The Place of a Positive Critique in Contemporary Critical Psychology

Critical Social Studies • No. 1 • 2008 49

Morten Nissen The Place of a Positive Critique in Contemporary Critical Psychology

Summary The essay attempts to contextualize the German-Scan- ticular, my aim was – and is, here – to argue dinavian tradition of Critical Psychology that bases on for the conception of psychology critique that Cultural-Historical Activity Theory in today’s critical was first developed in German-Scandinavian psychologies. It is argued that adding to a psychology Critical Psychology (GSCP) in the 1970’s and and ideology critique the positive dimension of “foundational” theory is important to counteract the currently which, drawing on Cultural-Historical Activity prevailing “negative” ideology of liberalism. It is also Theory (CHAT), added a positive, theoretically claimed that an “instrumental” version of critical psy- constructive dimension to the critique of, and chology, which takes up elements from psychology for with, psychology. tactical purposes will remain dependent on the given Whilst my purpose here is not a “review”, discipline of psychology and unable to reflect on its it may still be useful to take off with some idea own subject position. GSCP is then rendered as devel- about what I refer to as “today’s community of oping the Marxist ontology of social practice (rather than its utopianism) toward a concept of a subjectivity critical psychologists”. This is far from a sim- constituted in social practice but with the criteria of ple notion, partly since the criticality of critical action potency and productive needs on the part of the psychology makes it reflect on itself even more individual. It is suggested that this approach solves im- than is given with traditional academic reflec- portant problems in contemporary critical psychology. tion. Our ideas about what constitutes critical- Finally, it is described how GSCP, too, might grow ity importantly co-constitute the communities from the encounter, by developing a theory of collective subjectivity to include – us. we are, as writers and readers of a text such as this. Thus, we must first reflect on the communities implied or addressed by the text itself. So: Who exactly are “we”? True to its theme, the indexical “we” of this text is designed to Recontextualizing shift irregularly, and perhaps disturbingly, be- Critical Psychology tween different “we’s” as different dimensions In June 2005, the International Critical Psy- of implied or proposed identity between its au- chology Conference convened in Durban thor, its readers, and the social practices and under the title “Beyond the Pale”. The pres- communities it refers to. Of course, the aca- ent essay was originally drafted as a contribu- demic readership of Critical Social Studies, tion to that conference, and thus, to today’s whom I sometimes address as editor, is and community of critical psychologists. In par- remains wider than that of “critical psycholo-

72972_outlines_r01.indd 49 10-10-2008 09:04:00 The Place of a Positive Critique in Contemporary Critical Psychology • Morten Nissen 50 gy” whom I discuss, and whom I discuss with, character, themes, and approaches. Mindful here as author. But we shall also witness the of the pitfalls of a Euro- / Anglo-centric, false “we” of this text move between the traditional scientific universalism, the book’s section on academic incorporation of the reader into the theoretical resources includes African perspec- majestic representation of an ultimate commu- tives and it takes on the task of introducing a nity of scholars, the Modernist-utopian appeal global critical psychology to a local audience to a universal Humanity, and the perhaps more into a local context. activistic, grass-roots collectivity of some po- What is contemporary critical psychology, litically critical community1. The whole issue then, here? First of all, it is psychology ap- of the “we” of critical psychology will itself be plied as a progressive resource, in political the focus of the final part of the essay. and cultural critique – e.g. addressing the is- But aside from this (textually mediated) sues of racism or sexism with the help of psy- subjective side, we might approach the com- choanalytic or (more recent) poststructuralist munity of “today’s critical psychology” by conceptualizations of identity – or engaging looking at some of its (perhaps prototypically) with progressive social movements, commu- objectified manifestations. Thus, apart from, nity projects etc. – e.g. combining political obviously, the websites2 and the journals3, one or pedagogical theorizing of the processes can get a good impression of that community of change (e.g. Paulo Freire) with notions of by consulting a recent textbook titled “Criti- psychological mechanisms derived from com- cal Psychology” issued in Cape Town (Hook, munity psychology (e.g. empowerment), or, 2004). It is an edited volume; quite diverse in again, psychoanalysis (e.g. projection, repression). Secondly, it is critique of psychology: exposition of the ways in which psychology is 1 My inspiration for this style is Bertolt Brecht’s idea and has been ideological, that is, complicit in of “alienation” [Verfremdung] (Brecht, 1982): To de- liberately break with any immediate identification so social exploitation and oppression by produc- that the audience may come to question what is taken ing and distributing one-sided or false images for granted. Since nowadays one cannot, like Brecht, urge the audience to lean back and smoke, at least I of humans, by providing tools for social regu- can recommend that the reader reflect the ways s/he lation, and as a form of subjectifying power. does or does not think s/he belongs to the communities Not surprisingly, this aspect of criticality is circumscribed by my “we’s” as we go along. much influenced by Foucault, although the 2 As of April 2008, places to start may be http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_psychology, essentially political impetus gives it a flavor http://critpsy.blogspot.com/, http://radpsynet.org/, or that is often closer to ideology critique than to http://www.critical-psychology.de/ any pure genealogy. Finally, it is the positive 3 Probably the most important journal in this field (by proposition of theoretical alternatives to such 2008) is Subjectivity (formerly International Journal 4 of Critical Psychology; main editor: Valerie Walk- ideological psychology . erdine; city of issue: Cardiff, UK). Other directly critical psychology journals are Annual Review of Critical Psychology (main editor: Ian Parker; city of 4 In the book, these latter can be distinguished roughly issue: Manchester, UK), Psychology In Society (main in five groups: a) indigenous / African thinking empha- editor: Grahame Hayes; city of issue: Durban, SA), sizing cultural continuity and collectivity; b) general and of course this journal. Closely related are jour- philosophical or social theories such as those of Fou- nals such as those that address activity theory (e.g. cault, Freire, Bourdieu, Hegel, and, of course, Marx; Mind, Culture and Activity), theoretical psychology c) socio-linguistic theories, from Lacan and Bakhtin (e.g. Theory & Psychology), qualitative research (e.g. to more recent poststructuralist and discursive psy- Forum Qualitative Social Research), discourse analysis chologies; d) interactionist theories from Goffman (e.g. Discourse Analysis Online), as well as themes and Garfinkel to contemporary social construction- such as feminist psychology, community psychology, ism; e) Cultural-Historical Activity Theory, meaning cultural psychology etc. here primarily the American reception of Vygotsky

72972_outlines_r01.indd 50 10-10-2008 09:04:01 Critical Social Studies • No. 1 • 2008 51 Characteristically, while it is the two first- remains whether such is possible or desirable mentioned aspects – social and ideological in psychology, or, rather, the direction of any critique, with or of psychology – that define positive critique is a transformation from psy- critical psychology, the status of the proposed chological ideology to social theory6. Let me theoretical alternatives is a very open ques- first address these questions in turn. Subse- tion. It is primarily to this question that the quently, my conclusion will allow me to pres- present remarks are addressed. In my view, ent GSCP in a way that is designed for the the most pressing issue is the question of so- context thus sketched. called “foundationalism” in critical psychology, that is, the question of the possibility and desirability of a relatively consistent positive Positive or negative – or, system of general theoretical concepts, often the ideological positivity regarded spatially as “foundational”, “funda- 7 mental” or “basic”5. of pure negativity To be more precise, there are two related First, then: is it a good idea to propose a issues: 1) The general problem of negativity theory? My claim is that an open horizon of or positivity – in brief, should any explicit debate requires distinct, positively crafted the- and elaborate theoretical structure be at- oretical positions. Clearly, conferences, and, tempted at all, or is it better to concentrate at least to some extent, comprehensive text- on destabilizing hegemonic ideas and strive books and journals that seek to provide venues for an open-minded, tactical relation to more for debate, must operate on the wide horizon loosely coupled concepts? 2) The problem of that is circumscribed by the social practices the relation between critical social theory and of political struggles and of the therapeutic, psychology – even if it may be admitted that educational, community etc. applications of a positive theoretical system (such as that of psychology. This is the broader context within Marxism) is viable and useful, the question which any distinct theoretical approach can be suggested to be relevant, and with an eye to which its consistency can be sharpened. Thus, and Engeström’s activity system model and methodol- the diversity sketched above is necessary, even ogy. Absent from the book, but very much present in vital, to the project of critical psychology as a the wider critical psychology community (including the above-mentioned Durban 2005 conference), are whole. However, this does not mean that such two other semiotically inclined positions that draw negative ideals as diversity, openness – let on the epistemology of natural sciences (but in off- mainstream versions), namely the systemic/narrative approach and (post-) actor-network theory. 5 The metaphor of a “foundation” is really quite mislead- 6 It should be mentioned, perhaps, that these problems ing. As I have discussed in Nissen (2004a) and espe- were discussed extensively in Berlin already in the cially in Nissen (2000), the understanding of GSCP (in early 1970s. See, e.g. Holzkamp (1977), or Tolman, e.g. Holzkamp, 1983; Tolman, Maiers, et.al, 1991) as Maiers, et.al. (1991). a given paradigmatic foundation, rather than a set of 7 I should perhaps mention that the issue at hand is a artefacts relevant in certain social practices, has been basic philosophical problem. “Negative philosophy”, very problematic to that collective project. Sciences are with such names as Foucault, Deleuze, Derrida, Latour social practices. If theories are like brick walls, one (and many others) is a strong current in contemporary must view them with the eyes of a mason. If theories continental philosophy, and as such also criticized in are “frames”, they should be viewed more in a Goff- the philosophical literature (e.g. Badiou, 2002; Zizek, manian sense as the continuously revised (although 1999). Taking up the problem here is one example that materially objectified) common premises of activity psychological theory is a way of practicing philoso- than as Kantian categories that remain fixed for as long phy, even if, obviously, I cannot address it in its entire as they are presupposed. scope.

72972_outlines_r01.indd 51 10-10-2008 09:04:01 The Place of a Positive Critique in Contemporary Critical Psychology • Morten Nissen 52 alone heterogeneity and tactical eclecticism – stantial foundation, a dogmatism or a unified must rule as paradigmatic standards for each, truth to support a singular power structure. nor for any of the critical psychologies. Far In Marx’ analysis, capitalism was anything from it; it seems more reasonable to assume but a conservative or monolithic social struc- the opposite: theoretical debate (heterogene- ture. Much like the more recent modernity ity, openness, diversity) presupposes that each theories, Marx saw it as a process of cultural theoretical position is presented positively and deconstruction, disembedding and ever more consistently, so that arguments for or against it rapid transformation (cf. Hobsbawm, 1998). can be made sense of. This idea of theoretical positivity is far from dogmatism: Every truth The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly must be challenged, and all truths should be revolutionizing the instruments of production, and validated in terms of their social relevance thereby the relations of production, and with them rather than their intrinsic properties in a “truth the whole relations of society. Conservation of the game”; but it is also the case that a theory can old modes of production in unaltered form was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for only be challenged if it claims to be right; and all earlier industrial classes. Constant revolution- only practically relevant if / as it somehow izing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of enters the game of truth. all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and These dialectical points are not so much agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all pure academic speculations as they are cru- earlier ones. All fixed, fast-frozen relations, with cially relevant in practice, at a time when their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all new-formed ones neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism are so become antiquated before they can ossify. All that dominant that it is becoming increasingly dif- is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned, ficult to distinguish between liberal and social- and man is at last compelled to face with sober ist kinds of liberation from the given socio- senses his real conditions of life, and his relations cultural structures, conventions and “values” with his kind. endorsed by the neo-conservatives. Socialist (Marx & Engels, 1998, 38-39) transformation requires strategy, reflexive collectivity and coherent visions about alternative Of course, this continuous destabilization of organizations of community; liberal emancipa- given socio-cultural forms, including state tion involves nothing more than the dissolution powers and subjectivities – except perhaps of established social constraints. But in the the very formal principles of that process negative moment, the moment of “change”, itself, abstract value and the state power that the two are hard to tell apart. lends itself as an instrument of the process – In order to understand these social implica- also includes a deconstruction of ideological tions of pure negativity, allow me to attempt a forms, including science and theory. It is far brief historization. The liberal heritage of the from merely an economic process. Capitalism purely negative, non-foundationalist critique or modernity is a pool of acid that fragments goes far back. In fact, it is in some ways a the substantial world-views, the coherent continuation of the enlightenment critique that ethical standards, the religious systems, and has underpinned the relentless social trans- the elaborate theories that were built before formations in recent centuries we sometimes modernity – and then the structures that are call Modernity or capitalism. The contempo- rebuilt from their rubble. Modernity, in Zyg- rary neo-liberal – and the not-quite-so-modern mund Bauman’s analogous metaphor, has Modern – versions of a ruling ideology are of been a process of increasing dissolution and a kind which does not simply rest on a sub- fluidity, and is now well into an utterly liquid

72972_outlines_r01.indd 52 10-10-2008 09:04:01 Critical Social Studies • No. 1 • 2008 53 state where no new and improved solids are ics but the abstract fear of the collectivity from molded (Bauman, 2000). which it emerged. Concepts are to Enlightenment How should we judge this process of a gen- as stockholders to industrial trusts: nobody can rest assured. eralized emancipation from all given socio- cultural forms? The Marxist heritage is opti- (Horkheimer & Adorno, 1969, 29, translated from mistic. In Marx and Engels’ utopian vision, the German by MN)8 at the end of the above quote, when all the ideologies of past and present class societies The fragmentation of knowledge into masses have deteriorated, what is left are human be- of isolated facts and formal rules is another ings at last facing the real world, and each side of the atomization of human wealth into other, just as they are, “with sober senses”. commodities and abstract values. But this does A century later, a very different prophecy not, in the eyes of the critical theorists, unveil was rendered by critical theorists Adorno and false religions and theories and leave us with Horkheimer who – having fled Nazi Germany “sober senses”. Rather, it is what reduces our and repatriated in the USA of fast food, popu- senses to the banalities of consumerism. In- lar culture, and naïve but proliferating social deed, it is even this process which paves the science – approached the dialectics of Enlight- way to the completely arbitrary power of a enment as something that had begun already fascism that is no longer answerable to any with the ancient Greeks. The adventures of cosmology beyond the mock versions that fit Homer’s Ulysses are interpreted as one of the its whims. From a certain point, we might say, first renderings of humans’ separation from the conservative flip side of liberalism turns nature. Since then, the collective symbolic into a cynical or pathological parody that is unity of experience is broken up into incon- hardly to be threatened by irony. If mindless sequential beauty, blind production, and in- traditionalism is one side of contemporary creasingly formal reasoning. With 20th century ideology, inconsequential irony and meta- Positivism, the separation is completed, as any reflexivity is the other; and often enough, the positive ideational contents have been drained two join forces. from language: After yet another half century, Zygmund Bauman (2000) reframes Critical Theory into Being thus a confirmation of the social power of Modernity Theory. Here, the dystopian impli- language, ideas became ever more superfluous as cations of Horkheimer & Adorno’s dialectics this power grew, and the language of science dealt are brought to their conclusion in a tradition- them their final blow. The mesmerism which still ally academic descriptivism. And so, the task retained something of the terror of the fetish was of critical theory can be identified as construc- not dependent on conscious justification. Rather, the unity of collectivity and domination reveals tive – as “any true liberation calls today for itself in the General, which must adopt the bad more, not less, of the ‘public sphere’ and ‘pub- contents into language, be it metaphysical or sci- lic power’” (ibid., p. 51) – but the subject of entific. At least the metaphysical apology betrays that identification appears to exempt himself, the injustice of status quo by the incongruence of as he leaves us with no clue as to the forces concept and reality. In the impartiality of scientific that might contribute to such construction. language the powerless has finally lost all powers Still, with Critical or Modernity Theory, of expression, so that only the given finds its neutral signifier. Such neutrality is more metaphysical than metaphysics. Ultimately, Enlightenment devoured 8 The corresponding reference in English is Adorno & not only the symbols, but even their successors, the Horkheimer (1979; 22-23), but I find that the translation general concepts, and spared nothing of metaphys- from the German is slightly imprecise

72972_outlines_r01.indd 53 10-10-2008 09:04:01 The Place of a Positive Critique in Contemporary Critical Psychology • Morten Nissen 54 we can suggest that the current non-founda- ogy? I will argue that the question is itself tionalist, purely processual and negative ver- problematic. sion of criticality is really the imprint of an It was argued already by Klaus Holzkamp increasingly hegemonic neo-liberal formal- that psychology was marred by, on the one ism. Paradoxically then, non-foundationalism, hand, an ongoing purification of methodologi- just as much as uncritical foundationalism, is cal formalism and fetichism to superficially itself positive, a confirmation of ideological organize the proliferating bits of instrumental hegemony: the abolishment of metaphysics, knowledge, and, on the other hand, a con- whether as neutrality or as negativity, is really tinual resurfacing of arbitrary foundational the most hegemonic of all metaphysics since it theoretical constructs (Holzkamp, 1983; Tol- prohibits all other metaphysics than itself – or man, Maiers, et.al, 1991). I see no signs that in Horkheimer & Adorno’s terms, it is “more this perpetual crisis has been overcome since metaphysical than metaphysics”9. then10. In this situation, methodologically ar- Thus, if we are critical of Marx’ & Engels’ gued interventions (e.g. under the heading of utopian modernist metaphysics – as an abstract a “qualitative research”) appear to be just as universalist humanism, as the dubious belief frustratingly affirmative as the proposition of in a necessary evolution of History toward a yet another Grand Theory. naturalistic essence negatively embodied in a It seems more reasonable and feasible, then, universal proletariat of human individuals (the to oppose the process by moving the subject- “Gattung”), compelled to truth since deprived position of critique out of the field altogether. of any stable possessions – it will do us no To view psychology from the outside and good to repeat the attempts in positivism and judge it in purely tactical terms by what it does analytical philosophy to eradicate metaphysics for whom. This even promises one the freedom altogether. to reengage in psychology, say, in terms of a Instead, we must develop the other side of psychoanalysis that one knows well to be of Marxist ontology, the part that took the cultur- limited validity and with ideological implica- ally productive human collective as its starting tions, but keeping it at arm’s length, reserving point, and identified the constructive side, the a space of critical reflection that is defined and “socialization” implied even in capitalism. It sustained within a political struggle. is only by doing so that we will be able to find an alternative to liberalist instrumental- Thus, Derek Hook, in his introductory chapter ism and fragmentation; an alternative which to the above-mentioned textbook, asserts: does not depend on a transcendent foundation that cannot anyway withstand a thoroughgoing Critical psychology does not wish to do away with critique. all of psychology, or with all psychological forms of analysis. As ideologically unsound as much – even the majority – of psychology might be, we Inside or outside of psychology should still look to the critical potentials of certain forms of psychology, like that of psychoanalysis for We shall return to this idea of a dynamic Marx- example, as a way of trying to understand, grapple ian ontology. But first, turning to our second with, and ultimately intervene in, the working of question, should that theoretical ontology power. Here we might suggest that one important be developed inside or outside of psychol-

10 More recent examples of such arbitrary theoretical con- 9 See, for a good discussion of how metaphysics are un- structs might be “positive psychology” or “evolutionary avoidable, Wartofsky (1979) psychology”.

72972_outlines_r01.indd 54 10-10-2008 09:04:01 Critical Social Studies • No. 1 • 2008 55 task of critical psychology is not to dispense with gaging in the practices that we cannot help psychological types of analysis but rather to recon- but frame and construe positively as not only nect them to political levels of description and/or political, but also therapeutic, educational etc., analysis. (Hook, 2004, 20). and thus, inevitably, psychological. Otherwise, we have fallen into the somewhat familiar trap Similarly, Ian Parker, consultant editor of the of defining the political and the psychological book, suggests: as two intrinsically separate spaces and practices. Without that separation, how can we be Despite what has been said (…) about the dangers sure that our use of psychological fragments of essentialism, it is possible to work with a ‘stra- is really “strategic”? And further, for whom tegic essentialism’, precisely to take seriously how and for what exactly might the drawing of that forms of identity have been historically linked to boundary really be “strategic”?12 certain forms of oppression. The strategy here is to At first sight, a clear demarcation of the speak from a position (of being a woman, of being black, for example) because that is the way one field of psychology as itself ideological ap- is already positioned by others. It is a ‘strategy’ pears conducive to a re-articulation of issues because it refuses to take for granted the categories in terms of social theory. This is not necessar- used by others, and it plays with those categories ily the case, however, if the overall frame is in order to free the subject from those categories still – however critical – psychology. With that as fixed (Ibid., 152)11. frame as given, it is the use of social theory which remains ad hoc rather than obliging. We might refer to this as the instrumental ver- Any instrumentality of the relation to other sion of critical psychology, since it makes use disciplines goes unnoticed so long as it is still of pieces of the discipline without committing psychology that defines the field. Given the itself to the project of a better psychology. real existence and power of the discipline as In my view, however, this approach runs the social institution in which we make our into trouble when the reflexivity of critical living – and given that the relevance of psy- thinking is taken just a few steps further. While chological issues is by no means limited to the it is clear that establishing a subject-position institutions of Academia – this is a problem, of outside of the discipline provides a way to course, which we cannot overcome even with escape the entanglement in the paradoxes of the best of theoretical approaches. foundationalism and non-foundationalism Contemporary critical psychology shares within it, it is equally obvious that this pre- this problem with that of the 1970’s, including supposes precisely that the boundaries of the the German-Scandinavian version, where quite discipline are kept intact. The instrumental sketchy general notions of the “societal forma- version of critical psychology remains deeply tion” of “bourgeois society” were sometimes dependent on the given discipline of psychol- considered sufficient to historicize psychologi- ogy, precisely insofar as it defines itself out- cal analyses. But then the problem was at least side of it. And it does so in a way that keeps clearly visible because the ambition to develop it from going on to reflect the subject-position a positive theory was considered primary to – of critique itself. For, whether we call it psychology or not, such reflection must include ourselves as en- 1 2 As when, for instance, Ian Parker, practising psycho- analyst and member of the London Society of the New Lacanian School, defines Jacques Lacan as a “barred 11 See also, for a more unfolded argument for a “strategic” psychologist” (Parker, 2003), safely outside of the use of psychoanalysis, Parker (1997). discipline.

72972_outlines_r01.indd 55 10-10-2008 09:04:01 The Place of a Positive Critique in Contemporary Critical Psychology • Morten Nissen 56 and provided an approach to criticizing – the been dissolved. If we want to really break given disciplinary boundaries (as was quite away from the objects and approaches that clearly expressed in Holzkamp’s suggestion of define today’s psychology, an anti-psychology a “Subject-Science” as defining term). Today, just won’t do the job! perhaps, the cultural-historical over-simplicity of “societal formations” has been replaced by a simplicity of “epistèmes”. While Foucault’s Suggesting theoretical (and other foucauldians’) overall theories and categories for a critical specific genealogical analyses are certainly of great value, the almost complete dominance of psychology foucauldian approaches to supplement criti- But what will? Must we build a new post- cal psychology with social theory shows a psychological theory all over – or should we tendency to “empty” its socio-historical ori- merely return to one that exists already, such entation. It often appears as if a quite rigid as GSCP? Neither. The positive theorizing that grid of social “categories” – which even, once we need is neither to be built from scratch proclaimed historical, typically remain fixed or nor to be arrived at by simply translating and only vary insignificantly throughout the analy- teaching theoretical categories from GSCP ses – exhaust the socio-cultural field taken into or other kinds of CHAT (nor from any other consideration, to the exclusion of economy, substantial theoretical tradition). Both options state and military power, organizational struc- would rest on the problematic self-conception tures, technologies etc. etc. of an Enlightenment scientism, according to But the more important difference is that which a virgin natural and social world can be in today’s critical psychologies, the subject- approached unmediated by tradition, and / or position of critique mostly appears to (believe theoretical structures (“categorial frame- itself to) be external to both psychology and works”) can persist independently of history the (other) disciplines of social theory. In ef- and social practice14. fect, the reintegration of social theory remains Thus, when, in the following, I proceed largely tactical and external, precisely since it to attempt a concretization of the above gen- is not facilitated by the way critical psychol- eral considerations by rendering some of the ogy is itself established and crafted13. In other theoretical concepts from Ute Osterkamp’s words, so long as critical psychologists refrain Motivation Research [Motivationsforschung] from suggesting positive alternative theories, (Osterkamp, 1975, 1976) – to my mind one of it is still the empty shell of the discipline that the key works that took GSCP beyond what structures the field, even if its contents have had been proposed already in CHAT – it will be nothing like the structured argument that one finds in the original text or in most of the 13 Interestingly, this is not altogether characteristic of the secondary renderings that have been printed above-mentioned Hook (2004) volume. In part, this may be because of the way in which the book itself in journals such as Forum Kritische Psycholo- is situated at an obvious socio-historical watershed, gie, Nordiske Udkast, and elsewhere. Apart in the context of a palpable economic inequality, and as part of debates in a strong progressive movement. Perhaps it takes the continuity and the stronghold of a democratic and socialist movement such as the South 14 Even in the tradition of an historical “epistemology of African to make it feasible to suggest, as in the chapters practice” such as that of CHAT, this theory of know- by Mkhize (ch. 2) and Foster (ch. 22), the building of ledge has been influential enough to underlie the meth- a new paradigm for dealing with the issues that are odologies of such great theorists as Klaus Holzkamp currently discussed as psychology. and Vasily Davydov

72972_outlines_r01.indd 56 10-10-2008 09:04:01 Critical Social Studies • No. 1 • 2008 57 from, of course, the mutilations inescapably 2. It is sometimes argued that a completely resulting from brevity, the presentation must historicized psychology will lack an ac- be designed to address the concerns of the count of embodied sensuous subjectivity, present field, and it must be dialogic in the which is then sought in psychoanalysis deep Bakhtinian sense as utterances whose (e.g. Butler, 1997), phenomenology (e.g. meanings reside at the intersections with other Keller, 2007), neuro-psychology (e.g. utterances from other voices. Cromby, 2004), or elsewhere. But the This leads me to suggest the following three problem in the relations between history arguments as pivotal to a dynamic positive and the body, Ute Osterkamp would reply, ontology: is not too much, but too little historicity. As already highlighted by Leontiev 1. The kind of positive metaphysics which (1985), but largely eclipsed both in CHAT has been developed from the Marxian and in other critical psychologies16, the origins in CHAT15 is a kind of theory body itself has a history. Homo sapiens of human practice, as the participants did not emerge as a tabula rasa. Life pro- of which we can understand ourselves cesses, the psychological principle of as persons, as humans who collectively activity mediated by a relation between produce our life conditions and thereby sense and metabolism, emotion, learn- ourselves. The important point about it, ing, anxiety, and many other qualities in relation to the above sketched problem developed in a natural history that pre- of foundationalism, is that even as a gen- dates but also includes the becoming of eral theory of human practice it is not an human cultural production. This means a-historical and fixed point of reference, that human individuals are born to de- but, rather, it is making explicit and debat- velop into participants and transformers able the presuppositions of dynamic cul- of ever-changing cultures. Thus, in con- tural historicity itself. The anti-essentialist trast to psychoanalysis17, needs and mo- thrust, then, lies not merely in the evoca- tives are seen as basically neither private tion of the scientific spirit of an ongoing nor anti-social or destructive. critical revision of categories on the basis of (historical-) empirical “evidence” (as 3. Yet it also means that we are not made to was sometimes argued by Holzkamp and fit just any culture. In cultures of oppres- others), but in viewing the “foundation” sion, life can be inhuman for some or for in principle as the self-reflection of socio- all. The very ideas of oppression and in- historical practices. humanity presuppose a concept of human needs. While it is true, given the first point

1 5 Perhaps it should be noted that here, consistent with 16 Ian Burkitt, with his general discussion of “Bodies of the GSCP tradition (and with the ISCAR organiza- Thought”, is one of the very few exceptions to this rule tion), cultural-historical activity theory is considered (Burkitt, 1999). a quite diverse landscape of theories that have in com- 17 Although with this general theory of motivation, ex- mon some reception of the works of Lev Vygotsky and actly since it departed from psychoanalysis on the most some notion that the human psyche is developed and basic points, Ute Osterkamp was able to critically ap- culturally mediated in activities under specific histori- proach and integrate Freud’s theory of repression and cal conditions. In GSCP, the legacy of A.N. Leontiev is conflict. Not as a tactical use of unchallenged elements of particular importance since it was he who first stated of knowledge, but as a productive critique that was and demonstrated the generalized historical approach done both from without and from within, and which to the psyche. See also Langemeier & Nissen (2004) transformed those elements at the core.

72972_outlines_r01.indd 57 10-10-2008 09:04:01 The Place of a Positive Critique in Contemporary Critical Psychology • Morten Nissen 58 above, that human needs and motives are ently transformative, participation is neither tuned towards cultural objects, there is adaptation nor subjection, nor must an a priori certainly more to be said, and more that stipulated agency effect social practice from can be said on the background of a histo- the outside. In the words of Marx’ third Thesis ricity of the body. Already mammals are on Feuerbach: not driven only by the immediate needs of metabolism and procreation; play The materialist doctrine that men are products of and explorative behavior presuppose an circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, emotional regulation of curiosity versus changed men are products of changed circum- anxiety, and of social relations of various stances and changed upbringing, forgets that it is qualities and kinds. In the emergence of men who change circumstances and that the educa- tor must himself be educated. Hence this doctrine humans, these needs have been sublated – is bound to divide society into two parts, one of that is, developed and integrated in a new which is superior to society. The coincidence of the totality – into what Ute Osterkamp termed changing of circumstances and of human activity or “productive needs”, a generalized need to self-change [Selbstveränderung] can be conceived develop action potence [Handlungsfähig- and rationally understood only as revolutionary keit], one’s participation in the collective practice. (Marx, 2003) provision of conditions of life. Accordingly, the human need for action po- This conception usually provokes a reaction: tence is paradoxical in the sense that it pushes Does this not amount to the essentialist idea toward enhancing participation in social prac- that subjectivity is a pre-given beneficial natu- tices that exist in certain cultural forms, but ral entity, rather than developed in a cultural at the same time this inherently means appro- process of subjectification or interpellation? priating and taking part in transforming and But no, it means nothing of the kind. “Human developing those cultural forms. We might nature” is nowhere to be found on its own. say it’s a critical need; this theory of needs Rather, the suggestion is that in every produc- places human motivation on the same side, as tion of subjectivity, in every subjectification it were, as the subject-position of a productive and interpellation, humans retain the criterion critique. of action potence and productive needs; we The idea of a “critical” need as subjective must ideologically see ourselves as develop- criterion of participation in historical social ing participation – or perceive a threat to lose practice is important as an argument in today’s it that will force us to repress and thwart our critical psychology for at least two reasons. human desires. First, it addresses a simple but very difficult The idea of “productive needs” as “cri- question in a Foucauldian approach: When and terion” does not mean, either, that it is left why do people accept or reject possibilities of to a thing called “human nature” to provide subjectification given in discourses? This is a a dynamic and “diachronic” dimension to a question that keeps reappearing because each social theory otherwise only modeling the of the answers usually given are insufficient: a) “synchronic” reproduction of a static social that the question is irrelevant because the theo- structure. The theory is precisely designed to retical concept of power already presupposes attack that dichotomy, not by providing a psy- resistance (to which one might reply: yes, but chological counterweight, but by reading the does that mean we shouldn’t analyze the con- Marxian general ontology itself as dynamic. crete dilemmas of acceptance or resistance?); Thus, since productive collectivity is inher- b) that since we do not stipulate any unity of

72972_outlines_r01.indd 58 10-10-2008 09:04:01 Critical Social Studies • No. 1 • 2008 59 the subject, we are only interested insofar as tonomous action for which empty choices are subjectification occurs (but why must it remain the ultimate ideal. an isolated aspect, why are we not allowed Again, this problem was not invented by the to reflect its relevance in the concrete?); c) poststructuralists. It already marred symbolic that the very plurality of discourses provides interactionism and forced it into ever more cracks, gaps, and contradictions that consti- formal and detailed microstudies, even if the tute the subject as against power (perhaps, but analytical focus on socio-cultural categories we still have no idea what that subject wants, as performed, objectified and handled at first and so long as the subject is only constituted was quite fruitful. In fact, it is already inherent negatively, it must remain an abstract possi- to Marx’ and Engels’ utopianism mentioned bility); d) or that we must then return to the above. In the German Ideology (Marx & En- blank contingencies of unique biography or, gels, 1981), the alienation in class-societies of again, psychoanalysis (but that only confirms activities into fixed identities, classes, is criti- the subject as powerless). Those answers are cized, and an abstract multiplicity is proposed really so many versions of the rejection of a in its place: the image of the person who hunts positive theory of subjectivity, either as a pure in the morning and criticizes after dinner with- epistemological nominalism or as the disguise out ever becoming a hunter or a critic (etc.). of negativity itself in seemingly positive con- This is utopian in the sense that it works nega- cepts. Alternatively, with the theory of produc- tively, as a critique of alienated labour rather tive needs, we can embrace the issue of the than really as a positive conception of human subject’s criteria as a generalizing positivity. and humane life. The subject of such critique Second, it points a way beyond the futile is clearly “liberated”; but what does s/he want? concern, so pervasive in post-structuralist cri- S/he remains emancipated precisely for as long tique, with social categories taken as abstrac- as s/he is free of needs; in Marx’ communism, tions. It so easily becomes an aim in itself “society”, by definition, takes care of every- to achieve, as in the Ian Parker quote above, thing. In other words, the dichotomy of free- emancipation from any (tactically designated) dom and necessity, otherwise so importantly fixity of identity. Or, in Foucault’s famous overcome by Hegel and Marx, is here fully words, to “refuse what we are”. In the appear- re-established: freedom requires the absence ance it is more radical, e.g., to question the of needs. As Ute Osterkamp demonstrated designation of “women” than to oppose the (Osterkamp, 1976, ch. 4), this utopianism is oppression of women. But what for? Surely, connected with Marx’ insufficient conceptual- abstract destabilizations of social categories ization of needs as socio-culturally developed, must be substantialized by considerations of but still purely consumptive. The same theory importance and priorities, and this calls for an of needs, and the same problem, reoccurs in integral theory of needs. Otherwise, not only CHAT. In Leontiev, either the creative devel- is social critique made arbitrary18, but it gets opment of personality must go beyond needs stuck in a formal-academistic phase that ends (driven by what?), as in “Activity, Conscious- up reproducing a liberalist conception of au- ness, and Personality” (Leontiev, 1978, ch. 5.4.), or that drive is referred to as a system of “higher needs” that cannot but match social 18 One can think of many absurd examples: as a Dane, demands, as in “Problems of the Development I may miss possibilities in life that are available to of Mind” (Leontiev, 1981) – making quite ob- Swedes; so long as I spend my limited leisure time as a footballer I never get a chance to flourish as cricket vious the return of dualism and functionalism player, etc. etc. (see Axel & Nissen, 1993).

72972_outlines_r01.indd 59 10-10-2008 09:04:01 The Place of a Positive Critique in Contemporary Critical Psychology • Morten Nissen 60 With a conception of “productive needs”, (Dreier, 2008). But in addition to this, I and the ideal will not be the fading, nor the tran- others have proposed to understand subjectiv- scendence into social harmony, of needs, but ity also in terms of specific communities or their ever richer but perpetually contradictory collectives as local and situated practices. This development. is important because, in the end, the only way to overcome a dichotomy of “subject versus structure” in a theory of participation is to un- The collective subject of fold the idea of the collective as itself a sub- critical psychology ject, a “we” (I cannot unfold the argument in Even if one is convinced by arguments such the space of this essay, but see (Mørck, 2000; as these that translating and referencing Os- Nissen, 2004a; Nissen, 2005). terkamp’s Motivationsforschung would be Again here, we share with other strands of useful in today’s critical psychology, it is of CHAT the fundamental notion of collective course neither possible nor relevant to develop activity mediated by artifacts, objectifying a positive theory of subjectivity only through practice in cultural forms, and understood as a, however targeted, reintroduction of GSCP. structures of participation. But the emphasis One must also attend to the opposite move- on subjectivity makes us critical of any func- ment where this tradition is itself developed tionalist tendencies, that is, the abstraction dialogically, among other things by engaging from the inter-subjectivity of social practice in exchange with other positions in critical and of theory and research. This is particularly psychology. important since today, in many parts of the Therefore, it seems justified for me, in the world – including, again, the above-mentioned final part of this essay, to introduce some cur- Hook (2004) volume on critical psychology – rent attempts at theoretical development on a “activity theory” is seen as more or less identi- dimension that is closely connected with the cal with Yrjö Engeström’s theory of “activity recommended “foundational reflexivity” of a systems” (Engeström, 1987) which precisely positive critique: its subject positions. As men- achieves the level of collectivity by bracketing tioned above, if it is important to reflect what the subject of research and effectively strip- our critique presupposes (ontology, metaphys- ping the subjects in the “system” of any crite- ics), it is equally vital to ask: who does our ria outside of the “object-outcome” of activity critique presuppose? In fact, we might say that (see also Langemeier & Roth, 2006). any theoretical critique that develops ontology To understand collectivity in terms of par- at the same time repositions its subject (Nis- ticular we’s begins with seeing that we are sen, 2004a). ourselves as critical psychologists not outside As GSCP moved beyond the CHAT of of the society which we describe or criticize. Leon tiev and others, it was primarily to facili- Thus we must reflect the standpoint of our tate a more explicit ideology critique, in con- analyses and critiques. “The standpoint”, Marx nection with a questioning of subjectivity and stated in his tenth Thesis on Feuerbach, “of subject-positions, including those of ourselves, the old materialism is civil society [bürgerli- at a deeper level. In its early conceptions, as che Gesellschaft]; the standpoint of the new I have partly sketched, the focus was mostly materialism is human society or social human- on individual subjectivity as understood in ity” (Marx, 2003). As the moving foundation terms of participation in social practices. This / framework of all knowledge, including psy- emphasis still characterizes the situated turn chology, even critical psychology, the revo- in more recent Danish critical psychology lutionary practice of social humanity is not

72972_outlines_r01.indd 60 10-10-2008 09:04:02 Critical Social Studies • No. 1 • 2008 61 something ethereal, outside of the society we omized from its individual subject-position criticize, only to be embodied as a future or which is the free-floating, autonomous citizen; distant idealized utopia. It is really all about in other words, the standpoint of civil society identifying with the revolutionary, productive which Marx criticized in his 10th Thesis on and collective aspect of real social practices Feuerbach. Tönnies’ old dichotomy remains (Jensen, 1999). in place to structure reflection, splitting it up But we must take reflection yet a step in a “system world” of abstract exchange, and further: As particular collectives, we do not perhaps abstract collectivity, “out there”, and constitute ourselves in the abstract as a mere a “life world” of repressed (or hideously ex- “aspect” of social practice. So how do we con- plicit) concrete communitarianism, “in here ceive and constitute ourselves as collectives, with us” – a dichotomy that matches well with as particular “we’s”? the above-sketched oscillation between liberal This question is relevant also because we and conservative ethics. must seek to get beyond Ferdinand Tönnies’ Instead, we must begin from the way objec- original sociological concepts of Gesellschaft tification is dialectically related to subjectifica- and Gemeinschaft, society and community, in tion. This is where the more recent inspiration which we can only choose between a natu- from various forms of discursive psychology ralistic, pre-modern substantial community, adds to the classical CHAT theme of cultural and a liberal society based on social contract mediation. The constitution of subjects is the between “free” individuals – an ideological flip side of objectification also in the sense of dichotomy which, on the basis of a purely stip- power, discipline and recognition. Even criti- ulated psychology of “wills” (Tönnies’ term) cal inter-subjectivity is mediated. It is vital that are pre-given either as natural or rational, that we resist the temptation to think of our- works to conceal the real collective processes selves as “the good guys” who are not exert- that we are engaged in every day.(Tönnies, ing power, or of our own critical practices as 1970). It may appear that both terms in that beyond discipline. We, as critical collectives contradiction are immediately apparent as ide- and participants, are forged in a struggle for ology; but it is not enough to merely denounce recognition as much as in creative develop- both terms in the dichotomy, if it means that ment and exchange of artifacts. they are really maintained as repressed or Further, since practice is transformative, seen-but-unnoticed critical identities. Thus, we constitute ourselves prescriptively rather for instance, why do critical psychologists than descriptively. What we are is crucially often immediately react against any ideas of defined by what we strive to be. We cannot, for a particular collective subjectivity with the instance, “refuse what we are” – as Foucault argument that there is conflict, contradiction, recommends us – without at the same time transformation (as e.g. in the insightful dis- defining ourselves as aspiring to be “refusers”, cussion of the collectivity of memory work which might be re-described as the wannabe in Stephenson & Papadopoulos, 2006)? Why academic avant-garde of Enlightenment, occu- would a particularization of collectivity imply pying a standpoint that hides to itself how far its idealized and harmonized rendering? One really it is from being “outside” the processes hypothesis could be that this is because it is of producing society and subjectivity that it already inherent in the utopian shadow side of seeks to understand. If we are to understand critical psychology as particular community: ourselves as collectives, we must scrutinize and the utopian Gemeinschaft is the repressed col- debate our ideals, the models with which we lective subject-position of negativity, dichot- regulate ourselves ethically and thus connect

72972_outlines_r01.indd 61 10-10-2008 09:04:02 The Place of a Positive Critique in Contemporary Critical Psychology • Morten Nissen 62 what we do into wider political projects. ciplines subjectivities (of “experts”, “users”, One materialist way of approaching that “dependents” etc.) (see Nissen, 2006). process is to view our critical research as en- But further, the im- or explicit alternative gaged in the production not simply of repre- ideas of “human beings”, “whole persons”, sentations, but of prototypes – prototypes here “social problems”, “street-level work”, “com- defined, using the works of Uffe Juul Jensen, munity” etc. – the critically positive concepts – as the interrelations of a) situated prototypical must be reflected as theoretically obliging and practices, b) the model artifacts or inscription prototypically realized in practices as well. It devices in which they are objectified, and c) then becomes visible, for instance, how, con- their contested, and temporally as well as spa- cretely, the distinction between a humanist tially distributed, social relevances (Jensen, psychology and a socialist/Marxist concep- 1987, 1999)19. tion is realized in the organizational forms, Thus, to provide a brief example, the ab- ideologies, and social policy implications of stract-general concept of a “cannabis depen- different practices (Nissen, 2004b); how the dent” is currently being institutionalized in (quasi-) religious transcendence staged in Nar- Danish social work, in the shape of specialized cotics Anonymous can work as an alienated diagnoses and counseling procedures (in fact, form of a collectivity which could be articu- in the process, the number of “addicts” treated lated more forcefully in terms of democratized in Denmark has almost tripled from 1996 welfare services (Nissen, 2002), or how the to 2004). A critical analysis of this concept distribution of inside / outside institutional should not only focus on the socio-cultural spaces co-constitute the meaning of not only contextuality of this “behavior” to provide dependence, but also of “everyday life” (Nis- an alternative approach to dependency; nor sen, 2004c; Vinum & Nissen, 2006). should it (as in Dreier, 2008) settle for a de- It is important to notice how this “self- centering of the practice of counseling itself, critical” approach to aspects of what we are, encircling the real space of action possibilities do, and make, is, again, more than a refusal in the everyday lives of clients or therapists in or a purely formal, pragmatic manipulation. which the idea of “dependency” reveals itself Thus, to take up the latter theme from our ex- as an abstraction. It should also track the ways ample, when we refuse to subscribe to naïvely in which that abstraction is alive as material communitarian ideas about “everyday life” as reality, objectified in institutional structures revolutionarily innocent of the alienations of and knowledges, and in turn forms collectivi- institutionalized drug treatment, we do not ties (of “counseling”, “self-help” etc.) and dis- only critically reflect the ways in which such ideas could work to constitute ourselves along the lines of a utopian-sectarian collective – 19 The concept of prototype is developed from a Witt- taking Foucault’s concept of “heterotopia” as gensteinian and Marxist theory of knowledge (e.g. an inspiration (Foucault, 1986). We also strive Ruben, 1978; Wartofsky, 1979) and shaped to engage in dialogue with pragmatist (e.g Bowker & Star, 1999; to articulate the alternative values of a com- Suchman, Trigg, & Blomberg, 2002) and construction- munity working to advance political projects ist (e.g.Latour, 1987; Stengers, 1999) science studies, that extend a commitment across institutional but it can also be viewed as developing the implications of Klaus Holzkamp’s concept of “generalization of ac- boundaries and thus may engage with how tion possibilities” [Möglichkeitsverallgemeinerung] by “substance use” is (more or less problemati- emphasizing the ways in which (even abstract) concepts cally) present in our own lives in the same are objectified as artifacts in and of concrete collectives and social practices, rather than primarily mental overall terms as with how “dependence” and constructs in processes of communication. other social problems might be better addressed

72972_outlines_r01.indd 62 10-10-2008 09:04:02 Critical Social Studies • No. 1 • 2008 63 and reworked in current local welfare state laby but merely to sneak in and watch the way the services. Such values include that of an aca- people snore (Goffman, 1986, 14). demically accountable / reflexive social work practice for which it makes a difference how Yet, as he then takes us into the false infin- human needs are conceived because they are ity of endless meta-reflections on the textual more than preferences on a (pseudo-)market. framings he has made – culminating in a set of In general, we, as critical psychologists, comments on the lines of asterixes that divide together with all the various co-participants in his paragraphs (like those above here) – all the social practices we engage with in more the while pretending to assume a standpoint or less direct – but always mediated – ways, outside, we should begin to wonder if we are are in the business of prototyping forms of not in fact still dreaming and snoring when we collectivity and social practice. This is really think we are sneaking and watching. what all kinds of psychology are about – in the The reflexive highlighting of the “we” of words of Kurt Danziger: we are “construct- this text, by contrast, is intended as a wake-up ing the subject” (Danziger, 1994) – but we call. I urge you to question the ways in which critical psychologists should perhaps claim the this text presupposes and co-constitutes an advantage of knowing this to be the case; and “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991)20. I embrace it! We can only know that because seek to interpellate you as critical participants we define ourselves toward the horizons of of a continuously self-re-constituting commu- transforming the ideological kinds of partici- nity for which this journal retains or regains a pation that mainstream psychology idealizes particular relevance. and inculcates – which is why our critique is It is obvious that this imagined community from the outside – and at the same time real- can be seen as a “mere artifact” and “function ize that, in doing so, we are ourselves inside, of the text”. But that is just what it’s for; and taking part in the practices of psychology, and I hope it is no small or “mere” thing. If the working toward a psychology that is more context is worth its effort, it is because it makes a, sistent, more substantial, and socially relevant however small, contribution to something that in more democratic and egalitarian ways. matters: A community imagined is not confined to its text, nor independent of it. It is neither * * * * * nature nor spirit, and no more is it hard-wired structure than disembedded reflexivity. It is a And finally, there is the interplay of this text living social practice that intervenes in the real itself with “us”. It may appear provocative or world and re-/creates and re-/defines itself in innovative to suggest and invite the kind of the process. It must struggle for recognition reflexivity which that theme displays. But like from those who imagine it, critically, from the most everything else, it already has a long tra- inside and from the outside, individually and dition in social theory from which it is perhaps collectively. The community imagined as a useful to take off. function of this text is perhaps not as stable, In Erving Goffman’s wonderful reflexive in- one-layered and clearly delimited as one introduction to his Frame Analysis, he asserts: dexed by, e.g., an organizational document or

I can only suggest that he who would combat false consciousness and awaken people to their true in- 2 0 Anderson’s concept precisely addresses the way textual genres co-constitutes community – in particular, how terests has much to do, because the sleep is very the press and the novel was part of the emergence of deep. And I do not intend here to provide a lul- the modern nation state.

72972_outlines_r01.indd 63 10-10-2008 09:04:02 The Place of a Positive Critique in Contemporary Critical Psychology • Morten Nissen 64 a love letter would appear to be. But still, it Out. Classification and its Consequences. is a singular situated community participating Cambridge, Mass./London: MIT Press. Burkitt, I. (1999). Bodies of Thought. Embodi- in social practice, and as such, recognized and ment, Identity & Modernity. London: Sage. self-reflexive. This metaphysics of collective Brecht, B. (1982) Über experimentelles Theater, subjectivity leads to tougher questions than Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. those regarding the relations of the text with Butler, J. (1997). The Psychic Life of Power. The- itself and its grammatical, graphic or rhetorical ories in Subjection. Stanford, Cal.: Stanford functions. University Press. Do we still, in the times of a devastating ne- Cromby, J. (2004). Between Constructionism and oliberal / neo-conservative assault on the idea Neuroscience: The Societal Co-Constitution of of science critique as the ongoing revision of Embodied Subjectivity. Theory & Psychology, substantial theories and obliging epistemolo- 14, 797-821. Danziger, K. (1994). Constructing the Subject: gies, believe in ourselves as critical psychol- Historical Origins of Psychological Research. ogy, or as critical psychologists, or as readers Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. and writers of critical social studies? If so, do Dreier, O. (2008). Psychotherapy in Everyday these suggestions about collective subjectivity Life, Cambridge, Mass, New York: Cambridge in any way contribute to those projects? Do University Press. they contribute to redefining them? Engeström, Y. (1987). Learning by Expanding. An Or have I lost you somewhere along the activity-theoretical approach to developmental way, so that the “we” is in fact now purely research. Helsinki: Jyväskylä. formal? Is it that you read from the stand- Foucault, M. (19896). Of Other Spaces. Diacritics 16 (1): 22-27. point of an opposing community, or one with Goffman, E. (1986). Frame Analysis. An Essay on a language so different it would not be worth the Organization of Experience, Boston: North the effort to trace my meanings? Or have you Eastern University Press. simply better things to do? Hobsbawm, E. (1998). Introduction. In The Com- Such questions imply the kind of inquiry to munist Manifesto. A Modern Edition (pp. 1-29). which a positive theory of collective subjectiv- London: Verso. ity may be relevant. Holzkamp, K. (1983). Grundlegung der Psycholo- gie. Frankfurt/M: Campus Verlag. Holzkamp, K. (1977). Kann es im Rahmen der References marxistischen Theorie eine Kritische Psycholo- gie geben?:, 44-75. In K.H.Braun & K. Holz- Adorno, T.W. & Horkheimer, M. (1979). Dialectic kamp (Eds.), Kritische Psychologie. Bericht of Enlightenment. London:Verso. über den 1. Internationalen Kongreß Kritische Anderson, B. (1991). Imagined Communities, Psychologie … Bd. 1 (pp. 44-75). Köln: Pahl- London: Verso, 1991. Rugenstein Verlag. Axel, E. & Nissen, M. (1993). Relating the Sub- Hook, D. (2004). Critical Psychology. Cape Town: ject and Society in Activity – A Critical Ap- UCT Press. praisal. In Engelsted, N. (Ed.). The Societal Horkheimer, M. & Adorno, T. W. (1969). Dialek- Subject. (pp. 67-79). Aarhus: Aarhus Univer- tik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente. sity Press. Frankfurt/M: S. Fischer Verlag. Badiou, A. (2002). Ethics. An Essay on the Un- Jensen, U. J. (1987). Practice and Progress: A derstanding of Evil. London: Verso. Theory for the Modern Health Care System. Bauman, Z. (2000). Liquid Modernity, Cambrigde: Oxford: Blackwell. Polity. Jensen, U. J. (1999). Categories in Activity Theory: Bowker, G. & Star, S. L. (1999). Sorting Things Marx’ Philosophy Just-in-time. In S.Chaiklin,

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