Front Matter

The Middle East: The Impact of Generational Change The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies seeks to contribute by research, documentation, and publication to the study and understanding of the modern history and current affairs of the Middle East and Africa. The Center is part of the School of History and the Lester and Sally Entin Faculty of Humanities at Tel Aviv University. The Middle East: The Impact of Generational Change The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies Tel Aviv University Copyright © 2005 The Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University ISBN: 965-224-071-0 Series Editor: Asher Susser Thanslation from Hebrew: Avi Aronsky English Editor: Linda Landau Cover design and production: Elena Lesnick Printed by A.R.T. – Offset Printing Ltd. 4 Contents Introduction ................................................................................................................................... 7 FATHERS AND SONS, FROM JUMHURIYYA TO “JUMLUKIYYA” Yoram Meital The Struggle for the Reins of Power in Egypt ...................................... 17 Eyal Zisser In the Name of the Father: Is Bashar in Control of Syria? .......... 49 Yehudit Ronen Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi and Sayf al-Islam – Father and Son at a Historical Crossroads? ................................................................................. 55 AT THE CORE OF REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE Ephraim Lavie Between Revolution and Statehood– The Palestinians in the Aftermath of the Arafat Era ...........................................67 Ofra Bengio Upon the Fall of the Ba‘th: The Struggle between the Elites in Iraq .......................................................................................91 Meir Litvak Iran’s Rebellious Youth .......................................................... 119 THE SURPRISING STABILITY OF THE MONARCHIES Joshua Teitelbaum The Next Generation of Saudi ‘Ulama: A New Pillar of Support for the Regime? ........................................................135 Asher Susser All in the Family: GenerationalContinuityinJordan..........145 Daniel Zisenwine Political Elites amid a Changing Reality in Morocco .............. 163 5 Introduction Introduction1 A flurry of political change in the Middle East has created the appearance of an “Arab Spring”: elections in Iraq and the PA (Palestinian Authority), mass rallies and elections in Lebanon, President Husni Mubarak’s decision to allow other candidates to compete in the Egyptian presidential elections, and local elections in Saudi Arabia. What is the essence of these changes, and what is their cause? Are they the fruit of President Bush’s policy to advance democracy in the Middle East, or are they perhaps an outcome of the media revolution currently sweeping the Arab world? Are they the harbingers of a genuine revolution that has been provoked by the considerable political, economic, and social frustration in the region, or are they merely a series of superficial coincidences that have nothing to do with comprehensive change? Are the various leadership successions inducing gradual transformations, or are the new heads of state simply waging the same persistent, age- old struggle to preserve the status quo? In light of these ambiguities, the successions in the Middle East were examined at a symposium held in March 2005 at the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies. All the speakers were scholars of the Dayan Center, with the exception of Dr. Yoram Meital, a guest lecturer on Egyptian affairs from Ben-Gurion University. For quite some time, observers discussed the possibility that Husni Mubarak would follow in the footsteps of Syria’s Hafiz al-Asad and bequeath the Egyptian presidency to his son. However, in February 2005, Mubarak called for a revision of the constitution that would allow several candidates to compete in free presidential elections. Given the restrictions imposed on potential challengers and the overwhelming victory of Mubarak, the change appeared to be cosmetic or, as the Egyptian opposition claimed, merely an optical illusion of democracy. The question being asked in Syria is not whether democracy is making inroads following the aforementioned transfer of power but whether Hafiz al-Asad’s son and successor, Bashar, is actually in control of the country. A more pertinent question, however, is – how long can this 7 Introduction military, radical, and anachronistic regime, whose world view has become obsolete, continue to survive after having lost a substantial portion of its public base? Bashar’s gravest mistake, which might jeopardize the very existence of his regime, has been his failure to adapt Syria’s political strategies to the changes in the regional policy of the United States in the aftermath of 9/11 and the war in Iraq. Whereas the United States previously considered Syria an ally – albeit a somewhat problematic one – it now deems Syria an enemy, who threatens vital American interests in the Middle East. Tensions with the United States also contributed to the eruption of anti-Syrian sentiment in Lebanon, which culminated in Syria’s humiliating withdrawal from the land of the cedars after having ruled its diminutive neighbor with a heavy hand for the course of an entire generation. Libya is another example of a republican regime that seized the helm by means of a military coup and may now transfer the reins of power in the style of monarchs, from father to son, inasmuch as Sayf al-Islam – Mu‘ammar al-Qadhafi’s first-born, thirty-two year old son – is apparently his father’s candidate to succeed him. Sayf al-Islam began to make a name for himself during the second half of the 1990s, and today he is involved in all facets of government activity. He is well-versed in the culture of the West and the ways in which its society functions. Moreover, the head of state’s son is spearheading a reform process in domestic and foreign policy although he does not bear any official title. In fact, Sayf al-Islam is largely responsible for the dramatic change in his country’s international status; from an isolated state mired under heavy sanctions during the 1990s, Libya is presently being courted by the West in both the economic and diplomatic spheres. Unlike the aforementioned republican regimes, the changes in Iraq were precipitated by an external force, the United States, which incapacitated the existing elites – foremost among them, the Ba‘th party and the army – and elicited the rapid ascent of new elites. The collapse of the ruling center in Baghdad bolstered the Shi‘i and Kurdish elites on the periphery. Moreover, the fall of the old Sunni Arab elites set the stage for the meteoric rise of the Sunni clergy while the veterans of Saddam’s ousted regime have assumed the leadership of the opposition to the new order. Conversely, the Kurds have maintained the historical continuity 8 Introduction of their elite, which has led the community for more than seventy years. Furthermore, the Kurdish elite recently managed to extricate itself from the divisive internal struggles of the 1980s and 1990s. Among the Shi‘is, the clash over the leadership pitted a spiritual leader, ‘Ali al-Sistani, against a political leader, Muqtada al-Sadr (despite the fact that Sadr has drawn much of his authority from his family’s religious prestige). Sistani has proven to be the prime mover in his community and, for that matter, in all of Iraq, and his departure from the political scene would have left a gaping political void. In the Palestinian arena the topic of succession has become all the more relevant with the passing of Yasser Arafat. The succession issue is closely related to on-going friction within the Palestinian national movement, which has been fluctuating between two ideological poles since the founding of the PLO: revolution versus statehood. The revolutionary perspective clamors for strict adherence to the objectives set forth in the National Charter and for the liberation of all of Palestine by means of an armed struggle. In contrast, the “statehood” perspective espouses a two-state solution to be achieved by pragmatic and political means and by the construction of the institutions of the state-in-the- making. Thrown into this mix is an inter-generational struggle between the veteran leadership and the ranking members of an intermediate generation that has evolved during the last decade. The old guard has sought to protect itself by preserving the PLO’s status, while the members of the intermediate generation, who led the first Intifada, aspire to fill key positions in the PA establishment. During the al-Aqsa Intifada, the center of gravity of the PA’s political leadership shifted to the Fatah intermediate generation (e.g. Marwan al-Barghuti), who rode the wave of public protest with Arafat’s backing and formed the vanguard of the new phase of the national struggle. Despite anarchy and the damage to the legitimacy of the political struggle as result of the violent confrontation, the intermediate generation did not manage to seriously weaken the veteran leadership, accelerate the succession process, or consolidate its own power base. In contrast, Hamas boosted its power during the years of confrontation. However, the damage that Israel inflicted on its leadership and sources of income during the past year weakened the movement to a certain degree. This setback played a role in the Hamas decision to adopt a 9 Introduction pragmatic approach towards Mahmud ‘Abbas (Abu Mazin) after his election to the presidency. Before Arafat’s death, increasing

Load more