the insur- secure the peace, stability, and comity necessary gents so, in effect, the United States was funding the to stabilize these countries. Instead, the United insurgency with its own counterinsurgency funds. States was engaged in two unconventional, “asym- Of course, there were no committees or formal pro- metric” wars: nine years in Iraq, eleven years (and cedures attaching to the CERP funds. They were still counting) in Afghanistan. As in Vietnam, these immediate, tactical tools. were more than just military encounters and re- Moreover, even the hundreds of millions, in fact quired more than just a military engagement. The the billions, of dollars available through what pur- latest iteration of counterinsurgency doctrine, de- ported to be normal channels of assistance were veloped under General David Petraeus and encod- also in fact at the immediate service of the counter- ed in Army Field Manual 3-24, has been abbreviated insurgency effort, under the very strong influence of ‘shape, clear, hold, and build’ and is centered not on the military and under the very direct authority and pure military targets but on the populations that instruction of the ambassador. So, if the ambassador support the insurgency. The “shape and clear” part and the commanding general or their immediate is almost entirely military. The “hold” part is both subordinates (themselves sometimes ambassadors military and civilian. The “build” part is, at least and generals) thought that improving irrigation sys- conceptually, primarily civilian and framed in de- tems or education systems or court systems was im- velopmental terms. Hundreds of billions of dollars portant to the counterinsurgency, they were fund- have been programmed to “build” (Afghanistan) or ed, often without the design or monitoring efforts “rebuild” (Iraq), and that counts only the portion that accompanied normal assistance programs. In- provided by the United States, never mind the bil- deed the State and USAID civilians attached to the lions provided by other countries. military, for example in provisional reconstruction However, no matter what their term, they were teams (PRTs), were often overwhelmed with the provided not through the development or even the immediate security imperatives to move money and direct foreign policy procedures of State and US- implement projects and were so confined physically AID applicable to the other, nearly one hundred for their own security that they could not have un- countries in which the United States provides as- dertaken anything like regular design and monitor- sistance, but in the case of counterinsurgency under ing efforts even had they been allowed the latitude the disciplines and procedures of an active war. As to do so. in Vietnam, the assistance programs became instru- As between diplomacy and development, the ments of the counterinsurgency effort. Moreover, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts the military itself had enormous amounts of fund- also forged different relations of State and USAID, ing available quite apart from the civilian assistance diplomacy and development, in Washington and, budgets. For example, the Commander’s Emer- after the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development gency Response Program (CERP) provided local Review (QDDR), in most “normal” countries.4 Complicating the Already Complicated: Diplomacy, Development, and the New Media 67

For example, in the PRTs in Iraq and Afghanistan, tic, internal conflicts is not the same as normal state- which were the most local unit for military but also state diplomacy or sustainable development. And to for “diplomatic” and “development” or reconstruc- the extent that Secretary of State Hillary Rodham tion efforts, the military have far outnumbered the Clinton’s QDDR retains much salience, conflict civilians—in no small part because the civilian side prevention is now “a core mission” of State and US- often could not provide the needed personnel or AID.7 And Conflict and Stabilization Operations is their duration—and, at least as important, were now the name of a new bureau (and an attendant as- under the direct command of the senior military of- sistant secretary) at State. The attempt to intervene ficer. Development projects were almost totally at in domestic conflicts may well be a fool’s errand, the immediate service of the military’s security and not the proper state-to-state work of diplomacy or pacification objectives although, to be fair, those ob- even development, but for the moment it has taken jectives contained “build” and “hold” dimensions, a central place in both State and USAID. No doubt not just “kinetic” efforts to “clear.” Still, especially in the cancer of conflict, especially if it crosses borders the context of an exposed forward base, the military and creates regional instability, even global terror- calls the shots, and the civilian programs, diploma- ism, creates the need for unusual engagements. Cer- cy as well as development, serve the security dimen- tainly it requires a change in roles, procedures, and sion. This is perhaps the right order, since security is paradigms. the sine qua non for everything else, including the Those constitute the second effect of counterter- safety of the diplomacy and development staff. The rorism on the relation between diplomacy, develop- State and USAID officers there are under the -au ment, and security. In addition to its involvement in thority of the military commander (not surprising, actual battleground states, the Department of De- since the PRTs are primarily military units) and, as fense is now engaged in both diplomacy and devel- between the two, the USAID officer often reports opment in a qualitatively different way, geographi- directly to the State officer, not the commander.5 So cally and substantively. The diversion of its attention the pecking order is: military; State; USAID. Diplo- from states that directly threaten the security of the macy, in these environments, had little to do with United States to those that threaten regional stabil- geostrategic alliances and high foreign policy. De- ity anywhere in the world has broadened its scope velopment had little to do with long-term economic dramatically. And with that broader scope has come or social improvement. Both had to do with pacify- the use of Defense funding and Defense engage- ing the area and “turning” the loyalties of the local ment in entirely different settings, including diplo- population to the (usually central) government, and macy and development. all of the U.S. government officers used their respec- The creation of an entirely new command—Af- tive tools for those purposes.6 ricom—is only the most obvious example. No state To the extent that conflict in general and insur- in Africa has the intention, let alone the capacity, to gency more particularly have become more central threaten U.S. security except in the most derivative to U.S. foreign and development policy globally, the sense that they always did: their natural resources; peculiar paradigms of counterinsurgency in Iraq bases that could be built by and made available to and Afghanistan have also leaked into the more states potentially posing real threats; votes in in- usual goals, relations, and procedures of State and ternational bodies; and the like—all of which have USAID, of diplomacy and development more gen- ­become less important since the end of the Cold erally. Preventing, mitigating, or resolving domes- War. However, if regional stability in Africa is a 68 Gerald F. Hyman DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

U.S. security interest, and if guarding the security never mind Somalia or Pakistan, are now qualita- of every African state from the possibility of insur- tively different. rection and instability and therefore the possibility of providing a haven for operatives of Al Qaeda or THE INFORMATION AGE some other terrorist group is also a national secu- rity interest, and if virtually every African state has The new age of widespread and immediate informa- significant potential for instability, then the entire tion more than complicates these changes in pur- continent and all its fragile states warrant national poses, roles, resources, procedures, and paradigms. security attention and therefore participation by the The wide availability of new media, especially social Department of Defense and the National Security media, has changed both the domestic and the in- Council. Regional stability in Africa, a secondary ternational dynamics themselves. And it has done national security issue for diplomacy and defense so in the new context of fragility and conflict as well during the Cold War, is now front and center. In- as in the older, more traditional context of formal deed, the dispersal of national security threats so state-to-state diplomacy and development. That broadly defined as “instability” changes the pur- availability has affected relations with every kind poses, the participants, and the calculations of both of country and almost every kind of context, from diplomacy and development. autocratic regimes to civil wars to humanitarian di- So every country review now necessarily in- sasters to classified materials and to what were once cludes a serious consideration of conflict and in- state secrets. stability, part of the core missions of State and The most obvious effect of the new information USAID under the QDDR. Under the National Se- environment is on the relation between the United curity Strategy of 2010, they also become part of States and other governments. The old control by the “whole-of-government approach” to that coun- central authorities over capital-intensive, nondigital try, including the direct involvement of Defense media with large plants and equipment—newspa- resources and interests, which has had many mul- pers, television, and radio—has now been eroded. tiples of the resources available to State or USAID. Where the previous first targets of many coup at- Those resources are now potentially available to the tempts were the capital garrisons, the airports, the diplomacy and development programs in areas of rail links, and the television and radio stations, conflict. And not just potentially. In fact, transfers those traditional media outlets (the objects of skir- have been made from the Defense budget to State mish precisely because they had virtual monopolies and USAID for programs that would otherwise on communication with the public) are now far less have been less well funded or funded not at all.8 In- relevant both to the dissemination of information deed, somewhat unseemly appeals have been made and to the ability to mobilize and organize support- by State and USAID to consummate such transfers ers and opponents.9 Ordinary information, not just and thereby to incorporate Defense into what had about crises like coups, is now also widely available, been purely State or USAID interests. So the actors, quite apart from official sources and whatever the procedures, and paradigms of traditional diploma- wishes of the current government. cy and development have shifted markedly to the No doubt, governments still retain extensive extent that stability and conflict prevention have powers to regulate information flows even with the become central security purposes. Diplomacy and new, more mobile, and more individualized sources development in a country like Sri Lanka or Congo, of transmission, but their powers are much dimin- Complicating the Already Complicated: Diplomacy, Development, and the New Media 69 ished, and they carry greater costs. Even if a govern- risks of and exposure to reprisals notwithstanding ment can in theory close down the Internet or cap- the new countermeasures governments can take to ture cellphone towers and perhaps block satellite discover users’ identities. dishes, doing so in practice is not so easy, especially Perhaps more important as a practical matter, given the ability to send signals from neighboring the secrecy on which autocratic governments have countries.10 Moreover, doing so would also shut relied in order to avoid violence and retain control down much commerce, make the country much has clearly eroded. Much more is known by their less attractive to foreign investors, make domestic publics and at much lower costs. The oldsamizdat information harder to receive for the government’s dependence on ragged mimeographed, photo- intended audiences, and carry other domestic and copied, or even printed sheets of soon-tattered pa- international consequences. In that sense, govern- pers surreptitiously passed from person to person ments are much more vulnerable to public opinion has been replaced by cellphones, instant messages, and, in theory, commensurately more accountable twitters, and the Internet. More people know what irrespective of their governmental form and purely fewer once suspected no matter how great the con- as a result of the new media. More important, the trol of the government. And as the “color revolu- ability to organize antigovernment coalitions and tions” in Eastern Europe pioneered and the recent activities has increased through the new media, so revolutions in Northern Africa have advanced, so- even authoritarian governments are more vulner- cial networking has introduced much enhanced able, perhaps in some senses more accountable, tools for organization in all settings, but with espe- through these new channels of information and cially important effects in autocratic regimes. There, opinion.11 while social media certainly do not equalize organi- Naturally, the reality is more complicated. First, zational strength, they reduce the dramatic dispar- authoritarian governments still control a prepon- ity between the government and its critics. With derance of assets, so accountability is more compli- a Google executive in the spotlight on Facebook, cated. Second, true accountability requires ordinary the Internet, and short message service (texting) mechanisms to which governments are answer- (SMS), Egypt last January is the most obvious il- able, not protest demonstrations, insurgencies, and lustration but hardly the only one, especially in the coups. Absent fair elections, the rule of law, and Arab world. Dissident Shiites are using social net- institutional checks and balances, institutional ac- working sites to organize protests in Bahrain (and, countability would seem to rely on extraconstitu- in the process, challenging their traditional spokes- tional procedures (rather than embedded structures men in the more compromising and participating and procedures), and that kind of accountability is Al Wefaq). The new media have been instrumental crude, hard to direct, very difficult to organize, and as well in arousing Sunnis in Lebanon, anti-Khadaffi with uncertain results. Protests and insurgencies forces in Libya, and apparently almost everyone in do sometimes arise spontaneously, as the events in Tunisia. Tunisia demonstrate. But publics are much more But the authoritarian or semiauthoritarian con- likely to endure years of privation and control than text is only the most obvious case. Relations be- to revolt, especially when security services use force tween the United States and nonautocratic states, and intimidation. Nevertheless, the new media have indeed traditional diplomacy and assistance, have made anonymity, hence some measure of protec- also been affected by the 24/7, instantaneous tion, more feasible and have therefore reduced the new information environment. Sometimes it has 70 Gerald F. Hyman DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

­improved relations. Humanitarian disasters, for ex- multiple and more complex ways for the same rea- ample, like the earthquakes and tsunamis in Indo- sons: blogs, amateur journalists, and messages from nesia or Japan (then compounded by the meltdown the combatants themselves. of the Fukushima reactors) or the floods in Pakistan Beyond just raising awareness of these various were instantaneously on personal computer and conflicts, the new media and the new information cellphone screens as well as television. No presiden- environment have provided sustained, if sometimes tial or prime ministerial explanations of what had sporadic, coverage and analysis of the conflict dy- happened, of the widespread devastation and death, namics, the successes and failures of their various or of the continuing disasters were necessary to gal- adversaries, the attempts to reach some accommo- vanize public support for relief efforts. The scramble dations, and the possible shape of resolutions. Un- at State and USAID is now more frequently to keep like conflicts involving the major powers (like Iraq, ahead of reports about disease, corruption, and Afghanistan, and even Colombia), the major media coups, and their implications for the United States. cannot sustain coverage of the (unfortunately) doz- The clamor for action, often generated by nongov- ens of “minor” conflicts. But because the actual pro- ernmental organizations (NGOs) backed by news duction costs of the new media are so marginal and reports or documentaries, prompts spokespersons the costs of entry are so low, a small but committed to discuss the complexity of relations and “the need cadre of “citizen journalists”—itself a new develop- for balance and patience” as against justifications ment within the media—and a devoted readership for engagement as in the past. Cooling things down can sustain some coverage of even highly localized may now be at least as common as revving them up. conflicts, like Chechnya, the Kivus, and the Rohing- Similarly, conflicts and civil wars in what earlier ya. Moreover, that coverage spills over into the ma- were exotic, even unknown, places have become jor media channels from time to time and, partly for common subjects in the media, often first in the that reason, keeps these conflicts on the diplomatic new media and then in the more traditional ones. and assistance agendas where they otherwise prob- How much attention would an isolated place like ably would not have been. Darfur have received two decades ago; how sus- Still, multiple, complicated, and interwoven tained would the isolated story have been; and who factors and interests do not fit neatly into tweets of would have cared? In that respect, Darfur is the sto- 140 characters. But the globalization of interests, ry of the social media and celebrity advocacy driv- relations, contexts, information, opinion, and advo- ing traditional diplomacy or at the least keeping the cacy has created a much more sophisticated public diplomatic cauldron hot and far more central than of quasi-Metternichians, even at bars, picnics, and it would otherwise have been. The story is similar, school meetings. High school students in Iowa or though less central (perhaps precisely because less Nevada have “friended” their equivalents in Para- prominent) in Chechnya, the Kivus, Tibet, Xinji- guay, Malawi, and Bangladesh. A campaign debate ang, and Rohingya (How many people ever knew on the better course as between confrontation and or ever heard of the Rohingya, let alone about their force on the one side and diplomacy and sanctions treatment within Burma?). These are otherwise on the other to entice nuclear reductions in Iran perhaps unnoticed (and therefore inconsequential) would probably not have had much staying power conflicts now at center-stage as a direct result of ex- half a century ago when President Kennedy and posure through the efforts of blogs and instant mes- President Nixon squared off in the first televised sages. Iraq and Afghanistan have been covered in presidential debate, nor would the intricate dynam- Complicating the Already Complicated: Diplomacy, Development, and the New Media 71 ics within the present Israeli cabinet about a first tell and what to keep to themselves: “My goodness, strike on Iran. The complexities exposed by the new you’re ugly.” information and opinion environment have defi- Similar but more graphic than the Wikileaks ca- nitely complicated but also enriched and exposed bles were the various photos from Iraq and Afghani- the work of diplomacy and development, especially stan that were initially sent to specific recipients but for a democracy in which both ultimately depend then “went viral,” and with striking consequences: on public support. The photos of naked Iraqi prisoners, especially the Beyond merely creating the context and beyond pyramid, from Abu Ghraib; the four marines urinat- the potential transformation of governments, the ing on the bodies of dead Taliban; and the photos of new media affect the normal course and conduct Korans (admittedly desecrated by the Taliban with of traditional diplomacy. They have the power to secret messages) incinerated with garbage rather expose facts to which diplomacy is obligated to re- than turned over to the Afghans or destroyed in a spond. The Wikileaks cables are the most obvious religiously appropriate way. The photos and reports example. Albeit the result of a theft of clearly classi- from Afghanistan, which in previous times would fied materials by an army private with security clear- have been confiscated before they were published ance and unaccountably broad access to material or which some discreet editor or publisher might he had no need to know, it did more to embarrass have embargoed for a period, at the very least dis- the United States and its officials than actually to turbed negotiations between the coalition forces, expose serious secrets. The publishers of the leaks the government of Afghanistan, and the Taliban. were immune from prosecution under the first The Abu Ghraib photos ignited global revulsion amendments, but the actions of those who stole the and were instrumental in the closure of Abu Ghraib material and who made it available were not. Still, and, however independent, were cited to support al- at least in this case, the leaks exposed nothing not legations of torture at the Guantanamo Naval Base already known or well suspected. They did expose camp for “enemy combatants.” The reaction by Af- candid assessments and gossip better left private, ghans to the Koran burnings far exceeded their re- at least from the perspective of good relations, de- actions to various reports about deaths of civilians cent etiquette, and (most important) future access. during coalition night raids, affecting development Even in common parlance, diplomacy carries the projects as well as the no-longer-secret diplomatic connotation of tact and discretion, hence the idea negotiations in the Gulf. At the very least, these ex- of “being diplomatic” even in everyday social set- posures increased the volatility of the negotiations tings. Not everything that is known, believed, or and the immediate tactical postures of the parties. suspected needs to be said out loud and certainly Moreover, quite apart from legal liability (which not publicly. Ordinary human intercourse, and cer- was clearly unlikely), the Wikileaks cables and the tainly official diplomacy, depends on the opposite: viral photos created for the mainstream media di- not being public about it is better left private, that lemmas similar to but much less consequential than so-and-so has deteriorated physically or mentally, the publication of the Pentagon Papers during the or has had an affair, or has made unfavorable or em- Vietnam War controversies. What should be pub- barrassing comments. As Molière’s Alceste came to lished? What should be withheld? What should be understand, always telling the truth may be what delayed? What material should be redacted? Who parents initially instruct their children, but as those would be hurt? Who would be “victimized”? How children grow, they also learn what “white lies” to engaged were they? How “innocent”? And so forth. 72 Gerald F. Hyman DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

But those dilemmas were clearly absent from the Deviating from hard official lines or initial princi- social media precisely because of their anonymity ples, especially through testing alternative compro- and individuality and the inability to control them. mises, is rendered more difficult by fear of exposure. Cellphones with cameras are everywhere, captur- Transparency and exposure, and the fear of both, ing everything, profound and prosaic alike. Anyone make all of that more difficult. So, the negotiation with a cellphone is a photojournalist; anyone with process, with its inherent give-and-take and its ulti- Twitter is a commentator. No editor or publisher mate requirement for some degree of compromise, second-guesses the wisdom of exposure. Everyone can be impeded, not aided, by transparency. with access has the ability to publish. As a result, Apart from the difficulty of negotiations them- everything that can be broadcast almost certainly selves, the increased transparency and volatility will be. There is no filter. Everything is transparent. created by the new media have rendered planning There is therefore only downside for a mainstream and long-term strategy for even ordinary diplomatic publisher to exercise discretion and withhold infor- relations more risky than before, precisely because mation that will surely be viral anyway. the uncertainties have grown. No one knows where For governments, particularly democratic gov- or when the next shoe will drop or what it will be. ernments, such transparency has dual effects. It In addition to the origin of change, the new media illuminates without favoritism. It clarifies those have also increased the volatility of change. aspects of diplomacy and development that most So what are the consequences? Not all are del- evidence positive intentions. But it also clarifies eterious. Perhaps the propensity of governments those aspects that are not so positive, for example to overclassify will be reconsidered. The smaller the so-called “dark arts” of intelligence and covert the amount of material that truly needs to be kept operations. More commonly, though, it merely ex- secret, the greater the ability to protect it. First, it poses analyses, information, policies, contacts, and is simply not possible to protect the enormous compromises that are sensitive or embarrassing. If amount of material classified by the U.S. govern- diplomacy is the art of advancing national interests, ment, and quite a bit is classified primarily because in part through representation and agreements with it would be inconvenient if it were public. Much of counterparts (adversaries as well as partners), those the material carries no real national security stake. agreements are likely to encode common ground Second, too many indiscretions are passed through and reduce differences, which often means some cables, indiscretions that are not really fundamen- kind of compromise. Reaching those agreements tal, some not even germane, to foreign policy. The and compromises most often requires quiet, private temptation by embassies to display their access and conversations and negotiations in which policies (presumably) value back to the capitol is matched and possible options are surveyed and hypothetical by the temptation of recipients there to relish know- positions are explored, all without commitments. ing the hidden intricacies and intimacies (personal When complete commonality cannot be reached, and political) of their foreign counterparts. The they sometimes intentionally include what Henry mainstream press makes public much of what is re- Kissenger has called “constructive ambiguity.” No ally important for policy and, as noted, very little matter the result, the difference between a going-in of what passes for secret will not be well-known in and a coming-out position often gives rise to accusa- the near future. But precisely because of its value tions of hypocrisy, especially when core principles, as gossip or, on occasion, because of its real, useful not just minor details, are seen to be compromised. insight, cables passing on rumor and fact not (yet) Complicating the Already Complicated: Diplomacy, Development, and the New Media 73 public about counterparts (especially adversaries), phone and some “friends” could have had global, their motives, their weaknesses, and the like will viral access. surely continue. Their exposure will embarrass the The most recent illustration of the extent to protagonists and sometimes neuter potential allies. which increased transparency and accompanying Unfortunately, some disclosures will also spoil volatility poses problems for diplomacy is the Chen useful diplomatic initiatives that might have con- Guangchen incident in China. Briefly, a little over tributed to solutions by exposing them before they a week before the annual China-U.S. Strategic and are ripe or by exposing the quiet willingness to ne- Economic Dialogue meeting in Beijing between the gotiate, even to make important concessions, of a two respective foreign and finance ministers, blind protagonist who has taken a hard public line to the human rights activist Chen Guangchen managed to contrary. Certainly, some revelations scuttle the elude the security guards enforcing his house arrest possibility of compromise and conciliation. All of in Shandong Province, then (inexplicably) man- that is more likely with the increased transparency aged through a chain of human rights activists to of the new media. These media are more individ- be driven to Beijing and (even more incredibly) to ual, less institutional—one or a few people with a scale the wall of the U.S. embassy to ask for protec- camera and a computer—in which there are no real tion, notwithstanding a foot injury sustained when standards of probity or ethics and in which there he climbed over his house fence. U.S. diplomats, are, therefore, few peer or organizational pressures including of course the secretary of State herself, or mature supervision over content. were clearly caught between the impulse to protect Take perhaps the most transformative diplomat- Chen; find a solution to his presence in the embas- ic initiative of the last half century: the establish- sy; and continue with the issues, apart from human ment of diplomatic relations between the People’s rights and democracy, the dialogue was designed Republic of China and the United States. The clan- to address. Two decades ago, news of the incident destine negotiations in furtive trips abroad by then- would have been carried on television and in the National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger were newspapers, but certainly hours, probably even a necessarily cloaked in secrecy. Surely the discus- day, later. The new media created instantaneous and sions would have been aborted once they became global coverage without any time for diplomatic ex- public and long before they ripened into agreement. changes to fashion a diplomatic strategy by either The arch-champion of anticommunism, President side, let alone quiet consultations between the two Nixon, would have been unmasked by some blog, countries. After a set of missteps, embarrassing to all text message, or Twitter exposing the trips, their sides, in which Chen left the embassy; was admit- purpose, and their facades. Whether for better or ted to a hospital for his injured foot; was kept apart worse, once public, the exposure and their effects from his wife and family; changed his mind about on U.S. commitments to Taiwan, in fact on the in- forgoing his asylum request; and heard about Chi- ternational legal standing of Taiwan, could well have nese government harassment, even reputed torture, scuttled the diplomatic effort in its fragile infancy, as of his friends and family, the final face-saving solu- those opposed to normalization of relations would tion emerged. He would be allowed by the govern- almost surely have organized a blocking constituen- ment to apply for a visa to study abroad “the same cy. The chances of such an unmasking would have as any Chinese citizen” since, he said, he was only been much higher and the risks much greater in the asking for the rights of any Chinese citizen all along. age of the new media, when any worker with a cell- The solution was fashioned in the full and constant 74 Gerald F. Hyman DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE glare of instant messages, photojournalists, blogs, sets were not being stolen. When called to account Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. There was neither for their complicity, many donors retreat behind the the normal time nor political space for the sensitiv- insipid slogan: “Let’s not hurt the poor twice, first ity of crafting a solution that would satisfy the needs by the corruption and second by a consequent with- of all the parties. As important, the key State offi- drawal of aid.” cials were distracted from the issues and agenda of To take another example, probably most assis- the dialogue by the need to negotiate a solution for tance is not—as advertised—politically neutral. Chen. Incumbents are generally aided. They can point For development, the consequences of transpar- to goods, services, and projects that made life bet- ency and volatility are in general lower than for di- ter for their constituents. To the extent that every plomacy but still evident. True, there is less to hide, government benefits from the provision of a better less need for secrecy. Development activities have life for its constituents, it can point to the benefits long been overt. Indeed, development agencies are it has brought (admittedly through donors, but not perhaps overanxious to publicize their efforts and usually publicly acknowledged by the local authori- unfortunately probably too anxious to claim un- ties). While the government makes or encourages due credit for their impacts. Certainly in the United daily news clips documenting specific (often donor- States, the tendency is to “brand” too much so that funded) development projects—a new school, the foreign recipients will be appropriately appre- water purification facility, electric power plant— ciative for everything that has been (to use USAID’s its formal political opposition is left with mostly version of branding) “brought by the American theoretical critiques. Moreover, domestic provid- people” under the USAID logo. ers (often clients of government officials) are aided Still, there are elements of every assistance pro- concretely, and too many make their appreciation gram that both host governments and donors would known to their patrons in inappropriate ways. prefer to remain nonpublic. Perhaps most obvious Perhaps more pointed are some of the economic is the extent of corruption, particularly the partici- growth and democracy projects. Privatization is of- pation of host-country public officials in it, and its ten seen by local residents as the transfer of public effects even on assistance funds. To take some ob- goods to politically connected cronies at prices well vious examples, corruption by high-ranking host below what a market sale would produce. Insider government officials in the chain of pharmaceuti- privatizations reinforce, sometimes create, crony cals and medical devices is well-known, but donors capitalism with a small, politically created, very prefer to keep the information quiet and absorb the wealthy economic elite. And some privatizations are losses in deference to serving the health needs of the indeed exactly that. Yet the underlying economics large number of poor recipients. More outrageous is are often more complicated. Most publics believe the provision of budget or other financial support that public capital goods (factories, equipment, by bilateral and multilateral donors to countries transportation networks) are far more valuable than whose officials are engaged in illicit financial trans- investors are prepared to pay even in a public and actions, drug trafficking, corruption in the sale of completely honest bidding process. Investor valua- natural resources, and other similar transgressions. tions depend on market returns; public valuations In effect, the taxpayers of the donor counties are are often based on costs already incurred rather subsidizing those crimes and doing so in countries than future profits and therefore market value. So- that would not be quite so poor if their national as- cial media, inherently shorthand and idiosyncratic, Complicating the Already Complicated: Diplomacy, Development, and the New Media 75 are much more likely to emphasize simplistic rather required to intervene. The U.S. government posted than complex accounts and conclusions. Naturally, the $5 million bond required for their release pend- they pay disproportionate attention to the success- ing trial. The U.S. citizens all returned to the United ful as against the unsuccessful investors. States. All of this, including the (in previous times, Likewise, donor-provided political party build- discrete) negotiations, were carried day-by-day on ing programs, even when officially available to all TV, blogs, and instant messages. parties committed to the democratic process, dis- Unlike in real diplomacy, the main donors and proportionately benefit the smaller parties and the recipients have adopted a set of principles, the opposition parties. The lager parties, especially Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, in which they those that have formed the government, do not pledged not merely transparency but partnership in need them, indeed prefer to keep their party strate- providing assistance. The donors have committed gies quiet and internal. In many countries, the par- to harmonize their respective programs and, going ticipants in social media are likely to be opposition- further, align them with the development plans of ists, so perhaps they are less likely to dwell on the the recipient countries that presumably developed disparities of benefits. But democracy proponents and “owned” them; both donors and recipients and their donor benefactors also prefer quiet discre- agreed to mutual accountability and to manage for tion to public transparency. Assistance to democ- results. The underlying paradigm is partnership and racy advocates has long been tolerated so long as it participation. Much of the Paris Declaration is ill has been minor compared to the larger amounts for advised or unworkable in countries that suffer from food, health, education, the environment, and even authoritarianism; major conflict; poor policies; or economic reform . . . and so long as it has been rela- high levels of corruption, nepotism, and cronyism. tively quiet. Without publicity, each government in But in countries benefitting from good develop- the bilateral relation could maintain its position: on ment policies and implementation, the Paris prin- the U.S. side that it was supporting democracy and ciples can produce country ownership, reduction of reform and on the recipient side that the support redundancy, and true partnerships. In those coun- was insignificant, not worth a rupture in relations. tries, transparency is already high, since the donor Greater transparency emboldens reformers, but the and recipient partners are supposedly already in higher profile also increases the risk of disputes. alignment. The mantra of participation, ownership, Embassies are called upon to defend these pro- and alignment means broader accountability to the grams, indeed not just the programs themselves but host country, both to government officials and to also their U.S. and domestic implementers. For ex- the public. At least in theory, every project, grant, ample, when the Supreme Command of the Armed contract, and expenditure is known mutually, can or Forces government in Egypt detained and charged should be publicly posted, and ought to be moni- the U.S. and Egyptian staffs of six U.S. NGOs (in- tored by both donor and recipient governments cluding the National Democratic Institute, the and their respective publics. In an environment of International Republican Institute, and Freedom transparency, the new media have little to expose, House) that were fielding programs in Egypt while although perhaps much on which to comment, and waiting for ministerial approval of their registra- they provide additional mechanisms of transparen- tions—which they had done for years under the cy. Still, there are sensitivities: Who got the funds, Hosni Mubarak government—the embassy, the and how much did they get? For what purposes? Department of State, and the secretary of State were How was the money really spent? and the like. Of 76 Gerald F. Hyman DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE course, that is precisely the level of transparency anonymity, send false instructions, confuse the that is anathema to authoritarian regimes with high adversaries, foil (even subvert) their plans, expose levels of corruption, nepotism, and cronyism. their members, and capture them. At a more prosaic level, the new media have SUMMARY made it harder for the United States and its allies to support problematic governments discreetly in or- The social media are now an inherent part of the der to gain favors, pursue common goals, or at least diplomatic and developmental landscape. For bet- to find limited common ground. They have made it ter or worse, there is no going back, no returning to harder precisely because they create transparency the status quo ante. The transparency that both re- even when and where fog can sometimes be use- flects and creates volatility is also embedded in our ful, perhaps necessary, to practical achievements. current environment. What is gained, and what is The tension between public statements and practi- lost? And, more important, how will statesmen deal cal realities, which have traditionally lent diplomacy with them? an aura of stealthy deals and shady hypocrisy, will No doubt the pace of change has quickened, and grow. So too will the dissonance between diploma- in part because of the new media environment. The cy and certain parts of development. The new me- recent events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya trans- dia can complicate work in conflict environments, formed a region long requiring an explanation for especially when diplomats are forced to negotiate its stability and stagnation into one that makes the with and perhaps even provide compensatory assis- transformative events in parts of Central Europe tance incentives to distasteful combatants who kill, two decades ago seem almost slow by comparison. maim, and rape while they also hold some part of Their conclusion is another matter, perhaps not as the keys to peace. It will be harder as well for diplo- felicitous, but it would be hard to imagine them in mats to work with autocratic or even authoritarian the absence of blogs, Twitters, email, and cellphone governments while their developmental partners text messaging. For similar reasons, it would be hard have programs designed to weaken the hold those to imagine Al Qaeda and its many imitators, includ- government officials have on state-owned enterpris- ing web-based instructions for constructing and es, rents from corruption and nepotism, or political delivering weapons of terrorism, without the new and economic monopolies. Diplomats will be asked media. The new media offer anonymity; the ability to defend precisely the developmental programs to create virtual organizations and communities but designed to undermine their counterparts’ political with real consequences; and the capacity to orga- and economic power. That tension may not be new. nize activity even among colleagues who have never But its exposure by individuals or groups, some- met and cannot know one another’s identity for fear times anonymously, has expanded dramatically. of reprisals. The new media and, to some extent, the new forms of traditional media (for example, ENDNOTES cable and satellite television sometimes originating beyond the borders of a country) can create virtual 1. Among the others are accounts for the Andean communities, but they can also fracture real, exist- Counterdrug Program (ACP); Child Survival (CSH); ing, but fragile ones, as in Pakistan, for example. Foreign Military Financing (FMF); Global HIV/AIDS Meanwhile, the authorities in some countries Initiative (GHAI); International Military Education and search for countertechnologies that will pierce the Training (IMET); International Narcotics Control and Complicating the Already Complicated: Diplomacy, Development, and the New Media 77

Law Enforcement (INCLE); Migration and Refugee As- velopment officers. There are ample examples that -sug sistance (MRA); Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, De- gest the assumption is questionable, especially when the mining and Related Programs (NADR); Peacekeeping PRT commander has more money than good projects, Operations (PKO); and P.L. 480 (food aid). No doubt, spends the funds in ways that enhance corruption, and the assistance provided from these accounts contributes inevitably strengthens certain factions at the relative ex- in some way to development, but only for the special pur- pense of others and that achieve at best short-term gains, poses clearly identified by the titles of the accounts. and also when the lessons of one company or brigade are 2. In recent years, State has become much more ac- not passed along to the successors. Of course, the record tive in determining the details of the assistance programs of “development experts,” especially in areas of conflict, in the countries it identifies, not just the policies and is itself questionable. However, counterinsurgency is the overall budget levels. Post–Cold War, more latitude for exception to the normal Defense, State, and USAID re- policy beyond gaining and assembling allies, punishing lations as contemplated in the various national security adversaries, and containing the Soviet Union increased strategies and in the QDDR, and too much should not State’s bargaining leverage in discussions with recipi- be made of the many anomalies in a counterinsurgency ent countries and, without the fixation on the Soviet environment. Union—who was gaining and who was losing—perhaps 6. For some period in Afghanistan, the entire mili- consequently increased the engagement by State in the tary and civilian effort was designed explicitly “to en- details of their programs. hance the legitimacy and reach of the Government of 3. Without gainsaying a basic interest by State and Afghanistan,” although it became increasingly clear, as its Foreign Service officers in development, diplomats it should have been initially, that no international effort consider assistance a resource available to achieve diplo- could possibly establish the legitimacy of the govern- matic objectives. These are concrete incentives accessible ment of Afghanistan, especially given the levels of cor- to add heft and tangibility to its diplomacy. For that rea- ruption and ineffectiveness of the cliques of Kabul. son, the diplomatic part of the embassy will always try to 7. Department of State, “Preventing and Respond- influence assistance flows to individuals and institutions ing to Crisis and Conflict”, in Leading Through Civilian it would like to bring along to the U.S. side. And for ex- Power: the First Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development actly that reason, the favorite assistance element, albeit Review, 2010 (Washington, DC: 2010). http://www. usually by far the smallest amount, is the flexible “ambas- state.gov/documents/organization/153635.pdf sador’s fund,” which allows the ambassador to provide 8. Section 1207 of the National Defense Authoriza- small but very public assistance to projects of high vis- tion Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (P.L. 109-163) provided au- ibility (ribbon cutting) or to domestic actors the ambas- thority for the Department of Defense to “transfer to the sador wants to influence. These funds may even have a State Department up to $100 million in defense articles, developmental impact and may be put forward as “de- services, training or other support for reconstruction, velopmental,” but development is often not really their stabilization, and security activities in foreign countries.” primary purpose. http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/104687. 4. Of course, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan led to pdf. That authority was renewed in subsequent years the even broader integration of the “three D’s” (defense, albeit with some concern in Congress that such funds diplomacy, and development) in the National Security should properly be appropriated directly, if at all, not Strategy of 2002; the National Security Strategy of 2006; routinely through the Department of Defense. and, in a slightly more diluted way, in the National Secu- 9. Times may not to have changed so radically after rity Strategy of 2010. all: “BAMAKO, Mali—Gunfire rang out over this West 5. That assumes the military and State officers make African capital Monday night as soldiers loyal to the pres- good decisions about the development or “build” dimen- ident [Amadou Toumani Touré] who was deposed in a sion or at least that their decisions are as good as the de- coup in March, appeared to be attempting a countercoup 78 Gerald F. Hyman DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE against the ruling military junta. But by early Tuesday In many ways accommodating to diverse tastes morning the junta aired a message on state television say- and interests, such stations can also feed isolation and ing that it controlled the positions that had been under distortion. The viewers are more likely to share common attack, including the state broadcaster, the city’s inter- attitudes and be impervious to alternative views and national airport and a military base in Kati, the garrison facts, reinforced by like-minded broadcasters who derive village at the edge of Bamako where the military junta their audience and revenues precisely by appealing to and its troops are based, Reuters reported.” New York their viewers’ predispositions and preconceptions. In the Times, “Loyalists of Mali’s Overthrown Leader Appear extreme, these media can easily stoke division, conflict, to Be Attempting Countercoup,” May 1, 2012.http:// and violence, as did some of the registered, in-country www.nytimes.com/2012/05/01/world/africa/mali- radio stations in Rwanda. The difference is that, unlike soldiers-appear-to-have-countercoup-as-goal.html?_ Rwanda, the external stations do not need government r=1&ref=world. complicity, at least not from the government of the coun- 10. Indeed, the proliferation of television broadcast try into which they broadcast. via cable and by satellite—perhaps not new media per se 11. Recent cases exemplify the acceleration of in- but rather an old medium provided in a new way—has formation and the commensurate ability to organize. also transformed the monopoly of news, information, Beyond the Middle East, the “Red Shirt” opposition and analysis. Even when a government forbids satellite in Thailand brought down the government and nearly dishes, they are smuggled in and erected inside people’s caused a constitutional crisis. China experiences hun- homes rather than on rooftops where the security forc- dreds of demonstrations almost daily. Awareness of the es can easily see them. One consequence of the prolif- disparities of income between regions and classes, the eration of programming and stations originating from spread of knowledge and analysis, and the much wider abroad is the splintering of the audience, for example by dissemination of information, all accelerated by the new language, religion, or ethnicity. Rather than a few stations media, have increased protests around the world. Ironi- broadcasting a fairly common narrative in a common cally, improved standards of living, which are responsible “national” language, each “community” has access to, and for the improved access to the media, have often resulted can in a sense create, its own media environment, includ- in more, not less, social protest. ing its own vernacular. Transparency in Aid Programs Andrew Puddephatt

1. AID TRANSPARENCY: INTRODUCTION empower those in receipt of aid and reduce the risks of corruption or misuse of resources, thereby ulti- The policy focus upon transparency has become mately improving the quality of development. widespread in recent years and is far from limited to This paper explores these existing initiatives de- the realm of aid. Indeed, it has become a centerpiece signed to promote transparency with a particular of debates about governance. The growth of ubiq- interest in civil society involvement. The norma- uitous digital communications has enabled both tive assumptions that lie behind these initiatives the supply of and demand for information.1 De- assume that transparency itself will increase the velopments in technology have led to easier access effectiveness of aid by empowering civil society or- to information and, as a consequence, have raised ganizations (CSOs) to monitor aid, by acting as a public expectations about the transparency and ac- disincentive to corruption, and by ensuring broader countability of government activities. While expec- public awareness of aid flows. The relative success tations about the impact of digital communications of country-level, CSO-led initiatives as compared are high, the evidence of their impact is still sketchy to initiatives on the international level will be exam- and unproven. Whether digital technologies make ined. The vast range in the nature of initiatives and aid more effective is a proposition yet to be tested. their relatively recent genesis does mean, however, The effectiveness of aid has long been the center that an assessment of their impact is difficult. of debate. Advocates such as Jeffrey Sachs continue A counterthesis will also be examined, one that to promote the benefits of aid giving, while sceptics points to an unwillingness among donors and im- such as William Easterly and Dambisa Moyo scruti- plementers to be transparent about the impact of nize its ability to truly affect developing countries. their work through fear of a taxpayers’ revolt and an Yet an emerging concern for both advocates and undermining of the multilateral aid industry if the sceptics alike is the manner in which aid programs programs are perceived to have failed. The paper are delivered. It is no longer acceptable for donors will offer an analysis of possible future strategies to- simply to give aid; there is now a call for delivery ward aid delivery that would embrace a risk-taking of aid to be accountable and, above all, transparent. approach founded on the notion of aid as an “invest- This is driven by the belief that transparency will ment.”

79 80 Andrew Puddephatt DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

During the Cold War, aid was shaped by the geo- regular, detailed and timely information on volume, political rivalry between the United States and its al- allocation and, when available, results of develop- lies and the Soviet Union and in its latter stages saw ment expenditure to enable more accurate budget, the emergence of structural adjustment programs. accounting and audit by developing countries.”4 The end of this confrontation changed the focus of This commitment was cemented in Busan in 2011 aid more toward the alleviation of poverty, which with the preparation of the Busan Partnership for led, in time, to increasing concern about the impact Effective Development Cooperation which outlines of aid on recipient countries. During the 1990s, the important developments for aid transparency.5 international aid effectiveness movement began to However, the most recent critical factor in press- take shape. There was a growing realization among ing for transparency in aid programs has been the donor governments and aid agencies that the di- global financial crisis, particularly that facing the verging and frequently conflicting approaches to- United States and Europe. The need for tighter bud- ward aid giving were imposing huge costs on devel- gets has led to a resurgence of commitment to finan- oping countries and making aid less effective. This cial aid transparency in all areas and a greater focus led to a desire to coordinate development. on the effectiveness of spending.6 However, only in the past decade has there been This push for transparency in aid programs has any significant effort to make aid effective. There spawned a range of initiatives such as the Interna- has been increasing concern that aid has not been tional Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), estab- producing the development results expected. There lished in 2008 following the Third High Level- was a need to understand why this was the case and Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Accra. IATI is a to increase efforts to meet the ambitious targets set voluntary, multistakeholder initiative that includes by the Millennium Development Goals.2 The inter- donors, partner countries, and civil society organi- national development community has become pre- zations and that sets a standard for guidelines for occupied with the need to make aid more effective, publishing information about aid spending. IATI and efforts to coordinate a new approach have been builds on the work already achieved by intergov- focused on four major international events: the ernmental initiatives like the Organization for Eco- High Level Fora on Aid Effectiveness in Rome, Par- nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) is, Accra, and Busan in 2003, 2005, 2008, and 2011, Development Assistance Committee, which pro- respectively.3 Through these events, the demand for duces statistics about past aid flows and aid activi- greater transparency has become more marked. ties to encourage greater transparency. Further ini- The Accra Agenda for Action (prepared in 2008) tiatives include civil society coalitions like Make claimed that greater transparency and account- Aid Transparent or the global campaigners for aid ability for aid—domestic as well as external—was transparency, Publish What You Fund. a concrete step toward more effective aid. In Ac- Transparency in aid programs is a relatively cra, the signatories made the following significant recent development and, as such, measuring the commitment: “We will make aid more transparent. impact of transparency on aid effectiveness is still Developing countries will facilitate parliamentary very much in its early stages, and evidence is sparse. oversight by implementing greater transparency The general hypothesis is that improving budget in public financial management, including public transparency is not only an important goal in itself disclosure of revenues, budgets, expenditures, pro- but also that it would achieve better development curements and audits. Donors will publicly disclose ­outcomes for people, or human development. Transparency in Aid Programs 81

However, it is too early to assess whether, or indeed the donors and recipients exactly what purpose the when, this hypothesis will come to fruition.7 Chains aid is serving and to what it is being directed. of causality between aid transparency, accountabil- ity, and development outcomes are long—so it may 2. CIVIL SOCIETY INVOLVEMENT be a few years before the real impact of transparency can be assessed. Transparency in aid programs is crucial for main- The case for transparency as a deterrent against taining public support for aid. Worldwide, celebrity- the mismanagement of aid is strong. Poor coordi- endorsed campaigns such as Make Poverty History nation between donor governments and aid agen- and Live 8 saw public support for aid and develop- cies, competing interests and priorities, and a lack ment reach an all-time high. However, this support, of communication with partner countries leads to as noted in a Publish What You Fund briefing paper, an ineffective delivery of aid. Clare Lockhart writes is unreliable while in aid recipient countries public in Prospect magazine of $150 million in aid that faith in foreign aid remains low.11 In the current, un- should have gone toward reconstructing a village in stable economic climate, it is even more essential for Afghanistan and that ended up being squandered citizens to have access to clear, accurate, and timely in administrative costs in various agencies in the information about public expenditures on aid in or- United States and Switzerland.8 Sadly, this is not der to maintain public support. an exceptional case. Just in the process of writing It is obvious that the lack of transparency in aid this paper, the author read a breaking news story programs makes it much harder for civil society, of millions of dollars wasted in Afghan reconstruc- both in donor and recipient countries, to hold gov- tion projects.9 Poor coordination between the U.S. ernments accountable. For donors, transparency is Defense Department, the U.S. State Department, necessary to allow citizens and taxpayers to under- and the U.S. Agency for International Development stand how aid is being used and to see the vital role (USAID) led to unrealistic cost estimates and inad- that aid plays in supporting progress on poverty al- equate planning. leviation in many developing countries. In order for Campaigners such as those from IATI have implementation of aid to be carried out effectively responded to revelations such as these with the on the ground, citizens of recipient governments claim that increased transparency in the aid pro- must have access to greater levels of aid information cess would help prevent such blatant misuse of aid. to allow them to hold their governments to account Publish What You Fund claims that the benefits of over inconsistencies between aid received and aid transparency include more effective allocation and spent on behalf of beneficiaries.12 management of aid by donors, better planning by There is much interest in whether digital tech- recipient governments, increased accountability of nologies help foster greater accountability in aid— donors and governments in the North and South, or even more demand for transparency and ac- a reduced risk of corruption, and enhanced public countability. The empowering potential of digital participation.10 Campaigners argue that the publica- communications—making access to interactive tion of relevant and accessible information, which technologies widely available—would seem to of- is also timely and accurate, is the crucial element in fer the possibility that individuals can use technol- ensuring aid effectiveness. The innumerable exam- ogy to hold governments to account. One study13 ples of malpractice in aid delivery point to the need found that while there was some evidence that these for a more effective system where it is clear both to tools could be deployed effectively, much depended 82 Andrew Puddephatt DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE upon whether technology platforms were tailored the power and impact of crowdsourcing. This is a to local skills and capacities and whether technol- software platform that allows people to report inci- ogy reinforced the strategies of potential users. In dents and events that they have seen or experienced fact, such studies as exist14 show that it is not “mass” relating to a specific issue. The software processes users such as citizens or consumers who make the reports that it receives and logs them in a database. most effective use of technology; rather, it is “orga- The database is linked to a map of the area in which nizational” interests such as journalists, nongovern- incidents are occurring, allowing users to see how mental organizations (NGOs), governments, and events are unfolding and to analyze geographical corporations. and temporal trends. The system allows people to This seems to result from the motives and incen- log reports via a website, email, Twitter, SMS, or tives of potential users of the technology platform. multimedia message service (MMS). It has been For issues concerning public accountability, orga- used extensively for a range of purposes, from track- nizations have the incentives to acquire and act on ing harassment of women in Egypt, to monitoring information about corruption or budget misalloca- election violence in Kenya, to tracking water sup- tions and have the specific capabilities to use tech- plies in India. While the system has tremendous nology effectively. potential to monitor aid, there is, as yet, little de- Of particular relevance in the development con- velopment in this field. The most innovative uses of text are systems that combine voice and data, allow- technology are focused upon domestic political or ing people to both file and access citizen journalism accountability issues. This underlines the fact that reports via mobile phones. Examples include CG- it is not the availability of technology that is crucial Net Swara in India and the FreedomFone system but the incentives to use technology to monitor aid, developed and used by the civil society organiza- the appropriateness of the technology, and the skills tion Kubatana in Zimbabwe. People can contribute and capacities of the users. stories through dialling into a system to record their It is sometimes assumed that transparency fos- message in their mother tongue, and they also can ters antagonism between the state and citizens, but listen to items posted by other people. News items a key enabler of CSO-driven aid transparency initia- and stories are stored and administered on a fixed tives is active cooperation between the state and its line computer server, which is also used to send citizens. The mutual benefits from such a collabo- short message service (SMS) (texting) alerts to ration are obvious. CSOs cannot access detailed subscribers about new material. In addition to be- information on aid spending without cooperation ing available via the voice-operated system, stories from the state, while state actors cannot justify aid are also available via the web and are distributed transparency efforts in isolation from citizens and by email, from which they have been picked up by civil society accountability seekers.16 the mainstream media. With this system, even the Civil society has been shown to play a crucial poorest communities have some form of access to role in pressuring governments for increased ac- the information. countability through greater transparency and Digital technologies also permit crowdsourc- access to information (ATI). The positive correla- ing to harness the value of combined knowledge tion between CSO involvement and improved ATI and ideas from geographically dispersed people. frameworks is discussed in the paper “Citizens and The mobile phone platform Ushahidi15 is one of Service Delivery” by Dena Ringold. Countries with the most famous examples of how this can enhance strong civil society institutions, such as India, Mex- Transparency in Aid Programs 83 ico, and Romania, appear to have more extensive Borders that the Canadian government agreed to ATI legislation because of the ability of civil society join IATI.20 to “influence policy makers to draft effective laws” Various civil society initiatives now operate at and to “create awareness among citizens about how the international level in order to coordinate their to use ATI legislation.”17 efforts to hold donors to account. Civil society co- The involvement of civil society is shown to be alitions like Make Aid Transparent have been estab- equally effective in pressuring for transparency of lished in order to pressure donors into providing aid policy and programs. A report by Sakiko Fuku- transparent information regarding their aid deliv- da-Parr found that open budgeting, especially with ery. The Reality of Aid network is noted for being citizen participation to help set budget priorities, a southern-led North/South group that includes can lead to resource allocations for development more than forty civil society regional and global that result in positive human development and hu- networks and works to reform the practice of aid. man rights outcomes. Participatory budget process- Similarly, Better Aid brings together more than sev- es in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, for example, have en hundred development organizations from civil lead to the consistent prioritization of key sectors society in order to challenge the aid effectiveness such as urban infrastructure (roadways and water agenda. and sanitation), housing, and education and to ru- This is just a sample of CSO-led initiatives that ral needs such as transport and agriculture in state have been established in recent years to pressure do- budgeting.18 In the current financial climate, citi- nors for increased transparency and accountability. zen participation in the processes of public budgeting They have amassed wide support (Make Aid Trans- and financial management is increasingly essential parent, for example, has over seventy signatories for promoting transparency and accountability. and sixty-four thousand public signatures). How- In recent years, there has been a notable shift ever, it is difficult at this stage to assess the extent to toward grassroots participation instead of a “trickle- which these initiatives have genuinely affected aid down” process of social change. The demand for policy and practice. Although the organizations go civil society participation can be traced back to the into great detail on their websites about their vari- 1970s, but it has only more recently been picked ous arguments and claims for transparency and ac- up by the big, bilateral institutions. The inclusion countability, there is little to indicate exactly how of civil society participants at the Third High-Level they aim to ensure donors’ commit to transparency. Forum in Accra in 2008 was considered by many to Furthermore, the sample above is taken from a be the hallmark of the event. Significant gains were wide range of civil society schemes that look to hold made in recognizing the importance of CSOs as donors accountable; however, there are relatively independent development actors and in the agree- fewer CSOs that focus exclusively on the transpar- ment to work together to address CSO effectiveness ency and accountability of aid in the recipient coun- as a responsibility shared among CSOs, donors, and tries. This disparity between “supply” and “demand” developing country governments (though civil so- initiatives is noted by Sarah Mulley, who describes ciety groups argued that power remained with the initiatives on the “demand side” of accountability donors).19 Only through civil society putting pres- and transparency as “fragmented and patchy.”21 sure on donors can effective aid transparency come That said, there are examples of country-level about. In Canada, for example, it was only through civil society initiatives that have been successful in pressure from Canadian NGO Engineers without holding their governments to account, some, one 84 Andrew Puddephatt DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE may argue, demonstrating more concrete effect than relying upon a small number of profession- than their international initiative equivalents. als. It is a grassroots movement that includes local peasants and workers who directly benefit from India and RTI the work of the organization. There is a somewhat India has had a degree of success with its country- “Maoist” ideological commitment in the MKSS to level initiatives that push for in-country transpar- try to “match the lifestyle and work ethics with the ency in public governance and aid expenditure. For community to which it belongs.”24 example, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) Since its formation, MKSS has thus spurred is a people’s organization and part of the growing, community mobilization not only across the state nonparty political process in India:22 of Rajasthan but also nationwide. This mass sup- port, alongside the regular public hearings, has led The MKSS spearheaded the right to information to increasing pressure on government officials to movement in Rajasthan which eventually ex- clean up their act. Through the perseverance of the tended to the rest of India. MKSS used the RTI MKSS campaign, the Rajasthan Right to Informa- [Right to Information] as [a] tool to draw atten- tion Act was eventually passed in 2000, followed by tion to the underpayment of daily wage earners the nationwide Right to Information Act in 2005. and farmers on government projects, and more A further RTI campaign in India that has had generally, to expose corruption in government considerable success is the National Campaign for expenditure. Initially, MKSS lobbied govern- People’s Right to Information (NCPRI), which ment to obtain information such as employment works in conjunction with MKSS. NCPRI activities and payment records, and bills and vouchers include organizing National RTI conventions and relating to purchase and transportation of ma- establishing public campaigns for a more transpar- terials. This information was then crosschecked ent prelegislative process.25 Shekhar Singh, founder at Jan Sunwais (public hearings) against testi- of NCPRI, has outlined the size of the Freedom of monies of workers. The public hearings were Information movement, with around eight million very successful in drawing attention to corrup- applications each year. A freedom of information tion in the system. They were particularly signifi- system helps improve the quality of government cant because of their use of hard documentary by committing to the release of information that evidence to support the claims of villagers.23 should be provided anyway. It also increases the effi- The MKSS website shows a very effective video ciency of bureaucracy and acts as a deterrent against documentary of the MKSS’s campaign for RTI, corruption. which portrays how the poor of India are deprived Attesting to the positive impact of the freedom of their social benefits due to corrupt government of information movement in India, a Yale Univer- officials. sity study found that it was almost as effective as The particular success of this local campaign as bribes, with the particularly interesting finding that opposed to international CSO initiatives could be the movement works for poor as well as rich (un- attributed to the following factors. The organization like bribes).26 The study involved slumdwellers in of MKSS is entirely local, of genesis in Rajasthan, Delhi who wanted to apply for ration cards. They and focused exclusively on the rights of the Indian were randomly assigned to one of four experimen- people. Even more crucially, MKSS is an organiza- tal groups: One of the groups paid a bribe after tion that has built widespread mass support rather putting in the application, while the other group Transparency in Aid Programs 85 made an RTI request in order to inquire about the transparency initiatives and governance reforms in status of their ration card. Although the group that the education sector. In the early 1990s, there were applied with the bribe received their ration card in substantial “leakages” of funds from the system of the quickest time, the group that put in an RTI re- capitation grants—grants of money allocated to quest was almost as successful. Leonid Peisakhin schools based on the number of eligible pupils. Be- conducted an extension of this study and found that tween 1990 and 1995, a public expenditure tracking RTI requests helped underprivileged applicants survey was done by the World Bank. Calculations get results almost as fast as did the middle class. He from this revealed that only 12.6 percent of cen- concluded that access to information appears to trally allocated capitation funds for schools were ac- empower the poor to the point where they receive tually reaching the schools. And many schools did almost the same treatment as middle-class individu- not receive their capitation entitlements at all, with als at the hands of civil servants.27 parents and teachers in many cases unaware of the Needless to say, despite the incontestable existence of the capitation grant. A follow-up pub- achievements of MKSS and NCPRI and the find- lic expenditure tracking survey for 2001, however, ings of the Yale study, there are still many unre- revealed a dramatic increase in the proportion of solved issues regarding India and RTI. Indeed, RTI capitation grants reaching the intended schools of activists in India have been exposed to brutal attacks close to 80 percent.30 and even murdered for seeking information to “pro- Lessons can no doubt be taken from these na- mote transparency and accountability in the work- tional initiatives that are local, country-level initia- ing of every public authority” in India.28 The RTI tives with mass support and that have fought to Act of 2005 holds no protection for the activists. prove the value of transparency and accountability Since 2010 alone, twelve activists have been mur- through their RTI campaigning. Successful coun- dered. The assaults on activists point to the continu- try-level initiatives such as these indicate that civil ing, deep-seated problems with corruption and the society can have a positive effect in pushing for in- refusal of officials to be held accountable. country transparency and that this increased trans- There are other examples of improvements in parency can empower citizens, allowing for more domestic service delivery through applying trans- efficient aid delivery. What remains to be seen is parency. The Huduma project aims to improve whether these lessons can be translated into the service delivery in Kenya using a crowdsourcing monitoring of international aid programs. model. The project—developed by the Social De- velopment Network and the Kenya African Treat- ment Access Movement and launched in February 3. DONOR BEHAVIOR 2011—is a platform that allows citizens to report specific problems they encounter related to service For all the work of CSO-led initiatives such as IATI delivery (for example, a lack of access to a certain and Make Aid Transparent, there remains a struggle medicine) through their phone. Each report is veri- to implement transparency and openness in aid pro- fied and sent to the relevant authorities in the pri- grams unless donors are willing to adapt their be- vate or public sector who in theory should solve the havior accordingly. The benefits of aid transparency problem and inform Huduma.29 for donors are set out clearly by IATI.31 Incentives In Uganda, corruption in the education sector for joining IATI and for implementing the IATI was reduced significantly through a combination of standard include 86 Andrew Puddephatt DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

• improving the organization’s external profile, determine the level of their transparency.”34 The na- • improving organizational processes and sys- ture of an organization should thus not impede its tems, potential for transparency or, equally, excuse its lack • publishing better data to improve planning of transparency. processes, and Opaque and unaccountable aid reinforces dis- • Applying political pressures. empowering relationships between donors and aid A research paper on the relationship between recipients.35 It also isolates civil society from the aid transparency and aid recipient corruption levels aid process, an involvement that is crucial for effec- talks of “nearly universal enthusiasm for aid trans- tive aid delivery (see section 2). A report by Access parency.”32 But is this really the case? Numerous Info, “Not Available! Not Accessible!” examining studies indicate unwillingness on behalf of certain aid transparency in Canada, France, Norway, Spain, donors, despite their verbal and policy commit- and the United Kingdom, found there often to be a ments, to be transparent about the impact of their widespread failure on behalf of donors to make an work. Findings from a Pilot Aid Transparency In- explicit connection between budgets and activities dex in 2011 from Publish What You Fund indicate in the reports available on the websites of their aid that the vast majority of aid information is still not agencies. This also meant it was impossible for the published, with only a few organizations publishing public to make a link between donors’ budgets and more than 50 percent of the surveyed information ongoing activities, effectively blocking them from types. The performance of some of the organiza- the aid process.36 tions included in the assessment is “particularly How donors operate often militates against problematic given the amount of aid they give and transparency. A budget brief by the International therefore the relative impact of their lack of trans- Budget Partnership carried out in 2008 made inter- parency.”33 This notably includes the United States esting findings regarding donor behavior related to (with U.S. Department of the Treasury (scoring 10 transparency. According to the brief, much of the percent) and U.S. Department of Defense (14 per- rationale behind transparency failure lies in the fact cent)); Germany Gesellschaft fur Internationale that donors often direct their aid through mecha- Zusammenarbeit (GIZ–or Agency for Internation- nisms that are outside an aid recipient government’s al Cooperation) (25 percent); France (31 percent); formal budget system and that follow “separate and and Japan (36 percent). parallel budget formulation, implementation, and The index revealed that aid information was of- reporting procedures.”37 Off-budget funding is jus- ten inaccessible, not available systematically, and tified by donor concerns that existing government hard to find. Nonetheless, it is apparent from the budget management institutions and practices may index that aid transparency is possible, as evident be inclined toward mismanagement. from the high scores achieved by organizations such While donors should be concerned about the as the World Bank, the UK Department for Inter- proper use of their aid, they also need to assess the national Development (DFID), the Netherlands, long-term impact of off-budget funding.38 Accord- and the Millennium Challenge Corporation. Inter- ing to the authors of the budget brief, off-budget estingly, while some patterns do emerge, one of the financing often places strains on aid recipient gov- key findings from the index is that “an organisation’s ernments. In Ghana, for example, a study found that size, how established they are, or whether they are a senior government officials in the country spent ap- multi- or bilateral organisation does not predict or proximately forty-four weeks in a year fulfilling the Transparency in Aid Programs 87 requirements of donor agencies.39 The brief offers need to budget for these additional costs in order to sound advice about how donors should avoid in- enable them to implement IATI effectively.41 flicting unnecessary bureaucratic work on partner Furthermore, fear of inciting a taxpayers’ revolt countries: and of undermining the multilateral aid industry if the programs are perceived to have failed may ex- Whenever possible, donors should channel aid plain donors’ reluctance to be transparent and open flows through government budget systems, for about their aid processes. In a climate where the ef- example, by using budget support mechanisms fectiveness of aid is already under question, expos- of different kinds. When this is not possible, ing cases where aid has failed to produce results is a donors should ensure that the systems and pro- risk many donors are not willing to take. cedures utilized for their projects and programs Even when projects have clearly fallen short of are as compatible as possible with those of recip- their objectives, donors are still reluctant to admit ient government budget systems. For example, failure. For example, from 1988 to 2003, the Swed- donors should ensure that planned aid-financed ish government was involved in a lengthy project in activities are captured in the relevant sector’s Mozambique, enlisted to help improve the quality medium-term plan and expenditure framework, of budget management in the country. Over $17 and that information on commitments and dis- million was invested in the project and, although bursements is provided to government in for- positive changes were implemented, for example mats and at times that facilitate their inclusion in creating a system to prepare state accounts for the budget documents.40 first time since 1975, the government of Mozam- The budget brief indicates that off-budget aid- bique eventually rejected the Swedish financial giving does not facilitate effective delivery or allow model. The Mozambique government chose in- for transparency and openness in aid policy and stead the Brazilian cash accounting package, which budgeting. Working directly with the aid recipient did not even include double-entry bookkeeping—a government allows for improved long-term plan- derivative of old Portuguese systems—most likely ning, which is a key area that many aid programs because it was a more suitable model given the should work on. The current short-term nature of country’s history or more cynically because it does funding cycles, where distribution of funds is as- not produce accountable and transparent financ- sisted by framework agreements, complex designs, es.42 The project ended in 2003 and, although it is and assessment processes that are mostly paper ex- difficult to accurately judge the effectiveness of such ercises, means that a realistic impact evaluation of a long-running and changing project, it is fair to say aid is difficult. the objectives of the Swedish government (namely What assessments such as the Pilot Aid Trans- to reform and build capacity in budget preparation parency Index do not explain is exactly why some and budget execution/accounting) were not met. donors might be unwilling to implement transpar- Yet the project was never publicly acknowledged ency. An initial deterrent could be cost: Implement- to have been a failure, most likely because such an ing the IATI standard is costly for donor agencies. acknowledgement would have generated a backlash The publication of more detailed information in a from Swedish taxpayers. standardized form requires changes to information The desire on the part of donors and grantees technology systems, training, and change manage- to avoid transparency about outcomes thus stems ment within donor agencies. Donor agencies will from fear that it will expose the failure of aid to 88 Andrew Puddephatt DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

­produce results. The structuring of the aid process is no surprise that critiques such as Moyo’s are be- often means transparency is not easily facilitated, coming ever more prevalent. The state-versus-mar- and often donor practices can mitigate efforts for ket debate continues, yet economic history shows transparency. that neither the state nor the market on its own is adequate and that economic development is about 4. THE CHANGING FACE OF DEVELOPMENT finding a balance between the two that works but also adapting that synergistic solution as conditions It has become even more crucial in recent years change. East Asian countries seem to have done this for donors to adapt their behavior in order to keep more efficiently than African countries; this is one up with the radically evolving global development of the keys to their success and why they are emerg- landscape. In the last few years alone, transforma- ing as key players in the development field.45 tions have been tangible with the emergence of new Indeed, this emergence of new donors from the donors from the South and East, increased austerity East and South is a major shake-up in the develop- in the North, and a push toward transparency and ment scene. Future prospects for aid programs will accountability in aid delivery. This section looks at also be shaped by domestic austerity in western the development context, how it continues to shape countries. Indeed, the OECD has linked falls in de- political debate, and the implications for future aid velopment aid to the financial crisis, which has af- strategies. fected governments’ budgets. In 2011, the amount The efficacy of aid as a tool to help developing of aid richer nations give to developing nations fell countries has long been under fire. Dambisa Moyo by nearly 3 percent for the first time since 1997.46 wrote a damning report of aid programs in 2009, en- Increasingly tight budgets in OECD countries are titled Dead Aid, which fired an attack on the “patron- inevitably going to put pressure on aid levels in ising” West.43 In the past fifty years, an estimated $1 coming years. Notable cuts in official development trillion in aid has been invested in Africa alone, and assistance in 2011 were registered in sixteen Devel- Moyo questions what there is to show for it: Sub- opment Assistance Committee countries, with the Saharan Africa continues to be one of the poorest largest cuts recorded in Austria, Belgium, Greece, regions in the world. In June 2012, Moyo continued Japan, and Spain. her attack by outlining in the UK magazine New The shift toward the South and East as emerging Statesman why, in her opinion, aid does not work, Asian donors, including China, India, South Korea, and why “until African governments come to regard Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, grow aid as temporary support, as opposed to a right in and improve their aid programs will also have a sig- perpetuity, they will continue to fail to implement nificant impact on the way development currently the necessary measures for self-sufficiency, includ- works. The Lowy Institute for International Policy ing food production.”44 Critics of aid note how aid outlines some of the consequences from this shift: supply has been driven in the past by diplomatic and political pressure and that aid often serves the Strategy, tighter commodities markets and needs of donors and donor countries before recipi- a glut of donors means foreign aid is increas- ents. ingly acquiring a geostrategic edge. For aid In the current economic climate, where seem- recipients, emerging-country donors will ingly every dollar spent has to be accounted for, it be attractive for reasons other than strategy Transparency in Aid Programs 89

and self-interest; the emerging economies’ should be to try and engage new donors with IATI own stunning economic successes offer an standards.50 For the moment, there is no formal alternative model for developing countries. cooperation between traditional and emerging do- In delivering aid, Asian donors often have nors, though this is likely to change as the influence different motivations and expectations to those of emerging powers in global governance continues of traditional donors. A combination of local to increase through fora such as the Group of Twen- and regional stabilisation, humanitarian con- ty (G-20). Many of these new donors are a threat to cerns, commercial interests and geo-strategic aid transparency, as it is difficult with donors such as factors tend to be the primary forces motivating Brazil or China to extrapolate what is aid and what emerging donors in Asia. Of course, each donor is investment. Furthermore, much of this aid comes is developing and polishing their own unique without conditionality for the recipient countries. characteristics.47 5. RISK-TAKING AND INCENTIVIZING AID As became apparent in the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, new, emerg- Current aid practices are heavily influenced by the ing donors such as China are less willing to comply need to meet targets and produce tangible success- with the Eurocentric aid effectiveness agenda. One es, even if this means concealing the reality of donor of the stipulations for China signing the Busan Dec- aid effectiveness and obscuring the transparency of laration was that commitment to the declaration for certain aid programs. Original development plan- South-South partners is to be on a voluntary basis. ners were influenced by the failure of capitalism and China is set to become a key player on the develop- by the apparent successes of Soviet industrializa- ment scene, yet the rise of China (and other Asian tion.51 This led to a mindset of state planning that countries) poses a threat to the aid process. It “chal- is still evident in the current practice among donor lenges the consensus model of aid and development programs, where a lot of donor aid fails but the pre- built up over recent decades by other donors” and tense is upheld that targets are achieved. This paper “weakens the grip of key international institutions believes that these current practices toward aid are such as the OECD Development Assistance Com- essentially a modern variant on the Soviet approach mittee (DAC) which have been at the center of aid to planning and that a new, risk-taking approach is reform efforts.”48 needed. Busan therefore saw the beginning of a new As was discussed in section 3, with an increas- global partnership. “South-South” cooperation will ing demand for donors to be accountable to their certainly shape the future of development and could taxpayers and demonstrate results, donors are challenge efforts for transparency and accountabil- seemingly becoming more risk averse. A particu- ity. New donors currently operate outside tradition- lar pattern in donor practice concerns the choice al donor fora that have provided the focus of many of funding channels. With the call for increasing existing transparency and accountability initiatives; transparency and accountability, donors are dem- it will therefore be necessary to analyze aid from onstrating a particular aversion to fiduciary risk. new donors at the country level first, as so little is While there is donor support for government-led, known about their aid delivery, programming, and sectorwide approaches and technical assistance, effectiveness.49 One of the main objectives for IATI even in the more unstable contexts there continue 90 Andrew Puddephatt DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE to be many donors who prefer to fund projects and Incentivizing aid has already had success on the programs carried out by trusted UN, NGO, or com- recipient level. PROGRESA in Mexico, for example, mercial partners.52 The benefits of funding proj- is an antipoverty program that provides monetary ects in this way are manifest: In channelling funds transfers to families; such aid is contingent upon through a UN agency, donors simply shift the risk their children’s regular attendance at school. The (and the blame) onto them. findings demonstrate that the program, based on Limiting or avoiding risk can lead to perverse incentivizing behavior, successfully reduces drop- results: The more risk averse the approach, the nar- out rates and facilitates academic progression.56 rower may be the range of attainable goals.53 The Similarly, in Indonesia, an experiment in over three OECD Aid Risks report gives the example of the thousand Indonesian villages was designed to test Multi Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan, whose the role of performance incentives in improving the success has been limited by unrealistic donor expec- efficacy of aid programs. The implementers of the tations and fiduciary regulations that are too strict.54 experiment found that “incentives led to what ap- The World Bank was appointed the fund’s trustee; pear to be more efficient spending of block grants, however, the fund is restricted in terms of fiduciary and led to an increase in labour from health provid- risk-taking because of the bank’s board and their ers, who are partially paid fee-for-service, but not policy on fiduciary rules and regulations. teachers. On net, between 50–75% of the total im- In high-risk environments such as Afghanistan pact of the block grant program on health indicators and Iraq, donors continue to be risk averse, often to can be attributed to the performance incentives.”57 the detriment of effective aid implementation. As Incentives can equally contribute to greater the OECD report suggests, “Traditional approaches transparency. More transparent regimes create and standard operating procedures today are often greater incentives for politicians and aid agencies ill-adapted to the contexts of fragility and transition. to undertake better scrutiny of projects funded by For more effective aid in situations of transition, do- their organizations.58 Perhaps the greatest incentive nors need to change their individual and collective for donor programs to implement transparency is behaviour, allowing their implementing partners the proven lower recipient corruption that occurs greater flexibility.”55 as a result.59 Greater transparency in itself is a risk It is important, therefore, that a new approach to to donors; however, it would nonetheless be better aid be adopted, one that would embrace rather than to carry out an honest appraisal of donor programs, avoid risk and where incentives for donors would rather than continue to uphold the pretense that tar- consequently be put in place for appropriate risk- gets are achieved, when actually a lot of donor aid taking. fails. This new approach to aid should be based on in- “Failure” is a loaded term that is feared and mis- centivizing behaviors on the recipient level as well, used in the development context. Failure can actu- whereby aid is seen as an investment, rather than a ally lead to positive outcomes; for example, if a proj- gift or contract. The notion of aid as an investment ect is deemed to have fallen short of its objectives, it is significant; it implies that the approach should be can still be seen as a positive venture if there was an longer term and should be implemented with cer- element of risk-taking involved. Most importantly, tain stipulations on the part of both donors and re- lessons can be learned for the future. Donors should cipients that encourage maximum effectiveness. therefore admit when projects have not been an un- Transparency in Aid Programs 91 qualified success and have failed to meet targets. It will also be useful to focus on the potential This could lead to a more open and honest debate impact of communication technologies, particu- about why the project fell short of its targets and larly those that use mobile phones and combine how it can be implemented more effectively in the voice and data (to deal with problems of literacy future. and limited connectivity). There are currently six billion mobile phones in the world, and penetra- 6. CONCLUSION tion has reached 53 percent in Africa, the least well- served region. By 2020, it is estimated that everyone In recent years, an ambitious vision of aid has will own or have direct access to a mobile phone, emerged, spurred on by initiatives such as IATI. Aid so applications that empower people, through is envisaged as being implemented by transparent crowdsourcing platforms, to track aid delivery will and accountable programs, programs that will re- become an essential tool in the movement from duce the potential for corruption and that allow for transparency and accountability. This will require long-term success. the development of user-friendly mobile interfaces A crucial development, as this paper has dis- and aligning technology with incentives, so that aid cussed, in aid programs is the empowering role recipients are involved in designing the applications of civil society. Citizens and beneficiaries should they use for ends that they determine. But the po- be empowered to participate in the development tential is huge. process and should hold donors, recipient govern- There is still a long way to go. The move toward ments, and institutions to account. Initiatives such transparency is a relatively new focus and, as such, as Make Aid Transparent are seeking to do just this; there is very little existing assessment of its impact however, these initiatives are still in their early stag- on the efficacy of aid. This, no doubt, is an area that es, and their focus seems to be mainly on the donor will be focused on in future years. Current donor side rather than the recipient side. There would be behavior does not easily facilitate transparency, merit in establishing similar multistakeholder ini- with only about 50 percent of aid information be- tiatives in recipient countries—initiatives that can ing published. A fear of failure means that many do- work to bring together various stakeholders in order nors and grantees continue to implement aid with- to discuss aid delivery, programming, and effective- out any accountability. This is often detrimental ness.60 to effective aid delivery, as it renders coordination The involvement of civil society in the aid pro- among donors, and between donors and recipients, cess is thus imperative in ensuring that a donor gov- very difficult. ernment, aid agency, or recipient government can The development context continues to change; be held to account. Citizen participation can lead the current financial climate is not one in which aid to more responsive budgets and outcomes, particu- can easily flourish, so it will be increasingly crucial larly at the local level, as demonstrated by MKSS. for aid programs to adapt suitably. Aid should no MKSS is surely an example to be followed as a suc- longer be viewed as a gift or contract but as a long- cessful grassroots uprising with mass local support. term investment and, as part of this investment, it It will be important for future research to examine will be critical to have civil society support. An ele- the types of civil society institutions that facilitate ment of risk-taking should, furthermore, be encour- transparency most effectively. aged; ambitious and risk-taking aid projects should 92 Andrew Puddephatt DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE be commended, even if they fall short of their objec- ency Matters, and the Global Movement for Aid Trans- tives. Lessons can be learned that could lead to even parency” (London, United Kingdom: May 10, 2010). more effective aid implementation in the future. http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/pdf/luxem- Only time will tell whether transparency and bourg_bp1_why_aid_transparency_matters.pdf. accountability are likely to empower the potential 7. S. Fukuda-Parr, P. Guyer, and T. Lawson-Remer, “Does Budget Transparency Lead to Stronger Human of aid programs; however, the claims made by cam- Development Outcomes and Commitments to Econom- paigners such as Publish What You Fund and IATI ic and Social Rights?” International Budget Partnership 4 in favor of transparency are strong. IATI could be (December 2011). http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/ just the tool needed to convert the rhetoric from esswpaper/id_3a4707.htm. 61 Accra and Busan into practice. But this will only 8. Claire Lockhart, “The Failed State We’re In,” be possible through citizen participation and the Prospect, 2008. http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/ work of country-level, CSO-led initiatives such as magazine/thefailedstatewerein/. MKSS. With pressure from these kinds of initia- 9. BBC News, “Millions wasted in Afghan recon- tives, and willingness on behalf of donors and recip- struction projects, finds report,” July 2012. http://www. ients to coordinate and commit to accountable and bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-19052539. transparent aid, we can move toward a new era of 10. Publish What You Fund, “Why Aid Transpar- aid delivery where aid and development effective- ency Matters.” ness continue to improve through honest and open 11. Ibid. 12. Publish What You Fund, “Why Aid Transpar- appraisal. ency Matters.” 13. Archon Fung, Hollie Russo Gilman, and Jennifer ENDNOTES Shkabatur, Technologies of Transparency for Accountabil- ity: An Examination of Several Experiences from Middle 1. Sarah Mulley, “Donor aid: New Frontiers in Income and Developing Countries (October 1, 2010). transparency and accountability,” Transparency and Ac- http://right2info.org/resources/publications/technolo- countability Initiative (2010). http://www.transparency- gy-for-transparency. initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/donor_ 14. Ibid. aid_final1.pdf. 15. http://ushahidi.com/. 2. Organization for Economic Cooperation 16. R. McGee, “Annex 5: Aid transparency,” Institute and Development (OECD), “The High-Level Fora of Development Studies (2010), p. 16. http://www.ids. on Aid Effectiveness: a History” (Paris, France: ac.uk/files/dmfile/IETAAnnex5AidTransparencyMc- 2011). http://www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3746, GeeFinal28Oct2010.pdf. en_2649_3236398_46310975_1_1_1_1,00.html. 17. Dena Ringold, et al., “Citizens and Service Deliv- 3. Ibid. ery,” Overseas Development Institute (2012). http://www. 4. Aid Info, “Aid Transparency Movement” (Bris- odi.org.uk/events/docs/4871.pdf. tol, Somerset, United Kingdom: 2010). http://www.aid- 18. Fukuda-Parr, Guyer, and Lawson-Remer, “Does info.org./about-us/aid-transparency-movement. Budget Transparency Lead to Stronger Human Develop- 5. Publish What You Fund, “Aid transparency in ment Outcomes.” the Busan Outcome Document” (London, United King- 19. Task Team 2011, CSO Development Effectiveness dom: December 14, 2011). http://www.publishwhaty- and the Enabling Environment: A Review of the Evidence” oufund.org/news/2011/12/aid-transparency-busan- (Härnösand, Sweden, March 2011), p. 6. http://www. outcome-document/. cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/final_task_team_on_ 6. Publish What You Fund, “Why Aid Transpar- cso_development_effectiveness_and_enabling_envi- Transparency in Aid Programs 93 ronment_evidence_of_progress_on_aaa__en__.pdf. cySquared_aiddata.pdf. 20. Engineers Without Borders, “10,000 Canadians 33. Publish What You Fund, “Findings and Recom- Ask for IATI” (Canada: October 2011). http://legacy. mendations” (London, United Kingdom: 2011). http:// ewb.ca/en/whatsnew/story/102/10-000-canadians- www.publishwhatyoufund.org/resources/index/2011- ask-for-iati.html. index/findings-and-recommendations/. 21. Mulley, “Donor aid.” 34. Ibid. 22. Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS), 35. Mulley, “Donor aid.” “About Us.” http://www.mkssindia.org/about-us/. 36. Access Info, “Not Available! Not Accessible!” 23. Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, “State (Madrid, Spain: October 2009). http://www.access- Level RTI: Rajasthan.” http://www.humanrightsinitia- info.org/documents/Access_Docs/Advancing/Aid/ tive.org/programs/ai/rti/india/states/rajasthan.htm. Not_Available_Not_Accessible_Access_Info_Europe. 24. MKSS, “Story of MKSS,” http://www.mkssin- pdf. dia.org/about-us/story-of-mkss/. 37. V. Ramkumar, and P. de Renzio, “Improving 25. National Campaign for People’s Right to Infor- Budget Transparency and Accountability in Aid Depen- mation ( NCPRI), “Activities of the NCPRI.” http:// dent Countries: How Can Donors Help?” (Washington, righttoinformation.info/about-us/activities-of-the-nc- DC: International Budget Partnership, 2009. http://in- pri/. ternationalbudget.org/budget-briefs/brief7/. 26. L. Peisakhin and P. Pinto, “Is transparency an 38. Ibid. effective anti-corruption strategy? Evidence from a 39. D. Brautigam and S. Knack, “Foreign Aid, Insti- field experiment in India,” Accountability India (2010). tutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Eco- http://www.accountabilityindia.in/sites/default/files/ nomic Development and Cultural Change 52: 2 (January documentlibrary/regulationandgovernance_peisakhin. 2004): 255-285. pdf. 40. Ramkumar and de Renzio, “Improving Budget 27. R. Shrivnisan, “Don’t pay a bribe, file an RTI Transparency.” application,” Times of India, May 2, 2011. http://ar- 41. Matthew Collin et al., “The Costs and Ben- ticles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-02/in- efits of Aid Transparency” (Bristol, Somerset, United dia/29495522_1_ration-card-rti-request-rti-applica- Kingdom: Aid Info, April 2009), p. 7. http://www.aid- tion. transparency.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/1140- 28. Asian Centre for Human Rights, “RTI Activists: 100407-Framework-for-Costs-and-Bene- Sitting Ducks of India” (New Delhi, India: September fits-of-transparency-with-Annexes.pdf. 2011). http://www.achrweb.org/ihrrq/issue3-4/India- 42. R. McGill, P. Boulding and T. Bennet, “Mozam- Sitting-Ducks-2011.pdf. bique State Financial Management Project” (Stockholm, 29. Rebecca Zausmer and Dixie Hawtin, “Tak- Sweden: Swedish International Development Coopera- ing back our services,” Global Partners and Associates, tion Agency, 2004). http://www.sida.se/Documents/ March 2012. http://global-partners.co.uk/wp-content/ Import/pdf/0429-Mozambique-State-Financial-Man- uploads/Corruption-in-service-delivery.pdf. agement-Project-SFMP2.pdf. 30. Ibid. 43. W. Easterly, “Review of Dambisa Moyo’s Dead 31. IATI, “Organisational Incentives and Buy In,” Aid” (Commissioned by London Review of Books but then 2012. http://iatistandard.org/getting-started/policy- rejected by LRB for publication. It was never published.) considerations/organisational-incentives-and-buy-in. http://williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2011/07/ 32. Z. Christensen et al., “Transparency Squared: moyoreviewforlrbjune2009neverpublished.pdf. The Effects of Donor Transparency on Aid Recipi- 44. D. Moyo, “Does Aid Work?” New Statesman ents’ Corruption Levels” (Washington, DC: Aid Data, (June 2012). http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/ 2010). http://s3.amazonaws.com/aiddata/Transparen- human-rights/2012/06/does-aid-work. 94 Andrew Puddephatt DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

45. L. Whitfield, “The Aid Critic: Bill Easterly,” GEG BIBLIOGRAPHY Blog (February 2012). http://www.globaleconomicgov- ernance.org/blog/2010/02/the-aid-critic-bill-easterly/. Access Info. “Not Available! Not Accessible!” Madrid, 46. OECD, “Development: Aid to developing coun- Spain, October 2009. http://www.access-info.org/ tries falls because of global recession” (Paris, France: documents/Access_Docs/Advancing/Aid/Not_ April 2012). http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,374 Available_Not_Accessible_Access_Info_Europe. 6,en_2649_37413_50058883_1_1_1_37413,00.html. pdf. 47. D. Cave, “Asia’s emerging donors transform aid,” Aid Info. “Aid Transparency Movement.” Bristol, Somer- The Interpreter (New South Wales, Australia: Lowy Insti- set, UK, 2010. http://www.aidinfo.org./about-us/ tute for International Policy, February 9, 2012). http:// aid-transparency-movement. www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/02/09/Asias- Aid Transparency. “The Costs and Benefits of Aid emerging-donors-transform-aid.aspx. Transparency.” April 2009. http://www.aidtrans- 48. Mulley, “Donor aid.” parency.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/1140- 49. Ibid., pp. 32–33. 100407-Framework-for-Costs-and-Bene- 50. Mulley, “Donor Aid,” p. 32. fits-of-transparency-with-Annexes.pdf. 51. W. Easterly, “Review of Dambisa Moyo’s Dead Asian Centre for Human Rights. “RTI Activists: Sitting Aid.” Ducks of India.” New Delhi, India, September 2011. 52. OECD, “Aid Risks in Fragile and Transitional http://www.achrweb.org/ihrrq/issue3-4/India-Sit- Contexts: Improving Donor Behavior” (Paris, France: ting-Ducks-2011.pdf. 2011). http://www.oecd.org/development/conflic- BBC News. “Millions wasted in Afghan reconstruction tandfragility/47672264.pdf. projects, finds report.” July 2012. http://www.bbc. 53. Ibid. co.uk/news/world-us-canada-19052539. 54. OECD, “Aid Risks.” Behrman, Jere, Pigali Sengupta, and Petra Todd. “Pro- 55. Ibid. gressing through PROGRESA: An Impact Assess- 56. Jere Behrman, Piyali Sengupta, and Petra todd, ment of a School Subsidy Experiment.” Washington, “Progressing through PROGRESA: An Impact Assess- DC, International Food Policy Research Institute, ment of a School Subsidy Experiment” (Washington, April 2001. http://www.ifpri.cgiar.org/sites/de- DC: International Food Policy Research Institute (IF- fault/files/publications/behrmantodd_progressing. PRI), April 2001). http://www.ifpri.cgiar.org/sites/de- pdf fault/files/publications/behrmantodd_progressing.pdf. Brautigam, D., and S. Knack. “Foreign Aid, Institutions, 57. B. Olken, J. Onishi, and S. Wong, “Should Aid and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Economic Reward Performance?” (October 2012). http://eco- Development and Cultural Change 52: 2 (January nomics.mit.edu/files/6923. 2004): 255-285. 58. Christensen et al., “Transparency Squared.” Cave, D. “Asia’s emerging donors transform aid.” The In- 59. Ibid., see Abstract. terpreter. New South Wales, Australia, Lowy Institute 60. Mulley, “Donor aid.” for International Policy, February 9, 2012. http:// 61. Publish What You Fund, “Pilot Aid Transpar- www.lowyinterpreter.org/post/2012/02/09/Asias- ency Index 2011” (London, United Kingdom: 2011). emerging-donors-transform-aid.aspx. http://www.iwaweb.org/Docs/News/2011-Pilot-Aid- Christensen, Z., R. Nielsen, D. Nielsen, and M. Tier- Transparency-Index.pdf. ney. “Transparency Squared: The Effects of Do- nor Transparency on Aid Recipients’ Corruption Levels.” Washington, DC, Aid Data, 2010. http:// s3.amazonaws.com/aiddata/TransparencySquared_ Transparency in Aid Programs 95

aiddata.pdf. Ibid. “Story of MKSS.” http://www.mkssindia.org/ Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative. “State Level about-us/story-of-mkss/. RTI: Rajasthan.” http://www.humanrightsinitiative. Moyo, D. “Does Aid Work?” New Statesman, June 2012. org/programs/ai/rti/india/states/rajasthan.htm. http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/human- Easterly, W. “Review of Dambisa Moyo’s Dead Aid.” rights/2012/06/does-aid-work. (Commissioned by London Review of Books but Mulley, S. “Donor aid: New Frontiers in transparency then rejected by LRB for publication. It was never and accountability,” Transparency and Accountability published.) http://williameasterly.files.wordpress. Initiative. 2010. http://www.transparency-initiative. com/2011/07/moyoreviewforlrbjune2009never- org/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/donor_aid_fi- published.pdf. nal1.pdf. Engineers Without Borders. “10,000 Canadians Ask for National Campaign for People’s Right to Information IATI.” Canada, October 2011. http://legacy.ewb.ca/ (NCPRI). “Activities of the NCPRI.” http://rightto- en/whatsnew/story/102/10-000-canadians-ask-for- information.info/about-us/activities-of-the-ncpri/. iati.html. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Devel- Fukuda-Parr, S., P. Guyer, and T. Lawson-Remer. “Does opment (OECD). “Aid Risks in Fragile and Transi- Budget Transparency Lead to Stronger Human De- tional Contexts: Improving Donor Behaviour.” Paris, velopment Outcomes and Commitments to Eco- France, 2011. http://www.oecd.org/development/ nomic and Social Rights?” International Budget conflictandfragility/47672264.pdf. Partnership 4 (December 2011). http://econpapers. Ibid. “Development: Aid to developing countries falls repec.org/paper/esswpaper/id_3a4707.htm. because of global recession.” Paris, France, 2012. Fung, Archon, Hollie Russo Gilman, and Jennifer Shka- http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3746, en_264 batur. Technologies of Transparency for Accountability: 9_37413_50058883_1_1_1_37413,00.html. An Examination of Several Experiences from Middle In- Ibid. “The High Level Fora on Aid Effective- come and Developing Countries. October 1, 2010. ness: a History.” Paris, France, 2011. http:// International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). “Or- www.oecd.org/document/63/0,3746, ganisational Incentives and Buy In.” 2012. http:// en_2649_3236398_46310975_1_1_1_1,00.html. iatistandard.org/getting-started/policy-consider- Olken, B., J. Onishi, and S. Wong. “Should Aid Reward ations/organisational-incentives-and-buy-in. Performance?” October 2012. http://economics. Lockhart, Clare. “The Failed State We’re In,” Prospect, mit.edu/files/6923. 2008. http://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/maga- Peisakhin, L., and P. Pinto. “Is transparency an effective zine/thefailedstatewerein/. anti-corruption strategy? Evidence from a field ex- McGee, R. ”Annex 5: Aid transparency.” Institute of De- periment in India.” Accountability India, 2010. http:// velopment Studies, 2010, p. 16. http://www.ids.ac.uk/ www.accountabilityindia.in/sites/default/files/doc- files/dmfile/IETAAnnex5AidTransparencyMc- umentlibrary/regulationandgovernance_peisakhin. GeeFinal28Oct2010.pdf. pdf. McGill, R., P. Boulding and T. Bennet. “Mozambique Publish What You Fund. “Aid Transparency in the State Financial Management Project.” Stockholm, Busan Outcome Document.” London, UK, May Sweden: Swedish International Cooperation Agency, 10, 2010. http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/ 2004. http://www.sida.se/Documents/Import/ news/2011/12/aid-transparency-busan-outcome- pdf/0429-Mozambique-State-Financial-Manage- document/. ment-Project-SFMP2.pdf. Ibid. “Findings and Recommendations.” London, UK, Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS). “About Us.” 2011. http://www.publishwhatyoufund.org/re- http://www.mkssindia.org/about-us/. sources/index/2011-index/findings-and-recom- 96 Andrew Puddephatt DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

mendations/. Shrivnisan, R. “Don’t pay a bribe, file an RTI appli- Ibid. “Pilot Aid Transparency Index 2011.” London, UK, cation,” Times of India, May 2, 2011. http://ar- 2011. http://www.iwaweb.org/Docs/News/2011- ticles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2011-05-02/ Pilot-Aid-Transparency-Index.pdf. india/29495522_1_ration-card-rti-request-rti-ap- Ibid. “Why Aid Transparency Matters, and the Global plication. Movement for Aid Transparency.” London, UK, May Task Team. “CSO Development Effectiveness and the 10, 2010. http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/newfunct/ Enabling Environment: A Review of the Evidence.” pdf/luxembourg_bp1_why_aid_transparency_ Härnösand, Sweden, March 2011, p. 6. http://www. matters.pdf. cso-effectiveness.org/IMG/pdf/final_task_team_ Ramkumar, V., and P. de Renzio. “Improving Budget on_cso_development_effectiveness_and_en- Transparency and Accountability in Aid Dependent abling_environment_evidence_of_progress_on_ Countries: How Can Donors Help?” Washington, aaa__en__.pdf. DC, International Budget Partnership, 2008. http:// Whitfield, L. “The Aid Critic: Bill Easterly.”GEG Blog, internationalbudget.org/budget-briefs/brief7/. February 2010. http://www.globaleconomicgover- Ringold, Dena, et al. “Citizens and Service Delivery.” nance.org/blog/2010/02/the-aid-critic-bill-easter- Overseas Development Institute, 2012. http://www. ly/. odi.org.uk/events/docs/4871.pdf. Security in the Information Age

Cybersecurity and Modern Grand Strategy Sarah Granger & Lorelei Kelly

OVERVIEW The volatile and uncertain circumstances gener- ated by this untethered potential present a paradox. With the complex shifts in international security Just as technology is neutral, distributed access to resulting from increased global volatility and inter- communication can feed innovation and enterprise connectivity, new kinds of challenges have emerged. for good or for bad purposes. Value frameworks These challenges are distributed across the spec- help elected leaders and national policymakers trum of traditional national security policy and navigate risks optimally. While options like retalia- will require an approach unlike any in our nation’s tion in kind will always be a significant asset, several history. In order to adequately prepare for this un- distributable security concepts need to evolve for precedented shift, we must look to both traditional the United States to obtain well-rounded strength: security practices and to innovative strategies for a To become a twenty-first century power, the United hybrid policy method. Given the expanding pub- States must move lic demand for transparency and participation, the • away from coercion and toward credible influ- process for building a next-generation framework ence, to protect our information, infrastructure, and our • away from exclusion and toward par­ people must be conducted primarily through open ticipation,away from borders and toward net- and inclusive communications while respecting that works, containment of virtual threats is no longer a viable • away from secrecy and toward transparency, strategy. This new framework will enable prioritiza- • away from reaction and toward resilience, and tion and development of a resilience-themed net- • away from containment and toward sustain- work strategy and a policy framework that is adapt- ment. able and sustainable through the coming decades. These modern security concepts illustrate a dramatic shift from the last century. They intersect DEFINING THE GRAND STRATEGY diplomacy, development, and security in myriad ways. They stand in stark contrast to last century’s With the ability to communicate comes power, and Cold War—an ideological battle characterized by today power is distributing across the globe. competitive military preparedness between the

99 100 Sarah Granger & Lorelei Kelly SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

United States and the Soviet Union. In those days, resilience and our credibility, which in turn brings leaders sought security through war prevention us more influence and scope of relationships with with enough nuclear weapons to guarantee mutual which to pursue mutual interests. assured destruction. Yet the guns vs. butter battles of yesterday have been recast. Nearly every U.S. en- RETHINKING HOW TO DIVIDE UP SECURITY gagement since 1991 has involved volatile, ongoing crises requiring political and social solutions. Our Today, bottom-up societal resilience, i.e. “domestic tools left over from the Cold War have proved in- strength at home,” sits side by side with hardware adequate for these challenges, which require a com- dominance as a primary security concern. This sys- mitment to building societal resilience. In 2006, the tems framework stresses population security, hence Center for Naval Analyses brought this theme home robust health, education, communication, and when it issued a report on National Security and the transport are measures of modern strength. In addi- Threat of Climate Change.1 Today, an organizing con- tion, the threat assessments of this modern security cept for U.S. security is emerging from the military, strategy require the national capacity to withstand the State Department, and other federal agencies. It and bounce back from system shocks. Through this is sustainment—a broadly inclusive and bottom-up lens, connectivity issues have become a fundamen- ability to adapt, persevere, and prosper.2 The opera- tal part of what is generally considered “critical in- tional moniker for sustainment is “building resil- frastructure.” The Congressional Research Service ience.” acknowledges that the definition of critical infra- Grand strategy is a concept that describes how structure is continually evolving and—because it a nation’s leaders use instruments of power to over- is a large part of congressional budgets—always come challenges, defeat adversaries, and generate a subject to debate. During the last decade, it evolved unity of spirit toward achieving the nation’s com- rapidly from public works to a more comprehensive mon goal. The question, however, is how to think list of domestic assets that are vital to U.S. social and about U.S. grand strategy in a world where our se- economic well-being. These tend to be broad and curity is unavoidably shared with distant and far dif- often taken for granted. Add to the above list pub- ferent cultures and peoples—including with their lic interests like water, power grids, and generator long-term well-being. Today’s world also reflects plants. In twenty-first century America, critical in- new norms characterized by distributed threats, frastructure also includes the means for societywide not all of them man-made. Global risks like cli- communication, specifically telephone networks mate disruption, earthquakes, and disease have no and the Internet. simple solution and do not respect political bound- Within this new paradigm of distributed power aries. Other threats, like failing states, the preserva- and need for resilience, understanding and leverag- tion of dignity, and contagious extremist ideology ing collaborative networks is a vital asset. The cred- do not respond well to the use of force. Moreover, ibility of our democratic governing style is under today the U.S.’s persuasive influence (often called immense scrutiny in the current global push toward soft power) is a measurement of strength based on self-determination. In reports back from Iraq and our credibility, much like military dominance was a Afghanistan, military personnel claim that our chal- generation ago. The theory goes that our willingness lenges there are more social than political, that we to invest in our own domestic strength boosts our need more tools that recognize local tradition, that Cybersecurity and Modern Grand Strategy 101 respect the need for dignity, and that create positive spending be untouched. If carried out, this demand life chances for those we hope to influence. Mean- would, in effect, pit U.S. domestic resilience against while, the U.S.’s ability to model evolved demo- the last century’s war plans. cratic practice has been found severely wanting in Besides being streamlined and well staffed and the wake of the Arab and North African uprisings. resourced, the military has the unique capacity for If influencing these globally significant events is to assimilating big picture analysis. This talent is called be our new criterion for security, it underscores the “situational awareness.” It is a form of understanding need to move from the last century’s reliance on the that includes strategic judgment and especially per- military for threat containment to a modern strate- tains to individuals who must act quickly, despite gy of mutually beneficial relationships; an adaptive, many moving parts that could change and impact resilient societal infrastructure; and improvements the results of the decision at hand. It is anticipatory, in connectivity, both digital and human. not reactive. In the federal government, the military If we define connectivity as a security principle, has it in abundance of resources in comparison to in today’s world other executive branch agencies. The military cer- • our security must address the safety of people tainly has more analytical ability for trends and as- across and within our own borders, sessments than the U.S. Congress. This problem of • we cannot achieve security alone, and agency capacities and competencies is pervasive • we need a new combination of policies and and points to the need to rethink civil-military rela- resources to be secure. tions. In order to create a more balanced division of This premise requires that we view security as a labor for security, especially for cybersecurity, one larger concept than war-fighting or hardware domi- priority must be to stop the migration of policymak- nance. An ongoing problem for establishing a better ing to our military services and to impart this capac- civil-military balance in U.S. security strategy is the ity for situational awareness to civilian federal agen- migration of programs from civilian budgets to mili- cies and to Congress. Across the board, the federal tary ones. Everything, from breast cancer research government is overwhelmed by information. Mem- to funding for AIDS prevention, can be found in bers of Congress receive up to 1,000 percent more the defense budget; yet a significant recent trend contact from that outside world than in previous reflects the functional ability of the Defense De- decades. Helping the legislature sort, filter, evaluate, partment to “get things done” in contrast to other and make useful quality information remains a key foreign policy agencies. The reasons behind these challenge. shifts are numerous: The defense budget receives To the extent that cybersecurity reflects the less scrutiny, it has greater planning capacity, it has modernizing trend of sustainment over contain- more personnel, and it runs under an operational ment, it will be a catalyst for a new, national con- culture. Indeed, the budget sequestration debate of versation about a 21st Century Grand Strategy for 2012 illustrates perfectly why so much nonmilitary America. Our leaders’ objective should be to inspire activity happens in the Defense Department’s remit. Americans to imagine a new and different U.S. pres- The 2011 executive branch deal with Congress re- ence in the world; to boldly take action; to claim quires across-the-board spending cuts, if no budget the opportunities before us; and to move forward is agreed upon. Nevertheless, a broad and bipartisan together to a more resilient, productive, and shared swath of members of Congress insists that defense future. 102 Sarah Granger & Lorelei Kelly SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

Distributed power looks like complicated and and medical records. Security in this realm requires sometimes lethal mayhem to average Americans. resilience, not a padlock. Examples of resilience Because there is so much uncertainty in the global are found in both machines and people, hardware environment, our leaders must be able to explain and software, i.e., redundant data storage, distrib- the rationale and the possible trade-offs of cred- uted power grids, civic trust, and strong community ibility vs. control in our security choices. Today, identity. explanations about the challenges we face are in- Cybersecurity requires a good risk management adequate and often contradictory. For example, on formula, not a padlock. Moreover, much of the risk the one hand the United States promotes rule of law must be reduced at the individual level. Some typical and sees itself as exemplary, and on the other hand examples from an everyday office setting are vulner- it relies increasingly on drone strikes that much of able network access points (from thermostats and the world considers illegal.3 Some believe that our scanners to downloaded games or applying patches response to distributed power is increasingly tech- that look legitimate when they are not). These are nological distributed violence rather than evolved basic human error or human computer interaction democratic practice. On the one hand, we claim to challenges. Government’s role in this realm is im- be an open society. On the other, we cling to a cul- portant, but limited. Government can come up with ture of controlled access to information within gov- helpful processes, but the private sector will likely ernment. These seemingly contradictory scenarios be more expedient. The challenge for cybersecurity and gray policy areas will grow, play out, and require policymakers will be to find the best practices of more interpretation and explanation as information each of these contributors. Equally important, the supplies, transparency, and demands for inclusion U.S. government should be the standard bearer in increase. Indeed, the September 2012 attack on the its own workplaces. U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, illustrates the mix To illustrate the interconnectedness of the In- of forces at play. Several individuals were killed, in- ternet and envision our modern concept of “cyber- cluding the U.S. ambassador and three other Ameri- space,” we can look to astronomy. Imagine a super- cans, in a circumstance that included both coordi- nova exploding, bursting into bits that form into nated militants and protesting masses alledgedly clusters, planets, moons, and cosmic dust. As matter outraged by an Islam-slandering online video. expands outward, gravity and explosive forces con- trol the connections between the matter and how it forms into galaxies and solar systems. In the case of VISUALIZING CYBERSPACE the Internet, it all began when two computers con- nected, resulting in the explosive growth we have How do transparency and its accompanying volatil- witnessed in recent decades. ity play out in the cyberspace realm? Today, nearly one quarter of the world’s popula- “Big data” provides a contemporary example. tion is online: over two billion users.4 The indexed This buzzword refers to a current human dilemma web has over eight billion pages. By 2011, there only made possible by technology. We have moved were ten billion network connections. By 2016, it into an era where datasets have become enormous is expected there will be nearly nineteen billion. In and often too complicated to parse, sort, filter, or terms of data traversing the web, according to Cisco, otherwise render sensible. Examples run the gamut 369 exabytes (369 billion gigabytes) traveled the from phone logs and email to military surveillance Internet in 2011, with a forecast of 1.3 zettabytes Cybersecurity and Modern Grand Strategy 103

(roughly one trillion gigabytes) estimated for 2016.5 over the issue, leading to a situation where some Mobile technology is expanding at extraordinary stakeholders prefer no action to a regulatory chal- rates, and global penetration is evolving on a mas- lenge of unprecedented dimensions. To many, it al- sive scale. What this means is that our Andromeda- ready seems like scaling the insurmountable. like, galaxy-sized web of communication, engage- One of the positive reasons terms like “cyber- ment, and commerce cannot be steered like a ship space” and “cybersecurity” gained prevalence is that at sea. It can only be guided along existing patterns they assume a broader view on the reaches of the as it grows at its own pace, continuously expanding Internet, including mobile devices and future in- in the ether. ventions yet to take root. “Cyberspace is all of the The concept of ”cyberspace” began as a ficti- computer networks in the world and everything tious vision of the future, where man and machine they connect and control,” explains Richard Clarke became more closely linked. Coined by author Wil- in his book, Cyber War.8 As such, we use these terms liam Gibson in his book, Neuromancer,6 the idea in this paper to illustrate the vastness of the space gave rise to an entire subgenre called “cyberpunk” in which operations must take place to secure U.S. including notable films likeThe Matrix.7 Possibly technology, our information, and our people. because of its dramatic nature, the term “cyberse- The emerging threats we face include a wide curity” caught on in government circles and has be- range of individual actors, networks of hackers, come more prevalent in Washington in recent years, hacktivists, and cyberterrorists. They all use the while becoming nearly extinct in Silicon Valley and same types of weapons: computers, software, rout- other communities where the technology is being ers, Internet access, mobile devices, and the like. developed. Now, with military experts talking about Those responsible for the largest cyber threats gen- their “cyber capacity” and “cyber growth,” anything erally are groups that may or may not be attached related to “cyber” has morphed into an eerie, dysto- officially to particular government entities, whether pian image. they work for them or for rogue organizations. Lines The legislative community has reacted with have become increasingly blurred, and attacks have trepidation and “path of least resistance” inaction. become increasingly decentralized, where we might A recent example came in January 2012. In the face see hackers in Russia using networks in Iceland to of massive protest from the online community, both run software that lives on computers in Germany, the House and Senate abruptly reversed themselves storing data on Chinese servers, infiltrating U.S. on two controversial bills, the Stop Online Piracy systems. As a result, we face highly complex multi- Act and the Protect Intellectual Property Act. Yet jurisdiction issues, because most incidents happen within a few months, the House passed, with 248 across several invisible boundaries. votes, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protec- Moving forward, in order to acknowledge the tion Act, which would significantly limit online civil end of the containment era, we must liberties. Its fate is yet to be determined. • broaden our concept of security, The policy conversation about “cyber” issues is • recognize the limits of force in a world of dis- inadequate. Rather than reducing the technology tributed threats, and its weaknesses to the bits and bytes level, the • stand for fundamental principles as norms concerns have become elevated to a dark, chaotic evolve, threat fit only for military management. In short, • establish new decision rules in order to stay the terminology itself has taken a powerful hold ahead, and 104 Sarah Granger & Lorelei Kelly SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

• employ new risk models to facilitate vast data- have seen and would likely not have been so widely sets for threat assessment and response. publicized had it not gone rogue, infecting systems For national security strategy purposes, the outside the centrifuges. As cyber weapons of this world used to be easily framed as linear and mea- type become more common, the United States sured, with predictably scalable solutions. Now it should expect an increase in attempted attacks and appears more chaotic, and often random, and the sophistication of attacks. solutions must include humans. How we define The numbers are already staggering. Accord- modern security is at play. Issues of war and peace ing to DOD, their fifteen thousand networks are are the most important responsibilities of citizens scanned nearly ten million times each day. Hun- and elected leaders, yet our overreliance on coercion dreds of thousands of hacking attempts occur on and control shows how much leadership continues government networks each year. And because at- to execute a strategy stuck firmly in an obsolete par- tacks can be replicated through automated tools, adigm, one incapable of addressing the distributed one hacker can attempt to break into multiple sys- and human-centered threats we face today. tems simultaneously, and often hackers work in Across the globe, a profound shift is underway. groups together, running multiple programs aiming Demands for self-determination are redistributing at a wide range of networks. These hacker groups power from hierarchies to individuals. The changes are generally termed Advanced Persistent Threats in will ultimately be a blended mix of top-down and the military, due to their dangerous activities. They bottom-up strategies and directives. Attaining this can be independently run, hired by larger organiza- goal will require a vigilant global network of indi- tions, or affiliated with governments, but in most viduals and groups who see themselves as stake- cases they are classified as nonstate actors, muddy- holders in power-sharing and legitimate voices in ing the waters further. determining the future. According to most reports, Chinese hackers have infiltrated networks around the world, most notably ASSESSING EXPANDING THREATS AND in the United States, gaining intellectual property WEAKNESSES secrets, consumer data, website passwords, and oth- er technologies that could potentially aid Chinese Incidents over the past five years show how serious developers in obtaining advantages in the global cybersecurity threats have become and what kinds marketplace. While there is less concern about Chi- of attacks we should expect to see in the near future. nese military attacks on U.S. networks, it is widely Recent reports9 indicate that the United States like- known that “logic bombs,” or rogue code, now ex- ly orchestrated the Stuxnet virus that brought down ists in most U.S. government networks that could be some of Iran’s nuclear centrifuges, as the primary transferring information to the Chinese. weapon in a sophisticated program called Olympic In the past five years, we have seen a significant Games. This is the first major case of U.S. offensive increase in cyber attacks on financial and military use of cyber weapons over a period of several years. systems. Some prominent examples include While the National Security Agency (NSA), the • attacks on drones, air defense networks, and National Security Council, and the Department of air traffic control systems in the United States Defense (DOD) have alluded to expansive capabili- and Israel, ties in the past, Stuxnet is the first such example we • attacks on financial systems, banks of all sizes, Cybersecurity and Modern Grand Strategy 105

and financial services companies and organi- is the most sobering threat we face. Al Qaeda does zations, including Citibank, Morgan Stanley, not care whether rogue code designed to take down and the International Monetary Fund,10 financial systems or power grids damages other • attacks on technology companies key to Inter- companies and individuals’ computers or other un- net development, including Intel and Google, related systems in the process. As with the anthrax • attacks on power grids in Estonia and in Ohio, virus, we could see attacks on seemingly random and targets at any time.13 The worst kind of attacks we • attacks on government networks, including have yet to see—hybrid blends of cyber and kinetic the National Aeronautics and Space Admin- destruction, such as biological viruses introduced istration (NASA), the Department of Com- through water systems simultaneously as power merce, the Department of State, DOD, and grids are taken down by cyber weapons. the military Central Command. In May 2010, the DOD authorized a new U.S. While it may seem as if we are witnessing a break Cyber Command, headed by the director of the in the rash of attacks, they continue to happen every NSA. This command will manage dual responsi- day. The good news is that many of the attempts to bilities in parallel with the civilian agencies and is hack into critical systems are thwarted. In early May, tasked with both defending U.S. military networks the Department of Homeland Security warned of and attacking other countries’ systems, a.k.a. cyber- a “gas pipeline sector cyber intrusion campaign.”11 space operations.14 The NSA continues to conduct Intelligence in this area is crucial, and the media can intelligence and protect U.S. government com- play a role in disseminating information to entities munications on the civilian side. This is a first and operating critical infrastructure systems to raise the necessary step toward building capacity for coordi- alert and help them seek and detect any such at- nated intelligence and action but is only one critical tempts. This is where information-sharing is crucial piece of the puzzle. and must be conducted in ways where the most crit- Significant security challenges lie squarely in our ical information is shared without putting private future at this critical stage of the Internet’s evolu- information about Americans at risk. It also points tion. We can assume that any connected network out the urgent need to build resilience into systems can be hacked, and any data on any system in that and into society in advance. network can be stolen, altered, or removed. We can One of the biggest long-term challenges for poli- also assume that hackers already have malicious cymakers lies in the exponential rate of change in code in many of the U.S. networks. It is a general both the quality and quantity of attacks, as well as rule that technology companies responsible for the perpetrators. We have known for the past few building the underlying hardware and software do years that it is only a matter of time before terror- not have enough monetary incentive or public pres- ist groups get their hands on adequate resources for sure to fix all of their security holes. This gap is a causing damaging cyber attacks. A recent Al Qaeda double whammy, because both the government and video called for an “electronic Jihad”12 on the United private entities controlling the Internet and critical States, meaning our time is extremely limited before infrastructure tend to depend heavily upon software we face disruptive attacks. Whether and when ter- developed externally by these same companies. As a rorist groups obtain enough resources to do damage result, we continue to have security holes in critical at the Stuxnet level is yet to be determined, but this networks. Finally, people will always be the weakest 106 Sarah Granger & Lorelei Kelly SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE link, with human error allowing for simple mistakes Some areas where there is a need include the that can unravel the most robust networks. use of dated software in government systems that is no longer supported by updates or fixes. Another MODERN THREATS AND problem within government is the long timeline ANTIQUATED GOVERNMENT required for technology purchases and installation. By the time the vetting and procurement process Though both the executive and legislative branches takes place, the software that the government has of U.S. government are involved in policymaking on purchased is dated, and vendors have little incentive cybersecurity, Congress is far out-matched when it to support the product. A larger systemic problem comes to expertise and comprehensive knowledge relates to global competitiveness. The United States on the issues. Congress’s analog processes—devel- is not keeping pace with the human resources nec- oped in the nineteenth century—are inadequate for essary for the twenty-first century. U.S. schools are the volatility and hyperspeed of digital twenty-first not graduating enough trained engineers every year. century challenges. This problem is most acute on Indeed, the demand for a trained workforce is out- issues that involve public interests, with technical pacing the supply of personnel. Despite the uptick inputs and second and third order implications— of research and development investments in recent like cybersecurity. This sort of expertise is largely years, we are not keeping pace with the need. This missing during Congress’s policymaking process. will continue to be a problem until we can alter the From self-determination movements to the spread investment landscape and security prioritization. of dangerous nuclear knowledge through the In- The Congress is the first branch of government ternet and other communication media, Congress that is outlined in our country’s founding docu- often lacks even a basic understanding of today’s ments. The president and Congress, ideally, are fundamental technologies or emerging social/po- coequal branches of government that engage in litical forces. This lack leads to policy responses a healthy competition for influence over security that undermine not only our own democratic gov- policy. If the goal is to keep cybersecurity within ernance but also our position in the world. This is the realm of civilian authority, those with special slowly changing as more members and staffers find knowledge must work to balance the knowledge ways to bring expert knowledge to Capitol Hill, but disparity about modern threats between the execu- the process is still much too slow to keep up with tive and Congress. The past decade has seen a shift evolving technologies. This gap points to the need in power from the Congress to the White House on for technology subject matter experts to find a way matters of security. In addition, the defense portion to educate elected leaders about both the technical of the federal budget increased 70 percent between and the societal aspects of modern technology. 2001 and 2010. Significant challenges face companies that own This trend is a reaction to the terror attacks of much of the Internet infrastructure and control U.S. September 11, 2001. Starting with the Authoriza- communications. As financial pressures to be lean tion to Use Military Force approved within days, and “first to market” trump security, without a push this lack of clear civilian control shows up in differ- by corporate leadership, shareholders, and custom- ent ways. “Emergency spending” or supplemental ers for prioritized security in products and services, spending requests for the war in Afghanistan have weak links and security gaps will continue to be the received hardly any scrutiny, much less strategic standard. analysis on Capitol Hill. It also shows up in execu- Cybersecurity and Modern Grand Strategy 107 tive orders to use the military to achieve a policy CERT also participates in the national security outcome. Our experience in Afghanistan and cer- community by contributing policy ideas and open tainly the aftermath of the “Arab Spring” illustrate source tools for individual implementation (a tool- the limits of force in today’s world. Our constitution box for creating a Computer Security Incident Re- divides foreign policy power between the president sponse team, for example) along with other practi- and Congress. By law, the president is commander cal tools like security audits, network traffic analysis, in chief, but only the Congress can declare war. and vulnerability discovery methods. The CERT These authorities generally give the Congress power experts are also looking at measured, iterative, and over going to war but the president power over how agile ways to operationalize preventive measures— to conduct it. How must this framework evolve in a like building security precautions into software world of redistributed power, where both the capac- design and defining how to defend against insider ity to do good and the capacity to act treacherously threats like intellectual property loss or sabotage. are widely available? Academic and research organizations are begin- The question can be specifically reframed: What ning to assess, analyze, and make recommendations would the division of labor for authority to respond about cybersecurity. One early leader on this task is look like after a significant cyber attack? The- an the Center for Strategic and International Studies, swer: It depends. Given the current shifting legisla- which published a report15 and recommendations tive landscape, we are faced with several dilemmas. for the incoming administration in January 2009 For small-scale cyber attacks, we have mechanisms and then again in January 2011. The reports call for in place for rapid response. For large-scale attacks— cybersecurity to be given a higher priority and for particularly hybrid attacks such as those on critical the cessation of voluntary compliance measures, infrastructure systems like electric grids—currently including a tough, contractual regulatory backbone. there is no lead authority for civilian response. This The Center for Strategic and International Stud- can pose all kinds of problems, particularly in terms ies’ Technology and Public Policy Project Director, of reporting and tracking incidents and related at- James Lewis, sums up the civil military challenge: tacks. “[The NSA] has been doing it for 50 years, and they Civilian and military leaders alike want to avoid have 800 of the world’s best mathematicians and the overreaction that comes with high adrenaline, a giant supercomputer. There is some merit to the such as rushed lawmaking amid uncertain crisis re- argument that NSA should protect national net- sponse. One productive step forward would be to works—except that politically, the U.S. just doesn’t find and scale up early efforts at problem-solving, invite the military to do police work. So you have outreach, and education. Some of the most innova- this misallocation: NSA has the capability; Depart- tive work to this end began over two decades ago ment of Homeland Security has the responsibility. in U.S. higher education. For example, Carnegie We’ve got to find some way for them to work to- Mellon University hosts the Computer Emergency gether.”16 Response Team (CERT) dedicated to collecting The multistakeholder approach has been tried in information on security weaknesses and inform- Congress, with mixed results.17 Congress created the ing people of these weaknesses, coordinated in one Homeland Security Committee in 2003. Because of place. CERT plays a huge role in helping companies committee turf and the broad range of issues cov- and individuals secure their systems and networks ered, the Department of Homeland Security must when bugs are found. report to more than eighty panels on Capitol Hill. 108 Sarah Granger & Lorelei Kelly SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

This dilemma represents an extreme illustration of Conversations are where intellectual capital gets the legislature’s dysfunction in interpreting modern, generated. But business environments based on complex, global security threats. command and control are usually characterized To prevent the cyber equivalent of a Pearl Har- by intimidation, coercion and threats of reprisal. bor or 9/11, we must act as a collective conscious- In contrast, genuine conversation flourishes only ness, with public and private resources aligned to- in an atmosphere of free and open exchange.18 gether in preparation, with a serious attitude toward security and safety. Unfortunately, we lack the polit- This passage speaks volumes to our national di- ical cohesiveness that is required for such a massive lemma over cybersecurity and its place in modern undertaking, and most likely the past will repeat it- grand strategy. If we stay in the obsolete command- self, in a different form. It took Congress forty years and-control mode, we will miss out on all the op- to respond to steamboat accidents via policy, over portunities that come with innovation and change. fifty years to enact automobile safety regulations, Hierarchical governments—even in democracies— and twenty-three years to apply air safety regula- have limits to flexibility and nimble response. Yet tions after the first plane crash. Cybersecurity inci- one primary principle of resilience is well adapted dents have been plaguing us for over two decades, both to business and to governing: Managing risk is but only recently on a large scale. Cybersecurity less costly than managing crisis. Cybersecurity pol- bills have not made much headway in Congress. icy could also learn much from the world of devel- The latest to be introduced was the Cybersecurity opment, where risk management strategies for rural Act of 2012. The arguments for and against the bill farmers based on crop insurance, credit, and savings were significant, but the end result was an impasse incentivize prevention and create the capacity to in the Senate. Rather than bringing all stakehold- deal with volatility and uncertainty. Perhaps “civic ers together—government, industry, and civil soci- resilience technology” would be a more productive ety—to collaborate and put the best ideas together and relevant label than “cybersecurity.” toward working long-term solutions, we continue While cybersecurity may evoke bleak dystopia, what seems to be more of a political stalemate than civic resilience technology inspires hopeful oppor- a forward-thinking security strategy. tunity. Resilience happens when today’s communi- cation technology harnesses information to provide early warning and vastly improve our response to system-stressing events such as natural disasters A FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER RESILIENCE and pandemics. Technologies available now offer governments and engaged citizens much better ear- In many ways, the U.S. national security narrative ly warning surveillance, situational awareness, and resembles an industrial era public relations script. decision-making across all levels of response. This Our policies continue to see the United States as kind of informed action on behalf of a community the scheme of things instead of in the scheme of or a nation is resilience in a nutshell. things. Wedded to hierarchy, we are still counting Returning again to the example provided by ranks while the rest of the world counts links. The CERT, the CERT Resilience Management Model technology classic, The Cluetrain Manifesto, notes includes “four essential operational assets: people, how the Internet has changed “the market” into one information, technology, and facilities.”19 Based on big conversation. this model, we are farthest ahead in our informa- Cybersecurity and Modern Grand Strategy 109 tion. The Department of Homeland Security has for prevention or response. We must operate under acknowledged a significant need for more human the assumption that everything is connected, infor- resources for cybersecurity programs,20 we have mation is limitless, and data can be transferred in already assessed our existing technological weak- an instant. Information-sharing on multiple levels nesses, and our facilities will expand as we respond is critical to keeping up with the speed of the at- to the resource issues. What remains is a collection tacks by creating collective intelligence and defense of unanswered questions and policy challenges. mechanisms. Threats will be diverse and dispersed; A policy framework of sustainment rather than therefore, the capability to respond must follow suit. containment is intended to frame our national There is no way to control the chaos inherent ­decisions regarding investment, security, economic in the global communications revolution any more development, energy, the environment, and engage- than we can contain an exploding supernova. There ment well into this century, looking beyond risk and is, however, the ability to maximize prevention at threat with a more positive focus on converging in- the node level, diffusing problems rapidly at each terests and opportunities. The Obama administra- node, whether it is the size of one computer or one tion has named this future with several initiatives21 million, strategically selecting target nodes based on that include connectivity (hence cybersecurity) calculated risks. Containment of cyber attacks on a and will likely continue to put forward new organiz- grand scale is no longer a viable strategy. As with a ing concepts that link connectivity to the direction coordinated response to a biological virus, each sys- our nation will take. tem must be inoculated through a simultaneously The policy process moving forward will be a preventative and reactive process. With thousands hybrid. Federal agencies are already pursuing their of viruses attacking millions of systems every day, strong suits. A type of cyber diplomacy is evolving containment attempts must be kept at a surgical with the 21st Century Statecraft focus at the State level while taking a multidimensional approach to Department. This mission is thematically organized national security. This broader focus entails a com- around connectivity and using the Internet as a bination of the traditional four pillars of power: multiplier of diplomacy. Other ways forward will be diplomacy, information, military, and economic. A to look for areas where traditional security could be modernized diplomacy, information, military, and adapted to cybersecurity practices, such as re-cali- economic strategy might include coordinated intel- brating the mission of nuclear weapons labs. Their ligence collection, 21st Century Statecraft, strategic resident knowledge about complex design, verifica- policy changes, technological advancements, and tion, and technical problem-solving is unmatched. public education. This kind of resilience network The Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia Labs and grand strategy will only occur through coopera- is one example, as is the rich endowment of knowl- tion between the legislative and executive branches edge that exists in the thirty-nine Federally Funded of government. Moreover, it will need public sup- Research and Development Centers. port. Transparency and sharing of information on a Historically, national security models have op- strategic level for the benefit of the greater good is a erated most often within a “need-to-know” frame- paramount concern. Given the level of dysfunction work, keeping information separated in order to en- and acrimony in contemporary government, our sure tight control. In cyberspace, where our battles challenge then becomes how to bridge the gaps that happen instantaneously in a galaxy-sized web, we exist before our time runs out and—as a nation— cannot operate in a one- or two-dimensional path we lose by default. 110 Sarah Granger & Lorelei Kelly SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

CONCLUSION our perceived uncritical support for Israel are two examples. While the United States has been a stand- Moving forward, we must consider emergent cir- up champion for Internet freedom thus far, it is not cumstances and volatility not as our enemy but as clear what the trade-offs will be between security an opportunity. Collectively embracing the new and transparency in the global realm, security and landscape and planning for resilience models will privacy in the domestic. allow for greater long-term stability and global lead- A best-case scenario in the near future will be if ership. With new precedents waiting to be set, some the executive branch continues to promote initia- questions still remain that must be answered, name- tives like open government and 21st Century State- ly how pre-emptive and preventative cyber attacks craft and to steer the conversation away from cyber- will be considered under international law; how to security and toward civic technology and building avoid the escalation of threats; and how to appropri- resilience. A public engagement strategy to comple- ately balance civil liberties and security, including ment advances in transparency would benefit U.S. keeping a constant focus on transparency. democracy at this time and give our nation some In today’s world, where transparency is a condi- new models to share with countries that are looking tion more than a choice, democracies should have a for how to improve democratic practice in the digi- home field advantage. Over time, this form of gov- tal age. Technologically enhanced public participa- ernment has proved successful because it is more tion methods will be part of the future. From the adaptive, flexible, and open. Ideally, these qualities Arab Awakening to Germany’s liquid democracy, will lend themselves to the kind of evolved demo- stakeholder engagement is the next big step. If the cratic practice we need today, one that takes the president and administration officials continue to overwhelming noise created by globalization and lead, to reach out to Congress, and to pronounce translates it into intelligent, inclusive, evidence- these values of inclusion through a larger grand based decision-making. strategic lens—one that describes where we are go- Despite nearly two decades of investment in “in- ing as a nation in the world—Americans will better teragency” and “whole of government” efforts, the understand the concepts, language, and policies we need for the U.S. government to figure out better will need to modernize and lead the way toward a ways to collaborate, share, and optimize decisions promising and more fully shared future. remains with us. Since 1991, diplomacy, develop- ment, and security have not been separate lanes of ENDNOTES policy, yet instead of a fundamental rethink, we have seen a significant migration of civilian tasks into the military’s remit. In contrast, former Secretary of 1. Center for Naval Analyses, National Security and State Hillary Rodham Clinton’s 21st Century State- the Threat of Climate Change (Alexandria, VA: 2006). 2. Mr. Y, A National Strategic Narrative (Washing- craft reflects a modern, inclusive strategy for engage- ton, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center for Scholars, 2011). ment. This is a policy lens that views technology as a “Mr. Y” is a pseudonym for Captain Porter and Colonel tool through which societies can be empowered and Mykleby. free speech enabled. What it cannot do, however, is 3. William A. Owens, Kenneth W. Dam, and overcome some of the fundamental contradictions Herbert S. Lin, eds.,Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics between the U.S.’s declared values and perceptions Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capa- of our policies “on the ground.” Drone strikes and bilities (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, Cybersecurity and Modern Grand Strategy 111

2009). tacks,” Communications of the ACM [Association for 4. Graeme McMillan, “How Big is the Internet? Computing Machinery] (55: 3 (March 2012): 66–73. Bigger Than Humanity,” Techland, TIME.com, July 20, 14. Zachary Fryer-Biggs, “U.S. Military Goes on Cy- 2011. ber Offensive,”Defense News, March 24, 2012. 5. IT Business Edge, “The Internet Forecast to Qua- 15. Center for Strategic International Studies, Cy- druple in Size in Four Years,” 2012. bersecurity Two Years Later (Washington, DC: January 6. William Gibson, Neuromancer (Ace,1984). 2011). 7. The Matrix, film by Larry and Andy Wachowski, 16. Craig Collins, “Homeland Cybersecurity,” De- 1999. fense Media Network, April 1, 2012. 8. Richard Clarke and Robert K. Knake, Cyber War 17. Kristin M. Lord and Travis Sharp, eds., America’s (HarperCollins, 2010). Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in the Information 9. David Sanger, “Obama Order Sped Up Wave Age (Washington, DC: Center for a New American Secu- of Cyberattacks Against Iran,”New York Times, June 1, rity, May 31, 2011). 2012. 18. Rick Levine et al., The Cluetrain Manifesto (New 10. Center for Strategic International Studies, “Sig- York: Perseus Books, 2000), p. 15. nificant Cyber Incidents Since 2006” (Washington, DC: 19. CERT, CERT Resilience Management Model May 4, 2012). (Pittsburgh, PA: Carnegie Mellon University, 2010). 11. Tim Starks, “Cybersecurity: Rushing to Stall?” 20. Rene Marsh, “Feds need more computer defense CQ Weekly, May 12, 2012. experts, Napolitano says,” CNN.com, April 21, 2012. 12. Jack Cloherty, “Virtual Terrorism: Al Qaeda Vid- 21. International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, eo Calls for ‘Electronic Jihad’,” ABC News, May 22, 2012. Security, and Openness in a Networked World (Washing- 13. Seung Hyun Kim, Qiu-Hong Wang, and Jo- ton, DC: The White House, May 2011). hannes B. Ullrich, “A Comparative Study of Cyberat-

Managing Volatility with the Expanded Access to Information in Fragile States Joseph Siegle

INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS samese minorities living in southern Indian cities TECHNOLOGY (ICT) AND HEIGHTENED such as Bangalore set off a mass exodus of tens and VOLATILITY IN AN EVOLVING SECURITY possibly hundreds of thousands of people. Train LANDSCAPE platforms were swarmed with panic-stricken fami- lies attempting to flee, forcing authorities to add In an eighteen-minute video uploaded to YouTube train departures to accommodate the crush. The on May 1, 2012, the militant Nigerian Islamist rumors were all the more believable in that they group, Boko Haram, captured live footage of the were supported by graphic photos and video images bombing of the This Day newspaper offices in Abuja of casualties purportedly of attacks already begun. earlier that day in which eight people were killed Only later was it realized that these images were and scores more seriously injured. In claiming re- falsely identified earthquake victims. In the attempt sponsibility, the group justified the attack for what it to curb the exodus, the Indian government banned contended was the newspaper’s favorable treatment mass texting for two weeks and blocked roughly 250 of the government in its fight against the extremist websites allegedly hosting inflammatory content. group. Boko Haram warned of more such attacks In September 2012, an incendiary amateur vid- against other media outlets unless their coverage eo denigrating to Islam was uploaded to YouTube by of its movement improved. Several months later, its U.S. provocateurs, sparking protests and attacks more than thirty cellphone towers were destroyed on U.S. diplomatic missions throughout the Mus- in northeast Nigeria, Boko Haram’s base, disrupting lim world. The attacks in Benghazi, Libya, resulted cellphone and Internet service. The targeting of the in the burning of the U.S. consulate and the deaths communications sector is revealing not just for the of four U.S. embassy officials, including the ambas- psychological impact, a common aim of terrorist at- sador. While linked to extremist Islamist groups, the tacks, but by the explicit effort to shape the group’s attacks highlighted the fragility of Libyan state insti- image to the public. tutions at the early stages of transitioning from over In India, short message service (SMS), i.e., tex- four decades of coercive rule by Moummar Qaddafi. ting, and social media posts in August 2012 spread- These incidents demonstrate the heightened ing rumors of imminent ethnic violence against As- potential for volatility made possible by the grow-

113 114 Joseph Siegle DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE ing accessibility of information and communica- while, a single attack in the oil-rich Niger Delta can tions technology (ICT). This risk dovetails with cost global consumers billions in increased prices.2 the increasingly prominent role played by nonstate The developmental costs of this instability are, actors in the panoply of global security threats. The likewise, substantial. No conflict-affected country network of Al Qaeda franchises, transnational orga- has yet achieved a single Millennium Development nized criminal networks, narcotics traffickers, pira- Goal.3 Similar patterns are observed at the subna- cy syndicates, warlords, urban gangs, and extremist tional level. Marginalized areas tend to experience groups all pose ever more destabilizing threats to more instability and continued deprivation. The international security. ICT has asymmetrically en- instability caused by militias in the eastern Demo- abled the capability of these relatively small outfits cratic Republic of the Congo, for example, costs with otherwise limited conventional military power thousands of lives, limits movement into or out of by facilitating these groups’ ability to communicate, the area, and has forfeited countless children their plan, gather information, transfer funds, organize access to a meaningful education. Countries affect- themselves, and establish command-and-control ed by major conflict since 1980, over 90 percent of networks from disparate and at times highly isolat- which are internal, are likely to have a poverty rate ed locations around the world. The global position- that is 21 percentage points higher than a country ing system (GPS) and navigational technologies without armed violence.4 The “piracy premium” in- allow traffickers to evade detection and safely cross surance companies are charging shipping lines for borders at will across vast stretches of Africa, Latin cargo passing through the Red Sea or Gulf of Guin- America and the Caribbean, Asia, and the Mediter- ea significantly increases the cost of trade in Africa, ranean. Mexican drug cartels use mapping software limiting export opportunities and access to inputs. that tracks the location of police from high-tech In short, ICT-enabled nonstate actors pose an control rooms.1 escalating risk of volatility in poor or weak states The security implications of these unconven- that is increasingly capable of disrupting the global tional threats are nontrivial. As seen in Mexico, once system. criminal networks are well entrenched, the costs involved in uprooting them by even a relatively ca- INFORMATION AND VULNERABILITY pable state are enormous. Mexico has suffered for- TO NONSTATE THREATS ty-seven thousand violent deaths in its fight against its narcotics networks since 2006, putting it far over The networked nature of these emerging, trans- the one thousand deaths per year threshold of an national nonstate threats allows them to move armed conflict. The global drug trade is estimated operations and resources as required regardless of to involve at least $322 billion each year, reflecting national boundaries. Nonetheless, these nonstate the stakes and potential coercive capacity of these organizations need bases of operation outside the organizations while distorting the economies where purview of an intrusive state with interdiction ca- these transactions occur at the expense of produc- pacity. Consequently, the global system’s weak tive investments. In Africa, the growing collabora- link—fragile states, with their porous borders and tion between narcotics traffickers and Islamic mili- limited capacity, are an attractive forward base and tants has caused large swaths of the Sahel to fall out enabler for these illicit networks. Illustratively, Al of state control. Oil bunkering is estimated to cost Qaeda made its first inroads in Sudan and Afghani- Nigeria 10 percent of its total oil revenues. Mean- stan. Its main subsidiaries are now in Yemen and the Managing Volatility with the Expanded Access to Information in Fragile States 115

Sahel. Piracy in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Guinea portunity, and perceptions of injustice all contrib- is largely a function of the lawlessness and absence ute to higher propensities for conflict.5 of state capacity in Somalia and parts of Nigeria Weak governance and capacity in these states and Cameroon. Latin American cocaine networks also makes them vulnerable to cooption by nonstate have increasingly used Africa as a transshipment actors, the preferred method of operation for illicit point because of its relatively weaker controls. The trafficking organizations, which thrive by not draw- shantytowns expanding around many urban areas ing attention to themselves or directly confronting in the developing world have spawned a spate of or- state actors. To the extent that corruption is per- ganized criminal gangs that thrive in environments ceived as a “normal” way to get ahead, government with little or no police capacity. Militias like the officials will be receptive to entreaties from these Lord’s Resistance Army have sustained themselves illicit networks. The hierarchal structure of most au- for years in the largely lawless border areas of north- tocratic states, moreover, makes it easy for narcotics ern Uganda, South Sudan, and the Central African syndicates to gain expansive access to government Republic. Reducing the scope for nonstate security support once the traffickers have coopted a senior threats, then, is linked to strengthening the capacity official. This has long been seen in Latin America, of these fragile states. In a globalized environment, where politicians, the police, judges, key bureau- enhanced stability in one state contributes to great- crats, and oversight officials are regularly brought er stability overall. onto the payroll of narcotics networks. Similar pat- As one would expect, fragile states tend to have terns exist in Central Asia and have been emerging high levels of poverty. Of the twenty-eight coun- in Africa. tries listed on the Center for Systemic Peace’s State Fragile states, regardless of their level of legiti- Fragility Index as facing high or extreme fragility, macy, also provide a ready opening for “spoilers.” twenty-four are also considered low income (even These are individuals or groups that draw on or cre- though roughly half of these are natural resource ate perceptions of relative deprivation along ethnic rich). Low-income countries, in turn, are also more or religious lines by presenting a narrative that por- susceptible to conflict. Since 1990, low-income trays the marginalized population as victims of gov- countries have been in conflict one year out of four, ernment policies attempting to mobilize an identity on average. Fragile states are also typically charac- group to violence in order to reclaim their rights. An terized by low levels of legitimacy. Twenty of these illustration of such a narrative is a statement from twenty-eight fragile states are autocracies of one Abu Qaqa, a spokesman for Boko Haram, who said type or another. They govern, by definition, with a in January 2012 “we have been motivated by the narrow base of power, usually involving a combina- stark injustice in the land. . . . Poor people are tired tion of political party, ethnic group, or geographic of the injustice, people are crying for saviors and affiliation, along with control of the security sector. they know the messiahs are Boko Haram.”6 To maintain the support of this base, state resources Given its mass personal reach and low cost rela- and privileges are typically disproportionately di- tive to conventional communication channels, ac- rected to those within the ruling coalition. Over cess to ICT greatly enables spoilers’ capacity to con- time, this leads to ever-greater disparities within a vey their narrative. Governments that have a track society. Coercion can maintain a degree of stability record of corruption and fostering disparities stoke for some time, though eventually the combination such characterizations. Even if the charges levied of disenfranchisement, inequities in wealth and op- are unfounded, such polarizing claims are likely to 116 Joseph Siegle DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

­resonate, especially if levels of trust for the govern- nexus in fragile states. And, for this, information is ment are low. And economic deprivation is a key a vital tool. mobilizer. According to the 2011 World Develop- ment Report, unemployment was by far the most commonly cited reason by members of gangs and ICT LINKAGES TO SECURITY AND insurgent groups for why they joined the move- DEVELOPMENT ment. The widespread poverty in marginalized areas of fragile states makes these populations sus- While ICT can amplify the reach of violent non- ceptible to recruitment by illicit or violent organi- state actors, it can also be a force for development zations, providing the foot soldiers and community and stability. Societies that have relatively greater cooperation needed for these insurgent networks to access to information and independent perspec- sustain themselves over time. These populations are tives are exposed to a more vibrant marketplace of the key target audience of this messaging campaign. ideas. Authorities are required to respond to alter- While legitimacy is in many ways a necessary native proposals and, in the process, justify their condition for mitigating grievances, it is insufficient policy choices, leading to fewer ideologically driven to ensure stability. If able, spoilers will use violence and unchallenged policies. More open information to destabilize a legitimate, though weak, govern- environments, similarly, marginalize claims by radi- ment and intimidate a population in order to elevate cal groups or spoilers that can be held up to critical the spoiler’s influence. Such was the approach used scrutiny and contested, something that many mod- by Islamic militants in northern Mali who had been erate imams in northern Nigeria have done vis-à-vis eroding government authority for several years be- Boko Haram (sometimes generating a violent re- fore gaining effective control of this territory (two- sponse). thirds of the country’s land area) in April 2012, Greater access to information also facilitates the following a coup of the democratic government in sharing of development lessons learned, the adop- Bamako by disgruntled, low-ranking military offi- tion of best practices, and the introduction of new cers. Accordingly, legitimate governments must be ideas and technologies from outside the society that capable of defending themselves and their popula- improve living standards. With greater access to tions from destabilization. Among other things, this information, watchdog groups are better able to as- means establishing a capable security sector and be- sess governmental budget priorities and allocations. ing able to deliver basic development benefits val- This reduces the scope for corruption and improves ued by citizens while maintaining social cohesion in the efficiency and equity of government. Greater the face of efforts to fragment the populace along levels of transparency and oversight, accordingly, ethnic or geographic lines. contribute to greater stability. In other words, there is a powerful psychologi- ICT also contributes to greater legitimacy, one of cal dimension to the struggle with nonstate actors. the key stabilizing factors of fragile states. Election While genuine grievances undoubtedly exist in ev- monitoring groups are able to conduct parallel vote ery society, the degree to which the public views a counts at each local polling station and report these government as illegitimate, corrupt, and responsi- results back to a central headquarters, enabling real- ble for systemic inequities, the more susceptible it is time projections that challenge dubious official re- to instability. Winning the battle for public support, sults. The growing ubiquity of mobile phones with then, is the lynchpin for the development-security video camera capability is also expanding the capac- Managing Volatility with the Expanded Access to Information in Fragile States 117 ity of citizens to document abuses in the electoral now communicate with other local villages as part process. It was through such methods that blatant of collective security networks as well as notify gov- ballot-stuffing during Russia’s December 2011 par- ernment or United Nations (UN) agencies of their liamentary elections for President Vladimir Putin’s need for assistance, fostering more timely respons- United Russia Party was captured and disseminated es. on the Internet. The effect was to badly discredit Mr. Greater access to information also enhances sta- Putin’s claims of legitimacy. ICT was also believed bility by contributing to more effective early warn- to have contributed to what were hailed as Nigeria’s ing systems in the face of humanitarian crises. More cleanest elections ever in April 2011.7 ICT is there- open societies have historically been much more fore redefining relations between governments and responsive to droughts, earthquakes, hurricanes, societies. and other disasters, because news of an emerging The ability of citizens to quickly access informa- threat is more likely to be communicated to the tion from multiple sources is also fostering more capital city and disseminated on media outlets. This accountable governance by making it harder for attention puts pressure on a central government to exclusionary powers to maintain their monopolies take urgent action to safeguard the lives of citizens on information. Cellphones with the capacity for in harm’s way. Governments that are seen as unre- texting and access to Facebook and Twitter are pro- sponsive or incompetent lose the confidence of viding citizens in many low-income countries with their populations and are subsequently unable to the enhanced ability to exchange information hori- marshal the public support needed to govern. This zontally in a society, thereby reducing a key impedi- feedback loop is one of the reasons democracies are ment to organizing ordinary citizens around their better able to mitigate crises of various types. As common interests.8 This uphill battle to organize Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen, famously large, disparate populations has historically been observed, “No substantial famine has ever occurred a major advantage of autocratic governments and in any independent country with a democratic form why they have been able to sustain governance and of government and a relatively free press.”9 In con- development policies that are injurious to the ma- trast, autocratic governments are regularly the ori- jority. With the elevated ability for citizens to com- gin of preventable humanitarian crises. With their municate directly in large numbers, priorities for ability to monopolize the flow of information, they transparency, equitable development, justice, and have historically been able to prevent the dissemina- participation are more likely to be advanced. tion of news of such crises and can respond to them Local communities are now better able to moni- as suits the government’s interests. The response tor whether the designated expenditures on their lo- by the militant group al-Shaabab to the severe East cal schools and health clinics are being made, while African drought of 2011 is a contemporary case in ensuring that local pharmacies remain adequately point to this recurring phenomenon. The group, stocked with needed supplies. Farmers are better which effectively controlled large parts of southern able to check prices at all area and regional markets and central Somalia at that time, denied internation- when making planting and harvesting decisions, al humanitarian assistance agencies access to these significantly empowering them in negotiations with areas, resulting in the deaths of untold thousands marketers. Villagers in remote communities that of Somalis. Neighboring Kenya and Ethiopia, faced heretofore have been highly vulnerable to preda- with the same climatic conditions, suffered relative- tory violence by state security forces or militias can ly few drought-related deaths. 118 Joseph Siegle DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

Greater access to information similarly engages have similarly been much more robust since 2005, the international community in the build-up to a averaging 3.3 percent (despite the global financial humanitarian or human rights crisis much sooner crisis of 2008–2009), than they were from 1990 than would otherwise be the case. Guided by real- to 1995, when average growth was effectively flat. time and more reliable information, international Moreover, the variation in these immediate post- actors are better able to overcome the ignorance Cold War growth rates was more than three times as that enables collective inaction in the face of sys- large, reflecting the greater volatility of that period. tematic human rights abuses. This was seen in the Cases of hyperinflation, which were not uncommon decision by the international community to inter- up through the early 1990s, are today relatively rare, vene to stop former Libyan leader Muammar Qad- an indication of the stronger commitment to mac- dafi’s effort to violently repress a popular uprising in roeconomic stabilization and the more active role the country’s second city, Benghazi, in 2011. While played by global financial institutions, particularly international intervention is not the outcome in the International Monetary Fund. every case of such state violence (such as in Syria To be sure, there have been other important, in 2011–2012, largely due to deadlocks at the UN overarching global dynamics that have shaped the Security Council), the level of international atten- relatively more stabilizing patterns of the past two tion and pressure is invariably greater than has been decades. These dynamics include the end of the the case in the past, when these abuses took place in Cold War, the greater willingness of the internation- obscurity (consider the largely silent international al community to mount peacekeeping operations reaction to the estimated twenty thousand to forty in fragile states, the expansion of global trade, and thousand deaths in Syria during the Hama massacre the accelerated dissemination of development tech- of 1982). nologies, among others. Nonetheless, all of these These channels by which ICT contributes to other phenomena have been significantly enabled transparency and stability coincide with a global by the upsurge in communications capacity during pattern of relatively greater development progress this period. and stability observed during the past several de- It is similarly important to recognize that this cades in which information technologies have be- expansion in the capacity for ordinary citizens to come more ubiquitous. For example, the frequency communicate and gain access to unprecedented and magnitude of conflict have declined by 60 per- amounts of information did not unfold in a con- cent since the mid 1990s, reducing the number of textual vacuum. Rather, the surge in ICT occurred countries in conflict from thirty-five to twenty-one simultaneous to the wave of democratization that in 2011.10 While varying from year to year, the num- swept Latin America, Eastern Europe, Africa, parts ber of refugees around the world has similarly de- of Asia, and now the Middle East starting in the clined from eighteen million in 1992 to 10.4 million 1980s. The relatively greater openness of demo- in 2011. Likewise, infant mortality rates, a reliable cratic governance structures to the free flow of barometer for development more generally, have information has facilitated the diffusion of infor- declined by 41 percent since 1990.11 Accordingly, mation technology. Accordingly, it is important to only countries affected by conflict are not on track to recognize that ICT is part of a broader governance meet the Millennium Development Goals of halv- process. The development of an information and ing poverty by 50 percent from 1990 levels. Annual communications sector requires if not an enabling economic growth rates for low-income countries environment at least not a hostile one.12 Managing Volatility with the Expanded Access to Information in Fragile States 119

In short, the commonly expressed concerns role both in gathering and disseminating informa- raised at the outset of this essay that the expanding tion to a mass audience, effectively empowering accessibility of ICT is contributing to greater vola- the broader society. Public exposure of corruption tility in fragile states has been accompanied by an and ineffectiveness in the headlines of newspapers, improvement in the security and development in- radio, and television broadcasts, in turn, serves as a terests of many citizens in low-income countries. very powerful catalyst to spur government respon- That is, the expansion of ICT appears to present a siveness. Founded in 2008, Mozambique’s online trade-off of greater potential short-term volatility (and most popular) newspaper, @Verdade (or from destabilizing nonstate actors versus the long- “Truth” in Portuguese), has helped change the pub- term, institutionally based, stability-enhancing ben- lic dialogue by covering household issues like bread efits. subsidies, electricity prices, and crime in the slums. Its investigation into the poor service of the state THE INDISPENSIBLE ROLE OF electricity provider has prompted an official inquiry CIVIL SOCIETY AND MEDIA and improved service.15 Media and civil society groups also play an in- While ICT may be reshaping state-society rela- strumental role in generating and using information tions vis-à-vis development and security outcomes, to improve governance. Research organizations and it is important to recognize that, in the end, these think tanks use information to contribute to the are simply tools. In other words, ICT is value neu- policy debate with independent analysis that may tral. ICT requires reform-minded actors, generally force government officials to respond to unwel- civil society organizations (CSO) and the media, come data or alter their policy course. Watchdog to be transferred into meaningful change for ordi- groups provide the technical expertise to monitor nary citizens. In other words, progress only occurs budget expenditures and assess the degree to which when these tools are anchored in organizational these are meeting societal priorities. Human rights structures that can analyze, inform, and mobilize groups document and confront governments for the majority around key reforms, maintain pressure abuses of citizens, highlight corruption or injustices on government officials for greater transparency in the court system, and advocate for reforms. Pro- and service delivery, and sustain this process over fessional associations of journalists, teachers, and time. The issue of sustainability is particularly im- lawyers can set and uphold standards for their fields portant, since institutional change does not happen while accelerating the pace at which best practices quickly and is subject to setbacks (witness the chal- and lessons are learned are disseminated. By iden- lenges facing Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya in the ini- tifying bottlenecks to accessing licenses, credit, or tial stages of their transitions from long-established regulatory approvals, business associations repre- authoritarian rule). CSOs are particularly critical senting mid- and medium-sized enterprises help in sustaining momentum for reforms in these early level the economic playing field, spurring innova- years of a transition while governance institutions tion, productivity, and jobs. In the process, they are are reconstructed.13 In fact, the depth of civil society strengthening the middle class, widening a poten- networks in a society has been shown to be a strong tially powerful constituency group for reform. By predictor of this resiliency—and the likely success organizing workers, labor unions can help mobilize of democratic transitions.14 large numbers of workers for broader governance Independent media also play an indispensible reforms. 120 Joseph Siegle DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

The horizontal and vertical networks that these societies where governments are more tolerant of CSOs create have the potential to link societies the free flow of information. Accordingly, efforts across ethnic, geographic, and class boundaries, am- to expand the positive impacts of ICT cannot treat plifying the effects that any one organization could governance as a neutral factor and solely focus on realize. By doing so, these civil society groups are building the technological components. Rather, creating a societal “demand” for better governance the type of governance system in place has a major and accountability. It is by linking these networks influence in shaping the information environment. across a society that civil society can be a resilient Reformers, therefore, should conceive of ICT ini- force for reform in the face of inevitable pushback. tiatives from a broader governance framework and CSOs may also have networks outside a country. encourage norms tolerating dissent, freedom of This accelerates the access to best practices, techni- speech and assembly, transparency, and freedom of cal assistance, and funding that can help advance information regulations. citizen priorities. Reform-minded domestic and international partners should also recognize that the transpar- ENHANCING ICT’S BENEFICIAL IMPACTS ency, stability, and development benefits from ICT FOR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT do not occur spontaneously but are the result of de- velopment and activist organizations that can take The development-security challenge in fragile states advantage of the available information to advance is ultimately a governance process. It often entails a these goals. Since these changes are only realized battle for public support from a skeptical populace over time, investment in civil society and media jaundiced by years of government propaganda and institutions is needed. These domestic actors can indifference to the concerns of ordinary citizens. then effectively sustain and employ information This challenge is frequently exacerbated by an an- and communication tools to advance a construc- tagonist, also vying for popular support, in order tive public debate, educate citizens, expose cor- to persuade youth in marginalized regions that ruption, and establish public service watchdogs to they should take up arms to redress felt grievances. strengthen accountability and foster needed course This struggle is joined by a third force—reformist corrections. A multiplicity of media and informa- CSOs and media—that aims to improve norms of tion channels can also have a moderating effect by transparency and accountability in a society so as marginalizing extremist views as outside the main- to improve security and development. All sides of stream. A broad array of information outlets also this struggle are seeking to maximize the impact of facilitates the speed with which rumors can be fact new information and communication tools that are checked and stem the panic that is more likely to potentially decisive to defining public perceptions. emerge when the few available media sources are Strategies for enhancing the positive repercussions not trusted. of ICT, therefore, must advance the capacity and An inevitable challenge of strengthening the me- effectiveness of reformist actors if they are to be ef- dia in fragile states, however, is the risk that media fective. outlets will become platforms for hate speech and incitements to violence. This typically occurs when Recognize that ICT Is Part of the an outlet is aligned with a particular political party or Governance Process ethnic group and may be controlled by wealthy pa- ICT adoption has tended to flourish in more open trons or politicians seeking to advance their agenda. Managing Volatility with the Expanded Access to Information in Fragile States 121

Left unchecked, these media vehicles can be highly defamation, which are tools frequently used to im- polarizing in a society, trumpeting perceived griev- prison journalists or cow them into self-censorship. ances of one identity group vis-à-vis the presumed Such statutes should also authorize independent in- exploitation by a rival group. Proactive guidelines, vestigations into the suppression of society’s “eyes ideally crafted with independent journalists, curb- and ears.” Since local authorities cannot be counted ing such destructive uses of the media are needed. on to conduct such investigations impartially, these These must be balanced, however, by strong checks inquiries should be authorized at the national level, against political actors using such guidelines to stifle possibly with the participation of international part- criticism. ners. International actors can further undergird ef- Protecting Journalists, Bloggers, and forts to protect journalists by withholding develop- Civil Society Organizations ment funding to governments that do not uphold For ICT to have a beneficial effect in a society, those these protections. Doing so is justified not only on individuals and institutions that are responsible for human rights grounds but also for development generating and disseminating information must be effectiveness. Without journalists and watchdog protected. By facilitating the flow of information, groups, development assistance will lack transpar- journalists, bloggers, watchdog groups, and human ency and will be much more subject to diversion. rights organizations play a unique role in a society Under such conditions, aid is highly vulnerable to by informing the public, fostering public debate, inadvertently propping up autocratic systems that exposing corruption and abuses of power, and en- are detrimental to both development and security. couraging accountability. Since this threatens the privileges of actors who have benefitted from con- A Communications Strategy for a New Era trolled information environments and exclusive The greater accessibility of ICT provides new op- governance arrangements, journalists and other in- portunities for governments to communicate di- formation agents are regularly targeted for intimida- rectly to and hear from citizens, building a more tion, violence, and murder. In fact, roughly seventy- constructive relationship between the state and so- five journalists around the world are killed every ciety. In some cases, this will be the first occasion year for the stories they write.16 Yet, over 90 percent citizens will have to state their preferences to those of cases where journalists have been murdered go in power. Yet there are relatively few models of gov- unsolved.17 Many of these crimes are never even in- ernments in fragile states taking advantage of ICT to vestigated. communicate more effectively with citizens, build- More aggressive action is needed. Silencing ing the trust and cooperation needed to counter the journalists, after all, is more than an ordinary crime; appeals of spoilers and advance security and devel- it denies the entire society of the access to infor- opment.19 The challenge is all the more difficult in mation and analysis that can help citizens make these contexts because of the legacy of distrust that informed judgments on the priority issues faced. often exists between the state and its citizens. Still, All states, especially those that are transitioning it is imperative that reformist governments commu- or fragile, should therefore be pressed to establish nicate to citizens the initiatives being undertaken to laws that explicitly recognize the basic civil rights of address the priority grievances held by communi- journalists, bloggers, and human rights defenders.18 ties. It should not be assumed that these undertak- This includes decriminalizing charges of libel and ings are well known to the public. 122 Joseph Siegle DEVELOPMENT IN THE INFORMATION AGE

Such communications efforts must be more back and input to government officials than have than mere propaganda or public affairs announce- previously existed. ments, however, as these forms of communication In sum, information is and has always been cen- are familiar to many societies and will be quickly tral to the stability equation in fragile states. ICT dismissed. Rather, an authentic communications amplifies this effect—both as an opportunity and as strategy must be based on a sound array of policy a threat. Given the legacy of distrust, ICT can indel- priorities. For many communities in fragile states, ibly reinforce negative reputations for governments. this means greater attention to development, in par- Therefore, it cannot be “business as usual” if these ticular, health services, schools, and agriculture, and governments hope to gain popular support and sta- infrastructural initiatives that can generate a large bility. New means of communicating authentically number of jobs. In this way, development is a tan- to citizens must be learned. More fundamentally, gible arena in which the battle for popular support governance standards of legitimacy and account- takes place. That these development programs are ability will need to be raised in increasingly informa- conducted in a transparent and equitable manner is tion-rich societies. Given the greater trust afforded also essential in order to convince citizens that pub- CSOs and the media, these actors have ever more lic resources are not primarily being used to advance important roles to play in the security-development the interests of favored identity groups or patronage equation in the ICT era. networks. Perceptions of corruption are particularly debilitating, as they engender attitudes of injustice ENDNOTES and grievance that can be more easily mobilized by spoilers. Governments can also demonstrate their 1. Forum Citizens, “Can Google Defeat Boko Ha- commitment and responsiveness to the security of ram?” http://forumcitizens.com/business/can-google- local communities by establishing ongoing chan- defeat-boko-haram/. nels of communication with vulnerable towns and 2. Khusrav Gaibulloev and Todd Sandler, “Growth villages. Consequences of Terrorism in Western Europe,” Kyklos An effective communications strategy will also 61: 3 (2008): 411–414. involve outreach. Studies have shown that public 3. World Bank, World Development Report 2011: messaging coupled with interpersonal contacts Conflict, Security, and Development (Washington, DC: through a trusted network are most effective for World Bank, 2011). generating behavior changes.20 Networks of public 4. Ibid. health workers or agricultural extensionists, there- 5. World Bank, World Development Report 2011. fore, can be vital components of a communications 6. Monica Mark, “Boko Haram Vows to Fight Until strategy of development progress (and of govern- Nigeria Establishes Sharia Law,” Guardian (UK), January 27, 2012. ment concern for citizens, more generally). CSOs 7. Judith Burdin Asuni and Jacqueline Farris, with strong ties to local communities can be vital “Tracking Social Media: The Social Media Tracking Cen- partners in this process, as well. Such outreach ef- tre and the 2011 Nigerian Elections” (Abuja, Nigeria: forts also provide an opportunity to hear from citi- Shehu Musa Yar’Adua Foundation, May 2011). zens, making the dialogue a two-way process and 8. Steven Livingston, “Africa’s Evolving InfoSys- creating more community ownership over the de- tems: A Pathway to Development and Security,” Africa velopment efforts undertaken. It is here that ICT Center for Strategic Studies Research Paper #2 (2011). tools open more possibilities for direct citizen feed- 9. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New Managing Volatility with the Expanded Access to Information in Fragile States 123

York: Knopf, 1999). 2010. 10. Monty Marshall and Benjamin Cole, Global 16. Committee to Protect Journalists, “914 Jour- Report 2011 (Vienna, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, nalists Killed since 1992” (New York: May 30, 2012). 2011). http://cpj.org/killed/. 11. UNICEF, Committing to Child Survival: A Prom- 17. D. Mijatovic, “Protection of Journalists from Vio- ise Renewed (New York: UNICEF Progress Report lence” (Strasbourg, France: Council of Europe, Commis- 2012). sioner for Human Rights, Issue Discussion Paper, 2011). 12. Shanthi Kalathil and Taylor Boas, Open Networks, 18. Joseph Siegle, “Overcoming Dilemmas of De- Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian mocratisation: Protecting Civil Liberties and the Right to Rule (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Inter- Democracy,” Nordic Journal of International Law (2012). national Peace, 2009). 19. Shanthi Kalathil, John Langlois, and Adam Ka- 13. Joseph Siegle, “Building Democratic Account- plan, Towards a New Model: Media and Communications ability in Areas of Limited Statehood” (paper presented in Post-Conflict and Fragile States (Washington, DC: The at the International Studies Association Annual Confer- World Bank, Communication for Governance and Ac- ence, San Francisco, CA, April 1–4, 2012). countability Program, 2008). 14. Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, How 20. J. F. Phillips, Mian Bazle Hossain, and Mary Freedom is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democ- Arends-Kuenning, “The Long-Term Demographic Role racy (New York: Freedom House, 2005). of Community-Based Family Planning in Rural Ban- 15. Katherine Baldwin, “How One Newspaper gladesh,” Studies in Family Planning 27: 4 (July-August Wants to Change Mozambique,” Time, December 28, 1996).

If You Are Seeking an Advantage, Information Does Not Matter James Valentine & James Herlong

INFORMATION DOMINANCE: occurs thirteen times in the director of National A TRANSPARENTLY INADEQUATE STRATEGY Intelligence document “Vision 2015,” which states that the role of intelligence in national security is to In the U.S. military and intelligence realms, the “create decision advantage.”2 A quick Google search term “information dominance” is popular jargon reveals the use of these words in document after for discussing the relationship between intelligence, document, geared toward military, intelligence, or policy-making, and the modern information en- policymaker use. The definition of decision advan- vironment. John Arquilla first coined the phrase tage is as difficult to pinpoint as its origin but might in his 1994 article, “The Strategic Implications of be expressed as the ability to arm friendly decision- Information Dominance.” It is most accurately de- makers with better information than their adversar- fined, he states, as “knowing everything about an ies. This, presumably, will enable better decisions, adversary while keeping the adversary from know- all other things being equal. ing much about oneself.” He made a compelling If we accept that information is a lynchpin in na- argument that modern technology had enabled the tional security, because it can be “operationalized” emergence and possible supremacy of “control war- into decision advantage, then information domi- fare,” which paralyzes the enemy and prevents them nance makes a great deal of sense. The U.S. Navy from acting; it removes their capacity to make war agrees; it promulgated The U.S. Navy’s Vision for In- despite an abundance of will, materiel, and military formation Dominance, in May 2010, which defines know-how.1 “Information as warfare.”3 In addition, it created a Equally popular is “decision advantage.” While it deputy chief of Naval Operations for information is hard to pinpoint the exact origin of this term, the dominance, combining its intelligence, communi- U.S. government certainly embraces it. The phrase cations, and network staff into a single organization focused on both information and the technology that allows the navy to operate in the electromag- The views expressed herein are those of the authors and netic (EM) environment. This vision promises to are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views make information a “main battery of 21st Century of the Commandant or of the U.S. Coast Guard. seapower.”4

125 126 James Valentine & James Herlong SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

It is quite clear that the U.S.’s national security years away. Apple would not introduce the iPod for apparatus, from the military to intelligence agencies seven more years. Despite the digital revolution, the to policymakers has embraced the role of informa- requirements for power, infrastructure, and expen- tion and information technology in national secu- sive equipment limited the revolution to people and rity and power. The only problem is that the strat- countries that could afford it. This also meant that egy of information dominance to create decisional digital content was limited, because only people advantage or superiority is already hopelessly out of who had the equipment and expertise could push date. Information dominance was conceived in an information to and through the web,5 or access it. era where access to the EM domain was the purview The upshot of the information environment in of countries and regions that were well off; only the 1994 was that it looked almost precisely like the global “haves” could publish to, and scrape content information environment in 1894, from a strategic from, the EM information environment. The high perspective. Both eras were defined by information- level of transparency and interconnectedness that al scarcity, asymmetry, and friction. Information exists today, enabled by geospatially independent was scarce, because it was expensive. It took time, access to information, existed then only in science sweat (sometimes blood), and treasure to come fiction and, perhaps, minds at the bleeding edge of by, collect, or generate information. Asymmetry information technology (IT). Because of our mod- existed because geography mattered; different enti- ern degree of transparency, in the greatest paradox ties in different places had access to different pieces of the “information age,” information does not mat- of information. This asymmetry was perpetuated ter. by friction. The rate of information transfer was so slow that asymmetry was never corrected. While in- FROM OPACITY TO TRANSPARENCY formation might be more or less scarce, asymmetri- cal, or subject to friction at any given place or time, To be fair, the previous statement is a touch flip. overall, from a global perspective, these character- Information clearly matters, from the perspective istics have defined the information environment that without information, decisions are made in the since the dawn of human history. Conquering them dark. This, obviously, is hardly optimal. However, has traditionally taken a herculean investment of the strategy of information dominance is predicated people and resources, the creation of bureaucracies on the idea that information and its associated tech- and procedures, and lots of collective time. nology provide strategic advantage. That is, if the United States possesses information and the right SECURITY IN AN INFORMATIONALLY technology to exploit it, shape it, and deliver it as OPAQUE ENVIRONMENT needed, then it will occupy some kind of decisional high ground, compared to competitors. States pursuing security exploited these traits of the Today this notion is wrong, and it will be for information environment just as they exploited the the foreseeable future. The problem is with the way physical environment. Because information was things have changed in the nearly twenty years (al- expensive and scarce, the return on investment re- most a generation!) since Arquilla wrote his article. garding the collection of information was very high. In 1994, the digital age was in its revolutionary Having a lot of information conferred an inherent stages. There was no Wikipedia. The text message superiority over an adversary that had less. Further, was celebrating its second birthday. Google was two that superiority was scalable; the more information If You Are Seeking an Advantage, Information Does Not Matter 127 you had compared to your competitors, which were tion for it until 1994—when it still made sense as almost certainly states that could expend similar a strategy. amounts of energy, the greater your superiority. There was great incentive to expend national re- TRANSPARENCY: WHAT HAS IT WROUGHT? sources on having large volumes of relevant infor- mation. Unfortunately for the U.S. Navy, things have Similarly, asymmetry meant that information changed. Pictures, videos, and text can now be ex- you did acquire was unique, or nearly so. The infor- changed between all nodes of the web in the literal mation you had painstakingly, perhaps secretly, col- blink of an eye. Mobile multimedia devices, which lected was unknown to your adversaries, or at least we call “smartphones,” allow personal computing to the fact that you knew it was unknown to them. This be done in the palm of our hands. The technology created a security analogy to the economics concept for these multiple-use, mobile devices is so cheap, of informational asymmetry; when one party has and so available in every corner of the globe, that access to information that others do not, that party entire economies in Sub-Saharan Africa—the least possesses an advantage in economic transactions. developed region of the world—depend upon them Similarly, informational uniqueness in the realm of for economic transactions of all kinds.7 national security allowed you to have insights that Information used to be scarce; now it is so ever others could not, providing a strong element of de- present that our problems are not about obtaining cisional superiority. information but organizing, parsing, and sorting Finally, the natural, high level of environmental it. A study in 2009 estimated that the average U.S. friction meant that information could be kept secret consumer ingests 3.6 zettabytes a day, which corre- from others with relative ease. States exploited this sponds to a stack of books seven feet high covering by instituting cheap and effective methods of in- all of the United States.8 At least one study estimates formational security, many of them physical, to in- the entire storage capacity of humanity at 295 exa- crease friction even more. As with the collection of bytes (a one with twenty zeros) and notes that our information, the return on investment for security processing capability is “growing at an exponential was very high. With low to moderate effort, infor- rate.” 9 mational asymmetry, in terms of both volume and Similarly, informational asymmetry has been uniqueness, could be preserved. supplanted by people in the developed and devel- When you line up information volume, unique- oping worlds largely having access to the same da- ness, and security as the most efficient and natural tasets, the same news, the same raw facts and infor- strategies for states to adopt in an environment mation the world over—a never-before-seen kind defined by information scarcity, asymmetry, and of information parity and relative transparency10 friction, the result is to “know as much as possible enabled by geospatially independent access to in- about relevant things while preventing others from formation. Given the surge of mobile access even knowing that information, or knowing we know in the poorest areas, it is entirely possible that cur- it.” This sounds strikingly similar to Arquilla’s more rently disadvantaged states and people will achieve war-centric definition of information dominance.”6 similar parity and transparency, as South Korea did Information dominance has been the national secu- in a few short decades—an occurrence that could rity strategy for information for thousands of years. remake the global security map as previously weak We just did not have a coherent name or explana- players gain access and power. 128 James Valentine & James Herlong SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

While information transfer rates used to be comes absolutely necessary to any state or other en- governed by friction, on June 20, 2009 Neda Agah- tity seeking any of the elements of power, because it Soltan was murdered at a protest by a member of allows operation in the EM domain. Without these Iran’s basij militia. #Neda became a top trending IT tools, you cannot function in the new environ- topic on Twitter, and her death made international ment and are at a distinct disadvantage, a point Ar- headlines the same day.11 This all happened despite quilla highlighted when discussing the lack of Iraq’s Iran’s constant monitoring and restriction of Inter- effectiveness against U.S. and allied forces in Opera- net access. tion Desert Storm in 1990–1991.12 What has changed is not the fundamental prop- These new properties of the information envi- erties of information or communication. Rather, ronment raise serious questions about the validity the information environment itself has dramatically of the information dominance model. Because in- evolved. The properties of scarcity, asymmetry, and formation has become so cheap, having large vol- friction have been replaced by ubiquity, symmetry, umes of it confers no inherent advantage over an ad- and simultaneity. These new properties describe an versary, who likely has access to a similar stockpile information environment altogether different from of information. Further, asymmetry and friction, be our classical model. they natural or security driven, cannot be strategi- cally relied on to maintain a favorable balance of UBIQUITY, SYMMETRY, SIMULTANEITY, informational power. We also have a new strategic AND SECURITY need: to be constantly connected to the EM do- main and its information or to suffer immediate and In an environment defined by informational ubiq- dire social, political, economic, and military conse- uity, information is no longer expensive or resource quences. Given these facts, information dominance intensive to gather and maintain. Digital commu- cannot be an effective strategy for advancing state nication through the EM domain is cheap, nearly power on any front.13 approaching universal, and can transfer lots of data The solution lies in advancing and extending very quickly. Storage continues to increase in den- Arquilla’s, and the U.S. Navy’s notion of operation- sity and decrease in price, while search engines or alizing information. Information is only half of an other methods of parsing data are increasingly ca- equation that leads to “real-world” power: expertise, pable and refined. Informational symmetry means of all forms and kinds, is the other. In yet another that we all have access to roughly the same data and irony, exercising the digital revolution for maximum datasets. Simultaneity ensures that the time lag due benefit requires a strategic investment in people and to geography is negligible; information is no longer their social constructs. Melding information and geospatially constrained. While that information human knowledge together, using the modern in- may need to be parsed into something usable, it is formation environment created by IT and the EM still accessible worldwide via the EM domain. domain, yields a strategy we will call “cognitive Importantly, none of this would be possible dominance.” without the physical properties of the EM domain. Because the EM domain exists all around us, as long COGNITIVE DOMINANCE: PUTTING PEOPLE as we have access to it we function in the modern, BACK IN SECURITY STRATEGY nonclassical, information environment of ubiquity, symmetry, and simultaneity. In this context, IT be- Cognitive dominance differs from information If You Are Seeking an Advantage, Information Does Not Matter 129 dominance by making people and their expertise 3. Cognitive agility—The ability to bring the right the centerpiece of its construct. Where information information and the right expertise together dominance focuses on information, IT, and security more quickly than the adversary; to create a decisional and thus a competitive advan- tage, cognitive dominance focuses on knowledge, 4. Cognitive defense—The passive and active abil- people, and active resilience. Information domi- ity to protect all parts of your cognitive cycle and nance is rife with discussions of platforms, net-cen- its network14 from disruption and exploitation; tric architecture, cyberattacks and other arcane mat- and ters of IT. Cognitive dominance posits that the IT capabilities already exist and are in use; just because 5. Cognitive resilience—The ability to effectively some states and massive bureaucracies are having rebound from major losses, defeats, or other ca- trouble adjusting to the new environment does not tastrophes. make it any less real or extant. Therefore, the strate- gic advantage lies not in IT or information but in the ability to operationalize the information—make it In fairness, information dominance implies cer- useful for decisions—faster, better, more accurately, tain aspects of the above principles. However, it more safely, and more consistently than the adver- does not focus on, nor address, any of them com- sary. This can be achieved by improving your own pletely. States, nonstate actors, and their apparatus- organizational cognition or by degrading the adver- es of power ignore cognitive dominance at their per- saries’ abilities to operate in the EM domain. il—the lack of Afghanistan and Iraq experts, be they To execute cognitive dominance as a strategy, linguists, anthropologists, historians, or civil affairs people and the social networks that they are a part personnel in the U.S. military and intelligence com- of must be deeply connected; possess large bodies munity, for example, is well documented and has of expansive and specific expertise; demonstrate a caused a great deal of concern and occasional dif- high degree of individual and collective analytical ficulty in achieving even narrow goals. intelligence; conquer multiple or quickly chang- There are also obvious, practical difficulties: ing analytical challenges at once; be connected to Who is an expert? Where does that expert reside? the EM domain, and therefore, to each other at all Just how expert is this person, and what type of ex- times; and be able to recover from a localized or pertise does he or she they possess? How do I get generalized catastrophe with minimal disruption. in touch with that expert? Fortunately, modern IT Given this, there are five components of cognitive does offer ways to tackle these problems efficiently dominance that must be pursued and developed: and effectively. The U.S. intelligence community has taken the first steps toward this by implement- 1. Cognitive depth—Developed wells of useful ing “Web 2.0” technologies such as wikis and social and relevant knowledge, both explicit and in the networking across its classified and unclassified sys- form of expertise and experience, that are supe- tems. Because these tools link a unique identifier to rior to the adversary’s; an individual, “who knows what, and how well,” is much simpler to establish than it ever has been be- 2. Cognitive strength—The ability to generate fore. But this is a far cry from adopting an overall conclusions with greater accuracy and precision coordinated and crisply executed strategy of cogni- than the adversary; tive dominance as a cornerstone of power. 130 James Valentine & James Herlong SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

COGNITIVE DOMINANCE IN INTEGRATED progression of electronic warfare, they also realized NETWORK ELECTRONIC WARFARE that each element necessary for rapid and effective theater operations is also a key target. What China While there are no perfect examples of cognitive realized was needed was an integrated approach that dominance in the world today, at least one country is goes from “the acquisition, forwarding, and control half running, half lurching in that direction: China. of information to the entire process of information The Chinese government has relentlessly pursued a flow, to include processing and exploitation.”17 strategy of educating and training its populace while China’s concept of INEW was first explained adopting and implementing modern IT. Informa- in an article by Major General Dai Qinqmin, then tion to truly confirm if China has implemented and head of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Fourth successfully carried out cognitive dominance would Department. INEW is a seamless integration of likely go beyond openly available information. electronic warfare and computer network warfare However, by its own open press reporting, China to disrupt an adversary’s information systems while has appeared to set the right strategic context, and protecting one’s own systems. Computer network in some cases has examples of, the capabilities nec- warfare targets network layers where information is essary to achieve cognitive dominance in electronic processed and where humans gather information to warfare. make decisions. Electronic warfare targets the net- China’s strategic foundation is the premise that worked systems themselves as well as “information- the electromagnetic spectrum is a war-fighting alized” weapons, which rely on electronics to obtain domain. Based on this premise, the Chinese have the information that is necessary for them to func- developed their concept of integrated network- tion.18 electronic warfare (INEW). This concept is derived Evident in public documents and within the me- from a deep understanding and well-articulated dia, China, with its strategic context defined, has set strategic context that generates objectives, plans, a steady and measured approach to achieve its strat- and capabilities focused on creating a wide range egy. The 2007 PLA training guidelines highlighted of strategic and operational effects against their ad- the need to be able to operate in a “complex elec- versaries while at the same time defending against tromagnetic environment.”19 China’s 2008 Defense attack. white paper again emphasized this need, stating “[t] China learned how to operate successfully in a he PLA is spreading basic knowledge of electromag- complex EM by studying U.S. operations in the first netic-spectrum and battlefield-electromagnetic -en Gulf War.15 China was also influenced by the ob- vironments, learning and mastering basic theories servation that electronic warfare has evolved over of information warfare, particularly electronic war- the last one hundred years; as new ways to exploit fare.” 20 The PLA is involved in exercising, too. As far the electromagnetic spectrum for operations were back as 1999, Chinese military units were conduct- developed, so were the variety and scope of coun- ing exercises with elements of computer network termeasures.16 China viewed U.S. electronic op- warfare and electronic warfare.21 Most recently, ex- erations collectively as a system of sensors, connec- ercises in 2007 and 2009, in the Jinan and Nanjing tions, transport networks, processors, and controls military regions, were using “new tactics” including that create effects within and across the electromag- “hacker attacks and electromagnetic interference.” netic domain. Shaped by their understanding of the Guided by a well-defined and proper strategic If You Are Seeking an Advantage, Information Does Not Matter 131 context, China appears to be well on its way in set- discussion of China’s information warfare doctrine. ting the right objectives and plans and developing the right capabilities to operate offensively and de- Doctrine fensively in the electromagnetic domain. Below is China’s doctrine, or what it calls “rules and regula- an assessment, based upon open source reporting, tions,” is not something freely shared. It does not on how well China, framed in the context of infor- publish unclassified doctrine on the Internet as mation warfare, is prepared to carry out operations the United States and other nations do. However, in cyberspace. through a review of open source reporting and comments from China and its PLA, the thought THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) and strategy (the “why”) behind China’s use of in- AND INEW formation warfare can be understood.23 A review of open source material on Chinese theory by Timo- Information warfare can be defined as any opera- thy Thomas, an analyst at the Foreign Military Stud- tions directed at information in any form, stored ies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Toshi and transmitted by any means, or operations di- Yoshihara, a professor in the Strategy and Policy rected at the entire physical and personnel infra- Department at the Naval War College in Newport, structure supporting the management of informa- Rhode Island, shows that China believes criti- tion. An information-based attack is one in which cal components of its national strength will come unauthorized users acquire, alter, or disrupt the flow from the ability to be an economic power and suc- of information.22 With communications a critical cessfully conduct information warfare. The tools component in the daily operations of individuals to conduct this warfare are an active offense utiliz- and organizations, stolen, altered, or untimely in- ing cyber reconnaissance and computer network formation is a serious concern. exploitation activities to bolster its economic and China is conducting information warfare military advantage. through an active offense utilizing cyber reconnais- The U.S.’s use of high technology in Iraq, Afghan- sance and computer network exploitation activities. istan, and Kosovo has actually helped to change Facilitated by a large pool of technologically savvy China’s historic view of defense to a belief that only military and private citizen hackers, ubiquitous those forces that establish information superiority information technology resources, and access to will win.24 A 2000 article in China Military Science malware, and supported by a stratified training and highlights the need for an active offense in order to education plan, China has developed a strong “cy- maintain information control and provide an ad- ber workforce” to carry out its information warfare vantage over a superior force. The article also states operations. China believes these operations are nec- that offensive information can be used to sabotage essary in order to maintain information and knowl- an opponent’s information systems.25 edge superiority and bolster economic and military Cyber reconnaissance is a key component of an advantage. active offense. This reconnaissance is necessary to The assessment below, also known as a Doctrine, map an adversary’s commercial, weapons, and criti- Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and cal infrastructure networks to identify vulnerabili- Education, Personnel, and Facilities analysis, com- ties or leave behind “back doors” and other control monly used by military planners, provides a brief mechanisms. Under Chinese doctrine, in advance 132 James Valentine & James Herlong SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE of a kinetic conflict, the electric grid and other com- There are over 250 hacker groups in China. mercial, critical infrastructure, and weapons net- These hacker groups embody China’s concept of works will be attacked. the “people’s war,” leveraging the citizens to conduct The second component to an active offense is the cyber attacks against the nation’s adversaries. These use of computer network exploitation to steal infor- groups, made up of private citizens, provide the mation. Military information gives China the ability PLA and Chinese government additional capability to build weapons systems comparable to the United but no blame or responsibility for the ­attacks.29 States or to develop appropriate defenses. This in- formation also hastens China’s development of the Training right military organization required to effectively at- Training is how an organization prepares to fight. tack or defend itself in a major conflict. Gaining eco- The PLA accomplishes this task by incorporating nomic information, such as intellectual property, information warfare components in its military ex- means that China does not have to spend years and ercises. There is no information on how, or if, pri- dollars on research and development. Thus, China vate citizen “gray hats” and patriotic hackers con- can produce the same high-quality products as the duct exercises to support their cyber activities. United States and other countries but at a much There are several examples of the PLA incorpo- lower price. Computer network exploitation gives rating information warfare components into its ex- China the tool it needs to seek the right information ercises. In November 2000, two army teams in the to provide a military and economic advantage.26 Beijing Military Region conducted a “confrontation campaign” on a computer network.30 The Chengdu Organization Military Region conducted a similar exercise the Two main components in China carry out informa- same year.31 And lastly, exercises in the Jinan Mili- tion warfare. The first is the PLA, including the -re tary Region in 2007 and the Shenyang and Nanjing serve force. The second is private citizens, including Military Regions in 2009 utilized hacking tech- “gray hat” hackers or those motivated by patriotism. niques.32 These exercises were not limited to spe- The PLA is China’s unified military organiza- cific PLA components and included an electronic tion. It is comprised of the army, navy, air force, warfare regiment, air force command post, and an second artillery force (nuclear forces), the armed armored regiment. police force, and reserve forces.27 Although China’s White Paper on National Defense does not specifi- Materiel cally call out a separate information warfare or cy- Successful information warfare, specifically com- ber force, a review of several articles from China puter network operations, requires the right mali- (as far back as 1999) talk of creating offensive and cious software, known as malware, and the right defensive “computer confrontation forces” to carry network access. Malware and network access are out and defend against cyber attacks. In 2000, the not necessarily unique. The hardware and software journal Guangjiao Jing stated the PLA had estab- required to conduct computer network operations lished information warfare departments in its head- is available in the United States and in China. The quarters organizations. More recently, articles from difference is in the individual malware exploits de- 2003 indicate that specialized information warfare veloped and how they are used. units would be set up within all PLA armies, includ- There are several types of malware, including ing reserve forces.28 worms, viruses, trojans, and hacker utilities. Worms If You Are Seeking an Advantage, Information Does Not Matter 133 are malicious codes that spread via local area net- and knowledge necessary for information warfare works and always cause at least some harm even if command. Personnel aged thirty or less represent only reducing bandwidth. Generally worms spread the last group. These individuals are already techno- as files in email attachments, through chat pro- logically savvy. Their training and education focus grams, as links to infected web sites, and through on advanced information technology concepts and peer-to-peer file-sharing services. Viruses are a form command skills.35 of malware that copy and spread throughout a single In order to conduct this training and education, machine to carry out a specific action against that the PLA set up several information warfare focused machine. Trojans may be the most useful of the mal- universities such as the Communications Com- ware set. These programs perform certain actions, mand Academy in Wuhan, the Information Engi- such as collecting data and sending them to another neering University in Zhengzhou, the Science and host, destroying or altering data, causing a comput- Engineering University, the National Defense Sci- er to malfunction, or even “hi-jacking” a machine ence and Technology University in Changsha, and to be used later as part of a denial-of-service attack. a PLA Navy Engineering College.36 Hacker utilities refer to a broad collection of tools such as programs to construct malicious software, Personnel malware program libraries, and any other programs These individuals can be part of the military, active designed to damage or disrupt a user’s machine.33 or reserve, or private citizens. With 729 million peo- The malware program libraries are important. ple available for military service and a general popu- The availability of these libraries makes the materiel lation of over 1.3 billion, China indeed has a large necessary to conduct computer network operations pool of potential information warfare personnel.37 available to a wide range of people quickly. In fact, But these individuals need to be qualified. They a January 2009 report on badware (spyware, mal- should be technologically savvy and have a good ware, or deceptive adware) web sites showed that background in math, engineering, or computer sci- China hosted 48 percent of these sites on the Inter- ence. net. This is more than double its closest competitor, There are no statistics detailing the number of the United States, which had 21 percent of the bad- personnel in China’s “cyber force.” However, there ware sites.34 While this report does not distinguish are data suggesting that China produces a large between the types of malware on Chinese sites, it is number of the type of individuals suited to con- an example of the prevalence of the malicious soft- ducting information warfare, a number significantly ware available. greater than the United States. According to a 2007 report on education, 50 percent of all undergradu- Leadership and Education ates receive degrees in natural science or engineer- The PLA’s information warfare training and educa- ing. In the United States, it is 27 percent. In 2004, tion is set by age group. The first group is the -de it is estimated that China graduated 650,000 engi- cisionmakers, those over age forty. The focus for neers, computer scientists, and information tech- this group is to make senior leaders literate in in- nologists with either a three- or four-year degree. formation technology and to understand the value During that same period the United States only of this new type of warfare. Midlevel leaders, ages graduated 225,000.38 This represents a considerable thirty to forty, represent the future leaders of the or- amount of Chinese people well suited to conduct ganization. The focus for this group is on the skills information wafare activities. 134 James Valentine & James Herlong SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

Facilities ADAPT OR DIE The facilities necessary to support China’s infor- mation warfare activities include offices and labs While China has explicitly laid out its strategy in owned and operated by the government, military, terms of conflict and information warfare, it is ex- academia, industry, and even private homes. In con- ecuting this strategy via cognitive dominance. It is ducting cyber operations, both the development of training its population to be experts in INEW and malware and hacker tools and the carrying out of ensuring that the cycle and systems whereby that attacks themselves, the physical location and facil- knowledge and experience is translated into effec- ity support are not important. A computer and net- tive action are never disrupted in quality, speed, or work access are the basic requirements. mass. China moved well beyond information domi- As information technology becomes more ubiq- nance by trying to maximize not the amount of uitous, the “places” that can be used to train, pre- information flowing through its pipelines and into pare, and conduct information warfare operations its databases but by the ability to create, distribute, will grow. Malware, for instance, can be produced maintain, identify, and connect collective expertise on any personal computer and, while computer labs in INEW. may offer better and safer computer resources to To be clear, China’s strategy of cognitive domi- build malicious code, this is not a requirement. Net- nance is not limited to military conflict. Rather, it work access is also a key factor. In order to conduct is exercising its INEW capabilities across the entire successful information warfare, access to the “net” range of its interests in a bid for increased power. is required. China’s access to the Internet grew over China’s economic espionage, for instance, is an 1,200 percent between 2000 and 2008, and China open secret. Of the 108 countries attempting es- currently has about one-fifth of all Internet users pionage on proprietary U.S. technology, China and 40 (approximately three hundred million).39 This ac- Russia topped the list. A 2008 article from the Na- cess, wired or wireless, represents a lot of potential tional Journal reported that one large U.S. company attack origination points. (which remained unnamed for obvious reasons), realized its negotiating strategies—stored on com- pany networks—had been compromised when its Chinese counterparts knew the company’s bottom line on every negotiating point. Similarly, another CHINESE COGNITIVE DOMINANCE company noted that at its negotiations with the Chi- STRATEGY IN INEW nese, the delegation “based their starting points for negotiation on the Americans’ end points.”41 The above analysis shows that the Chinese gov- In an example more directly linked to “hard ernment has correctly marshaled its resources, power,” between 2002 and 2006 several attacks be- including its human talent, to develop cognitive lieved to have originated in China were conducted dominance in the realm of INEW. The Doctrine, against multiple National Aeronautics and Space Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Administration (NASA) facilities and its headquar- Education, Personnel, and Facilities analysis and ters. In 2002, rocket design information was sto- stated goals of the Chinese military link directly to len from the network of the Marshall Space Flight five cognitive dominance principles, as defined in Center in Huntsville, Alabama. In 2005, in what is Table 1. believed to have been the most serious attack, infor- If You Are Seeking an Advantage, Information Does Not Matter 135

Table 1. Cognitive Dominance Chinese Actions

Cognitive Depth—Developed wells of useful and Investment in skilled/educated population. relevant knowledge, both explicit, and in the form Training of leadership echelons. of expertise and experience that are superior to the Creation of malware repositories. adversary’s.

Cognitive Strength—The ability to generate conclu- Creation of truly expert hackers. sions with greater accuracy and precision than the Successful INEW attacks/exercises. adversary. Cyber-reconnaisance/espionage. Cognitive Agility—The ability to bring the right Massive investment in Internet access. information and the right expertise together more Encouragement of “gray hat” ethos/community. quickly than the adversary. Cognitive Defense—The passive and active ability Significant monitoring/security in place. to protect all parts of your cognitive cycle and its “Cyber confrontation” incorporated into network from disruption and exploitation. PLA training. Cognitive Resilience—The ability to effectively Wide pool of possible talent. rebound from major losses, defeats, or other catas- Wide pool of extant INEW warriors. trophes. Distributed Internet access nodes.

mation that could help build, fly, or sabotage a space off” industries but obviously to military hardware as shuttle was stolen from the Johnson and Kennedy well. Space Centers. The investigation into this incident While these may seem like fairly innocuous ex- suggests the information ended up in mainland amples of how China has employed its INEW capa- China. In another breach at the Johnson facility, evi- bility, three points must be raised. First, the reason dence pointed toward one of NASA’s contractor’s these attacks were relatively harmless is because the network, Lockheed Martin, as the gateway into the United States is not at war with China; the same NASA systems.42 INEW capabilities could be used in a state-on-state This was not just an attack on NASA; every conflict, potentially crippling enemy warfighters. partner that NASA has its network connected to is The U.S. way of war, for instance, emphasizes mobil- a gateway into its systems, and vice versa. The Chi- ity and maneuver, made possible by advanced tech- nese attacks effectively breached the partner net- nology and communications systems—all of which works as well. The amount of information that the are ripe targets for INEW. Second, these hacking- Chinese gleaned about the science, technology, and style attacks allow the Chinese formal and informal engineering involved in space flight could easily be army of experts the opportunity to hone their skills applied not only to its own space program or “spin- and practice their craft. Third, these acts of espio- 136 James Valentine & James Herlong SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE nage are the direct result of a coordinated national already “leapfrogged” over expensive legacy or in- strategy to create and gain cognitive dominance termediate infrastructure and technology, expand- within the EM domain. Each attack demonstrated ing both the regions and sources of informational that the Chinese, through national investment, had transparency and the access to the EM domain. created the ability to “out-think” their adversaries at Properly leveraged, these represent cheap sources the strategic level, creating accurate and precise de- of strategic power. Self-organizing groups of “digital cisions before their rivals even had a chance to ori- natives”—people born almost literally with a mo- ent themselves. bile device in their hand—effectively used modern Emphatically, the point of these examples is not IT and its access to the EM domain to challenge, to cast China as the next bogeyman for U.S. national destabilize, and bring down regimes in the Arab strategy. The authors of this paper, in fact, emphati- Spring. It is both easy and reasonable to envision cally disagree with casting China as a grave threat to such uprisings elsewhere. the safety and security of the United States. Instead, Given the above facts, informational ubiquity, the INEW and EM domain expertise China has de- symmetry, and simultaneity are not normative; veloped should be seen as driving home the central they do not favor any party over another. Rather, theme of cognitive dominance: Because IT and in- they are facts of the “terrain of power.” Those who formational disparity is rapidly diminishing around use the terrain properly will gain an advantage over the world, they can offer no strategic advantage. potential threats and adversaries. Those who do not They are necessary as a “cost of business,” and you will find their position compromised. Information will lose without them, but they are not decisive or dominance, unfortunately for the United States, advantageous in and of themselves. Therefore, the does not take full advantage of today’s information modern information environment requires not just environment. But, as China demonstrates, cognitive information and the tools to process and deliver it dominance does and provides with it the competi- but also the individual and collective ability of peo- tive edge that states seek in power transactions. ple to “think and act better and faster” than the en- emy. And because only people can think (for now), ENDNOTES China has invested massive amounts of resources in the people it is educating and training as part of its 1. John Arquilla, “The Strategic Implications of In- strategy. formation Dominance” (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgradu- Whether the Chinese think of their strategy as ate School, 1994). http://www.nps.edu/academics/Cen- cognitive dominance is of course immaterial; what ters/IOCenter/docs/publications/The%20Strategic% is important is that the actions of the Chinese gov- 20Implications%20of%20Information%20Dominance. . ernment demonstrate a clear understanding of the pdf 2. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, modern information environment, using the prin- “Vision 2015” (Washington, DC: July 2008), p. 6. ciples this paper outlines. They have successfully http://www.dni.gov/Vision_2015.pdf. delivered tremendous INEW and EM domain capa- 3. “The U.S. Navy’s Vision for Information” (May bilities, creating tangible decisional improvements, 2010), p. 4. http://www.insaonline.org/assets/files/Na- and in some cases, superiority. vyInformationDominanceVisionMay2010.pdf. The implications of the modern information en- 4. Ibid., p. 3. vironment, and its impact on security and stability, 5. In this case, the “web” refers to all the connec- cannot be ignored. Poorer regions of the world have tion equipment, devices, content, etc. that exist in a digi- If You Are Seeking an Advantage, Information Does Not Matter 137 tal context and are connected to each other. It is not just proach to Military Training,” China Brief 7: 12 (June web pages, websites, and so forth. 13, 2007) (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foun- 6. Arquilla, “The Strategic Implications,” p. 25. dation). http://www.jamestown.org/programs/ 7. http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdf/10.1257/ chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D= jep.24.3.207. 4227&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=197&no_cache=1. 8. UC Newsroom, “How much information do 20. China.org.cn, “White paper on national de- we consume?” (University of California: December 9, fense published,” 2009. http://www.china.org.cn/ 2009). http://www.universityofcalifornia.edu/news/ar- government/central_government/2009-01/20/con- ticle/22528. tent_17155577.htm. 9. Science Daily, “How Much Information Is There 21. Yan Hong and Zhou Meng, “Beijing Military in the World?” February 11, 2011. http://www.science- Region Conducts Computer Exercise,” Beijing Jiefangjun daily.com/releases/2011/02/110210141219.htm. Bao, April 8, 2000, as translated and downloaded from 10. This transparency is far from complete, but it is a the Open Source Center. windowpane compared to the past. 22. Clay Wilson. “Information Warfare and Cyber- 11. CNN World, “Neda becomes rallying cry for war: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues: RL31787” Iranian protests,” June 21, 2009. http://articles.cnn. (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, com/2009-06-21/world/iran.woman.twitter_1_neda- 2004), p. 2. peaceful-protest-cell-phone?_s=PM:WORLD. 23. Timothy L. Thomas, “China’s Electronic Long- 12. Arquilla, “The Strategic Implications.” Range Reconnaissance,” Military Review 88: 6 (Novem- 13. This is distinct from tactical maneuvers on the ber-December 2008): 53-54. battlefield, in diplomacy, economic exchange, etc. At 24. Thomas, “China’s Electronic Long-Range Re- the tactical level, the time lag between when you and an connaissance,” p. 48. adversary know something can be exploited to dramatic 25. Ibid., p. 49. effect. Information dominance could also be a “strategy,” 26. Thomas, “China’s Electronic Long-Range Re- when facing a far inferior adversary with poor EM do- connaissance,” p. 53; Yoshihara, “Chinese Information main presence. However, it is likely that an adversary of Warfare,” p. 6. that nature is going to lose anyway. 27. China.org.cn, “White paper on national defense 14. Network is inclusive of the IT tools that enable published.” networking, and the social network itself. 28. Thomas, “China’s Electronic Long-Range Re- 15. Toshi Yoshihara, “Chinese Information Warfare: connaissance,” pp. 48–51. A Phantom Menace or Emerging Threat?” (Carlisle Bar- 29. Ibid., p. 53. racks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Insti- 30. Hong and Meng, “Beijing Military Region Con- tute, November 2001). http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/ ducts Computer Exercise.” awcgate/ssi/chininfo.pdf. 31. Xu Wenliang and Wan Yuan, “Chengdu MR 16. Dai Qingmin, “On Integrating Network Warfare [Military Region] Conducts Confrontational Exercise and Electronic Warfare,” Beijing Zhongguo Junshi Kexue, on Internet,” Beijing Jiefangjun Bao (Internet Version- February 1, 2002, as translated and downloaded from the WWW), July 10, 2000, as translated and downloaded Open Source Center. from the Open Source Center. 17. Ibid. 32. An Chenguang, “PRC [People’s Republic of Chi- 18. Timothy L. Thomas, “Chinese and American na]: Jinan Military Region Electronic Warfare Regiment Network Warfare,” Joint Forces Quarterly 3rd Qtr: 38 Adds ‘Hacking’ to Tactics,” Jinan Qianwei Bao, May 25, (July 2005): 77. 2007; Li Jia and Wang Daqun, “PRC: Shenyan MR Air 19. Michael S. Chase, “China’s 2007 Military Force Command Post Executes ‘Trojan Software’ in On- Training Guidelines and the PLA’s Evolving Ap- line Drill,” Beijing Kongjun Bao, February 3, 2009; Mao 138 James Valentine & James Herlong SECURITY IN THE INFORMATION AGE

Xiuguo and Xiang Haoyu, “PRC: Nanjing MR Armored emy of Engineering, and Institute of Medicine, “Rising Regiment Improves Information Confrontation Capabil- Above the Gathering Storm: Energizing and Employing ity,” Nanjing Renmin Qianxian, February 11, 2009. All as America for a Brighter Economic Future” (Washington, translated and downloaded from the Open Source Cen- DC: The National Academies Press, 2007), p. 16. ter. 39. Information Warfare Monitor, “Tracking Ghost- 33. Viruslist.com, “Malicious Programs Descrip- Net: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network” (On- tions.” tario, Canada: University of Toronto, Munk School of 34. stopBADware.org, “”Where’s the badware?” Global Affairs, March 29, 2009), p. 9. http://www.in- http://blog.stopbadware.org/2009/03/03/wheres-the- fowar-monitor.net/ghostnet. badware. 40. Center for Strategic and International Studies, 35. Timothy L. Thomas. “Like Adding Wings to the “Threats Posed by the Internet” (Washington, DC: CSIS Tiger: Chinese Information War Theory and Practice” Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Foreign Military Threat Working Group, 2008), p. iii. Studies Office). http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/doc- 41. Shane Harris, “China’s Cyber-Militia,” National uments/chinaiw.htm. Journal, May 31, 2008. 36. Ibid. 42. Keith Epstein and Ben Elgin, “Network Se- 37. The World Factbook, “Military China” (Langley, curity Breaches Plague NASA,” Businessweek. VA: Central Intelligence Agency). China, https://www. com, November 20, 2008, under “Yanking Cables.” cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/ ch.html. 08_48/b4110072404167.htm. 38. National Academy of Sciences, National Acad- About the Authors

Séverine Arsène was the 2011–2012 Yahoo! Fel- Participatory Cultures Handbook. Faris also serves low at the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. as a Strategy Group Advisor for the Meta-Activism She is the author of Internet and Politics in China Project (MAP), which seeks to build foundational (Karthala, 2011, France). As an expert on Internet knowledge about digital activism. He has published governance and online mobilizations, Arsène has op-eds and features for the Christian Science Moni- worked with Orange in Paris and in Beijing. She was tor, NPR.org, The Daily News Egypt, The Philadel- previously an assistant lecturer at the University of phia Citypaper, Sightings and Insights on Law and Lille 3, France in the Department of Information Society. and Communication where she taught courses on information technologies. Arsène holds a Ph.D. in Sarah Granger is the founder of the Center for political science from Sciences Po in Paris. Technology, Media & Society. She is also a Fellow at the Truman National Security Project, cochair- David M. Faris is an Assistant Professor of Politi- ing their cybersecurity group. She began her career cal Science and Director of International Studies at working in cybersecurity for the Lawrence Liver- Roosevelt University. He received his PhD in Politi- more National Laboratory after graduating from the cal Science from the University of Pennsylvania in University of Michigan. She worked as a network 2010. He is the author of Dissent and Revolution in security consultant for several years before becom- a Digital Age: Social Media, Blogging and Activism in ing the Project Director for the Computer Profes- Egypt (forthcoming from IB Tauris and Co.). His sionals for Social Responsibility, where she served research focuses on both global digital activism as as a delegate to the World Summit on the Informa- well as the development of political institutions in tion Society at the U.N. in Geneva. Granger was a the Middle East, and is currently in the process of contributing author of Ethical Hacking, and she has completing projects on the growth of Iranian so- edited books on mobile security, cryptography and cial media, the rise of digital diplomacy and digital biometrics. She currently blogs for SFGate and The inequality in the Middle East. His academic work Huffington Post. Other publishing credits include Se- has appeared in Arab Media & Society, Middle East curity Focus,WSJ.com, Forbes Russia, and IEEE Spec- Policy, Politique etrangere, as well as The Routledge trum. For more information, see sarahgranger.com.

139 140 About the Authors

Craig Hayden is an assistant professor in the In- International Development’s Office of Democracy ternational Communication Program at American and Governance, a senior management position. University’s School of International Service. His Between 1990 and 2002, he held a number of posts current research focuses on the discourse of public at USAID dealing primarily with democracy and diplomacy, the rhetoric of foreign policy related to governance, including (from 2001 to 2002) a USAID media technologies, as well as the impact of global Senior Management Group position as director of media and media convergence on international rela- the Office of Democracy, Governance and Social tions. He is particularly interested in the compara- Transitions in the Bureau for Europe and Eurasia. tive study of public diplomacy and media culture as He developed the programming strategy paradigm a pivotal resource for international relations, as well for USAID democracy and governance assistance. as the impact of communication technology on in- From 1985 to 1990, he practiced corporate law at ternational influence. Dr. Hayden received his Ph.D. Covington & Burling in Washington, DC. Between from the Annenberg School of Communication at 1970 and 1982, he taught in the Department of the University of Southern California. He is also the Sociology & Anthropology at Smith College. He author of The Rhetoric of Soft Power: Public Diplo- also taught courses at Williams College. He holds macy in Global Contexts (Lexington Books, 2012). a B.A. in Philosophy and a Ph.D. in Anthropology from the University of Chicago and a J.D. from James Herlong is a forward-thinking, strategic the University of Virginia. He is the author of intelligence and information technology leader numerous articles and publications. He is a member and cyber strategy and security subject matter ex- of the Advisory Board of National Endowment pert. Herlong has a comprehensive background in- for Democracy’s Center for International Media cluding a wide range of national security and cyber Assistance and of the NED’s Research Council of issues. He has made notable contributions to home- the its International Forum for Democratic Studies. land security developing the nation’s first program to screen incoming merchant ship crew, passengers, Lorelei Kelly is the founder or director of five and cargo for intelligence and law enforcement is- projects in Washington, D.C. with the purpose of sues and the building of the Coast Guard Cyber system-level change in information flows between Command. In 2004, Herlong was awarded the Ad- Congress and American citizens. She joined the miral Frederick Billard award, the Coast Guard’s New America Foundation’s Open Technology In- top intelligence honor. Mr. Herlong is a graduate stitute to pilot Smart Congress—a decentralized of the United States Coast Guard Academy, holds a system of expert knowledge and civic participation Master of Science in Information Systems from the methods for the U.S. Congress. OTI’s mission is to University of Baltimore, and a Master of Strategic build an open and free global town square, enabled Intelligence from the National Defense Intelligence by twenty-first century communications technolo- College where he was the top Reserve graduate. gies. Kelly is a civil–military expert, and part of her work at OTI looks at the impact of distributed Gerald F. (“Jerry”) Hyman has been Senior power and the components of a security strategy Advisor at the Center for Strategic and In­ for civil society. She attended Grinnell College. Af- ternational Studies and the President of its Hills ter living in Berlin while the Cold War ended, she Program on Governance since 2007. From 2002 taught Peace Studies at Stanford, moved to Wash- to 2007, he was the director of the U.S. Agency for ington, DC to work in Congress, and attended the About the Authors 141

Air Command and Staff College of the U.S. Air curing a Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom and Force. She is the co-author of two books, both free in January 2003 was awarded an OBE for services and available online. to human rights. He holds several Board positions in the non-profit and public sector: he is Chair of Shanthi Kalathil is an international development Danish-based International Media Support, a Dan- consultant and adviser, focusing on the intersec- ish based NGO that provides emergency support to tion between development, democracy and, in- journalists in conflict areas; the Deputy Chair of the ternational security. Kalathil is coauthor of Open Sigrid Rausing Trust; and he is on the board of the Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet European Council for Foreign Relations. on Authoritarian Rule, a widely cited work that ex- Andrew has led human rights organisations in amined the Internet and political transition in eight the not-for-profit sector for more than fifteen years. authoritarian contexts. Over the past decade, Kal- Previous to founding Global Partners he was Ex- athil has advised the U.S. government, international ecutive Director of ARTICLE 19, a pioneering or- organizations, and nonprofits on the policy and ganisation working on freedom of expression from practical aspects of support for civil society, media, 1999 to 2004. As Executive Director, Andrew led transparency and accountability as a function of de- the organisation and was responsible for the strat- mocracy and good governance. Previously a Senior egy, management and policy direction. Democracy Fellow at the U.S. Agency for Interna- tional Development and a regular consultant for the Joseph Siegle is a Senior Research Scholar at the World Bank, she is currently an adjunct professor at Center for International and Security Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and Maryland (CISSM) and the Director of Research codirector of the Institute’s Colloquium on Evolv- at the African Center for Strategic Studies at the ing Global Security Challenges. She has authored National Defense University. Siegle has written numerous policy and scholarly publications, includ- widely on the political economy of democratic tran- ing the recent Developing Independent Media as an sitions, stabilizing fragile states, and establishing Institution of Accountable Governance, published by institutions of accountability, including the coau- the World Bank. A former Hong Kong-based staff thored work, The Democracy Advantage: How De- reporter for the Wall Street Journal Asia, Kalathil is a mocracies Promote Prosperity and Peace (Routledge, member of the Advisory Board for the National En- revised edition 2010). His background combines dowment for Democracy’s Center for International policy analysis, academic research, and field practi- Media Assistance. tioner experience from over 40 countries, including numerous stabilization, postconflict reconstruc- Andrew Puddephatt is a founding Director tion, and fragile state contexts. Previously, Siegle of Global Partners & Associates (www.global- has held positions as Douglas Dillon Fellow at the partners.co.uk). He has worked to promote human Council on Foreign Relations, a Senior Advisor for rights for twenty years and has specific expertise in Democratic Governance at the international con- freedom of expression, transparency, the role of me- sulting firm, DAI, and a Country Director with the dia and digital communications in society, and im- international NGO, World Vision. Dr. Siegle earned plementing human rights. He is currently managing a Ph.D. from the University of Maryland’s School of projects in Brazil, Egypt, the United States, Iraq and Public Policy and a M.A. in Agricultural Economics China. Puddephatt has played a leading role in se- from Michigan State University. 142 About the Authors

James Valentine is currently the Chief of Intelli- University), and holds a Master’s Degree in Strate- gence for U.S. Coast Guard District 11. Previous gic Intelligence. He earned his B.S. in Government, tours include the Maritime Intelligence Fusion emphasis International Affairs, at the U.S. Coast Center Pacific, in Alameda, California, the Coast Guard Academy in 1997. He has published two arti- Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, Coast cles on the implications of information technology Guard Headquarters, and the USCG cutter SHER- on cognition and warfare, and holds a Black Belt in MAN. He is a 2005 graduate of the Joint Military Brazilian Jiu Jitsu. Intelligence College (now the National Intelligence