47(6) 1279–1299, May 2010

Nineteen Days in April: Urban Protest and Democracy in

Paul Routledge

[Paper first received, February 2008; in final form, October 2008]

Abstract For 19 days in April 2006, Nepal witnessed a popular uprising against the royal-military coup staged by King Gyanendra in February 2005. The Jana Andolan II (People’s Movement II) demanded a return to democracy, the establishment of a lasting peace in Nepal and more political and economic inclusion for the various ethnic and caste groups historically marginalised in Nepali society. Through an analysis of the Jana Andolan (particularly within the urban space of Nepal’s capital, Kathmandu) and the subsequent peace process that has unfolded in Nepal, this paper will consider how and why the city was a key terrain for the prosecution of conflict by the people’s movement, and how such protest entailed the articulation of particular democratic rights discourses. The paper will also consider the role of civil society within urban protest in order to reflect upon debates concerning liberal and radical democracy, and the ‘politics of the governed’.

State of Reversal On 22 April 2006, hundreds of thousands of staged by King Gyanendra in February 2005. people filled Kathmandu’s 27 km long ring The Jana Andolan II (People’s Movement II, road, effectively encircling the city.1 Amid named after the first people’s movement of road blockades, burning tyres, liberated 1990) demanded a return to democracy, the spaces and destroyed police posts, the demand establishment of a lasting peace in Nepal and of the protestors was for a democratic repub- more political and economic inclusion for the lic, in a country that had experienced persis- various ethnic and caste groups historically tent political corruption, a ten-year Maoist marginalised in Nepali society. The move- insurgency and a royal-military coup. For 19 ment was successful in toppling the King’s days in April 2006, Nepal witnessed a popu- direct rule of the country, forging the way lar uprising against the royal-military coup for the reinstatement of political parties in

Paul Routledge is in the Department of Geography, University of Glasgow, East Quadrangle, University Avenue, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK. E-mail: [email protected].

0042-0980 Print/1360-063X Online © 2010 Urban Studies Journal Limited DOI: 10.1177/0042098009360221 1280 PAUL ROUTLEDGE the political life of Nepal, the establishment three strands that are pertinent to discussions of an interim government and the holding of about events in Nepal—namely, liberal national elections (in April 2008). democracy, radical democracy and what A consideration of this “state of reversal” Partha Chatterjee (2004) terms the ‘politics and “collective deliverance from the stings of the governed’. First, liberal interpretations of command” (Canetti, 1962, p. 67) provides of democracy envisage the practice of fair, insights into the character of Nepal’s transi- competitive elections between individuals, tion to democracy. Through an analysis of organisations and political parties for political the activities of the Jana Andolan (particularly positions within the state; inclusive participa- within the urban space of Nepal’s capital, tion of all social groups; and civil liberties Kathmandu) and the subsequent peace process such as freedom of expression, freedom of that has unfolded in Nepal during 2006–08, the press and freedom of association. From this paper will consider how the city was a key the perspective of liberal democracy, civil target and terrain for the prosecution of con- society is a terrain of social action consisting flict by the people’s movement and how such of interest-groups that do not question the protest entailed the articulation of particular dominant social, economic or cultural values democratic rights discourses. The paper will within society (Olesen, 2005, pp. 155–165). also consider the role of civil society within Secondly, radical democracy, as espoused by urban protest in order to reflect upon debates Chantal Mouffe (1993, 2000, 2002, 2005), con- concerning liberal and radical democracy, and ceives of the political as premised upon a rela- the ‘politics of the governed’ (Chatterjee, 2004). tional understanding of identity constituted In order to ‘place’ an analysis of the Jana through (for example, religious, ethnic and Andolan and its aftermath, this paper will economic) difference and inequality. Radical first consider certain debates regarding the democratic practice is open ended, perme- practice of democracy, before proceeding to ated by inequalities of power and centred on discuss the political economy of Nepal (and conflict and contestation between adversarial the importance, therein, of Kathmandu) since collective political identities. Mouffe espouses the initial transition to democracy in 1990 an agonistic model of democracy, where (including the delineation of caste power in ‘enemies’ are reconfigured as ‘adversaries’ the country, the effects of the Maoist insur- who share common democratic values (for gency upon the integrity of the Nepali state example, of equality and liberty) and whose and the role of the monarchy). The paper will differences (and the conflicts that arise from then consider how democratic practices have them) can be negotiated through democratic been articulated prior to, during and after the procedures (such as voting) that are accepted Jana Andolan of 2006 in the light of the theo- by the adversaries. Radical democracy views retical debates concerning democracy and the civil society in a Gramscian sense as an role of civil society.2 In so doing, the paper will integral part of the state and as a sphere of consider the importance of the urban in the hegemony, albeit a politicised arena of conflict prosecution of conflict in Nepal. and the development of contentious identi- ties and counter-hegemonic claims (Olesen, Liberal Democracy, Radical 2005, p. 179). Democracy and the ‘Politics Thirdly, the ‘politics of the governed’ of the Governed’ (Chatterjee, 2004) is concerned with the rela- tionship between political participation and Amongst the plethora of debates about the forms of governance, in particular, the role the character of democracy, I want to draw out post-colonial state (in the global South) plays NINETEEN DAYS IN APRIL 1281 in shaping its subjects. Focusing primarily of more lasting democratic change in Nepal upon subaltern politics in India, Chatterjee and what kind of change that will be. Before draws a distinction between two ways in discussing how various elements of the which the modern state views people: as aforementioned interpretations of democracy rights-bearing citizens, and as populations, or are pertinent to an understanding of con- ‘subjects’ (in the Foucauldian sense) who are temporary politics in Nepal, I shall briefly targets of government policy. He argues that describe Nepal’s political economy following the post-colonial state deals with its people the revolution of 1990. primarily as governed populations and that this mode of operation has been reinforced in The Political Economy of part through its expanded interventions con- Nepal since 1990 ducted in the name of ‘development’, whereby groups of people have been classified (for Economic Liberalisation and example, by means of caste, ethnicity) into the Role of Kathmandu suitable targets for administrative, legal, eco- With the restoration of democracy in 1990, nomic or electoral policy. Chatterjee argues following the Jana Andolan I, a popular that, under such conditions, the politics of movement against the panchayat regime civil society is élitist, dominated by NGOs and (see Routledge, 1997),3 the new constitu- other institutions that treat communities as tion confirmed the position of the King as a subjects through discourses (and policies) of constitutional monarch, with political parties reform that serve to marginalise the politics competing for electoral office. There have of poor people. Therefore, lacking full citizen- been three general elections (in 1991, 1994, ship, the marginalised make claims on the and 1999) since 1990, and 12 changes of gov- state from the political space of negotiation ernment between 1991 and 2002.4 and brokerage that Chatterjee calls ‘political Since the mid 1980s, there has been an society’. This is a space of possibility where ideological shift to economic liberalisation new forms of democratic representation can and market-led approaches to develop- be created and where the needs of the mar- ment, according to the conditions of donor ginalised are voiced (for example, through aid and IMF structural adjustment pro- social movements) and are sometimes met, grammes, through deregulating capital and but always as conditional claims rather than labour markets, removing price controls, formal rights. privatising state-owned enterprises, liber- alising trade and introducing convertibility Urban Space, Protest and Democracy of the domestic currency (Sharma, 1997). Following the 1990 people’s movement, Development functions have been increas- there was a clear spatial outcome to the ingly ‘contracted out’ to non-government struggle for democracy in Nepal. Whereas, organisations (NGOs)—partly as a response in the cities, people experienced greater to the failures of government institutions, but freedom of expression and association, in also contributing to their increased decline. rural Nepal these freedoms continued to be The increasing privatisation of state enter- seriously compromised (Routledge, 1997). prises has been supported both by the Nepali Given the temporary importance of the Congress (NC) and the Communist Party city—as terrain and target—for the articula- of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) [CPN- tion of protest by the Jana Andolan of 2006, UML] parties, the two dominant electoral it raises the question of the opportunities political parties in the country until 2008 and limits of the urban for the prosecution (Gellner, 2005). 1282 PAUL ROUTLEDGE

However, as Rankin (2004) notes, foreign supported urbanised societies since the fourth aid transformed Nepal’s economy, as India, century CE, has enabled the flourishing of a China and the US competed with each varied Newar culture and has situated the other for disbursements of aid.5 Foreign Kathmandu valley as a primary trade route aid financed infrastructure growth, such as between Tibet, China and India (Rankin, motorable roadways, postal and telecom- 2004). As a result, the urban centres within munications facilities, irrigation projects, the valley, and Kathmandu in particular, came schools, rural development projects, malarial to dominate the economic life of Nepal. The eradication in the southern Terai region and city is the country’s capital, home to the King economic development (such as import sub- and the government, the key site where politi- stitution industries). cal decision-making is undertaken and a key Nevertheless, economically, Nepal has low nexus of transport and telecommunications; rates of growth and the heaviest reliance on the majority of Nepal’s economic invest- agriculture of any country in the world (57 ment is made within the Kathmandu valley per cent of GDP and 80 per cent of the labour (Routledge, 1997; Thapa and Sijapati, 2006).7 force) (Thapa and Sijapati, 2006). According For example, Nepal’s three key industries in to the UN Human Development Report of the 1990s, carpets, garments and tourism, 2006, 38 per cent of Nepal’s population are were all primarily located in Kathmandu.8 The extremely poor and cannot meet their basic HDI for urban areas in 2000 was 0.616, far needs, annual per capita income is US$ 220 above that of rural areas (0.446) where over and Nepal is 142nd (out of 177 countries) 80 per cent of the population lives (Thapa and on the UNDP’s Human Development Index Sijapati, 2006). The primary importance of (HDI).6 Life expectancy is 62.6 years and adult the city in Nepal’s political economy ensured literacy 48.6 per cent. However, these figures that it would become the key target and ter- mask regional disparities. For example, in the rain of resistance during the events of April mountain regions of the far west of the coun- 2006. The country’s economic disparities are try, life expectancy is only 42 years and adult further accentuated by the concentration of literacy 37 per cent (Thapa and Sijapati, 2006). political, economic and cultural power in a Nepal is characterised by an economic caste hierarchy. dualism that is manifested in the position of Kathmandu, the nation’s capital, where most Caste and Ethnic Power of the political, economic and cultural (espe- There are more than 60 caste and ethnic cially caste) power of the country is concen- groups in Nepal.9 However, according to trated (see later). Like all cities, Kathmandu a gender and social exclusion assessment is a product of spatially specific relations undertaken by the World Bank and DFID (Massey, 2005). Nepal’s capital is a product of Nepal (2005), dimensions of exclusion, a complex mix of caste, ethnic, economic and poverty and inequality cut across gender, political relations that make it the locus where caste, ethnicity and location. Broadly speak- decisions are made regarding the appropria- ing, males have dominant social status over tion, distribution and realisation of economic females; the Bahun (or Brahman, 12.74 per cent surpluses generated by production in the of Nepal’s population), Chhetri (15.8 per cent of peripheral areas outside the Kathmandu Nepal’s population), Thakuri (1.47 per cent) valley (especially the Terai and the hills). and Sanyasi (0.88 per cent) castes are the The city’s location—in a high fertile valley culturally, politically and resource-dominant situated between the to the north groups, with Dalits the most disadvantaged; and the Gangetic plains to the south—has those of Indo-Nepalese ethnicity have NINETEEN DAYS IN APRIL 1283 dominant status over Janajati (indigenous) The weak representation of disadvantaged groups; and hill dwellers (Parbatiyas) have groups in the Parliament and the cabinet dominant social status over plains (Terai) means that even when power is shared between dwellers (Madhesis). The Newar, an indig- legislature and the executive, disadvantaged enous group from the capital, is also better-off groups do not get access to it. The dominant economically and politically but faces cultural group members, who control the major discrimination (Lawoti, 2007). political parties, have, effectively, shared power On all major indices such as poverty levels, among themselves (Lawoti, 2007). Hence, per capita household consumption, incomes, the post-1990 democratic epoch in Nepal health and education indicators, infant mor- witnessed widespread corruption, grinding tality and literacy, the Bahun/Chhetri hill poverty, the politicisation of the administra- Hindu groups fare far better than the mar- tion and the continued exclusion of caste and ginalised groups (i.e. women, Dalits, Janajatis ethnic minorities from the governance of the and Madhesis), although there are a wide polity and the economic wealth generated in range of variations (for example, high-caste the country. It was against this backdrop that women fare better than low-caste women; the Maoist insurgency was to emerge. certain inequalities exist within Janajati and Madeshi groups) (World Bank and DFID, The Maoist Insurgency 2005). The restoration of democracy in 1990 Although the Communist Party of Nepal saw an explosion of identity movements mak- (Maoist) [CPN (M)] had been preparing ing claims regarding their historical marginali- their armed struggle for some years before, sation (Gellner, 1997; Pfaff-Czarnecka, 1999; the Maoist insurgency was finally launched Hangen, 2000). in February 1996 and was aimed at the over- The Bahun/Chhetri hill Hindu groups and throw of the political-economic status quo. Newars dominate Nepal’s politics, the execu- It grew rapidly with the support and par- tive, judiciary, Parliament, civil administra- ticipation of a large section of the alienated tion, academia, industry and commerce, civil population, including the excluded ethnic/ society, local government and educational and caste groups particularly in the impoverished cultural leadership.10 Although they jointly rural areas of the west and far west of Nepal comprise 36.37 per cent of the population, and the Terai region (Lawoti, 2003). in 1999 they were holding more than 80 per The intention of the armed struggle was to cent of the leadership positions in the impor- confiscate the lands of feudal and landlord tant arenas of governance. Even the relatively elements and to redistribute them amongst more open realms such as the media and civil the landless and poor peasants (i.e. land to the society demonstrate the high exclusion of tiller) and to effect a ‘proletarian revolution’ traditionally marginalised groups. Women’s completely to reorganise and restructure the presence in public positions, including that of Nepali state. The Maoists pursued a three- Bahun/Chhetri hill Hindu women, has been pronged strategy, directly borrowed from Mao insignificant as well. Women’s representa- Zedong: to seize the enemies’ arms; to encircle tion never exceeded 6 per cent in the House the cities from the countryside (which by the of Representatives (HOR) formed in 1991, time the army was deployed against them in 1994 and 1999. Some of the cabinets had no November 2001, they had largely achieved); women at all. Only one Dalit got elected to and the waging of ‘protracted war’ in three the HOR and not a single Dalit was made a stages. First, strategic defence (i.e. the waging cabinet member during the democratic epoch of guerrilla war and the creation of popular from 1990 to 2002 (Lawoti, 2007). fronts); secondly, strategic stalemate (i.e. 1284 PAUL ROUTLEDGE through control of the countryside, the state There has also been a massive increase in is reduced to protecting areas that remain military spending—Rs1 billion in 1990/91 under its control, particularly urban areas, and (£7.5 million) to Rs7 billion in 2002/03 in especially the Kathmandu valley); and, thirdly, £52.8 million—so that, by 2006, the army and strategic offence (i.e. the final military offen- police consumed over 15 per cent of the total sive against the state). By the end of 2002, the national budget (Thapa and Sijapati, 2006). Maoists believed that they had reached the sec- There have also been numerous human ond stage and were preparing to launch their rights violations committed by the army, the final offensive (Thapa and Sijapati, 2006). armed police and the Maoists. After 10 years However, despite this military approach, the of fighting, over 13 000 lives have been lost Maoists have frequently offered, or engaged and there has been about £1 billion in infra- in, negotiations with the state (for example, in structure damage, as well as the displacement 2001 and 2003, there were peace talks between of millions to Kathmandu, and abroad to the Maoists and the government). India. As the Maoist insurgency escalated, NC There has been a huge economic and human and CPN-UML governments have enforced cost to the insurgency. In 2001/02 Nepal’s press censorship, suspended civil rights and GDP contracted by 0.6 per cent compared imposed a brutal counter-insurgency—even- with a growth rate of 4.7 per cent the previous tually deploying the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) year. Per capita income for the Nepali popula- in late 2001. The deployment of the RNA tion for the same period dropped from £121 to against the Maoists was eventually to lead to £114. In 2000, tourism had generated £80 mil- a military stalemate between the two forces. lion a year to the Nepali economy. However, The combined strength of the state forces was tourist arrivals declined by 17 per cent in 2001 insufficient to launch an effective counter- and decreased a further 28 per cent in 2002. insurgency and, as a result, significant num- Health care centres, schools, community cen- bers of troops were withdrawn to Kathmandu, tres and local government offices were burnt for the protection and management of the down in over 300 communities. Telephone capital, the country’s economic and political and radio towers were destroyed, leaving over heart (Cherian, 2006a).11 20 districts with limited, or no, communica- tions. Frequent checkpoints, government The Monarchy curfews and booby-trapped roads have led The role of the king in Nepal has been a to reduced transport within and between dis- principal factor in the development of the tricts. Frequent general strikes (bandhs) have country’s polity. The House of Gorkha con- cost the economy RS630 million (£4.76 mil- quered different kingdoms, principalities and lion) a day. However, despite its political and indigenous peoples from 1769 to form what economic importance in Nepal, Kathmandu would become the . The remained largely inured from the effects of monarchy weakened after 1846 for a century the insurgency (Thapa and Sijapati, 2006). As when the Rana family effectively assumed a Maoist activist noted autocratic control of the governance of the country. The Ranas introduced a Civil Code Kathmandu did not really suffer during the in 1854 that imposed the Hindu caste hierar- 10-year insurgency. Indeed, the capital’s economy was booming at that time, favouring chy on non-Hindus. The Ranas were thrown the Kathmandu establishment, that is the out in 1951, through an armed movement business and media élites, the class and caste led by the party in alliance hierarchies, and the mainstream political party with King Tribhuvan, after which the pol- establishment (interview, Kathmandu, 2007). ity remained open for a decade. The first NINETEEN DAYS IN APRIL 1285 parliamentary election was held in 1959 but, the villages due to the Maoist insurgency. after 18 months, King Mahendra (the son of As a result, the mainstream political parties Tribhuvan who had died in 1955) deposed had been politically weakened. Informed the democratic government and introduced of this by military intelligence, the palace saw this as an opportunity to exert its the panchayat system that lasted for 30 years. influence, by dissolving the government and During these periods, the dominant ethnic/ assuming control of the country (interview, caste groups consolidated their position in the Kathmandu, 2007). polity and society at the cost of other groups (Lawoti, 2007). There followed a clamp-down on civil and The panchayat system continued under political society: leaders of political par- King Birendra (Mahendra’s son), until it was ties and human rights organisations were successfully challenged by the Jana Andolan arrested; a ban was instituted on the media, I in 1990 (see Routledge, 1997). A multiparty including the arrest of journalists and the democracy ensued with the King retaining raiding of the offices of publications critical much of his power (not least control of the of the take-over; and there were travel restric- army). A crisis developed when, on 1 June tions imposed on movement throughout the 2001, the entire royal family were massacred country for a period of six months following and the king’s brother, Gyanendra, assumed the coup (INSEC, 2007). the throne. A state of emergency was declared in November 2001 and the RNA replaced the armed police in the counter-insurgency Democracy in Nepal: The against the Maoists. The King dissolved the Prelude to the Jana Andolan House of Representatives (the Nepalese par- liament) in May 2002 and, in October 2002, To understand Nepal’s movement towards the King dismissed the Prime Minister and the democracy requires a consideration of the elected government and assumed executive role played by civil society in the country. authority (see Thapa, 2007). The term nagrik samaj (civil society) dates However, by the time the RNA engaged the back to the revolution of 1990 and the Maoists, they found a guerrilla army that was emergence of modern, urban, élitist and battle hardened, while the army itself was not rights-based civil society organisations battle ready and, due to its UN commitments, (CSOs). Unlike non-government organisa- unable to deploy as many troops as it would tions (NGOs), which have tended to define have liked. As a result, by the end of 2002, themselves in non-political terms, CSOs have there was a military and political stalemate sought to influence state actions and political which continued until February 2005, when processes (for example, concerning freedom the King assumed complete control of the of expression, association and assembly) country: in effect, initiating a Royal-military while functioning within the bounds of the coup. As one Informal Sector Service Centre state-defined public sphere and while often (INSEC) activist noted closely collaborating with political parties, market institutions and Western aid donors Prior to the royal takeover, the presence of (Dahal, 2006, pp. 4, 29, 33). However, as the mainstream political parties in the villages Dahal notes had been greatly eroded. The national-level leadership of the mainstream parties were Civil society in Nepal is so variegated and absent in the districts; the villagers were terrified disparate in terms of size, nature, function, of the Maoists and the security forces; and character and identity, that it is difficult to the political party cadres had also vacated develop a precise definition (Dahal, 2006, p. 21). 1286 PAUL ROUTLEDGE

Civil society in Nepal is certainly dominated the emerging resistance to the royal regime by élitist NGOs and CSOs as Chatterjee (2004) (interviews, Kathmandu, 2007). The main- has argued. However, in the context of the stream political parties put aside their politi- Jana Andolan, this has not marginalised the cal differences and formed the Seven Party poor. While some organisations have acted Alliance (SPA), a coalition of seven Nepali within a liberal interpretation of civil society political parties seeking the re-introduction (as a terrain of social action that does not of democracy in Nepal.12 question dominant societal values), other Meanwhile, the Maoist response to the coup organisations have viewed civil society as during February and March 2006, included a politicised terrain of counter-hegemonic a succession of general strikes, shutdowns claims. This latter interpretation was par- and blockades at the local and regional levels ticularly apparent as resistance to the coup (Cherian, 2006a). At the international level, developed. Through the Jana Andolan, the foreign governments and international aid marginalised were able to make claims on the agencies cut crucial financial and military aid state, but did so in collaboration with more to Nepal. For example, on 25 February 2005, élitist civil society actors and political parties, the World Bank informed the Nepal govern- as noted in what follows. ment that it was suspending its US$70 mil- Despite the restrictions implemented as lion budgetary support for the current fiscal a result of the coup, a range of civil society year. The US, India and the UK, Kathmandu’s organisations (CSOs) (for example, INSEC) principal military backers, suspended arms and NGOs (for example, the NGO Federation) supplies to Nepal (Cherian, 2006b, 2006c). had been still working in rural Nepal, through However, the most important political their networks of support, filling the void cre- development was to be the decision, by ated by the absence of the mainstream politi- the Maoists, to abandon the ‘people’s war’ cal parties. After the travel ban was lifted, the and join mainstream multiparty politics. A CSOs formed a temporary coalition (which three-month ceasefire was announced by the included a range of organisations includ- Maoists on 3 September 2005. During the ing the Civil Movement for Democracy and autumn of 2005, both mainstream political Peace, the National Federation of Indigenous parties, the Maoists and CSOs held meetings People, the Nepal Bar Association and the in New Delhi, India, with Indian and other Federation of Nepalese Journalists) that held foreign diplomats concerning the situation in public meetings across Nepal concerning the Nepal. The result was that, on 22 November royal take-over and its threat to human rights 2005, the SPA and the Maoist leadership in the country. They also initiated contacts announced a 12-point agreement, that com- with foreign diplomats concerning the royal mitted all signatories to oppose and end the take-over (interviews, Kathmandu, 2007). ‘autocratic monarchy’ through a people’s One outcome of the work of CSOs such as movement; to form an interim government INSEC was the declaration of human rights composed of all signatory political parties in for Nepal (known as Agenda 19) that received order to hold constituent assembly elections the support of 92 per cent of the members (a long-term Maoist demand);13 to place the of the dissolved House of Representatives, Maoist armed forces and the RNA under the including the signatures of the mainstream supervision of the United Nations; to establish political party leaders. Agenda 19 was trans- a peaceful, competitive multiparty system lated into Nepali and distributed across Nepal, of governance, civil liberties, press freedom, generating a discourse of people’s fundamen- human rights and the rule of law within Nepal; tal human rights that gave momentum to and to call upon civil society, professional NINETEEN DAYS IN APRIL 1287 organisations, the press and intellectuals, and Nepal. The principal actors in the move- people of all communities and regions, to par- ment were: the political parties; CSOs such ticipate actively in the people’s movement.14 as the Citizens’ Movement for Peace and In the words of senior Maoist, Baburam Democracy (CMPD) and the Professional Bhattarai Alliance for Peace and Democracy (PAPAD) comprising lawyers, teachers, engineers, The new objective reality of the country is professors, doctors and journalists, and the that the new ‘two pillars’ of parliamentary and charismatic individuals who fronted these revolutionary democratic forces join hands to organisations; NGOs; a coalition of four uproot the outdated and rotten third ‘pillar’ 15 of monarchy (quoted in Sahni, 2006). trade union confederations; the Maoists; and a range of women’s groups including More cynically, an activist in the Citizen’s such human rights organisations as the Movement for Democracy and Peace claimed: Women’s Rehabilitation Centre (WOREC), “It was a marriage of convenience for all Women’s Security Pressure Group, Women of the signatories” (interview, Kathmandu, Human Rights Defenders (WHRD) and the 2007). Certainly, for the mainstream political Alliance Against Traffic in parties and CSOs, the agreement began the (ATTWIN). In addition, the women’s wings process of bringing the Maoists back into the of each of the principal political parties, mainstream political process, which all parties trades unions and peasant organisations were favoured. For the Indian government, faced mobilised such as the All Nepal Women’s with a Maoist insurgency of their own (that Association (sister organisation to All Nepal had links with the Nepali Maoists), the end Peasant Federation) and the Centre Women to the armed struggle in Nepal was important Workers’ Department (women’s wing of geopolitically. For the Maoists, the agreement GEFONT).16 presented a possibility to move their politi- Confronted by demonstrations across cal agenda beyond the stalemate that their Nepal, and aware of the importance of the armed struggle had reached. Moreover, the capital to the maintenance of royal control, coalition between the SPA and the Maoists, the government responded with a ban on prepared the ground for the emergence mass meetings, assemblies, rallies and sit- of the Jana Andolan. As an activist in the in programmes within Kathmandu’s ring General Federation of Nepalese Trade Unions road (see Figure 1), a curfew between 11pm (GEFONT) commented and 4am, and the cutting of telephone and mobile phone connections. Municipal elec- Immediately after the 12-point agreement, tions (held on 8 February 2006) were boy- the mass meetings of the political parties cotted by the SPA and faced a general strike took on a different flavour, because with organised by the Maoists. As a result, average the Maoists brought in, the hope could be for democracy and peace. The numbers at voter turnout was under 20 per cent, with public and party meetings suddenly surged Kathmandu witnessing a 14 per cent turnout 17 (interview, Kathmandu, 2007). (Cherian, 2006b). The Maoists increased armed attacks on security personnel in urban centres such as Nepalgunj, Biratnagar and Democracy in Nepal: the Pokhara. Jana Andolan II Joint Jana Andolan Co-ordination Committees (consisting of members of the From the beginning of 2006, the agitation SPA but liaising with CSO cadres, NGOs against the King began to take shape across and villagers) began to organise a new 1288 PAUL ROUTLEDGE

Figure 1. Kathmandu: sites of urban resistance during April 2006. Source: Aryal and Poudel (2006). phase of programmes from 13 March 2006, fear (for example, to travel) from the villagers with a ‘Let’s go to Kathmandu’ campaign (interview, Kathmandu, 2007). and a nation-wide protest against price rises (Aryal and Poudel, 2006). Further, However, the Maoists continued to launch the Maoists announced a unilateral cease- armed attacks on security installations and fire in the Kathmandu valley with effect government offices in various other parts of from 3 April 2006. As an activist in PAPAD the country (Cherian, 2006c). Protests and commented strikes took place across rural and urban When the Maoists stated publicly that Nepal, in particular in cities such as Pokhara, they supported the movement, they would Janakpur and Biratnagar. participate and they would not restrict people Urban spaces constituted the key are- from participating in the agitation, it gave a nas in which to bring together the diverse great boost to the movement as it removed the groups that comprised the Jana Andolan’s NINETEEN DAYS IN APRIL 1289 participants. They provided accessible places to participate in the movement, through for bringing marginalised groups (such as public meetings, rallies and demonstrations. peasants) into public activism and they also In Nepal’s villages, where there were few provided key sites for broader mobilisations cadres, the people took the initiative. Indeed, (Sites, 2007). Indeed, urban-based activism according to many activists, demonstrations has benefited from the presence of mobilis- were as much spontaneously organised (by ing structures and resources (for example, individuals and communities) as they were universities, media, state facilities, indus- by the SPA (interviews, Kathmandu, 2007). tries, ethnic and religious organisations). Moreover, women’s groups helped to mobi- In addition, the Maoist insurgency had lise the urban population of Kathmandu forced many opposing activists to migrate particularly after political party leaders to the cities and, in particular, to the capital were arrested, as noted by a female activist (Karki, 2006). from GEFONT The subsequent targeting of Kathmandu had a particular spatial and political reso- We came together and organised separate nance, since the capital—as a product of action programmes for women, speaking in particular political-economic relations that different places, distributing handbills and taking part in demonstrations and strikes. had favoured its development relative to Tens of thousands of women protested on the rest of the country—was the locus of the streets and organised all-women’s rallies, royal, political, administrative and economic and comprised about half of the total people power within Nepal. The central offices of mobilised. Women were arrested and beaten the national political parties, and of many by the police, and the women were also killed NGOs and CSOs, are located in the capi- (interview, on-line, 2008). tal.18 Moreover, the dense concentration of population within the city (800 000) and the The Joint Jana Andolan Co-ordination Kathmandu valley (1 600 000) facilitated mass Committees also used the government’s pro- mobilisations against the regime. As a CPN- pensity to arrest demonstrators for their own UML activist argued purposes, as one Committee member noted

The main aim of the movement was to One tactic was to get the SPA personalities capture the cities and paralyse the system. arrested—who would be recognised by the Therefore the agitations focused mainly on media and the people—to act as an incentive the cities throughout Nepal and particularly to the movement. Meanwhile, other activists Kathmandu, since this is where the power deliberately avoided arrest so that they of the regime was located (interview, could organise the agitations (interview, Kathmandu, 2007). Kathmandu, 2007).

The united front between the SPA and In response, the government announced plans the Maoists called for a four-day nation- to step up its enforcement of the curfew and wide general strike on 5–9 April 2006 and claimed that the Maoists had infiltrated the the Maoists called for a cease-fire in the protests. The Ministry of Home Affairs issued Kathmandu valley. A curfew was announced a statement on 5 April 2006, alerting the coun- by the government on 8 April. On 9 April, the try to the involvement of “the terrorist group” SPA announced that it intended to continue (i.e. the Maoists) in the “anti-people so-called its protests indefinitely and called for a tax general strike” and requested Nepalis to: boycott. In Kathmandu, CSOs and SPA party postpone trips to their capital; not participate cadres went door-to-door organising people in the strike; carry identity cards; and notify 1290 PAUL ROUTLEDGE security forces of any suspicious ‘terrorist’ Peasants locked up their homes and came activities. In the half-page announcement, to the city. Schools, shops, businesses and the word ‘terrorist’ was mentioned seven government offices were closed for 19 days times (Aryal and Poudel, 2006, p. 216). As (interview, Kathmandu, 2007). Mitchell (2003) notes, the constriction of On 22 April, as noted at the beginning of public space becomes part of a wider attack this paper, protestors filled the ring road, on civil liberties and progressive politics, etc. in effect encircling the capital, in an (albeit The government’s discourse of terrorism was unintentional) symbolic echo of the tradi- deployed to deny others the right both to tional Maoist strategy. The symbolism went the city (particularly Kathmandu) and to all further: Kathmandu, the site of economic, public space within Nepal. caste and political power in Nepal was gher- However, protests continued in the fol- aoed19 by protestors demanding ‘democracy’, lowing days, with crowds increasing to sizes ‘peace’ and a republic. The conflict was played estimated at 100 000 to 200 000 in Kathmandu out across Nepal, but took on a particular in various estimates—more than 10 per cent relevance in Kathmandu (and other key of the city population. According to an activist urban centres), as protests reflected the wider in the CMPD struggle for a just and democratic polity. In In the climax of the movement, there were such urban spaces, civil society became both 5.5 million people on the streets of Nepal. the terrain and target of public intervention Every village was on the streets, people where different interest-groups challenged were organising themselves, no-one had the political, economic and cultural values an organised plan, although youths were at enshrined in the coup. An activist with the the forefront in all the villages (interview, CPN UML-affiliated All Nepal Peasant’s Kathmandu, 2007). Federation argued In such circumstances, the struggle for demo- Peasants coming from the rural areas cratic rights in Nepal predictably produced a comprised the majority of the demonstrators landscape of conflict. In Kirtipur, located in on the ring road and were the major force of the Kathmandu valley and the location for the Jana Andolan. They were organised by Tribhuvan University, university professors the SPA and the Maoists. The encirclement and student leaders organised the residents to of Kathmandu, on the ring road, showed that blockade the entry to the town and to ‘liberate’ a mass invasion of the city was possible, that it (from army or police incursion) for the 19 there was a potential for people to enter the days of the rebellion (interviews, Kathmandu, city and do what they liked, such as march 2007). Elsewhere, road-blocks were organised on the palace. It also symbolically showed the solidarity between the people and boosted by protestors, police posts were set aflame and their spirit. The movement would not have martyrs of the movement (i.e. those killed succeeded if this had not happened. They by security forces) were commemorated at were the main pillar of the success of the Jana road intersections with flowers, the burning Andolan (interview, Kathmandu, 2007). of incense and the displaying of photographs of the deceased. Frequent protests within the As a counter-hegemonic practice, and following ring road of the capital further challenged Chatterjee (2004), I would argue that the Jana the government’s authority (see Figure 1). Andolan represented a space of political pos- The entire country observed the bandh, as sibility where new forms of democratic repre- a Nepali Congress affiliated student activist sentation were demanded and where the needs acknowledged of the politically, economically and culturally NINETEEN DAYS IN APRIL 1291 marginalised were voiced. However, contra form an interim government with the inten- Chatterjee (2004), the Jana Andolan represented tion of restructuring the state to “resolve a politics of the increasingly ungovernable, as class-based, racial, regional and gender-based the movement pressed for formal democratic problems, through the election of a constitu- rights—epitomised by the demand to end the ent assembly” (INSEC, 2007, pp. 342–343). coup, abolish the monarchy and reconstitute Certainly, women activists, particularly in Nepal’s polity—rather than conditional claims. the women’s wings of all of the major politi- An initial royal offer of compromise on 21 cal parties, pushed for changes in the law that April was rejected by the SPA as demonstra- discriminated on the basis of gender. Indeed, tions continued throughout the country. The on 30 May 2006, the House of Representatives king finally succumbed to the demands of declared a 33 per cent reservation for women the Jana Andolan and reinstated the House in all political bodies as well as the abolition of of Representatives that he had dissolved in untouchability in Nepal. Women’s groups agi- 2002 (Aryal and Poudel, 2006). The Jana tated for the restructuring of social, economic Andolan succeeded in toppling the coup and and political structures in Nepal to eliminate undermining the position of the monarchy in gender discrimination. As one female activist Nepal, at the cost of 25 killed, 5000 wounded in GEFONT noted and 15 000 arrested (INSEC, 2007). A new government was established on 24 April Women identified a women’s agenda and 2006. On 27 April 2006, the Maoists announced created space in the political process. They a unilateral three-month truce. In the face of created a base for restructuring Nepal, for deciding what and how it could make a popular protest against government delays in difference to women’s lives. Such issues as instituting the demands of the Jana Andolan, abolishing patriarchal values and feudalism, one of the first acts of the new government and questions of landownership, head of the was to declare areas around Singh Durbar in family, women’s leadership and economic Kathmandu prohibited for demonstrations. opportunities (interview, on-line, 2008). The District Administration office for the capital prohibited the organising of assemblies, rallies, As an outcome of the 12-point agreement and sit-ins, hunger-strikes and gheraos in parts of the Jana Andolan, the interim constitution Kathmandu. The government also banned adopted some of the key issues of the Maoist broadcasts of saarbajanik sunuwai (public hear- agenda. In November 2006, a peace agreement ings) on Nepal television, thereby curbing citizen was reached that effectively ended the Maoist rights to criticise the government (INSEC, 2007). ‘people’s war’; two months later, an interim On 18 May 2006, the newly constructed constitution was promulgated and an interim House of Representatives (i.e. the parliament) legislature was convened, with the Communist unanimously voted to strip the King of many Party of Nepal (Maoist) as a major presence. of his powers, depriving him of any role in the The definition of the country’s very identity state, and brought the army under civilian was reconfigured to reflect its demographic control.20 On 16 June 2006, an eight-point plurality, through actions such as dropping the agreement between the SPA and the Maoists controversial provision that declared Nepal to committed all parties to: a competitive, mul- be a Hindu country and a promise to redress tiparty democracy; the upholding of civil the exclusion felt by many social groups. The liberties; the rule of law; and a request to the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections were United Nations to assist in the management arranged for June 2007, postponed until of arms and armies in the peace process. An November 2007 and then postponed again, interim constitution was framed in order to finally taking place in April 2008. These 1292 PAUL ROUTLEDGE elections would determine amongst other republic (thereby abolishing the monarchy), issues, the future of the monarchy. In addi- subject to endorsement by the first meeting tion, the CA would: restructure the Nepali of the Constituent Assembly. state as per the Jana Andolan mandate; ensure Secondly, loktantra has been adopted by proportional representation (PR) at all levels those advocating liberal democracy (i.e. of the state administration; institutionalise the mainstream political parties). As noted people’s sovereignty and rights; and formulate earlier, liberal democracy presupposes that and enforce the law of the land.21 there should be competing parties, a free While the primary issue for the move- market, private property and an independent ment was to challenge the coup, other issues judiciary (as noted in the 12-point agree- concerning ethnic rights and the meaning ment). Basic rights (for example, freedom of democracy simmered below the surface. of speech and assembly, the rule of law) Despite the movement articulating broad and facilities are guaranteed by the state demands for ‘peace’ (i.e. against Maoist and and a leading role in the economy is given state violence) and ‘democracy’ (i.e. against to private enterprise. The third interpreta- the royal-military coup) different notions of tion of democracy comes from the Maoists, democracy compete with one another in Nepal. which they term revolutionary, or ‘people’s’, democracy. According to this model, demo- cratic institutions are inevitably a front for Discourses of Democracy middle-class interests. For example, the Democratic rights discourse in Nepal has Maoist leader, Prachanda, noted in 2004: involved four broad understandings of “democracy for the entire people is noth- democracy (Gellner, 2007a), all of which are ing other than the hypocrisy of the bour- articulated in some way in contemporary geois class to confuse the working masses” Nepali politics. The practice of politics in (Prachanda; quoted in Gellner, 2005, p. 4). In Nepal involves elements of liberal and radical the revolutionary model, democracy consists democracy and the ‘politics of the governed’. of the rule of the working class, the majority, First, under the constitutional monarchy, as represented by vanguard parties. Their democracy was translated as praja¯tantra task is to remove poverty and the exploita- (literally rule by the subjects [of a king]). tion that is associated with feudal relations The ‘people’ here were understood (by the of dependence (Gellner, 2005, 2007a). In protestors) as a subjugated, dominated people discussion, one of the advisors to the CPN (as in Foucault’s terms) and hence in the (Maoist) central committee argued Jana Andolan alternative understandings of democracy gained currency, particularly gana- For us, people’s democracy comprises tantra (understood to mean republicanism in reducing poverty in Nepal, improving education and health, reducing the capture Nepal—i.e. abolishing the monarchy), and of Nepali markets by multinationals, and the loktantra (‘rule by the people’) (Gellner, 2005, abolition of the king and feudal exploitation 2007a; Dixit, 2006; interviews, Kathmandu, (interview, Kathmandu, 2007). 2007). The two terms were also joined (lok- trantik ganatantra), to denote a democractic However, as noted, the Maoists agreed to republic with the monarchy abolished (Dixit, participate in national elections and, despite 2006). Indeed, in December 2007, Nepal’s their differences with the mainstream political Parliament passed the third amendment bill in parties concerning the post-Andolan politi- the Interim Constitution by an overwhelming cal process, they appear to accept the broad majority, declaring Nepal a federal democratic contours of the liberal democratic model. As NINETEEN DAYS IN APRIL 1293 a key advisor to the Maoist central commit- namely, sanghiya (or federalism) meaning to tee argued abolish racial exploitation and the economic marginalisation of ethnic groups—in effect, We need to develop a mixed economy, through a demand for the recognition of identity both the state and private sectors, based upon politics, through ethnic rights (interview, Nepal’s biodiversity and natural resources. We Kathmandu, 2007). Gellner (2007a, p. 55) recognise this is a capitalist democracy but it can move towards a people’s democracy through the terms this interpretation ‘multicultural’ in establishment of a republic and a democratic that each cultural group in Nepal should have system of rights. We have not given up on the political representation in proportion to its people’s war or given up our weapons, but we size in the country, and indigenous languages believe that we can go ahead with shanti kranti—a and cultures should be protected from the peaceful revolution. People’s expectation, the effects of globalisation. need of the hour, is that the Maoists and the SPA Certainly, the success of the Jana Andolan work together. This is the product of the Jana raised political expectations amongst many Andolan (interview, Kathmandu, 2007). different interest-groups in Nepal, particu- One of the top Maoist leaders, Dr Baburam larly for the elections for a constituent assem- Bhattarai, concurred bly. As a prominent journalist, active in the Jana Andolan commented The political order we want to establish is a kind of capitalist order in which discrimination The constituent assembly was a frame given against region, gender and ethnicity no longer by the political parties to the demands of the prevails (Himalayan News Service, 2007b, p. 3). people’s movement, because the 12-point agreement pinpointed the constituent assembly Given the Maoists acknowledgement of ine- as the direction to take. The constituent assembly is seen as a touchstone for all marginalised and qualities of power within Nepali society and disenfranchised groups to wrong historical ills. the conflicting interests and values inherent in The constituent assembly comes up from the such difference, the undertaking of the Nepali people. That is the model of democracy for elections appears to reflect Mouffe’s (2005) Nepal (interview, Kathmandu, 2007). agonistic model of democracy, where former political ‘enemies’ (i.e. the Maoists and the The Maoists had adopted the issue of the mainstream political parties) are reconfigured underprivileged as a key organising tool as ‘adversaries’ who seem to share common during their insurgency and used group (liberal) democratic values and whose differ- grievances to their fullest potential to rally ences were negotiated through the democratic support for their cause. Thus, within a few elections of 2008. However, as Barnet (2004) years, groups that have been discriminated and Featherstone (2007) note, Mouffe’s focus against and remain underrepresented across on democratic (electoral) conflict excludes all spheres in Nepal—for example, Dalits, concerns with the situated practices of Janajatis, Madhesis, and women—were being articulation, formation and intervention of mobilised both by their respective community counter-hegemonic politics as evinced by organisations and by the Maoists to assert the Jana Andolan—i.e. that which played an their right to citizenship (Gellner, 2007b; important role in bringing Nepal’s current Thapa, 2007). The Jana Andolan had given rise model of democracy into being. to expectations among Madhesis and other Indeed, a fourth interpretation of democ- disadvantaged groups that they would finally racy is also at work in Nepal. During the Jana be recognised as equal citizens and would find Andolan, another term was also articulated— space in the national polity (Jha, 2007). In the 1294 PAUL ROUTLEDGE final section, I will discuss how this post-Jana However, despite the toppling of the coup, Andolan process played out in Nepal. the interim constitution was silent on two of the major demands of the Madhesi and Janajati communities—a federated state and a Democracy in Nepal: In the full proportional electoral system. As a result, Aftermath of the Andolan in January–February 2007, an emergent Concerning the opportunities and limits of Madhesi agitation in the Terai region saw the urban for the prosecution of more last- over 30 people killed, most of them in police ing democratic change in Nepal, the strug- firing. Madhesi groups involved included gles waged upon the streets of Kathmandu the Madhesi Janadhikar Forum (MJF)—a and other urban centres confirmed the cross-party intellectual forum—and the importance of the physical occupation Janatantrik Tarai Mukti Morcha (Democratic of urban space as an integral part of the Terai Liberation Front, JTMM), an armed challenge for democratic rights in Nepal. splinter group of the Maoists that has since Material urban space had to be contested, fractured into two (Jha, 2007). This agitation occupied and ultimately won in order might be conceived of, in part, as a ‘politics of successfully to challenge an unjust polity. the governed’ in that the voices of the mar- This was because the capital—a privileged ginalised were raised in illegal ways in order economic and political space within Nepal to make claims on the state, demanding new that had remained relatively inured from the (inclusive) forms of democratic representa- effects of the Maoist insurgency—was the tion. However, again, the demands of the locus of royal, political, administrative and marginalised concern formal democratic economic power within the country, and rights rather than conditional claims. of many opposition political parties, NGO Indeed, the government responded to two and CSO offices. Moreover, mass mobilisa- of the MJF’s major demands. Prime Minister tions could be better facilitated given the Koirala declared that the interim constitu- city’s (and the Kathmandu valley’s) dense tion would be amended to make Nepal a concentration of population. Kathmandu’s federated union and that the number of privileged position ensured that it became electoral-constituency seats in the Terai (as the primary target and terrain of the Jana well as the mid-hills and the mountains) Andolan in their attempt to paralyse the coup. would be increased in proportion to the However, when considering the territoriality respective population distributions (Thapa, of social change in Nepal, it is important to 2007). Despite this response, the govern- recognise that the events of the 19 days in April ment’s failure adequately to address Madhesi took place within the context of a 10-year rural concerns resulted in Minister for Science, insurgency that had precipitated the coup, and Technology and Environment and senior continued to drain the power of, and popular Nepali Congress leader Mahantha Thakur support for, the royal regime. Within this con- and three other MPs resigning from their text, and together with the 12-point agreement respective posts in the interim parliament to between the SPA and the Maoist leadership, form a separate Madhesi regional political urban space became the site of the ‘tipping- party in December 2007 (Himalayan News point’ in the struggle for democracy in Nepal. Service, 2007c). Moreover, violence from vari- Only with the cities paralysed—symbolised by ous ethnic groups continued through 2007. the encirclement of Kathmandu—could the On April 10th 2008, the CA elections were royal regime finally be toppled and the stage held in Nepal and were won by the Maoists.22 set for democratic elections. According to Jha (2008), the Maoists received NINETEEN DAYS IN APRIL 1295 considerable support from a diverse voter It’s true that the bureaucracy and political base, including the indigenous communities parties are dominated by the Bahun caste, but (such as the Tharu) in the Terai, ethnic groups we are creating a new democracy this time, in the hill region, Dalits and the landless across which will be participatory and inclusive. However, the transition must be run by those the country. Having controlled much of rural who can handle the process, those competent Nepal for a decade and having claimed to to run affairs (interview, Kathmandu, 2007). represent the interests of many of the mar- ginalised, the Maoists were in a powerful An important question is, of course, just position to benefit from such constituencies how ‘new’ or radical will Nepal’s democracy in the election. This contrasted with a relative be? Radical democracy requires the effective lack of rural mobilisation by the mainstream participation of all groups in the decision- political parties. As an activist in the Nepal Bar making process and public policies that Association noted before the election address the needs and aspirations of different interest-groups (Dryzek, 1996; Young, 2000; Loktantra means one Nepal, with rights and Lawoti, 2007). However, according to human privileges to the people, but no leader has gone to the rural Nepal where the problems rights commentators, the issues of the rights lie. The leaders remain in Kathmandu and (such as those concerning the recognition give meaningless speeches on television. of ethnic identities, equality and justice) for The state has not taken any responsibility to Madhesis, Dalits and women have remained educate the people concerning the constituent largely ignored (witness the Terai agitations) assembly election, and receive opinions from prior to the elections and the peace process Nepali society. This is not a lacunae, it is a was effectively colonised by the SPA and the blunder (interview, Kathmandu, 2007). Maoists, thereby undermining the roles of Meanwhile, the MJF electoral success in the civil society actors, including women activ- Terai seemed to point to an agonistic (rather ists, in the process (INSEC, 2007; interviews, than armed) representation of Madhesi iden- Kathmandu, 2007). Meanwhile (and partially tity politics.23 On 28 May 2008, the CA voted confirming Chatterjee’s (2004) critique), to abolish the monarchy and declare Nepal a an élite interpretation of politics pervades democratic republic—a position that all of Nepal’s civil society as well, summed up by the major political parties had agreed to prior an INSEC activist who argued that to the holding of the elections. Whether the Sometimes in the movement people repeat the Jana Andolan process entailed private agree- slogans without understanding the meaning ments between the mainstream parties and and sentiment (interview, Kathmandu, 2007). the monarchy to retain the latter in some form after the CA elections seems moot at The concern of hitherto marginalised groups this point. The Jana Andolan raised popular is that the country’s emerging model of expectations for both peace and a demo- democratic rights will be inevitably refracted cratic state free from royal interference—for through the place-specific caste relations of some form of loktantra and sanghiya—and Nepal. As an activist in the CMPD argued it appears that the electorate decided that Democracy in Nepal means governance the Maoists were most likely to deliver these. through the consent of the people, through However, despite the Maoist victory, the elections, pluralism and multiparty politics, restructuring of the Nepali state will take place with the weaknesses of a Bahun-centric state, under the watchful eyes of the élite castes. As a Bahun-centric media and a Bahun-centric one UML affiliated activist argued bureaucracy. This is one of the biggest hurdles 1296 PAUL ROUTLEDGE

that we have to overcome to make Nepal an and a sphere of hegemony wherein consent inclusive state (interview, Kathmandu, 2007). is manufactured (albeit through extremely complex mediums, diverse institutions and Moreover, the (Bahun-controlled) political constantly changing processes), but also an parties are deemed to represent the aspirations arena of social action and of potential conflict of the Jana Andolan and, by extension, those and the development of contentious identi- of the Nepali population as a whole—the ties and counter-hegemonic claims. For the same parties (and politicians) who presided country’s predominantly rural marginalised, over Nepal during the 1990s. For example, the it is yet to be seen whether Nepal’s predomi- 12-point agreement states that “the people and nantly urban-based civil society will provide their representative political parties are the real the political space from which to address the guardians of nationality” (http: //www.peace. ethnic, gender and caste inequalities that have gov.np/admin/doc/12-point%20understand- plagued the country for centuries. ing-20%20Nov%202005.pdf) thereby defin- ing Nepali democracy within the confines of a representative system controlled by the political Notes parties. As one Maoist activist argued 1. Estimates range from 300 000 to 1 million people (interviews, Kathmandu, 2007). the political parties are the representatives of 2. This research was based upon 30 interviews people’s sovereignty, but those parties need conducted in Kathmandu, Nepal, during the to be transformed: ideologically, theoretically autumn of 2007. Interviews were conducted and politically (interview, Kathmandu, 2007). with male and female members of some political parties, peasant organisations, civil In addition, the principal decisions affecting society organisations and NGOs. Given that the country will continue to emanate from much urban activism in Nepal is sustained the capital, the seat of government and the by English-speaking élite groups such as the location of the majority of political party Bahun and Chhetri castes (Karki, 2006), headquarters. many of my interview sources derived from The broad contours of Nepali democracy these sources. Where this was not the case, appear to favour the liberal democratic eco- interpreters were used. Respondents were nomic model, but one with an agonistic negoti- male unless otherwise noted in the text. ation of political differences, between erstwhile The ethnicity of my respondents was not ascertained. enemies now reconfigured as adversaries, 3. The panchayat system, a ‘guided democracy’, embodied as the political parties. Within these was a pyramidal system of political power democratic contours, the on-going margin- with the King at the apex, as the ultimate alisation of various ethnic, tribal and women’s source of that power, and political parties groups might generate the conditions for a poli- banned (for 30 years until the people’s tics of the governed—whereby the marginalised movement of 1990). make claims on the state from the political space 4. After 1999, successive governments were of negotiation and brokerage, questioning the unable to conduct elections across the country caste-inflected character of dominant demo- due to the on-going Maoist insurgency. cratic discourses. However, Chatterjee’s (2004) 5. India (at 37 per cent) and the US (at 13.6 per cent) together account for over half of terming of such a space ‘political society’ is per- all foreign investment in Nepal (GEFONT, haps less helpful in the Nepali context, since this 2006). space is more of a hybrid version of civil society 6. The Human Development Index (HDI) that incorporates elements of both liberal and is a measure of development in terms of radical democracy—an integral part of the state life expectancy, literacy, education and NINETEEN DAYS IN APRIL 1297

standard of living. An HDI below 0.5 is parties, and the two largest members, the considered to represent low development, Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML are each while an HDI of 0.8 or more is considered much larger than the rest of the members to represent high development. Nepal’s put together. HDI was calculated for 2006/07 as being 13. The issue of a constituent assembly was first 0.527 (UNDP, 2006). articulated by the Communist Party of Nepal 7. Approximately 45 per cent of all joint ventures during the 1960s (Thapa, 2007). Maoist and multinational corporations operating in demands for an elected constituent assembly, Nepal, and 58 per cent of all foreign-invested an interim government prior to constituent industries, are located in the Kathmandu assembly elections, a new constitution valley (GEFONT, 2006). and the establishment of a republic were 8. For example, hand-knotted ‘Tibetan’ carpets considered unacceptable to the successive (using cheap, often child, labour) comprised Nepali governments prior to the agreement 57 per cent of all exports in 1994 (although the (Sahni, 2005). industry was subsequently destroyed by the 14. See http://www.kantipuron-line.com/ Maoists); and tourism was the third-largest kolnews.php?andnid=57858. generator of foreign exchange between 1986 15. These were the General Federation of and 1996 (Rankin, 2004). Nepalese Trade Unions (GEFONT), the 9. According to the 2001 census, 31 per cent Nepal Trade Union Congress (NTUC), the of Nepal’s population comprises Bahun, Democratic Confederation of Nepalese Trade Chhetri, Thakuri and Sannyasi castes; 36.3 Unions (DCONT) and the Confederation of per cent of the population are Janajati Nepali Professionals (CONIP) (interview, (indigenous people); 15 per cent are Dalit Kathmandu, 2007). (literally, ‘the oppressed’, being those born 16. Each political party has its own affiliated trade without caste); and16.5 per cent of the unions, student organisations and peasant population are Madhesi (excluding adivasis organisations that were also involved in the and Dalits)—i.e. those ethnic groups who movement. live in the Terai (plains) region (Lawoti, 17. Voter turnout had been around 60 per cent in 2003). the local elections of 1992 and 1997 (Cherian, 10. Representation in parliament and the civil 2006b). service of the Bahuns and Chhetris in the 18. For example, of the 50 organisations that three parliaments of 1991, 1994 and 1999 are members of the National Federation of was 55, 63 and 63 per cent respectively. In Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN), 30 have 2001, 98 per cent of those who passed the their head offices in Kathmandu (Karki, 2006). civil service examination were from these 19. The non-violent tactic of surrounding one’s two castes (Thapa and Sijapati, 2006). opponent. 11. The RNA has an estimated strength of 80 000 20. The bill included: placing 90 000 troops personnel, the Armed Police Force has 17 000 under Parliamentary control, with the personnel and the Police Force has 47 000 National Security Council under the chair personnel. The Maoists have an estimated of the Prime Minister to control, use strength of 8000 to 10 000 armed personnel and mobilise the Nepalese army (INSEC, and an estimated 25 000 moderately armed 2007); placing a tax on the royal family militia (Cherian, 2006a). and its assets; ending the Raj Parishad, a 12. The SPA consisted of the Nepali Congress, royal advisory council; eliminating royal Nepali Congress (Democratic), Communist references from army and government Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist), titles; (v) declaring Nepal a secular country Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, Nepal rather than a Hindu Kingdom; abolishing Sadbhawana Party (Anandi Devi), United the national anthem until a new one can be Left Front and People’s Front. Actually, the created; and abolishing the king’s position SPA is a misnomer, since one of its members, as the supreme commander of the Army the United Left Front is an alliance of three (Thapa, 2007). 1298 PAUL ROUTLEDGE

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