JOE ARPAIO AND THE PHENOMENON OF THE 'TOUGHEST SHERIFF IN AMERICA'

______

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of the Department of History

Sam Houston State University

______

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree of

Master of Arts

______

by

Nicholas D. Rizzi

December, 2016

JOE ARPAIO AND THE PHENOMENON OF THE 'TOUGHEST SHERIFF IN AMERICA'

by

Nicholas D. Rizzi

______

APPROVED:

George Diaz, PhD Thesis Director

Nancy Baker, PhD Committee Member

Wesley Phelps, PhD Committee Member

Jeff Littlejohn, PhD Dean, College of Humanities and Social Sciences ABSTRACT

Rizzi, Nicholas D., Joe Arpaio and the phenomenon of the 'Toughest Sheriff in America'. Master of Arts (History), December, 2016, Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas.

Since first winning election as the Sheriff of Maricopa County in 1992, Joe

Arpaio has cultivated an image as the ‘toughest sheriff in America.’ While Sheriff Arpaio has often been the subject of headlines and contemporary journalism, other than a handful of scholarly studies focused upon incarceration methods within Maricopa County, scant historical study has been devoted to Arpaio. The study will examine issues of race, ethnicity, conflict, and cooperation in the borderlands from the seventeenth into the twentieth centuries. Furthermore, the thesis will examine the mystique of law enforcement in the West, before finally exploring the confluence of all these factors that ultimately facilitated the rise, notoriety, and resiliency of Joe Arpaio as the Sheriff of

Maricopa County.

The research is taken from a combination of primary and secondary sources. The first two chapters rely heavily upon assorted secondary scholarly studies related to law enforcement in the West, race, ethnicity, and intermittent periods of conflict and cooperation in the borderlands. The final two chapters use primary sources ranging from the Arizona Republic, the Phoenix New Times, Arpaio’s two autobiographies, and other periodicals to polling data culled from the Behavior Research Center to examine the tenure of Sheriff Joe Arpaio.

Although Sheriff Arpaio’s incarceration methods and fixation to undocumented immigration has made him the center of contentious political debates since 1992, the thesis will mostly eschew those disputes. Rather, the thesis will seek to study Arpaio as a

iii

historical figure. In total, the thesis will argue factors unique to the borderlands, namely

persistent questions of race, the rise of the Sunbelt, conservative politics, contemporary concerns over crime and undocumented immigration buttressed the influence and notoriety of Sheriff Joe Arpaio.

KEY WORDS: Sheriff Joe Arpaio, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), borderlands, Undocumented immigration, Race and ethnicity, Phoenix, Arizona, Sunbelt

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I express my sincere thanks to Dr. George T. Díaz for agreeing to work on the project. His patient guidance helped me grow as a student, thinker, and writer. His

efforts proved invaluable throughout the process. I would also like to thank Dr. Nancy

Baker and Dr. Wesley Phelps for serving on my thesis committee and offering important

advice and support.

v TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ABSTRACT ...... iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... v

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... vi

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

CHAPTER

I THE SHERIFF IN THE WEST: HISTORY AND MYTH ...... 9

II COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND EVOLUTION IN THE ARIZONA

BORDERLANDS: RACE AND ETHNICITY FROM THE SPANISH ERA TO

THE RISE OF THE SUNBELT ...... 29

III THE RISE OF SHERIFF JOE ARPAIO ...... 54

IV CONSERVATIVE POLITICS, FEAR, RACE AND THE POPULARITY OF

JOE ARPAIO ...... 88

V INTO THE SUNSET? ...... 124

REFERENCES ...... 131

VITA ...... 136

vi 1

INTRODUCTION

JOE ARPAIO: THE PHENOMENON OF ‘THE TOUGHEST SHERIFF IN

AMERICA’

Joe Arpaio first became the Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona in 1992. Over the next twenty-four years, including five reelections, Arpaio became more simply known as ‘Sheriff Joe.’1 He has gained notice for his ‘get-tough’ on crime and jail

policies such as housing inmates in tents in 115 degree temperatures, the reconstitution of

citizen posses, and most-strikingly, the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office’s (MCSO)

aggressive efforts in combating undocumented immigration. The nation’s renewed and

contentious debates over race, ethnicity, and immigration pushed Arpaio to the front pages of many notable newspapers like the New York Times, the Washington Post, and

the Wall Street Journal. Seen as a hero by some, and reviled by others, Arpaio became a consequential public figure. Although some scholarly work has been conducted concerning the incarceration policies of the MCSO, little has been devoted to Sheriff

Arpaio as a person of historical significance in Maricopa County, Arizona, and the

country as a whole.

A study of Arpaio must first be rooted through understanding of the office of

sheriff itself. According to Larry D. Ball’s study Desert Lawmen: The High Sheriffs of

New Mexico and Arizona 1846-1912, the office of sheriff originated in ninth-century

Anglo-Saxon England as a representative of the Crown in local government.2 As the

1 Michael Kiefer, "Sheriff Joe Arpaio Has Always Done It His Own Way," Arizona Republic, September 11, 2015. 2 Larry D. Ball, Desert lawmen the high sheriffs of New Mexico and Arizona, 1846-1912. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992), 1.

2

United States expanded its borders westward throughout the eighteen and nineteenth centuries, the sheriff was responsible for a plethora of duties. Beyond law enforcement and ensuring public safety, sheriffs were also responsible for tax collection, management of county jails, the formation of juries, and other related judicial tasks. Ball argues that historical sheriffs were important public and bureaucratic officials in the New Mexico and Arizona Territories. In contrast to the Hollywood myth, gunplay and violence represented a departure from the norm and sheriffs generally attempted to simply bring order and governance to loosely incorporated territories. A second book, Arizona

Sheriffs: Badges and Bad Men by Jane Eppinga focuses upon the stories of notable sheriffs. The book ranges from an exploration of the Pleasant Valley War in 1880s Gila

County to the “Tucson Four” of the early 1990s. But, only a minimal portion of the text is devoted to Joe Arpaio, the latest embodiment of the sheriff ideal. Eppinga notes that while actions of assorted Arizona sheriffs have not been flawless, many should be credited for effective law enforcement and adaptability in the face of a changing society and its laws.3 The book provides helpful context for the popularly-held notions of an ideal, tough sheriff staring down all threats to the community. Most importantly, the chapter will examine the historical myths and realities of the ‘Wild West’ Lawman. In particular, this thesis will explore the myths that buttressed the legendary status of the

Earp brothers and other notable western lawmen. Two books, No Duty to Retreat:

Violence and Values in American History and Society by Richard Maxwell Brown and

Wyatt Earp: A Vigilante Life by Andrew C. Isenberg provides the bulk of the

3 Jane Eppinga, Arizona Sheriffs: Badges and Bad Men (Tucson, AZ: Rio Nuevo Publishers, 2006, 7).

3 interpretative framework for the chapter 1, “The Sheriff in the West: History and Myth.”

Brown’s work discusses the imposition of larger authority in the U.S. West and the important symbolic place held by county sheriffs.4 Isenberg’s book argues the legendary lawman’s status was largely fictional—created by Earp himself.5 In a manner similar to

predecessors like Earp, Sheriff Joe has proven himself a wily and astute politician, one

skillfully able to create an image as the ‘Toughest Sheriff in America.’ In order to best

understand this image, the historical study must compare myth and reality of law

enforcement in Arizona and the larger historical American West.

“Cooperation, conflict, and evolution in the Arizona Borderlands: race and

ethnicity from the Spanish era to the rise of the sunbelt” examines issues of race and

ethnicity in the borderlands. The chapter considers the complexities of conflict and

cooperation in the Southwest borderlands. Assorted texts have explored episodes of

conflict in the region-- Shadows at Dawn: An Apache Massacre and the Violence of

History by Karl Jacoby, Borderline Americans by Katherine Benton Cohen, and

Revolution in Texas: How a Forgotten Rebellion and Its Bloody Suppression Turned

Mexicans into Americans by Benjamin Heber Johnson each explore outbursts of violence

in the region.6 Another text, Border Citizens by Eric V. Meeks explores the periods of

inclusive and exclusive racial definitions—and the contributing factors—that influenced

4 Richard Maxwell Brown, No Duty to Retreat: Violence and Values in American History and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 44-47.

5 Andrew C. Isenberg, Wyatt Earp: A Vigilante Life (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013), 4-7.

6 See Karl Jacoby, Shadows at Dawn: A Borderlands Massacre and the Violence of History (New York: Penguin Press, 2008); Katherine Benton-Cohen, Borderline Americans: Racial Division and Labor War in the Arizona Borderlands (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009); Benjamin Heber. Johnson, Revolution in Texas: How a Forgotten Rebellion and Its Bloody Suppression Turned Mexicans into Americans (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).

4 the notions in the borderlands.7 A final text, Standing on Common Ground: The Making

of a Sunbelt Borderland by Geraldo L. Cadava, explores modern flexible notions of race

in the borderlands using the context of peaceful economic cooperation after the Second

World War.8 These texts provide vital context as a large portion of Sheriff Arpaio’s

notoriety and influence can be traced to highly contentious, and ultimately changing,

ideas of race and ethnicity in the Arizona borderlands.

“The Rise of Sheriff Joe Arpaio,” the third chapter will explore the social realities behind Joe Arpaio. Aside from utilizing Sheriff Arpaio’s autobiography, this chapter

considers treatises on law enforcement, assorted historical studies of Phoenix and the

larger state of Arizona, and newspapers ranging from local sources the Arizona Republic,

the Phoenix New Times, the East Valley Tribune to national outlets like the

aforementioned Washington Post to understand the reality behind Arpaio’s rhetoric.

Particular discussion is placed upon Sheriff Arpaio’s two books. His 1996 autobiography,

America’s Toughest Sheriff: How We Can Win the War Against Crime presented

Arpaio’s vision for crime prevention and law enforcement. America’s Toughest Sheriff

explores the creation of ‘tent city,’ the reintroduction of citizen posses, and Arpaio’s

other assorted methods to aggressively counteract crime and save taxpayer dollars. The

text is popular among conservative readers but many of the methods advocated by Arpaio

will be found to carry more political or symbolic value, rather than actual effectiveness.

A second autobiography, Joe’s Law: America’s Toughest Sheriff Takes on Illegal

7 Eric V. Meeks, Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos in Arizona (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 8-10.

8 Geraldo L. Cadava, Standing on Common Ground: The Making of a Sunbelt Borderland (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013).

5

Immigration, Drugs, and Everything Else that Threatens America follows a similar pattern. The book is a compilation of Arpaio’s experiences as Sheriff with particular focus upon the politically contentious issue of immigration.9 Of particular interest are

Arpaio’s claims that he had little to do with the writing of the book and does not even

recall many of the ideas expressed in his second autobiography. The claim stems from

2009 testimony from a racial profiling lawsuit against Arpaio by legal Mexican

immigrant Ortega Melendres. An excerpt from the Phoenix New Times summarized the

atmosphere,

In several Perry Mason moments, Arpaio denied that he said or did something, only to be caught in traps by Young, who played videotapes of depositions and news conferences or presented Arpaio with his own previous statements. For instance, Young asked Arpaio if his policy was to go after illegal immigrants first, and their crimes second…Young then played the video from a news conference in which Arpaio states bluntly that he has a "pure" program that targets illegal immigrants and not the crime first.10

The books represent dubious scholarly value, yet remain valuable to this study. The

arguments and ideas expressed in Arpaio’s autobiographies represent the fundamental

appeal of his methods to many voters. Despite assorted claims of inconsistencies and

half-truths expressed in the books, citizens and voters find his ‘get-tough’ stance highly appealing. In total, the chapter examines the correlation between sunbelt growth, popular fears over crime and undocumented immigration, Maricopa County Sheriff Office’s history and how each contributed to the rise of Sheriff Joe Arpaio.

9 Joe Arpaio and Len Sherman, America's Toughest Sheriff: How to Win the War against Crime (Arlington, TX: Summit Pub. Group, 1996); Joe Arpaio and Len Sherman, Joe's Law: America's Toughest Sheriff Takes on Illegal Immigration, Drugs, and Everything Else That Threatens America (New York: AMACOM, 2008).

10 Ray Stern, "Joe Arpaio Struggles in Racial-Profiling Trial to Answer Examples of Seemingly Bigoted Leadership." Phoenix New Times, July 24, 2012.

6

Area and regional newspapers provide insight into attitudes of the electorate that put Arpaio in office and the constituents he cultivated. The Arizona Republic and

Phoenix Gazette offer in-depth records that detail Arpaio’s tenure in elected office. For example, in response to the controversy over undocumented immigration enforcement in

2011, the Arizona Republic quoted Arpaio, “"I have compassion, I've told you people that

over and over again...enforcing the law overrides my compassion."11 And while

undocumented immigration enforcement has been only the most recent source of

controversy, Arpaio has faced accusations of inmate abuse, civil rights violations,

financial mismanagement, and assorted forms of political intrigue.12

“Conservative politics, fear, race, and the popularity of Joe Arpaio,” the fifth

chapter explores the underlying roots of Sheriff Arpaio’s popularity. The presentation of

Joe Arpaio as an individual whose popularity, influence and notoriety is directly

attributable to factors unique to Arizona and the borderlands constitutes the crux of the

study. Shortly after taking office in 1993, Arpaio’s law-enforcement efforts gained him notice from many media outlets beyond Arizona. Consider the brief 1994 Newsweek article,

About the potbellied posse of Maricopa County and other innovations of Phoenix's straight-talkin', PR-seekin' Sheriff Joe Arpaio, 62. Elected on a promised one-term, "get tough" platform in 1992. Arpaio has beefed up a horseback-riding citizens' volunteer posse to 2,200 members (800 trained to carry guns) and erected a jail tent city to house 1,000 inmates. …. Critics, like the state cops and the ACLU, say Arpaio's schemes are accidents waiting to happen: what if a posse member shoots someone? Or a convict dies in 120-degree heat? "Tough beans," says Arpaio -- and so far, most state residents love it. Arpaio

11 J.J. Hensley, "Sheriff Joe Arpaio: 20 Years of Controversies and Successes." The Arizona Republic, December 18, 2011.

12 Ibid.

7

plans to form a new environmental-law posse this fall, and intends to expand the tent jail next month. He also plans to run for office again, in 1997.13

The early roots of Arpaio’s ‘toughest sheriff in America’ persona are apparent.

Indifferent to naysayers like the American Civil Liberties Union or other law enforcement agencies, Arpaio did what he felt was best for Maricopa County—save money and protect the community. Beyond the no-nonsense nature exemplified by the above statement, Arpaio’s willingness to ‘thumb his nose’ in the face of the federal government speaks to the politics of the United States in the 21st century. As events like the ‘war on terror,’ bulging government deficits, and the disclosure of National Security

Administration eavesdropping have contributed to cries of big government overreach, Joe

Arpaio represents an ideal to some conservatives. Consider Arpaio’s recent foray into the world of political conspiracies. Compelled by repeated requests by the Arizona Tea

Party, in 2011 the MCSO opened an investigation into President Barack Obama’s long form birth certificate. Upon the investigation, Arpaio concluded in March 2012, “Based on all of the evidence presented and investigated I cannot in good faith report to you that these documents are authentic…My investigators believe that the long-form birth certificate was manufactured electronically and that it did not originate in a paper format as claimed by the White House."14 And while many will agree that conspiracy-hunting is well beyond the jurisdiction of a county sheriff, such limits do not apply to Joe Arpaio.

When the politically vocal Arizona Tea Party called for action the MCSO responded.

Other relevant examples—ranging from the MCSO’s flirtation with reality television,

13 Lucy Howard and Gregory Cerio, "Arizona is Talking..." Newsweek, August 22, 1994.

14 BBC, "Joe Arpaio: Barack Obama birth proof 'may be forged'." http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-17229009 (accessed April 29, 2014).

8

Arpaio’s relationships with B-movie action hero Steven Segal, and retired N.B.A. star

Shaquille O’Neal—illustrate the unique and colorful phenomenon of Joe Arpaio. Joe

Arpaio is an obvious product of the borderlands, Arizona and American society.

The thesis will examine the historical and political significance of Joe Arpaio.

While many of the correlated issues—growth of the Sunbelt, undocumented immigration, race and ethnicity in Arizona—have been examined, the significance of Arpaio has not been the subject of any scholarly study. Rather, Joe Arpaio has simply been a persistent topic of conversation in the nation’s news media. Since 1992, Joe Arpaio has cultivated an image—and following—that far outstrips the job description of a local county sheriff.

Simply stated, Joe Arpaio’s success stems from his skillful manipulation of conservative concerns and his ability to tap into white Americans’ myth of the tough western sheriff.

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CHAPTER I

THE SHERIFF IN THE WEST: HISTORY AND MYTH

The image of an ‘Old West’ sheriff as a hard-bitten, rugged and tough lawman is one popularized in dime novels and Hollywood films. Acting with bravado, outfitted with a cowboy hat, a badge, and shiny revolver, the sheriff courageously defended frontier towns from Indians, greedy cattle rustlers, and violent bank robbers. These popular notions came to symbolize law enforcement in the American West. Although individuals like Bat Masterson, Pat Garrett, and the Earp Brothers endure in the nation’s historical imaginary—the swaggering sheriff is little more than a myth. With some notable exceptions, law enforcement officials in the West played a vital—albeit somewhat mundane—role in the development of the borderlands. Sheriffs enforced laws, acted as officers of the judicial system, and collected taxes, amongst a variety of assorted community tasks. The disjunction between myth and historical reality lies in the representation of the ‘Old West’ in American politics, popular culture, and literature. In fact, the sheriff’s mystique represented a desire amongst communities for protection from evolving threats. This chapter is about the roots of the sheriff, the realities of the office in the West, and development of the mythology of sheriffs as legendary characters.

The office of sheriff can be traced across centuries of history. In its earliest form, the sheriff represented the English Crown. The “shire of the reeve” kept the peace, held court, and commanded the local militia.15 These vast powers were later reduced as

15 Jane Eppinga. Arizona Sheriffs: Badges and Bad Men. (Tucson, Arizona: Rio Nuevo Publishers, 2006), 9.

10 subsequent kings removed the sheriff’s ability to preside over local courts.16 Once in

North America, community members often chose wealthy landowners as sheriffs.

Sheriffs served legal papers, kept the peace, maintained jails, and collected taxes.17 After

the American Revolution, sheriffs became familiar lawmen on the frontier, and as the

borders of the United States expanded, new territorial and state constitutions carried the

office of sheriff westward. As U.S. state forces replaced Mexican borderlands

institutions, the sheriff came to represent not only law enforcement, but also way of life

unique to the West.18

After 1848, in the aftermath of the U.S.-Mexican War and the Treaty of

Guadalupe-Hidalgo, the United States began the imposition of its institutions on the

territories in the Mexican Cession. The Kearny Code, named after General Stephen W.

Kearny, provided the first framework in the region. The code represented a composite of

laws from Missouri, Texas, and Mexico, contained a bill of rights, and included a proviso

for the creation of the sheriff and other common local officials.19 Sheriffs were initially

selected for two-year terms by territorial governors. When Arizona achieved separate

territorial status in 1863, the Howell Code replaced the Kearney Code. Judge William T.

Howell modeled the 400-page document after laws from New York and California and

the ideas formed the groundwork for the Arizona Statutes. Particularly, sheriffs served

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid.

19 Larry D. Ball. Desert Lawmen: The High Sheriffs of New Mexico and Arizona, 1846-1912. (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996), 2.

11 officials within the counties over a two-year term.20 Sheriffs collected taxes, served

warrants, subpoenas, and other writs while also walking the line of not alienating the

electorate. In addition, they conserved peace by suppressing “assaults and batteries.” 21

Furthermore, sheriffs were charged with custody of county jails, and were empowered to

summon the posse comitatus, or Power of the County.22 Territorial sheriffs faced

challenges in executing their offices. For instance, Arizona’s population in 1866 was a

mere 5,526 before increasing to 9,658 in 1870 and 40,440 ten years later.23 Sparse

overall population, the presence of a sizable Hispanic majority within that group, the

remnants of Mexican governing structures, generally hostile Indian people, and sluggish

economic growth presented sheriffs with unique challenges in fulfilling the expectations

of the office. Despite the obvious obstacles of enforcing the law in a loosely

incorporated and inhospitable region, sheriffs played an important part in the

implementation of U.S. law over the New Mexico and Arizona Territories.24

Sheriffs did not work alone in service to the county. Upon taking office, selecting deputies represented the most pressing initial task. The typical office comprised a sheriff,

chief deputy, and three or four deputies while more affluent counties supported a clerk or

cashier. In most cases, a deputy had to be someone of known bravery, possess

20 Eppinga, 9.

21 Ball, 2.

22 Ibid. The term also applies to the Constitutional restriction upon the U.S. Military and domestic law enforcement. The act, signed by President Rutherford B. Hayes, in 1878 and specifically referred to the U.S. Army and was later expanded to also restrict the U.S. Air Force. For further information, see: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/MR1251/MR1251.AppD.pdf

23 Ibid., 18.

24 Ibid., 18.

12 proficiency with gun, be able to ride horseback for extended periods of time, and be familiar with the countryside.25 Other factors also influenced sheriffs’ choices. By the

late 1880s Pima County, Arizona was a relatively diverse community which made

Nathan Appel well-suited. Appel, a German immigrant, spoke French, Spanish, and

English. The language skills coupled with his marriage to a Hispana gave Appel access

to the inner circle of that community.26 Familial connections also swayed the choice of deputies. Sheriffs sought to give job opportunities to immediate and extended family.

Deputizing kinsfolk protected sheriffs from political enemies trying to compromise underlings.27 While sheriffs represented the chief law enforcement officers of the county,

they were rarely alone in their efforts. In choosing subordinates, and cognizant of the

diverse populations they policed, sheriffs sought individuals with both the expected

requisite skills of horsemanship but also less dramatized attributes such as diverse language proficiencies and favorable family connections. While fulfilling their assorted duties, sheriffs were also beholden to voters.

Given elections occurred every two years, a good deal of sheriff work involved politics and passionately contested local elections. Unable to participate in most elections at the federal level—President, United States senators, and representatives— territorial residents channeled their political fervor into local elections.28 The distribution

of “five gallon kegs filled with customary whiskey, calculated to encourage fights and

25 Ibid., 27.

26 Ibid., 31-32.

27 Ibid., 33.

28 Ibid., 55.

13 provide votes” in 1870s San Miguel County, New Mexico reflected the often chaotic and underhanded pursuit of the office.29 In these cases, the divisive and manipulative tactics

represented little more than alcohol-laden popularity contests. At the same time,

intoxicants did not guarantee success as noted by local newsman George Curry in Pat

Garrett’s election in the 1880 Lincoln County, New Mexico. Although the overall victor,

Garrett lost the primarily Hispanic precinct of Los Tablas because as Curry complained,

“whiskey and tobacco did no voting.”30 If alcohol and tobacco did not influence voters, in turbulent times calls for ‘law and order’ often prevailed as individuals like Pat Garrett gained election while Commodore Owens Perry of Apache County, Arizona garnered favor for his steely nerves as the popular slogan was “a man who knows no fear.”31 In times of perceived public disorder, voters favored sheriffs willing and able to face down law-breakers. But, in the cases of Garrett and Perry, neither possessed an extensive record of deadly force— records indicate each only killed a single man. More importantly, the public consistently confined a ‘nervy man’ to a single term.32 Ultimately,

other factors, namely the—later discussed—influence of big business and more

crystalized party lines, eventually carried more influence than bravery. While alcohol and

the perception of toughness constituted short-term ingredients for success, the racial and

ethnic makeup of communities also influenced the political efforts of lawmen.

29 Ibid., 59.

30 Leon Claire Metz. Pat Garrett: The Story of a Western Lawman. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), 53.

31 Ball, 57.

32 Ibid.

14

Political success often led to the cultivation of favor within ethnic voting blocks.

The presence of large Mexican and European immigrant communities in Arizona mining camps represented important targets for sheriffs seeking victory. For example, in early

1900s Graham County, Arizona, Jennie Parks Ringgold recalled, “Whenever the [law] officers saw one of the foreigners becoming a leader…they cultivated his friendship…for political reasons.” 33 Sheriffs who built relationships with leaders of ethnic or racial

blocks expected reciprocal support. If chummy behavior did not work, some sheriffs

simply fell back to commonly-held Anglo baseline views that believed Hispanic voters

could be easily manipulated, since they lacked formal education and training in

democracy. During the 1890 election, in Pima County, Arizona supporters of Matthew F.

Shaw pressed voters by handing them, “a registration receipt and a ticket apiece and

marching them to the polls at gunpoint.”34 Successful sheriffs and their supporters were

wily operators that relied upon both positive and coercive methods to garner support in

essential voting blocks. As time progressed, the larger political environment—and a highly contentious debate over the proposed joint statehood of the Arizona and New

Mexico territories—increased the marginalization of Hispanic voters. In 1909, and echoing tones that will appear in later chapters of the study, Arizona Governor Richard E.

Sloan declared, “the Mexican population is not more than fifteen percent, mostly itinerants, and likewise no important factor in politics, for the American population is increasing while the Spanish-American stands still.”35 Anglos in the Arizona Territory

33 Ibid., 61.

34 Ibid., 61.

35 Linda C. Noel. ""I Am an American": Anglos, Mexicans, Nativos, and the National Debate over Arizona and New Mexico Statehood." Pacific Historical Review 80, no. 3 (2011): 456.

15 viewed Mexicans dismissively or with outward disdain, and, as a result, loathed any political attachment to New Mexico Territory where Hispanos possessed more power.

These methods exhibited by electioneering lawmen and exclusionary views expressed by other politicians reflected the larger societal trends of the time period. The

Gilded Age by Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner, lent its name to the era— defined the period as one rife with schemes, vote buying, and every imaginable corruption.36 In many cases, the methods employed by western sheriffs fit into the larger

framework of an unscrupulous and exploitative period in the nation’s history. Just as

graft, ‘law and order,’ and the cultivation—or marginalization of—ethnic communities

constituted Gilded Age ploys to win votes, big business also maintained a strong

influence in the West.

The arrival of railroad, mining, ranching, and other interests further impacted the electioneering efforts of lawmen. In some cases, industry became a convenient political target for office-seekers. In 1888, Buckley O’Neill ran for sheriff of Yavapai County,

Arizona. His campaign singled out the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad Company—and its ownership of thousands of acres of land—in his upstart campaign for sheriff. O’Neill challenged the railroads to pay more taxes thus enriching the county—and him personally—and his words appealed to many voters. Despite efforts by the A & P

Company in shipping in employees with instructions to vote against the candidate,

O’Neill won the election.37 While some candidate used big business in populist appeals to

36 Robert Worth Miller. "The Lost World of Gilded Age Politics." The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 1, no. 1 (2002): 49.

37 Ball, 62.

16 the masses, other lawmen garnered important support from moneyed interests. Consider an emblematic example. In 1881, Pinal County, Arizona mining and middle-class business owners persuaded Andrew J. Doran, manager of Silver King Mine, to run for sheriff. Doran recalled, “whiskey men, gamblers, and the rough element were running the county.”38 In this case, the outward desire for law and order—and the protection of

financial interests—compelled businessmen to throw support behind a known and trusted

candidate. On another level, the influence of big business either as targets or kingmakers

illustrated the complex and deepening realities of the office as sheriffs became

consistently beholden not to only local communities, but also, to outside factors.

Although most sheriffs were simply local politicians and represented a generally

unremarkable bureaucracy, the placement of that bureaucracy represented a larger shift in

the history of the West.39

Once in office the protection of public safety represented the primary concern for

sheriffs. Lawmen faced a myriad of concerns and complicating factors in their efforts to promote public order. The mixture of wealth-seeking pioneers, the boom-and-bust nature of the western economy, unbalanced sex ratios, the persistent influence of vice—namely alcohol, gambling, and prostitution, coupled with the generally isolated nature of territorial towns created an environment predisposed to spasms of violence and disorder.

Peacekeeping dominated the daily activities of many sheriffs. For instance, in April 1897,

Sheriff Dan R. Williamson reacted to a “day of disturbances” in Globe, Arizona during

38 Ibid., 65.

39 Richard Maxwell Brown. No Duty to Retreat Violence and Values in American History and Society. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 41-45.

17 which the sheriff and his deputies responded to a knife fight, several fist fights, and by the end of day arrested eight individuals. 40 Investigative work also occupied a great deal

of lawmen’s time. The recollection of Deputy Fred J. Dodge offers insight into this

aspect. For example, Dodge and his colleagues pursued highwaymen responsible for the

robbery of several stores and the murder of a deputy and three citizens in Bisbee, AZ in

November 1883. The lawmen relied upon witness testimony on the distinctive voices of the bandits, the measurements of hoof prints, and an incriminating hat plus dogged tracking to arrest and convict six suspects. The court legally executed five while a lynch mob took the life of the sixth.41 In total, the aforementioned Sheriff Matthew Shaw

noted that lawmen “could not complain of monotony.”42 Occasionally, public disorder

and investigations were overshadowed by more pressing threats to lawmen and the

community. Consider the testimony of Cochise County Sheriff John H. Slaughter of

events on June 7, 1888 when the lawman and his deputies happened upon multiple

robbery suspects as he recalled:

I asked them if they would surrender…just at this moment, one of the men shot, and knocked the bark off the tree close to my ear. Just about that time, I shot him…a second man jumped with a six-shooter…I said, “Burt [Deputy Alvord], there is another sonofabitch, and I shot him…Just after that, this Manuel [Robles] ran down the canyon...I shot him.43

40 Arizona Weekly Journal Miner, April 17, 1897.

41 Fred Dodge. Under Cover for Wells Fargo: The Unvarnished Recollections of Fred Dodge. Edited by Carolyn Lake. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998), 44-45.

42 Arizona Daily Star, October 16, 1921.

43 Allen A Erwin. The Southwest of John H. Slaughter: Pioneer Cattleman and Trail-driver of Texas, the Pecos, and Arizona and Sheriff of Tombstone. (Glendale, CA: A. H. Clark, 1965), 214-17.

18

A Cochise County Coroner’s report justified Slaughter’s actions in the face of immediate threats but the above incident and others contributed to the description of

Slaughter by an unnamed 1922 source as the “sort of man we call a killer.”44 A guns-

blazing climax to the pursuit of criminals constituted an atypical and violent departure for

lawmen of the region. In fact, premeditated standoffs at high noon on the main street

represent romance not history. Whereas the exploits of Slaughter proved historically

tantalizing, most trudged a conventional middle ground of law enforcement.45 Although

corralling drunks and the investigation and arrest of the accused carried inherent risk,

those risks did not rise to the level of far more unusual shootouts. Despite the mundane

duties which occupied most of their time by lawmen, the office of Sheriff held a far more

powerful symbolic position in the struggle that dominated the West during the era.

Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries, the

West experienced the imposition of a new order already present in the East. That order, defined by layered and complex governmental and law enforcement structures such as state, city, county, and metropolitan offices created a regulated eastern society. The less- populated trans-Mississippi West, in contrast, depended more closely upon the sheriff for law enforcement. Although similarly to their eastern counterparts, western sheriffs also worked with assorted local police and federal marshals—western sheriffs occupied a unique position. Since the counties constituted the most important foundation of local government in the Anglo-American tradition, western sheriffs held a central place in

44 Ball,198.

45 Ibid., 201.

19 territorial law enforcement.46 The sheriff’s central place thrust the office—and to a lesser

extent other law enforcement entities—into a far larger western conflict. In No Duty to

Retreat, historian Richard Maxwell Brown cited the work of Alan Trachtenberg and his

examination of the conflicting forces of incorporation and resistance. Accordingly,

outbursts of violence arose from the conservative consolidating authority of capital—the

urban, industrial, often corporate forces that were “incorporating” the western regions of

the United States during the latter half of the nineteenth century.47 The influx of northern

and Republican capital sowed the seeds of conflict with more traditional, southern, and

Democratic-leaning interests. Furthermore, Brown noted that gunfighters played a

crucial role in these struggles. In particular, he explained:

On one side were the conservative incorporation gunfighters whose ranks included glorified gunfighters such as Wild Bill Hickok of Kansas, Wyatt Earp of Arizona, and Frank Canton of Wyoming…on the other side were dissident resister gunfighters some of whom were themselves mythologized as “social bandits” of the West.48

Whereas the organization of the eastern portions of the U.S. occurred with the work of

various levels of government, in the West central authority remained distant and the

sheriff’s office held greater status. Rather than simply maintaining peace and stability, the

influx of urban, moneyed interests meant law enforcement represented incorporation

against the forces of resistance.49 The exploits of Wyatt Earp and similar gunslingers constituted actions to strengthen civil society and maintain the interests of a select few.

46 Ibid., 54.

47 Brown, 43.

48 Ibid., 44-45.

49 Ibid.

20

The events in an 1880s silver boom town illustrated the elevated and mythical position of law enforcement in the West.

Tombstone, Arizona played a fundamental role in the creation of the nation’s historical myth surrounding western lawmen. The discovery of silver transformed the sleepy southern Arizona ranching outpost into a tumultuous boomtown. Like thousands of others, the pursuit of wealth compelled Wyatt Earp, his brothers Morgan and Virgil, joined by John Henry “Doc” Holliday to Tombstone. The Earps dabbled in mining, acquired real estate, gambled, and became important members of the community. The pro-business, Republican-leaning Earp brothers and Holliday eventually found themselves in conflict with the Democratic-leaning Clanton-McClaury clan, a local family of cattle ranchers and rustlers. Simmering animosities boiled over by October

1881. Virgil, the chief marshal in Tombstone deputized Wyatt, Morgan, and Doc

Holliday and prepared for the likely impending clash. On October 26, 1881, a thirty- second flurry of gunfire resulted in the wounding of Virgil and Morgan Earp and the deaths of Tom and Frank McLaury and Billy Clanton. While Doc Holliday was grazed with a bullet, only Wyatt escaped unharmed.50 Earp and his comrades faced charges and

a month-long trial before being acquitted of murder. Violence continued as assailants

seriously wounded Virgil in December 1881 and killed Morgan in March 1882 as

revenge for their roles in the shootout at the O.K. Corral. The bloody episode ended only

after a final act of retribution—Wyatt killed Frank Stillwell, Morgan’s presumed

murderer, in March 1882 before fleeing Arizona with authorities hot on his trail.51

50 Ibid., 79.

51 Ibid., 81.

21

Popularly known as the no-nonsense lawman that cleaned up Dodge City, Kansas before facing murderous cattle rustlers in Tombstone, Arizona, Earp became a symbol of frontier justice and an icon of ‘Wild West’ history.

Describing Wyatt’s actions historian Andrew Isenberg noted that “despite the ignominy of his exit from Tombstone, his role as a vigilante became a crucial part of his eventual status in American popular culture as an icon of law and order.”52 In exploring

this mystique it is important to explore the realities of his life. Isenberg succinctly

explained:

Wyatt led a life of restlessness, inconstancy, impulsive law-breaking, and shifting identities…he was a lawman in Missouri, Kansas, and Arizona; he was also a fugitive in Colorado, and saw the inside of jail cells in Arkansas, Illinois, Arizona, and California…he struck most as the paragon of probity; he spent most of his life working in brothels, saloons, and gambling halls. When he was not wearing a badge, he was variously thief, brothel bouncer, professional gambler, and confidence man.53

Dodge City and Tombstone constituted only a small portion of Earp’s life. The perceived

nobility of his vigilante actions belied the actualities of Earp’s life in the West.

Upon his hurried exit from Arizona, Wyatt Earp spent the proceeding years

wandering from one business, gambling, or mining venture to the next. Between the end

of the nineteenth century and moving into the twentieth, Earp pursued interests—both

legitimate and illegitimate—in New Mexico, Colorado, Kansas, Idaho, Kansas,

California, and Nevada. But his role in the apparent fixing of the 1896 championship

boxing match between Bob Fitzsimmons and Tom Sharkey returned Earp to the national

limelight. The crowd expressed severe displeasure with Earp’s decision to disqualify the

52 Andrew C. Isenberg. Wyatt Earp: A Vigilante Life. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2013), 4.

53 Ibid., 5.

22 champion Fitzsimmons for a suspicious low-blow. The San Jose Evening News reported that the crowd “dispersed amid cries of ‘swindle,’ ‘robbery,’ ‘jobbery,’ and similar evidences of disproval.”54 In the aftermath of the controversial fight Earp continued a

lifelong pattern—he left town. In 1897, Earp liquidated his possessions and sought riches

at the gold strike in the Klondike. More importantly, the episode facilitated an important

lesson—in a new media age Wyatt’s reputation preceded him wherever he went.55

Dime novels and other forms of nineteenth century popular literature influenced the nation’s memory of Earp and other law enforcement officials in the West. In the mid-

19th century dime novels represented a popular and widely-circulated medium of

literature in the United States. The novels—which generally contained simplified plots,

clearly defined heroes, villains, and conflicts—were cheaply produced on inexpensive

materials and often featured adventure stories about detectives, Native Americans, explorers of the American West, and mountain men, whose daring adventures kept readers coming back for more.56 Furthermore, the novels were often set in a range of

historical periods and geographic locales and notable western characters included Buffalo

Bill, Diamond Dick, or outlaws like Deadwood Dick and Jesse James. Written in an

accessible manner, the books appealed to an increasingly literate population, and

particularly, to young male readers.57 The mass consumption of fictionalized history

influenced the collective memory of the West. The portrayal of Earp and other law

54 Ibid., 171.

55 Ibid., 198.

56 J. Randolph Cox. The Dime Novel Companion a Source Book. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2000), xv-xvii. 57 Ibid.

23 enforcement figures in popular literature strongly contributed to the creation of a national myth, and while dime novels helped create a genre of imagined history, the publication of

The Virginian in 1902 particularly influenced Wyatt Earp.

Owen Wister’s book, The Virginian was a wildly popular tale of a cowboy on the

Wyoming frontier. From the perspective of an unnamed narrator readers learned the story of the ‘Virginian’ a stoic, thoughtful and brave individual as he experienced adventure, danger, and love along the western trails. In the story’s climatic scene, The Virginian faced his nemesis, the dishonorable and villainous Trampas. The drama of the book is illustrated:

A wind seemed to blow his sleeve off his arm, and he replied to it, and saw Trampas pitch forward. He saw Trampas raise his arm from the ground and fall again, and lie there this time, still. A little smoke was rising from the pistol on the ground, and he looked at his own, and saw the smoke flowing upward out of it. “I expect that's all," he said aloud. But as he came nearer Trampas, he covered him with his weapon. He stopped a moment, seeing the hand on the ground move. Two fingers twitched, and then ceased; for it was all. The Virginian stood looking down at Trampas. “Both of mine hit,” he said. “His must have gone mighty close to my arm…I told her it would not be me."58

The scene represented the quintessential modern idea of a “wild west’ showdown. Its

depiction of a skilled, honorable, and decisive character appealed to thousands of male

readers. The imagery of an honorable hero facing down the threats of a violent adversary

before returnin g home to his new bride struck a chord and further reinforced notions of

the West via literature.59 In particular, Wyatt Earp derived inspiration from popular

literature as he created a new image of himself in the nation’s historical memory.

58 Owen Wister. "The Virginian." The Gutenberg Project. September 17, 2008. Accessed June 23, 2015. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1298/1298-h/1298-h.htm. 59 Brown, 46.

24

The Virginian proved influential in Wyatt Earp’s efforts to alter his place in the nation’s history. Apparently given a copy of the book by his brother-in-law William

Edwards, in the last decades of his life Wyatt Earp undertook a conscious effort to influence and manipulate his image to that akin to Wister’s archetype. 60 In addition to

The Virginian’s heroic traits, Wister created a character with rough-hewn, humble roots.

Historian and author of Wyatt Earp: A Vigilante Life, Andrew Isenberg drew parallels

between the literary creation and Earp’s roots:

In Wister’s hero, Wyatt could see himself as he wished to be: a child of the backcountry who had risen to dominance in the cutthroat, male-dominated world of cow towns and mining camps. This made him not a “bad man,” as some newspapers characterized him, but a natural aristocrat.61

Earp found his inspiration in this story. Just as the book’s hero was uplifted to frontier nobility, Earp sought similar status. Furthermore, the positive portrayal of vigilante justice by Wister offered Earp the requisite justification for his actions at the O.K. Corral and its aftermath.62 The combination of humble roots and noble actions presented a

compelling archetype for Wyatt Earp in his efforts to craft a new persona. He first turned

to the nascent movie industry in Hollywood, California.

Hollywood, California became a budding center of movie production as

independent producers headed west in search of relief from the monopoly held by

Thomas Edison’s Motion Picture Patent Company. In 1915, a federal court ruling against

the Edison Trust facilitated the large-scale shift of the motion picture industry from

60 Isenberg, 202.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

25

Menlo Park, New Jersey to California.63 Wyatt Earp grasped the importance of

Hollywood in building his preferred place in history. In the years after his first visit to

Hollywood in 1914, Earp established stronger connections in the business. He charmed director Raoul Walsh and Charlie Chaplin with stories of his exploits before becoming an

informal advisor on the set of westerns. Earp first scored a walk-on role in 1916, in The

Half-Breed.64 Not a simple passion for acting, but rather more thoughtful desires

motivated Earp’s efforts in the movie-making community. By 1923, Earp maintained a

relationship with western film actor and director William S. Hart. In a letter to Hart, Earp wrote:

“Many wrong impressions of the early days of Tombstone and myself have been created…I am not going to live to the age of Methuselah, and any wrong impression I want to make right before I go away….The screen could do all this.”65

Earp’s words represented a distinct sense of mortality and a dual concern for his life’s

reflection in history. Whereas newspapers once trounced Earp for his role in the crooked

1896 championship boxing match, he was now far more cognizant of the positive uses of

the media. As a result, Wyatt consciously cultivated connections and relationships with

prominent members of the Hollywood community in the hope that his efforts would

create the lasting memory of himself as a heroic lawman, rather than a violent cattle

rustler and vigilante. In the last decade of his life, Wyatt Earp shifted his focus from

Hollywood and towards his story expressed in the written word.

63 "The Renegade Roots of Hollywood Studios." History.com. April 30, 2012. Accessed August 1, 2015.

64 Isenberg, 204.

65 Ibid.

26

Beginning in 1910 and continuing to his death in 1929, Wyatt Earp displayed a keen concern for the production and publication of a proper biography. Over that span of time, assorted writers—guided, influenced, cajoled, and occasionally, bullied by Earp— created the life story of a western hero for American readers. Early manuscripts presented Earp as a vigilante fulfilling a vendetta, while another portrayed the Earp family as principled nobles standing against a degenerate and corrupt society.66 Historian

Frank Lockwood, while researching in the mid-1920s for Arizona Characters,

interviewed an aged Earp and left with a different, darker perspective. While discussing

Earp’s recollections of the shooting of Frank Stillwell, Lockwood noted:

“Earp’s physical reactions that day as he sat talking to us of the way in which he shot Stillwell, the supple slithery fingering of the trigger of his gun as he visualized and reenacted the scene…in the minds of both my brother and myself that he had been a cold and cruel killer.”67

Earp’s seeming pleasure at taking the life of another man stood in contrast to the principled image apparent in other biographies of the western lawman. Other

perspectives were equally negative. William Breakenridge, an Earp rival, portrayed

Wyatt as little more than an unscrupulous murderer that wore a steel vest and gunned

down innocent and non-resisting cowboys in Tombstone.68 Ultimately, Lockwood and

Breakenridge represented the minority perspective of Earp. Instead, Wyatt Earp:

Frontier Marshal, written by Stuart Lake, supplanted the negative picture. Published

after his death, Lake offered the following description of Earp:

66 Ibid., 211.

67 Ibid.

68 William M. Breakenridge. Helldorado: Bringing Law to the Mesquite. (New York: Houghton Mifflin), 1928, 246.

27

Six feet tall, not weighing more than one hundred and fifty-five pounds…Wyatt possessed exceptional strength…Wyatt’s lean and muscular features were smooth-shaven and tanned brown, his slimness further set off by a white shirt, black trousers, wide-brimmed black hat, and high-heeled horsemen’s boots…Lake also armed him with a Buntline Special—a pistol with a twelve-inch barrel.”69

Although published after his death, Lake’s book sold out multiple printings and represented an immediate commercial success. In the aftermath of publication, the New

York Herald Tribune noted the book allowed Earp to “emerge from the shadows of the past in a halo and a robe.”70 Furthermore, Frontier Marshal formed the narrative behind the modern conception of Wyatt Earp. In the following years Frontier Marshal (1939),

My Darling Clementine (1946), and Gunfight at O.K. Corral (1946) were feature movies, while The Life and Legend of Wyatt Earp appeared on weekly television between 1955 and 1961.71 Any question of his character seemingly settled, Earp became the masculine, tough, wily, imposing, and valiant lawman he hoped to be remembered as. As assorted characters, particularly cowboys and lawmen, first played prominent roles in dime novels, magazines, and later, Hollywood movies the mythology of the western lawman cemented itself into the collective American memory.

The next chapter will explore the fundamental role of questions of race and ethnicity in the borderlands. Readers will find questions of race and ethnicity stretch back to the arrival of the Spanish in the sixteenth century before continuing in the contemporary era. Furthermore, readers will learn of the assorted factors that influenced

69 Isenberg, 214.

70 Ibid., 216.

71 Ibid., 217.

28 questions of race and ethnicity, and the accompanying inclusive or exclusive notions in the borderlands.

29

CHAPTER II

COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND EVOLUTION IN THE ARIZONA

BORDERLANDS: RACE AND ETHNICITY FROM THE SPANISH ERA TO

THE RISE OF THE SUNBELT

In the early pages of her seminal work of western history, The Legacy of

Conquest, historian Patricia Nelson Limerick examined Frederick Jackson Turner’s famous 1893 address, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History.” In the twilight of the nineteen century, Turner argued, “the frontier was the outer edge of the wave—the meeting point between savagery and civilization.”72 Reliant 1890 U.S. census,

and its findings of a closed frontier, Turner presented the West as a region where the

arrival and settlement of white Europeans represented progress and modernity in the face

of uncivilized and savage Indians. Moreover, while Turner’s arguments appealed to the

psyche of a nation on its ascent to world-power status; it represented an overly simplistic

and ethnocentric perspective. In contrast, Limerick interpreted the West as a place

subject to conflicting—European, Indian, Hispanic—influences in persistent competition

for dominance in the region. In general, diversity proved a better descriptor of the West

than previously acknowledged in American memory.

Just as Limerick presented a multifaceted history, it is critical to examine the

nuanced questions of race and ethnicity in the Southwest borderlands. In history that

stretched across the centuries from the arrival of the Spanish, through the Mexican

period, to the U.S. territorial era, and finally into the twentieth century intermittent

72 Patricia Nelson Limerick. The Legacy of Conquest: The Unbroken Past of the American West. (New York: Norton, 1987), 20.

30 episodes of conflict and cooperation demarcated the relationship between old and new arrivals. Across the eras, economic interdependence, or lack thereof, demographic shifts, and the perception of outside threats to the community facilitated cooperation or conflict—and widely interpretive notions of race—amongst the various peoples in the borderlands.

The first recorded episodes of conflict and cooperation date back to the arrival and growing influence of the Spanish in the sixteenth century. Although initial Spanish forays into Arizona by Marcos de Niza in 1539 and Francisco Vàzquez de Coronado a year later—in search of wealth and riches—came and left quickly, the expeditions marked a tumultuous era for natives. In 1736, a Yaqui Indian named Antonio Siraumea struck silver at a ranch later named Arizona, or the “good oak tree” in Basque. Despite providing the territory with its eventual name, the strike provided minimal long-term prosperity as a tiny minority of about 1,000 Hispanic settlers scraped along as subsistence farmers and small ranchers. Larger Spanish settlements followed with the establishment of a chain of missions that stretched into southern Arizona. 73

Presidios, or a system of forts intended to protect Spanish interests played a

fundamental role in the evolving questions of race in the borderlands. Although the

network in Arizona did not stretch much beyond northern Sonora—and was relatively

small comparable to missions in Florida, Texas, or other parts of Mexico—Tubac, a presidio in present-day southern Arizona, became a center of cultural exchange in the region. Founded in 1752, Tubac acted as an ethnic melting pot composed of Spaniards, mestizos, coyotes (Mestizo-Indians), mulattos, (Spanish-black), and members of assorted

73 Thomas E. Sheridan, Arizona: A History. Revised ed. (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012), 42.

31

Indian tribes. In general, the captains of the presidios claimed an Iberian or criollo

(Spaniard of New World birth) identity while most gente de razon (“people of reason”) descended from a fusion of European, Indian, and African that made colonial Mexico such a diverse and fluid society during the colonial period.74 Although presidios

facilitated exchanges on Spanish terms, European influence occupied a highly tenuous

position in the face of a multitude of hostile native groups.

The establishment of Tubac contributed to a period of persistent conflict in the

borderlands. In 1775, Juan Bautista de Anza (the Younger) led a group of colonists from

Tubac to San Francisco Bay. Six years later, Quechan Indians violently responded to the

incursions by slaughtering a group of Spanish settlers and effectively severed the link

connecting California, Arizona, and Mexico. In addition to the Quechan, the Pueblo,

O’odham, Navajo, Apache, and other groups occupied assorted territories in Arizona.75

As Spanish settlement persevered through setbacks, the relationship between

Europeans, O’odham and Apache—peaceful and violent—often constituted a vital dynamic in the region. The Apache—with its highly fluid clan-based society, reputation for punishing raids throughout the region, and propensity to break treaties—particularly confounded the Spaniards. Cognizant of the threat and in an early instance of cooperation, according to historian Kieran McCarty, the O’odham served as the

“perennial listening post during the Spanish and Mexican periods for situations developing beyond the frontier.”76 Cooperation between Indians and Europeans did not

74 Ibid., 43.

75 Ibid., 39-40.

76 Ibid., 42.

32 end with a single tribe. Coupled with larger changes such as removal of the Jesuits, the weakening of the Franciscans in 1767, Spanish government officials undertook wholesale plans to divide and weaken their Indian foes. As an example, in the 1780s leaders like

Bautista de Anza persuaded Navajos, Utes, and Comanches to stop fighting Spaniards and carry the battle to their Apache foe.77 In this case, a tenuous environment together

with an omnipresent enemy—the Apache—facilitated cooperation between the Spanish

and tribes primarily hostile to the Apache. Although the Spanish population numbered

approximately one-thousand by the end of the 18th century, the cooperation begat modest

economic prosperity and enabled the resiliency of Hispanic culture in the inhospitable

Southwest borderlands.78

In contrast to the Spanish, Mexican authorities failed in maintaining a prosperous

and stable environment in the region. Upon independence from Spain in 1821, Mexico

found itself saddled with a tumultuous and evolving Arizona borderlands. The arrival of

Anglo trappers represented the first stage of these changes. Historian Thomas Sheridan described the trappers as a “ragtag collection of misfits, adventurers, and businessmen later romanticized as mountain men.”79 Sylvester Pattie, and his son James, were the first

Anglo trappers to set foot in Arizona in the winter of 1825-26. In particular, the journals of James presented a fanciful picture of the region, as he noted, “panthers, bloodthirsty

Indians, and wild hogs, or javelina…. whose tusks were of a size so enormous, that I am

77 Ibid., 47.

78 Ibid., 50.

79 Ibid., 52.

33 afraid to commit my credibility, by giving their dimensions.”80 Hyperbole aside, the

journals illustrated the appeal of the borderlands as trappers eyed the pristine wilderness

as an opportunity to rip “hairy banknotes,” the term applied to much sought after beaver

pelts, from every waterway from the upper Gila to the Colorado delta.81 The economic pursuits contributed to the distinct atmosphere of conflict as many tribes viewed trappers with distrust. A January 1826 massacre highlighted the suspicious environment. The

Pattie journals described acrimonious interactions between a group of sixteen traders and

Papago Indians when the trappers happened upon the village in the Salt River Valley.

The two groups retired for the evening only for the Papago to spring upon their guests in a treacherous nighttime attack. Camped a distance from the main village, Pattie described the attack,

We heard a fierce whistle, which we instantly understood as signal for an attack on the French camp…we heard the clashing of war clubs, followed by the shrieks of the dying French, mingled with the louder and more horrible yells of these bloodthirsty savages.82

Pattie, Michael Robidoux, and an unnamed third Frenchman escaped and survived the

carnage. In the following days, the survivors crossed paths with another group of Anglo

trappers and sprang a trap upon the Papago village massacring 110 Indians.83 Pattie

matter-of-factly described the results of the reprisal, as the group found a lone survivor

described as, “one poor old and deaf Indian, who sat eating his mush as unconcernedly as

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 Robert J. Willoughby. Brothers Robidoux and the Opening of the American West. (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2014), 85.

83 Ibid., 86.

34 if all had been tranquil in the village. We did not molest him.”84 The massacre arose

from the belligerent atmosphere present in the Arizona borderlands. In the face of

heavily-armed strangers encroaching upon their lands and competing for resources,

Indians reasonably responded with violence.85 Although the presence of trappers in

Arizona represented a minimal—and short-lived—intrusion into the region compared to

the growth of other Anglo populations in Texas or along portions of the Santa Fe Trail in

the 1820s and 30s, their presence became emblematic of the loosening grip of the

Mexican government on their northern territories.86

The Mexican government—and its loss of control of the region—also played a

role in the violence. A New York editor expressed the sentiments of many Anglos when

he wrote, “There is no such thing as title to the wild lands of the new world, except which

actual possession gives. They belong to whoever will redeem them from the Indian and

the desert, and subjugate them to the use of man.”87 The editor’s words showed an

indifference or outright ambivalence toward the presence of Indians, but more

importantly, the failure of Mexican government authority and the legitimacy of manifest

destiny. In the years after independence, Mexico underwent a series of changes that

precipitated conflict in Arizona. Historians point to the replacement of the provincias

internas—a centralized authority— in 1821 with a less effective state system as crucial in

the collapse of Mexican authority in the borderlands. The lack of a strong central

84 Ibid.

85 Sheridan, 53.

86 Ibid., 54.

87 Ibid., 56.

35 authority predisposed Mexico toward a highly fragmented, ineffective governing structure. Furthermore, assorted caudillos, or military strongmen, jockeyed for position and dominated Mexican politics during the nineteenth century. As a result, the constant civil strife, and occasionally outright combat, amongst competing power brokers left the northernmost reaches of Mexican territory exposed to Apache raids.88 A final factor, the

dismantling of the Apache rationing program further exacerbated conflict in the region.

Begun as part of the “Galvez Reforms,” in the 1790s Spanish authorities dispensed food rations to Apaches in an attempt to mollify and pacify the warring tribe.89 When

Mexican authorities effectively ended the rationing program in 1831, many previously-

dependent Apache resumed raids along the frontier to acquire resources.90 Indian raids in the northern borderlands reduced the Mexican presence considerably. The slight—but growing—intrusion of Anglos, combined with civil strife, government ineptitude, and renewed Apache raids created a highly turbulent period in the region’s history. In a few short years, United States authority replaced Mexican and the inhabitants of the borderlands faced renewed and persistent questions concerning race and ethnicity in the borderlands.91

Upon the end of the U.S.-Mexican War and Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo in

1848, coupled with the Gadsden Purchase in 1854, the United States took possession of

88 Ibid., 55.

89 Richard John Perry. Western Apache Heritage: People of the Mountain Corridor. (Austin: University of Texas Press), 1991.

90 William B. Griffen. Apaches at War and Peace: The Janos Presidio, 1750-1858. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press), 1998.

91 For more information on the imposition of U.S. control in the Southwest borderlands reference “War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S.-Mexican War” by Brian DeLay.

36 the Arizona Territory. Mining represented the earliest example of large-scale Anglo economic activities in Arizona as prospectors descended upon places like Haysayampa,

Harquahala, and Castle Dome in search of gold, silver, copper, and other valuable ores.

These activities perpetuated the cycle of cooperation and conflict in the region as many mining communities relied upon Sonoran trading links. Historian and borderlands scholar Samuel Truett explained:

merchants from northern Mexico freighted wagonloads of flour, beans, fruit, and panoche (brown sugar cakes) across the line, which they often exchanged for bullion. From these, the Mexican miners made their traditional fare of tortillas, frijoles, and pinole. Such transactions were often modest, but they anchored far- reaching connections. In Sonora, almost every shopkeeper knew the value of the ore…which passed from hand to hand across a vast transnational network of exchange that reached even to the merchant ships along Mexico's west coast.92

Mining and trading strengthened traditional borderlands and cross-cultural relationships

while creating a diverse elite class. This class, comprised by a small group of ethnic

Mexicans and a growing segment of Euro-Americans, enjoyed economic and political

influence while sharing status as “white.” For example, individuals like Estevan Ochoa

and Mariano Samaniego controlled the freight industry in the region while Leopoldo

Carrillo, a native Sonoran, was the wealthiest individual in Tucson. 93 In a continuation of

history that stretched back to the Spanish era, racial and ethnic boundaries carried

minimal meaning as economic interests promoted cooperation amongst Anglos,

Mexicans, and Indians and created a diverse elite class. The elite power dynamic also

filtered down to the working class. Anglo mining efforts relied upon Mexican and Indian

92 Samuel Truett. "The Ghosts of Frontiers Past: Making and Unmaking Space in the Borderlands." Journal of the Southwest 2004, 46, no. 2, 326.

93 Eric V. Meeks. Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos in Arizona. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 25.

37 labor as more than 80 percent of the men in the Santa Rita and Heintzelman mining camps in 1860 were from Mexico (86 percent if one counts those Mexicans born in

Arizona), and 94 percent of those at the Mowry mine in 1864 were of Mexican origin.

Mestizos, Opatas, Yaquis, and Tohono O'odham comprised this group.94 These numbers

granted Mexican and Indian workers a degree of power as work stoppages or occasional

outbursts of violence allowed workers to negotiate favorable terms of labor with owners.95 The construction of the railroad networks, however, rekindled questions of

race in the Arizona borderlands.

Despite the measured racial harmony in the region, Arizona lacked development

comparable to cities in the Great Plains or east of the Mississippi River. Upon

disembarking from a steamboat along the Colorado River at Ehrenberg in the summer of

1874, U.S. Army wife Martha Summerhays described the territory as, “An unfriendly,

dirty, and Heaven-forsaken place, inhabited by a poor class of Mexicans and half-

breeds.”96 Aside from the obvious disdain and prejudice, the remarks summarized the realities of the underdeveloped Arizona territory—most communities initially founded

after 1850 sprang up near steamboat ports, mining communities, and military installations

in relative proximity to the Colorado or Santa Cruz Rivers and could not grow beyond limited connections afforded by aforementioned Sonoran trading connections. The 1877 introduction and passage of a bill in the Arizona territorial assembly by Estevan Ochoa— a member of the ethnic Mexican elite—facilitated the construction of the Southern

94 Truett, 326.

95 Meeks, 26.

96 Sheridan, 71.

38

Pacific railroad. The Southern Pacific and other smaller rails integrated Arizona with markets far beyond the borderlands but also began the alteration of the traditional racial relationship in Arizona.

In his book, Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos in

Arizona, historian Eric V. Meeks aptly described the irony of Ochoa’s successful legislation in the territorial assembly. The Southern Pacific railroad created stronger connections between the borderlands and eastern regions of the United States and ushered in an era of remarkable prosperity. This prosperity, however, rendered historic Sonoran links—often controlled by ethnic Mexicans—obsolete. Without lucrative commercial operations, assorted members of the previously-diverse elite class lost influence. As an example, Mariano Samaniego represented the only Spanish-surnamed member of the territorial assembly by the late 1880s, and by the turn of the century, the assembly lacked any ethnic Mexican membership.97 The railroad also negatively affected workers as

mining and agricultural owners sought workers from new sources. By the 1880s,

laborers from China and other regions of Mexico now accessible via the Mexican Central

Railroad replaced many workers hailing from Sonora. Deprived of their advantage, unskilled Sonoran labor could no longer negotiate favorable terms while companies also began importing their own skilled workers and managers from other portions of the

United States and Europe. As economic prosperity shifted away from Mexicans and became more closely held by Anglos, traditional forms of cooperation moved toward

97 Meeks, 27.

39 historical irrelevance. With obsolete trading networks, and no longer the primary labor source, many ethnic Mexicans in the borderlands lost economic and political power.98

The economic changes precipitated by the railroad and other industries led to the

solidification of a complex racial hierarchy in the borderlands. Meeks noted the stratified

wage structure in the Clifton-Morenci-Metcalf mining district. According to records, in

1909, 94 percent of U.S.-born workers identified as white and earned $3.50 or more.

What Canadian, English, German, and Irish immigrants earned was comparable with the

wages of native-born, Euro-American workers. In contrast, 93 percent of Mexican-born

workers earned between $1.50 and $2.50. In general, native-born and European

immigrants described as miners and general workers earned twice the wage of the ethnic

Mexicans in the same positions and substantially more than Italians, who despite also

being European still represented a lower social class than those of northern or western

European lineage. The hierarchical system further solidified, or restricted, the work

available to Mexicans and Indians. The vast majority of skilled, and office positions went

to those designated as “white” while most Mexicans worked as translators or in

construction. Yaquis held the lowest-paid positions as repairmen or construction

workers, most earning less than $2.00 a day. 99 As the modern industrialized economy,

defined by the increasing use of unskilled labor and the concentration of capital in a small

class of wealthy Anglos, predominated in the borderlands at the turn of the twentieth

century, a stratified racial system took hold in Arizona. Native born Anglos sat atop the

hierarchy, followed by “white” European immigrants, a quickly-shrinking class of elite

98 Ibid.

99 Ibid., 29-30.

40

Mexicans able to retain their previous status, Slavic and Italian immigrants increasingly seen as “non-white” and finally a growing “underclass” of Mexicans and Indians.100

In the second half of the nineteenth century, millions of Europeans and Asians immigrated to the United States. Societal problems often arose in the midst of this immigrant influx. In particular, thousands of homeless, neglected, and dependent children thronged the streets of the larger Eastern cities, with very few individuals concerned with their plight. Deadening poverty, with concomitant high birth, and mortality rates, sprawling slums, rampant vice, few compulsory school laws, and an almost complete absence of welfare programs of any significance characterized cities in the Progressive Era.101 Irish immigrant children acutely suffered under these

circumstances. In response, organizations such as the New York Foundling Hospital

worked to mitigate the misery of Irish Catholic orphans by settling them in appropriate homes. In 1904, three nuns sought to settle forty orphans in Arizona, but their efforts

touched off a firestorm and revealed a contentious split over questions of race and

ethnicity in the region.

In October 1904 forty Irish-Catholic orphans arrived in Clifton and Morenci.

Father Constant Mandin—a Frenchman on his first pastoral assignment—led the group

aided by Sister Anna Michaella Bowen. The two received further assistance from Sister

Ann Corsini Cross, an Irish immigrant; Sister Francis Liguori Keller, a French-born nun;

100 Ibid., 40-41.

101 Raymond A. Mulligan. "New York Foundlings at Clifton-Morenci Social Justice in Arizona Territory 1904-1905." Arizona and the West, 1964, 105.

41 four nurses and placement agent George Swayne.102 Taken to the Sacred Heart Church

shortly before being placed in foster homes, the arrival of a large group of children

represented an unusual event in the mining communities. News of their presence filtered

around the Mexican and Anglo communities creating a fierce and violent controversy

among Anglo Arizonans. Within hours, a vigilante mob—comprised of mostly women,

some husbands, and the local sheriff—numbering about twenty-five descended upon the

foster homes in Clifton and forcibly recovered the orphans. The events in Morenci

followed a similar course. The Tucson Daily carried a nun’s account of the evening’s

events:

On Sunday night we were called from the rooms of our hotel in Morenci. In the street a sheriff sat on horseback, armed with a revolver, like the other men. Women called us vile names, and some of them put pistols to our heads. They said there was no law in that town; that they made their own laws. We were told to get the children from the Spaniards and leave by Tuesday morning. If we did not, we would be killed. We got the children, but nineteen of the twenty-four were taken from the nurses by force and put, I understand, into the families of Americans.103

The armed abduction of the orphans out of Mexican homes and into Anglo homes—and

the court case precipitated by the events—offered a stark example of the highly stratified

racial hierarchy present in Arizona by the turn of the twentieth century.

Historian Linda Gordon’s prize winning book The Great Arizona Orphan

Abduction, explored these questions and realities of race in Arizona. Consider the

statements of Tom Simpson, a Clifton locomotive engineer, in his court testimony as he

102 Margaret Regan. "The Irish Orphan Abduction." Tucson Weekly. March 15, 2007. Accessed December 27, 2015. http://www.tucsonweekly.com/tucson/the-irish-orphan- abduction/Content?oid=1087070.

103 Mulligan, 112.

42 noted, “they all live in those little shacks about the size of 8 x 6, or 8 x 10, and most of them have no floor at all…. they all get very little salary…they have five or six people staying one room.”104 The description of squalid living conditions represented only a

small portion of the tropes concerning Mexicans. living in the mining camps as Gordon

further explained that Anglos believed:

Mexicans were cruel, to animals, women, and other men; they were cowardly and treacherous and could triumph only through betrayal and a knife in the back; they were natural thieves and had no respect for property; and they were indolent…the inferiority—especially moral inferiority—of Mexicans was part of the Anglos’ individual identities, their egos as brave, rough, and honest westerners.105

The perceptions created a stark contrast in those defined as “white” as rugged, bold, and moral, whereas Mexicans personified subordinate and impure traits. Legal efforts by the

Foundling Hospital to regain custody of the orphans only reinforced these racial norms.

In January 1905 the Arizona Territorial Supreme Court explained the Anglos acted, “with humanitarian impulse…assisted in the rescue of these children,” and ruled, “We feel it is for their best interests that no change be made in their custody.”106 Against this backdrop

of racial hierarchy and conflict, it was simply incomprehensible that Mexicans could

raise “white” Irish orphans in moral and loving homes. The accepted norms of this era

defined the episode not as violent vigilantism, but rather altruistic actions taken to protect

vulnerable children from lives of misery and suffering. Whereas hardened racial ideas

predicated a community’s reaction to the arrival of handful of orphans, the Bisbee

104 Linda Gordon. The Great Arizona Orphan Abduction. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999), 150-51.

105 Ibid, 151.

106 Ibid., 294.

43

Deportation served as another stark example of conflict over questions of race in the borderlands.

In the summer of 1917 efforts by the underclass of workers and “foreigners” to decisively change their economic stead prompted a harsh backlash in the Anglo community. On July 13, 1917 the Bisbee Daily Review exclaimed, “IT WAS A

QUESTION OF BEATING THESE FOREIGN TERRORISTS AND PROFESSIONAL

AGITATORS AND STRIKERS TO IT.”107 The statements came in response to an event

known to history as the Bisbee Deportation. Under the leadership of the International

Workers of the World—a union that specifically recruited foreign or unskilled labor—

(I.W.W.) or ‘Wobblies,’ agitated workers struck in June 1917. On June 24, 1917, the

I.W.W. presented the Bisbee mining companies with a list of demands. These demands

included improvements to safety and working conditions, such as requiring two men on

each machine and an end to blasting in the mines during shifts. Strikers further demanded

an end to discrimination against members of labor organizations and the unequal

treatment of foreign and minority workers. Furthermore, the unions wanted a flat wage

system to replace sliding scales tied to the market price of copper. The copper companies

refused all I.W.W. demands, using the war effort as justification. As a result, a strike was

called, and by June 27 roughly half of the Bisbee workforce left their jobs. In the early

morning hours of July 12, The Citizen's Protective League, an anti-union organization

formed during a previous labor dispute, and a group of miners loyal to the mining

companies known as the Workman’s Loyalty League responded. Numbering about 2,000

and under the leadership of Sheriff Henry Wheeler, the armed group rounded up,

107 "The Great Wobbly Drive." The Bisbee Daily Review, July 13, 1917.

44 arrested, and deported—under inhumane conditions—approximately 1,200 strikers, agitators, and other individuals. 108 As stated by the Bisbee Daily Review and on a

simplistic level, the events represented proactive measures to protect a nation in the midst

of World War I, but in the borderlands, the events of June and July 1917 carried deeper

significance.

The Bisbee Deportation constituted another example of the flexible interpretations

of race and ethnicity in the borderlands and the resultant periods of conflict and

cooperation. During the unrest, Mexicans reoccupied their position as foreigners, and in

this particular case-enemies. Assorted reasons fermented the hostility towards Mexicans.

First, Anglos perceived strikers’ wage demands as radical. In particular, the strike

proposed to more than double the wages of all surface laborers, regardless of race, from

$2.50 to $5.50 per day, while raising the wage of white underground miners from $5.75

to $6.00—an increase of less than five percent.109 In Borderline Americans: Racial

Division and Labor War in the Arizona Borderlands, Katherine Benton-Cohen addressed

the deeper implications of such demands. For example, Miles Merrill, a miner who led

the Workman’s Loyalty League, protested the “inconsistency of that wage scale…Miners

would prefer to work on the top for five and a half than underground for six [dollars]. I

would prefer to.”110 By the time of the 1917 strike, unskilled labor had replaced large

portions of the skilled underground workforce. That fact, coupled with increased wage

108 "The Bisbee Deportation of 1917." Historical Context-Overview. Accessed January 3, 2016. http://www.library.arizona.edu/exhibits/bisbee/history/overview.html.

109 Katherine Benton Cohen. Borderline Americans: Racial Division and Labor War in the Arizona Borderlands. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press), 2009, 208.

110 Ibid.

45 demands from strikers undermined the roots of the racial system. Without the appeal of higher wages—and the attached notions of skilled workmanship and masculinity that came with working underground—above ground work attracted increased numbers of whites. As more Anglos worked above ground—and shared labor with Mexican or non- white workers—notions of Mexican inferiority and ineptitude slowly lost influence. In short, proposing such high wages for surface work hinted at a wholesale reordering of mining’s race-based labor system.111 As labor unrest in southern Arizona threatened the

region’s social hierarchy, questions of statehood, and international events also influenced

this episode of conflict.

Domestic politics and questions of statehood influenced questions of race in the

borderlands. In the contentious debate preceding statehood for each territory in 1912,

race again represented a primary concern. In particular, a 1905 congressional proposal to

combine Arizona and New Mexico territories into one state unleashed a spate of racist

rhetoric from mostly-Democratic Arizona lawmakers. A Scientific American editorial

exhorted, “Arizona is American. New Mexico is Mexican, to the extent of sixty percent

of its population. Even the legislature of the latter is controlled by the Spanish-American element, while the Arizona body there is but one member of the Latin race.”112 The

language vividly stated the perceived racial dichotomy between the two territories and

Anglo Arizonans could not tolerate the notion of sharing statehood—and being controlled by—a predominantly Hispanic and Republic legislature. Even more starkly, the same editorial noted, “Arizona doesn’t want senators, she wants home rule, and by all right of

111 Ibid.

112 Ibid., 186.

46

American citizenship, she ought to have what she wants.”113 In this case, Arizona’s

obstinacy, even in the face of increased political rights brought about by statehood,

reflected a remarkable fear stemming from questions of race in the borderlands. In the

eyes of many Anglo Arizonans, political equality with, or minority status to, Hispanics

represented a simply intolerable outcome. While Arizona and New Mexico gained

separate statehood, international affairs only inflamed questions of race in the borderlands.

At the same time, the Mexican Revolution and the First World War sharpened the

ethno-racial conflict in the borderlands. The Mexican Revolution—that began in 1910

and punctuated by massive social unrest, violence, political chaos, fostered great unease

across the region. In “Mexican camps,” like Clifton north of the border, malingering,

brief sit-downs, and other minor work stoppages became so common that a new Spanish

term arose to describe them: strikitos.114 Furthermore, between 1913-15 large-scale

strikes occurred in El Paso, Texas, and the Arizona mining communities of Ray, Clifton,

and Ajo. As the larger revolutionary environment created a class of Mexican laborers

more willing to agitate for change, events in Mexico also facilitated a harsh backlash and

the actions of Sherriff Wheeler offer a clear example. Wheeler, defined by Beton-Cohen

as neither a “company man, nor crooked”115 nonetheless actively led the deportation

efforts.116 Wheeler revealed his motivations upon noting, “We intend to make this an

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid., 203.

115 Ibid., 220.

116 Ibid., 220.

47

American camp where American working men may enjoy life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness unmolested by alien enemies of any breed.”117 “Border troubles” referenced by

Wheeler during the accompanying investigation worsened the racial hostility. Historical

questions of race, exacerbated by the nationwide anti-German anxiety created by the war

in Europe, presented a mix ripe for conflict. In the early years of Arizona’s statehood, assorted factors hardened the racial divide, only to see those divisions dissipate as a result of another conflict and accompanying demographic shifts.

The theme of conflict and cooperation continued in Arizona as the borderlands entered the middle of the twentieth century. In his study, Standing on Common Ground: the Making of a Sunbelt Borderland, Gerardo L. Cadava explores the transnational connections between Hispanic and Anglo communities that stretched from Tucson to

Sonora. These developments originated with economic stimulus and prosperity initially experienced during World War II. In particular, domestic and international affairs exercised great influence as perceived threats during the Second War geared spending toward national and hemispheric defense.118 During wartime, the expansion of Davis-

Monthan Air Force Base in Tucson exemplified the militarization of the borderlands. By

January 1942, the U.S. military invested $3 million in the expansion program. The result,

according to one reporter, was that “pilots, co-pilots, navigators, bombardiers, radio men,

aircraft gunners and engineers flocked to Tucson to be molded into war-ready B-17 and

B-24 crews.”119 Furthermore, thousands of other military and civilian personnel flocked

117 Ibid., 221.

118 Geraldo L. Cadava. Standing on Common Ground: The Making of a Sunbelt Borderland. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 12.

119 Ibid., 39.

48 to the area and held jobs described as, “satisfying,” because it introduced them to “people from different parts of the country….and people of different ethnicities.”120 On a larger

level, government officials echoed similarly cooperative tones when discussing the

relationship between the United States and Mexico during the era. For example, in letters written to Mexican journalists, Arizona Governor Sidney P. Osborn wrote, “old prejudices and barriers of race,” and “mankind possesses a mutuality of interests that is not confined by national boundaries.”121 As international threats influenced the

borderlands economy and created an outwardly more cooperative racial environment,

ethnic Mexicans more fully participated in the era’s economic and social progress.

Mexican-Americans and Mexican nationals played a vital role in the wartime economy. Just as millions of other workers around the country flocked to the nation’s factories to help create an ‘arsenal of democracy,’ thousands of Mexican-Americans worked in war-related capacities. Two entities, Consolidated Vultee and the Southern

Pacific railroad represented the primary employers of Mexicans in Tucson as they, respectively, comprised approximately 25 percent of the Consolidated workforce and 65 percent of the Standard Pacific labor force. Company reports touted the impact of these workers, as “minority laborers could be found in all areas of the plants.”122 More

particularly, women like Lily Valenzuela Liu, Jenny Benitez, and Juanita Villegas Bernal

exemplified the experiences of many minority women in the borderlands. Bernal noted

120 Ibid.

121 Ibid., 37.

122 Ibid., 48.

49 that SP “hired women right off the street” during the war.123 Paid $50 to $60 every two

weeks while maintaining Standard Pacific trains, Liu and Benitez faced grueling and

dangerous conditions, while Bernal coped with social isolation as a telegrapher and telephone operator perpetually relocating at the behest of Standard Pacific. As women found non-traditional vocations, agriculture continued its influence in the region. In response to increased agricultural demands, in 1942, the U.S. and Mexico formalized the

Bracero Program that further strengthened borderland connections. Despite those stronger bonds, wartime needs did not eliminate old questions and animosities concerning race in

the region, but rather, altered their perception within communities. In a continuation of

historical trends, Mexicans often received lower wages, were restricted to unskilled

occupations, and some Anglo Arizonans expressed displeasure over the importation of

laborers.124 But ultimately, wartime need trumped historical debates over race as

Governor Osborn noted, “racial prejudices and antagonisms undermined national

unity.”125 The hardened racial boundaries created by the early twentieth century lost

value in the midst of international crisis. Furthermore, the Second World War proved

transformative as wartime production and construction of infrastructure generated tens of

thousands of new jobs and laid the groundwork for the explosive growth of the postwar

Sunbelt. More importantly, the war mitigated historically divisive questions of race for a

brief period and created the foundation for race relations in the following decades.126

123 Ibid.

124 Ibid., 50.

125 Ibid., 52.

126 Ibid., 55.

50

The growth of postwar Tucson exemplified the changes within the Sunbelt borderlands. With support from federal governments on both sides of the border, manufacturing, tourism, agriculture, and livestock industries expanded dramatically.

Politicians and businessmen drove the atmosphere of growth as entities like Goodyear

Aircraft Company, Sperry Rand, Motorola, and Howard Hughes Aircraft located operations in Phoenix or Tucson. The region’s economic growth stimulated—or coincided with—an influx of thousands of white, middle-class individuals and families from the rustbelt. As a result, Tucson’s white population grew faster than the city’s

Mexican or native communities, which, by 1960, formed barely 20 percent of the city’s population.127 These postwar demographic changes and marketing facilitated the

reappearance of historical questions of race and ethnicity in the borderlands.

Begun in 1925, La Fiesta de los Vaqueros became the most important event in

Arizona and Sonora’s winter tourism season. Originally the brainchild of businessman

Leighton Kramer as a fundraiser to send the University of Arizona polo team to a match against Princeton, the festivities eventually grew into a weeklong spectacle of parades and rodeos. The activities promoted cross-border connections as chambers of commerce, branches of the Rotary Club, and La Alianza lodges promoted Good Neighbor relations through La Fiesta de los Vaqueros via banquets, golf tournaments, charity drives and tours of dams, ranches, warehouses, and other hubs of activities in the borderlands.128 In

127 Ibid., 59.

128 Ibid., 69.

51 the immediate postwar era, the festivities helped the borderlands fashion an imagined and economically desirable cultural identity in the postwar era.129

Stereotypical, yet marketable images dominated postwar growth. Civic leaders

created the story that Anglo entrepreneurial spirit spearheaded Tucson’s prosperity. By

the early 1950s, tourism and conventions became the city’s greatest moneymakers,

bringing in $58 million per year. Wholesale and retail employers paid workers more than

$55 million while other assorted industries filled the list. Furthermore, promotional literature offered the impression that whites were responsible for such growth, ignoring

how Mexican and native laborers, tourists, and cross-border consumers supported the city’s expansion.130 Local industries and businesses perpetuated this fantasy. For

example, Hughes Aircraft encouraged its employees to “indulge in the spirit” of rodeo

week by going western. Department stores such as Jacome’s, Steinfeld’s, and Cele

Peterson’s advertised Tony Lama cowboy boots, starch-stiff Levi’s, and wide-brimmed

sombreros. Indeed, “Go Western” represented a business opportunity.131 As rodeo week indulged the capitalist desires of the borderlands, it also reinforced traditional racial and ethnic stereotypes. Consider the persistent inclusion of images such as a Mexican wearing a serape and a sombrero pulled down over his eyes, napping against a wall.

Others showed a Mexican boy drawing water from a well and a Tohono O’odham mother staring into the distance, seemingly out of place on a downtown street corner.

Promotional materials depicted Mexicans and Native Americans as lazy, anti-modern,

129 Ibid., 57.

130 Ibid., 80.

131 Ibid.

52 common laborers.132 In this hierarchy, Anglos created and promoted prosperity, while

Mexicans and natives simply constituted an inferior class of laborers. As a result,

Mexicans and natives often faced discrimination in employment, housing, and education.133 Rather than limit ethno-racial problems in the borderlands, La Fiesta de los

Vaqueros reinforced longstanding racist notions in the borderlands.

Questions of race and ethnicity have remained persistent in the borderlands. In contrast to the notions initially put forth by Frederick Jackson Turner, Arizona’s history should not be perceived as a little more than a savage frontier only civilized upon the arrival of Anglos. As early as the seventeenth century, Spanish settlers and Indians experienced intermittent periods of conflict and cooperation. The cycle continued during a brief period of Mexican control, the imposition of U.S. authority after 1848, international crisis during Arizona’s early statehood, and finally the growth of the sunbelt borderlands after World War II. In each case, periods of conflict or cooperation stemmed from a handful of common factors. Economic prosperity or interdependence, such as during Arizona’s nineteenth-century territorial period or the Second World War, often contributed to cooperation. At other points, such as the influx of Asian and European immigrants to the borderlands or the threat of Germany during the First World War represented perceived threats to the community and resulted in conflict. When racial tension eased, race and ethnicity represented more inclusive notions as Anglos and

Mexicans or Indians could more easily share common social status. In time of conflict racial boundaries hardened as Mexicans and natives were perceived as “others”

132 Ibid., 87.

133 Ibid., 82-83.

53 occupying a social status beneath Anglos. Just as race has influenced the borderlands since the seventeenth century, it played a consequential part in the rise of Sheriff Joe

Arpaio.

The next chapter will explore the rise of Sheriff Joe Arpaio. In most cases,

Sheriff Arpaio often filled the everyday roles reminiscent of territorial lawmen. Yet, in a continuation of the larger historical trends, communities perceived—and reacted to outside threats. Modern fears of crime, the international drug trade, or undocumented immigration replaced radical labor or German espionage as threats to the borderlands.

Readers will find the intersection of a mythical ‘Wild West’ lawman, racial and ethnic questions in the borderlands, and perceived threats to the community facilitated the rise of Joe Arpaio to remarkable influence and notoriety since his election as the Sheriff of

Maricopa County.

54

CHAPTER III

THE RISE OF SHERIFF JOE ARPAIO

Joe Arpaio first won election as the Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arizona in 1992.

In the years that followed, Sheriff Arpaio cultivated an image as the ‘toughest sheriff in

America.’ The hard-bitten, straight-talking and crime-fighting persona served him well.

He won the next five elections, and as of August 2016 Arpaio continued to serve as the

Sheriff of Maricopa County. The conservative ‘war on drugs,’ crime, the growth of the

Sunbelt, and particularly, the changing demographic and economic character of Arizona have facilitated the rise of Sheriff Joe Arpaio into an influential public figure. Rather than merely ride the wave of changing attitudes, Arpaio astutely crafted an image designed to appeal to conservative, Anglo, and older voters. Moreover, posses, harsh incarceration methods, and swagger appealed to the mythic past of an ‘old West’ sheriff and allowed Arpaio to earn the distinction of the ‘toughest sheriff in America.134

Born in 1932 in Springfield, Massachusetts to Italian immigrants, Joe Arpaio was

raised by his father after his mother died during childbirth. He later grew up in New

Jersey. As a young man, Arpaio volunteered and enlisted in the U.S. Army from 1950-

53. Although his service coincided with the Korean War, Arpaio’s typist skills facilitated

his lone overseas deployment to France as a clerk in a medical detachment. He then

served as a police officer in Washington D.C. and Las Vegas, Nevada from 1954-57.

After the brief stint in local law enforcement, Joe Arpaio embarked upon a federal law

enforcement career that stretched from 1957-1982. He became a federal agent for the

134 Joe Arpaio and Len Sherman. America's Toughest Sheriff: How to Win the War Against Crime. (Arlington, TX: Summit Pub. Group, 1996), 5.

55

Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), the predecessor of the Drug Enforcement Agency

(DEA). Early in his career, Arpaio acquired the nickname “Nickel-Bag Joe.”135 Arpaio

explained, “I got that from starting with a measly nickel bag and leveraging it up to big

busts.”136 As his federal career progressed, Arpaio combated the narcotics trade around

the globe. After assorted postings, notably in Turkey, the greater Middle East, Central

and South America, Arpaio returned to the United States. His career trajectory continued upward. Arpaio filled various offices such as regional director-in-charge for the DEA

which acquainted him with the narcotics trade across the U.S.-Mexico border. In 1969, he

participated in Operation Intercept, the anti-drug effort by the Nixon Administration as an

aerial observer on the border.137 According to Arpaio, his career as a federal drug

enforcement official constituted nearly an unadulterated success as his visionary ideas

and strict enforcement begat large-scale busts and high profile arrests. Over the course of

his career, Arpaio noted that he received assorted citations and commendations that

ranged from the Extraordinary Service Award from the Office of Special Investigations

of the U.S. Air Force to a Special Award from the attorney general of Mexico.138 Arpaio retired in 1982 as the DEA’s director of its Arizona field office. Arpaio left law enforcement as a distinguished public servant, but one whose ambition remained unsated.

‘Law and order’ played an important role in Richard Nixon’s presidency from

1969-73. Under executive direction, Attorney General John Mitchell created a large

135 Ibid., 171.

136 Ibid.

137 Ibid., 192

138 Ibid., 186.

56 multiagency task force to combat the flow of illegal narcotics from Mexico.

Congressional testimony stated the task force’s goal, was to make a concerted “frontal attack” on the illegal importation into and subsequent illegal sale and use of marijuana, narcotics, and dangerous drugs in the United States.139 As a part of this, in September

1969, Operation Intercept constituted a distinct effort to control the border. The Treasury

Department termed Intercept:

a "coordinated effort" encompassing the law-enforcement resources of several branches of the federal government. Involving intensified land, sea, and air surveillance along the entire 1,945- mile U.S.-Mexico border, the effort would continue "for an indefinite period," as everything and everyone, no matter their nationality or status, were thoroughly and painstakingly searched.140

The operation represented a wholesale blockade of the U.S. Mexico border. Over the span of more than twenty days, U.S. authorities searched every vehicle or person that crossed the border. The United States pursued two goals—the interdiction of narcotics and the exertion of pressure on Mexico to more actively stem the flow of drugs. The three-week blockade ceased nearly all illicit flows on the border as authorities seized

3200 pounds of marijuana. In comparison, in 1968 authorities confiscated, on average, fifty pounds of marijuana each day and deterred traffickers from continuing their routine.

141 Legal commerce plunged as well as business sales, and hotel occupancy fell by 40-70 percent as a result of the measures.142 Intercept also led to diplomatic discord between the

U.S and Mexico. With obvious displeasure, Senator Barry Goldwater commented, “An

139 Richard B. Craig, "Operation Intercept: The International Politics of Pressure," The Review of Politics, 42, no. 4 (1980): 556.

140 Ibid.

141 Ibid., 566

142 Ibid., 567

57 error like this is enough to destroy something so beautiful that has cost so many years of

effort. The man who ordered it must be a mental retard.”143 While the operation proved

successful in stemming the flow of illicit narcotics, the larger negative commerce and

diplomatic consequences worsened U.S.-Mexico relations. Stringent enforcement

appeared as an imposition of U.S. authority and represented a unilateral act of aggression

upon its southern neighbor. More symbolically, the effort’s particular targeting of

northward-bound Mexicans perpetuated the stereotype of all Mexicans as criminals. The

imagery of thousands of schoolchildren, shoppers, tourists, and workers searched as a

result of their ethnicity represented unenlightened American foreign policy and

contributed to Operation Intercept’s failure. Moreover, effective closing of the border

created economic consequences for Mexico and sharpened the racial divide between

neighboring countries. As a result, one-sided U.S. enforcement did little to solve the

deeper issues within the drug trade. Instead, both the flow of illicit narcotics and ‘war on

drugs’ continued and expanded.144

In the midst of the social upheaval spurred by the Vietnam War and the

counterculture movement, many within Richard Nixon’s ‘Silent Majority’ grew

concerned over the influence of drugs. Law enforcement efforts against drugs

represented a product of the larger “Southern Strategy” used by Richard Nixon and later

Republican leaders. During a 1981 interview—not published until 2012—Republican

operative Lee Atwater recalled and starkly explained the cynical methodology that

buttressed the post-1968 revival of the GOP:

143 Ibid., 571

144 Ibid., 567-68

58

You start out in 1954 by saying, “Nigger, nigger, nigger.” By 1968 you can’t say “nigger”—that hurts you, backfires. So you say stuff like, uh, forced busing, states’ rights, and all that stuff, and you’re getting so abstract. Now, you’re talking about cutting taxes, and all these things you’re talking about are totally economic things and a byproduct of them is, blacks get hurt worse than whites.… “We want to cut this,” is much more abstract than even the busing thing, uh, and a hell of a lot more abstract than “Nigger, nigger.”145

The coded language of the “Southern Strategy” used by Richard Nixon and the GOP

appealed to reactionary white voters while avoiding the harsh and bigoted tones of

traditional segregationists.146 In a June 1971 speech before Congress, President Nixon

publicly declared a ‘war on drugs’ and pushed for comprehensive efforts to combat the threat. Rigorous enforcement, lengthier prison sentences, and increased spending on drug treatment and rehabilitation composed the bulk of the measures.147 Nixon’s efforts led to

June 1973 creation of the DEA, an agency tasked to coordinate the nation’s effort against

narcotics. Nixon’s declaration provided the context for President Ronald Reagan’s

renewed efforts to combat narcotics. In 1987, the Reagan administration taught the

nation’s schoolchildren to “Just Say No!” Before Nixon and Reagan, society viewed

drugs as little more than an unfortunate social ill, something that generally could be

ignored. But, in the wake of the counterculture movement, and its acceptance of drug use

among middle-class youth, fear replaced indifference. Furthermore, 1988 New York

Times editorial highlighted the drug war’s more insidious nature when it stated, “Drug

145 Rick Perlstein, "Exclusive: Lee Atwater's Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern Strategy," The Nation, November 13, 2012, accessed July 06, 2016, https://www.thenation.com/article/exclusive-lee- atwaters-infamous-1981-interview-southern-strategy/.

146 For further discussion of GOP efforts to slow school integration after the Brown ruling see: Frank Brown. "Nixon's" southern strategy" and forces against Brown." Journal of Negro Education (2004): 191-208.

147 John J. Dilulio, "Federal Crime Policy: Time for a Moratorium," The Brookings Review, 17, no. 1 (1999): 18.

59 trafficking, no longer just a regrettable social problem, now threatens national security.”148 By early 1990s, enforcement efforts focused upon stemming the flow of

narcotics along the east coast of the U.S. from the Caribbean Sea, and South America. As

a result, between 1990 and 1994 Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia received $2.2 billion in

aid.149 The ‘Andean Drug Strategy’ then facilitated a westward shift of Colombian

smuggling efforts. This shift—later coupled with effective crackdowns on the Medellin and Cali Cartels—allowed Mexican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) to supplant their southern counterparts as the dominant narcotics suppliers in the United States.150 As interdiction efforts pushed drug trade routes from Florida to the U.S.-Mexico border,

Arizona and Phoenix became a battleground in the international flow of illicit drugs. A

U.S. Customs official in a 1990 Los Angeles Times article outlined the evolving threat after the discovery of a tunnel used to traffic drugs under the border. Officials explained the:

Discovery of the tunnel--dug near an official border crossing in Douglas, Ariz.-- confirmed the emergence of a long-rumored new dimension in international drug smuggling. Bush Administration officials said they now suspect that the Southwest border may have been breached by several such underground passages... “We believe there are other tunnels, and we are working to find them," Customs Commissioner Carol Hallett said. "This shows how brazen they are.”151

148 "For Drugs: A Monroe Doctrine." New York Times, Late City Final edition, sec. Editorial, March 1, 1988.

149 William O. Walker III, "The Foreign Narcotics Policy of the United States since 1980: An End to the War on Drugs?" International Journal, 49, no. 1 (1993-94): 39.

150 Douglas Farah and Molly Moore. "Mexican Drug Traffickers Eclipse Colombian Cartels; Onetime Underlings Extend Reach into U.S." The Washington Post, March 30, 1997, sec. A.

151 Douglas Jehl. "$1-Million Drug Tunnel Found at Mexico Border: Narcotics: The passageway ends at a warehouse in Arizona. It was used to bring cocaine into the U.S.." Los Angeles Times, May 19, 1990. http://articles.latimes.com/1990-05-19/news/mn-65_1_mexico-border (accessed December 5, 2013).

60

The discovery of tunnels and other ancillary operations denoted both increased sophistication and an escalation in the flow of narcotics into the U.S. Southwest. By this time, Americans spent approximately $60 billion per year on illicit narcotics while the economic toll of drug-abuse and drug-related illness incurred costs of another $60 billion per year.152 Urban areas like Phoenix drew dealers shipping to other markets, but willing

to sell locally. In 1999, the Phoenix New Times quoted a succinct Customs assessment of

Phoenix, “a narcotics shopping mall for criminal gangs across the country.”153 Although

the Phoenix New Times labeled the city as major transit point for the flow of illicit drugs,

other cities like Los Angeles, Chicago, and New York have generally constituted far

larger markets. However, Phoenix’s geographic proximity to the border and the presence

of a sizable Hispanic minority exacerbated white concerns over the ‘war on drugs’ in

Arizona. As the reports of drug smuggling and violence dominated headlines, Joe Arpaio

entered the political arena.

A shocking murder and a botched investigation launched Arpaio’s political

career. On the morning of August 10, 1991 Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO)

deputies responded to a call from the Wat Promkunaram Buddhist Temple west of

Phoenix. Deputies found nine people, including six monks, one acolyte, one temple

helper, and a seventy-five year-old nun, all clad in saffron robes face down, drenched in

pools of blood.154 The Kingman Daily Miner quoted county medical examiner Dr. Heinz

152 Peter H. Smith, Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin Relations, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 285.

153 David Holthouse. "City of Coke." Phoenix New Times, December 30, 1999.

154 Jane Eppinga. Arizona Sheriffs: Badges and Bad men. (Tucson, Ariz.: Rio Nuevo Publishers, 2006), 154.

61

Kamitschnig, “The shotgun blast did not kill anyone…it hurt them, but that is all...they died almost instantly from bullets to the head.”155 The shocking massacre contributed to

local, national, and international outrage.156 An investigative task force composed of

MCSO and other local, state, and federal authorities soon focused upon suspects dubbed the ‘Tucson Four.’ Despite extensive investigation and confessions, little physical

evidence linked the four men, Michael Lawrence McGraw, Dante Parker, Mark Felix

Nunez, and Leo Valdez to the murders. Shortly thereafter, the investigation shifted

toward two local high school students, Jonathan Doody and Alex Garcia, later found guilty of the crime when crime scene ballistics matched guns in the possession of Doody and Garcia. Although Sheriff Thomas Agnos persisted in the guilt of the ‘Tucson Four,’ the local district attorney dropped all charges due to a lack of evidence.157 Later inquiries

determined deputies relied upon harsh and inappropriate interrogation methods to coerce

false confessions from the four men.158 The episode stained Sheriff Agnos and severely

damaged the MCSO’s reputation. As the investigative failures of Sheriff Agnos provided

short-term electoral fodder, Arizona’s historically high crime rates, and popular fear over

those rates, also aided the rise of Joe Arpaio.

While popular concerns over crime, narcotics, and MCSO incompetence provided

the context for the 1992 electoral season, Joe Arpaio’s experience appealed to voters.

155 "Methodical Killers Left Temple Riches Undisturbed." The Kingman Daily Miner, sec. First, August 11, 1991.

156 "Thailand Outraged by Monks Massacre." The Independent (London), First edition, sec. Foreign News, August 14, 1991.

157 Eppinga, 164.

158 “Negotiators Agree to $2.8 million settlement with Tucson Defendants.” The Kingman Daily Miner, sec. First, April 22, 1994.

62

During the 1992 campaign, the Phoenix Gazette quoted him touting his credentials, “I want to bring that worldwide experience to Maricopa County. It's a different perspective than anyone else who is running has had.”159 Although Arpaio’s background was exclusive to law enforcement, those qualifications served him well while campaigning.

Arpaio decisively explained, in reference to his status as a political novice, “You might call that a weakness. But on the other hand, I'm not going to run for re-election, so I don't have to worry about being re-elected. I don't have to worry about politics.”160 The

Arizona Republic spoke glowingly of the candidate:

Mr. Arpaio's reputation within the federal law enforcement community, where he is well known, is excellent, both as to integrity and administrative ability. A proven professional, he offers the best chance of reforming our clownish sheriff's department…and we recommend his election.161

The editorial staff, and much of the electorate, desired an individual like Joe Arpaio. His background and experience represented precisely the remedy for an agency awash in ineptitude and reeling from failure. Arpaio presented himself as a no-nonsense lawman uniquely skilled to fix the MCSO and aggressively protect the citizens of Maricopa

County from the corrosive effects of crime.

In the early 1990s, a fear of crime and call of increased punishment of criminals gripped the nation. As those concerns influenced Maricopa County, Sheriff Arpaio used history to his advantage. The history of the American West has occasionally been punctuated by the appearance of the posse, or power of the county. According to the

159 Mike Padgett. "Veteran lawmen seek Sheriff's star retired DEA chief in Arizona." Phoenix Gazette, August 14, 1992.

160 Ibid.

161 "Our choices: Arpaio for sheriff." Arizona Republic, sec. Editorial, November 1, 1992.

63

nineteenth century Kearney Code, a sheriff could summon all able-bodied men of the

county into action.162 Throughout much of the twentieth century, Arpaio’s predecessors

relied upon, on a limited scale, the citizenry for assistance. Sheriff Arpaio and the MSCO

increased the size and profile of the posse to reduce crime in Maricopa County. Initially

formed after a streak of carjackings during the 1993 holiday season, the MSCO “citizens’

posse” became a ubiquitous example of Arpaio’s tactics in the community. He described

the force in trademark straightforward and undefined terms, “They are volunteers. They

are trained. And they are ready to go.”163 The notoriety of the posse spread worldwide.

The Independent of London, England offered a more nuanced perspective on the

community policing efforts:

The unpaid force of 2,300 has not been idle. Before Christmas, after several car- jackings, possemen on horseback paraded in shopping malls, escorting shoppers from store-to-store. Then the sheriff dispatched his troopers to clear prostitutes from a red-light district, instructing his posse - a mostly white, male collection of lawyers, blue-collar workers, executives, and retirees - to follow the women around until they left.”164

The posse represented influential older, affluent and Anglo portions of society. Lawyers,

businessmen, and other white-collar individuals plus retirees filled the bulk of the posse.

The posse evolved into an unofficial police force as members received rudimentary

training, uniforms similar to those of professional deputies, and roles in assorted public

162 Larry D. Ball, Desert Lawmen: The High Sheriffs of New Mexico and Arizona, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1992), 2.

163 Roberto Sanchez and Chris Fiscus. "Sheriff's Posse on Mall Patrol." The Phoenix Gazette, November 18, 1993.

164 Phil Reeves. "Posses ride again in Wild West Phoenix; Out in Arizona, a Wyatt Earp-type lawman reckons he has the crime wave licked." The Independent, sec. International News, August 22, 1994.

64 safety activities. As citizens—and typically conservative voters—participated in community service and increased public safety, Joe Arpaio and the MCSO presented a muscular public image and scored notable capital amongst politically reliable blocs of the electorate. Once the carjackings decreased, the posse moved against prostitution, vandalism, deadbeat parents, and, most importantly, illicit narcotics.

If the DEA or FBI could not win the war on drugs, Sheriff Arpaio and the citizenry would act. In late 1993, the MSCO announced the creation of checkpoints around the borders of the county. The Arizona Republic quoted Arpaio, “My plan is to kind of surround the county…I hope to have 1,000 people participate, I want to send a message really to drug traffickers to stay out of this county and go somewhere else.”165

Joe Arpaio correctly perceived local anxiety towards drugs and took action which gained him further approval. Marvin Weide, chairman of the Maricopa County Republican Party and posse member exemplified Arpaio’s support among citizens in his statement, ''I think the community has just about come to the point where everybody wants to be a part of ending this drug scene…I think the mood is right for it [(the checkpoints)].”166 Despite

Weide’s hopeful tones, the posse achieved negligible results. According to the FBI’s

Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics (UCRS), in 1992 approximately 5,400 property

crimes were committed in the county. That number increased to about 6,500 within two

years.167 Although the posse had a negligible impact on crime, the group proved far more

165 David Fritze. "Sheriff plans drug blockade." The Arizona Republic, December 17, 1993.

166 Ibid.

167 Federal Bureau of Investigation. Crime reported by Maricopa County Sheriff Department, Arizona. Last Modified March 29, 2010. http://www.ucrdatatool.gov/Search/Crime/Local/RunCrimeJurisbyJuris.cfm

65 valuable as a public relations tool. First started to combat a holiday crime spree, and later, the nefarious spread of drugs, the posse appealed to the community’s desire for law and order. During a June 1994 crime suppression sweep, massive operations that generally involved a number of deputies and hundreds of volunteers, the Arizona

Republic quoted Arpaio admitting, “I want publicity.”168 The sweeps splashed the MCSO

across the headlines and onto local news broadcasts. Beyond publicity, the posse

empowered citizens. Arpaio acknowledged this fact when he later explained the posse

represented, “the great American tradition of self-reliance.”169 The posse, and their use of

sizable, flashy law enforcement activities, presented Arpaio as a dynamic crime fighter

that provided a concerned citizenry an active role in promoting public safety. In a

manner strikingly similar to Operation Intercept, the MCSO and the posse sought to close

the borders of Maricopa County to criminal activity. Sheriff Joe Arpaio used the western

individualist ideal to his advantage. The generally prosperous and politically connected civilian police force accomplished dual goals for Arpaio and the MSCO. The posse had some effect on reducing carjacking, prostitution, and vandalism in the county, but more importantly, Sheriff Joe fostered relationships with a vocal and reliable demographic of

Phoenix society, the 55-plus age-restricted and overwhelmingly white Sun City communities. Fear can motivate groups in society and Arpaio provided Arizonan a way to address, and combat, their fears. Joining the posse, wearing a uniform, and participating in MCSO efforts represented decisive and seemingly appropriate action to

an anxious community. Many in the Phoenix community, and nationwide, felt law

168 Roberto Sanchez. “Posse puts on heat, makes 30 arrests.” Phoenix Gazette. June 24, 1994.

169 Arpaio and Sherman, 100.

66 enforcement agencies could not adequately protect the public. Keenly aware of these facts, Joe Arpaio championed the posse as a community-based approach to improving public safety. Despite the popularity of the western sheriff mystique, Arpaio did not enjoy universal support for his crime-fighting policies. Indeed, some found the posse troubling. In 1995, the New York Times quoted Louis Rhodes, chairman of the Arizona

Civil Liberties Union:

Joe Arpaio has a comic-book mentality of fighting crime…the sheriff's approach risks serious abuses. At a time when people are fearful, he's mixing the ingredients to create a kind of Molotov cocktail that will eventually blow up.170

The opinions expressed by Louis Rhodes reflected obvious concern. Yet, in the face of

the A.C.L.U.’s distress, the public desire for harsh justice overshadowed those matters

locally. A majority of the older, white, and blue-collar Phoenix community agreed with

Arpaio’s actions. Fear coupled with a citizen posse represented a combustible and

dangerous coupling—one where civil liberties took a backseat to the popular desire for

severe justice. Arpaio’s approach to the county jail system furthered his appeal.

Incarceration policies adopted by the MCSO became a fundamental aspect of Joe

Arpaio’s mystique. When asked about the Maricopa County jail system in an interview

with The New York Times, Joe Arpaio boldly claimed, “I want everybody in this county

to know that if you commit a crime, you are going into a very bad jail…I want people to

say: 'I hate that sheriff. I hate his jails.”171 'Joe Arpaio entered office with a vision for

toughness and efficiency in policing the county. Saddled with overcrowded, dangerous,

and expensive jails, Sheriff Arpaio approved the construction of ‘tent-city.’ In an attempt

170 Seth Mydans. "Taking No Prisoners, In Manner of Speaking." The New York Times, March 4, 1995, Late edition, sec. 1. 171 Ibid.

67 to mitigate the human and budgetary pressures of prison overcrowding, the MCSO used

donated Korean War-era surplus U.S. Army tents to house inmates. Built at a cost of

$100,000—Arpaio outwardly presented ‘tent-city’ as a simple matter of cost-cutting and

efficiency-minded camp for non-violent inmates serving minimal jail time.172 Despite

being equipped with running water and rudimentary air conditioning, Phoenix’s high

temperatures presented a particular concern to Arpaio and the MCSO. Arpaio deemed

101 degrees acceptable and even just conditions for inmates. Although cost-cutting may

have initially precipitated Arpaio’s decisions, tent-city ultimately morphed into a larger

political symbol as he cleverly employed the detention center as an example of Arizona

justice and efficiency. Indeed, Sheriff Joe’s astute appeal of no nonsense, swift, and

effective methods became his political trademark.

Increasingly restrictive policies within county facilities further improved Arpaio’s

political stature. Shortly after the opening of tent-city, the MCSO began restricting items

available to inmates. Arpaio banned pornographic magazines in all MCSO facilities in

June 1993. Some questioned the First Amendment implications of the ban. Inmate-

rights activist Donna Leone Hamm explained, “He needs to set an example for the very

people he is incarcerating…He needs to obey the law whether he agrees with it or not.''173

Arpaio ignored the questions of legality as he justified the ban, “Jail is a workplace. We

have 350 female detention officers…Fifteen percent of our inmates are sexual

deviants…You don't give heroin to heroin addicts, why should we give sex offenders sex

172 Frederick Bermudez and Richard F. Casey. "Tent City: Canvas Replaces Bars for Inmates." Arizona Republic, August 4, 1993 173 David Rossmiller. "Tough-talking Arpaio promises to keep ban on 'skin' mags in jail." The Phoenix Gazette, March 10, 1994.

68 magazines?”174 The banning of pornography, rated-R movies, followed later by

cigarettes and coffee, began an increasing cycle of stringent MCSO policies. The

procedures bolstered his appeal as citizens preferred to punish inmates rather than simply

detain them. Arpaio offered the rationale in his 1996 book, “Our inmates should never

live better in jail than they do on the outside.”175 William Finnegan of The New Yorker

further described the enhanced restrictions:

Meals were cut to two a day and Arpaio got the cost down, he says, to thirty cents per meal. "It costs more to feed the dogs than it does the inmates," he told me. Jail, Arpaio likes to say, is not a spa-it's punishment. He wants inmates whose keenest wish is never to get locked up again. He limits their television, he told me, to the Weather Channel, C-SPAN, and, just to aggravate their hunger, the Food Network.176

Meals often consisted of powdered eggs, cereal, white bread, peanut butter, and most

infamously, green bologna.177 Additionally, detention-issued underwear became

symbolic of county facilities. An uptick in stolen undergarments posed a minor

budgetary dilemma to the MCSO. Officials found that dying socks and underwear pink

reduced the incidence of thievery. Arpaio claimed the policy saved $40,000 in yearly

costs.178 While the lack of culinary luxuries clearly aided the budgets of the county,

basic health care granted to inmates also suffered. In 2009, the National Commission on

Correctional Health Care revoked the accreditation for MCSO medical facilities.179 Chain

174 Ibid.

175 Arpaio and Sherman, 41.

176 William Finnegan. "Sheriff Joe; Joe Arpaio is tough on prisoners and undocumented immigrants. What about crime?." The New Yorker, July 20, 2009, 42. 177 Arpaio and Sherman, 47.

178 Ibid.

69 gangs also played a role in MCSO incarceration policies. Reintroduced in May 1995, and known as the Last Chance Program, the use of inmate-labor became a cornerstone of the

Arpaio mystique. Arpaio described the specifics of the program in his book: Fifteen non-violent offenders work on the gang. The gangs operate under quasi-military style discipline.180 Bright orange jumpsuits, short haircuts, and a clean shave defined the

appearance of the crews. Under the guard of deputies, and occasionally, posse members, the inmates were chained together in groups of five and separated by five feet of metal.

The crews completed assorted community projects such as removing trash and brush

from roadsides—often during the heat of the Arizona summer. Presented as an

opportunity for rehabilitation, the MCSO quoted Sheriff Arpaio stating—“Chain gangs

help inmates learn to be productive and [make them] better disciplined.”181 Arpaio

argued that images of chain-gangs in the style of Cool Hand Luke did not represent inmate labor in the county. Fruitful labor that benefitted the community and granted prisoners opportunities for success and responsibility replaced the dehumanizing violence of yesteryear. Moreover, MCSO releases quoted an unnamed inmate, “It sure beats being in a cell all day. I’d rather be busy than locked up.”182 Restrictive policies coupled

with chain-gang labor presented one of the most inhospitable environments for county

inmates in the United States.

179 John Dickerson. "Sheriff Lawbreaker: Joe Arpaio's Jails Lose Accreditation Again, and Again, and Again." Phoenix New Times, October 9, 2008.

180 Arpaio and Sherman, 56.

181 Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, "Questions about the MCSO." Accessed June 15, 2014. http://www.mcso.org/About/FAQ/pdf/Chain_Gangs.pdf.

182 Ibid.

70

Rather than bend offender to his will, harsh methods triggered violence and riots within MCSO facilities during Joe Arpaio’s tenure. In November 1996, prisoners lashed out in violence. Joe’s policies backfired when poor conditions and treatment fed inmate anger. Armed with captured stun guns and homemade weapons inmates took control of the jail. Guards sustained injuries and initial attempts at retaking the facility failed. The riot did not subside until Sheriff Arpaio met with inmate representatives to discuss grievances. Early MCSO reports blamed the outbreak of violence on simmering racial animosities. Later findings altered the narrative. According to county documents reported by the Arizona Republic:

Immediately after the outbreak, inmates stated their grievance to reporters: ''The DOs (detention officers) get their attitude from the big boss, the sheriff,'' one prisoner said. ''They know he says we should be treated like garbage, so they think it's OK to push us around, to act like a bunch of thugs.''183

Arpaio promoted an environment of simmering tensions which finally erupted violently.

High temperatures, bad food, and restrictions represented draconian measures which

fostered a hostile environment in county jails. More importantly, the coarse treatment filtered down from Sheriff Joe himself.

In the aftermath of the riot, questions arose concerning MCSO methods. In particular, Republic reporter E.J. Motini asked pointed questions concerning the tent- city’s true purpose. In a November 1996 article, he quoted an unnamed and recently released, tent-city prisoner:

''Most of us were in for misdemeanor stuff,'' he said. ''You're not dealing with really hardened guys. But, you know, everybody has a breaking point. You get tired of being put on display. You remember that movie Rocky? There's a scene in it where Rocky's beating on the champ and the champ's trainer says to him, 'He

183 Dennis Wagner. "Jail Riot: The Real Story." Arizona Republic, February 8, 1998.

71

don't think it's a damn show. He thinks it's a damn fight.' Well, the danger is, Sheriff Joe still thinks it's a show.''184

Arpaio fashioned himself as the ‘toughest sheriff in America’ and his policies hardened prisoners leading them to lash out violently. Sheriff Joe, however, did not heed these realities. In addition to violence, academic studies illustrated the ineffectiveness of

Arpaio’s methods as an Arizona State University study found the methods did not reduce recidivism.185 The conclusions did not lead to a meaningful alteration in policy; in fact,

the showy methods continued. In 2000, Arpaio approved an internet-based reality show

which allowed viewers to log on to a website and view real-time footage from facility

security cameras. In response to those troubled by the show, Arpaio remarked, “We get

hundreds of e-mails from all over the world… 95 percent love it and feel it's a great

deterrent.''186 Rather than deter criminals, the unorthodox policies simply increased the notoriety of the MCSO and Sheriff Joe Arpaio. In fact, Arpaio cared more about popularity than reality.

Despite their popularity, controversy often followed the incarceration policies of

Sheriff Joe and the MCSO. In addition to riots and minimal impact on recidivism, jail

policies, arguably contributed to the deaths of inmates. In June 1996, Scott Norberg, a

former college football player and drug addict charged with assaulting a police officer,

died in the Madison Street Jail in Phoenix. Norberg’s death resulted from a scuffle with

184 E.J. Motini. “Sheriff rides again in TV land.” Arizona Republic, November 19, 1996.

185 Mike Mcloy. "Jail door revolves: Get-tough programs failing." Arizona Republic, April 3, 1998. Although Dr. John Hepburn’s subjects expressed displeasure at MCSO policies, the study found a 62% recidivism rate within 30 months—in line with national norms.

186 Mindy Sink. “Hoping people watch jail and won’t want to visit.” New York Times, August 24, 2000.

72 officers after which he was restrained, his head forced downward, and a towel place over his mouth. An autopsy determined Norberg’s body had fourteen stun gun burns, a broken larynx, and pegged the cause of death as “positional asphyxiation.”187 The

county settled with Norberg’s family for $8.25 million. In a separate case, a jury

awarded the family of Charles Agster III, a mentally impaired man jailed for drug

possession, $9 million in 2006 when he died after being placed in the same restraints.188

Furthermore, the Phoenix New Times listed ten inmates that died while in MCSO

custody. Each inmate had committed relatively minor offenses and was serving short jail

terms. The causes of death ranged from severe internal injuries resulting from a fall, to

diabetic shock, and bludgeoning at the hands of the Aryan Brotherhood.189 By 2008,

Maricopa County paid out $41.4 million in lawsuits due to conditions—and deaths that occurred—within MCSO facilities.190 Despite the outcry, incarceration policies ultimately faded into the background as Sheriff Joe and his deputies took an active role in the nation’s historic and contemporary debates over immigration and border security.

Immigration reemerged as an important political issue in the latter half of the twentieth century. As the manpower needs of the Second World War contributed to the end of earlier restrictive immigration quotas, the United States and Mexico signed the

187 David Holthouse. "Murder on Madison: The Norberg Remix." Phoenix New Times, April 15, 1999.

188 J.J. Hensley "Sheriff Joe Arpaio: 20 years of controversies and successes." Arizona Republic, December 18, 2011.

189 John Dickerson. "Dead End." The Phoenix New Times, December 20, 2007.

190 Stephen Lemmon. “Math-Challenged Sheriff Joe Arpaio Can't Account for the $41 Million He's Cost Taxpayers.” The Phoenix New Times, January 10, 2008.

73

Bracero Program in 1942. Before its end in 1965, the program facilitated the employment of approximately four million Mexicans on farms throughout the borderlands. The Immigration Act of 1965 scrapped the Bracero Program and enabled the settlement of millions from Asia and Central and South America. Of the four million people who entered the United States during the 1970s, seventy-five percent came from the developing world.191 While millions of legal immigrants from places like Vietnam,

Korea, India, Mexico, and Nicaragua further diversified the region, advocates of more

restrictive immigration policies grew alarmed over undocumented immigration from

Mexico. In 1978, the Washington Post reported concerns voiced in Congress,

particularly that, “Overall illegal immigration already accounts for 15 to 25 percent of the

nation's population growth…and if current low U.S. fertility rates continue, eventually all

U.S. population growth will be attributable to immigration - mostly illegal - unless

something is done."192 Although nativist fear—not reality—provided much of the

motivation for the preceding statement, national apprehension over undocumented

immigration remained strong. Against this backdrop, the U.S Congress passed the

Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The sweeping legislation contained two

fundamental measures. First, it granted amnesty to approximately three million

undocumented migrants. Second, the legislation sought to limit future illicit migration by

imposing fines upon firms that employed undocumented workers. Despite the hopeful

intentions, the act had mixed results. In a 1989 Journal of Commerce article, Wayne

191 Richard White. "It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A History of the American West. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. 596.

192 Warren Brown. "House Committee Proposes Sealing Mexican Border." Washington Post, Final edition, sec. First, December 21, 1978.

74

Cornelius, director of the Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies at the University of

California-San Diego, explained, “The long-term trend toward permanent settlement in

this country is actually being accelerated by the 1986 law.”193 Amnesty granted legal

status to millions of previously undocumented immigrants. Additionally, stricter border controls and employment restrictions did not deter migration, but rather, funneled

migrants to lower-wage occupations. Although the exact numbers remained unclear,

many Arizonans echoed longstanding concerns about the flow of undocumented migrants

held across the Southwest borderlands. El Paso County, Texas Judge Pat O’Rourke

alarmingly noted, “In 18 to 24 months, it’s just going to overwhelm the social service

system on the border.”194 Proponents of restrictive immigration policies worried the

United States would eventually be engulfed, and unduly strained, by undocumented

migrants—individuals that took jobs, lowered wages, acquired welfare benefits, and used

social services—traditional xenophobia. Renewed enforcement efforts on the U.S.-

Mexico border pushed Arizona to the forefront of the nation’s battle over undocumented immigration and race.

In the early 1990s, the United States tightened control of its border with Mexico.

Law enforcement agencies increased efforts between San Diego and Brownsville. New fences, technologies, a greater law enforcement and military presence solidified the border. In 1992, about 3,500 Border Patrol agents policed the U.S.-Mexico border. That number increased to approximately 9,500 in 2004.195 Increased policing impacted illicit

193 Bill Mongelluzzo. "Debate Continues over US Immigration Reform Act." Journal of Commerce, June 26, 1989.

194 Peter Applebome, "Surge in Illegal Alien Taxes Southwest Towns' Resources," New York Times, March 9, 1986.

75 flow in unexpected ways—studies found firmer border controls in San Diego and El Paso pushed larger flows toward central Arizona.196 Contrary to expectations, heightened

enforcement actually enlarged the number of undocumented immigrants in the United

States. As law enforcement and geography made the trek more dangerous, many

immigrants chose to permanently reside in the United States rather than return to their

home countries and risk capture in their attempts to reenter later. The altered flow of

immigration heavily impacted Arizona and Maricopa County. A 2009 study conducted by

Arizona State University found that between 2000 and 2007, the overall Hispanic

population in Maricopa County increased by 54.9%.197 Moreover, while legal migration constituted the vast majority of the increase, undocumented migrants also contributed to

the growth. In 2001, an estimated 400,000 undocumented immigrants lived in

Arizona.198 Additionally, migrants increasingly relied upon coyotes—guides who

facilitated illegal border crossings for payment—and other human traffickers to gain entrance into the United States. Strong demand precipitated an, on average, $500-1,000 rise in the fees coyotes demanded.199 The lucrative nature of illicit crossings led to

increased danger in the borderlands. The Devil’s Highway by Luis Alberto Urrea

195 Jordan Weissman. "Here's Exactly How the Senate's Bipartisan Immigration Plan Could Go Horribly Wrong." The Atlantic, January 29, 2013.

196 Wayne A. Cornelius Social Science Research Council, "Impacts of Border Enforcement on Unauthorized Mexican Migration to the United States." Last modified September 26, 2006. Accessed December 9, 2013. http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Cornelius/.

197 Center for Community Development and Civil Rights, State of Latino Arizona: History, by Arturo Rosales and Christine Marin (Tempe: Arizona State University, 2009), 17.

198 Michael Janofsky. "Illegal Immigration Strains Services in Arizona." The New York Times, April 11, 2001.

199 Cornelius.

76 presented a horrifying narrative of the tragic fate of migrants dubbed the ‘Yuma 14.’ In particular, the author detailed the grim realities of undocumented migration during the summer of 2001:

“Bound bodies, supposedly of Mexicans, began to appear in the brush. They had been laid facedown, with their hands tied behind them, shot in the head. Various theories attribute the crime to vigilante “citizens’ border patrols” freelancing the chaos across the line, or to rival coyote mobs exterminating walkers to make a point; paranoiac border watchers imagine a rogue Border Patrol squad.”200

Border-crossers no longer simply faced arrest and deportation from urban areas in Texas or California. Instead, migrants encountered the daunting challenge of crossing the inhospitable Arizona desert or risked fate at the hands of assorted, yet unknown and violent elements. In the end, renewed enforcement further solidified the border, but also contributed to a higher undocumented population in the Southwest borderlands. At the same time, domestic migration from the ‘Rustbelt’ reached a fever pitch.

Optimism drove Arizona’s remarkable growth in the 1990s. The same factors that appealed during the immediate postwar era—abundant sunshine, plentiful employment opportunities, and lower cost of living—motivated much of the population growth in more recent years. Although the real estate crash and the saving and loan scandals of the 1980s represented a brief hiccup, hopefulness remained. USA Today quoted Arizona State University economist Lee McPheeters, ''We'll add another million people and 500,000 jobs this decade, we've got slower growth now, but by the mid-

1990s, we'll be the fastest-growing state.''201 The prediction proved correct. About 3.6

200 Luis Alberto Urrea. The Devil's Highway: A True Story. New York: Little, Brown and Company, 2004. 210.

201 Beth Belton. "Economy warms in desert." USA Today, Final edition, sec. Money, September 11, 1992.

77 million people lived in Arizona in 1990.202 By 2000, that number increased to about 5.1 million.203 For much of its recent history, vibrant job growth kept pace with Arizona’s

ever-increasing population. The trend ceased during the first decade of the twenty-first

century, when Arizona ranked second in population growth but eleventh in job

creation.204 The state no longer created enough jobs to support new inhabitants but the

real estate bonanza of the early twenty-first century obscured these facts. In 2000,

construction provided about 170,000 jobs. That number climbed to about 240,000 in

2006.205 In total, when divided by race, as percentage of overall workforce, 17 percent of

the Hispanic community worked in the construction industry. By comparison, only 5.1 percent of non-Hispanic Caucasians worked in the building trades.206 Hispanics more

readily filled construction jobs. The boom created thousands of new jobs, stimulated

related industries, and created the façade of continued prosperity. In reality, real estate growth overshadowed deeper—and vexing—paths in manufacturing. Historian Thomas

E. Sheridan explained:

Beginning in the late 1980s, semiconductor industries began to discard jobs; between 2000 and 2007, employment in the semiconductor industry fell from 33,565 to 23,179, a drop of 31 percent. Intel held its own, employing about 10,000 by the late 1990s and investing in new facilities in 2005 and 2009. But Motorola, Arizona’s most iconic firm, withered to a shadow of its former self. In 1997, it relocated the headquarters of its semiconductor business to Austin. Two

202 Richard L Forstall. United States Census Bureau, "Population of Counties by Decennial Census: 1900 to 1990." Last modified March 27, 1995. Accessed June 5, 2014. http://www.census.gov/population/cencounts/az190090.txt.

203 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary

204 Thomas E. Sheridan, Arizona: A History, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012), 385.

205 Ibid., 385.

206 Center for Community Development and Civil Rights, State of Latino Arizona: Economic and Financial Issues, by Barbara Robles and Loui Olivas (Tempe: Arizona State University, 2009), 59.

78

years later, its Iridium cell phone network collapsed. Two spinoffs remained in the metro Phoenix area, but the workforce of Motorola itself plunged from more than 20,000 in the 1990s to 1,000 by 2007.207

High tech manufacturing once constituted the backbone of Arizona’s economy and begat

an educated, stable, and highly-paid workforce. As companies like Motorola shifted

operations or collapsed, real estate and home construction replaced high tech

manufacturing as the state’s primary economy driver. The new jobs often provided lower

incomes. In 2006, Phoenix ranked 131st out of 366 metropolitan areas in per capita

income. Four years later, it dropped to 190th.208 As Phoenix lost its relative economic

standing, the city—and the state—set a course for severe economic downturn. The

Morrison Institute—a public policy think tank at ASU—starkly noted, in 2010, “Arizona

must expand beyond its traditional dependence upon real estate and construction to a

more diverse economic portfolio.”209 Economic struggles predisposed Arizona to harsh

policies towards issues of race, ethnicity, and undocumented immigration. Traditionally,

economic recessions in U.S. history have contributed to xenophobic outbursts. The

Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, the 1917 Bisbee Deportation in neighboring Pima

County, and the National Origins Act of 1924 represented examples that punctuated the

history of Arizona and the United States.210 The collapse of the housing market severely

207 Sheridan., 386. 208 Ibid., 386.

209 Ibid., 387

210 The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 placed a ten-year moratorium on the immigration of Chinese laborers. For further discussion of the Chinese Exclusion Act, please see At America’s Gate: Chinese Immigration during the Exclusion Era, 1882-1943 by Erika Lee. The National Origins Act of 1924 limited the number of immigrants from eastern and southern European nations to two percent of the population according to the 1890 census.

79 damaged Arizona’s economy and the downturn provoked another xenophobic outburst in the state. Hispanics—again—occupied the role of scapegoat in times of economic crisis.

Concerns over changing population, economic decline, and overall uncertainty contributed to Proposition 200. Reminiscent of California’s 1994 ballot initiative

Proposition 187—which required doctors and teachers to deny services to undocumented individuals and report them to authorities—Arizona placed the proposition on the ballot in 2004. In reaction to the perceived negative impact of unauthorized migrants the initiative explained:

This state finds that illegal immigration is causing economic hardship to this state and that illegal immigration is encouraged by public agencies within this state that provide public benefits without verifying immigration status. This state further finds that illegal immigrants have been given a safe haven in this state with the aid of identification cards that are issued without verifying immigration status, and that this conduct contradicts federal immigration policy, undermines the security of our borders and demeans the value of citizenship.211

The proposition echoed concerns that undocumented migrants encumbered schools, hospitals, and other social infrastructure in the state. In an effort to mitigate the

perceived burden, Proposition 200 also called for stricter voter identification standards.

The debate over the law and its impact proved highly contentious. Rightward-leaning

supporters of the ballot measure such as the Federation for American Immigration

Reform (FAIR) pegged the economic cost of undocumented immigration at

approximately $1.3 billion per year.212 The New York Times quoted Kathy McKee,

chairman and director of Protect Arizona Now stating, ''This is about protecting the

211 Arizona Secretary of State, "2004 Ballot Proposition." Last modified September 2004. Accessed December 9, 2013. http://www.azsos.gov/election/2004/Info/PubPamphlet/english/prop200.htm.

212 Federation for American Immigration Reform, "Cost of Illegal Immigration to Arizonans." Accessed May 30, 2014. http://www.fairus.org/site/DocServer/azcosts2.pdf?docID=101.

80

voting process and prohibiting welfare fraud, nothing more, nothing less.”213 Despite the

stated narrow intentions of the legislation, opponents feared otherwise. A 2004 editorial

in the New York Times pondered the larger results:

Will residents be required to carry citizenship documents? Firefighters wonder if they will have to check immigration status when assisting in a hit-and-run accident. Would welfare workers who do not turn in someone suspected of being an illegal immigrant really be fined $750 and sentenced to four months in jail, as the measure stipulates? Librarians ask if they will go to jail for issuing library cards. People with brown skin fear a witch hunt.214

While Proposition 200 intended to limit or stop undocumented immigration, its vague language opened the door for insidious possibilities and symbolized the culture of xenophobia in Arizona. The GOP, the Democratic Party and business community voiced concerns the measure did not solve the problem of undocumented immigration and preferred larger reforms, particularly, a guest worker program. Arizona Senators John

McCain (R), John Kyl (R) and Governor Janet Napolitano (D) opposed the legislation,

but Prop 200 passed with 56 percent of the vote.215 A series of legal challenges by Native

American and Latino groups followed. Ultimately, the Supreme Court decisions lessened

the severity of the law, but the initial passage represented heightened concerns over

immigration. Backlash against undocumented immigrants and—by extension—other

minorities again became a persistent theme within Arizona and Maricopa County.

Joe Arpaio’s views on undocumented immigration and border issues evolved

based upon political expediency. As recently as 2005, Sheriff Arpaio and the MCSO did

213 Charlie LeDuff. "Immigration Measure Taps Frustrations in Arizona." New York Times, October 26, 2004.

214 Ibid.

215 Ian de Silva. "Immigration: A moral issue." The Washington Times, sec. OPED, November 19, 2004.

81 not view undocumented immigrants as criminals to be targeted. The Associated Press quoted Sheriff Arpaio as saying, “I don’t expect to concentrate on some guy in a truck with six illegals. I want to go after the professional smugglers who do this for money, the top people.”216 Individual migrants did not initially concern Arpaio. In line with most

others in the law-enforcement community, the MSCO targeted leaders and large-scale

traffickers. The 2005 arrest of army-reservist Sgt. Patrick Haab altered Arpaio’s views

and compelled the sheriff to take a harsher stance towards undocumented immigration.

Haab’s arrest stemmed from a quarrel, during which he pulled a gun on a group of

migrants encountered at a rest stop in the desert. When the MCSO arrested Haab, Joe

Arpaio remarked, “You don't go around pulling guns on people. Being illegal is not a serious crime. You can't go to jail for being an illegal alien."217 As a misdemeanor,

simply being a migrant represented a less serious crime than Haab’s gun felony. Against

the backdrop of post-September 11th border security issues, the rise of the Minutemen in

the borderlands, and the recent fight over Proposition 200, Sgt. Haab garnered attention

and became a fixture on conservative radio and TV talk shows across the nation, saying

undocumented immigrants are turning the country into "Americo."218 Against this

backdrop, the Maricopa County Attorney Andrew Thomas dropped all charges against

Haab ten days after the initial arrest. Additionally, Arizona Senate Bill 1372 created the

murky legal atmosphere that led to Haab’s release and prompted Arpaio to take a harsher

216 Paul Gilbin. "Reasonable Doubt: Joe Arpaio's evolution." East Valley Tribune, July 9, 2008. 217 Alexander Provan. "The Vigilante." GQ, October 9, 2009. http://www.gq.com/news- politics/big-issues/200911/joe-arpaio-sheriff-phoenix-mexico-border-immigration (accessed December 9, 2013).

218 Robert Anglen, and Yvonne Wingett. "Feds Question Freeing Reservist." Arizona Republic, April 23, 2005.

82 stance against unauthorized migration. The legislation granted local authorities greater powers to prosecute coyotes with felonies related to kidnapping and sex trafficking. No longer a misdemeanor, undocumented migrants became felons. The popular passion elicited by the Haab case coupled with S.B. 1372 increased the political stakes for Sheriff

Arpaio. As politics contributed to an evolution in Arpaio’s approach toward undocumented immigration, the Sheriff became an active voice in the debate over immigration in the borderlands and across the United States.

Much like earlier examples of illegal narcotics and MCSO incarceration policies,

Arpaio argued he offered unique approaches to undocumented immigration. Arpaio explained his principles in 2008, “I had another idea…my idea was that you arrest everybody involved in the crime, coyotes, and customers, conspirators, and co- conspirators.”219 Just as the posse tried to stamp out crime or a focus upon efficiency

improved the county’s bottom line, Arpaio’s innovative policies would combat

undocumented migration. Although Joe cited an altruistic duty to ensure public safety, others perceived more cynical motivations. The East Valley Tribune quoted former

Maricopa County Attorney Richard Romley (R), “If something, some way of engaging a

law enforcement issue, can politically benefit Joe, or keep him in good favor with the

public, Joe seems to go that way…He can flip on a dime. And I think he did that with

illegal immigration.”220 Ostracized from the Republican Party establishment by his

actions during the 2000 and 2004 elections, and in need of outside political support,

Sheriff Joe capitalized on a winning issue and proved a shrewd political opportunist. A

219 Arpaio and Sherman, 26.

220 Giblin.

83 combination of factors, namely Proposition 200 and the Patrick Haab case, transformed the formerly disinterested Arpaio into a crusader against undocumented immigrants.

Consequentially, Joe Arpaio and the MCSO shifted their focus onto all crimes related to undocumented immigration.

Federal law enforcement and border control policy also contributed to the shift.

Section 287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of

1996 enabled the federal government to form agreements with local authorities to aid in

immigration law enforcement, thereby allowing the MCSO federal financial support and

training.221 As a result, Joe Arpaio and his deputies had an avenue for executing federal

immigration law. In the aftermath of Proposition 200, S.B. 1372, and the Haab Case,

287(g) federal policing authority provided Arpaio a unique opportunity. The particular

focus swept up every law enforcement division of the sheriff’s office: patrol,

investigations, SWAT, even aviation services. ‘Crime suppression sweeps’ became

commonplace in Maricopa County. Imposing squads of MCSO deputies, and in some

cases—posse members—descended upon neighborhoods throughout the area. In many

cases, primarily Hispanic enclaves, such as Guadalupe or Sunnyslope, or areas frequented

by day-laborers experienced the sweeps.222 Additionally, the MCSO conducted

operations without probable cause or acceptable supporting crime data required by

federal law. The change created dramatic results. Between 2005 and 2007, the MCSO

221 Immigration and Customs Enforcement, "Fact Sheet: Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act." Accessed June 27, 2014. http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g.htm

222 Giblin.

84 arrested approximately 33,000 undocumented migrants.223 Rather than task his deputies in traditional community safeguarding, Sheriff Joe Arpaio constructed the MCSO as a law enforcement agency with the near myopic focus on policing illegal immigration. In many cases, this new mandate translated into the strict policing of the Hispanic population in Maricopa County. Amid concerns of racial profiling, civil rights violations, and abuse of power by the MCSO, the Justice Department stripped the agency of its federal immigration enforcement powers in 2009.224 In a historical sense, the actions of

Arpaio and the MCSO continued historical trends as Sheriff Arpaio and his deputies gained influence and notoriety because Arizona’s position in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands. As race, ethnicity, undocumented immigration, and economics created a historically unique environment where Sheriff Arpaio gained influence and notoriety.

The shift towards prioritizing action against undocumented immigration came at a cost. First, the county budget suffered as a result of MCSO immigration policies.

Building upon the earlier 287(g) agreement, in January 2007, Maricopa County approved a partnership between the MCSO and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) thus morphing the MCSO into a near-extension of federal law enforcement authorities. The partnership dramatically affected county payrolls. During one pay period in April of the same year, deputies worked more than 9,000 extra hours, three times the amount normally accumulated, and cost the county $373,757.225 While the federal partnership

223 Provan.

224 J.J. Hensley. "Arpaio May Lose Some Immigrant Authority." Arizona Republic, October 3, 2009.

225 Ryan Gabrielson. "Reasonable Doubt: Breaking the budget." East Valley Tribune, July 10, 2008.

85

and resultant grants defrayed a portion of the costs, immigration enforcement placed a

considerable strain on county budgets. In addition to financial pressures, public safety

worsened due to the MCSO’s narrow focus. Consider the below account of a March

2008 robbery in the Phoenix community of Guadalupe:

After 10 p.m. on March 18, two people walked into the Circle B grocery store in Guadalupe brandishing a gun and demanding cash. The female cashier followed the robbers' orders, but also triggered a silent alarm, said Betty Mar, who owns Circle B with her husband. The store's security firm immediately alerted the MCSO of the armed robbery in progress. "She pushed the panic button and waited 15 minutes," Mar said. "And nothing. "The cashier triggered the alarm a second time, the robbers long gone with $400 from the register. Mar said deputies arrived 45 minutes after the MCSO received the emergency call.226

Sluggish response time to an armed robbery represented a troubling trend. Interventions

into federal law actually took the MCSO away from their traditional duties as law

enforcement agents tasked with public safety. As increasing numbers of officers

participated in sting operations and immigration sweeps, deputies were less able to

adequately ensure public safety. Response time increased, while non-immigration

arrests, and the number of cases closed all declined.227 In March 2009, Phoenix Mayor

Phil Gordon voiced sharp distaste with Arpaio when he challenged MCSO tactics, saying,

“If he really wants to fight crime, he should start rounding up dangerous criminals who

have outstanding felony warrants issued for them."228 While Gordon expressed unusual

displeasure, the revelation of events in El Mirage, Arizona a suburb northwest of Phoenix

226 Ryan Gabrielson. "Reasonable Doubt: Public pays the price." East Valley Tribune, July 12, 2008.

227 Ibid.

228 J.J. Hensley and Casey Newton. "Gordon Blasts Arpaio over Migrant Sweeps." Arizona Republic, March 29, 2009.

86 provided the most glaring example of Arpaio’s preference for high-profile methods over routine duties which had historically safeguarded the community. Rather than maintain a city police force, El Mirage contracted the MCSO to provide law enforcement for its working-class Hispanic community. In 2007, city officials canceled the contract and reconstituted El Mirage’s police force. Soon thereafter, the El Mirage Police Department discovered disturbing remnants from the days of MCSO protection. The discovery of eighteen armed robberies and twelve sexual assaults uninvestigated in the city later expanded as officials uncovered more than 400 cases—throughout Maricopa County— that did not receive proper scrutiny.229 As crimes went unsolved, dangerous criminals

escaped justice. The narrow and politically convenient actions of Sheriff Arpaio and the

MCSO put the financial and personal security of many county citizens at greater risk.

Arpaio dismissed the sexual assault oversight, simply saying, “If there were any victims,

I apologize.”230 The El Mirage assaults constituted another one of many scandals

prompted and weathered by Joe Arpaio. Despite these scandals, as of his most recent

reelection in 2012 Sheriff Joe remained a popular figure and winning candidate.

The rise of Joe Arpaio should be attributed to assorted factors. The national effort

against illegal narcotics and the location of Arizona and Maricopa County within the

U.S.-Mexico borderlands on the frontline of the ‘war on drugs’ created a historically

distinct environment that predicated the rise of Sheriff Joe. During the 1990s, local and

national concerns over crime, coupled with the investigative failures of the MCSO during

229 Gabrielson,

230 Nico Hines. "America's toughest sheriff 'ignored 500 sex assault claims'." The Times, Morning edition, sec. US and Americas, December 6, 2011.

87 the “Tucson Four” case catapulted Joe Arpaio toward initial electoral success. Once in office, Joe Arpaio proved an astute even charismatic politician. No-nonsense law enforcement policies, the citizens’ posse, and strict incarceration methods, and the related controversies, became Sheriff Arpaio’s claim to fame. By the early twenty-first century, the changing nature of Arizona prompted another evolution by Arpaio. The influx of

Hispanics, coupled with a shift in the state’s economy contributed to the reappearance of historic and latent xenophobic fears among Anglos over matters of race, ethnicity, unchecked undocumented immigration, and changing demographics. The embrace of Joe

Arpaio as the ‘toughest Sheriff in America’ can be traced back to factors particular to

Arizona, Maricopa County, and the city of Phoenix. While Arpaio’s rise resulted from the discussed reasons, it is also historically significant to discuss his remarkable popularity and resiliency as the Sheriff of Maricopa County.

88

CHAPTER IV

CONSERVATIVE POLITICS, FEAR, RACE AND THE POPULARITY OF JOE

ARPAIO

Controversy has punctuated the tenure of Sheriff Arpaio. Despite public outcry over incarceration policies and a confrontational approach to undocumented immigration, he has remained remarkably popular amongst the Arizona electorate. As a Republican,

Joe Arpaio enjoyed a strong baseline of support in a county which has traditionally supported the GOP since the 1950s. But polling data offers a more nuanced perspective.

In 2006, the East Valley Tribune reported a poll conducted by the Behavior Research

Center, “He [Arpaio] gets high marks from conservatives (68 percent), moderates (65 percent) and liberals (54 percent).231 Arpaio’s support bridged traditional partisan divides and represented his highest recorded public approval ratings. Sheriff Arpaio’s acclaim reflected historic and political trends in Arizona and Maricopa County. Aside from his

political opportunism, Joe’s popularity embodies Arizona’s conservative populist political culture, Anglo fear of changing demographics, and a longing for the ‘good old

days’ when justice and white authority went unchallenged.

To understand Sherriff Joe’s contemporary prominence, one must look back at

Arizona’s history in the middle half of the twentieth century and its impact on Phoenix

politics. Scandal plagued Phoenix city government during the New Deal and Second

World War era. The push for reform prompted the creation of the Charter Government

Committee (CGC) in 1949. The CGC—founded by department store owner Barry

Goldwater, lawyer Frank Snell, Arizona Republic owner Eugene Pulliam, Valley

231 Mike Banom. "Valley Still Gives Arpaio High Marks." East Valley Tribune, March 23, 2006.

89

National Bank owner Frank Bimson—represented a new direction for city government.

The new city charter scrapped the ward system. Instead, candidates gained city council seats based upon simple majority in a city wide election. Beyond the notable founders, members generally hailed from Anglo, upper middle-class businessmen and professional segments of Phoenix. The CGC set the tone for postwar Phoenix—business friendly, growth oriented, uniform, and mostly non-partisan.232 Between 1950 and 1975, no

Phoenix mayor and only two city council members won election without the endorsement

of the Committee.233 A 2011 retrospective article from the Arizona Republic offered an

insightful anecdote from an El Paso, Texas businessman who observed the efforts of

CGC leaders, “Industrial scouts are met at the plane, entertained, offered free land, tax

deals and an electorate willing to approve millions in business-backed bond issues…In

comparison, "El Paso does nothing."234 The envious statements uttered by the El Paso

observer illustrated the growth-centered approach followed by Phoenix leaders that

facilitated the city’s expansion throughout the postwar era. The growth of Phoenix

helped make Arizona a GOP stronghold and buttressed the status of influential state and

national leaders. John J. Rhodes (R), who served as House Minority Leader from 1973-

1981, Senator Barry Goldwater (R), and Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor

began their respective political careers as CGC-supported candidates.235 Initially started

as a reform movement to combat corruption, the CGC provided the political and

232 Thomas E. Sheridan, Arizona: A History, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012), 283.

233 Ibid., 283

234 Richard Nilsen. “Charter Government Changed Phoenix.” Arizona Republic, August 20, 2011.

235 Sheridan, 340.

90

governing framework that facilitated the growth of Phoenix into an economic

powerhouse of the southwest. Although successful in promoting a business-friendly

environment, the CGC struggled to cope with the wave for change that spread across the

United States by the end of the 1960s. Despite its reformist roots, the CGC eventually

became the establishment. As a symbol of the establishment, the CGC came under

pointed attack from both the liberal left and the conservative right.

Modern conservatism grew in response to the established order of the postwar

United States. Adherents of conservative Republicanism argued that the spending of

Lyndon Johnson’s “Great Society,” the trauma of the Vietnam War, and the social unrest

of the African-American Civil Rights Movement all represented attacks on the United

States and its ideals. Liberal efforts to ease poverty, fight communism, and reduce social

inequality failed. Conservatives held that anti-war protestors, the Head Start Program, the

Roe v. Wade verdict, and many other examples constituted liberal, and intrusive, attacks

on millions of law-abiding, God-fearing, and patriotic citizens. In response, modern

conservatism preached a political fundamentalism of opposition to bureaucracy, planners,

regulators, government red tape, the welfare state, and high taxes.236 Historically,

conservatives associated themselves with affluent and big business interests of the

Northeast. Furthermore, with the influx of millions into the West, the region became a

bastion of conservative political ideology. Bruce J. Schulman explained in his book The

Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics, “As the geographic

locus of conservative politics had moved south and west, its nature changed: it became

236 Richard White, "It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A New History of the American West, (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 603.

91 more populist, more middle class, and more antiestablishment.”237 As millions migrated

to California, Arizona, Georgia, Texas, or other Sunbelt locales, conservative

Republicanism evolved. By the 1970s, right-wing populists replaced moneyed centrists

as the dominant voice of the Republican Party. The growth of Phoenix—with its nearly

unrestricted suburban sprawl and growing influence of right-wing conservatism—

reflected the larger national trend. The impact of this new brand of conservatism

fundamentally altered the political landscape in Arizona and Phoenix.

The Charter Government Committee’s grasp on power slipped under the social

and political pressures of the era. The liberal left voiced the first call for reform.

According to historian Philip VanderMeer, “The limited aspect of charter government in

the '50s and into the '60s is all economic development and with no social aspect at all…It

came as a shock when they discovered poverty and discrimination."238 While the CGC

made some efforts to attract diverse candidates, tokenism had minimal effect. Historian

Elizabeth Tandy Shermer explained:

In the mid-1960s, African-Americans had a disproportionally small presence in all employment sectors except domestic service, entertainment, and recreation…Mexican-Americans also had limited opportunities…Only 33.5 percent had a high school diploma, twenty-one percent lived below the poverty line, more than double the percentage of Anglos.239

Prosperity and growth defined Phoenix in the 1950s and 1960s, although that affluence

did not reach across all portions of Phoenix society. Upper-class Anglos remained the

237 Bruce J. Schulman, The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics, (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2001), 114.

238 Nilsen.

239 Elizabeth Tandy Shermer, Sunbelt Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 314.

92

most prosperous—and influential—group in Phoenix. In response, assorted African-

American and Mexican-American groups agitated for change. Stricter enforcement of

federal civil rights legislation, legal actions, boycotts, voter registration drives, and other

forms of protest slowly forced progress. That social advancement weakened the CGC’s

hold on power, but more importantly, prompted a strong response from the conservative

right.240

Phoenix experienced a conservative backlash in the 1970s. As the city prospered

and expanded in physical size, local government struggled to effectively manage popular

needs. Debates over city services, taxes, and zoning restriction contributed to increased

complaints from voters. By the early 1970s, opponents of the CGC called the group

elitist and undemocratic. For example, the 1973 election garnered only 14 percent voter

turnout.241 The 1975 election of Republican Margaret Hance and four city councilmen—

each without CGC endorsement—foreshadowed the end of the once-omnipresent group.

In his study of Phoenix history, Bradford Luckingham cited Phoenix Gazette commentary

on the eve of the 1977 election that noted:

But Charter has fallen on hard times because it hasn’t kept up with the times. Charter leaders are aging, at a time when Phoenix boasts one of the nation’s youngest median ages…Charter’s noble principle of slating candidates who represent virtue and civic achievement seem esoteric at a time when more down- to-earth problems trouble big city residents.242

Urban problems, crime, and taxes played an important role in the 1977 election, won

again, by Hance. The aged, business-first philosophies could no longer effectively

240 Bradford Luckingham, Phoenix: The History of a Southwest Metropolis, (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989) 178.

241 Ibid., 181.

242 Ibid., 181.

93 govern a large metropolitan city beset with modern concerns. Without the CGC,

Phoenix—and Arizona—lacked a traditional political structure, and grassroots conservatism filled the gap.

By the 1980s, a new political culture grew to dominate Arizona. Between 1975 and 1980 ninety-three percent of people moving into the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan areas were not from Arizona. Furthermore, for every ten people who settled in Arizona each year during the early 1980s, seven moved away.243 Many newcomers—

retirees, independents, and religious conservatives—hailed from the ‘Rustbelt’ of the

industrial Northeast and Midwest and found the message of the Republican right very

appealing. The 1986 election of Evan Mecham as Governor symbolized this larger

political shift. Mecham represented the “Constitutionalist” wing of the Republican Party.

This arm of the GOP held that the U.S. Constitution is a revelation from God and that

establishment politicians have harmed the country by stripping God from government.244

Mecham had unsuccessfully run for Senator in 1962, and again failed in the gubernatorial

elections of 1964, 1974, 1978, and 1982. His reliance on a dirty guerilla campaign and

smear tactics, coupled with a split Democratic Party ticket, facilitated the win. Mecham’s

victory concerned the GOP. In response to the GOP’s displeasure, Mecham retorted,

“The establishment has never been on my side…They told themselves for so many years

that I didn't know what I was doing.”245 Still, Mecham’s insurgent and populist message

243 Sheridan, 339.

244 T.R. Reid, "Arizona's GOP Governor Ridiculed by the Voters; Democrats Optimistic About Regaining Majority." Washington Post, Final edition, sec. First, June 21, 1987.

245 Ibid.

94 appealed to Arizona voters. In June 1987, the Washington Post explained the unconventional makeup of his supporters:

“Mecham's victory last November was the product of a political coalition that would seem bizarre, even impossible, in any state east of the Rockies. An amalgam of blue-collar workers unhappy with both parties, rural Mormons and the "Sun City set" -- new residents of the mushrooming retirement communities -- helped him win two upsets.”246

Mecham’s election reflected the new era of Arizona politics. In this case, a perpetually

unsuccessful politician who conducted a dirty and disorganized campaign won for two

reasons. First, the CGG no longer possessed the power to block such a candidate.

Second, his message appealed to disparate, often newly arrived, voters distrustful of, or

ignorant to, the traditional political norms in Arizona and Phoenix. Evan Mecham’s

tenure proved disastrous as string of controversies, heated budgets battles, and charges of

malfeasance defined Mechem’s tenure. In particular, his January 1987 decision to rescind

the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday caused a political firestorm and precipitated calls for

boycotts of Phoenix and Arizona. Despite being impeached and removed from office in

April 1988 for unrelated charges obstruction of justice and misuse of funds, National

Football League’s 1991 decision to strip Phoenix of the 1993 Super Bowl stemmed

directly from earlier Mechem’s efforts against a day of remembrance for the civil rights

leader.247 The Mecham episode typified the larger political trends in Arizona. The

moderate, gentlemanly good-old boy and business-focused agenda of CGC candidates

had been replaced by conservative populists like Mecham. By the end of the 1980s,

246 Ibid.

247 Sheridan, 342.

95

Republicans dominated the state, and often, the most radical and populist voices commanded the political discourse. By 1992, Phoenix politics were ripe for an individual like Joe Arpaio.

The populist and anti-establishment orientation of modern conservatism intersected with the rugged individualist ethos of the U.S. West. According to this nation’s historical myth, rugged individuals faced a plethora of threats in the ‘Old West.’

Threats arose from many sources—nature, Indians, cattle rustlers, or corrupt businessmen—but through perseverance, grit, and an adherence to democracy, settlers conquered all threats. The conservative political ideology espoused by Barry Goldwater,

Richard Nixon, and Ronald Reagan presented a modern spin on the popular myth, the rugged individualist as a victim. Unique to the rugged individualist ethos of the West, noted historian Richard White offered telling commentary:

Rugged individualists are not supposed to feel victimized, particularly by the powerless. To combine the two was roughly akin to having John Wayne whining that the Chinese laundryman in Tombstone was pilfering his shirts and the sheriff refused to do anything about it.248

Threats arose in the contemporary United States. High taxes, wasteful spending, big

government intrusions, common criminals, drug-dealers, and undocumented migrants

replaced the traditional threats of the previous century. As previously noted, Sheriff

Arpaio’s ideas and methods repeatedly capitalized on notions of fear, and the desire for

law and order, to garner influence and notoriety. The threats compelled individuals to

action. Joe Arpaio spoke to those fears in a 1995 editorial published in the Arizona

Republic when he explained:

I am not a prophet or a showman. I knew violent crime was growing, and I knew tax revenues would be difficult to allocate because of the county budget mess. I

248 White, 604.

96

also knew that the establishment was deaf to the anxiety and fears of ordinary people. When the media ignored my initial attempts to publicize the new, violent and drug-related crime wave, I went to the people.249

While the above editorial spoke directly to the threat of the contemporary narcotics

trade, its themes reflected persistent historical myths of the frontier—a decisive citizenry

that acted against external threats. The citizens’ posse, harsh incarceration policies, and

later stringent countermeasures against undocumented immigration symbolized

aggressive responses. As retirees and other members of the Anglo community felt

imperiled by minority criminals, many westerners advocated a return to the imagined values of the ‘Old West.’ Joe Arpaio repeatedly exploited this ethos—even terms like posse evoked this western imagery—in his efforts to both control crime and gain favor among a politically conservative constituency.

By the end of his first term, Sheriff Arpaio possessed enough influence to become

an informal kingmaker for the GOP. In September 1996, Arpaio boasted, ''I don't think

people want my endorsement because they think I am going to be governor… They want

my endorsement because they want to win.''250 The above statements, quoted by the

Arizona Republic, reflected reality. In November of that year, polls conducted by O’Neil

Associates determined Joe Arpaio enjoyed an 82 percent approval rating among

Maricopa County voters.251 Candidates eagerly sought his endorsement. Representative

Scott Bungaard (R) reiterated the value of the Sheriff’s support, ''Joe Arpaio's is the only

endorsement I have, and the only endorsement I have sought…Arpaio's endorsement

249 Joe Arpaio. "Sheriff: I'm Not a Showman." Arizona Republic, December 20, 1995.

250 Martin Van Der Werf. “Arpaio plays GOP Kingmaker.” Arizona Republic, September 6, 1996.

251 Ibid.

97 carries a lot of weight in any district, but especially in the more conservative parts of the

Valley, he appeals to people's get-tough-on-crime attitude.''252 The bidding for Sheriff

Joe’s endorsement spoke to the political makeup of Arizona, and his notoriety in the state. Throughout much of the 1990s, law and order constituted a fundamental issue for conservative voters. Arpaio’s incarceration policies and the posse appealed to an influential demographic of voters. In Arizona—a state dominated by the Republican

Party since the 1960s—Arpaio’s endorsement carried much weight. The value of

Arpaio’s endorsement also impacted Democratic candidates.

During the same election, Sheriff Joe Arpaio endorsed Mary Rose Wilcox (D) in the race for Maricopa County Supervisor. If it was not unusual enough for an ardent

Republican to endorse a liberal Democrat, controversy defined Wilcox’s history. The controversy stemmed from the 1995 shooting of Rudy Buchannan, Jr. by the Phoenix

Police Department. The death of a Buchannan, a man of mixed Hispanic and African-

American descent, touched off a political firestorm. As a result of a heated press conference—during which she called the shooting unnecessary and questioned the racial motives of Phoenix officers—Wilcox became a divisive figure in the community.253

Despite the controversy, Wilcox resoundingly defeated her rival, Tommy Salazar (R).

Some in the community credited her eventual victory in a contentious election, partially, to Joe Arpaio’s endorsement.254 Many questioned Arpaio’s motives in endorsing a

252 Ibid.

253 Martin Van Der Werf. "County supervisor has criticized police, is liberal." Arizona Republic, September 12, 1996.

254 Ibid.

98

Democrat that maintained a quarrelsome relationship with the Phoenix Police

Department. In the Arizona Republic, Arpaio explained himself: “Helping my people is

my job, first and foremost…If I have to go to the devil to protect my employees, to get

them raises, to get them the equipment they need to fight crime, I will do it.''255 The

endorsement accomplished multiple, if somewhat contradictory goals. He created a

beneficial political relationship and presented himself as non-partisan crime-fighter.

Maricopa County voters threw their support behind Wilcox, in part, because of her

relationship with Sheriff Arpaio. The Wilcox endorsement is an instructive example in

the study of Joe Arpaio. It is overly simplistic to chalk up Joe Arpaio’s electoral

success—and popularity—to partisan politics. Throughout much of his tenure, Arpaio

has enjoyed political support and approval across the political spectrum. Consider the

following statement, from Chandler, Arizona resident Pam Schmidt. The suburban

housewife explained her preference for Sheriff Joe, “We just think he is great…his

boldness, frankness, and fair treatment of people.”256 In this case, Schmidt did not

directly cite a specific political reason for her favorable view of Sheriff Joe. Rather, her

preference stemmed from his perceived courageous, honest, and principled approach

within the community. His appeal illustrates Sheriff Joe as a charismatic figure who

exists beyond the bounds of either Republican or strictly conservative camps that also

appeals to active Democrats or more politically independent community members.

255 Ibid.

256 Megan Boehnke. "Sheriff's Popularity safely in the pink." Chandler Republic, February 15, 2008.

99

Joe Arpaio was arguably the most popular Republican in Arizona and his

influence and notoriety resulted from his ability to appeal to a wide variety of voters.

Sheriff Joe won an uncontested election in 1996, but decisively defeated Democrat

Robert Ayala in 2000. According to the Maricopa County Recorder, Arpaio received

66.49 percent of the vote to Ayala’s 26.39 percent.257 In August 2001, the Behavior

Research Center (BRC) conducted its Rocky Mountain Poll and found Arpaio leading

other Republican candidates for the upcoming 2002 Arizona gubernatorial election.

Although he never formally declared his candidacy and Janet Napolitano scored an easy

victory in November of that year, the data illustrated Arpaio’s strong appeal among

important portions of the Arizona electorate. Among 444 registered Maricopa County

voters, Arpaio led with 26 percent among respondents. More importantly, Arpaio

maintained a sizable advantage among retired voters—37 percent preferred him

compared to 19 percent for former Congressman Matt Salmon.258 A March 2002 BRC

poll also identified significant gender differences in support for Arpaio. The poll found:

A major difference is found in the vote of men and women in this race. More specifically, Matt Salmon already has a plurality among male Republicans, leading Joe Arpaio by 29 to 23 percent, with Betsey Bayless far behind at nine percent. Among Republican women, on the other hand, Arpaio is very strong – pulling 31 percent compared to Bayless at 17 and Salmon at 16.259

257 Maricopa County Recorder, "Maricopa County General Election 2000." Last modified November 20, 2000. Accessed July 15, 2014. http://recorder.maricopa.gov/electionarchives/2000/11-07- 2000 Final Summary.pdf.

258 Earl de Berge. Behavior Research Center, "Governor’s Race: Rivals Falling Behind Napolitano." Last modified August 18, 2001. Accessed July 15, 2014. http://www.brcpolls.com/01/RMP2001-III-14.pdf.

259 Earl de Berge. Behavior Research Center, "Matt Salmon Closes Gap on Arpaio." Last modified March 3, 2002. Accessed July 15, 2014. http://www.brcpolls.com/02/RMP2002-I-13.PDF.

100

Retirees preferred Arpaio. Sizable age-restricted retirement communities populated by generally conservative leaning voters were particularly receptive to Arpaio’s persona.

Retirement communities, such as Sun City sold and reinforced the notions of paradise. 260

Joe Arpaio’s ‘tough as nails’ persona and methods appealed to conservative voters eager to protect their way of life. Women formed a second important constituency of support.

With sentiments echoed, like those above by Pam Schmidt, women preferred Sheriff

Arpaio for many reasons. His crime-fighting image, his perceived non-partisan willingness to endorse other candidates best-suited to protect the community, and the symbolic protection his message afforded their families. The elections in following years followed a similar pattern.

Earlier events illustrated Joe Arpaio’s appeal during the 2004 election. First, the

Sheriff’s endorsement of George W. Bush over John McCain during the 2000 Republican

Presidential primary alienated many within the Arizona GOP establishment. Arpaio matter-of-factly described his endorsement of Bush in 2000 stating, “Bush asked me…I don't give people endorsements unless they ask."261 Although unclear at the time,

Arpaio later clarified in his 2008 book, Joe’s Law:

I liked Bush. I liked that he seemed to understand how American businesses profited on the backs of cheap labor, and how that cheap labor also hurt the opportunity of our own workers to compete and earn a reasonable wage. I also

260 The Fair Housing Act of 1969 banned housing discrimination based upon race, color, national origin, religion, sex, or familial status—with some exceptions. Age-restrictions are proper under certain legally-defined circumstances. As a result, Arizona is home to multiple large and vibrant age-restricted communities. For more information: http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/seniors. For more information on Sun City, Arizona reference: Magic Lands: Western Cityscapes and American Culture After 1940 by John M. Findlay.

261 Ibid.

101

liked that he expressed compassion for the illegals and the desperate situation that brought them to the United States.262

While relying on the traditional arguments prescribing a connection between

undocumented immigration and harm to domestic workers, Arpaio cited Bush’s insight

and compassion for the realities of these matters as important factors behind his decision

to endorse the Governor of Texas. It should be noted that John McCain also hailed from a

border state and likely also possessed a nuanced and informed perspective on

undocumented immigration. What led Arpaio to bypass one of Arizona’s favorite

political sons for an outsider? Arpaio cited McCain’s detached attitude toward the

Sheriff, when he explained, “Maybe McCain thought that as Arizona’s own candidate, he

possessed some divine call on all local loyalties.”263 Arpaio felt ignored and slighted by

John McCain and shifted his allegiance to George W. Bush. Governor Bush actively

pursued Arpaio, benefitting from his endorsement, while McCain was left without an

influential supporter. John McCain’s presumptive attitude and Sheriff Joe’s reaction

contributed to a political firestorm in Arizona.

During the 2002 Arizona gubernatorial election Janet Napolitano (D) found an

unlikely ally, Sheriff Arpaio. Citing his long-standing professional relationship that

dated back to his tenure as federal officer while Napolitano served as a U.S. Attorney,

Arpaio defended her from political attacks. Napolitano scored a victory by less than

10,000 votes. Arpaio’s vouching arguably proved decisive and stung many in state and

local Republican circles. By 2004, lingering rancor with Senator John McCain, his

262 Joe Arpaio, and Len Sherman, Joe's Law: America's Toughest Sheriff Takes on Illegal Immigration, Drugs, and Everything Else that Threatens America, (New York: AMACOM, 2008), 228.

263 Ibid.

102 indirect support for Napolitano, and a federal court ruling against MCSO facilities made

Joe Arpaio a pariah in the GOP establishment.264 Local Republican Party power-brokers grew frustrated with Arpaio’s antics and shifted their support. In response, the county

Republicans supported Dan Saban. The GOP’s preferred candidate, a former Mesa,

Arizona police commander echoed the party’s sentiments, "They [GOP leaders] are fed up with Joe, and I'm the most qualified candidate [to replace him]. They made an informed decision based on my abilities to straighten up this mess."265 Commentators cited two reasons behind the Republican Party’s choice. First, those aforementioned residual hard feelings between John McCain and Joe Arpaio and his quasi-endorsement of eventual winner-Janet Napolitano (D) in 2002. He explained in an August 2004

Arizona Republic article, “I never endorsed Janet Napolitano…I did defend her, and I'm not going to back down for doing that.”266 After rationalizing his 2002 actions, Arpaio further referenced his prior 2000 endorsement of Bush over McCain, "I know the senator wasn't happy with me. ... He's never forgiven me.”267 Arpaio’s Lone Ranger mentality alienated the Republican establishment. Yet, he remained defiant. He retorted, “I really don't care because I get my support from the Republicans on the street."268 The establishment’s opinion did little to sway voters. An August BRC poll found among

452—including 210 likely Republican—voters, Arpaio benefitted from a 53 to 25 percent

264 Dennis Wagner. "GOP makes Arpaio pay for alliances." Arizona Republic, August 7, 2004.

265 Ibid.

266 Ibid.

267 Wagner.

268 Wagner.

103

advantage over Saban.269 The poll’s prediction proved correct as Arpaio resoundingly

defeated Saban in the primary before again trouncing Robert Ayala with 56.66 percent of

the vote.270 Arpaio’s easy victory highlighted his continued appeal to voters. Despite

lacking mainstream support from his party and facing a candidate whose Hispanic

heritage appealed to a growing segment of the electorate, Arpaio’s mystique continued to

resonate with the majority of voters. But, after 2004, without mainstream GOP support,

Joe Arpaio required another issue to motivate voters.

Undocumented immigration altered the political calculus for Sheriff Arpaio. In

December 2007, long-simmering questions over undocumented immigration hit a boiling

point outside Pruitt’s Home Furnishings located in east Phoenix. Opened in 1950, and

once surrounded by mostly middle-class Anglo neighborhoods, Pruitt’s and its

surrounding disputes symbolized larger changes in the city. Between 1990 and 2000, the

square-mile area north and south of Pruitt's saw the Hispanic population increase from 17

percent to 45 percent. During the same time, the Anglo population dropped from 76

percent to 45 percent.271 The Arizona Republic quoted homeowner Tim Maes when he

observed:

The neighborhood's changing…There are some people who don't like that. And there are some things about it that I don't like. But I think change is inevitable. When the complexion of a community changes, there is going to be conflict.272

269 Earl de Berge. Behavior Research Center, "Arpaio still the man to beat." Last modified August 20, 2004. Accessed July 16, 2014. http://www.brcpolls.com/04/RMP2004-III-10.pdf.

270 Maricopa County Recorder. "Maricopa County General Election Results." http://recorder.maricopa.gov/electionarchives/2004/11-04-2004%20Final%20Summary%20Report.pdf (accessed July 16, 2014). 271 Casey Newton. "Outside Phoenix store, border debate rages on." Arizona Republic, December 9, 2007.

272 Ibid.

104

The neighborhood around Pruitt’s evolved by 2007. The neighborhood became a

Hispanic, working-class enclave. Remaining Anglo residents voiced unease over the

change. In particular, the symbols of this changes—businesses that catered to Latinos,

Spanish language advertisements, and the presence of day laborers—became targets of

the anger. The December 2007 arrest of six laborers, on trespassing charges near Pruitt’s,

by MCSO deputies exacerbated the situation. Labor advocate Salvador Reza accused

local business owners and accused store owner Roger Sensing of intimidation. Reza

described Sensing as, "a man with a mission…And the mission is to rid the whole place

of jornaleros."273 In the months after the Pruitt’s disputes, Sheriff Joe Arpaio and the

MCSO began conducting large-scale ‘crime-suppression’ operations.274 The largest and

most infamous sweeps often occurred in Mesa, the second-largest city in the Phoenix

metropolitan area. A brief account from June 2008, illustrated the scope of such raids:

The operation began just before 2 p.m. Thursday. A pair of undercover detectives with the sheriff's human-smuggling unit set out in an unmarked car and, within 10 minutes, detained and cited a motorist for running a stop sign. Moments later, the detectives pulled over faded blue Ford pickup and cited a driver for expired registration. "What am I supposed to do, stay home?" asked the frustrated motorist, who only gave his name as Bobby. "I've got nothing to hide."275

The operation described above involved more than 200 officers. Using broad

interpretations of probably cause, the MCSO used traffic offenses to catch twenty-eight

individuals in its dragnet.276 In a manner similar to previous events outside Pruitt’s,

273 Ibid.

274 J.J. Hensley. "13 held in Arpaio-led sweep." Arizona Republic, March 22, 2008. 275 Senta Scarborough, J.J. Hensely, Dennis Wagner, and Ali Pfauser. "28 arrested in Mesa sweep." Arizona Republic, June 27, 2008.

276 Ibid.

105 supporters and opponents voiced mixed opinions of MCSO operations. When asked his opinion of Joe Arpaio, Phoenix attorney Antonio Bustamante responded, “[Arpaio] is perpetuating some of the grossest injustice this nation has witnessed since the 1960s and the Jim Crow South."277 At the same time, Richard Ingebretsen, 65, a member of the

American Freedom Riders immigration-control group, articulated his support for efforts to detain undocumented immigrants, "They aren't citizens of this country…The color of their skin and where they are from doesn't bother me. Just don't break the law."278 The

MCSO presented ‘crime suppressions’ as nothing more than what their names implied— aggressive law enforcement efforts to ferret out drug-dealers, thieves, and other criminals. The effort of Joe Arpaio and the MCSO capitalized on latent—yet acute— fears within Anglo society, that shifting demographics represented a distinct threat to their way of life.

Anti-immigration efforts by Sheriff Arpaio and the MCSO elicit important historical questions. Despite their dubious legal underpinnings, many Phoenicians supported Sheriff Arpaio and the MCSO. Law enforcement policies that, arguably, represented wholesale civil liberties violations and harkened back to the Jim Crow South can be attributed to fear. Apprehension simmered beneath the surface of Arizona and the city of Phoenix. Support for Sheriff Arpaio often stemmed from older and family- orientated segments of the community most apprehensive that contemporary demographic shifts represented a dangerous turn for the society. Many graying Anglos viewed demographic changes as a threat and perceived Latinos as criminals rather than

277 Ibid.

278 Ibid.

106

neighbors. Consider the below statements from one of the many protestors on the scene

of the aforementioned Pruitt’s episode. Danny Smith of the American Freedom Riders

motorcycle club stated, "This is no longer a mere skirmish, it is a major battle which we

cannot afford to lose. We have succeeded in taking it to a national level of visibility, and

now there is no turning back -- WE MUST WIN."279 Rather than a simple matter of

economics, workers’ rights, loitering, or trespassing, individuals like Danny Smith

perceived the country’s demographic transformation in a far larger and more dangerous

scope. May 2008 commentary from the East Valley Tribune succinctly explained the

latent, but growing, fears connected to race, immigration, and generational shifts. The

article cited a comment left below one of its many immigration-related articles:

One evtrib.com reader, identified as brittanicus, posted this comment after an immigration story… Are you now living from paycheck to paycheck, wondering how you’re going to feed your family, making your mortgage payment? You need to be aware of how much Uncle Sam is secretly skimming off your taxes and diverting into government freebies for immigrants and illegal foreign nationals.280

According to this unnamed individual, undocumented migration represented a threat to

the economic security of the family. The commenter perceived a permissive federal

government that deprived Anglos and citizens to support ‘foreigners.’ Blue-collar

Anglos frustrated over economic difficulties and under the misperception that

government aid went to immigrants rather than them reacted by expressing vehement

support for Sheriff Arpaio. The “us vs. them” mentality acutely impacted Phoenix. The

publication of the “Reasonable Doubt” series by the East Valley Tribune illustrated the

279 Newton.

280 Denis Welch. “The Immigration Debate Why So Angry?: Signs of discontent on both sides of the heated issue.” East Valley Tribune, May 5, 2008.

107

unique appeal of Sheriff Arpaio. While some praised the investigative journalism and

expressed displeasure with Arpaio, most supported the actions of the MCSO. The

following represented typical responses:

...I wish this paper would just leave him alone, let him do what he's supposed to he's the only one that is...... since Sheriff Joe started his illegal sweeps, people like me are getting their jobs back...... it's just kind of sad to think that the only one that's really doing any job around here is Sheriff Joe....actually doing what the majority of the people want and yet your paper is just tearing him apart every day...we just need more of Sheriff Joe...281

Readers disliked the negative portrayal of Sheriff Arpaio and the MCSO in the East

Valley Tribune. Fear told Arpaio’s supporters that failed policies or feckless leadership

contributed to a plague of undocumented immigration. Supporters perceived MCSO

actions as decisive and effective. Without men like Sheriff Joe, white Arizonans foresaw

their community and rest of the U.S. overrun by undocumented migrants, and by

extension, other Hispanics. For older, working-class Anglos, Sheriff Arpaio stood as a

protector against change.

In his book, Who Are We? The Challenges to American National Identity,

Harvard University Professor Samuel P. Huntington put forth analysis insightful for the

study of Sheriff Joe Arpaio. In the book, Huntington argued the value of America’s

unique and enlightened Anglo-Protestant culture. As a central tenet of the book, he

argued, America’s “greatest achievement is the extent to which it has eliminated the

racial and ethnic components that historically were central to its identity and has become

a multiethnic, multiracial society in which individuals are to be judged on their

281 Now, “The People’s Sheriff.” Now video, 26:36. March 27, 2009, http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/513/index.html.

108

merits.”282 Huntington also explained the contemporary wave of Hispanic—particularly

Mexican—immigration did not follow his understanding of historical precedent. Instead

of assimilation that incrementally occurred over multiple generations, Huntington

perceived Mexican immigration—because of its large numbers, proximity and

concentration in the borderlands—would facilitate the growth of a nation bifurcated

along language and cultural lines. In Arizona, where increasing numbers of Hispanics

emigrated and settled in the state, a nativist backlash grew amongst the Anglo citizenry.

Huntington again offered apt analysis when he explained:

One very plausible reaction would be the emergence of exclusivist sociopolitical movements composed largely but not only of white males, primarily working- class and middle-class, protesting and attempting to stop or reverse these changes and what they believe, accurately or not, to be the diminution of their social and economic status, their loss of jobs to immigrants and foreigners, the perversion of their culture, the displacement of their language, and the erosion or even evaporation of the historical identity of their country.”283

The frustration and anger voiced by Sheriff Arpaio’s supporters reflected this concern.

The presence of increasing numbers of Hispanic residents and the general predominance

of the Latino culture troubled Anglos who perceived their culture under threat. And

while the growing nativist sentiment crystallized support for Joe Arpaio in particular

Anglo segments of the Phoenix community, disdain also flourished in other portions of

the public.

In the summer of 2008, support for Sheriff Arpaio softened. The primary reasons

were displeasure over the growing perception that the MCSO unfairly targeted Hispanics,

282 Samuel P. Huntington. Who Are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004, xviii.

283 Ibid., 310.

109

budget deficits, and anger over slow response times. An August 2008 BRC poll showed

increasingly negative perceptions of Sheriff Arpaio:

The popularity of Sheriff Joe Arpaio continues to shrink in his home base of Maricopa County and now stands at 54 percent – down from 64 percent in March 2007 and 59 percent in November 2007. This decline is driven largely by growth in negative public assessment of his job performance among Phoenix residents (43%) and among registered Democrats in the county, 53 percent of whom today rate his job performance as "poor or very poor. 284

Sheriff Joe Arpaio’s once steadfast support across the partisan divide showed cracks by

the second-half of 2008. Although Republicans and Independents generally remained

supportive, Democrats and Phoenix voters soured on Arpaio. Arpaio’s reactionary

policies, while prompting short-term popularity, had long term consequences. Despite

this growing unease, Sheriff Arpaio won the 2008 election by a sizable margin. He

defeated Democrat Dan Saban, this time, by carrying 55.13 percent of the vote in

Maricopa County.285 Although a culture of intolerance and fear aided Sheriff Arpaio’s

2008 victory, his declining support among Democrats and urban voters foreshadowed an

important trend that continued into the following years.

The ‘toughest sheriff in America’ faced a turning point in 2009. In particular, his

actions as a crusader against undocumented immigration drew ire from the administration

of President Barack Obama. In March, the Justice Department began an investigation

into MCSO. The investigation stemmed from persistent complaints of civil rights

violations by deputies under the guise of the federal 287(g) statute. Under the measure,

284 Earl de Berge. "Sheriff Arpaio Popularity Shrinking but Still Has 14-point Lead over Dan Saban." http://www.brcpolls.com/08/RMP%202008-III-02.pdf (accessed July 17, 2014).

285 Helen Purcell. "Maricopa County 2008 General Election Results Summary." http://recorder.maricopa.gov/electionarchives/2008/11-04-2008%20Final%20Summary%20Report.pdf (accessed July 17, 2014).

110

the MCSO—and hundreds of other local law enforcement organizations—received

training and were granted powers to enforce federal immigration laws.286 Antagonists of

Sheriff Arpaio voiced pleasure in the decision. According to Association of the

Community Organizers for Reform Now member, Monica Sandschafer, the, “sense is

that finally - finally - there is reception in Washington, finally there is an administration

that is interested in holding people accountable for the Constitution and the rule of

law."287 In the 1990s, the MCSO faced federal pressure and scrutiny stemming from civil

right violations in its jails. While inappropriate and illegal, violating the civil rights of

inmates did not elicit the same level of public displeasure. In fact, it arguably enhanced

Sheriff Arpaio’s public persona. In contrast, the use of ‘crime suppression sweeps,’ and

questionable arrests in predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods constituted, according to

opponents of Arpaio, wholesale civil rights violations alienated a growing segment of the

Phoenix community. Joe Arpaio defiantly responded to the investigation, stating,

“Everyone who is making an issue is a Democrat…The big problem is the 287(g). I'm the

most active (participant), the largest with 160 officers, and they're using me as a poster

286 In 1996, IIRIRA amended the Immigration and Nationality Act by the addition of Section 287(g). The amendment authorized the federal government to enter into a written memorandum of agreement (MOA) with state and local law enforcement to participate in immigration control, which until then had fallen under the sole purview of federal immigration agents. At the state level, Florida (2002) and Alabama (2003) were the first to sign on, followed by Arizona (2005). At the local county level, Los Angeles and San Bernardino, California, entered the program in 2005, followed by Orange and Riverside, California, and Mecklenburg, North Carolina, in 2006. Enrollment significantly increased in 2007 with twenty-six new jurisdictions, and again in 2008 with the addition of thirty-four jurisdictions. The program has been tightly linked to the number of deportations; by 2011, 186,000 immigrants had been identified for removal through the program, and 126,000 voluntarily departed. (See IMMIGRATION AND THE CHANGING SOCIAL FABRIC OF AMERICAN CITIES: Immigration Enforcement Policies, the Economic Recession, and the Size of Local Mexican Immigrant Populations, The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science May, 2012.

287 Dan Nowicki. “Feds’ new Tone puts Arpaio in the hot seat.” Arizona Republic, March 15, 2009.

111

boy.”288 Sheriff Arpaio perceived the federal probe as an expression of partisan politics.

As a result, Arpaio argued, the Obama administration targeted the MCSO because of the

organization’s notoriety and unusual effectiveness in enforcing immigration law in the

county. By the end of 2009, Arpaio’s reactionary anti-immigration excesses cost him his

bipartisan appeal.

Lower poll numbers reflected Arpaio’s new political reality. According to a BRC

poll conducted in January of the year, his approval rating stood at 39 percent.289 While 57

percent of GOP voters approved, the Sheriff enjoyed only 34 percent among

Independents. In addition to the overall low rating, the poll revealed Arpaio’s reduced

appeal across different demographics. Two particular demographics, minorities and

young people, maintained a resoundingly negative opinion. Sixty-seven percent of

minorities disliked Arpaio and unfavorable ratings were five times greater (52 percent to

11 percent) among voters under the age of 35.290 In the same poll, disapproval ratings for

Joe Arpaio increased as income rose. Low income voters expressed a 34 percent

negative rating, middle-class stood at 39 percent, and 45 percent of high income voters

expressed displeasure of Sheriff Arpaio.291 Simply stated, fewer and fewer individuals

supported Joe Arpaio. While Democrats had soured on Joe Arpaio years before, by 2010,

Independents, young people, and higher income earners expressed tepid or outright

hostile opinions of Joe Arpaio. Sheriff Arpaio’s reactionary methods remained popular

288 Ibid.

289 Earl de Berge. "Sheriff Arpaio's Popularity Collapses." http://www.brcpolls.com/10/RMP%202010-I-01.pdf (accessed July 18, 2014).

290 Ibid.

291 Ibid.

112

amongst older, Caucasian Arizonans but had the opposite impact on younger individuals,

particularly Latino, and other minorities. Increasingly, Arpaio’s supporters represented

solely the graying, backward-looking portions of society, while the future of Arizona

voiced displeasure with the sheriff. Living in the past would eventually further cost

Arpaio his once ironclad popularity. As accusations of racial profiling, civil rights

violations, and misguided law enforcement priorities splashed across the headlines

Sheriff Arpaio lost public approval. Against the backdrop of dwindling support, multiple

acts of violence in the borderlands again pushed undocumented immigration to the

forefront of the nation’s political debate.

In March 2010, rancher Robert Krentz was found shot to death on his acreage

outside of Douglas, Arizona. The New York Times reported the murky, and ultimately

tragic, circumstances:

[Krentz] was found shot to death March 27 on his vast, remote ranch north of here after radioing to his brother that he was aiding someone he believed to be an illegal immigrant. Mr. Krentz went missing shortly after that call, and the police found his body several hours later in his all-terrain vehicle, his guns untouched in the back, his dog shot and critically wounded. Fresh footprints led from the scene to the Mexican border 20 miles away. Given Mr. Krentz’s radio transmission, the footprints and heavy drug and illegal immigrant trafficking in that area, investigators are working on the assumption that he encountered a smuggler, possibly heading back to Mexico.292

The murder of a respected local rancher struck at the heart of the community. Although

the crime remained unsolved, the evidence identified drug smugglers as Krentz’s likely

killers, and the murder highlighted the dangers of living in the borderlands. Fellow

rancher, William McDonald explained, “You never know who you’re dealing with out

here because you get all kinds of traffic through here… Everything was in place for

292 Randall C. Archibold. "Ranchers Alarmed by Killing Near Border." The New York Times, April 4, 2010.

113

something like this to happen.”293 Ineffective border security coupled with the steady

flow of undocumented migrants and narcotics highlighted an increasingly political

situation. In the aftermath of Krentz’s death, Senator John McCain, Governor Jan

Brewer, and Representative Gabriel Giffords condemned the killing and called for tighter

border security.294 Beyond the public outcry and political response, the murder of Robert

Krentz typified persistent borderland fears. Without proper action, Arizona would be

awash in murderers, drug smugglers, and other criminals. While Krentz’s murder elicited

a large response, an earlier—but less publicized—murder of a young Hispanic girl and

her father also illustrated borderland fears.

In the early morning hours of May 30, 2009, three camouflage-clad individuals

broke into a home in Arivaca, Arizona about fifty miles southwest of Tucson near the

U.S.-Mexico border. In the minutes that followed, Raul Flores, Jr. and his nine-year old

daughter, Brisenia, were executed while the child’s mother, Gina Gonzalez, survived her

gunshot wounds. Authorities later arrested three individuals including the leader of the

nativist Minuteman American Defense Group, Shawna Forde. A radical splinter group

from the more widely-known Minutemen, the group raided the Flores home in search of

drugs and cash to finance their operations. In the immediate days after the incident, Pima

County Sheriff Clarence Dupnik theorized a motive, stating, “There was an anticipation

that there would be a considerable amount of cash at this location."295 Despite the

Sheriff’s implication that Flores was involved in the narcotics trade, many in the

293 Ibid.

294 Ibid. 295 Jesse, McKinley and Malia Wollan. "Border Fear: Robberies by Rogue Citizens Militia." Deseret Morning News, June 28, 2009.

114

community disagreed with the assessment. Particularly, Fern Loevall responded, “It's a

good place to live, and it's a good place to raise kids. What they're saying about it isn't

true."296 The working-class Flores family maintained no clear connection to drugs but the

father and daughter nonetheless suffered a savage fate.297 During the 2011 trial, Gina

Gonzalez chillingly testified to the words of the one of the assailants, Jason Ford, to Raul

Flores, “"Don't take this personal, but this bullet has your name on it."298 Ultimately, the

assailants were found guilty and Forde was sentenced to death for the abhorrent crime.

The verdict—while a severe blow against anti-immigrant vigilante groups—did little to

quell outrage, particularly among Hispanics. The Christian Science Monitor captured the

frustration of Carlos Galindo, a community activist and radio talk-show host in Phoenix,

“We have failed leadership: They won't speak up, they're silent…To not say that it's

tragic for a child to die - that leaves it as acceptable to continue harming immigrants or

Hispanics here in Arizona."299 Whereas a chorus of influential politicians publically

reacted to the 2010 murder of Robert Krentz, non-Hispanic society registered a largely

muted response in the initial days after the murders or the trial that followed. Hispanics

perceived a racial double standard. Violence against the Anglo community represented a

more pressing risk than similar dangers faced by Hispanics. Arizona reinforced this

296 Ibid.

297 Tim Vanderpool. "Murder in the Desert." http://www.tucsonweekly.com/tucson/murder-in- the-desert/Content?oid=1739974 (accessed July 30, 2014).

298 Nicholas Riccardi. "Mother describes border vigilante killings in Arizona." Los Angeles Times, January 25, 2011.

299 Lourdes Medrano. "Arizona justice: Shawna Forde Death Sentence a Rebuke to Border Vigilantes." The Christian Science Monitor, February 23, 2011.

115 reputation for intolerance in the months after the violence by enacting severely restrictive legislation.

While the Flores murders caused a minimal reaction outside the Hispanic community, the murder of Robert Krentz directly contributed to the passage of legislation. In April 2010, Governor Jan Brewer signed the Support Our Law

Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, better known as S.B. 1070. S.B. 1070 required immigrants fourteen years or older to register with the government and carry registration documents at all times.300 In addition to other provisions, it also directed law enforcement to “determine immigration status of individuals who they reasonably suspect to be illegal aliens, and for all those persons who are arrested.”301 The statutes made immigration enforcement a state and local matter, and again thrust Arizona into the center of the national debate. While advocates and opponents debated the issue, Joe Arpaio played a symbolic and powerful role.

Sheriff Arpaio became an even larger emblematic figure. As national and international light shown on Arizona, Arpaio became the symbol of S.B. 1070 and the state’s restrictive policies. Consider an editorial from the Investor’s Business Daily that noted:

Arpaio's ground-level enforcement of illegal immigration violations has worked. Using the "broken windows" theory, Arpaio has attacked the small crimes that create the conditions for larger, more serious crimes to occur. This explains the cartel's fury. Arpaio is a rare lawman who understands that Mexico's war and Arizona's are the same. His work to halt illegal immigration damages the cartels and benefits both Arizona and Mexico. It's a war against a common enemy that should trigger a united front and a common — and merciless response.302

300 Sheridan 393-94.

301 Ibid.

116

The editorial drew strong connections between the drug-fueled violence that plagued

Mexico and the flow of undocumented immigration. Accordingly, harsh enforcement of

immigration law would limit or preclude the flow of illegal narcotics—and the

accompanying violence—across the border into the United States. The editorial

applauded Arpaio’s unique and insightful perspective in combating undocumented

migration, and by extension, keeping the U.S. safe from Mexican drug cartels. Despite

the supportive words, others did not favorably view S.B. 1070 and Sheriff Joe Arpaio.

The law led to a vociferous outcry—popular protests, boycotts, and assorted legal

challenges followed its passage. In the end, the United States Supreme Court weakened

or disallowed many of S.B. 1070’s provisions. But, the law proved more consequential

for Sheriff Arpaio. The new—and increasingly divided—views of Joe Arpaio

contributed to a hotly contested 2012 election. While MCSO actions, the murder of

Robert Krentz, and S.B. 1070 reinforced the perception of the borderlands as a violent

and lawless region, it is useful to match to concerns against reality.

When Governor Jan Brewer signed S.B. 1070 into law, she exclaimed, ''We

cannot sacrifice our safety to the murderous greed of drug cartels. We cannot stand idly

by as drop houses, kidnappings and violence compromise our quality of life.''303

According to Brewer, spillover from Mexico’s violent drug wars threatened Arizona.

With instances such as the Krentz murder guiding public opinion, on the surface, the bill

represented a decisive attempt to protect Arizona from the scourge of drug violence and

undocumented smugglers streaming northward. While Mexico clearly suffered as result

302 Investor's Business Daily. "An Illegal Bounty." http://news.investors.com/ibd- editorials/080310-542543-an-illegal-bounty.htm (accessed July 24, 2014). 303 Randall C. Archibold. "In Border Violence, Perception is Greater than Crime Statistics." New York Times, Late edition, sec. A, June 20, 2010.

117 of drug-related violence, it is important to examine documented crime rates against perceived fears. The New York Times compiled relevant F.B.I. data and found:

statistics show that even as Arizona's population swelled, buoyed in part by illegal immigrants funneling across the border, violent crime rates declined, to 447 incidents per 100,000 residents in 2008, the most recent year for which comprehensive data is available from the F.B.I. In 2000, the rate was 532 incidents per 100,000…But the rate for property crime, the kind that people may experience most often, increased in the state, to 4,082 per 100,000 residents in 2008 from 3,682 in 2000. Preliminary data for 2009 suggests that this rate may also be falling in the state's biggest cities...304

Violent crime rates fell in Arizona between 2000 and 2008. Arizona’s population increase—and influx of undocumented migrants—did not lead to, or coincide with, an uptick in violent crime. While property crimes increased, in general Arizona became safer in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Moreover, as immigration increased violent crime declined. University of Pennsylvania criminology Professor John M.

McDonald and Harvard social science Professor Robert Sampson found that immigrant youths in Los Angeles were involved in less crime and violence than their native-born peers in similar economic circumstances. Arizona was not unique, with San Antonio and

Miami following a similar trend of more immigrants and less crime.305 The publically— and politically—popular notion of a distinct correlation between undocumented immigration and crime rang false. Although immigration corresponded with reduced crime in U.S. cities, policies like S.B. 1070 and individuals like Sheriff Joe Arpaio reflected this fear-mongering mentality. If the correlation between immigration and

304 Ibid.

305 John M. McDonald and Robert Sampson. "Don't Shut the Golden Door." The New York Times, Late edition, sec. Editorial, June 20, 2012.

118

crime proved weak, persistent fears concerning Mexican immigration into the Southwest

accounted for the public perception.

Professor Huntington’s analysis again proves useful. He drew a connection

between concerns over the “Hispanization” of the southwest to the modern character of

the rest of the United States. Huntington argued that Anglos, long since deprived of their

ethnic heritage by generations of assimilation have adopted a victim mentality in the face

of Hispanic immigration in the borderlands. He cited the statements of sociologist

Professor Charles Gallagher of Georgia State University who explained:

Like it or not, middle-class and lower middle-class whites see themselves as a minority and have adopted a posture of being the victims. Most of them feel they have no real culture. They might have had a grandmother who was Italian and a grandfather who was French, but by now they are so hybridized that they have no ethnic identity.306

Huntington postulated that many low and middle-class individuals felt threatened by a

changing society. As assimilation deprived many Anglos of a distinct ethnic identity, the

arrival of millions of Mexican immigrants—many of whom possessed a strong ethnic and

cultural identity—represented a distinct threat to Anglo culture and society. The race-

based anxiety contributed to a sense of victimhood among the Anglo community. As an

example, the 2010 passage of Arizona House Bill 2281 squashed a Mexican-American

Studies course in the Tucson Unified School District. State Superintendent Jon

Huppenthal (R) commented, “When I came into a classroom, they were portraying Ben

Franklin as a racist.” 307 Although the course represented a valuable effort to instruct

306 Huntington, 315.

307 J. Weston Phippen, "How One Law Banning Ethnic Studies Led to Its Rise," The Atlantic, July 19, 2015. Although S.B. 2281 banned ethnic studies course in Arizona, the popular backlash facilitated the

119

diverse and low-income students with a more comprehensive version of history, its

curriculum threatened anxious Anglos. In 2012, Time offered insightful commentary to

the color-blind claims of Arizona leaders behind the legislation:

But of course this is a claim made by a bloc of whites whose identity feels threatened by the changing look and sound of their neighbors. Their sense of siege rises in direct proportion to the brownness and redness of the population.308

Many white Arizonans—particularly in the era of Sunbelt growth—lacked a strong sense

of cultural and community identity compared to vibrant and growing Mexican

communities. These perceptions contributed to a sense of inferiority and fear.

Outwardly, legislation like S.B. 1070 or S.B. 2281 and the efforts of Joe Arpaio

represented efforts to protect public safety. In reality, Sheriff Joe and 1070 were

surreptitious desires to maintain the Anglo character of Arizona. Although his actions

within Maricopa County appealed to racial fears, Sheriff Arpaio’s embrace of the ‘Birther

Movement’ thrust him further onto the national political stage.

Shortly after the election of then-Senator Barack Obama as President of the

United States in 2008, the ‘Birther Movement’ gained traction. The movement—based

upon the conspiratorial notion of Obama’s birth in Kenya, not Hawaii—dogged the

President throughout his first term. For example, a 2011 CBS/New York Times poll

reported one-quarter of respondents believed Obama was not born in the United States.309

Lingering concerns over Barack Obama’s “otherness” compelled the April 2011 release

expansion of similar courses around the country. New courses have joined the curriculum of districts in California and Texas.

308 Eric Liu, "The Whitewashing of Arizona," Time, May 1, 2012.

309 Carol E. Lee and John Weisman, "Obama Seeks to Quell 'Birther' Talk," The Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2011.

120

of the long-form birth certificate. During the accompanying White House press

conference, Obama contemptuously stated, “We do not have time for this type of

silliness. We have better stuff to do.”310 Although the document’s release mostly

squelched alarmist calls from conservatives—most notably from real estate magnate

Donald Trump—Sheriff Arpaio used the conspiratorial anxieties to again derive support

from the electorate. Beginning in early 2012, a MCSO ‘cold case squad’ comprised of

retired officers and other volunteers investigated the origins of President Obama’s birth

certificate. In March 2012, the Associated Press quoted Arpaio, “Based on all of the

evidence presented and investigated, I cannot in good faith report to you that these

documents are authentic…My investigators believe that the long-form birth certificate

was manufactured electronically and that it did not originate in paper format as claimed

by the White House.”311 Despite the claims, the lack of actual evidence denoted an

inquiry of dubious merit. Furthermore, others perceived the political value of the sixteen-

month inquiry as Arizona State Senator Steve Gallardo (D) noted, "It doesn't matter what

President Obama does, they'll never support him…It's those folks who will continue to

write checks to Sheriff Joe because of this stuff."312 In an increasingly partisan and

divisive political climate, President Obama’s mixed racial background replaced narcotics

or undocumented immigration as Sheriff Arpaio’s most recent tool for stoking fear—and

gaining support—in Anglo segments of the community apprehensive about racial

310 Ibid.

311 "Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio Launches Investigation into Obama’s Birth Certificate," New York Daily News, March 1, 2012.

312 Ibid.

121

changes. At the same time, those anxieties became further localized as the year’s election

showed more voters grew weary of the apprehension that underpinned Sheriff Joe.

In November 2012, Joe Arpaio won a sixth term as the Sheriff of Maricopa

County. In a three-way race he won only 50.7 percent of the vote, his smallest margin of

victory ever. 313 The Arizona Capitol Times found telling voter patterns. Arpaio didn’t

carry areas where Republicans outnumber Democrats in Ahwatukee, Tempe, Chandler,

west Mesa, Paradise Valley, northeast Phoenix, south Scottsdale and some isolated

precincts in Glendale and Peoria. The below statements from local pollster Michael

O’Neill illustrated the turning public opinion of Sheriff Arpaio:

The disparity between support in the outer ring of the county and the strong vote against Arpaio in the central part of the county is stark. Central and west Phoenix gave him less than 20 percent of the vote, while the most rural outer areas gave him more than 70 percent support…There are a few common threads among the areas where Arpaio lost despite a Republican registration advantage… the most prevalent being education and money. Geographically, the two go hand in hand. And those bedroom communities on the edge of the more diverse, politically liberal metro Phoenix area are full of relatively affluent and more highly educated voters who are willing to vote against a controversial figure, even if they share party affiliation.314

Arpaio received minimal support from urban precincts while outlying, predominantly

Anglo and rural areas continued their historical preference for the Republican Sheriff. At

the same time, Arpaio no longer received universal GOP support. Suburban, affluent,

and more-educated individuals cast their votes for Democrat Paul Penzone.

Undocumented immigration, again, played an important role in this change. According

to a May 2010 CNN/Opinion Research Council poll, only 38 percent of respondents

313 Evan Wyloge. "Support for Sheriff Arpaio declines even in some GOP strongholds." Arizona Capitol Times, December 20, 2012.

314 Ibid.

122

advocated a plan that led to amnesty for undocumented migrants while 60 percent

preferred deportation and other stringent enforcement methods. By September 2012,

those numbers flipped to 56 percent in favor of an amnesty-based plan.315 Furthermore,

an April 2013 NBC/Wall Street Journal poll found 54 percent of Americans felt,

“Immigration adds to our character and strengthens the United States.”316 In the months

surrounding the 2012, election xenophobia in the United States waned. With the

stabilization of the housing market and the measured improvement of the overall

economy, the economic and race-based paranoia that lost luster. Without an obvious

threat to livelihood, educated and middle-class or affluent individuals no longer accepted

the race-based populism Arpaio espoused. Instead, those groups viewed Arpaio as a

negative symbol of the state. Arizona voters grew tired of the state’s backward

reputation and its acceptance or perpetuation of racial intolerance. In the short-term, a

narrow group of Anglo, older, and rural voters granted Sheriff Arpaio another four-year

term in office. In the long-term, the outcome represented a troubling trend for Arpaio. By

2012, ‘America’s Toughest Sheriff” no longer maintained an impeccable image as the

protector of Arizona and its borders, and his days as sheriff appeared numbered.

Arizona and Phoenix experienced significant changes in the latter half of the

twentieth and start of the twenty-first century. The influx of millions of new residents

from the northeast and Midwest into the Sunbelt coupled with the arrival of Hispanic

immigrants begat a political and demographic evolution in the region. As a new strand of

315 Paul Steinhauser. "CNN Poll: Path to Citizenship Trumps Border Security." CNN Political Ticker. February 6, 2014. Accessed August 5, 2014. http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/02/06/cnn- poll-pathway-to-citizenship-trumps-border-security/comment-page-2/.

316 Ibid.

123 conservative Republican populism replaced the centrist, business-focused ideology of the

Charter Government Committee, the stage was set for the arrival of Sheriff Joe Arpaio.

By capitalizing on the mystique of the frontier lawman, Sheriff Joe presented himself as the protector of an Anglo society threatened by crime, undocumented immigration, and

Hispanics. Initially, many supported Arpaio as he scored repeated electoral victories and gained impressive political influence. By 2012, economic improvement, public anger over assorted controversies, and the nation’s changing demography—and the resultant more positive perception of immigration—pushed Arpaio further into the arms of increasingly isolated and reactionary supporters.

124

CONCLUSION

INTO THE SUNSET?

In September 2015, Univision anchor Jorge Ramos interviewed Sheriff Joe

Arpaio. In the sweltering Phoenix heat, and against the backdrop of ‘Tent City,’ the

award-winning journalist and caricatured lawman matched wits. In an unexpectedly

cordial interview, Ramos quizzed Arpaio on topics ranging from recent federal court

decisions against the MCSO to the political phenomenon of Republican presidential

candidate Donald Trump. In recalling Ramos’ amiable methods Sheriff Arpaio recalled,

“I’m a little disappointed he was so nice to me. ... I worry that he’s getting to like me

now. He’ll ruin my reputation.”317 The Sheriff’s light-hearted statements belied a

discernable downturn in his popularity and notoriety since 2012. Whereas Joe Arpaio has

consistently dealt with judicial pressure and popular discord stemming from MCSO

actions and policies, a 2012 racial profiling case may precipitate Arpaio’s downfall. The

case, heard before the United States District Court for Arizona, arguably represented a

turning point in the political significance of Sheriff Joe Arpaio—a turning point from

which Sheriff Arpaio may not recover.318

In April 2013, Judge G. Murray Snow of the United States District Court for

Arizona ruled against Sheriff Joe Arpaio and the MCSO in Melendres vs. Arpaio. In the

case, stemming from the 2007 detainment of Manuel De Jesus Ortega Melendres, a

Mexican tourist in nearby Cave Creek, Arizona, Snow ruled Arpaio and the MCSO’s

317 Marcella Valdez. "Jorge Ramos’s Long Game." New York Times, September 25, 2015, Magazine sec.

318 J.J Hensley. "Joe Arpaio's Legacy in the Balance with Lawsuit Outcome." Arizona Republic, July 8, 2012.

125 policies violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and racially profiled Hispanics.

Additionally, Snow issued corrective actions for the MCSO including the appointment of an independent monitor, the end of saturation patrols, and significant training for deputies in the avoidance of racial profiling. 319 The Ninth Court of Appeals largely upheld the ruling in April 2015. Sheriff Arpaio suffered further public disgrace that same month upon the disclosure of his hiring of a private investigator to investigate Judge Snow’s wife during a contempt-of-court hearing.320 The disclosure became more damning when

MCSO emails revealed the existence of more than fifty hard drives of information relevant to the informant hired by Arpaio to gather information on the judge. By July

2015, Sheriff Arpaio no longer possessed an impeccable public persona.321

This study of Arpaio’s Arizona began with an examination of history and legend in the West. Historically, sheriffs and other officers acted as vital civil servants in a changing western region. But, the myth of a swaggering, gun-toting ‘wild west sheriff’ overshadowed that reality. As Sheriff of Maricopa County, Arpaio skillfully relied upon the myth to garner influence in a community beset by crime and incompetence in the early 1990s. This thesis continued with an exploration of the complexities of race in the borderlands. Historically, those complexities have contributed to intermittent periods of both conflict and cooperation. Periods of conflict or cooperation often resulted from assorted interrelated factors, namely, economic prosperity or lack thereof coupled with

319 Melendres v. Arpaio. 2013. United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

320 Megan Cassidy. "Arpaio: PI Hired to Investigate Judge's Wife." Arizona Republic.

321 Megan Cassidy. “Judge Sends Marshals to Seize Evidence from Sheriff Arpaio.” Arizona Republic.

126 the perception of an outside threat to the community. As Arpaio’s tenure continued, the self-styled ‘toughest sheriff in America’ used historical and contemporary concerns about immigration and race in the borderlands to gain favor amongst an older reactionary white electorate. In the early years of Arizona’s statehood after 1912, the combustible combination of labor unrest and paranoia resultant from the Mexican Revolution and

World War I contributed to restrictive notions of race, particularly the perception of

Hispanics and Mexicans as enemy others. Similarly, demographic and economic shifts in the last generation has contributed to an atmosphere that vilified undocumented immigrants—and by extension all Hispanics, even those who are U.S. citizens—as enemies of Anglos in the borderlands. Furthermore, the study sought to explore the remarkable resiliency, unique political appeal, and historical significance of a local law enforcement official whose influence stretched beyond the borders of Phoenix and

Maricopa County and onto the national and international stage.

Beyond the aforementioned typical realties of law enforcement in the West, the thesis found law enforcement officials represented the imposition of a new order in the area. The imposition of said order, coupled with the arrival of assorted forms of mass media, the pursuit of a proper legacy by Wyatt Earp, and Hollywood movies facilitated the creation of one of the nation’s most enduring myths—the swaggering sheriff. Sheriff

Arpaio utilized the myth of the grizzled, gun-toting sheriff to powerful effect. After a long, and arguably distinguished, career in federal law enforcement Joe Arpaio won election as the Sheriff of Maricopa County in 1992. His initial victory and following tenure echoed both historical and contemporary matters. Arpaio initially used crime and illicit narcotics as dire threats to the community before shifting to simmering fears over

127 undocumented immigration and demographic changes to gain popularity in Phoenix and the larger county. The 1990s-era push for ‘law and order’ coupled with renewed concerns over undocumented immigration helped Arpaio present himself as the community’s protector. From his first election until approximately 2010, when demographic shifts and unfavorable legal rulings significantly reduced his popular appeal, Arpaio enjoyed strong support across the political spectrum for his ‘get tough’ approach to crime, jails, and undocumented immigration. Recently, allegations of misconduct, assorted legal challenges, lawsuits, and a diversifying electorate have deprived Sheriff Arpaio of broad community support. In particular, Arpaio’s support became more limited to Anglo and older, backward-looking segments of the conservative electorate. Research found how Sheriff Joe Arpaio—a political novice when he first entered office—exhibited great savvy, a keen historical sense for the needs of a community perceived as under threat, and a willingness to exploit those anxieties for political expediency.

As the study progressed, it examined how the tenure of Sheriff Joe Arpaio reflected ethnoracial anxiety in the borderlands. The texts revealed Sheriff Joe Arpaio as a politically shrewd operator who possessed a keen ability to appeal to the electorate within Maricopa County, Arizona. The appeal and deeper historical significance of

Sheriff Joe Arpaio is evident in the 2016 Republican presidential campaign. On the eve of the January Iowa Caucus, real estate mogul, reality television star, and Republican

Presidential candidate Donald Trump received Arpaio’s endorsement. In a statement released by the campaign, Arpaio explained,

Donald Trump is a leader. He produces results and is ready to get tough in order to protect American jobs and families. I have fought on the front lines to prevent

128

illegal immigration and I know Donald Trump will stand with me and countless Americans to secure our border. I am proud to support him as the best candidate for president of the United States of America.322

The endorsement arguably represents a ploy by Arpaio to hitch his fading fortunes to the unusual GOP nominee as Sheriff Arpaio struggles to remain the ‘toughest sheriff in the

West.’ Since the early stages of his tenure, Arpaio wrapped himself in the myth of the swaggering sheriff, the brazen protector of a community at-risk. Like Arpaio, Trump casts himself as authoritative leader who does not allow facts and evidence to sway the certainty of his ideas. Yale School of Medicine professor of clinical psychiatry, David

Berg observed that many Trump supporters perceive threats:

from both inside the group (e.g. changing demographics, Wall Street greed, immigration, income inequality repercussions) — as well as from outside the group (international disorder, ISIS, China, Russia).323

In Maricopa County Sheriff Arpaio reinstituted citizen posses, toughened incarceration practices, and targeted undocumented immigration under the pretext of protecting the community. On the national stage, Trump’s call for the construction of a fortified wall along the U.S.-Mexico border, protectionist trade policies, and the banning of all Muslim immigration smacks of a similar unorthodox and demagogic appeal to an electorate motivated—at least partially—by fear and racial prejudice.324

The rise of figures like Sheriff Arpaio and Donald Trump to prominence are illustrative of complex larger societal and historical trends in the United States. As

322 Maggie Haberman. "Sheriff Joe Arpaio to Endorse Donald Trump in Iowa." New York Times, January 26, 2016.

323 Thomas B. Edsell. "Donald Trump's Appeal." New York Times, December 2, 2015.

324 Ibid.

129

African-Americans and Hispanics have gained more clout, blue-collar Anglos without a

college education perceived other groups’ gains coming at their expense. In the specific

case of Donald Trump, some commentators have attributed his rise to a backlash from

lower-class, white, Republican voters who no longer support free trade, the privatization

of social security, financial deregulation, or tax cuts.325

Increased racial and ethnic diversity in the country has precipitated recent

scholarly and historical study—with specific focus upon the evolving status of Anglos

relative to racial and ethnic minorities. In particular, White Rage: The Unspoken Truth of

Our Racial Divide by Dr. Carol Anderson explores legal, judicial, and political resistance

by Anglos to the advancement of African-Americans. While the book explores white

resistance to the racial equality stretching from Reconstruction to the modern-day, efforts

to reduce minority voter turnout in the aftermath the 2008 election of Barack Obama are

most relevant to this study. Anderson argues that a bleak demographic future and

dwindling voter rolls has led to surreptitious efforts by GOP-leaning politicians to

disenfranchise minority voters. For example, the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby vs.

Holder (2013) led to the passage of assorted voter ID and other similar laws in Arizona,

Arkansas, Florida, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, Virginia, and Texas. The

legislation came under the guise of protecting the “integrity” of the ballot box, but all had

the intent of limiting and frustrating voting by African-Americans and Latinos.326

Despite the efforts of some backward-looking Anglos, the electorate of Maricopa County,

325 Jacob Weisberg, "How the GOP Is Losing Its Grip on Working-Class Republicans," Slate Magazine, April 18, 2016, accessed September 18, 2016, http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2016/04/how_the_gop_is_losing_its_grip_on_wo rking_class_republicans.html.

326 Anderson, Carol. White Rage: The Unspoken Truth of Our Racial Divide. (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 151.

130 and by extension the entire country, has become more diverse. As a result, Hispanics,

African-Americans, and other minorities represent ascendant voting blocks in this country.

The study of Sheriff Joe Arpaio proved a novel and interesting thesis topic.

Despite becoming one of the most notable elected officials in the borderlands, a surprising dearth of scholarly information existed on Arpaio. Beyond the lack of scholarly analysis, a second factor drew the author to Sheriff Arpaio. I have carried a lifelong interest and passion for history, but when a teaching job precipitated a move to

Phoenix in the summer of 2007, my new home—with its high proportion of transplants and sprawling landscapes punctuated by relatively new growth—seemingly lacked history. The thesis revealed my misperception. Instead, the Arizona borderlands offer a rich, diverse, and fascinating history. Furthermore, as the United States moves into the twenty-first century, conflicts, and individuals that have defined borderlands may provide instructive examples to a nation experiencing demographic, political, cultural and social changes.

131

REFERENCES

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Jacoby, Karl. Shadows at Dawn: An Apache Massacre and the Violence of History. New York: Penguin Books, 2008.

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Luckingham, Bradford. Minorities in Phoenix: A Profile of Mexican American, Chinese American, and African American Communities, 1860-1992. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1994.

Luckingham, Bradford. Phoenix: The History of a Southwestern Metropolis. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1989.

Meeks, Eric V. Border Citizens: The Making of Indians, Mexicans, and Anglos in Arizona. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007.

Metz, Leon Claire. Pat Garrett: The Story of a Western Lawman. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973.

Milner, Clyde A. The Oxford History of the American West. New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Perry, Richard John. Western Apache Heritage: People of the Mountain Corridor. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1991.

Regan, Margaret. The Death of Josseline: Immigration Stories from the Arizona-Mexico Borderlands. Boston: Beacon Press, 2010.

Schulman, Bruce J. The Seventies: The Great Shift in American Culture, Society, and Politics, Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 2001.

Sheridan, Thomas E. Arizona: A History. ed. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2012.

Shermer, Elizabeth Tandy. Sunbelt Capitalism: Phoenix and the Transformation of American Politics. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013.

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Smith, Peter H. Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.

St. John, Rachel. Line in the sand: A History of the Western U.S.-Mexico border. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.

Sterling, Terry Greene. Illegal: Life and Death in Arizona's Immigration War Zone. Guilford, CT: Lyons Press, 2010.

Urrea, Luis Alberto. The Devil's Highway: A True Story. New York: Little, Brown, 2004.

White, Richard. It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A History of the American West. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

Willoughby, Robert J. Brothers Robidoux and the Opening of the American West. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2014.

Journal Articles: Craig, Richard B. "Operation Intercept: The International Politics of Pressure." The Review of Politics. no. 4 (1980): 556-580.

Dilulio, John J. "Federal Crime Policy: Time for a Moratorium," The Brookings Review, 17, no. 1 (1999): 18-20.

Miller, Worth Robert. "The Lost World of Gilded Age Politics." The Journal of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era 1, no. 1 (2002): 49-67.

Mongelluzzo, Bill. "Debate Continues over US Immigration Reform Act." Journal of Commerce, June 26, 1989.

Mulligan, Raymond A. "New York Foundlings at Clifton-Morenci Social Justice in Arizona Territory 1904-1905." Arizona and the West, (1964) 104-118.

Noel, Linda C. ""I Am an American": Anglos, Mexicans, Nativos, and the National Debate over Arizona and New Mexico Statehood." Pacific Historical Review 80, no. 3 (2011): 430-467.

Truett, Samuel. "The Ghosts of Frontiers Past: Making and Unmaking Space in the Borderlands." Journal of the Southwest, 46, no. 2 (2004): 309-350.

Walker, William O. III. "The Foreign Narcotics Policy of the United States since 1980: An End to the War on Drugs?" International Journal, 49, no. 1 (1993-94): 37-65.

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Newspapers/Magazines:

Arizona Capitol Times

Arizona Daily Star (Tucson)

Arizona Republic (Phoenix)

Arizona Weekly Journal Miner (Prescott, AZ)

Christian Science Monitor

Deseret Morning News (Salt Lake City)

East Valley Tribune (Mesa, AZ)

GQ Magazine

The Independent (London)

Investor’s Business Daily

Los Angeles Times

Phoenix Gazette

Phoenix New Times

The Atlantic

Bisbee Daily Review (Bisbee, AZ)

Kingman Daily Miner (Kingman, AZ)

New York Times

The New Yorker

USA Today

Washington Post

The Washington Times

Tucson Weekly

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Primary Source Collections:

Records of Maricopa County Recorder. 2000 General Election Results. Phoenix.

Records of Maricopa County Recorder. 2008 General Election Results. Phoenix.

Behavior Research Council. Rocky Mountain Poll Results

Internet-based Sources:

Cornelius, Wayne A. Social Science Research Council, "Impacts of Border Enforcement on Unauthorized Mexican Migration to the United States." Last modified September 26, 2006. Accessed December 9, 2013. http://borderbattles.ssrc.org/Cornelius/.

Klein, Christopher. "The Renegade Roots of Hollywood." History in the Headlines. April 30, 2012. Accessed August 1, 2015. http://www.history.com/news/the-renegade- roots-of-hollywood-studios.

Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office. “Questions about the MCSO.” http://www.mcso.org/About/FAQ/pdf/Chain_Gangs.pdf.

Perlstein, Rick. "Exclusive: Lee Atwater's Infamous 1981 Interview on the Southern Strategy." The Nation. November 13, 2012. Accessed July 06, 2016. https://www.thenation.com/article/exclusive-lee-atwaters-infamous-1981- interview-southern-strategy/.

Regan, Margaret. "The Irish Orphan Abduction." Tucson Weekly. March 15, 2007. Accessed December 27, 2015. http://www.tucsonweekly.com/tucson/the-irish- orphan-abduction/Content?oid=1087070

"The Bisbee Deportation of 1917." Historical Context-Overview. Accessed January 3, 2016. http://www.library.arizona.edu/exhibits/bisbee/history/overview.html.

Wister, Owen. "The Virginian." The Gutenberg Project. September 17, 2008. Accessed June 23, 2015. http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1298/1298-h/1298-h.htm.

Film:

Public Broadcasting Service. “Now: The People’s Sheriff.” Available from http://www.pbs.org/now/shows/513/index.html, accessed July 25, 2014.

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VITA

Nicholas D. Rizzi

EDUCATION

Master of Arts student in History at Sam Houston State University, Huntsville, Texas, January 2012-December 2016. Thesis title: “Joe Arpaio and the Phenomenon of the ‘Toughest Sheriff in America.’”

Bachelor of Arts (April 2005) in Secondary Education, The University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT

Secondary teacher, Dysart Unified School District #89, Surprise, Arizona, September 2007-present. Responsibilities include planning and conducting classroom lessons, grading, tutoring, coaching sports, and leading extracurricular activities.

PUBLICATIONS

The New Right and the Old West: Sheriff Joe Arpaio and a History of Conservative Politics and Fear in the Borderlands, Journal of the West, Fall 2015.