Michael A. Cohen writes on politics and national security and was previously a senior research fellow at the New America Foundation. He is a regular contributor to the blog www.democracyarsenal.org.
The Myth of a Kinder, Gentler War Michael A. Cohen
We learn from history that we learn nothing military approach that seeks to convince the from history. population that counter-insurgents, acting —George Bernard Shaw on behalf of a sovereign government, can be trusted and are worthy of popular support. Shortly after he assumed command of all With its seemingly progressive and hu - U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, Lt. manistic approach, FM 3-24, and counter- Gen. Stanley McChrystal provided his sol - insurgency in general, offer a seductive ideal diers with operational guidance for fighting for the future of American war-fighting. insurgent Taliban forces. McChrystal’s words But the veneration of COIN conceals a brutal directly reflect the Pentagon’s new model reality. The history of counter-insurgency of U.S. warfare and inform the philosophy in the twentieth century is not a story of behind the current U .S. military escalation warm and fuzzy war, of benevolent soldiers in Afghanistan: “The ongoing insurgency providing essential government services to must be met with a counterinsurgency cam - grateful natives, of armed social work, or paign adapted to the unique conditions in of the gentleman soldier’s antidote to the each area that: protects the Afghan people, Shermanesque notion of Total War. Instead, allowing them to choose a future they can counter-insurgency is a repeated tale of be proud of; provides a secure environment coercion and violence directed largely allowing good government and economic against unarmed civilians. And this defines development to undercut the causes and both those COIN efforts that have been advocates of insurgency.” successful—and those that have failed. According to McChrystal, the “Afghan Yet counter-insurgency is often de - people are at the center of our mission...in scribed today in misleading terms. Accord - reality they are the mission.” These senti - ing to Mark Bowden, author of Black Hawk ments are reflective of what has become the Down: A Story of Modern War , COIN “em - new way of American war—population - braces distinctly liberal, humanistic values centric counter-insurgency ( COIN ). The like protecting civilians, cultural sensitivity, focus on COIN doctrine was enshrined by and rigid adherence to ethical standards and Gen . David Petraeus and the 2006 publica - the law.” Others such as Max Boot, senior tion of the Army and Marine counter-insur - fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations gency manual, FM 3-24, which calls for a and the author of The Savage Wars of Peace:
© 2010 World Policy Institute 75 Small Wars and the Rise of American Power , humanistic approach described by COIN ad - have argued that the focus on counter-insur - vocates. Still, current operations in Afghan- gency, in Afghanistan today, is in keeping istan are predicated on this fundamental with a grand U.S. military tradition: “Mc - misreading and misunderstanding of COIN ’s Chrystal’s advice to embrace the population bloody past. Indeed , the tactics espoused by and be sparing in the use of firepower has McChrystal and others are fundamentally been employed by successful counterinsur - counter to historical precedent—and the as - gents from the American Army in the sumption they will succeed in Afghanistan Philippines at the turn of the twentieth is highly suspect. century.” Even those on the left are not im - Like all wars, counter-insurgency is, at mune to the seductions of this new mode of its core, war—and the idea that it can be American warfare. Rachel Kleinfeld, direc - sanitized or made less violent is deeply and tor of the progressive–oriented Truman dangerously misleading. John Nagl, presi - National Security Project, has lauded dent of the Center for A New American counter-insurgency for its focus on the Security (a locus of COIN thinking in Wash - “importance of legitimacy and privileging ington) and a co-author of FM 3-24, has civilian life in order to gain hearts and argued that, “unless the counterinsurgent minds,” a goal we are told that “progres- is willing to employ the so-called Roman sives have been promoting for years.” method of unrestrained violence to suppress rebellion, the only way to defeat an insur - Do as the Romans Do gency is to gain the loyalty of the popula - Though protecting the population, or tion, thereby depriving insurgents of the cleaving them away from insurgents, has support base they require to destabilize a long defined COIN operations, the more government.” coercive elements that have accompanied Indeed , the Roman Empire did de- these efforts receive far less mention. For velop an often-imitated counter-insurgency example, FM 3-24 approvingly cites the ex - response—brutally destroying the cities of periences of the British military in Malaya those who resisted Roman rule and forcing and Kenya, as well as the French in Algeria , any surviving prisoners into slavery. In the as potential models for how to wage a popu - fabled words of Tacitus, “They make a lation -centric counter-insurgency. But each wasteland and call it peace.” of these conflicts—as well as U .S. COIN op - Throughout history, counter-insurgents erations in the Philippines and Vietnam— have often adopted some variation of the were defined by significant levels of coercion Roman method —from Gen. William and violence against civilians. Even in Iraq, Tecumseh Sherman’s March to the Sea to the which has been heralded as COIN ’s shining far more brutal tactics adopted by the Nazis contemporary success story, the “triumph ” in World War II and the Soviet Union of counter-insurgency tactics that accompa - against recalcitrant ethnic minorities. Far nied the 2007 surge of U.S. troops was fewer have taken their cues from the Ameri - matched with horrific levels of violence and can way of COIN as described in FM 3-24. population resettlement —and a higher This is not to suggest that U.S. military number of civilian deaths due to American leaders should take inspiration from Imperi - military actions. al Rome or Nazi Germany. But the contin - In fact, none of the major counter-insur - ued evangelism of humanistic COIN threat - gent wars fought by the United States and ens to convince policymakers that counter- other Western countries look much like the insurgency can be done effectively, without
76 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SPRING 2010 ©Jeff Danziger coercion —or that there exists a simplistc military operations against the antebellum choice between the Roman method and Mc - South and Native American tribes were Chrystal’s predominant focus on population intended to pacify rebellious populations — protection. And while it can be problematic and with often harsh tactics —operations in to draw too narrow an historical lesson from the Philippines reflected the first concerted past events, on this point the legacy of COIN U.S. effort to conduct nation-building in a is consistent. The methods for defeating an faraway land . insurgency have generally been defined less After the capture of the island archi- by an open hand than a clenched fist. pelago from the Spanish in 1898, control The mistaken belief that counter- of the Philippines had been ceded to the insurgencies can be waged humanely risks United States. But the Americans quickly embroiling the United States in more ran headfirst into an emerging nationalist conflicts and weakening national security. movement, which declared war against the When it comes to COIN , the best course United States in early 1899 and sought the of action for the United States is most cer - removal of foreign troops. A two-tiered tainly less, not more. response to the emerging insurgency was adopted. First , there was a strong military COIN in the Philippines commitment to what Filipino rebels would The unsavory realities of subduing a rebel - call the “politics of attraction.” Civic proj - lion were evident in America’s first overseas ects were established, schools and roads foray in counter-insurgency. While domestic built, health care and proper sanitation
The Myth of a Kinder, Gentler War 77 provided, and efforts made to build an effec - forces. The balance would generally be de - tive and legitimate Filipino government. fined more by the latter than the former — Initially, the U.S. military focused on and brutal methods generally produced the restoring order and civic action, but due to greatest immediate success. the persistence of the insurgency —and the move to cruel and bloody guerrilla tactics — The British Experience that balance would shift rather dramatically COIN advocates, in an effort to present mod - in the later periods of the conflict. This ern, population-centric counter-insurgency would prove decisive. A program of coercion as an enlightened way of war-fighting all and punitive measures was implemented, too often gloss over this difficult history. ranging from the destruction of crops and Perhaps the best example of this historical property to the separation of civilians into inaccuracy is the tale of British counter- euphemistically described “protected zones” insurgency mission in Malaya, a colonial to extrajudicial punishment of Filipino pris - conflict waged against the Malayan National oners and torture. This stepped -up military Liberation Army, a Communist insurgent effort culminated in the Marine campaign group supported by the colony’s poor and at Samar, a spasm of violence that saw disenfranchised ethnic Chinese population. widespread atrocities committed against But a closer look at the British experi - civilians. ence in Malaya suggests that its success , like While the American experience in the the Philippines , was predicated on the use Philippines can be seen today as a civic suc - of coercion against the civilian population in cess , the accomplishment relied in large concert with civil action and amnesty pro - part on the use of sustained coercion and grams. British Field Marshal Sir Gerald violence. By some estimates, as many as Templer, who is generally credited with 300,000 Filipino civilians died in the war. turning around the counter-insurgency mis - As the historian Brian Linn has written, sion in Malaya after his arrival in the colony “Benevolence and civic action were not in 1952, adopted a more conciliatory and enough to overcome Filipino resistance. open-handed approach, arguing that the Despite garrisoning hundreds of posts “answer [to the uprising] lies not in pouring throughout the archipelago, soldiers found more troops into the jungle, but in the they could neither offer sufficient rewards to hearts and minds of the people”—thus coin - win over their opponents nor sufficient pro - ing what has become the favorite expression tection to save their friends from guerrilla of COIN advocates . retaliation ... as Kipling predicted, the John Nagl cites Malaya as the quintes - Philippine War proved to be a ‘savage sential example of how an army became a war of peace.’” “learning organization” in responding to the The U.S. experience in the Philippines complexities of dealing with an insurgent served as a resonant example of the sorts of force. Indeed, one of the three books listed counter-insurgency fights to come. in the Acknowledgements of FM 3-24 is Throughout much of the twentieth century , Robert Thompson’s Defeating Communist In - Western governments would find them - surgencies: The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam . selves facing the same challenge that con - It’s not surprising that Thompson—one of fronted American colonial overseers in the chief architects of the COIN mission in Philippines—how to balance the need for Malaya and a key advisor to Templer— civil action against the demands of main - offers a positive take on British counter- taining security and defeating insurgent insurgency policy .
78 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SPRING 2010 The veneration of Templer and Thomp - the conflict came with the “increasing con - son, however, ignores some inconvenient straints” placed on the operations of the in - facts. By the time Templer had arrived on surgents due to resettlement. the scene , the tide of the war against the in - The British experience in Malaya was, to surgency had already begun to turn. This a large extent, replicated in Kenya during had far less to do with protecting the popu - the Mau Mau rebellion against British colo - lation than it did separating the ethnic nial rule—but in even more brutal terms. Chinese population from the insurgents , by The heart of the Mau Mau insurgency came force. Historian Paul Dixon has offered a from the country’s Kikuyu tribe, which had compelling list of indignities visited upon endured years of deprivation and land theft this group: mass arrests, the death penalty from British colonial overseers. But , as in for carrying weapons, food control systems, burning down of the homes of Communist sympathiz - British counter-insurgency ers, curfews and fines against com - was predicated on the use munities as forms of collective “ punishment for individual offenses, of coercion against civilian detention without trial (used on more than 30,000 people), and populations . deportations. But perhaps no method was more suc - Malaya , the ethn”ic homogeneity of the in - cessful than that put forward by Sir Harold surgency made it easier for the British to Briggs, who preceded Templer as the British separate the population from the rebels. Army’s director of operations in Malaya. His Once again, it was often savage brutality strategy, which became known as the Briggs that proved decisive in meeting that goal. Plan , was a forced resettlement policy insti - According to David Anderson, author tuted in 1950 that moved more than half a of Histories of the Hanged , an authoritative million ethnic Chinese—a quarter of the study of the Mau Mau rebellion, “The war Chinese people in Malaya—into so-called against Mau Mau was fought not just by New Villages . While these settlements may the military or by the police, but by the have provided some of the first adequate civil administration, in a pervasive cam - lodging for the local population, they were paign that sought to strip the rebels and maintained by force , and tough punish - their sympathizers of every possible human ments were meted out to those who did not right, while at the same time maintaining abide by British diktats. the appearance of accountability, trans- Indeed, by instituting a policy of forced parency, and justice .... When the fighting resettlement, years before the introduction was at its worst, the Kikuyu districts of of Templer’s “hearts and minds” strategy, Kenya became a police state in the very the stage was already set for the British fullest sense of the term.” Collective pun- defeat of the insurgents. It is a view sup - ishments were used, property was seized, ported by Chin Peng, the head of the civilians were resettled, torture became Malayan Communist party , who reported institutionalized , and the death penalty in post-war histories that when he heard was widely expanded. In all, nearly 1,100 about the appointment of Templer, “we Kikuyu were hanged for infractions associ- were really feeling the heat of the New ated with the rebellion —less than a quarter Villages.” For Peng , the turning point in for capital crimes.
The Myth of a Kinder, Gentler War 79 There were also civil policies that em - brought some short-term military success ployed gentler tactics, including land re - they ultimately were politically disastrous form initiatives and the cultivation of a and hastened ignominious defeats for both cadre of tribal loyalists known as the countries. Kikuyu Home Guard. But in the end, it One of the odd elements of the modern was the appropriately named Operation fetishizing of counter-insurgency is the at - Anvil in May 1954 that truly broke the tention focused on French military officer back of the insurgency. In sweeps across David Galula and the slender volume he Nairobi and other major cities , tens of thou - wrote about his experiences in Algeria, sands of Kikuyu were detained and shipped Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice . to detention facilities. At its height, more It has become a bible for many of today’s than 70,000 Kikuyu were held in camps COIN adherents and Galula has been hailed far worse than those to which the ethnic as one of the fathers of modern counter- Chinese in Malaya were subjected. Most insurgency doctrine. While noting that were held without trial and conditions in revolutionary wars are perhaps the “cruelest the camps were appalling with poor sanita - of all,” Galula contends that the “counter- tion, meager provisions, and the frequent insurgent is endowed with congenital employment of violence as a disciplinary strength; for him to adopt the insurgent’s measure. warfare would be the same as for a giant to What both Kenya and Malaya have in try to fit into a dwarf’s clothing.” Or , put common is not a “hearts and minds” ap - another way, the counter-insurgent must proach to counter-insurgency or a focus on avoid the urge to wallow in the same muck protecting the population at the expense of as the insurgent. targeting the enemy—instead it was the ap - But during the height of the Algerian plication of overwhelming and callous force revolution, the French military institution - against the civilian population. In both alized the systematic use of torture and cases , as in the Philippines , it was the use of summary execution of guerrillas. Wide - coercion that proved decisive for the count - spread population resettlement policies and er-insurgents. While noting the deplorable other punitive measures were used against elements of each campaign , FM 3-24 does civilians. According to Alistair Horne’s cite these two examples of the “traditional magisterial history of the conflict, at the British method of fighting insurgency” as height of the battle of Algiers, the seminal ones to be imitated by the U .S. military in episode of the war, “between thirty and its waging of counter-insurgency. Yet, what forty percent of the entire male population is lacking in FM 3-24 is the all-important of the Casbah were arrested at some point” recognition that coercion and violence were and more than a million villagers had been not only integral but decisive to British suc - transferred to desperate “regroupment cess in Malaya and Kenya. camps.” Indeed, the Algerian counter-insur - gency was among the bloodiest and most The French in Algeria violent in modern history, particularly since The excesses perpetrated by counter-insur - French brutality was matched —and in many gents in Malaya, Kenya , and the Philippines cases surpassed —by the extraordinary car - were recreated on an even grander scale dur - nage and barbarism of Algerian FLN rebels. ing the French engagement in Algeria and Though eventually the French were able the American war in Vietnam. But in these to defeat the insurgency militarily, the use latter examples, while coercive methods of such coercive methods created a public
80 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SPRING 2010 backlash in France that sapped the country’s gents’ influence and appeal.” Counter-insur - political will to maintain an occupying gency advocates have argued that CORDS was force. The political fallout from such coer - a success and would have defeated the insur - cive and violent techniques rendered contin - gency had the effort been maintained. As ued occupation unsustainable. It would the argument goes, CORDS forced the North eventually lead to the Evian Accords and Vietnamese to abandon their support for the Algerian independence in 1962 and con - Vietcong insurgency and adopt a conven - tribute to a phenomenon of national soul- tional military approach—and demonstrated searching that continued for decades. the U.S. military’s core capability in con - ducting effective counter-insurgency opera - The Vietnam Experience tions. But , in fact , the “success” of the In Vietnam, the approach to counter-insur - CORDS program coincided with a series of gency was never as violent and coercive as far more important strategic events , particu - the tactics employed by French forces in Algeria, but COIN proponents’ The political fallout from coercive take whitewashes the and violent techniques in Algeria history of a vicious and “ ultimately lost conflict. rendered continued the French Here again, the United States focused its energy occupation unsustainable. on the goal of separating the insurgents from the population. And larly the depletion of the Vietc”ong ranks once again coercion would be a key feature through repeated attacks on U .S. and South of this effort. In the early stages of the war, Vietnamese forces (highlighted by the mili - the United States implemented the so-called tarily disastrous Tet offensive of 1968 ). strategic hamlet initiative, which forcibly Also missing from the CORDS story — relocated rural civilians into “secure ” set - and curiously omitted from FM 3-24 —is tings. This wreaked havoc on local commu - its important corollary, the Phoenix Pro - nities and sowed deep-seated enmity to - gram. This euphemistically described “anti- wards American forces and the South infrastructure initiative” was aimed at elimi - Vietnamese government. Corruption, coer - nating top Vietcong leaders and operatives. cion , and the lack of security from the While not an assassination program per se South Vietnamese military would ensure (since a key element included the capture that these hamlets were anything but and arrest of Vietcong political leaders) , strategic or safe. more than 26,000 Vietcong operatives were By late 1967, the U.S. military devised killed among the 80,000 or so “neutral - a new approach for defeating the insurgency ized.” Though Phoenix had some limited in South Vietnam: the Civil Operations and success in undermining the Vietcong insur - Rural Development Support ( CORDS ) pro - gency and pacifying rural communities, the gram, which more fully integrated U .S. cost in political terms was far greater. civilian and military efforts in support of A recent Rand Corporation study the South Vietnamese government. that defended the program as an effective FM 3-24 hails the program for “protect - counter-insurgency tool also highlights ing the South Vietnamese population the enormous damage it did to larger U.S. and...undermining the communist insur - interests:
The Myth of a Kinder, Gentler War 81 Although assassination was never have worked more successfully had it been part of Phoenix policy, it was por - implemented sooner or had political leaders trayed as such by opponents of the the will to see the fight through. But ulti - war, and this view enjoyed wide cir - mately in both places, the cause of the in - culation in the press and among do - surgent force was simply more appealing mestic American and international than anything being propagated by the audiences. In the polarized and in - counter-insurgents. Indeed , even the much deed overheated political environ - admired Galula argues that without a ment of the late 1960s and early “countercause” that appeals to the popula - 1970s, Phoenix embodied for many tion, the effort is doomed to failure. Thus , on the political left the violent ex - short of military saturation of the entire cesses of America as it rampaged country , the need to resort to coercive meth - across Southeast Asia. Phoenix ods was not only necessary, but practically therefore contributed to a lasting inevitable. legacy of suspicion about U.S. power and global ambitions. Beware the Surge Narrative But perhaps nowhere is the divide between Rather than proving the efficacy of fact and fiction about counter-insurgency counter-insurgency, the war in Vietnam is starker than in discussions about the U.S. an object lesson in how difficult it can be war in Iraq. The dominant narrative about to maintain support for such a long-term the Iraq war is that, after the American in - war-fighting effort. The experiences of the vasion in 2003, the U.S. Army forgot the French in Algeria and Americans in Viet - lessons of counter-insurgency and bungled nam should serve as an important reminder their way through a heavy-handed military to the modern counter-insurgent of the lim - occupation marked by the use of conven - its of political and public will for such cam - tional military tactics ill-suited to fighting a paigns. The harsh measures taken in both guerilla war. The situation, as the story theaters undermined domestic political sup - goes, turned around in 2007 after the adop - port, as did the growing costs of fighting tion of population-centric, counter-insur - conflicts that seemed increasingly peripheral gency techniques, which occurred in concert to the country’s national interests. with a surge of U.S. troops into the country. In Vietnam, efforts to “protect ” the There is little question that civilian ca - population ended up doing more harm than sualties in Iraq declined in the latter end of good . Military efforts to undermine the in - 2007 and into 2008. And U.S. military doc - surgency—in particular , the 1970 invasion trine (at least nominally) did shift in the di - of Cambodia —caused more civilian suffer - rection of outreach toward the Iraqi popula - ing and brought little strategic benefit. tion. But, once again, the “success” of Moreover, the excesses of America’s war in counter-insurgency techniques in Iraq and Vietnam so traumatized the nation and its the stabilization of the country was twinned military that it changed the very focus of with horrific levels of violence. Iraq’s blood - U.S. national security policy and for nearly letting began in earnest in February 2006 two decades left American policymakers following the bombing of the Samarra skittish and reluctant to employ military Mosque in by Sunni Al-Qaeda-in-Iraq force. terrorists. The attack, on one of the holiest It is frequently suggested that counter- religious sites for Iraqi Shiites, unleashed a insurgency in Vietnam and Algeria might torrent of sectarian warfare. At its height ,
82 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SPRING 2010 more than 3,000 Iraqi civilians were being United States may not have directly taken killed each month and in a manner that was part in this ethnic cleansing, it had the in - often deeply sadistic, including the use of direct effect of furthering American interests electric drills and mutilation . and political objectives. Most problematical - As the violence raged, an estimated one ly, however, COIN advocates have confused million Iraqis (mostly Sunni Arabs) fled the correlation with causality in Iraq. Since the country to Jordan, Syria, and elsewhere. In frequency and intensity of violence abated Baghdad, the ethnic cleansing soon turned just as the U.S. military was implementing a once Sunni city into one dominated by a kinder, gentler , population -centric , COIN - Shiites. By the fall of 2007 , the killing had fighting strategy, well, surely that means created ethnic enclaves that were impervious that the adoption of COIN tactics was to continued sectarian cleansing. The U.S. decisive —or so the surge narrative goes . government’s own National Intelligence But this is a dangerous and false myth that Estimate for Iraq in August 2007, couched obscures a far more complicated reality. in the standard antiseptic language, is Indeed , it is not even possible to say nonetheless illuminating on this point : that America’s hands were clean. COIN pro - ponents have argued that one of the more The polarization of communities is important changes by the U.S. military most evident in Baghdad, where the when it implemented the surge in Iraq in [Shiite] are a clear majority in more than half of all neighbor - hoods and Sunni areas have be - COIN advocates have come surrounded by predomi - confused correlation nately [Shiite] districts. Where “ population displacements have with causality in Iraq . led to significant sectarian sepa - ration, conflict levels have diminished to 2007 was a focus limiting civilian casu”al - some extent because warring communities ties. Though that certainly was the intent, find it more difficult to penetrate commu - the facts suggest otherwise . nal enclaves. [italics added] According to one measure, U.S. air- strikes killed nearly four times as many Simply put, both sides ran out of political Iraqis in 2007 than in 2006. According to opponents to slaughter. This is a critical Iraq Body Count, a database that records the point: though the decline in violence coin - number of violent civilian casualties in Iraq cided with the surge in U.S. troop levels since the 2003 invasion, the numbers actu - and the application of new, counter-insur - ally increased, post-surge. Deaths of non- gency tactics put forth in FM 3-24, a signif - combatants involving U.S.-led Coalition icant portion of the drop in bloodshed hap - military forces rose from between 544 and pened organically and because of actions 623 in 2006 to between 868 and 1,326 in taken by Iraqis themselves . 2007; civilian deaths directly attributable In Iraq, the notable difference from the to U.S. forces alone (i.e., not involving any conflicts in the Philippines, Malaya, Alge - other combatants) increased steeply from be - ria, or Kenya, is that it was not the counter- tween 394 and 434 in 2006 to between 669 insurgents that perpetrated the worst vio - and 756 in 2007. Additionally, the surge lence, but rather insurgents and proxy mili - was witness to a substantial increase in the tias fighting among themselves. While the number of Iraqis held in U.S. detention.
The Myth of a Kinder, Gentler War 83 Between February and August 2007, the up the element of surprise, practically inmate population jumped 50 percent from broadcasting to the Taliban their intentions 16,000 to 24,500. to take the town . The hope was that Taliban This is not to say that the surge of U .S. fighters would flee before the battle began, troops and the adoption of counter-insur - sparing the lives of civilians potentially gency tactics failed to have a positive impact caught in the crossfire. In the wake of the on Iraqi stabilization or contributed to the battle, the United States and NATO brought decline in civilian deaths. They did. But in both civil aid projects and what General these advances took advantage of changes McChrystal referred to as “government in already occurring on the ground—changes a box.” born out of extreme violence and coercion However, this approach is fundamen- perpetrated against civilians. Without the tally incongruent with the timeline of U.S. violent civil war of 2006, the accompanying military engagement in Afghanistan. The ethnic enclaving , and large-scale population current U .S. mission is predicated on the resettlement, it is highly doubtful that the goal of building up the confidence of the adoption of counter-insurgency techniques population, providing security , and expand - in 2007 would have turned the tide on ing the legitimacy of the government in their own . Kabul. But since that government lacks basic capacity, this is a goal that cannot be Applying COIN in Afghanistan accomplished in the near-term. Yet the The historical myopia of modern counterin - clock is ticking on America’s troop presence surgency doctrine brings with it potentially there —President Barack Obama has made dangerous consequences. The first and most clear that U .S. forces will begin coming obvious is that the United States will choose home in June 2011. There seems to be a to fight more of these types of wars out of critical mismatch between strategy and tac - the mistaken belief that they are more hu - tics. A carrot-based approach that aims to mane, and less deadly than conventional build up the confidence of the Afghan peo - wars. The seductive allure of capturing ple in the U .S. military, NATO , and their “hearts and minds ” can conceal from the own government is the sort of mission public the true nature of counter-insurgency that might have worked at the beginning tactics. But there is another perverse and of the war in Afghanistan —not eight troubling possibility: that COIN advocates years later. will actually integrate their own interpreta - In short, the Pentagon has chosen a mis - tion of the past into a belief that counter- sion in Afghanistan that minimizes its most insurgency can be fought and won with obvious military advantage and accentuates predominately carrots rather than sticks. practices for which it has neither the will , In fact, this is the approach being resources , nor core competency to imple - adopted today in Afghanistan, where U.S. ment successfully. Moreover, even by the military leaders have gone to great lengths tenets laid out in FM 3-24, Afghanistan is to make clear that protecting civilian a poor choice for a counter-insurgency cam - lives—rather than targeting the enemy— paign. The country lacks a competent and is the primary military mission. February’s respected host government , Afghanistan’s coordinated attack on the city of Marjah in security services are inadequate and feared Afghanistan’s Helmand Province marked by the population, and the presence of a the high-water mark of this policy. In the sanctuary for Taliban fighters across the bor - run-up to the battle, the U .S. military gave der in Pakistan fundamentally undermines
84 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SPRING 2010 the ability of the counter-insurgency effort . after the implementation of this policy, the Moreover, the United States faces an in - remaining LTTE fighters had been pushed in - tractable enemy that, particularly in the to a tiny corner of the island country, and Pashtun-dominated south, has the advan - were soundly and decisively defeated in bat - tage of ethnic fealty —as well as the inclina - tle. Not surprisingly, many prominent COIN tion to use coercive techniques of its own. advocates have been reluctant to draw con - Assassination of local leaders who resist its clusions about what Sri Lanka’s war on the influence, night letters meant to sow fear LTTE tells us about the lessons of counter-in - in the minds of unarmed and defenseless surgency. This shouldn’t come as a surprise. civilians; each of these tactics is crucial to The Sri Lanka experience has the disadvan - Taliban success. And , as Galula has pointed tage of fitting poorly into current U.S. out, fear—not hope—is generally the great counter-insurgency doctrine . motivator for civilian populations that find So, would the United States be better themselves caught in the crossfire. served by adopting a Sri Lankan-style ap - proach to waging the Afghanistan counter- The Sri Lanka Model insurgency? Not at all. Ignoring the obvious In light of the daunting task in Afghan- moral dimensions that weigh against such a istan, one last example of COIN —from the course of action, the experiences in Algeria very recent past—may offer some clarity. By 2006, the Sri Lankan military had been mired in a pro - The Pentagon has chosen a tracted 26-year war against the mission in Afghanistan that Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam “ (LTTE ), a counter-insurgent force in minimizes its most obvious the northern part of the country. Peace talks had broken down and military advantage . the majority Sinhalese population was frustrated with the lack of progress . and Vietnam demonstrate tha”t even the As a result , the government finally adopted adoption of these methods is unlikely to the more decisive “Rajapaksa Model,” cham - bring success. And, the blowback can be pioned by (and named for) the country’s far worse and longer lasting. president. Its tenets were described in a Counter-insurgents can win if their widely read appraisal conducted by the cause and political message have greater ap - Indian Defense Ministry: unwavering peal or if they are willing to act as violently political will, disregard for international and coercively as the insurgent forces. Nei - opinion distracting from the goal, no nego - ther is true in Afghanistan today. The cause tiations with the forces of terror, complete of the Taliban insurgents, particularly in the operational freedom for the security forces, so-called Pashtun belt of southern Afghan- absence of political intervention to divert istan, is as strong as any political tonic be - focus away from complete defeat. ing sold by NATO forces or an increasingly On the ground, that meant not only illegitimate and corrupt central govern- targeting Tamil civilians with coercive and ment in Kabul. In the Philippines, Malaya, punitive means, but also assassinating oppo - Kenya , and to a limited extent Iraq, the suc - sition journalists and the extrajudicial cess of counter-insurgencies was derived in killing of civilians and combatants. It wasn’t large measure not just from the military pretty, but it worked. Less than three years weakness of the insurgent forces, but also
The Myth of a Kinder, Gentler War 85 their political weakness. Precisely the favorably on the long-term occupation by opposite was true in Algeria and Vietnam . foreigners that will be required if the cur - The notion that U.S. troops could foster rent program of extending government a counter-cause that outweighs Pashtun soli - legitimacy is to be properly administered. darity is difficult to imagine. Money alone In the end, nations inclined to embark won’t do the trick. Of course, another possi - on these campaigns in foreign lands would bility also exists—the entry of large num - be wise to remember that even the best in - bers of U.S. and NATO troops, far more than tentions of occupiers have generally bumped the additional 30,000 soldiers that Presi - head-first into the shoals of bloody reality. dent Obama approved this past winter. But Counterinsurgencies are as violent, coercive, political constraints make such an additional destructive , and brutal as any other type outlay highly unlikely. of conflict. To ignore the fundamental ele - Indeed, as the Obama administration ments of COIN operations —and to believe seeks to find a workable path in Afghan- that an approach characterized by humanism istan , there is a clear and unambiguous les - and protection of civilians will succeed — son to be derived from a proper reading of is simply misguided. COIN history : it is a lot more difficult and The great American Civil War general , violent than experts acknowledge. Counter- William Tecumseh Sherman , is best remem - insurgency should focus on those locations bered for the phrase, “War is hell.” But per - (such as Afghanistan’s northern and western haps the more resonant expression for those provinces ) where the Pashtun, and in turn who would seek to humanize the most pri - Taliban , influence is weaker. In the south mal of human conflicts is one he wrote to and east, where the Taliban message is the pitiable people of Atlanta before he strongest, a more robust counter-terrorism burned their city to the ground in 1864 : strategy would be a better approach. “You cannot qualify war in harsher terms This does not mean withdrawal, but a than I will. War is cruelty, and you cannot regional prioritization and distribution of refine it.” troops and resources to places where the Given the numerous impediments to most good can be done most quickly —and conducting COIN in the modern era, it where the cause of the counter-insurgent is would be prudent to resist the uniquely more likely to be embraced. Yet, to date, American temptation to rewrite history. U.S. and NATO military efforts continue in The scope and goals of the U.S. mission in areas (such as Marjah) that are not only the Afghanistan should be narrowed, and the most volatile but least inclined to look sooner the better. •
86 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL • SPRING 2010